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Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are venerable, whatsoever things are righteous, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things.

St. Paul.

The doctrine serves to point the way and guide the traveller; the vision, however, is for him who will see it.

Plotinus

The basis of true life must continually be won anew.....Only through ceaseless activity can life remain at the height to which it has attained.

Eucken.

GOODS AND BADS

Outlines of a Philosophy of Life

Being the substance of
A Series of Talks and Discussions
with

H. H. the Maharajah Gaekwar of Baroda

by

ALBAN C. WIDGERY
Professor of Philosophy, Baroda

BARODA

The chapters of this book formed also the substance of a series of public lectures delivered at the College, Baroda, in August and September, 1919.

I have to thank my wife for assistance in the correction of proofs and in the making of the index. I wish also to express my gratitude to the Rev. Dr. H. R. Scott, for agreeing to have the book printed at the Mission Press, Surat, when he had so much other urgent work on hand, and for the excellent manner in which it has been done. In the care shown, my own press work has been reduced to a minimum. The promotion of good printing has certainly not been one of the least benefits of Christian Missions in India and the East generally.

PREFACE

*An Open Letter to His Highness Maharajah
Sayaji Rao Gaekwad*

Your Highness,

In presenting this small volume to a wider circle of readers, I feel it a privilege and a more than pleasant duty to thank Your Highness for the honour of inviting me to discuss with you some philosophical topics, for the patient way in which you have followed my efforts to explain, and for the encouragement which in our talks you have continually given me, not merely with regard to this publication, but all my work.

Almost from the outset it has been evident to me that Your Highness' interests in philosophical matters in themselves are at least in degree probably unique amongst princes. But as we have proceeded I have found that still greater than this are your desires to learn how in any practical manner improved conditions of life might be effected for the people you govern. In the following pages, consistent with the general

view of life to which I have myself so far come, I have endeavoured to throw into relief what may prove practical and, I trust, instructive to the generally educated of the Baroda State and beyond. For the same reason and with the hope of appealing to a wide public, I have omitted much of the more difficult metaphysical portions of our discussions, due to penetrating questions raised by Your Highness. The purpose of the book as it now appears is to give a sketch of a general philosophy and indications of some definite attitudes towards some of the main problems of life. In the pursuit of this aim you have continually given me the great benefit of your far wider experience.

In conclusion I would thank Your Highness most of all for the manner in which our association in this task has been permitted to be carried on. This has been that of a personal friendship, a "good" which, with the ancient Greeks, I should assign to one of the very highest places in life's values.

I have the honour to be
Your Highness' obedient servant
ALBAN G. WIDGERY.

Gulmarg, Kashmir,
June 20th 1919.

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Errata

On Page 63 read 20 for 21
64 22 11
105 26 28
192 11 before "Self-respect."

GOODS AND BADS

Outlines of a Philosophy of Life

Introduction

1. To many of those persons who have never had the opportunity, or never taken the trouble to enquire into the use of the term, philosophy seems to suggest something in a high degree mysterious and incomprehensible. A large number of comparatively well educated general readers concern themselves so little with it, because for one reason or another they have come to regard it as something to be left solely to the few individuals who have a definite taste and capacity for it. One reason for the neglect of its study amongst a wider circle has been an undoubtedly prevalent disinclination on the part of the average man to discipline himself to more careful and closer thought. Another reason has been the different ways in which the term philosophy has been

and is used, and the difficulty of some of its problems when it is interpreted chiefly as metaphysics. To state the various conceptions of philosophy which have been held in the history of human thought, or to discuss the diverse views which divide leading thinkers of our own times does not come within the scope of this volume. It must suffice simply to indicate the fact that the nature of philosophy is itself a difficult philosophical problem which has long been and continues to be discussed amongst serious thinkers.¹

The purpose of the following chapters being more definitely popular and practical, philosophy is here taken to mean a general view of

1. Readers interested in this question should consult some of the standard histories of philosophy, such as those by W. Windelband, H. Hoffding, F. Uberweg. For some modern attitudes the following, mostly short expositions, might be read with advantage: I. Kant: *Prolegomena to every future Metaphysic*. Chicago; P. Deussen: *Elements of Metaphysics*. London 1894; J. Caird: *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*. Glasgow, 1905; H. Spencer: *First Principles*. London 1906; H. Hoffding: *Problems of Philosophy*. London 1906; R. Eucken: *The Life of the Spirit*. London 1909; B. Russell: *The Problems of Philosophy*. London; F. Paulsen: *Introduction to Philosophy*. New York 1906; W. James: *Pragmatism*. London 1908; H. Rashdall: *Philosophy and Religion*. London 1909.

experience on all its sides, with especial reference to experience as involving processes related to human ideals. It is an attempt to come to as comprehensive, clear and consistent an understanding as possible of the nature of life as it is actively lived, to bring order and harmony into the realm of ideas, feelings and activities. Though in regard to many of the problems of life thought may be compelled to admit ultimately that it is faced by mystery, philosophy as an effort of thought is in itself neither mysterious nor incomprehensible. And the results of this effort concern just those aspects of existence which have proved at least in part intelligible. If he only apply himself seriously to the task every intelligent man may arrive at a philosophy of life as above described, either more particularly through his own reflection or by the acceptance of views thought out by others with more capacity and more leisure for the task. As far as the space available allows all the chief attitudes towards the problems discussed will be considered, but in view of the untechnical character of the book references will not usually be made to other writings on these subjects.

2. In spite of not infrequent attempts to make it appear otherwise, it must be insisted that philosophy undoubtedly starts from what may be called the experience of common-sense. Even when a philosopher states a particular proposition as the starting point of his philosophy it will be found to have been reached by a process of reflection upon or an analysis of ordinary experience. It was thus, for example, with Descartes' *Cogito, ergo sum* — I think, therefore I am, — accepted by him as fundamental and as a touchstone of certainty. The real starting point of Kant's constructive attempts was the experience of will or practical reason, as manifested in the common conviction of the moral consciousness, *I ought, therefore I can*. So again, however abstract philosophical reflection may appear to become, it continually returns to the experience of common-sense as a test. In fact, to be honest, it is this experience which it wishes to explain.

In common-sense experience three aspects may be distinguished :

a. There are what may be suitably described as *facts*. The term *fact* may quite justifiably be applied to all constituents of experience,

but there is an advantage in limiting its use to all which does not come within the other two aspects to be described. *Facts* are thus the experiences of physical objects, such as the heavenly bodies, mountains, rivers, all kinds of plants and trees, insects, birds, infra-human animals, and human beings; the characteristics of thought; the experiences of the beautiful and the ugly; moral qualities such as veracity and courage, falsehood and cowardice; superstitious fear or optimistic joy associated with religion, and so on.

b. Almost all, if not all, facts affect or may affect human beings in one of two ways. In one degree or another they either attract or repel. At times the degree of attraction or repulsion may be so low that for all practical purposes the individual may be said to be in a state of indifference. For a philosophy which aims especially at being a "philosophy of life" most of these facts of virtual indifference may be left out of account. Nevertheless, on the other hand, it is true to say that one purpose of such a philosophy is to awaken people from an attitude of indifference to many of the important facts of life.

c. Whether particular facts attract or repel does not appear to be fixed once for all. Related in one way they may repel; related in another they may attract. The individual is endowed with the capacity for various kinds of *activity* and with regard to many facts he may change their relations so as to produce experiences more attractive or less repulsive, or even to replace the repulsive by the attractive.

Starting out from the recognition of these aspects of experience, the various classes of facts need to be considered in relation with the different kinds of attraction and repulsion of which they are capable, and the nature of the activities required to modify the connections between facts. The enquiry might well be taken up in the form of an investigation of the answers to the following questions :
i. What are the facts? ii. What are the kinds of attraction and repulsion? iii. What are the best relations between facts from the point of view of their attraction or repulsion? and iv. How may these relations be best established? In other words : Taking into consideration the facts of experience, how are they to be thought

INTRODUCTION

of to accord with the highest conception of life, and what are the practical activities which this conception implies?

3. The later discussions will be more clear if the manner in which certain terms are used is indicated here at the outset :

(*Goods* are those experiences which attract, which we would undoubtedly preserve, repeat or continue.)

(*Bads* are those experiences which repel, which we would undoubtedly get rid of and not repeat.²)

Values are all goods and bads : they are divided into :

a. *Intrinsic Values* — those experiences which are good or bad in themselves, apart from any reference to experiences other than themselves ; and

b. *Extrinsic Values* — those experiences which are good or bad on account of their relation to intrinsic goods or bads.

Knowledge by acquaintance is the actual

2. The individual may at any particular time be mistaken as to what in a complex experience is the aspect or part which is attractive or repulsive. Judgments concerning goods and bads are formed in part under influences due to intercourse in society.

GOODS AND BADS

immediate experience by any particular individual for himself. The meaning is the same as the French *connaître* and the German *kennen*.

Knowledge by description is the knowledge obtained from others by indirect means, such as imitation and ideas expressed in language. The meaning is the same as the French *savoir* and the German *wissen*.

4. Within recent times many tendencies in philosophical circles, especially those of Pluralism and Logical Atomism, have insisted on the importance of the recognition of the particular and individual character of experiences of all kinds, of values perhaps more than of all others. These tendencies are partly due to the fact that the great progress in the Natural Sciences has depended largely upon the closest possible attention to individual details. They may be even more the result of the endeavour to apply the theoretical sciences to the solution of practical problems, for in them the particular circumstances are often fundamental. Yet long ago Aristotle saw how vital for practical conduct is the recognition of such particularity. At the end of the third chapter of Book I of the *Nicomach-*

can Ethics, he significantly remarks: "For, manifestly, it is not health after this general and abstract fashion which is the subject of the physician's investigation, but the health of Man, *or rather of this or that man*; for he has to heal individuals."³ The importance of this aspect of experience for any attempt to outline a philosophy of life is once again receiving attention. Reference will be made to it in the later discussion of each class of values considered. This is undoubtedly an age in which in almost every sphere of activity the man with a knowledge of intricate details is most certain of success. The problems of practical life do not yield so much to generalisations as to careful and close investigations of details. In a similar attention to the individual and the particular much contemporary philosophical thought hopes for more definite advances.

5. Another set of influences has turned the attention of thinkers and of men of affairs to the essentially active character of human nature. These have found expression in the

3. The Scott Library ed. D. P. Chase's trs. revised by T. W. Rolleston, p. 12.

voluntaristic psychologies of scholars such as Wilhelm Wundt and James Ward, as well as in the general philosophical attitude of Pragmatism as represented by William James Rudolph Eucken also terms his philosophy an Activism.

Human activity is conative or purposive. By means of it man may modify the conditions of his life; and this more or less in accordance with his purposes. A detailed examination of the particular experiences of the individual reveals that they are in large measure due to his own activity or to that of others exercised upon him directly or indirectly.

This activity, with which men are immediately acquainted, is experienced as the expression of the individual will. And of the individual will it may be said that it cannot be coerced but must act of its own accord, either yielding to or resisting influences from without. The body of a person may be treated in almost any manner by others and yet the will remain obdurate. If the individual decides to act as others wish, it is the autonomous act of the will which accepts the suggestion to do so. Underlying all these

contentions of common-sense there are, undoubtedly, many disputed points, but none of the theories proposed appear to carry us really further. So, again, whatever may be said about the nature of responsibility, it is on the acceptance of this common-sense view that responsibility is usually supposed to depend. And for our present purpose that is sufficient. The goods and bads of experience thus depend upon the activity of the individual in large measure, and as this is an expression of his own will, he is responsible for the character or at least the direction of his efforts.

6. The goods and bads in relation with which the purposive activity of mankind is exercised may be regarded as associated with three divisions of reality. There are i. all the facts of non-human Nature, that is, the physical world in all its phases, other than man; ii. all the facts of human nature, that of the individual as such, as well as of human society; and iii. all other beings, such as supernatural beings, if any exist. Sometimes i and ii together have been included in the term Nature.

In this connection it appears to be an

essential for the individual to make enquiry as to his relation to powers others than himself. Expressed broadly, the relation may be one of co-operation or of opposition. Sometimes general expressions have been put forward as principles of conduct, such as "Follow Nature," and "Fight against Nature." To understand either of these maxims, the former as taught by the Stoics, or the latter as urged by T. H. Huxley, it is necessary to be quite clear as to the use of the term "Nature" in each case. Even from this apparent opposition of precepts, as from common-sense experience, Nature in some sense appears to be a source of goods and bads. The best attitude of a man towards his own character and towards the human society in which he finds himself cannot be indicated without further consideration of what constitutes the goods and bads of human nature. Again, rightly or wrongly, the religions have maintained the existence of non-Natural beings other than men, and have taught and encouraged attitudes of opposition and of co-operation towards them. Here, once more, supposing such beings to exist, the problem concerns first the character of the goods and the

bad which may be experienced by men in relation with them.

7. As all these goods and bads also depend on the character of human functions, it is intended to consider values not in direct relation with the three-fold division just mentioned, but with the more or less clearly marked sides of life. These may be taken to be five. Facts may be thought of as directly associated with goods and bads of the physical body: these goods and bads are to be called *Physical Values*. *Intellectual Values* arise from the relation of the intellect to facts, leading to truths or to errors. Similarly *Aesthetic Values* are the individual experiences of the beautiful and the ugly. *Moral Values* are related to the particular ways in which facts affect the moral consciousness of mankind. Finally, there are the goods and bads associated with religion, as it is at present experienced; these are called *Religious Values*. Arranged in this order the five divisions may be thus tabulated:

- | | |
|-------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Physical Values. | 3. Aesthetic Values. |
| 2. Intellectual Values. | 4. Moral Values. |
| 5. Religious Values. | |

Though these represent distinct kinds of goods and bads, it hardly need be said that they are often closely related one to the others.

8. The primary concern of the philosophical consideration of values is to differentiate and make clear the intrinsic values and their relation to facts. For a practical philosophy of life it is also of importance to survey in a general way some of the chief extrinsic values. An exhaustive enquiry into extrinsic values is impossible, for it would include practically the whole machinery of civilisation. Incidentally, without denying the intrinsic values of the Natural Sciences, it may with good reason be maintained that they are more closely related to extrinsic values. In any case, the truths of these sciences are frequently capable of a practical application in addition to their own interest. For fuller treatment of extrinsic values the reader is referred, therefore, to books on applied sciences and practical affairs generally.

9. With relation to the distinction between goods and bads, two widely spread theories which more or less directly affect the practical

attitudes of men, must be briefly considered. They are the views: i. that bads are merely negative, and ii. that the distinction of goods and bads is merely relative.

The unsophisticated mind rarely denies the positive character of much of the evil in life. The assertion that evil is merely negative is made in the interests of a particular theory of Reality. It frequently rests upon a failure to distinguish in actual experience between the last two of three different conditions: i. the presence of a good; ii. the absence of either a good or a bad; and iii. the presence of a bad. The second of these corresponds to some extent with states of practical indifference, but it is also justifiable to contend that the mere absence of good is itself an evil. Accepting this view, distinction may be made in the uses of the terms *evil* and *bad*. *Evil* may stand for the mere absence of goods as well as for the presence of bads. In discussing each of the five classes of values these three conditions will be referred to. Here, however, one simple example may be given. A man may i. tell the truth; ii. say nothing at all; or iii. tell a falsehood. The

first is a positive good; the second is the absence of a good or a bad; and the third is the presence of a positive bad. The second in many cases would rightly be regarded as evil.

The theories which endeavour to maintain the view that evil is merely negative turn out in the end to be little else than a mitigation of the evil in pointing to wider wholes in relation to which the evil may not appear so great. But it should hardly be necessary to point out that even if from "the point of view of the Whole," or as Spinoza put it "*sub specie aeternitatis*," the evil be not apparent, it is quite unjustifiable to suppose that the bads from the limited point of view to which mankind is so far accustomed are any the less positively bad.

The most unfortunate part of such theories is not that they appear to be a form of intellectual error, but that they not only do not encourage men to fight against the bads, they also do not lead men, as one might expect, to strive for the positive goods. They tend rather, when seriously believed, to the attempt by mere contemplation to come to some form of mystical union or identity with the Absolute

for which, *ex hypothesi*, evil does not exist. In other words, they militate against an active type of life devoted to the actual realisation of goods and the eradication of bads.

10. The second view, that the distinction between goods and bads is merely relative seems to be equally erroneous. It frequently rests upon a failure to distinguish between the objective fact and the developing subjective knowledge of it. A good, for example, a particular kind of nutritious food, or again veracity, is none the less good because certain individuals may not yet have come to recognise it as such.

The view is also due to a confusion between the causes of experiences and the experiences themselves. Thus, for example, up to a certain degree the heat of the water in a bath may be pleasurable, but pass that limit and pain results. Now this does not mean that pleasure and pain are degrees of the same quality, if one may roughly express it so. All it shows is that different degrees of the same kind of physical stimulus produce different psychical results. The different degrees which may be pleasurable or painful to people may vary:

nevertheless, for each and all, pain is pain and pleasure is pleasure, when either one or the other is produced by the stimulus in any instance. Similarly, the distinction between goods and bads of all kinds is thus absolute : each is of its own nature, not a particular degree of the nature of something else. Nevertheless, the causes needed to produce the particular experiences of goods and bads may vary with the individual.

The manner in which the experiences of goods and bads may be said to be relative may be repeated briefly. They are not relative in the sense meant by the holders of the theory of relativity,—they are not different degrees of some homogeneous quality. But they may be known and appreciated in different degrees relative to the individual, his age, his country, his social environment, even his own particular effort to come to know them. The actual causes which produce the experiences of particular goods and bads may also vary with individuals. It may, further, even be admitted that as each particular experience is that of an individual mind, it is peculiar and thus relative. This, however, is valid of all experiences and

of, all knowledge, but it does not show that goods and bads are merely relative to one another, which is the point at issue.

11. It has been implied in the preceding paragraph that there are varying grades of knowledge of goods and bads: and this is to most persons sufficiently obvious. A survey of the history of culture and civilisation shows that in every one of the classes of values there has been a progressive increase in the knowledge of goods and bads. This has been chiefly through increasing differentiation of the factors of experience. And with increase of apprehension has gone also some progressive attainment of the goods and eradication of the bads. One important feature of this advance in both knowledge and realisation is its essentially social character. The contributions have in every case depended on the effort of the individuals, but however great that effort, it has been rendered possible and as fruitful as it has actually been by the fact of their social relationships. Though, therefore, responsibility may come ultimately on each individual himself, his activity is in a social context. No age appears yet to have arrived

at the knowledge of an ideal such as might justifiably claim to be exhaustive of all goods. But in one way or another each age may be said to have endeavoured to promote the cause of some of life's goods. The increasing apprehension and attainment of goods and the increasing apprehension and eradication of bads is thus a historical and social task. Whether he acts as it were alone, or in definitely organised co-operation with his fellowmen, a man should feel that he is striving not merely for his individual advantage, nor even for that of his country and generation, but as an heir of the ages that are gone for the ages that are to come.

12. From the standpoint of a psychology which maintains that man is only aware of that which in some manner affects his interests, it may be contended that there is no fact of his experience which is purely indifferent. Some facts, however, affect him so little as to be rightly regarded as of no value. Human philosophy should concern itself with what has definite value for men. It will recognise that facts which appear to have no values for them may, nevertheless, have values for others.

The philosophic attitude is that of an open mind ever ready to acknowledge new values. To strive with an open mind for the most comprehensive knowledge of values should indeed be accepted by all as a moral duty. The possibility of the existence of goods and bads of which mankind may never become aware may be admitted, but this does not affect the humanistic attitude indicated.

13. The history of philosophy and a consideration of some of the current systems provide sufficient evidence for the insistence on the fundamental importance of the character of the starting point from which philosophical reflection sets out, and the method or methods adopted. The starting point of our investigation is the recognition of the multiplicity of the facts, values and activities, of common-sense experience. Its method is to classify and discuss the different types of values in detail, with their relation to facts and activities. In the first place, therefore, it is an individualising and particularising method. Only by starting with a careful treatment of the many does it seem possible to do justice to the nature of experience. No great labour is

required to discover that those who have attempted to form systems consistently by other methods, such as the commencement with abstract principles or conceptions of the Whole, have largely failed to preserve the concreteness of experience or to find any real meaning in human life. They have been compelled to introduce the details, when they have paid any attention to them at all, from without. They have not been able to deduce them from their fundamental principles or conceptions. Thus, Spinoza having started with the barren concept of substance, had then from experience to introduce into it the attributes of thought and extension, and having these, in order to come into touch with the details of life had to introduce again the idea of modes.⁴ As thought and extension could not be deduced from substance, so modes could not be deduced from thought and extension.

4. Spinoza: *Ethics* ed. R. H. M. Elwes, Bohn Lib. London. The same criticism may be urged with regard to Hegel's notions of "Pure Being" and "Not-Being." So again it seems impossible to the present writer to get any intelligible grasp of the relation of the world of particular experiences (as due to *Maya* or *Avidya*) and the Brahman which the forms of the Vedanta philosophy usually take as granted (either as taught in the scriptures or as a presupposition of all thought).

The character of the individual modes has to be learned from experience.

Any such classification of values as is here suggested cannot be exhaustive in a small volume. Perhaps no particular individual can rightly claim to have a full knowledge of all the goods and bads at present known. But an attempt at completeness is not what is required. The actual goods and bads which are referred to are to be considered chiefly as illustrative of what the philosophy of life here outlined means in relation to the details from which it starts. The reader will have lost much of what is meant if, not entering into the general method and spirit of the philosophy, he is not able to fill up these outlines with values and activities from all sides of experience.

14. The life of the individual from moment to moment is constituted largely by such particular experiences. Nevertheless, in every mind which attains to a more or less clear self-consciousness and even a moderate degree of rational reflection, there is a demand for unity and harmony amongst its experiences. Oppositions between feelings and activities, and inconsistencies between thoughts become

more and more intolerable the higher the mental development. Further, man feels the need of comprehending experience as a whole, and adopting an attitude towards it as a unity. Almost from the earliest times in human philosophical thought there has been a main endeavour to harmonise the different sides of experience. Although some thinkers of the West, such as Josiah Royce, Bernard Bosanquet, and Rudolph Eucken, have placed the conception of unity in the forefront of their philosophies, it must be confessed that in recent years there has been a tendency to neglect this aspect of the problem of life.

But what kind of unity is possible and truly satisfying? That must depend on the nature of the facts and cannot be decided until the facts have been investigated. The problem of unity, although it makes itself felt at an early stage, is not one to be approached at the beginning but rather towards the close of the discussion. It is considered in the final chapter. But if experience is in any sense worthy of the attribute of unity, some aspects of the character of the unity should become evident in the course of the discussion itself.

CHAPTER I

Physical Values

1. To common-sense the physical, the experiences of the senses, such as touch, sight, hearing, appear to be the most immediate and direct of all facts. Whether they are indeed more direct than other types need not be discussed here, though there is good ground to deny it. Nevertheless, it is evident that infra-human beings, the human infant, and no small proportion of adults are almost solely occupied with them and that in the mode of existence on earth most other aspects of life are closely related with them at one point or another. The reasons are sufficient for beginning with the consideration of the physical, even though they might well be placed lowest in any estimate of the relative positions of values. Only a mistaken form of thought can seriously advocate their neglect.

Physical values are experiences of the extended body, in so far as they attract or repel. They are chiefly forms of sensation. Though aesthetic values (see chapter iii) are also often associated with the experiences of the senses, little discrimination is required to distinguish what are merely physical values. They may be said to be those pleasures and pains of the body, apart from any feeling of beauty or ugliness or other emotion which they may arouse. Quite independently of any ideas the sensations are regarded as themselves giving some satisfaction or pleasure, dissatisfaction or pain. That is, however, a description of intrinsic physical values. Most physical values are extrinsic, means to the attainment of intrinsic values, physical, aesthetic, intellectual, even moral and religious.

2. The enjoyment of that complex of sensations involved in what is called "feeling in good health"; the satisfaction of hunger and thirst; the pleasures of sex intercourse; a certain degree of warmth, as of sunshine or of a warm bath; a certain degree of invigorating coldness; the comfort of a soft bed; the feeling of physical strength in forms of sport,

all these are examples of intrinsic physical goods. Houses, clothes, food, railways, ships, lamps, and so on, are examples of extrinsic physical goods.

3. All that goes to constitute the feeling of physical unfitness, of feeling "run down", as the saying is; all forms of physical pain whether due to disease, as forms of fever, to accident, as broken limbs, to foolishness, as the cuts with a bayonet in war, to ignorance, as the child putting its finger in a candle flame; hunger and thirst not being satisfied; the sense of physical weakness; too great heat or cold; all these are examples of intrinsic physical bads. Poisons, bayonets, the refuse of animals, gunpowder are examples of extrinsic physical bads—but only according to the manner in which they are treated. They might be used as means to goods.

4. Physical values are *sui generis*, that is, they have a character of their own. In order to know them the individual must have knowledge by acquaintance: without some such knowledge he may obtain no knowledge by description. For example, the physical goods of the feeling of physical vigour or of sex

intercourse, or the bads of hunger and thirst must be experienced to be known. For the understanding of all description concerning physical values there must be some basis in experience, and this must be of the same type or types as is involved in the description.

These goods and bads, by their very nature associated with a body must be individual in the sense that they are the experiences of a particular being. For physical bodies are particular. A bad, such for example as tooth-ache, is not the idea tooth-ache or tooth-ache in general, but tooth-ache actually felt at this time or that by this person or that, or at this time and that by this person and that. All physical goods and bads are the experiences of individuals and are themselves particulars. Practical activity has to recognise this, and so should the philosophy which is to guide it. Actual particular physical goods for particular beings (e. g. men and animals) have to be striven for; the bads to be eradicated are actual particular bads. It is only a philosophy of life which emphasises this that can be truly practical. A thorough-going psychological analysis would even maintain that each

experience of a type of physical value is individual and in some manner peculiar to itself. This may be one reason why some physical goods can be repeated any number of times without growing "stale."

Another important feature of physical values is that they are mostly positive. The pain of tooth-ache is a distinct positive experience: it is not the mere absence of a good. The person with no tooth-ache is usually quite unaware of any sensation good or bad caused by the teeth. So again the pain of hunger may be *caused* by the *absence* of food, but the pain itself is not simply the absence of the pleasure of partaking of food and appeasing hunger. The feeling of physical vigour or of pleasant warmth or stimulating cold is in each case a positive experience. So it is with most physical goods. If one wishes one may say that the absence of a physical bad is good, and that the absence of a physical good is evil.

5. Both the positive goods and bads and the evil or good of their respective absence are dependent on Nature, including the individual human body, and on human activity. The kinds of physical values mankind experiences

are quite clearly due in part to the kind of physical world in which we live and the nature of the physical organism by means of which the individual comes into contact with it. In addition to these two factors, that of human activity, springing, as has been already maintained, from the will, has a marked part to play in determining the particular experiences the individual will enjoy or suffer. For upon it depends to some extent the interaction of a man's physical body with what is other than itself, the interaction upon which the experiences of physical goods and bads in part rests. To look at this interaction in another way. By means of his deliberate effort, determined by will, the individual may modify the constitution of his own physical body (he may, for example, make it stronger by physical exercise and a rigid adherence to solely healthy forms of diet). In this manner the experience of physical values may be improved. But further, by means of his deliberate effort, determined by will, the individual may modify the constitution of the world of Nature other than his own body, (for example by cultivating the land and carefully breeding good cattle).

In this manner also the experience of physical values may be improved.

For a practical philosophy of life, which would consider how the best on all sides of experience may be attained, the recognition of these effects of human activity is fundamental. The attention is thus turned to the need of a right attitude of will, that is, of moral endeavour. On every occasion when physical goods can be obtained, or physical bads eradicated, it is the moral duty of the individual to aim at this achievement, *unless he is convinced that some good or goods which he places higher would thereby be lost.* Here a close relation between the physical values and the moral values manifests itself. But more than the right attitude of will from this moral point of view is required. The kind of activity must be that which will lead to the desired results, and this can only be activity guided by correct ideas. The attainment of physical goods and freedom from physical bads is thus related to the possession of knowledge concerning the external world and the nature of the human body—even of the relations within human society, that is, there is also a close relation between the physical

values and the intellectual values. As truths may guide activity to physical success, so errors may lead to physical failure.

6. The types of intrinsic physical goods and bads are few in number. There are those associated with hunger and thirst and their satisfaction. Distinctions of temperature form another group. There are pleasures or pains of physical comfort or discomfort; the pleasures of good health, strength, and vigorous exercise, and the pains of bad health and weakness. The satisfaction of sex is another distinctive good. Bodily rest appears to be an intrinsic value: it is largely the sense of this before passing into sleep or in awakening from it that in the main constitutes the attraction of going to sleep.⁵ Tiredness, without rest, is an intrinsic bad. But almost all these depend upon physical conditions, which must be regarded as extrinsic values. As physical values are mostly extrinsic, it is better to consider them in detail from that point of view. The task is therefore to indicate physical values in relation to some of their causes.

5. Sleep is probably as much a psychical phenomenon as a physical one: it may be even more so.

They will be discussed in the following order :

- | | | |
|---|----|---|
| 1 | a. | Physical goods and bads in relation with birth |
| | b. | " " " " " " " " foods |
| | c. | " " " " " " " " clothing |
| | d. | " " " " " " " " dwellings |
| | e. | " " " " " " " " physical exercise |
| | f. | " " " " " " " " sex |

7. a. Let it be said at once, and this once for all, that in these discussions no use will be made of the assumption that all a man's goods and bads are the effects of his own acts or failures to act, either in this life or in a previous one. That many of a man's goods and bads are due in part to his own acts is clear and has already been insisted on (see above pages 9-11). But there is no adequate evidence that they all are, and such an assumption appears to be both unjustified and unjustifiable. A consequence of the belief in this theory has often been and still is to encourage a form of egoism. It is not logically opposed to benevolent conduct, but without sufficient reason ascribing sufferings to the fault of the particular individual suffering it lessens the feeling of social responsibility in regard to physical as all other matters.

The kind of body which an individual has at birth is an example for which there is a lack of evidence that it is due in any way to his own *karma*.⁶ The physical similarities of the members of particular racial stocks, such as the Mongolian, the Aryan, the Semitic, and the Negroid are patent to the most superficial observer. The likeness of children to parents is also sufficiently frequent to require no insisting upon. The study of hereditary diseases has established beyond doubt the fact of physical similarities between parents and offspring.

The first physical values may be thus taken to be a good or a bad birth, that is, being born with a strong and healthy body or a weak and diseased one. And this, in one degree or another, is dependent on the physical conditions of the parents. Much also depends on the care and the feeding of the mother during the time of pregnancy. Particular circumstances of the actual birth may result in

6. For the prevalent Eastern theory that the soul chooses or is attracted to a body according to its own nature, there is little evidence one way or another. It is simply an interesting speculation, like that which regards the body as a manifestation of the spirit or some aspect of its nature,—“materialisation” as Spiritists and some Theosophists would say.

life-long after effects in the child, for example, blindness, epilepsy, tuberculosis, and so on.

Note on some practical considerations :—

The problems associated with how to ensure good births and to prevent bad ones are the subject of enquiry in the modern science of Eugenics. Interested readers may consult the following small books : W. C. D. and C. D. Whetham : *An Introduction to Eugenics*. Cambridge 1912 ; E. Schuster : *Eugenics*. London 1913 ; C. L. Saleeby : *Parenthood and Race Culture*. London 1909 ; K. Pearson : *Groundwork of Eugenics and Problem of Practical Eugenics*. London 1909. Many practical considerations follow from reflection on these problems, which sooner or later most intelligent men and civilised States are likely to adopt. Seeing how, directly or indirectly, the weakling and the diseased child is a burden to the society generally, it is of great importance to the State that the children born shall be strong and healthy. Besides this, as the child before birth and for long afterward is unable to take care of itself, for the sake of the child also, the State must see that the best is done to ensure good births. It should also try definitely to prevent bad births. Some of the means may with advantage be referred to briefly :

i. In every State there should be an adequate, organised system of midwives and doctors, who will attend to all the requirements before, on the occasion of, and after birth. As so much depends on the care and the feeding of the mother before the birth, registration of prospective births should be compulsory about sometime after the fifth month. Where necessary the authorities should see that food is provided and all other arrangements made till

after the first year of the child's life. Instruction, in the form of simple literature, should be supplied free to anyone on request, or at the time when the preliminary registration is made.

ii. Sooner or later every State may be expected to insist on the segregation or the sterilisation of those persons who otherwise, according to the highest opinion of science, might almost certainly produce diseased children. Perhaps the chief question is where the line should be drawn. But already many States segregate the mentally insane. A beginning might therefore be made with the worst types of hereditary diseases. The relative advantages and disadvantages of segregation and of sterilisation cannot be discussed here.

iii. Every State might establish (as some have already done) a law that a medical examination, and if necessary medical treatment, shall precede marriage. Copies of the certificates should be officially sent to both parties. In India where the low age of marriage is a factor seriously affecting the kinds of births, the responsible persons should be required to show evidence of a medical examination of the individuals concerned. Where a medical examination of school children is arranged, the contracting parties should be required to consult the respective reports. Incidentally it may be supposed that every educated Indian and all progressive States will strive more and more to raise the age for marriage. It may be maintained that though the beginning of puberty may be at an early age, the person is not at that time necessarily sufficiently mature and strong physically to procreate or to bear healthy children.

8. b. To say that man does not live to eat, but eats to live, has become a commonplace. Nevertheless, most persons find a good in the flavours or tastes of some things they eat, in addition to the satisfaction of the desire for food in the need of nourishment. In most lives there is thus also an element of truth in saying that men not only eat to live but also live to eat. With regard to articles of food distinction must be made between two things : i. their worth as means to the satisfaction of hunger and thirst and as forms of nourishment ; and ii. their character as being attractive or repulsive in their tastes and odours. The latter may be regarded as forms of physical values, but it seems more correct to treat them as aesthetic. Nevertheless it is important to note that the more palatable a food, the more it is enjoyed, the greater the stimulation to the secretion of the necessary juices and so much the better the digestion

Viewed from the standpoint of hunger and thirst or of nourishment, food may be considered in relation to kinds and qualities and to quantity. With regard to quantity the good is a mean between insufficiency on the one

hand and excess on the other. Now though the true satisfaction of these needs is to all men good, the amounts of food necessary to produce this result vary with individuals. Each individual who takes this matter as seriously as it deserves has the problem of estimating what on any particular occasion is for him neither too little nor too much. But there is sufficient similarity in the physical needs of individual human beings in similar circumstances for it to be roughly calculated how much of particular foods is generally good. This, however, depends largely on the kinds of and qualities of the food.

The body is so constituted as to require a variety of elements in the diet.¹ The provision of pure water needs no insistence upon. For

7. No attempt is made here to describe foods in terms of proteins, fats, carbohydrates, and vitamins, or to discuss needs in terms of calories or heat units. For detailed information on the important subject of foods and their preparation, see A. Bryce: *Dietetics*. Edinburgh; R. A. Wardell and E. N. White: *A Study of Foods*. Boston 1914; H. Kinne and A. M. Cooley: *Foods and Household Management*. New York 1917; H. C. Sherman: *The Chemistry of Food and Nutrition*. New York 1918. A simple and instructive statement is given in the essay "Calories in Common Life" by Graham Lusk in *Food in War Time*. Philadelphia 1918.

the young, and for invalids, at least, milk is more or less of a necessity. It forms also a valuable part of the food of most adults. Ordinary butter or clarified butter (ghee) or some kind of oil (as olive oil) or fat (as from animals) is required. Some variety or varieties of grain must form an essential part of any ordinary diet. It is a very much disputed question whether the flesh of fish, birds, or other animals is really required. In nearly all countries there are those who live without it, but there is good reason to believe that at least in cold climates it is more beneficial than not. Some forms of fruits and of vegetables are an advantageous element of food.

To know the best kinds of food is insufficient: it is necessary to be able to get them in good qualities, clean and unadulterated. Further, as most foods have to be cooked, there is the further question as to how each should be prepared in order to be most beneficial and least harmful. Considering the effects of foods on the bodies and indirectly on the minds of human beings such matters are not trivial and insignificant. In accordance with the principle stated in the Introduction, as men

must needs feed, it is best that they shall feed as well as possible. And this implies not only a sufficiency of all the elements of a good diet but also their best preparation.

Note on some practical considerations :—

As health and efficiency depend so much on correct and adequate feeding, the State is interested in the supply, distribution and modes of preparation of food. This leads to certain definite practical considerations :

i. Nearly all social communities, such as municipalities, through their organisation make provision for and control the water supply. The grains, milk, butter (or other fats) are just as vital and ought undoubtedly to be under Government control. It is not enough to pass laws against adulteration. The State must concern itself with seeing that an adequate supply of the best available foods is obtained, and must make arrangements for its proper distribution. In times of war there has been much control in the West, and in times of famine in India there has been similar control. But as with the water, so with all these other vital necessities, they should be socially owned as well as controlled. The time must certainly come and it is to be hoped it will come soon, when any society which allows private individuals to make profits and accumulate wealth out of the food supply of the mass of the people, will be regarded as indeed barbaric. The first step must be State supervision, and this must lead in the shortest manner, according to circumstances, to State ownership. Besides the prevention of the amassing

of private profits, this would enable the State more directly to provide the kinds and amounts required. For the State has access to sources of information which the ordinary agriculturist or merchant does not possess. The agricultural development of the country can then be organised on systematic rational lines. In place of local jealousy and competition between individuals there must be a State organised co-operation.

ii. The preparation of food in the best manner depends upon two things: *a.* the knowledge of how, and some practice in actual doing; and *b.* the necessary utensils. Here again the State has its function. Some knowledge of foods and their preparation, and some practice is certainly as important to be included in education as to learn the history of the past, to work out cube-roots, or to read second-rate poetry. Further, though to some it may sound strange, the State ought to see that there is an adequate supply of the necessary utensils. These also may be a State monopoly, and disposed of at rates within the reach of all families. It would prove beneficial if the State published and distributed free simple literature on matters relating to food.

iii. As frequently luxurious foods are not especially nutritious, and are generally rare, the State should tax them highly. Thus the amount of labour diverted from necessities for the production of luxuries of this kind will be limited. This is by no means to deny the place of such goods in human life but to keep them strictly in that place.

9. c. Clothing, like foods, may be considered from two points of view. i. There is first the protection which it gives from inclement variations of the weather: it is a preventive of the bads of too great heat or cold, and from exposure to rain and wind, snow and sun. Then ii. there are appeals to the aesthetic side of human nature. The latter are aesthetic values and they are discussed in chapter iii.

Again, as with foods, the quantity of clothing is a mean between the bad of too little or too much, and what is too little or too much depends on the individual person and the climatic conditions in which at a particular time he finds himself. The quantity will also depend in part upon the kind and the quality. For certain conditions normal individuals require amounts of clothing of particular kinds which are roughly similar. As to the best material from which clothing should be made for one set of conditions or another, expert opinion is not generally agreed. Some advocate the use of wool always next to the skin, while others regard cotton as just as good, if not better. Sometimes closely woven, sometimes coarsely woven material is better.

One main consideration with regard to clothing is that of its cleanliness. Of less importance, from the physical point of view is its form. Here aesthetic appeal must be allowed weight: otherwise it is simply a question of personal convenience or of national or other sentiment. On grounds chiefly of convenience many Japanese men have adopted the Western mode of dress. Some Indians wish to retain types of clothing chiefly on nationalistic grounds. But if convenience is thereby sacrificed, this is not to be very highly commended, for after all national sentiment can be expressed by means of other badges, and it cannot be a very high kind of sentiment which depends much on the form of dress.

Note on some practical considerations:—

On some matters relating to clothing the following may be consulted: H. Kinne and A. M. Cooley: *Shelter and Clothing*. New York 1917; W. H. Dooley: *Textiles*. New York 1914; L. R. Balderston: *Laundering*. Boston.

Though not quite to the same extent the State is concerned with the clothing of its subjects as with their food. It should at least organise and control the supply and distribution of clothing so that each individual may not find it difficult to obtain the minimum requirements of a good even though simple kind. More important,

however than this, is provision for the cleansing of clothes. Dirty clothing is apt to spread disease, and uncontrolled washermen or washing establishments may through lack of care or insanitary arrangements also spread diseases. There are highly scientific and somewhat elaborate forms of laundering, but such arrangements cannot for very long be available for the large numbers of people in towns. The State (in India especially) ought nevertheless to provide special tanks (constructed according to rational plans) for the washing in different districts, and the washing should be done there under supervision. Any washing of clothes in other public places should be prohibited. All washermen or women by trade should be registered and licensed, for control especially at the times of epidemics.

10. d. The goods of health and comfort and the bads of disease and discomfort are closely related to the nature and condition of the places in which men dwell. In this connection there is a wider and a narrower problem. The former concerns the character of the town or village, the latter the character of the individual house. Within recent years town-planning has become almost a science and an art. Here it is quite impossible to go into details. For many towns almost the only remedy would be that of abandoning them to build on a new site, or else destroying them to build anew. The greatest evil in most

towns is overcrowding; there are too many congested areas, and too few open spaces admitting of air and light. A very grave evil in Indian towns is the filthy condition of the streets, which are too often regarded as places for tying up cattle at night and for throwing domestic rubbish during the day. The goods of a well organised city will include wide streets, well cleaned; many open spaces and public parks; a thoroughly scientific sanitary system for the quick disposal of rubbish; a number of public conveniences kept well cleaned; a good system of lighting; wide pavements; high chimneys to all fire-places; traffic controlled; factories and business places kept away from the residential parts of the city and the educational institutions and the places of amusement. All drains should be closed drains, not primitive open ones as is so common in Indian streets. A city in which the municipal authorities did their duty in these matters thoroughly would soon tend to improve the type of individual dwelling.

Though the general public health depends more on the care of the city, the individual comfort depends much more on the individual

dwelling. Here again over-crowding is one of the chief evils: rooms are too small, the number of rooms is often too few, and the number of persons to live in them too great. The construction is frequently quite unscientific, giving for example at times (as in "back to back" houses) no air through, or at others too many cross currents; fire-places where such exist are put in such a position in relation to the windows and doors, and the chimneys are so badly made, that it is almost impossible for the smoke to go up the chimney till the room is filled; most houses have no bath-rooms; the chief rooms of many houses overlook the dirty back-yards and out-houses of others; windows are too small; the walls are old and the abode of vermin; and so on. The planning of a good house is a matter for the expert. Nevertheless, most intelligent persons may with a modicum of thought enumerate some of the chief requirements. The rooms must be light, not only for the sake of the light itself, but also because otherwise it is much more difficult to keep them clean. It must be possible to open up one or more rooms to obtain the greatest freshness and coolness, and to close up others

to obtain necessary warmth. Every house should have at least one bath-room and other conveniences arranged on the best sanitary principles. For sleeping accommodation rarely should more than two people be compelled to sleep in the same room, unless they are small children. There should be scientifically arranged cupboards for the storing of food and all necessary means for what one might even call "sanitary" cooking. Stringent regulations should be in force with relation to the preservation of cleanliness within and outside the house, and severe penalties inflicted for their violation. All these are serious demands, but the matter is one of the most vital to the living of a healthy and a happy life. Upon these conditions of one's daily, weekly, monthly, yearly dwelling place depend often one's general mood and disposition, physical goods, intellectual vigour, even moral attitude.

Note on some practical considerations :—

Information concerning town planning and dwellings may be obtained from: G. Cadbury: *Town planning*. London 1915; C. S. Bird: *Town planning for small communities*. New York 1917; H. I. Triggs: *Town planning, past, present and possible*. London 1909; R.

Unwin: *Town planning in practice*. London 1909; Isabel Bevier: *The House, its plan, decoration and care*. New York 1907; Marion Talbot: *House Sanitation*. Chicago 1917. Some practical considerations follow on the recognition of the importance of these physical goods of dwelling places. It is not possible for any State except of the smallest size to take over immediately the ownership of all house property, and such a proposition has rarely been put forward. A State can, however, exercise control and supervision over it. The following suggestions are made in this connection:

i. For every town a good plan for future developments and alterations should be drawn by an expert in town planning. Unless those who wish to diverge from the plan adopted can bring before the government or municipal council convincing reasons all should conform to the plan.

ii. No building, including dwelling houses, should be erected before the plans are passed by an expert acting on behalf of the government.

iii. The government should declare its right to inspect through definite officials any buildings with the purpose of enquiring into their sanitary condition.

iv. The government should condemn house property which is unfit for human habitation, judging by the average standard of a typical town. In this connection it is important to protest against the absurd notions which exist with regard to compensation. No man should be compensated for slum property; rather he should think himself fortunate that the State does not treat him as a criminal for endangering the public health.

v. The government should put up some model houses in the first instance for its highest officers as part of their emoluments, then for the next lower and so on till practically all State servants are in suitable houses.

11. c. Frequently it is suggested that the person in good health is not aware of it, but that he only really appreciates good health when in some manner he has lost it. Such a statement implies an insufficient analysis of the nature of experience. For a man may enjoy his good health and yet not be definitely thinking that he is in good health. When a man is in bad health he may call up in thought a remembrance of the time when he was in good health. It is just because he was consciously enjoying it previously that now he is able to contrast his bad health with it. Nevertheless there is an important implication in the statement: it implies that persons do not give much attention to the good of good health. Further, there are ways in which good health may become more consciously felt, and for the enjoyment of good health these must be adopted to some degree by every individual. Expressed briefly they may be called forms of physical exercise, for it is in the effort to use one's body that one may become aware of its vigour or its weakness.

Like most of the other physical values the goods and bads of physical exercise have become

the subject of careful investigation. Defect and excess are both apt to be intrinsically and extrinsically bad. To take a simple example: there are times when in a football match the backs get far too little exercise and the forwards far too much. The former do not feel the pleasure of vigorous effort, and the latter feel over-strained. What exactly constitutes the mean depends upon the nature of the individual. So also the particular varieties of exercise depend in part upon the climate and the physical conditions of the environment, even sometimes on historical tradition. Many forms of exercise, especially as sports, have moral implications besides the physical values, but these are referred to in chapter iv. As far as the circumstances permit all forms of exercise judged by the standards of such things to be good ought to be encouraged, whatever the country or people with whom they originated.

And in this connection it should be urged that the only reason why any form of exercise should be restricted to boys and men should be its unsuitability to the physical constitution of girls and women. Otherwise any form of

sport physically beneficial to both should be encouraged for both. The recognition of the importance of this would militate to some extent against purdah conditions in India.

Note on some practical considerations :—

The values of physical exercise are as forms of amusement as well as means to promote or to preserve health. The State might be expected to do all in its power to encourage this side of life, if only for the sake of the health of the people. It ought, however, to have in view the giving of opportunity for enjoying good health. For it has been said that that government is best where the subjects are happiest, and to the promotion of happiness these forms of recreation contribute much. The following practical suggestions may be useful :

i. Definite and carefully planned forms of physical exercise, especially games and sports, should be an important factor in all educational institutions. The State should insist on provision for this.

ii. The organisation and provision for the physical recreation of adults is a social duty ; the State should perform it. This implies (a) sufficient open spaces set apart for sports ; (b) some organisation of societies or groups making the recreation systematic and disciplined ; (c) at least some substantial contribution towards the expenses ; (d) recognition of the services of those who especially aid in this direction and also of the individuals who show special capacity and devotion to physical exercise. Annual games and sports in the form of competitions, similar in some ways to the games of ancient Greece, should be instituted. Some decoration should be given to the amateur champions of the different kinds of exercises, games or sports.

12. f. Few if any will need to be urged by discussion to admit the reality of the physical good of sex-intercourse. Some ascetics have shunned it—not as a radical bad but rather as a good of the flesh which, as they have maintained, comes into conflict with the goods of the spirit. This good like the others is also *sui generis*. It has to be experienced to be known; how it could be described except in terms of itself it is impossible to say. Again, it is fundamentally particular and individual. Often it is allied with other values, such as the aesthetic, as in the admiration of beauty in the human form; or the moral, when a means of expression of the sentiment of love, or of the procreation of children. Whatever these additional values, and however much higher they are, it is futile to try to deny that most individuals also find value in the physical sensation as such. Not to admit this merely physical value seems insincere and priggish. Leaving at present entirely out of account the allied aspects of the experience, attention must be placed on the physical value.

The question of practical importance concerns the conditions for the best type of this physical

value and the means by which it is to be retained. It is probably correct to say that the strong and healthy individual has the greatest chance of experiencing the best type, and that excess lowers the tone of the experience by weakening the constitution. The retention of a good type thus probably depends upon moderation. What this is must vary with the individuals. But as there is a large amount of physical similarity between men and between women it may be expected that the scientists engaged upon investigation into the sex life will one day state authoritatively the required information on such questions. It may be, as has been contended, that there are recurring periods of such desire in men and in women. The art of the best sex life (viewed physically) would then consist partly in endeavouring to bring these to coincide. The value can hardly be expected to be and to remain the best if the relationship is begun too early in life. Though perhaps the least important of the arguments against early marriages and their early consummation (so prevalent in India) this is a reason which deserves to be given weight.

The extrinsic value of sex in the procreation of children needs no discussion. In recent investigations into the so-called internal secretions associated with the sex organs much light has been thrown on the close relation between the primary and the secondary sex differentiations. The qualities, for example, of form, of voice, even perhaps of manner and of feeling, which distinguish the masculine and the feminine appear to be related with these internal secretions. It may be that some functioning of sex with external secretions also stimulates internal ones, and aids in the particular masculine or feminine development. There is no need to deny that many unmarried women have beautiful characters and lead lives of great devotion to one cause or another; yet it does not require very great capacity of analysis and appreciation of character to notice the difference between the married and the average of unmarried women and even the childless married ones. Surely it is not unreasonable to believe that for the full development of every human being all functions should be allowed their part. In view both of the intrinsic and the extrinsic physical values the state of marriage is to be commended

Note on some practical considerations:—

i. It is in relation to sex intercourse as a merely physical value that prostitution has prevailed throughout the ages. *From the merely physical point of view* this is a form of evil only in so far as it leads to the spread of physical diseases or reduces vitality individually or racially. Unless the State assumes the attitude that all prostitution is illegal, and takes all means, including severe punishment to try to stamp it out, then it must take some steps to prevent the spread of such diseases. In any case it should certainly be regarded as a serious criminal offence for a person with such diseases to prostitute herself. For the institution of a State medical examination and licence, much is to be said, but also much against. If adopted along with other methods of trying to eradicate the evil it is better (in our opinion) to have such a system. Some of these other methods must be an improvement in the economic condition of women and also of many men, and reforms in the systems of marriage.

ii. The greatest and most effective force directed to the eradication of these evils must be the moral one. Associated with this a more definite knowledge of the nature and causes of the evils would probably also have good results. There can be no doubt that clear information should be available for every intelligent person. The chief questions are as to how and when this should be given. Some very simple instruction might be given in the last year of the boy's or girl's life at school (i.e. the primary) and earlier in the secondary schools. But the chief information should be available in the form of simple literature to be had free by all adults. This might be distributed by public libraries, athletic clubs, various societies, priests and doctors, and so on.

iii. In the interests of all concerned the State should insist both on the notification of sex diseases, which may

be hereditary, and on definite treatment. At the same time it should prohibit the advertisements of quack remedies, and medical practice by unqualified persons.

13. Sufficient has now been said in the previous pages by way of illustration of kinds of goods and bads to make it unnecessary to give much more time to the detailed consideration of the fact that with regard to these physical values practical and particular action is required, whatever else, such as intellectual knowledge and moral earnestness, may be indispensable for good results. To produce physical changes physical forces are usually in some form necessary, even though at some stage or other these are guided and perhaps even re-inforced by forces which are not apparently physical. To discuss the latter possibility would lead to metaphysical enquiries as to the nature of forces of all kinds, enquiries which it is not intended to pursue in this volume. The practical implication is here of first importance. And this is that the production of physical goods and the eradication of physical bads is a matter for definite physical action applied in particular circumstances for the production of particular results.

14. Most physical values differ in *intensity*, in *extensity*, and in *protensity*. The meanings of the phrases, for example, "the pain was intense," and "the pain was not so intense," are known to immediate experience. Certain sensations, such as those of heat and cold, are judged goods or bads according to the degree of intensity. The greater or less intensity of a pain, or the greater or less intensity of a particular stimulus,—the former a direct and the latter an indirect example of the physical—is of considerable importance in the estimation of values and the question of their modification. So also is the extensity and the protensity. The extensity is the impression of greater or less voluminousness or expansiveness of sensations. There is a greater extensity in the boom of a cannon and the roll of thunder than in the crack of a toy pistol, or between the pain of a sprained arm and that of a sprained thumb or between neuralgia in the side of the face and toothache in one tooth. Protensity is simply the length of duration of an experience. The longer time goods continue, and the shorter bads continue, so much the better. To make an exhaustive examination would entail

detailed enquiry into the modifications which certain types of experiences of goods and bads undergo through longer or shorter continuance. Some lose their intensity and thus their degree of attraction or repulsion, others gain in intensity and so in attraction or repulsion. These distinctions of intensity, extensity, and protensity are all of importance in any attempt to calculate the course of conduct in particular circumstances. According to these distinctions one course or another may lead to more goods or fewer bads

15. Someone has said that the greatest evils he ever suffered were those which never happened. He might perhaps equally well have said that his best enjoyments were those which never happened. The imagination, especially in anticipation and retrospection, plays a considerable part in human life, associated as the imagination so often is with values which are the subject of ardent desires. This is true with reference to physical pleasures and pains as of other higher values. For the present purpose the most important difference between imagination and an actual experience is that the former is more often under the control

of the individual himself to a greater extent than the latter which has a present objective basis outside the individual. The imagination of pleasures may to some degree be prolonged, and that of pains shortened. As, however, imagination of physical experiences has also a definite physical basis the control is limited.

16. Other attitudes towards physical bads, especially pains, have been advocated besides that of active exertion to remove them. One of these is the cultivation of a state of indifference. That is a method which has commended itself especially to the ascetic. He, however, has also frequently endeavoured to adopt the same attitude towards physical goods. No one who has had even a moderately wide experience of physical bads will underestimate the importance of this method as an occasional manner of meeting evil. But as a practice for general adoption or frequent use it is to be condemned. For it leads more often than not to stagnation. If a man begins to treat the bads with indifference, he will probably ere long begin also to treat the goods in a similar manner. The ascetic has proved this. The attitude of indifference is one to be resorted to in the failure

of every other method or in the instances when the circumstances are such that it is obvious that no active method will yield good results. Incidentally it may be remarked that some of the practices of the Buddhist monks are deliberately meant to cultivate an attitude in which bads - particularly physical—do not disturb the mind.

17. The felt intensity of an experience rests in part upon the attention that is paid to it. To say that the degree of attention depends in part upon the intensity is also true. From the former fact another way of meeting physical bads is sometimes advocated. This is by the distraction of attention. In the early life of the child this method is probably resorted to more than any other. But the older a person becomes the more difficult it is, as a general rule. The advice: "Try not to think of it," is not easy to follow, especially with reference to physical bads. Nevertheless, it is a most valuable method if it does not lead to a neglect of active endeavour to get rid of the bad permanently. For such distraction of attention is rarely complete; the attention is apt to come back again and again on the evil, so long

as it is there. The method of distraction of attention has this great advantage over that of the cultivation of indifference: it is best achieved by an active pursuit of a greater good.

18. The capacity of the individual to cultivate an attitude of indifference or to distract his attention from the bads would seem in most instances to be limited. So also is his power actively to obtain goods and remove bads. The amount any particular person might realise for himself in the realm of physical values is comparatively insignificant, even though he use all his energy backed up by a keen intelligence, a large fund of knowledge, and great moral earnestness. The goods of food, of clothing, of dwellings, of exercise are rarely even in the simplest conditions of human life, the achievement of the individual for himself. It is important to take notice of this with reference to physical values in order to compare and contrast these conditions with those of the other values.

19. No one can reasonably deny that the highest physical values are attained by means of co-operation between individuals, dividing the labours according to their capacities. Try

as men will to maintain that opposition leads to better physical results, they always fail to do anything but indicate their own or other men's selfishness. If men were to put forward in co-operation the amount of energy which they are led (generally by individualistic profit makers) to put forward in opposition, the results must in every instance be indubitably greater. Here the question is simply of the physical facts. The moral aspects of the matter come for independent consideration. Here union is strength: without it bads cannot be thoroughly eradicated to the full extent of human capacity, nor goods achieved. But for effective co-operation intelligent far seeing co-ordination is required. The end, including as it does good foods, clothing, dwellings, the goods of physical exercise and of sex, must be systematically and carefully thought out in the greatest possible detail, and whether that is by one mind or many, the whole must be grasped as one. The existing agents and materials are to be brought into that relationship in which it appears the nearest approach to the aim will be reached. The experience of the individual in his own particular sphere,

small or great, shows that definite co-ordination is essential. For the wider whole of physical values with which we are here concerned, to attain the highest results such co-ordination is indispensable, whether in municipalities or districts, small states, or even larger nations, where the organisation is already far advanced. To leave the production of physical goods and the eradication of physical bads, such as above described, to the more or less chaotic interactions of individuals or small groups of individuals, is to say the least, a mark either of lack of power, of intelligence, or of moral keenness and courage.⁸

21. Incidentally the duty of man towards infra-human animals as far as physical values are concerned may be emphasised. In so far as he is able he should accept the responsibility of doing all possible for the physical good and the eradication of physical bad for the animals with whom he comes into definite contact. It

8. There is room in every State for a *Minister of Co-ordination* whose duty it should be to consider and to plan out the best forms of co-ordination. He may or may not be an executive officer, as circumstances suggest. He may simply be an advisor leaving the supreme authority to carry out what seem good in his proposals.

is not sufficient to adopt the maxim of alleviation of the suffering of animals: there must also be an effort to lead them to the goods. Only the limits of human capacity should set the limit to this type of activity.

22. What these limits are man himself only comes to know through actual experience. And little experience is required for him to find out certain of the fundamental limitations. He is almost powerless in face of the earthquake, the hurricane, the lightning; the nature of the soil he can change but little; even his own physical nature is more fixed than otherwise. Whether rain shall come or not, thus affecting the production of his food and clothing, depends not on man's activity, whether as an individual or as one of a social group. The consideration of physical values, however greatly they demand human activity, leads one beyond it. But of the physical bads which as far as man is concerned are unpreventible, it may be said that human activity can in some extent alleviate the suffering. The sufferings which come thus, e. g. by pestilence and famine, are a call for a moral recognition of social solidarity. They may in the end be found to

be a means to higher values, and thus though bad in themselves, not unmitigated evil.

22. The control of the physical, as far as that is possible, is at almost every turn found to be related to the extent of man's knowledge concerning it. Thus Bacon with his *dictum* in reference to Nature "Knowledge is power," laid one of the foundation stones of modern natural science. Error undoubtedly leads to physical suffering in a very large number of instances, while truth opens the eyes to a wider and wider circle of goods and how they may be attained. To the consideration of the character of truths and errors the attention must now be turned.

CHAPTER II

Intellectual Values

1. The attainment of many of the physical goods and the eradication of many of the physical bads is seen to depend in part upon knowledge acquired by the intellect. This leads to the consideration of what are best called intellectual values. *Intellectual Values* are directly associated with the intellect, and are commonly described as truths and errors.

2. The propositions—Flies are carriers of disease: King Charles I of England was beheaded: A straight line is the shortest distance between two points: Benares is the sacred city of the Hindus: Most politicians have never seriously studied the problems of politics—are all truths, or at least are generally accepted as such by those who have thought over these things. They may be regarded as simple examples of intellectual goods. It may

be well to point out that intellectual goods are not necessarily accompanied by a feeling of pleasure : some truths are associated with pain much more than with pleasure. This does not affect the desire of the rational mind to know the truths—rather than to be deluded by errors.

3. On the other hand, the propositions—The sun goes round the earth : the earth is flat : The Buddha's tooth was as long as a man's finger : By the utterance of spells witches cause diseases and death : The British Government is not controlled by financial interests—are examples of errors or intellectual bads. Falsehoods, being what may be termed "intentional" errors, are also in part moral bads as far as the person who utters them is concerned. For those who accept them they are simply errors. Again, errors may be associated with feelings of pleasure or emotional satisfaction—but the healthy mind will usually try to reject error in any case, immediately it is known to be such. Indeed, it seems correct to say that when an error is known as such it is rarely possible for the individual to reap emotional satisfaction from it.

4. Intellectual goods and bads thus have a character of their own—they are *sui generis*. They may be, and often are, extrinsic in that they lead to other goods or bads. But the intrinsic character of intellectual goods and bads can only be known truly by acquaintance—like all other types of values. Nevertheless the fact may be indirectly indicated by pointing to the devotion of many men to the search for knowledge apart from any conviction that even if obtained it would be practically useful. Knowledge for the sake of knowledge does not appear to those who are genuine students to be any less reasonable than beauty for the sake of beauty, or virtue for its own sake, or pleasure for its own sake.

We are not here concerned with Truth. What is truth? said Pilate, and adds Bacon, he would not wait for an answer.⁹ Yet for ages before and ever since Pilate mankind has waited for an answer to this question. It is still disputed, and though during the last few decades the problem has been investigated probably more intensively than ever previously, it may be doubted whether anyone would claim

9. *The Fourth Gospel* : xviii 38. Bacon : *Essay on Truth*.

that he or anybody else has arrived at a satisfactory conclusion. What we are concerned with are truths and errors. These are expressed as individual propositions. They are particulars whether they refer to principles or to perceptual or other psychological experiences. Further, they are known only as particular events or experiences in the minds of individual persons.

An examination of truths and errors reveals that they are mostly positive and not merely negative. Even when they appear to be negative they are positive in implication, indicating a judgment upon some object or objects of experience, perceptual or other. Brief consideration of most errors will suffice to show that they are not simply the absence of truths. Of course, for an error to exist in a particular person's mind, the corresponding particular truth must necessarily be absent. But errors are more than the absence of truths. My own experience is almost completely void of truths such as are included in the science of chemistry, but it is not therefore rich in errors concerning such matters. There is a more or less general absence of truths and errors seeing that I rarely read about or make

judgment on objects of chemical knowledge. Or, again, a man may ask a policeman to tell him the direction to someone's residence. The policeman may tell him correctly, or he may say he does not know, or he may make an error, thus leading the man in a direction not giving him his objective. Similarly there may be positive errors concerning almost all aspects of experience.

5. Truths and errors are judgments usually expressed in the form of propositions. To the formation of these judgments two factors appear to contribute. There is the activity of the mind which judges. But this activity is related to something other than itself—the physical world, emotional states, imagery, ideas, and so on. The second factor here indicated is what was previously described as facts and values.

6. The type of mental function involved in the making of intellectual judgments is most commonly called reason, though sometimes more specifically, the intellect. Sometimes,¹⁰ however, the reason, perhaps justifiably, is

10. Dr. Hastings Rashdall's contention that the moral judgment is essentially a judgment by reason seems to imply this view. See *Theory of Good and Evil*. Oxford 1907, Book I ch. 6. also *Is Conscience an Emotion?* London 1914.

identified with the capacity of the mind to make judgments as such. In whichever way the term is used, it seems to be a particular function of the mind which leads to the formation of truths and errors. Without some exercise of the activity of reason there can be neither.

Seeing that the main aim of these discussions is to consider the characters of goods and bads, and how the former may be obtained and the latter eradicated, it is of importance to ask how errors are caused. This must be in one of the two factors, or in both, or in the nature of the relation between them. The chief theories as to the cause of error will be briefly surveyed.

7. It may be maintained that error arises through an imperfection of reason as a form of human activity. Such a view is sometimes urged on the ground of the theory of evolution. For according to that theory man in his present form is but the highest known member of an ascending series, and though he may seem more advanced toward perfection than ever before, higher stages may yet be reached. So just as the physical eye is not able to see everything unaided, and frequently meets its

limits when aided, and sometimes is structurally the cause of illusions, it is believed that every part of the body has its defects. And, if the body, why not the mind? Are there not signs that mind has evolved? If so, how can any factor in it be considered perfect?

Any such form of argument must in the end defeat itself. For, in accordance with its own implications must it not also be defective? And if it is defective, why should it be accepted? Or again—if the theory of evolution is to be treated as true in application to everything, including reason, the theory must itself share in the defects of the reason which has elaborated it. There is no way of demonstrating that reason is imperfect as it exists in man, and until there is, the only reasonable attitude is to trust it with confidence as not defective. Such acceptance of reason has been a most prominent characteristic of the greatest philosophical thinkers of the East and the West. It can hardly be denied that nearly all attempts to dethrone reason have involved vital appeals to reason itself, which however is far too rational to commit suicide. The view that reason is defective being rejected,

there remains the problem as to how error arises when reason is perfect.¹¹

8. One proposed solution to this problem may be called the ethical view of the cause of error. An intellectual judgment being a form of mental activity is as such related to the will. It is maintained that in this as in all other forms of its expression there are influences from the interests, desires, or feelings of the subject. Errors are thus believed to arise because, under the influence of non-rational factors, the reason has been wrongly directed by the will. This conception of the origin of error appears to be that which appealed most to the classical Greek philosophers, whose teaching emphasises the necessity of controlling the non-rational factors according to reason. The same general attitude is to be seen in those forms of Eastern thought which advocate forms of asceticism as accompaniments to the effort to come to a knowledge of truth. The relation of the apprehension of truth to the moral is an important teaching of Scholastic

11. The importance of reason for religion and its place in it have been more fully discussed in my *Human Needs and Religious Beliefs*. Baroda 1918, ch. II. III. and V.

philosophy, mediaeval and modern.¹² The modern voluntaristic systems of psychology, insisting, as they do, upon the element of purpose in all human conduct have given much support to this theory of error. Errors are made because, whether we are explicitly aware of it or not, our judgments are being partly determined by our interests. That this does not necessarily mean that the feelings corrupt the reason may be seen by considering the next solution.

9. The making of a judgment involves not merely the function of reason but also facts in relation to which the judgment is given. A proposition or judgment is the product of reason surveying the facts. Such facts become known either through one's own immediate acquaintance with them or through some form of description transmitted to us by others who have had actual acquaintance with the particular facts concerned. Thus it is contended that error arises if reason is led to

12. This has been emphasised for Jewish thought by my former pupil Prof. Rehman in an article on *Maimonides and Religious Truth* in the *Indian Philosophical Review* II. pp. 24-32.

pronounce a judgment going beyond the facts as experienced. If all the facts were experienced, then there would be no error. Such a view accords closely with the conviction of common sense, but the question still remains why a function regarded as not in itself defective is led to pronounce wrong judgments.

10. The answer to the problem enunciated is essentially a return to the ethical view. A man is led to make a judgment, even though the experienced facts are inadequate, because of personal interests. The desire for some conclusion may lead a man to make a judgment when he ought rather to suspend judgment. Under the influence of feelings his attention (and thus the operation of reason) may be directed towards the facts which satisfy and diverted from others. The judgments then made may in many instances be false. How they are false may only be clearly seen when all the relevant facts are considered. —

11. The general conclusion reached may be summed up thus: *Reason as such is perfect, but error arises through judgments on insufficient data, and this is frequently due to the influence of feeling on the will.* A little reflect-

ion will show how this conception of error fits in with an acknowledgement of an evolution of knowledge, even while rejecting the view that reason as such is at any stage imperfect. For the advance or development of knowledge is real if the judgments at a higher level represent a wider contact with the relevant facts.¹³

12. The goods and bads of the intellect, that is, truths and errors, being individual propositions, and the aim of man having relation to such particulars, it is an advantage to consider them in groups or classes, according to the nature of the experienced facts. In regard to each and every side of life truths, even to the smallest detail, are in themselves better than errors. It is no unworthy endeavour of the human mind to strive for the fullest knowledge. Nevertheless, it has perforce to be admitted that the fullest knowledge in many spheres of thought is open only to specialists in those spheres. For the ordinary

13. Error—or perhaps rather the appearance of error—is sometimes regarded as due to man's finitude—or again rather his apparent finitude. On analysis this theory would tend to come under one or other of the attitudes discussed.

individual it must often—most often—be sufficient if the most interesting and the most practical truths are known, and the intellectually narrowing and practically pernicious errors are avoided. Even such a limited acquaintance with truths in the different realms of thought will comprise no insignificant intellectual wealth.

There is no great difficulty, for purposes such as the present, in classifying truths and errors according to the sides of experience with which they deal. The classes as here given do not claim to be logically exclusive in the last analysis. Truths and errors may relate to i. one's own body; ii. one's own mind; iii. other human beings; iv. infra-human animate nature; v. inanimate nature; vi. the ultimate character of reality, including the possible existence (and nature) of beings (such as non-human spirits, as God and angels) not implied in the previous classes.

13. One who closely examined most of the curricula of the general educational institutions¹⁴ of the past and of the present might with

14. With the probable exception of some parts of the educational systems of the United States of America.

good grounds suppose that there has been a continued conspiracy to boycott any detailed knowledge of his own body on the part of the individual. Yet the body, as an ever present reality for each person, should be for each a source of intellectual interest. That it is not so is due almost to a cultivated neglect. The knowledge has obviously also an extrinsic value in respect of the attainment of other classes of goods.

The truths which are grouped together in the sciences of human physiology and hygiene might be studied first. But these treat in a general manner with the subject—the physiology and hygiene of an “ideal” or an “average” individual. There remains the particular person’s close investigation of the peculiarities of his own body. Some day, perhaps, as adherents to some religions are required to make periodically a moral and spiritual self-examination, so human beings may be taught to make periodically an examination of their own bodies. How that is to be done scientifically, in a manner to be of real value, needs detailed instruction. The nature of the origin of the body from the bodies of the parents; the chief

grounds for the theory that it is also a lineal descendant of remote non-human ancestors in a continuity of animal life; the outlines of human anatomy; the physiological processes of nutrition, and growth; the nature of the organs of sense and of respiration; as well as the physiological characteristics of sleep, physical decay, senility, and death—truths about all these will to most persons prove interesting and practically beneficial. The physical peculiarities of the individual body in its particular environment can be investigated satisfactorily only after the average conditions are more or less clear.

14. The individual's ignorance of his own mind is often greater than that concerning his own body. The elementary truths of physiology are more widely diffused than those of psychology. The perceptions of the body, depending on the senses, are more obvious than the factors of the mind, the nature of which is learned chiefly through introspection. In recognising features of his own body the individual is aided by the easy acquaintance with the similarities and differences of the bodies of others, but the knowledge of the minds of others is more indirect and inexact.

and affords little help in introspective analysis of one's own mind.

A serious enquiry into the origin of his mind rarely leads a person to the conclusion that it arose from the parents. The origin and the destiny of the mind are not to be learnt from psychology, but are the subject of speculations in metaphysics and beliefs in religion. But of the nature of the mind as it is, psychology in its different branches has something to teach, at once intrinsically interesting and extrinsically useful. To discuss this in detail is the task not of this book but of special works on psychology. Incidentally, however, it may be pointed out that the practice of introspection which the study of one's own mind systematically involves, leads to a better understanding of the real character of the motives which underlie conduct, and as to the actual things we truly believe and not merely pretend to believe. For personal progress in the attainment of goods and the eradication of bads, as well as for social advance, such "knowing one's own mind" is an invaluable factor. Here, especially, a man may see many actual examples of how his

feelings and interests have warped his judgment and led him to error. A knowledge of one's own mind—gained partly by consideration of the truths of the science of psychology, which like physiology is of an “average” or “ideal” man, and partly by recognition of peculiarities—ought also to aid in observing what aspects of mental life are being neglected and what over-emphasised. The more closely the individual investigates his own mind, the more truths and the less errors he has concerning it, the more probable are his judgments as to the minds of others likely to be correct.

15. There is no need for us to discuss independently the knowledge of the bodies of others. The belief in the existence of other minds is justified by analogy, although the belief may not have arisen by any conscious logical analogy. The judgments as to the nature of the mind of another person depend upon (a) his own statements, and (b) his acts, both as interpreted by the experience of the individual judging. The difficulty here is two-fold. In the first place the statements may be erroneous judgments, or deliberate falsehoods

with intent to deceive. In the second place actions may be expressions of different ideas or feelings in different individuals, and in some instances they also may be meant to deceive.

The knowledge of the minds of others is likely to be interesting in itself: it may also be of extrinsic value. Especially is one concerned with the real motives and actual beliefs of others. Errors are apt to arise here through analogies formed in reference to the members of particular groups, but carried wrongly beyond them. The financier and the merchant, for example, carrying on the greater portion of their operations with the main motive of accumulating private wealth, meet predominantly in their most active times men inspired with similar motives. Thus, in such minds the judgment frequently arises that this man, that man, in fact any man is imbued also with egoism and selfishness, as the main-spring of his action. A similar type of error arises with most of those whose education or occupation has been in special groups, as soldiers, teachers, priests. The error arises in the application to individuals beyond the group what may be correct only within the group.

The best way to try to prevent such errors is to avoid *isolated* forms of specialist education, and further to promote as much intercourse as possible between the different groups and individuals constituting society.

The whole range of the historical offers truths or the possibility of truths which may prove in themselves interesting. Apart from their own interest and the general effect of broadening the outlook the truths of history have no great contribution to make to human welfare—but to admit little pragmatic value in history is only one more reason for emphasising its great intrinsic worth. The individual is perhaps naturally, certainly justifiably, most interested as a rule in the great movements and men of his own times and his own race—if he can get to know of them at all. Then his vision is broadened to those of recent times beyond his own people—the immediate environment then the more and more remote. In turning to the past it is first the past of his own people and then of those more closely related of whom he wishes to learn. A knowledge of his own people, present and past, and of all others in proportion to the closeness or

otherwise to his people should constitute an element in the sum total of intellectual goods.

The truths of history which men find of highest worth do not concern the wars and political feuds which represent chiefly the effects of the bad elements in human nature, and, in general, human failure to achieve higher goods.¹⁵ Rather what appeals most is the description of the personalities and careers of noble men, the movements of civilisation and culture triumphing over barbarism and chaos. After all, it is impossible reasonably to deny that it is the great religious personalities and moral teachers who have made the greatest and most direct impression on the largest numbers of the human race. So again the history that entrances is not so much accounts of works of art but—works of art themselves,—the masterpieces of Phidias, the *Divina Commedia* of Dante, the works of Michael Angelo, the intellectual reflections of Leibniz, the drama of Shakespeare, the music of Wagner and Beethoven, the saintliness of St. Francis,

15. Nevertheless, the history books for schools and colleges are formed largely of the political and the military—a traditional custom from which it will require earnest effort to break away.

the moral force of John Knox ; the utterances, the grasp of the problem of life of the Buddha ; the poems of a Tukaram ; the songs of Chaitanya ; the great temples of Buddhism and Hinduism—these and a myriad other things which go to form what there is worth having a history of. Thus, in intimate enjoyment and understanding of these actualities of literature and art in all its forms the truths of men's minds may become known and found to be worth all the effort to attain them.

16. The infra-human world of animate nature also affords a wealth of intellectual enjoyment, whether on the side of plant life or animal life in all their varied forms. Few persons who seriously take up the study of the nature and life history of some living organism or organisms, fail in the course of time to become entranced with the subject. And this is quite apart from any extrinsic value in the truths which become known—in fact, comparatively few truths in these realms have a direct bearing on non-intellectual human welfare. But those which do are of very great importance. One may single out the good effects which accrue in increased production e. g. of grain or

of milk, by the application of scientific methods of cultivation, breeding, and feeding, based on the knowledge of truths in these directions.

17. But as mankind and indeed all forms of animate nature live in intimate relations with the inanimate aspects of the world, these afford again another realm for intellectual activity. Now, though the more truths a man may be aware of in this as in other spheres, the better, as the opportunity to attain them is so limited, none but specialists can hope to acquire much knowledge in these directions. The truths of astronomy, of geology, of inorganic chemistry, of the various branches of physics may no doubt be deeply interesting to those who may give adequate time to their study, but for the average individual they do not possess a high position in the scale of intellectual goods. As a rule he will be quite satisfied to obtain the advantages which the knowledge of these truths in the mind of the specialist leads to in practical life. His philosophy of life will not be much affected by ignorance on such subjects. The chief requirement is that he shall be firmly convinced of the reign of order and the general absence of

caprice in the world of nature.

18. All the types of truths and errors so far referred to are the subjects of investigation of particular sciences, to the expositions of which readers must turn for details. There are also certain more formal studies, such as mathematics and logic, which are concerned with the more abstract principles and relations implied in these sciences. Some acquaintance with mathematics and logic is indispensable for a correct appreciation of much in the realm of intellectual values. But the more deeply they are studied the more evidently they are seen to be bound up with considerations of a philosophical character. It is only few, however, who have the capacity or the opportunity to occupy themselves with such discussions, however much in the end they bear on the more obvious problems of the philosophy of life. In view of the purpose of this book no further reference will be made to them, but the attention must now be turned to a review of the chief philosophical attitudes and systems. As these are closely connected with a man's mode of life, are in some way expressions of philosophies of life—seen from the side of

intellect—they will need more detailed treatment.

The persons who make a special study of philosophy will be aware of a number of positions not discussed here, but in one way or another they are simply refinements on the more general views considered. A detailed investigation would indicate many more arguments for and against the views than those actually raised. The chief views are Agnosticism, Scepticism, Materialism, Absolutism, Pluralism, and Theism. In connection with all these it may with good grounds be maintained that errors have arisen from insufficient acquaintance with or consideration of the relevant facts and in part to the influence of the non-rational factors of experience. In these general philosophical theories the effects of the emotional dispositions and of the practical interests of the individuals are particularly evident—and it is well to admit the fact. Physical sanity and moral attitude, to say nothing of aesthetic and religious feelings have more influence in the determination of a person's philosophy than men—especially philosophers—are usually willing to acknowledge.

19. *Agnosticism* is an excellent example of the influence of general mental attitude on philosophical opinion. It is not the profession of a particular philosophy, but rather of the absence of any philosophy. The Agnostic says with regard to all—or most—ultimate problems: “I do not know.” But this often means “I have not yet been able to come to any more or less acceptable conclusion on the matter.” Such an attitude is quite reasonable, and is far from hopeless. At times Agnosticism goes further, meaning virtually: “I have come to the conclusion that I am ignorant of the most probable solution, that I shall remain so, and that it is of little significance that I shall remain so.” That it is a more serious attitude, bordering upon Scepticism. The Agnostic is impressed by the fact that there is so much—or so little—to be said for any and all views and yet no evidently reliable means of deciding between them.

As the agnostic maintains no positive theory on the ultimate questions his opponent is not concerned with any kind of refutation. All he may do is to try to persuade the agnostic to reconsider the different theories of a positive

type. In support of this it may be pointed out that the practical action and attitude of the agnostic suggests not so much agnosticism as a vacillation between the other different views. For example, he treats the world of nature as a more or less orderly system; his own body he regards not as a chaos but as a more or less intelligible whole; in his general dealings with others he acts on the view that they are rational beings. In one way and another his conduct which shows what he really believes—though he may not admit it and may pretend not to know it—reveals a conviction that the universe is to a large extent rational and intelligible. His manner of action, his conversation, his feelings will suggest that he is more inclined to act either as though this present life is all or that consciousness continues beyond physical death. In a thousand ways often unsuspected, it becomes evident that the agnostic acts as though he believes in God or does not. He assumes the attitude of ignorance very largely because he does not sufficiently consider all the facts, including those of his own conduct. At one time he acts as though a confirmed materialist,

at another as though a definite theist, and so on. His vacillation from one attitude to another is most often due to lack of the necessary effort and concentration to follow out the discussions. It is in part a cause of and an effect of vacillation in conduct. The only remedy is through the establishment of a particular positive position as more justifiable, and even as more probable also than any other view. To do this involves an examination of the leading positive philosophies of life. But before taking up such an examination it is necessary to consider the attitude of Scepticism which the agnostic may adopt in face of criticism.

20. *Scepticism*, somewhat dogmatically as a rule, asserts that "nothing can be known," i. e. about the ultimate nature of reality. The obvious retort to such a contention is that this appears to be itself an important piece of information, and it might be well to know how it is arrived at. A person who is genuine and serious in his scepticism has more often than not arrived at the position by a process of rejection of first this view and then that and that till no view seems to remain. The

difference between the sceptic and the non-sceptic will thus depend upon the acceptance or rejection of this or that fundamental in the different systems. The only way to overcome scepticism is to reconsider these. It may also be contended against the agnostic and the sceptic that the human mind has shown great capacity for knowledge in the different empirical sciences, and there is no sufficient reason for the view that the human mind is constitutionally unable to come to rational conclusions as to the nature and meaning of life and the universe.

21. It is on the supposed results of human reason in the more conspicuous of the empirical sciences that *Materialism* is thought to find its justification. Materialism is the theory that Reality is material. Many causes have led to its acceptance in wide circles of readers in recent times. The material appears so obvious; and it has been wrongly believed that it is on the assumption of the truth of Materialism that the sciences have progressed to so great an extent during the last century. The sciences have in fact progressed without that assumption, which they do not make. Materialism may be

rejected on three definite grounds—i. the Psychological; ii. the Epistemological; and iii. the Ethical, Aesthetic and Religious.

The Psychological argument against Materialism is that it endeavours to explain mental states as the product of matter, while psychologically it can be seen that it is only in mental states that matter (if there is any such) is known. What reason has the materialist for believing that matter existed previous to consciousness and produced consciousness from itself? This leads to the demand for some clear conception of what is meant by matter. All the qualities included in the connotation of the term are known immediately by the senses—and thus through mental channels—or are inferred, thus also through mental operation. Materialism can with good reason be charged with the fallacy of *hysteron proteron*, putting the cart before the horse, regarding mind as the result of material processes when matter can only be known to exist when experienced by mind.

The Epistemological argument against Materialism is even more decisive. This maintains that Materialism is quite unable to give any

account of the distinction between truths and errors. As the universe is simply a machine, working according to uniform laws, whatever propositions it produces are as such equally true or equally false. Thus in one mind appears the judgment "Materialism is true," and in another "Materialism is false." Which is to be accepted? Materialism can give no grounds to accept the former rather than the latter.

Finally, Materialism is justly charged with being too narrow; it is an error arising from an inadequate consideration of facts. Especially is it unable to give any satisfactory account of the fundamentals of moral, aesthetic and religious experiences. None of these can be completely expressed in terms of matter and motion. There is, for example, in the moral life in society something far more than an interaction of physiological organisms—there are wills, feelings, ideas—none of which can be explained in any way by the idea of matter. Further—even that characteristic which differentiates a physiological organism from a mere physical inorganic body has never been shown to be a form of non-vital qualities of

material elements. But all this is no criticism of the physical sciences, which represent important fields of human knowledge, and are quite independent of the theory of Materialism.

22. In recent times attempts have been made to avoid some of these obvious difficulties of Materialism by a theory which may be called *Neutral Monism*. According to this, Reality is one in essence but it is neither matter nor mind, which are simply its chief forms of manifestation. What it is in itself, otherwise than being the basis of what we know as matter and mind, is not expressed. This attitude has been common amongst certain physical scientists, for example, Ernst Haeckel of Jena and Wilhelm Ostwald of Leipzig. The position is to all intents and purposes the same as Agnosticism, but owing to its adoption chiefly by some prominent physical scientists it has tended more popularly to lapse into a materialistic mode of thought.

Another view which is similarly agnostic in character, if considered metaphysically, is that of *Phenomenalism*, which regards phenomena as all that may be known. Either phenomena constitute all that exists—then they are the only

Reality—and the transition to a type of Idealism is almost inevitable; or there is something beyond phenomena—and the attitude is that of Agnosticism. In the latter case it is not made clear how even the existence of a cause of phenomena becomes known.

The belief of the majority of human beings—if the question were put to them, without preliminary discussion—is probably that of *Dualism*, that both matter and mind are in themselves real—without any thought being entertained of any essential or existential dependence. The dependence, if thought of, would usually be conceived as one of mind on matter. To critical reflection Dualism will appear unsatisfactory for similar reasons as Materialism, in so far as it implies the reality of matter as distinct from what in experience is called the “material.” Thus, the three theories of Neutral Monism, Phenomenalism, and Dualism are to be rejected on grounds similar to those referred to in the criticism of Agnosticism and of Materialism.

23. At what is frequently supposed to be the opposite extreme from Materialism are the various theories which maintain that Reality is all spiritual, that is, of the nature of mind. Before discussing the most important of these theories, it is well to consider an objection which the ordinary and less metaphysically trained mind not infrequently makes. It is urged that it is as impossible for one to give an account of or understand what mind is as to understand what the matter of the materialist is. It may indeed be admitted that no adequate account of mind can be given in the terms of language we employ. But this is not to be taken as the same as not knowing what mind is. Real knowledge of the mind is not *knowledge by description* but immediate, a *knowledge by acquaintance*. The materialist in the very act of elaborating his theory is aware of his mind. Mind is to be equated with consciousness. Human beings are minds which are aware of themselves—that is, are self-consciousnesses. It may reasonably be doubted whether there is any mind which is not in some degree self-conscious. To say that mind is a willing, feeling, thinking reality, is only

to refer to aspects which can be truly known only as factors of or within consciousness.

Now, though the individual human being thinks of himself as a mind and for some reason or other believes in the existence of other minds the theory has been somewhat widely held that Reality is one, either as one mind, or as something spiritual higher than mind. All forms of this theory may be termed *Absolutism*. With reference to those versions which endeavour to represent the Absolute as one Reality spiritual but not a consciousness as known by us, it may be objected once for all that this is to lapse again into a form of Agnosticism. To call the Absolute spiritual, and then to call it impersonal means either that the Absolute is conceived as a society of minds (and not itself a mind) or to use the term spiritual in a manner essentially unintelligible to minds immediately aware of themselves only, and this as personal. To treat the Absolute as a society of minds, not itself mind, is a modified type of Pluralism. Absolutism is here taken to mean the theory which regards Reality as one Mind, and all apparently individual minds as ultimately identical with one another and It.

With some modifications (chiefly regarding the term *personal*), the view of Absolutism just indicated is prevalent in much Eastern thought. But the process (or processes) by which one is supposed to attain to what is sometimes popularly called "God-realisation" professes to lead to an immediate apprehension of the identity of *Atman* and *Brahman*, soul and Absolute. In so far as this implies an immediate experience as real knowledge, a *knowledge by acquaintance*, it is not open to objection from outside. This is essentially the mystical attitude, and the truly mystical seems as such indescribable. But when a definite theory is formulated, however intimately related to such mystical experience it may appear, it challenges critical consideration. For it must be remembered that the actuality of mystical experience can and has been admitted along with intellectual accounts of Reality which are not Absolutist.

A survey of the expositions of Absolutism may soon lead to the recognition that for its activity in its essential nature is not admitted. The one thing which is clear about activity is that though it is denominated by a static term

its character is not itself indicated by a static idea. There is a fundamental difference between a conception of Reality which represents activity as an ultimate and as actual in individual centres which mutually affect one another, and one which is unable to acknowledge activity as real if only because there is no Other to act upon. In history Absolutism as a theory has been most often associated with forms of mysticism which have been quietistic and passive.

The theory of Absolutism must be charged with an inability to give an intelligible account of the distinction of truth and error. Each time the belief in the reality of an individual mind is present, there is or there is not such a mind: For Absolutism the finite individual mind is not ultimately real. Thus the belief in such is an error. But if there is an error it must be committed or held by a mind, and as there is only one mind—the Absolute—the Absolute must be subject to error. Further than this, it can only be the Absolute which knows it to be error. Thus, the distinction between truth and error is either false or true. If it is false, to believe in the distinction is an

error—so there is self-contradiction and error still remains. If it is true, error also remains. The conclusion is that on Absolutist grounds we are led to a Mind which deludes itself. This may suit the Absolute, but for finite minds seeking to escape from the bonds of error, this is to trifle with the problem.

Absolutism has never yet been able to give any satisfactory conception of the nature of the historical process. The whole of human history reveals human effort to attain to a condition, be it physical well-being, intellectual knowledge, beauty, moral excellence, or religious peace, other than that actually experienced. The striving has meaning only in so far as thereby it is fully believed that something may be achieved which otherwise would not be. Yet, according to the Absolutist, everything is already perfect—in the Absolute. Here, again, the Absolute must be practising a species of self-delusion, and one may well ask—that is, the Absolute may well ask—whether it can respect itself.

In the historical it is perhaps especially the elements of moral effort, based upon the distinctions between the different types of

moral goods and bads, which are considered of greatest importance. However that may be, the distinction between virtue and vice is held as fundamental. Absolutism may be charged, as before, with eradicating this as an ultimate distinction. For, in the end it must be the Absolute which is the subject of all the sins as of all the virtues. They must be included in the Absolute Mind just as they appear to us, even though also they may appear, as Mr. Bradley puts it "transmuted." The latter term has to cover a multitude of difficulties. Nevertheless, though the one Mind must be the one sinning mind as well as the one virtuous mind, It is perfect. In fact, it would appear that the sins are an element in Its immutable perfection. One may well ask if this is the Object of religious reverence and moral awe. To suppose so, is to raise the question whether the Absolute deludes itself into sinning—for the sake of repentance—*O felix culpa!*

24. If these are some of the conclusions to which we are led by the theory of Absolutism as one mind, a return again to the aspects of common-sense experience, and an attempt

once more to review the whole problem seems almost inevitable. It is unnecessary to endeavour to solve the problem whether the world is first experienced as a one or as a many—if it is experienced as a one it may be merely because the mind which thus experiences is a one. What is undeniable is that by the time the individual has attained an intellectual development sufficiently high to begin philosophical reflection, experience presents a multitude of aspects. Thus a theory—or a group of theories—is formed by insisting on such plurality. The forms of *Pluralism* endeavour to account for experience solely by reference to a multiplicity of particulars. According to Pluralism Reality is a multiplicity of reals. These may be (a) particular sensations, (b) particular ideas, (c) particular relations, (d) particular feelings (e) particular volitions, (f) particular minds.

25. There are not merely different kinds of colours, sounds, tastes, etc., but each colour, each sound, each sensation of any kind is at least unique in its simultaneous relations in time and space. To admit the particularity, the individuality of sensations, is the basis of

a Pluralism of sensations. But on such a basis it is evident that no philosophical view of Reality is possible over and above their mere recognition. Experience is of sensations in relations, temporal and spacial as the most prominent. But each relation may be regarded as itself particular—hence it may be suggested that to the Pluralism of sensations may be added a Pluralism of relations. This, however is to misconceive the very character of relations, which are not without the related. It is just the relations of sensations to one another which give a character of unity in experience and constitutes a large element of its intelligibility. For some most important relations are those of sensations to ideas. Ideas may also be considered as individual and particular—occurring in the minds of individuals at different times and expressing variations of content. Further than this, however, is the fact that it is just in relation to ideas that groups of related sensations are often judged as having meaning. A picture, for example, is a relationship of colours but in such a manner as to express an idea, or a group of ideas. The unity of the picture means especially this, that one central

idea is called up by the sensations in these particular relations. But sensations and ideas are known only as the experience of each individual mind and of this with particular feelings and volitions. There is at least this unity that they are within such a mind. The recognition of other minds than one's own may lead to the theory of a Pluralism of minds. This is Pluralism in its most definite sense.

28. It may be said at once that though sheer Pluralism in the sense that there may be many minds quite unrelated is conceivable—if only because it is conceived—the position has rarely, if indeed ever been maintained. By practically all who would call themselves pluralists, it is admitted that the minds are in some manner related. This admission need not, as so many absolutists suppose, lead one straight to the extreme of Absolutism. For though the relations of sensations and ideas to one another imply a mind in which they exist in relation, it does not follow that for minds to be in relation there must be a sort of all-embracing mind. The metaphysical relationship between minds does not appear

capable of expression in terms of ideas within the minds related. To argue on this ground that therefore there is no plurality of minds, but only one mind (as the absolutist does) is to deny the problem rather than to solve it. Or rather – to deny it in this form – for the relation of the apparent finite minds, which an absolutist must admit is no more intelligible for Absolutism than for Pluralism. To think of the finite minds as within an all-embracing mind as the sensations and ideas are within the finite minds is to make a false analogy on account of an insufficient recognition of the nature of activity, – a serious error of Absolutism. The pluralist will affirm that there are changes in his own experience which are not obviously due to his own activity. He regards them as caused by the influence of other realities (in the position being considered, other minds). Some of his experiences, indeed most, appear to be due to an interaction between his own mind and some other reality, (other mind or minds). *How*¹⁶

16. Hermann Lotze discusses virtually the same question and rejects the notion of what he terms *transcunt* action, regarding all as *immanent*. He maintains that "influence cannot pass over," and thus he gives his philosophy

the interactions occur, or to put it more popularly how the influence passes from one mind to another, neither he nor any other can say.

27. It is the failure to account for the predominant uniformities of experience, the predominant intelligibility of the whole expanse of Nature or the great currents of history, which convicts Pluralism of insufficiency and error. Pluralism is undoubtedly right in insisting on the reality of the particulars, especially of the individual minds. The whole course of the exposition in this book emphasises the importance, indeed, the necessity of beginning with and continually coming back to the particular constituents of experience. But this does not mean that one may or even can avoid the facts and the problems of unity. These facts and these problems are themselves particulars in relation to this side of life and that. But over and

distinctively Absolutist character. But immanent action is certainly no less mysterious than transeunt. We seem here rather to have reached one of those questions which he calls "unanswerable." "How the principles themselves have power to "be" or to "act" is an unanswerable idle enquiry." See *Outlines of Metaphysic*. Eng. trs. by G. T. Ladd 1893. and *Metaphysics*. Eng. trs. B. Bosanquet. 1887. Bk. I. ch. vi.

above such question of unities and uniformities of groups of facts, there is the fact of a predominant unity and of predominant uniformities in the whole as such. These uniformities and this unity it does not seem possible to account for by a mere juxtaposition of minds without some common origin or a controlling power. It is by the recognition of a predominant power and the endeavour to give some basis to the unity and uniformities that from a Pluralism which makes no provision for such we pass to a modified Pluralism which does. The theory thus adopted is sufficiently distinct to be given a specific denomination in spite of its pluralistic affinities. It is *Theism*.

28. Before proceeding further it will be well to make clear the particular problem here involved. The experience of common-sense, which abstract philosophy is not able to replace or eradicate; is of a manifold (of sensations, ideas, judgments, feelings, volitions, minds,) with interrelationships and evidence of uniformities and irregularities, of harmonies and discords, of truths and errors, virtues and vices, pains and pleasures, of co-operation and

opposition. If one may so put it, the fact that the world "holds together," in spite of the oppositions within it, suggests at once that there is a power or somewhat which is the ground of the unity. The problem is to give an intelligible account of this ground and at the same time of the elements of diversity, of individual initiative, especially of discord and the various kinds of bads.

29. *Theism*, the theory that Reality consists of a Supreme Mind and of other minds,¹⁷ appears to be the only important view left to consider in reference to the problem. There have been in the course of history and are still different conceptions as to the meaning of Theism. But of most, if not all, it is correct to say that they represent the Supreme Being as a self-consciousness and do not identify the individual human or other beings or any aspect of the world with Him. God and men

17. The ordinary believer in God also usually believes in a substantial matter produced by God. Berkeley maintained that God might equally well produce the experience of the so-called material directly without the creation of a material substance. For the more pluralistic Theism here outlined the world may similarly be regarded as the impression of spirits upon one another, especially the impression made by God upon lesser minds.

are distinct, even though related. In order to state the position of Theism, as here accepted, it is first necessary to outline what is meant by the term God.

30. God is a self-consciousness. By the previous discussion the belief in the reality of an independent substantial matter was rejected, as was also the agnostic position that Reality is an Unknowable, neither matter nor mind. The conclusion adopted is that all Reality is spiritual, that is, is itself a mind or falls within a mind. God as a Reality is a mind, and by mind is meant mind as known in its essential character by each in his own self-consciousness. Whatever the differences may be God is self-consciousness in precisely the same sense that I am aware of myself as being. It may be willingly admitted that this is anthropomorphic, but it does not imply any physical likeness of God to man. In some sense all human thought may be charged with being anthropomorphic. To call God personal is the same as to call Him *self-conscious.

31. The belief in God depends upon some form or forms of direct experience and upon forms of indirect arguments and reflections. It

must be insisted that the individual does not as a rule come to the belief in God as the result of a course of study or discussion, and neither does he retain it or endeavour to justify it by such means. To him, God is a Reality of Whom he is immediately aware in his religious experience. In a later chapter religious values are to be independently discussed, and further reference is unnecessary here apart from this insistence upon recognition of the fact. This fact must be noticed because like all others it demands to be considered and allowed for in the development of an intellectual theory of Reality. But though (for religion) religious experience is the most important of all sides of life upon which to rest the belief in God, the other sides may and must also be considered as the basis of indirect arguments.

32. The indirect reasons for the belief in God may be said to be cumulative, that is to say, a number of different trains of thought beginning from different facts lead towards the same conclusion. While taken separately any one of these may not appear very strong or compelling, taken together the total effect is to form an argument of no small weight. The

indirect reasons are analogical in character, similar to those in the justification of the belief in other human minds. The essential difference is the greater comprehension of facts forming the basis of the analogy. In the main the argument is from intelligibility to intelligence.

a. The world of Nature as studied by the modern scientist is before all else a realm of order. The so-called Laws of Nature are expressions of uniformities and of regularities. Viewed thus, Nature is no incomprehensible collation of facts but in a greater or less degree a rational system. There is an interconnection between the parts and a predominant unity of plan which transcends the diversities and oppositions which in this and that make themselves evident. This fundamental unity and uniformity it is which makes Nature in the main intelligible. From this the argument passes to the belief in an intelligence which is its ground or cause. On the one hand the belief in God should be one of the strongest reasons for the rejection of those superstitions which attribute caprice to Nature. On the other hand the triumphs of scientific research in discovering order in natural facts should

be regarded not as evidence that Nature is a mere mechanism but is the expression of a rational Reality. It should be noticed that this train of thought does not lead us beyond the idea of an *Intelligent Being*.

b. The ordinary every day experiences of life show quite clearly that human intercourse is possible because of a similarity between the different minds. The capacity to understand a common language, to engage in co-operation for the satisfaction of common needs, these and a thousand other things reveal an essential likeness which transcends the elements of diversity and of opposition. Yet beyond these similarities, the very nature of many of the diversities is such that they are able to fit together to make a wider and a richer whole. This man has the capacity of artist, that of an educationist, another is a statesman, and so on, with the total result of a complex yet intelligible society. It is maintained, therefore, that this degree of similarity united as it is with degrees of dissimilarity so often mutually complementary, suggests a common source, and that an intelligent one, since through these facts human life is predominant-

ly intelligible. Such a train of thought may lead beyond the idea of an intelligent Being, for human life is personal in the broad sense of including sentiments and emotions as well as reason and will. And the source of human life must possess what is essential in it.

c. The wider view of the main currents of human history may also be made the starting point for a train of thought leading up to the conception of a guiding power of more than intellectual character. In spite of the evident differences, even oppositions, of the tendencies of history in different ages, it cannot be denied that those which in any sphere have been considered progressive have been directed towards similar or at least consistent ends. This is true even in the history of morality, where appearances seem opposed. The different ages and peoples have rather emphasised diverse sides of the moral ideal than adopted contradictory views, however contradictory they may seem on a first superficial acquaintance. The development of knowledge, the undoubted evolution of religion, the advances in art, the improvement in social organisation and the control of natural

forces for human ends, these all are also consistent with moral advance. There is here, in spite of backward eddies in this and forward rushes in that, a current of predominantly harmonious tendencies. The argument runs that it is more reasonable to regard this element of unity of direction as due to the influence of a Supreme Being than to the fortuitous interactions of an uncontrolled manifold of minds from no common source. The Supreme Being may be conceived as in nature consistent with the type of ideal which seems to be implied in the great tendencies of history.¹⁸

The indirect argument for the belief in God is thus to maintain that the aspects of unity and uniformity in Nature, the basis of human intercourse in society, the consistency of the great tendencies of history, suggest not

18. It may be pointed out to the general reader that another argument has been elaborated by Mr. Balfour in his *Theism and Humanism*, London 1915, which may appear similar to the above. Mr. Balfour maintains that without the idea of God, as a rational being, and the ground of morality, beauty, etc. such values in their broad sense would lose for us their essential worth. For then they would have to be regarded as the products of an unintelligible and presumably unintelligent somewhat.

merely the presence of a Supreme Power but further that the Power has qualities such as are found in the highest types of human personality which appear in the course of history. Nevertheless, it is impossible to avoid the recognition of the many instances of conflict with the main currents of human life, the oppositions in the realm of infra-human as in human life. The world as known to us is not just simply cosmos, it is only partly such—there are aspects of chaos which philosophising of the Absolutist type does not suffice to explain away. It is in the sphere of human interaction that the aspects of chaos may best be studied and where the individual's consciousness of having led in particular instances to elements of chaos through wrong conduct suggests considerations of the kind of cause upon which chaos depends. Attention must, therefore, be turned to the consideration of the nature of the human soul.

33. The human soul can only be truly known by acquaintance, that is, by self-consciousness, which for us means the mind's immediate awareness of itself. No description is likely to be adequate to the reality, and no

description can mean anything to one not immediately aware of the reality. There is no question of proving the existence of the soul, as some under materialistic influences have at times supposed. The reality of the soul being regarded as self-evident, evident to itself, the present purpose requires consideration of those characteristics of the soul of importance in the elaboration of a philosophy of life.

As the soul is aware of itself, so it is cognisant of its own activity as one of its most prominent features. All attempts to describe or explain activity in terms not involving activity itself have failed, and must fail. Activity is *sui generis*. But activity is associated with some cognitive element as sensations or ideas and some element of feeling. Activity without direction is a mere abstraction. Activity with direction is towards some end indicated by a cognitive element or elements, and it is usually influenced by feeling. That is, activity in the human soul, or of the human soul, is purposive. Now, whatever may appear to be the antecedents of this experience or that, it can never be established that the antecedent is a compelling cause of

the activity in this or that. Each individual act, as an expression of activity, is in itself ultimate, that is, to put it crudely, "there is nothing behind it." The human soul is to be considered as a genuine agent, as a true initiator of changes in experience, whether its own experience or that of others.¹⁹

It is not for us here to give an elaborate analysis of the nature and contents of the human soul: that must be left for treatises on human psychology. The human soul as known to us is known as particular and individual. All its contents in some sense partake of this particularity—even the universal ideas the individual possesses are his particular possessions. The whole of experience is concerned

19. This would lead in a more elaborate treatise to a discussion of human freedom. Without attempting to describe the position or to defend it, I may confess to holding what is frequently regarded as the absurd view of Libertarianism. So called Self-determinism, in my judgment, involves all the difficulties of Determinism and of Libertarianism. Paradoxical as it may sound Determinism is perhaps ultimately dependent upon elements which are Libertarian! No inconsiderable number of recent philosophical writers appear to hold a similar view, but hesitate to admit it. Otherwise they virtually deny the reality of activity and change, and thus the problem of freedom does not truly arise, and may be regarded as delusory.

with an interrelationship of facts and values—the main problems of which in different spheres the chapters of this book discuss. The nature of these facts and values depends largely upon the character of the interaction between souls, human and higher souls, including God. On the basis of the type of philosophy here outlined an individual's suffering and happiness will not depend solely upon his own conduct, but also in part on the influence of God and other wills. For, if we have rejected the belief in matter as a substance, the contents of consciousness are due to the interactions of spirits, or to their own actions upon themselves.

34. In discussing religious values the beliefs concerning the origin of the soul will be considered in more detail. The position so far adopted sufficiently clearly involves the essential dependence of souls on God. But further, in some degree they manifest participation in a unitary plan. The universe is treated Theistically as predominantly orderly and intelligible. If this is considered in its detail in relation to the individual life and the currents in history, there is a ground for the belief that human souls may continue beyond

the present physical life. To contend that human life is unintelligible and worthless apart from such continuance does not seem justified. That would be to deny the intelligibility and the value of very much of what has happened and is happening in our lives. Nevertheless, the immortality of the soul is a belief which is not contradictory to any established truth and does make most lives seem more intelligible than otherwise. On this alone—and it is sufficient—the belief in immortality may justifiably be accepted.

35. The conception of Reality reached is that of a Supreme Mind in active relationship with other minds dependent upon Him, but nevertheless able to diverge in their activities from the main course of His activity. It may be supposed that all other minds but God are limited in their interrelationships, only receiving impressions from and making impressions upon comparatively few minds other than themselves. The contact may, however, grow in extent, and there is no reason why eventually every mind should not come into direct contact with every other mind. As long as this is not the case, error is possible through

any individual mind making judgments going beyond the range of its experience. God may be conceived as in direct contact with all minds, as dependent on Him. But the fact of this Divine contact and the nature of the influence involved is only to be explicitly known by the individual mind by its free activity turned towards God. In such contact also, directly and indirectly, the central meaning of Reality may come to be known. Similarly the character of the aims of lesser minds is only to be clearly understood by a definite effort. The knowledge of truths and the avoidance of errors imply a constant endeavour to come into more direct contact with more and more of the constituents of Reality. This contact is, fortunately, productive of much more than a knowledge of truths; it leads also to the experiences of the beautiful, to moral and to religious values.

CHAPTER III

Aesthetic Values

1. No forms of values except the physical appear to the ordinary common-sense point of view more immediate than those of beauty and its opposite, ugliness. Perhaps this is partly the reason why there has been comparatively little investigation into the character of beauty, especially in the East. *Aesthetic Values* are the goods and bads directly associated with the human capacity to distinguish the beautiful and the ugly. The fact of the existence of such a capacity is undisputed, differences arise with regard to the conception of the psychical constitution of the capacity. With the psychological details of this latter question, the present exposition is not concerned. Neither will it be occupied with a consideration of the contention that the experiences of beauty and ugliness are matters

merely of individual taste. An assertion of that kind can be seriously made only by those who have never given sufficiently long and careful attention to the subject. A factual answer to the question would obviously need a detailed account of the different forms of art in history, with an indication that there have been no fundamental oppositions in the essentials of beauty, but that the elements of diversity, in this sphere of values possibly more than in any other, add to the total worth of the result.

2. There is little need to illustrate with many examples what is here meant by aesthetic goods. They are those impressions, general and felt rather as wholes, which are implied by the terms beautiful birds, flowers, trees, buildings, women, children, beautiful music, painting, sculpture, dawns and sunsets, and so on. A superficial examination may lead the untrained to suppose that most of these are composed simply from beautiful colours, sounds, odours and lines. While some analysis may be attempted later, it is better at the outset to regard the experience of a beautiful object as one impression.

3. Examples of the ugly are, fortunately, not so easy to find. Forms of ugliness are rare amongst flowers, plants and birds. Some animals are usually considered ugly. While in human beauty the form of women in youth has been adjudged as possessing distinctive charm, there can be no doubt that ugliness is seldom more definite than in certain types of old decrepit women of the lower strata of mankind. Apparently, the most repulsive type of ugliness is that of filth and dirt and of the signs of disease which has come mainly through insanitary habits or conditions. On the presence of filth and dirt depends so much of the general impression of ugliness in towns. Some sounds seem ugly even when heard once, or when repeated in one way or another, as a shrill whistle of a locomotive or one-finger tunes on a worn out harmonium rescued by an untrained Indian. Similarly there are bad odours, and discordant shapes.

4. The experiences of beauty and of ugliness are all individual and particular. We are concerned no more with beauty in general than with truth in general. As intellectual values are truths and errors, so aesthetic values

are individual experiences. Aesthetic goods are this, that and the other beautiful tune, heard at this, that or the other time; this particular flower, that painting, and so on. It does not seem possible to form a significant conception of beauty as a common characteristic of particular objects. The beautiful is the sum total of all beautiful objects, whether they have anything in common or not. The effort to obtain the beautiful is the endeavour to obtain objects which give the experience of beauty. Similarly the ugly is the sum total of ugly objects; all ugliness is to be found in particular experiences. There is no ugliness in general, as a kind of common quality.

Aesthetic bads, like the physical pains and the intellectual errors considered in the two previous chapters, are not merely negative. An experience of ugliness is not simply the absence of an experience of beauty. More than is the case with regard to any other type of value many experiences appear almost if not entirely devoid of aesthetic appeal or repulsion. The idea of unity or equality, the hope of immortality, the recognition of the necessity of physical exercise for physical health,

these and a thousand other things are perhaps entirely—at least to all intents and purposes—aesthetically indifferent. An experience of ugliness is as positive in character as an experience of beauty: there is in the former as clearly a positive basis of repulsion as there is in the latter a positive basis of attraction. The experiences of the ugly give no support to—they rather contradict—the theory, discussed and rejected in the Introduction, that all forms of evil are negative or privative, simply the absence of the good, simply an inevitable consequence of the finitude of human minds. As obtaining the beautiful means the effort for particular beautiful objects, so the eradication of the ugly means the destruction of ugly objects, or the prevention of the production of such.

5. The tendencies of modern thought, especially those of the nineteenth century in the West, have led to an emphasis on the biological and the psychological consideration of aesthetic values. It will be seen later that the keen activity which prevailed in the realm of biological research, as one result of the establishment of the theory of evolution, has

had a marked effect on the study of the beautiful, leading to valuable results. The advances in psychology have not had so great an importance in this direction, but they have helped to isolate and make more clear the chief problems involved. The voluntaristic or activistic movements in psychology have led to more explicit recognition of the active attitude and function of the mind in aesthetic appreciation as in artistic endeavour. The Idealistic consideration of aesthetic values goes far more clearly into a comparatively distant past. This was the fundamental type of treatment in ancient Greece and in the Italy of the Renaissance, as of individual philosophical thinkers in non-Latin Europe in post-Reformation times. The Classical Idealism of Germany, following on a period of Romanticism, strengthened the efforts in this direction and Idealistic conceptions of the nature of the beautiful and the ugly have been in the forefront in the study of aesthetics ever since. Each one of these three attitudes must be treated in some detail: a. the *Psychological*; b. the *Biological*; and c. the *Idealistic*.

6. The *Psychological* consideration of aesthetic values adopts, as it were of necessity

and in self-consistency, the attitude that the beautiful and the ugly are modes of psychical or mental experience. Whether there is an object which in itself, *apart from being experienced is in the same manner* beautiful or ugly does not concern the psychologist as psychologist. It may also be said that it need hardly concern anyone else, seeing that it is only as psychical experience that aesthetic values are known and appreciated. But this admission is no ground for refusing to recognise that the experiences of the beautiful and the ugly depend upon something other than the activity of the mind. An analysis makes clear that the experiences depend upon a special capacity or function of the mind exerted in relation to something other than the function itself. The fact of such a special form of apprehension may be regarded as self-evident. In any case, it may justifiably be accepted on the ground that by courses of training it is possible to increase the power of an individual to appreciate the distinctions between aesthetic goods and bads. Similarly the amount of success of creative effort in art may be increased by suitable training. But it is in this connection

apparently more obvious than in most other directions that very much depends upon what is frequently called "a natural gift" or capacity for art and the appreciation of the beautiful. Further to describe the character of this capacity does not seem possible, at least in the present condition of the psychology of beauty.

Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise the necessity of training in order that individuals shall attain their best in the realm of aesthetic goods. Such insistence is all the more needed, in that attention to the aesthetic side of education is in all modern countries more often than not totally inadequate to the place which experiences of the beautiful might reasonably be expected to occupy in life. The manner in which the training is alone possible turns the attention to the objective side of aesthetic experience. For, such training can be only by bringing into relation with the activity of the mind objects which may lead in that relation to the experience of beauty. As apart from the particular aesthetic ability of the mind aesthetic values are not experienced, neither are they apart from some objective counterpart to that ability. For the purpose

of the present exposition of a philosophy of life, therefore, it may be asserted that the nature of Reality is such that something other than the particular human activity may in relation to that activity produce experiences of aesthetic goods and bads. Even a superficial enquiry will establish that the question as to whether this individual or that is to experience examples of beauty or of ugliness depends in part upon the amount and nature of the human activity exerted. And here it is to be noted that again the best aesthetic goods are attained only by a large amount of social co-operation, however necessary it may be for the particular individual to use his own capacity whether in appreciation or in creative endeavour.

7. All attempts to define what constitutes the beauty of a beautiful experience or the ugliness of an ugly one in terms which do not already imply these aesthetic values may be said to have failed. Psychological analysis leads at the most to an indication of the factors of a total experience which attract as beautiful or repel as ugly. Just why this or that should be beautiful or ugly, just what constitutes the

beauty or ugliness of this or that, it seems impossible adequately to describe in any terms. Aesthetic values are *sui generis*, and they are indefinable. "You may lead a horse to the water but you cannot make him drink." You may indicate to another in this way and in that, that in certain circumstances you have an experience of beauty, but you cannot make the other experience the beauty. In the end it is a matter of immediate experience, of knowledge by acquaintance, for each and every individual. But none the less evident is it that human minds are sufficiently similar that in similar conditions they experience in the main similar aesthetic values, and further that they are able to co-operate to the production of conditions which involve the eradication or modification of the ugly and increase in the experiences of the beautiful. The development of art and of the appreciation of the beautiful shows a certain degree of unity and uniformity or consistency amongst men. To maintain that the beautiful and the ugly are as such indefinable is not to deny the importance of further consideration of the individual experiences and the conditions of their enjoyment.

8. Thus, for example, there are good grounds for maintaining that many experiences of the beautiful have the characteristic of intelligibility. They do not present the appearance of ineradicable and irreconcilable oppositions. Oppositions there may be—as in tragic drama—but the experiences are of beauty just in so far as a transcendence of the oppositions is suggested, even if not explicitly expressed or displayed.²⁰ The impression of a lack of order, of a tangled chaos, though it may arouse strong sentiments cannot be called beautiful. The characteristic of order and intelligibility which is found so frequently in aesthetic goods suggests their relation with reason. That which is disorderly, which resists the attempts at rational comprehension, gives more often than not the impression of ugliness. A certain degree of regularity and uniformity, of “balance” as one may say, is to be found in many examples of the beautiful. It may even be said that where the irregularity predominates over the uniformity, the general result is likely to be ugly rather than otherwise. Flowers and plants

20. The appeal of tragic drama is, of course, not merely aesthetical, it is usually also ethical.

have usually a large element of symmetry in their leaves; there is a poise and balance about the branches of a magnificent tree. However unsymmetrical a sculpture may be, if it is beautiful at all it will be found to have its parts in balanced proportions. In music, from its simplest to its highest forms, there is much regularity and rhythm, and in this poetry is similar. The order implied aids in the comprehension, and constitutes part of the intelligibility. Yet in spite of the intellectualistic character of so many attempts at theories of aesthetic values, it may be said that the most superficial acquaintance with the beautiful will show that such form can never constitute what is most essential. If it did, any trivial words or combination of sounds would have to be called beautiful as long as regularity and rhythm were present. Intelligibility must also include rational significance.

9. Notwithstanding the rational character of many experiences of the beautiful and the suggestion of the absence of reason in those of the ugly, aesthetic values, as the name implies, are more definitely associated with feelings than with intellect. The fact that in

the highest stages of human development the feelings associated with the beautiful and the ugly are very restrained and controlled, must not mislead in this matter. For it is manifest that rational control of feelings is also increasingly present in other spheres such as that of religion, the higher the development. The experiences of the beautiful frequently arouse strong emotions without the individual being able to recognise or express very definitely the reasons. At almost all stages of the history of mankind beautiful colours, as of clothes, and music, vocal and instrumental, have been used as expressions of joy and as means for arousing joyous sentiments. Dancing, as a type of beautiful rhythm of movement; processions and decorations at times of festivity, are further examples of appeals to and expressions of feelings of a happy kind. Some examples of the beautiful call up feelings of admiration and awe, others of peaceful rest and calm.²¹

21. The nature of the feelings aroused varies with the mood or disposition of the individual. Thus, in a state of sadness or grief some music would irritate which in other circumstances would be the occasion for increased cheerfulness.

The ugly, on the other hand, is far more frequently associated with feelings of repulsion, disgust and despair. In the child and the primitive mind the ugly not infrequently arouses feelings of fear. The later discussion will bring into relief our main contention as to the relation of the feelings to aesthetic values. For the feelings have a close connection with biological conditions, and the biological consideration of aesthetic values demands independent treatment.

10. The *Biological* theories concerning beauty relate it to the process of evolution and those particular aspects of it denoted by the terms Natural and Sexual Selection. To refer first to the latter; it needs no enumeration of examples to support the contention that in mating beauty plays a part. It is the bird with the more beautiful song or the more profuse and gay feathers which attracts more easily a mate. The flowers with a beautiful odour and colour or with the sweet honey attract the insects which aid in their fertilisation and propagation. Amongst mankind also it is apparent that the attractions of the sexes due to types of beauty lead on, if not deliberately

restrained, finally however gradually to the feeling of sex impulse and procreation. If the various conventions affecting marriage, due to the development of other sides of human social life were abandoned, there can be little doubt that the sex relationship would depend largely in its incipient stages on the attraction of beauty. Thus the tendency would be, as it is already to no inconsiderable degree in some species, for the more and more beautiful to be selected and thus continued and the less beautiful to die out. Apart from the other factors which affect the development, it may be maintained that the evolution of the beautiful is an aspect of general biological evolution.

11. . Attention to some of the implications of the conception of Natural Selection will lead to the recognition of a most important truth in regard to aesthetic values. Those which tend to survive in the struggle for existence are those individuals or species which have at least sufficient strength to protect themselves against opposing forces of any and every kind. Of constitutional strength or vitality, it may be said that it is (a) deficient in view of needs; or (b) sufficient; or (c) super-

abundant. The last two will survive and the first may be expected sooner or later to die out. The energy of the (b) group will be all utilised in the ordinary processes and demands of continuance. But with the third group (c) there is a surplus over and above what is needed for mere individual continuance. Such surplus tends to be used up in a variety of ways. Almost inevitably among the infra-human, and frequently among the human it leads to a full-blooded procreative activity. But, and this is the chief thing in the present connection, it also expresses itself in forms of beauty. It is the strong well-fed peacock which grows the most impressive tail and succeeds both in attracting the mate and in the conflict with its rivals. All that is contended here is that in the realm of nature a large number of the instances of the beautiful are due to a superabundance of energy over the minimum needs of continuance.

Even more obvious does the opposite implication appear: that deficiency leads to a condition of the organism giving an impression of ugliness. A half starved pariah dog, a plant drooping through insufficient moisture, a feeble debilitat-

ed human being—these and a thousand other similar examples of the lack of vitality in comparison with the demands of a normal type of existence arouse the sense of aesthetic repulsion, of ugliness. So also in art such as sculpture or architecture impressions of beauty are marred by any disproportion which suggests in one part or another a certain degree of relative weakness.

In many, if not indeed most instances, a real sufficiency without any excess, gives an experience of beauty. This is practically the same as to say, for example, that any healthy, normally constituted, human body is a thing of beauty. Though it would hardly be justifiable dogmatically to assert such a principle for all living species, for the majority of them it undoubtedly holds true. There is apparent an intimate relation between physical sanity and general well-being and the beauty of the living organism. In striving for physical welfare mankind may at the same time be also following a most important path to increase the extent and number of experiences of beauty. This constitutes a significant fact in relation to the problem of the unity of values.

12. Turning now from this treatment of aesthetic values as found in the individuals of this species or that, to the experiences of beauty due to the creative activity of men in social conditions, practically the same contentions seem to be valid. Art has only been able to flourish to any considerable extent, to an extent to make an appreciable difference in social life, when either the sufficiency of resources to needs has been carefully organised in relation to those needs, or there has been a real superabundance of wealth. As the forms of society and the products of social co-operation are affected especially by the ends adopted and the means used, the question of aesthetic values is here more one of a deliberate conscious kind than that concerning such values in particular living organisms. That is, given adequacy or excess of resources to needs for the physiological needs of the particular organism, beauty generally results without conscious effort to produce it. This is not the case with regard to the beauty of cities and other forms of satisfaction of social needs. Nevertheless, the same general principles hold, although conscious social co-operation is more or less necessary.

When there is a deficiency of resources, either of human energy or of the required materials, dwellings and cities are likely to be of the simplest and most often of a crude type, and of sculpture and decorative forms of art little is to be expected. If there is a sufficiency of resources, beauty will be produced in such and other forms of art only if the capacity of aesthetic creation and appreciation actively asserts itself. The same is true with regard to conditions in which there is a definite excess of resources over needs. Although in times of general poverty artists of various kinds have indeed lived precariously and produced masterpieces, there has never been in such circumstances what may justifiably be called a flourishing characteristic art. Where in these conditions the artist has succeeded, it has been rather out of the superabundant energy of his individual spirit.

The thesis here maintained, that aesthetic values have relation to deficiency, sufficiency, or excess of energy and materials under or over the requirements of mere continuance, receives considerable support from the study of *The Revolutions of Civilisation* by Dr. Flinders

Petrie, in which forms of art are the chief data examined. The author with good effect endeavours to show that the highest levels of art have been reached when two peoples have become sufficiently amalgamated as veritably to constitute a new people, stronger and more comprehensive in character than either of the two. At this stage the energy and resources are likely to be not merely sufficient for but in excess over needs. Artistic creation has often proved a main outlet for the surplus. But some of the surplus—perhaps the greater part—has been used to provide an excess of physical pleasures or to provide for needs apart from further and continuous effort. There has set in a period of luxury and then of idleness, followed by a tendency for the race to become weakened, and eventually becoming deficient, to lose its higher art, even finally to succumb to the attacks of another and a stronger people.

The suggestion in the foregoing exposition is that a people, out of the surplus of its energy and resources, or in the ordinary use of a sufficiency of energy and resources, may develop an art, that is, produce experiences of beauty, and this as something indigenous,

arising from the aesthetic capacities of the individuals in their social relationship. One definite set of aesthetic goods would undoubtedly be the beauties of the physical bodies of the individuals in the society. To say this is, in accordance with our previous contention, to imply that the individuals will have their physical needs satisfied and be physically fit. Only in these conditions is there a probability for the development of aesthetic values in the most comprehensive sense and their enjoyment by the people in general. But the directing elements of governments and selfish individuals or groups of individuals have and do still come into the matter and produce important modifications in practice. Thus, those who control labour and the sources of the satisfaction of the main physical needs, have taken, and still too often take, so great a proportion of the products of the interaction of labour and these sources, that the physical welfare of great numbers of individuals is not attained to a degree necessary for their bodies to be beautiful. Here, therefore, selfishness—a moral bad—interferes with the attainment of widespread physical and aesthetic goods. Sometimes the surplus

which has thus accrued to particular individuals or groups of individuals has been used for the patronage of art—but then chiefly in inanimate things, such as sculptures, music and paintings. A similar situation sometimes arises when governments, owing to the particular interests of ruling princes or the influence of members of the dominant and wealthier classes embark upon artistic undertakings, as the building of beautiful cities or parts of such, the encouragement of music and painting, and so on. If such results are obtained simply by careful organisation of the resources of a people having a mere sufficiency, in such a manner that the very great majority (if, indeed, not all) suffer no deficiency in regard to physical welfare, or if such results are obtained from a superabundance of energy and resources all is well. But it is not without reason that one asks: How often has this been or how often is this the case? The lesson of history is fairly clear that in empires where the encouragement of these inanimate forms of beauty has ultimately depended upon an excessive taxation or an oppression (by governments or others) of the masses of the people, downfall has sooner or

later resulted. An impoverished people has rightly succumbed to a more strong, healthy and if the view proposed is correct—more beautiful race. The inanimate aesthetic goods have then been destroyed in the time of conflict, or have passed to the conquering race.

The practical implication is clear. The forces of government should be exercised in such a manner that the first forms of beauty which are encouraged are those of living human bodies. A government should not allow those of the non-labouring classes to indulge in other forms of aesthetic values, at the expense of the physical strength, health and beauty of the individuals of labouring classes. So again, no government can be considered justified in carrying out aesthetic schemes until the general physical welfare of its subjects is thoroughly and adequately provided for.²²

13. Whatever the degree of validity of these biological theories, it is still correct and important to maintain, as in the psychological

22. To be more explicit: the provision of sanitary dwellings for all, of wide clean streets and open places should take precedence of expensive public buildings and palaces. This is especially important if, as is usual, there is a conflict between the two *desiderata*.

consideration of aesthetic values, that beauty and ugliness are indefinable. A careful psychological analysis of aesthetic experiences will, however, insist that there are other frequent characteristics of such experiences, besides those which form the central facts of the biological treatment. It is in large measure these other characteristics which are fundamental in the Idealistic attitude towards aesthetic goods and bads. For the essential nature of Idealism is to view experience as intelligible and significant, a rational whole or a part of such. Thus, from one point of view it may be maintained that there is an experience of beauty only when there is coherence, a certain unity, regularity or uniformity. Aesthetic bads or the ugly involve the absence of these aspects. But in what is supposed to be its profoundest form, the Idealist conception implies that aesthetic goods are the expression of types of spiritual ideas and feelings and call forth in the experient such feelings and ideas. It is in some agreement and similarity with this that Mr. Balfour has urged that beauty would not have the worth it has for us, if it did not imply a mind as its source. Aesthetic

goods, thus regarded, are a form of manifestation of mind to mind—or for the consistent Absolutist, a form of manifestation of the Absolute to Itself.

14. In discussing the Idealistic suggestions concerning the aesthetic, it is well to distinguish the values due to some degree to human activity, and those not so due. This distinction is sometimes described at that between beauty in Nature and beauty in Art. The human artist is limited to the manipulation of elements given by Nature. The questions for answer concern the character of these elements and how they are treated in order to produce experiences of the beautiful. The Idealist conception rests predominantly on the answer to the latter question.

Aesthetic goods being experienced immediately in relation with so-called external Nature without any conscious modifying activity of man, the answer to the last mentioned question is sometimes given, that beauty is to be attained in artistic endeavour by copying Nature, being true to facts. If this attitude of "Realism" and "Naturalism" is accepted, then aesthetic values in Art may be considered

as, essentially similar to those of Nature. In contrast with any such mere copying, the Idealistic contention is that "to be true to facts" is to go beyond appearances to the inner significance. The mind of the artist by its distinct aesthetic capacity is able to re-present with modifications the materials obtained from Nature. The result of his activity is to be regarded as genuine Art, as real aesthetic goods, just in so far as it arouses experiences which are immediately intuited as more beautiful than Nature unmodified. The activity of the artist is to eradicate the aspects which arouse a sense of repulsion and ugliness, and to call forth feelings such as are associated with beauty. For Idealism this beauty in Art is, whether in itself definable or not, a form of expression of spirit. And as the Idealist conceives the whole of Reality as spiritual, beauty in Nature is also regarded by him as rightly understood and appreciated only in the same manner.

15. Consideration of the activity of the artist in each and every kind of Art, especially from the standpoint of the Idealist position just discussed, leads to the recognition of some

usefulness in the differentiation between *matter* and *form*. True, there is no formless matter, and nothing mere form, but under certain forces there are variations in form. To some extent therefore it is possible to abstract in thought aspects which may appropriately be termed *matter* and others *form*. The artist has to choose his material, suitable for and possessing a form at least not opposed to the form which he wishes to produce. There are, for example, considerable differences in the aesthetic results possible in wood, copper, granite, or marble. But while many of the qualities of the material are important for the consideration of the artist, they may not come directly into the concern of the persons appreciating aesthetic goods. It is the *matter* and *form* as it is for these latter with which the present exposition has to do. And in accordance with the individualising and particularising character of the method here adopted, it is necessary to survey in some detail the different types of what may be called the *matter* of aesthetic values, and further to enquire into the main characteristics of *forms*.

The distinction of matter and form applies

to aesthetic values in Nature as well as in Art. It will be found that even though the Idealist may emphasise an idealising in the forms of Art, this idealisation is only possible (at least according to the Idealist philosophical standpoint) because the inner nature and even the original form of the material is essentially consistent with the highest of which Art is capable. The action and reaction of man and Nature are considered as movements or relations within a significant whole. The tendency with all such types of theory is to discount Nature as immediately perceived, and thus also to explain away the ugly. Instead of a radical distinction aesthetic values are differentiated in degrees. But the difference between the ugly and the beautiful cannot be seriously considered to be merely relative in the manner implied. Nevertheless, it still remains to be investigated whether ugliness is due to what has been called the *matter* or what has been called the *form*. For a practical philosophy of life this is a most important question because if the experiences of ugliness are chiefly or entirely due to *form* then it may be possible by means of human activity to

modify the *form* and so change the character of the aesthetic result. For this enquiry it will be best to review first some of the chief divisions of the *matter* of aesthetic values.

16. The simplest and most evident constituents of the *matter* of aesthetic goods and bads are the impressions of the senses, especially the sensations of colour and of sound, and to a less degree of odour and taste. Whatever may be the ideal or intelligible factor in works of Art—or even in Nature—some of these sensations constitute important elements of direct appeal (or possibly repulsion). With regard to these sensations the question is whether in themselves they are examples of beauty or of ugliness. Now, if aesthetic values are to be known only by immediate acquaintance, a complete answer might be given to the question only as the conclusion of an immediate acquaintance with each and every particular sensation. And that is obviously something that none would venture to claim. In this, therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge that all that can be reached is a view which is to be accepted either as probable, in the sense that it fits into the general philosophy of

life as implying an intelligible Reality, or as possible, and thus at least as a basis for practical conduct. An important gain would be achieved if it could be justifiably maintained that no sensation, as such, is in itself an aesthetic bad.

17. Colours are amongst the most generally experienced aesthetic values. That very many, indeed most, colours are in themselves beautiful is admitted. Are any colours, as such, ugly? Some persons will be inclined to answer immediately in the affirmative. The difficulty is to find any examples of colours in themselves ugly. For it is important to remember that not infrequently a certain repulsion is felt at the sight of an object or of a colour not because of anything disagreeable in the colour, but because of associations. Blood red patches may cause a shudder and a feeling of repulsion because of their suggestion of some foul event. The colour of ordinary earth may similarly appear repugnant on account of some of its associations. Some persons in the West find the use of all black for clothing at least not beautiful, even sometimes as ugly, and this probably because black is connected with

mourning and the thought of death. Similarly, on the other hand, particular colours have greater attraction, and are described as more beautiful, partly because of special or frequent connection with experiences of joy. Another important fact is that we rarely, if ever, experience a pure simple sensation of any particular colour. It is not clear how one could decide in any particular case whether the sensation is actually simple. All that could justifiably be said is that as far as introspection and analysis have gone, a particular experience does not appear to be complex. Thus, it would always be possible to say with regard to the experience of any colour, which is said to be ugly, that this impression is due to the relations between certain simple colours which are combined in this, which is a complex. The contention is not unreasonable, even though unprovable, that every pure sensation of colour is in itself or would be, if experienced, beautiful, or at least, not ugly. To re-iterate: there is no way of proving, or disproving, the contention except by each particular simple sensation of colour being brought before the bar of aesthetic judgment.

But though no colours may be ugly, colours may differ in the degree of their attraction as beautiful. Some may appear almost at the level of indifference, while others may be immediately acknowledged by all to be of great aesthetic attraction. So again, the fact that different individuals regard different colours as more or less beautiful does not affect the contention. Rather, in the influence on the general aesthetic experiences of mankind, that fact has a great and important significance. For, as different individuals tend to emphasise different colours the total effect is more varied and rich than it might otherwise be. This has its obvious practical application in the realm of human dress, in the decoration of dwellings and buildings generally, in the choice of flowers in gardens, and so on. The acceptance of the view that all colours are as such aesthetic goods may be made the basis of a faith inspiring activity to discover possible colours not yet experienced, and further to enquire into the causes of appearances of ugliness in this direction, with the purpose of endeavouring to modify the relationships which *ex hypothesi* may be implied.

18. The general nature of the treatment of sounds is the same as that for colours. Music, as the type of aesthetic experience in which sound sensations are chiefly found, is obviously dependent to a very large extent on the relations between the sounds. Nevertheless, the nature of the individual sounds in themselves is of indisputable importance. It will be readily admitted that some sounds are in themselves beautiful. The question is whether any particular sound sensations are in themselves ugly. Once more some will answer immediately in the affirmative. And, without doubt, most individuals could give examples from their own experience. But, as with colour sensations, so with sounds, it is extremely difficult psychologically to decide what sounds are simple. Further, it is well known that some combinations of sounds—discords—are generally judged to be ugly. The contention may thus again be ventured in this connection also, that all simple sensations may be aesthetic goods, or at least not aesthetic bads.

If no individual simple sounds are ugly, it may still be that some sounds are more attractive as beautiful than others. Some may indeed

be almost at a level of aesthetic indifference. Different sounds or series of sounds appeal to different persons. Different races have evolved diverse kinds of musical instruments. The result is to increase the variety of aesthetic goods and the general richness of the total result. Experience also proves that for the appreciation of the beautiful in the realm of music active endeavour and frequently a large amount of training is necessary. These aesthetic goods do not come without some effort on the part of the individual. Much also depends upon the nature of the musical instruments and these are due in large measure not merely to aesthetic capacity but also to an intellectual knowledge of physics, the proper kinds of materials and the skill to manipulate them. Further, in vocal music it may be justifiable to contend that on the whole better results are likely to be obtained the better the physical health of the singer. It is even probable that the physical health of the listener affects his enjoyment of aesthetic values. Thus, therefore, good grounds may be found for believing in an intimate connection between these aesthetic values and physical well-being and intellectual knowledge.

19. Though it is not unusual to talk of a beautiful odour, it is seldom that one uses the term an "ugly" one. The phrase employed is "bad" or "unpleasant odour". This is only an example of the manner in which popular phraseology lacks the uniformity expected in scientific exposition. Viewed physiologically and even psychologically odours are distinctly complex experiences. Repulsion sometimes arises through causes which only apparently are due to odour. Such causes may be irritation rather of the nature of touch of the nerves in the nasal cavities. But in so far as it is possible to conceive of odours as particular experiences similar questions may be raised to those discussed in the last two sections. Are there any simple odours which in themselves are ugly? Or does repulsion arise through a complex of two or more odours which do not go well together? If the latter, it may be possible by means of human effort to isolate and regroup odours so that the bads may be eradicated and the goods increased. It is not open to denial that some odours experienced together produce a total effect which is repulsive. It may be that all aesthetic bads in this direction

are similarly caused by such combinations. This, at least in the present condition of investigation into the physiology and the psychology of smell, does not seem capable of proof, but on the other hand there is no definite reason against the correctness of the view. Examples will easily be called to mind by most readers in which odours have been deemed and continue to appear disagreeable to a very large extent owing to the associations in which they arise. Again, many odours which at first repel come afterwards to have an attraction. But, over against this truth is to be set the other that beautiful odours become repellent if continued very long. Rightly or wrongly aesthetic goods and bads of this type do not occupy a prominent place in human interests. The chief attention to the production of beautiful odours is in the manufacture of scents and in the burning of scented gums or woods. One is justified in saying: let us experience all beautiful odours, and certainly let us eradicate the bad ones. But it must be asked whether mankind in existing conditions can spare the activity from other aims to occupy itself much with the aesthetic goods and bads of odours.

20. Many persons will raise this last question also in reference to tastes. But tastes are not quite parallel with odours in human experience. To eat and to drink are for most individuals daily necessities, or are accepted as such, and it makes a considerable difference to the general disposition whether the articles of diet are or are not usually palatable. After all, if men must eat and drink to live, (and they decide to try to live) it is best that the tastes of their food shall be the best compatible with their character as means of nourishment. Incidentally it may also be insisted that digestion is aided by that enjoyment of food due to good tastes. Though the ordinary person does not think of tastes as kinds of aesthetic values, referring to them as pleasant and unpleasant, it is more consistent with a scientific exposition to call them beautiful and ugly. The fact that these terms are rarely used in this connection is probably due to a more or less general agreement that however much attention may be given to tastes they rank as values far below those aesthetic goods of Nature and Art which are usually called beautiful. To adhere to this opinion

in no way provides an excuse for lack of all possible attention to tastes.

The general experiences of taste are, like those of odours, physiologically and psychologically complex. In many instances the experiences of taste appear in part to depend on those of smell, as most have noticed in the apparent loss of flavour in e. g. a fruit when one eats it while suffering from a nasal catarrh. But leaving the implicated intricate physiological and psychological investigations on one side, it suffices for our purpose to treat tastes as though in themselves simple or complex. In this realm of aesthetic goods and bads the contention adopted with regard to colours, sounds and odours again seems applicable. That certain combinations of tastes are good will not be denied. It is equally easy to find examples where combinations of tastes are regarded as bad. The Frenchman is reputed to detest that concoction of sugar, vinegar, and mint going by the name of mint-sauce, of which many English people are particularly fond. The question: Are any simple tastes in themselves repulsive or ugly? may be answered, though not dogmatically, with a

negative. The task is to isolate what may be called simple tastes and to regroup them in such manner as to avoid results which are bad. Here, as before, the experiences of the goods are dependent upon effort turned in these particular directions. These are nevertheless values upon the attainment of which a large amount of emphasis cannot be placed if other values are to be given the higher relative position which in most instances they rightly claim.

21. The view adopted with reference to the aesthetic characters of the sensations of colours, sounds, odours and tastes is briefly summed up in this main suggestion that there being no definite evidence that any simple sensations are in themselves ugly, it is allowable to suppose that none are so. The experiences of the ugly are due, according to this theory, to the manner in which sensations are experienced together. It is just in regard to the relations between sensations that human activity may make its effects felt, and so there is a basis for hope that eventually all the relations producing bad results may be changed. The manner in which sensations are related in large measure

constitutes what has above been called *form* in aesthetic experiences. The meaning or significance, the intelligibility, the tendency to arouse emotions, all depend on the *forms* in the aesthetic experiences. Into the great variety of these—almost as diverse as the number of individual experiences of the beautiful and the ugly, it is not possible to enquire adequately. Attention may be centred upon some typical forms or upon some characteristics of forms which will enable the reader to see some connection between this consideration of aesthetic goods and bads and the biological.

Although beauty or ugliness of *form* is no more definable than beauty or ugliness of *matter* there are in many instances of beauty distinct characteristics which can be denoted. The first suggestion to be made in this connection is that the form of an experience will produce an impression of beauty or of ugliness according to whether it implies a sufficiency or a deficiency of strength in relation to needs. The main effect must be of strength, judged according to the strength which might be expected in the circumstances. It might be better to say that there should be no indication

of weakness, for an excess of strength may appear to repel. This latter fact may not be really due to the excess of strength itself but indirectly to the, by contrast, suggested weakness of some other co-existent element of the experience. This contention fits in with the conclusions accepted from the biological consideration of aesthetic values. It is also applicable to much in Art. Pillars supporting an arch or roof, to take a simple example, rarely if ever give the impression of beauty if they *appear* too weak to bear the weight of that which they are meant to support. Mere excess of strength is not in itself beautiful, but must be seen to have been used up in the production of some forms intrinsically beautiful, as in decoration and ornament.

22. The position just described is one way of saying that a sense of proportion is associated with the beautiful and of disproportion with the ugly. But it applies especially to those instances in which there is a question of a balance of forces. Perhaps in all such aesthetic proportion there is real or implied balance of forces, seeing that the human mind as active and dynamic tends to interpret what is other

than itself as of the same essential dynamic character as itself. That which is really or metaphorically "dead," static, or lifeless, rarely arouses aesthetic appreciation. Proportion and disproportion are suggestive (in Nature and works of Art) of harmony or disharmony, of oppositions reconciled or unreconciled. If this is what is essential in proportion it is clear that symmetry, that is, a distinct similarity of one half (or part) of an object with the other, is not necessarily involved. There can be and most often is in Nature and Art proportion without symmetry. Nevertheless to many of the less educated the symmetrical makes a strong appeal. To others the symmetrical, especially if repeated becomes monotonous. The question as to the part played by the symmetrical in the experiences of beauty is an aspect of the problem of uniformity, regularity and rhythm in aesthetic goods.

23. A marked feature of most early attempts to produce experiences aesthetically pleasing is the character of uniformity and of repetition in regular sequence. This is evident in primitive forms of decoration, and especially so in

early song and the dances which such song usually accompanies. But an element of regularity and repetition, at least of form, is found in many of the very highest and very latest aesthetic experiences, whether of music, poetry, dancing or decoration. The more advanced mind, especially the Western type, finds monotonous and wearisome the constant repetition of a single type of simple motion (as in the dance of the Todas of the Nilgiri Hills and most simple peoples) or of the same short melody. But when the melody remains the same there are most often slight changes in the words of the different lines of even primitive songs. It nevertheless remains true to say that the feature of regularity and rhythm continues to predominate in the most advanced Art of this kind: the existence of a science of music and of poetic form sufficiently proves it. It is almost equally true to say that the most advanced Art—like the most beautiful in Nature—has the greatest possible amount of diversity consistent with the predominance of uniformity.

A consideration of the difference in aesthetic appeal of, let us say, a somewhat complex

piece of music heard for the first time and when heard after one has "got the swing of it"—to put the matter popularly—brings out the importance of the view. At first one feels unable to grasp the tune: later, definite sequences begin to be evident, and with a clear consciousness of a certain order and regularity the parts and the whole appear intelligible and the beauty felt. At this stage there is a sense of triumph over what was previously in a sort of opposition to the human spirit. If there were no uniformity, no regularity, no intelligible order, this sense of having grasped the whole, having "mastered" it, would rarely come. The simple movements of the early forms of dancing, the constantly repeated short melodies in song and the recurring forms of early poetry—all these give a feeling of facility and of power. Here the easy flow of sensation, thought, and feeling is uninterrupted, and the mind is not aware of any weakness in relation to what is (in this particular experience) beyond itself. Once again, therefore, it seems that if the individual experient is in some sense conscious at least of a sufficiency of power (of whatever particular kind) or of an

excess in face of the particular object, the experience of beauty will be felt if that particular object, be it natural scenery, music, painting, poetry, or any other form of Art is in itself objectively beautiful. That in which there is regularity, uniformity, rhythm, is more easy for the human mind to grasp with regard to its form, and for this reason it so often constitutes one aspect of experiences of the beautiful.

Similarly it is in the main true that the chaotic, the irregular, the disorderly, that which lacks rhythm, is more or less unintelligible to the human mind, and bears not infrequently the character of ugliness. If there is no actual uniformity and regularity, there must at least be a congruency or harmony of the parts with one another and the general idea of the whole. Viewed in itself a curve is comparatively beautiful when contrasted with a zigzag with quite unequal angles and lines. But if the zigzag is a congruent element in a picture, as for example, the outline of some rocks, then it forms part of a whole which as a whole may be felt as beautiful. From this, and many similar examples, it may be maintained that regularity, uniformity, rhythm are

not so much in themselves beautiful—they may even present a monotonous ugliness—but are such chiefly in relation to a controlling conception.

24. The account so far given has attempted to centre attention on the ultimate factors of aesthetic experiences, by way of analysis. This is evidently in a marked degree abstract. The experiences of the beautiful and the ugly are predominantly synoptic, that is, grasped as wholes, which are usually complex. And from this point of view the suggestion of ideas and the arousing of sentiments become more significant. For example, the beautiful has been and still is a source of religious emotion and is made a form of expression of religious idealism. National character has endeavoured to embody itself in works of Art, and beauty in the environment has helped to mould national character. Not a few find a certain type of beauty in what may be called mere "fitness," that is, the exact working together of parts or organs in a system. But it seems essential in most cases that the beautiful shall be grasped as one impression, synoptically (as distinct from analytically or synthetically)

however complex it may be. Whether there is a mind which can and does grasp the whole complex of Reality as one experience of beauty or not, such an experience is the ideal to which thought points. But mankind is certainly at no such point of view. For it, the beautiful consists of a number of particular experiences with no apparent intelligible relation, and it is with such particular experiences that its activity is concerned.

25. Aesthetic values may be divided into those which are dependent upon human activity to any degree whatever and those which are not so. Thus, for many the starry heavens above have an aesthetic appeal so great as to arouse in them a feeling of the presence of a divine creator. Here human activity can achieve no change, except in the means by which the heavens may be surveyed. There is a beauty of the sea and of the mountains, of mighty rivers and plains, all independent of human planning. The charm of the flower, of the child, the youth and maid, and of strong healthy manhood—how little these are produced by human effort? Nevertheless, it is just in some of these latter that human

thought and care can accomplish some of its best, and a practical philosophy of life should centre the attention of men on the concrete types of beauty which they should endeavour to achieve.

The beauty of the human form depends, as experience has amply proved, upon physical conditions, prenatal as well as postnatal. Here a sufficiency of good food and other physical necessities must be accompanied by vigorous exercise and good habits. The aesthetic appeal of the human person is in considerable measure related to the impression of the features. Here a look of intelligence and of moral character is essential. Religious Art has frequently enough depicted the beauty of the features of the saint. Surely, also, there is a beauty of motion of the human body, as in walking, which appeals not merely to the aesthetic consciousness but also to the feeling of dignity and self-respect. The fact of the need of dress gives to mankind an opportunity for endless variety of artistic effort and aesthetic appeal. The same may be said of the need for dwellings. Human sentiment, such as that of the respect and praise of ancestors

or the great leaders of mankind, leads again to works of Art. Religious emotions have formed a spring of inspiration to the production of some of the finest music, paintings, sculpture and architecture that the world has known.

That is one side of the picture. The other appears equally impressive. Physical unfitness, imbecility, lack of intelligence and moral character, vicious habits, lack of self-respect, all these are intimately associated with forms of human ugliness. A meanness of religious conception and a narrowness of feeling, how often these have been found with a poverty of architecture in religious buildings! To what is the sordidness of so many towns in East and West due more than to the selfishness of industrial capitalism and the apathy of officialdom? In this realm of experience at least, moral idealism goes hand in hand with cleanliness and beauty. Another fact is worthy of notice, that a keen interest in the beautiful, as any particular kind of Art, is not simply a good in itself, but one of the best positive counterattractions to the impulses leading to moral evil. The once alleged conflict between

Art and morality was due to a narrow conception of the latter and a debased conception of the former.

26. Aesthetics has sometimes been called the dessert of the philosophic diet. This seems to suggest that it does not relate to a predominant necessity of human life. Whatever may be thought of the need of the science of Aesthetics—and in its present condition it can hardly be accorded much value,—it may quite reasonably be maintained that any lack of feeling of a need of the beautiful, whether in Nature or Art, is a characteristic of a stage of development distinctly lower than the highest. This applies to individual persons, to small communities and to human races. As on the one hand they do not manifest themselves so imperatively as physical, intellectual, moral, and religious needs, on the other hand aesthetic values are in large measure an accompaniment to the satisfaction of these needs. One thing seems certain, that indefinable as aesthetic values may be, and however one may subject aesthetic experiences to an abstract form of analysis, a living Art is possible only in definite relation with a

more or less active life dominated by comprehensive ideals. Further, it may be maintained that in the past far too much emphasis has been placed on the more passive receptive side of the experiences of the beautiful than on the active creative side. Yet it is particularly in the latter that the inner spirit is truly known, and the artist's work may be appreciated only in the degree in which it calls forth in others an echo of that creative spirit. There is thus from the side of aesthetic values, as from those of the physical and the intellectual a definite call for activity; an activity directed to the attainment of particular individual aesthetic goods and the eradication of particular aesthetic bads; an activity in which each person is called to share according to his capacity; an activity which yields its best results with organised co-operation. The wealth of beauty which is possible in human life is almost unlimited, but it can be attained only with united and systematic effort. This spirit of fellowship and co-operation in common tasks constitutes one of the most important of moral values, which may now be independently considered.

The modern scientific study of Aesthetics has been pursued chiefly by the Austrians and the Germans, and the literature is mostly untranslated. A historical survey of the subject may be found in B. Bosanquet's : *History of Aesthetics*, London 3rd ed. 1904 and at the end of the English edition of B. Croce's *Aesthetic*, London 1909. A useful short essay for the general reader is Vernon Lee's : *The Beautiful*, Cambridge 1913. The same writer has written a larger work entitled : *Beauty and Ugliness*. London 1912. Professor W. Knight's : *The Philosophy of the Beautiful*. Two parts, London, 1891, 1893, is in the popular form of the University Extension Manuals. Croce's *Aesthetic* is elaborate and critical, but not strikingly clear. The questions of origin and psychology are discussed in F. Clay : *The Origin of the Sense of Beauty*. London, 1908 and Yrjo Hirn : *The Origins of Art*. London 1900. Eric Major's : *Die Quellen des künstlerischen Schaffens*. Leipzig 1913, insists perhaps the most emphatically on approaching the subject from the side of active creation.

CHAPTER IV

Moral Values

1. At the outset *Moral Values* may be vaguely described as particular classes of goods and bads, predominantly associated with attitudes of will, and distinguished by a definite capacity of the human mind, which may for convenience be called conscience. These moral goods and bads are in the main virtues and vices. Such a description, it is admitted, is no form of definition and for the moral philosopher suggests a large number of problems: nevertheless, it will do for our more practical purpose. There is a wider and a narrower way of considering morality, both of which are valid and important. The more general conception needs merely stating: the more particular and special conception forms the subject of the present chapter.

The broad conception of morality consists in that common-sense view of duty, which maintains that a person is under an obligation to do all the good he can, or in other words, to promote the greatest amount of goods and to strive against the bads to the best of his ability. It is clear that from this standpoint duty includes the endeavour to attain the greatest amount and the best physical, intellectual, aesthetic, and any other kinds of goods and to eradicate the bads of all these kinds. But although this term *duty*, as implying a certain moral obligation may remain, it should be recognised that the sanction for such conduct rests in the values themselves. The physical goods are to be sought for their own intrinsic character, so are truths and the beautiful. If, however, it is maintained that any particular moral value accrues from the striving for an attainment of any of these goods, the general conception of duty has given place to attention to the theory of special moral values. This position is that there are peculiar individual moral goods and bads, which themselves are distinct from the other classes of values, and from the general

notion of duty. The consideration of the moral is continually complicated by this requirement of moral effort to obtain other than moral values, and by the fact that moral conduct is continually and rightly judged in part by the non-moral goods obtained or the non-moral bads eradicated. In the exposition in this small book non-moral values are treated in chapters for themselves: they will only be referred to incidentally in this chapter which must endeavour to indicate and discuss particular moral goods and bads as such. These, to repeat, are kinds of mental attitude and character, associated especially with the will and to only slightly less an extent with the feelings.

2. Examples of moral goods or virtues will occur to almost any reader of these pages. They are frequently in our minds in estimating human conduct and human worth; they have formed much of the teaching of great religious teachers and have been time after time sung of by poets. Benevolence is one such fundamental attitude expressing itself in a thousand and one different ways. Friendship justifies all that the ancient Greeks said of it. To

Christians love denotes a distinct central attitude in the good life. Veracity and honesty, courage and fortitude, patience and cheerfulness, purity—these all imply a content however indefinite and incomplete even to the unlettered.

3. There is considerable justification for the Zoroastrian systematisers who in the *Vendidad* more or less definitely regarded each virtue as opposed by a corresponding vice. Thus, in contrast with the given examples of moral goods may be set particular bads. Malevolence, which like its counterpart has no particular mode of expression, is a definite attitude of will and feeling. Animosity and hatred are the enemies of friendship and love. Falsehood and deceit, cowardice and fear, impatience and gloominess, impurity—these again imply a content more or less distinct. This is not the place to attempt any further enumeration of moral goods or bads: those mentioned should suffice to indicate what is meant by moral values.

4. These moral values have a character of their own; they cannot be accounted for as a complex of non-moral elements. They may be, and often are, means to other goods or

bad, but over and above this they are of intrinsic worth. Here again, as for the values previously discussed, the ultimate concern is with immediate experiences. Moral goods and bads can be only truly known *by acquaintance*. All description of the ethical presupposes such acquaintance. This truth is embodied in the somewhat hackneyed saying "Virtue is its own reward", implying further that "Vice is its own punishment". In other words: to the truly moral man morality is in no need of external sanctions. Unless moral goods themselves attract and moral bads repel, there is no way of demonstrating their goodness or badness. One may endeavour to put a person in the position to see this or that in this way or that, but in the end the appeal is to each individual conscience.

We are not here concerned with the Good, in the sense of a common factor universally present in all moral goods. The efforts of thinkers to indicate the universal in the Good appear to have been as little fruitful as the corresponding enquiries as to Truth and Beauty. What we are concerned with are virtues and

known only as particular events or experiences in the minds of individual persons. If the term *The Good* is to be used at all, it should imply the sum total of goods in their best relation. The moral good is not a general universal principle but a concrete moral life particular in character for each and every individual. The approval of this experience as a moral good, and the disapproval of that as a moral bad depend on a peculiar capacity of the human mind, call it conscience, moral sense, or moral consciousness, or the capacity of making moral judgments, or what one will. That capacity is not adequately described as a judgment of mere reason or a play of mere feeling. These are individual experiences which are thus distinguished, but to express in theoretical terms just what in each instance is the basis of the judgment is not possible. This contention corresponds largely with the position of those writers who maintain that good is indefinable.

An examination of virtues and vices reveals that they are mostly positive and rarely merely negative. Benevolence and friendship, for example, are definite positive attitudes.

Malevolence and animosity are not simply the absence of benevolence and friendship but more—the presence of a positive bad as a type of feeling attitude. Veracity is something more than a will to avoid falsehood—for that might be achieved by committing oneself to nothing at all. It is an attachment to truth as such, involving an attitude of the will based on an estimate of truthfulness by the conscience. Falsehood is not simply error, but a deliberate will to lead another into error. This contention—that moral values, bads as well as goods are positive—holds for all or almost all instances. Again, moral values, as actually experienced realities, are all particular. Courage that counts in life is not a courage in general, but this and that individual instance of courage. What is of worth is not this idea of friendship, but the actually existing state of friendship between this person and that. The vices which are to be disapproved and to be eradicated are the particular vices of this person and that. Such individualisation is fundamental in experience and practical affairs, and the philosophy of life must give it due recognition.

5. In the making of moral judgments and for a particularising theory of moral values, the common distinction between *Motives*, *Intentions* and *Consequences* is of considerable importance, although the nature of these three and the relation between them is not sufficiently recognised. Upon their interpretation depends the answer to the frequently raised question: Is the moral judgment on the motive, the intention, or the consequence? The character of distinctive moral values is sometimes misunderstood owing to a failure to adopt a clear meaning for these terms. Although all three may be taken into consideration in the formation of the moral judgment, the emphasis varies. In any definite course of conduct the motive leads on to the formation of the intention and this is followed by the deed (or the deliberate abstention from action), and its consequences.

6. *Motive* has been defined as that which impels one to act (or refrain from acting). It is essentially related to the source of power in conduct, and as such is to a large extent constituted by feeling, the "stuff" of impulses and instincts. To refer to that constituent

first need imply no lack of recognition of the part played by ideas. In fact, it seems true to say that human development depends to no inconsiderable extent upon the degree to which impulse, instinct, feeling, become associated with ideas systematised by reason, and durable sentiments formed as motives in contrast with transitory passions. But however rationalised a motive the feeling element remains essential. Human conduct has its root in the will and thus the motive is also in part volitional. Motives may therefore be described as dynamic feeling attitudes which are the more rational the more highly developed the individual.

The examples given of moral values are ultimately of this character, so that it may almost be said that moral values are forms of motives. Such a statement would need to be supplemented by another emphasising that, as continuous in one person, these dynamic feeling attitudes constitute the most essential factor in personal character.

7. *Intention* is the idea of the end consciously adopted and of the means explicitly conceived by which it is believed the end may be attained. The intention is often the consequences as

foreseen. In intention knowledge and reason are more important than all else. A man's motive may be of the best, but if he is not sufficiently well informed concerning the circumstances of conduct in this instance or that or he is not sufficiently intellectual to consider the possible consequences of this course of action or that, his intention may be open to strong criticism. It is chiefly through the effects on the formation of particular intentions (under the influence of motives) that the results of intellectual advance make themselves felt in the good life.

8. The *Consequences* of conduct may be both moral and non-moral.²³ It requires no argument to maintain that conduct may be approved in so far as it leads to physical, intellectual, aesthetic or (and) religious goods, and to the eradication of the opposite bads. Such consequences are, as a matter of fact, universally considered in judgments of conduct and to discuss the question whether they should be is futile and gratuitous. Nevertheless, from the distinctly moral point of view, these con-

23. Dr. Rashdall's: *Theory of Good and Evil*. Oxford 1907. contains important discussions on the whole problem of *Consequences* in ethics.

sequences are at most secondary. Of fundamental importance is rather any distinctively moral value which may be included in the consequences. It is frequently overlooked that in this consideration of the moral consequences the motive comes into the calculation. For to give oneself up to a motive and to carry out a course of action under its sway leads to its development into a definite continuous constituent of character. That the person who is swayed by a feeling of benevolence may as one consequence of benevolent conduct become a persistently benevolent personality is for ethical consideration of essential importance. From the standpoint of moral values the chief question with regard to consequences is: What kind of moral character does this conduct develop in the individual who acts, and how does it affect the moral character of others?

9. By personal moral character as referred to in the affairs of every day is meant the main general impression which the conduct and demeanour of the individual makes on the conscience of himself and others. This impression will rarely be the same on all. The individual himself knows inwardly and immed-

ately the motives of his conduct : others will be able to know him and judge only on data more or less incomplete and probably in part inaccurate. Nevertheless, for a character of any definiteness and strength the general impression given will be that of the predominant dynamic feeling attitude. But personal moral character is not constituted by any one or two particular moral values. Rather it should include in some measure each and every moral good. It should be an organic or a spiritual unity of virtues. If one would, one might endeavour to outline such a complete co-ordinated system of moral goods. Indeed, it may reasonably be regarded as a task for everyone to strive to become acquainted with all goods.

Moral values are, however, the particular experiences of individual human consciousnesses. From the common-sense point of view these consciousnesses are differentiated one from another by some particular qualities or quality. The individual human being is, in other words, peculiar and unique. This uniqueness may manifest itself in a number of different ways—for example, physically, intellectually, and religiously. It may express

itself chiefly in the moral character. The system of moral values constituting this particular person's character at its highest may differ greatly from that particular person's character at its highest. For one veracity, for another purity, may be the dominating passion. The constituents of the characters of different individuals and the relative predominance of these constituents vary according to the circumstances in which they find themselves in society and in the whole of reality. In such peculiarities in individual characters consists much of the rich variety of moral values in the whole human race.²⁴ Ethics as a science elaborating a universal ideal is not a study concerning an ideal which each is to achieve in toto, but of a system in which each is to find and endeavour to realise his own peculiar part. Thus over and above any general study of moral values, the individual person is called upon to enquire into the nature of his own peculiar ideal.

²⁴. Ethics, on its empirical side, should include a study of the history of moral ideas and moral systems and a detailed comparison of them. See further my introduction to M. A. Buch : *Zoroastrian Ethics*.

10. Moral character as a consistent system of moral goods is attained only as a result of definite activity and endeavour. Even the knowledge of moral goods does not always come spontaneously. The child may be instructed and trained in the simplest yet fundamental principles of moral conduct, but until virtues are consciously accepted as such by the individual, he cannot be said to experience moral values or to have genuine moral worth. Having arrived at that stage it is for him to seek an ever widening and deepening knowledge of moral goods. Effort is required for that: it is even more clearly required for the cultivation of moral goods as the motives of one's conduct and the constituents of one's character. Seeing that human nature is essentially active, moral character is itself real only as active. The saint and the sinner in dreamless sleep are ethically different only as having attributed to them powers and tendencies to a different kind of conduct *when they shall wake up*.

11. It is just the saint awake who occupies a central position in regard to moral goods. For him they are the focus of attention, the chief aim of life. His nature is endowed with

a clearer perception of moral values, and a more intense activity for their achievement than is ordinary. The true saint is the moral genius. His influence upon others is in part like that of the geniuses in other sides of human life—through precept and example. The question is here and always not merely what to do, but also how it should be done, and the latter is best shown by practical action. But the influence of the saint is also of another kind: his character appeals immediately to the conscience, and arouses in others by an indescribable power motives similar to his own. Here again in the vast majority of instances this influence is felt only by those who put themselves into an appropriate receptive attitude, have as it were the desire to learn.

Though it is quite true that in the history of mankind so-called religious ideas and practices have at times militated against moral progress, this cannot be regarded as the rule. Rather the great majority of mankind have obtained ethical knowledge and moral inspiration from religious leaders, through sacred scriptures, or membership in a religious order or church. In the past and also largely in the present it is

the religious communities that have at least tried to preserve the memory and to keep alive the spirit of the saints.

12. Recent thought, however, rightly insists upon a distinction of the moral values as they are in themselves from a prevalent confusion with religion. This is an advantage both for morality and religion, because it leads to a more explicit recognition of something unique in both, and so to more adequate attention to both. At the present time there are many of high moral character who regard their efforts for moral values as their only religion. The discussion of the distinctive religious values is the subject of the following chapter. The important point here is this growing appreciation of moral values as of intrinsic worth. Thus, whatever may be believed with regard to the existence of God, or a future life of the individual human soul, or any other doctrine of religion, moral values still make their appeal. Whatever may happen to-morrow benevolence to-day is none the less good, and malevolence none the less bad. Advance in morality is aided and marked by the acceptance of moral values as intrinsic and

self-dependent. Equally significant is the careful discrimination between moral values which are truly intrinsic and those which are only extrinsic. A very large number of customary moral precepts refer to merely extrinsic forms of conduct, which having intrinsic value ascribed to them have tended to obscure the real intrinsic values, even to militate against them. This has frequently been so with the precepts concerning forms of marriage.

13. Ethics, as the science of morality, has been very much hindered in its development by the amount of attention which has been devoted to claims that the good consists in something expressed in a universal, such as duty, pleasure, personality, self-realisation and self-renunciation, unity or harmony with the divine, and so on. The result has been a large amount of abstract discussion. The empirical facts of the moral life have never been sufficiently carefully examined, nor any prolonged attempt made at a systematisation of moral values. A truly empirical ethics would concern itself first with the enumeration of intrinsic moral goods and bads, and their classification. This task has never been seri-

ostly taken up, and a short chapter in a general philosophical survey is certainly not the place to embark upon it. All that can be done here is to indicate what is required, so that the reader may endeavour to think out the matter for himself.

The question is: What are the moral goods and bads which are intrinsic values in themselves, and what are their relations? The answer to this question might be obtained by an examination by the individual of his own moral experience. This experience while essential as the final test for the individual himself suffers from inevitable limitations. It must be supplemented considerably by reference to current social conceptions and more especially to the writings of moral teachers and saints. Christians have continually represented intrinsic moral goods of personal attitude and disposition in the words, for example, of the *Epistle to the Galatians*:²⁵ "love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance." Such a list is not a complete or a systematic statement of intrinsic values. It is important to notice

25. Chapter V. 22, 23.

that particular moral values are more appropriately emphasised in one set of circumstances than in another. Thus joy or cheerfulness may be well regarded as an intrinsic moral value; so may the feeling of sympathy, i. e. the attitude of sharing another's joys and sorrows. But cheerfulness will take a different form according to whether one is or is not at a particular time experiencing sympathy with a person in grief. The intrinsic moral goods are not all to be experienced in the same degree by all persons, nor by any person at all times. The moral universal of intrinsic goods is rather to be conceived as the sum total of all the intrinsic moral goods experienced by the sum total of related individuals. Each will endeavour to experience as many as he can, in the highest degree.

Self-respect is a distinctive attitude and disposition, of value in itself, whether it has any further effects or not. Frequently it depends upon or accompanies other intrinsic moral goods. Veracity is one such, which may be expressed either in word or action. Love or benevolence is the most general intrinsic moral good felt towards others.

Courage is a factor indispensable in self-respect, and also often in benevolence. It denotes, nevertheless, a unique type of moral disposition. Joy or cheerfulness is far too often considered as a non-moral element of character, as dependent upon bodily conditions and on social circumstances. That certain bodily and social conditions may aid or hinder cheerfulness should not merely be admitted, but insisted upon. These conditions are certainly not the whole: to regard cheerfulness as a moral value is to emphasise that it should rest predominantly upon the will by the exercise of which it may become in the course of time a persistent element of character.

It is widely believed that justice is a particular intrinsic moral virtue, and with the theory of the indefinable character of the good this may be still maintained even when all objections are considered. For it may be that justice is only known by immediate apprehension and is otherwise incapable of indication. Justice is, however, most frequently supposed to imply the idea of equality, be it in the treatment of individuals or groups, or in the relation of some particular consequences to some particu-

ar conduct. But precisely in what equality consists in any particular instances, it seems generally impossible to say; sometimes it is quite impossible. The old maxim "An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" was revenge, if it meant: "You have caused my eye (or tooth) to be put out, now I shall cause yours to be put out". Justice in the sense of equality might seem to be implied if it meant "You have caused my eye (or tooth) to be put out, now you must give me back my eye (or tooth) as it was previously". But obviously that is physically impossible. Even if it were possible, what would be an equivalent compensation for the inconvenience and pain suffered in the circumstances? What again does justice in the sense of equality require in the instance of slander? Ultimately the idea of equality is only vaguely present in relation to justice, and is not very helpful. David Hume's conception of it as that which is socially useful is much nearer the actual meaning; but it implies that it is an extrinsic value. Plato's conception of it, as implying the balanced or harmonious functioning of the factors of the individual nature or the social

organism, might be associated with Hume's view. Yet, the conviction that justice as equality or as intrinsic good is unrealisable may be the ground for that particular form of the virtue of benevolence, called forgiveness.

Similarly it has been supposed that the virtue of purity is only extrinsic, as an attitude and mode of conduct leading to good physical and intellectual consequences, or at least, preventing some particular bad consequences. The verdict of tradition and of introspection, however, seems indubitably to be that purity is a particular moral disposition, the worth of which does not simply depend upon the consequences of a physical or intellectual kind. The possession of it constitutes an important factor in self-respect. If medical science could discover means of over-coming the physical evils of impurity, the moral call of purity would remain. Purity as a definite disposition, though present in "thought, word, and deed", is more especially a type of feeling.

Self-control is a term which though not strictly accurate (it being rather only particular phases of the self which are subject to control) may be regarded as a distinctive moral

characteristic, general moral strength as opposing particular moral evils. Fortitude, patience and temperance are forms of self-control. Honesty is a form of veracity. Friendship, patriotism, humanitarianism, are modes of expression, differing especially in extent, of the fundamental virtue of love. There is something distinctive in gratitude, as also in trust or confidence with its counterpart loyalty (taken in its widest sense). Another characteristic moral good is an attitude which, for lack of another equally well known term may be called "industry". This denotes a persistent active disposition. Magnanimity suggests a frank open comprehensive character capable of a wide display of the particular forms of love, generosity and forgiveness.

15. Psychologically it has long been recognised that the best way to endeavour to eradicate vices is to centre attention and activity upon particular virtues. The less the mind is occupied with vices the better. Here a mere list, unsystematic and incomplete, is enough for the present purpose: selfishness, conceit, insolence (or the lack of respect for others), malevolence or hatred, envy, anger, deceit (in

all its forms such as lying, hypocrisy), impatience and lack of "self"-control, theft, idleness, cowardice, impurity, and meanness. The objection may be urged that hatred or opposition to another and anger may sometimes be approved, that is, when they are directed against evil. In such instances they are nevertheless still intrinsically bad: they are only extrinsically good, solely as means of overcoming some greater evil.

16. A large proportion of the moral precepts which are included in ethical codes are concerned with the modes of conduct required to attain moral goods or avoid moral bads. Their significance is extrinsic. This is especially true of most moral maxims based on custom and tradition, as also of most of the moral bases of common law. Such traditional precepts are of value chiefly as embodying the results of much practical experience in the history of a people or indeed of the human race. They signify the means which, up to this stage of history or that, in these circumstances or those, have appeared best suited to attain the desired goods. It is only when they are raised to the rank of absolute moral

commandments that they constitute a hindrance to moral development. For with advancing knowledge and changing circumstances other and essentially different means may become evident. This question of means, mainly of the actual mode of conduct implied in the intention, is an ever present one in practical life, especially one which is progressive. The conservative element in human nature endeavours to hold to specific traditional modes of conduct and maintains that if these are changed the intrinsic good is lost. But the progressive mind strives by new methods not merely to retain the usual goods, but further, to increase them and to reduce the bads. The highest moral attitude is one which is free from definite laws or precepts. Clear and firm with regard to the intrinsic goods, freedom is retained to achieve these in the best manner possible in the circumstances. The varying and sometimes apparently contrary moral precepts of different ages and peoples have frequently been expressions of what seemed the best means to the same intrinsic end. Very different views have prevailed concerning marriage and property. Each individual may

have his own particular modes of conduct in a thousand and one minor matters and even in some of great significance he may follow a distinctive course. Clearly, the individual has to decide for himself according to his circumstances. But there are questions of social organisation which require discussion, such, for example, as marriage and the family, educational institutions, vocation and occupation, leisure and recreation, and the form of Government. In conformity with the particularising tendency of the present exposition, it is the nature of these as affecting the individual which should be kept in mind.

17. Expressed in its most general terms the problem of marriage and the family concerns the forms of these most conducive to the attainment of goods and the avoidance of bads for all involved. These goods and bads are of any or all classes: physical, intellectual, aesthetic, moral and religious. The persons involved may be grouped as (a) wife or wives, (b) husband or husbands, (c) child or children, (d) other persons. From the point of view of the present discussion of moral values, the question is essentially: How do the different

forms of marriage and the family affect the experience and cultivation of moral values, and how far are other values obtained through marriage dependent on moral values?

Perhaps it is necessary to say that by marriage is meant not any civil or religious ceremony of being married, but the condition of marriage, whether legalised or not. Marriage implies a certain continuity or intention of continuity of sex relationship, and is distinct from the casual relations of prostitution. It has already been maintained (pp. 52-56) that estimated as a condition for the physical good of sex intercourse marriage is to be commended. A very good case might be made for the contention that marriage for the normal human being has been a stimulus to intellectual effort, an occasion of aesthetic interests, and a support in religious faith. Nevertheless, it scarcely needs explicit acknowledgement that some of the greatest in the realms of knowledge, art, and religion have been unmarried.

A good beginning has been made in the psychology of sex, but up to the present there cannot be said to be any clearly defined body of knowledge as to the psychical effects of the

state of marriage on men and women in that state. That the condition of "married love" has definite psychological effects is indubitable: what they are in detail is less certain.

18. The moral idealist will maintain that marriage—if it is to be a source of moral goods—must be based on the feeling of love and a pure disposition. Love and purity should be the two moral qualities especially cultivated in the married state. As an ideal it may be urged that none should assume the state of marriage except with the sentiment of love and an attitude of purity. This is certainly not realised in the vast majority of marriages in the East, and even in the West the marriage of choice and inclination though much more common is by no means universal. But even if love is not present at the outset it may be cultivated, and if in the absence of love a positive purity is impossible, positive impurity may be avoided. The state of marriage may reasonably be entered for the purpose of physical satisfaction and the procreation of a family, even where there is at the outset no particular sentiment of love for the other person concerned. The very nature of love,

whether as initially felt or as a sentiment to be cultivated, is to endure. But as experience suggests, it is not impossible for it to fade and die. This or the growth of a positive impurity in either of the parties in a marriage is sufficient to make its continuance of very doubtful ethical value. Self-control may be called for and practiced in such circumstances, but the situation is likely to be deplorable at the best.

Social precepts are common with regard to the form of marriage. These are justified on a number of different grounds. But viewed from the standpoint of love and purity no absolute precepts can be formulated on the question. It does not seem right to say dogmatically that a person cannot at the same time, have a genuine love for more than one person of the opposite sex. It does not seem right to say dogmatically that purity necessarily implies a condition of monogamy. Whether particular individuals are able to associate in a polygamous or polyandrous or polygamous-polyandrous condition is a question of particular experience, just as that whether a given person A can associate in love and purity with

a particular person B. Other reasons are necessary for disallowing complete freedom in these matters. Where the numbers of individuals of both sexes are approximately equal, the enforcement of monogamy may be required in order as far as possible to prevent the more wealthy depriving the poor from the opportunity of marriage. On the other hand, it may be maintained where there is a great preponderance of one sex, if opportunities of marriage are not forthcoming elsewhere, polygamy or polyandry ought to be allowed, and not condemned or disapproved unless in individual instances on particular grounds. The same reason may be urged here as in the preceding argument for monogamy: to give all an opportunity of marriage. The greatest moral difficulty is the retention or the cultivation of good feelings amongst all the persons concerned in such families.

19. The Hebrew Psalmist has sung the praise of children in the family, and indeed, all peoples, even those with the most pessimistic strains, have felt the charm of childhood. The family is par excellence the condition for the development of distinctive moral qualities in

man, woman, and child. Undoubtedly, even when accompanied by strength and harshness, there is still normally in the father or mother a greater warmth of feeling, a deeper kindness, than is common in the childless. Parents are aware of a more persistent demand for sacrifice. Particular moral qualities are also better developed in children in the family than otherwise. The moral disadvantage of the single child in a family deserves especial mention, in that the prevalent limitation of families at the present time often leads to this condition. Children brought up together in the family learn most thoroughly the most important moral lessons of their lives.

Note on some practical considerations:—

As the ideal relation for marriage is a sentiment growing up spontaneously between persons, society ought to leave to individuals the greatest possible freedom from adverse comment or legal consequences. The State should concern itself chiefly with the prevention of marriages likely to result in diseased off-spring. Similarly, if it can be shown that it is morally harmful for a child or children to remain in particular family conditions it should see that the conditions are changed or the children removed.

The State should not disallow polygamy up to certain degrees and in satisfactory conditions, according to the relative proportions of the sexes of marriageable age, al-

ways providing that adequate safeguards are arranged for any eventual dissolution of the marriage. There may be, especially in the post-war Europe, women who unable to find a suitable husband, yet desire not to forego also the joys of motherhood. For these society should not disapprove of a frankly temporary union for the purpose of raising off-spring, which the State should regard as legitimate children of the mother. The absence of fatherly influence on the child would have to be met by the type of school to which the child would be sent.

The position has been maintained above that the ethically ideal form of family is one in which there are several children besides the parents. On the other hand it must be insisted that it is not mere selfishness which leads many at the present time to the limitation of the family. In part it is an increasing recognition of responsibility to children. The moral values acquired by parents from their relations to children are such that any means adopted to avoid children altogether must mean a moral loss which is hardly to be compensated for by any other means. Further, the loss to the child in single child families is so great, especially in regard to moral development and scope for child enjoyment, that limitation to one child can, with difficulty, if at all be justified. But where economic conditions, or the state of the mother's health come into the question there are good reasons for not raising a large family. Each child should be assured a good standard of life all round. It is for the men and women concerned to estimate for how many children this is possible in their own circumstances. The urgent ethical question is as to the means of limitation to be adopted. There are those who maintain that the only moral method is abstinence from the sex act. Certainly if such abstinence had no effects on the general relations of man and wife it would be difficult to object

much to the contention. But on the most healthy view of marriage there is a psychical—we might justly say a moral—effect in the sex act. There are good reasons for believing that alienation of man and wife frequently arises from such abstinence. It must therefore be asked: Is artificial prevention of conception morally justifiable? Seeing that knowledge as to means has been acquired by the human intellect, it is difficult to contend that all use of the knowledge is morally wrong. Rather it is here accepted as more reasonable to maintain that there is a moral use of the knowledge. The nature of that use has been previously implied. That there is an immoral use hardly requires admission. But even in that connection it should be sufficiently evident that if illicit intercourse is bad, a resultant birth of an illegitimate child is much worse. In one way and another the knowledge of contra-ceptives is becoming general, and only frank moral instruction, not mere condemnation, can be of influence on the increasingly educated mass of men and women.

To people outside of India, it will appear almost incredible that in India powerful forces of caste prevent the re-marriage of widows. Sufficient instances of widows charged with infanticide have shown one evil result of this unjustifiable opposition, and there must be many undiscovered instances of procured abortion and infanticide due to the same cause. The condition, from the point of view expressed above, is worse when the husbands married at an early age die before there is any consummation and possibility of leaving children to the woman. If Hindus are of opinion that to remain a widow is an act of merit (as before to commit suttee was supposed to be), then the individual woman should be left free to decide for herself. Enlightened Indians should see that their Governments protect widows who remarry from any wrongs and disabilities on the part of the caste.

20. Prostitution is a world-wide moral problem. The evil physical consequences have been referred to. To the healthy mind the moral consequences are even more repulsive. That those who resort to it feel something of moral disapproval is evident from the usually concealed nature of their conduct. Such individuals—or at least the men—wish to pass in society as pure, and their attitude is thus also one of deceit. Further, in a large majority of instances this is allied with disloyalty to wife or prospective wife. Nor can it be denied that resort to prostitutes implies a lack of self-control. The condition for the woman is certainly worse, in that the morally healthy woman desires to give herself to a man who inspires at least moral respect even if he falls short of arousing affection. Nothing can be felt as more degrading than yielding to persons who must inevitably arouse disgust. But a fall having occurred, time and habit dull the moral sense.

21. The consideration of moral values and their cultivation should be one of the chief determining factors of school organisation. This cannot be discussed here in detail, but a

few salient problems especially related to moral values may well be referred to. Only for the children of the very rich or of high social status is there present the alternative of private tuition or school. Leaving on one side the question of the relative value for intellectual advance, the latter is certainly preferable for moral development. It widens the scope of social feelings, brings the child into relation with a growing appreciation of moral distinctions, provides more opportunities for the cultivation of self-control, courage, and many other virtues. In the home, apart from the school, there are insufficient opportunities of varied personal contacts, particularly with children of like age. The most frequent factor in the child's environment, if not the strongest, should be other children.

22. The alternative of boarding school or day school is again open to a comparatively limited number. The moral effects of the two have marked differences. Anyone who has known the former from within will recognise the tendency for the predominant growth of group action, under the leadership of a few stronger personalities, by whom the ruling

moral tone is largely determined. Such institutional life has, as far as moral attitude is concerned, a general effect of levelling up and down. The greater opportunities which such continuous contact gives for sports and games leads to a distinct character of strength and *esprit de corps*. There is, however, on the other hand amongst boys a loss of the softer and warmer qualities of character and amongst girls of the qualities of independence, and the finenesses of individual peculiarity tend to be dulled if not eradicated. This is largely due to the facts (a) that *pari passu* with the contact with wider groups of boys (or girls) there is not a continuous intimate influence of older persons and of both sexes; (b) that there are so few opportunities for even a modicum of solitude and communing with oneself, a vital need for depth in soul development. The day school does not turn out its boys in so uniform a moral mould, and if it does not level up those below the normal moral standard, it does not so easily affect the highly refined moral character. The daily life in the home gives the required influences in the intimate relations of parents and children, brothers and sisters,—for

the preservation or cultivation of the qualities of benevolence and love, and probably also is more conducive to the strengthening of the virtue of purity. The home more easily provides opportunity for some solitude, and gives some shelter for the development of individual peculiarities. That so often the day school does not cultivate such firm characters nor so strong an *esprit de corps* as the boarding school is probably due to defective organisation. While there are grounds for believing that the moral effects of day school plus continuous home life are better for the majority of children than the boarding school, the society as a whole gains if there are some of its members with the particular type of character which the boarding schools produce. Further, there are some children whose mental and moral characteristics make the harder life of a boarding school distinctly preferable for them.

23. Another important question from a moral point of view is that of the co-education of the sexes. If this is taken to mean that the two sexes are educated in the same or adjacent buildings, are in some subjects taught together, and participate in some forms of recreation,

then the result of greater moral respect and less unnatural reserve can be expected. In addition there is a probability of the association leading to greater moral strength of the feminine character and to a refining of the masculine. The danger of co-education arises only when the two sexes are made to follow identically the same courses of instruction and training.²⁶

24. There are distinct moral disadvantages in the isolation of specialist educational institutions. The great moral influence in the life of the Universities of the best types—especially some of the older European ones, such as Cambridge, Oxford, St. Andrews, Jena, (and to a less degree the Sorbonne which is too much grown round by the modern Paris)—has been the close contact not merely of teachers

26. While the greatest admiration must be expressed for the work of Professor Karve and his associates in the formation of the Women's University at Poona, it may be doubted whether the formation of such a separate institution is better from a moral point of view than making the proper kind of provision for "women's courses" in the older Universities. India is especially in need of a greater recognition amongst its men students of the claims to greater freedom for its women. The presence of women in the Colleges will do more in this direction than hundreds of lectures and books.

of all the most important subjects but of students with varied aims in life. In the attendance at common classes and in special societies there is ample opportunity for the growth of a corporate spirit amongst those looking forward to the same type of career. Isolated specialist educational institutions tend to cultivate amongst their students a narrowness of outlook and a lack of sympathy with and understanding of other forms of occupation. On the other hand the more varied the aims and the training of students coming into contact in one inclusive institution the more broad-minded and properly balanced the individuals are likely to become. In such an institution they can hardly avoid assimilating much which will give them a keener moral sense of the ethical character of social life and its many demands.

25. The moral life in its social aspect is essentially one of activity. Socially organised education should be governed by a recognition of this fact. It must aim at the formation of active habits of social usefulness. There can be no doubt that the form of education which keeps the young for the greater portion of the

time sitting with attention on book or paper cannot cultivate active habits. Neither does it develop the self-reliance which active initiative demands. Time after time it has been proved that greater alertness of mind, a facility for a quicker assimilation of knowledge, has come with a predominantly active type of education. Much of the prevailing so-called literary education is in large measure a cultivation of an idle disposition.

26. Leisure and recreation may be considered as a means to mental and physical recuperation and thus as an extrinsic good. But to regard it thus is inadequate: the various forms of amusement should have some intrinsic appeal. Apart, however, from a recognised intrinsic worth, it is important to consider what are the moral consequences or presuppositions. A sufficiency of leisure and recreation helps to engender a calmer temper and a more cheerful disposition. Amusements are a most important factor in the cultivation of joy. Though this is central and of greatest importance particular kinds of recreation strengthen particular virtues. For example, fishing demands and cultivates patience, boxing self-

control, games like football militate against selfishness. There is undoubtedly a great good in the feeling of physical vigour in riding in a hunt, and possibly some little excitement in killing the animal, but it is extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to find any particular moral value in such sport. On the contrary there is good ground for the feeling of moral repulsion from the killing of animals for the sake of amusement. Recreation need not take the form of sport or games. In so far as it is an enjoyment of other values—as the intellectual and the aesthetic—it has an indirect moral effect in the broadening of mental outlook, and a widening of sympathies.

27. Unfortunately the moral bads due to insufficient or too much leisure and to irrational forms of recreation are more often evident than the moral goods to which we have just referred. Insufficient leisure and recreation leads to a certain harshness, lack of sympathy, lack of a sense of inner freedom, and sometimes to dullness and gloominess. Too much leisure tends often to a shallowness, a lack of the feeling of personal dignity, to boredom and cynicism. In the present economic condition

of mankind it may also be supposed with good reason that too much leisure is due either to an immoral dependence on the industry of others—whether by “idle rich” or “idle poor”. The more irrational forms of amusement have arisen in the attempts to fill up too much leisure time. Insufficient leisure is by far the most wide-spread condition. A social change might partially remedy both evils by reducing the superfluous leisure of some for the relief of the others. To accomplish this the chief requirement is a moral change in most persons dependent in all but an inconsiderable degree on unearned incomes.

28. From the social point of view the most important factor in a man's life is usually the occupational function he performs as a member of society. For the individual himself the method by which he earns his living acts upon his moral character as little else in life. Here the question is the relation of vocation and occupation to moral values. If character is essentially a dynamic system of values, tending in this or that main direction, it is reasonable to maintain that the highest results are likely to be achieved both in the effects on the develop-

ment of the character and in the consequences for mankind when the occupation is in harmony with the predominant good tendency in the individual. In other words the individual's occupation ought to be as nearly as possible what he conceives as his vocation, the work for which he has a special liking and believes he has a special aptitude.

To what degree this is possible can only be discovered in each individual instance. Nor is anything gained here by raising the metaphysical question as to whether the subjective tendencies or conations of the individual must inevitably find corresponding harmonious objective conditions in which to realise themselves. On the practical side it is evident that many come to a sense of particular vocation only gradually and largely as a result of educational influences. Interests and the sense of particular vocations may be cultivated in individuals such that the various demands of social organisation will be best satisfied. Educationalists have not yet sufficiently recognised the moral significance of vocational training, as not merely socially advantageous, but as developing moral force and a sense of

moral worth in the individual.

29. A very large amount of moral approbation, especially that socially expressed, is for the performance of socially useful functions which do not come within the scope of the duties of the individual's occupation. In such activity there is greater opportunity for moral autonomy and for the experience of intrinsic moral values. Going beyond the definite demands of one's occupation, in reality simply using every opportunity for a wider or more intense experience of moral values, will be accepted as a moral obligation by the reflective on the ground of the inherent moral advantage. The notion of the meritorious as bringing some essentially extraneous gain belongs to a lower level of moral development.

30. The different forms of political theory are frequently discussed with reference to their ethical implications. Yet the moral is not conspicuously evident as a determining factor in practical politics. The only remedy is the development of a keener sense of moral values on the part of those who determine the form of government, and greater moral integrity in those who carry on the government. Participation

in social life beyond the family gives wider scope for the experience of moral goods. It makes life richer in a thousand ways, and develops a more comprehensive character. It is the greatest influence, except that of religion, counter-acting "narrowness of mind". Thus far a share in social and political activities is a privilege. It should also be regarded as an obligation, a duty. There can be no serious denial of the statement that very many social and political ills, now as in the past, are due to "sins of omission", to neglect on the part of men (and women) to exert themselves politically.

An examination is necessary of the relative worth of the existent and so far known possible types of social and political organisation from the point of view of moral values. These forms are here limited to three main classes: (1) autocratic, where the ultimate power in the society rests with one individual; (2) oligarchic, where the ultimate power rests with an insignificant number of persons; and (3) democratic, where the ultimate power rests with at least the majority of people in the society. Never does any one of these conditions seem to have been

found simple without an element of the others. Nevertheless the predominance of one or another leads to distinctive moral effects.

31. Autocracy is a fast dying form of political government. Its defect is the danger of the autocrat being capricious, morally unworthy or intellectually weak. In larger States such a situation lends itself eventually to revolution, and in smaller ones to the general apathy of the populace and to continued intrigue on the part of unscrupulous persons wishing to obtain power. The only conceivable moral good which can here arise is patience, but the moral bads of instability, the lack of self-control, the deceit in the ruler, are only surpassed by the dishonesty and selfishness of those who strive to surround him closely. Some tendencies in these directions remain even in the conditions when the ruler is intellectually competent, morally strong and not capricious. In so far as the ruler does actually come as much as possible into personal contact with his subjects, and retains a large share in the executive activities of government, there is far more than a mere name in the expression "personal government". There is something here far

more sympathetic, more "human" and less mechanical than in those forms of government which regard an impersonal abstraction, such as "the constitution" as predominant. The ruler feels the call for equity and justice and for continued benevolence. The subjects feel the call for loyalty as a relation between person and person. The feeling of loyalty is the more intense the more the ruler seems to embody in his personality and his acts of government the ideals of his subjects.

32. Most of the prevailing forms of government are really of the oligarchic type. It was supposed by many that the chief countries of the West were democratic, but the doings of the governments during the Great War and since have shown quite clearly that the rulers are a few who are engineered into their positions by a number of powerful forces. If government by the few meant government in the power of those best fitted to govern—best fitted from the moral and intellectual points of view—then a spirit of trust and co-operation might be engendered. But it is futile not to recognise that, however much camouflage is necessary in the way of policy affecting general welfare,

the forms of government, in Britain, for example, have represented particular interests. Broadly speaking, "Conservative" governments have primarily been inspired by the conservation and welfare of the landed aristocracy; "Liberal" by the needs of a growing industrial capitalism, especially as allied with or opposed to the interests of the landed aristocracy. In both these forms the welfare of the vast majority has been affected, but the welfare of the vast majority has never been the central moral aim. Although this welfare is far more directly the object of attention amongst those who constitute the party of "Labour", here again sectional interests dominate the political outlook and form the main moral motive. A combination of representatives of these oligarchical ideals does not lead to a new and higher type of government, as appears to us to have been proved sufficiently by the present British Coalition government. The policy of oligarchies must always be in some degree that of repression. The limitation of the freedom of speech, diplomatic secrecy and misrepresentation,—these are the methods which modern oligarchies use (and to what an extent during the Great War!)

—to cloak their real character from the gaze of the majority of men. Nothing has been misrepresented more than democracy, and especially that thoroughgoing form of it, Socialism.

33. The present problem is the moral basis and moral effects of Socialism. In this direction it is significant that (like Christianity) it has been charged on the one hand with being too ideal and on the other as being distinctly immoral. The main ethical principle of Socialism is summed up in the phrase: "Let no man seek his own weal, let him seek the common weal."²⁷ Here there is no question of compromises of party aims, as in Coalitions, but an inner motive of general welfare. Socialism is rooted in a moral attitude which is opposed to each and every form of selfishness. Undoubtedly there is amongst mankind a vast amount of selfishness, but it is pure assumption to assert, as many do, that selfishness can never cease to be the mainspring of human endeavour. Socialism implies the question for all social organisation: Is this truly for the general welfare? The socialistic organisation is morally healthy also in the principle: "If any will not

27. Compare I Corinthians X 24.

work neither let him eat." ²⁸ An individual not performing useful work for the community is to be regarded as criminal or physically or mentally sick. There will always be scope for each individual to put forth his highest effort for the realisation of goods or the removal of bads for society (including himself), but the very trend of socialistic organisation would make it increasingly impossible for the individual to gain (as in other forms of government) selfish advantages at the expense of others. The lack of opportunity would tend to divert activity from anti-social conduct. Not the kind of work for which a man is capable, nor the kind of work which society for its organised welfare requires from him, should determine the standard of living to be enjoyed, but the devotion to duty, the diligence in the performance of the function society requires from him. In a socialistic state the social positions of men would not be able to be estimated by considerations of material wealth, as is so often done at present, irrespective of the manner in which that wealth has been acquired. Socialism stands morally for co-operation as contrasted

28. II Thessalonians III 10.

with opposition. It encourages the only healthy form of competition—a rivalry to do better than one's fellows, not for selfish private gain, but solely for the very joy of doing one's best and for the welfare of all and the general advance. These are ethical characteristics of Socialism in a way that they are of no other form of social and political organisation. It has been willingly admitted that the personal loyalty attaching a subject to an autocratic ruler is of great moral worth. Socialism is as much superior as the loyalty to the welfare of the vast majority of men is superior to the loyalty to one. Personal loyalty is here widened to the utmost, and the more it is understood and felt in this manner the more intense it will become. The socialistic form of organisation and government gives the best opportunity for the enjoyment of moral goods and the eradication of moral bads. Equally it must be insisted that for its success it also demands the highest devotion to and endeavour for moral goods.

Note on some practical considerations:

From the point of view of practical policy the important question concerns the steps to be taken in order in the

best manner and the shortest time to arrive from particular circumstances at this highest form of government and social organisation. The most important is the spread of education. When education, even of a moderate standard has become general, men and women will not tolerate being governed for the interests of particular groups. The prevailing types of social and political organisation not merely permit, but largely encourage those forms of speculation and financial operations which cultivate the most despicable types of personal character, and frequently cause moral and material ills to the greater portions of mankind. A step onward would be the suppression of the means by which individuals or groups can acquire wealth otherwise than by socially beneficial work. Titles of honour ought to be reserved solely for socially useful work, and even then where such work is performed by means of wealth, it should be asked first how the wealth has been obtained.

There does not appear to be any absolute necessity for the stage of thorough-going democracy or socialism to be reached through a long process of development through ever widening oligarchic governments. The steps to be taken depend largely on the nature of the starting-point. Of particular importance is this in India at the present time. The autocratic rulers have an opportunity, even a duty, to inaugurate socialisations of activities, industrial, commercial and other. They are called upon to defend the masses of their peoples from the efforts of financial and other groups to establish partisan types of oligarchy. The task will become increasingly difficult, but ruling chiefs and the central and provincial governments should resist encroachments on their power, till they can be sure of handing it over to others representing not party aims but the general welfare. At the same time, they are under an obligation to advance the general education of their subjects so that all adults may participate as soon as possible in the moral responsibility of government.

34. There are good grounds to believe in a development of the knowledge of moral values, and though probably in less degree in the extent and intensity of their enjoyment. A history of ethical theory and moral practice should form a definite and essential part of any empirical study of morality. But the evolution of ethical knowledge while it depends upon increasing refinement in moral perception, or in other words, though it is due to immediate experiences and intuitions, allied with rational reflection, raises a metaphysical problem in that though the development of knowledge is subjective, moral values are in themselves of objective character. This problem has been met by the suggestion that moral goods are objectively real in the nature of the supreme being, or God. The suggestion fits in well with the contentions urged above (pages 114-115) and with two other facts. The first is that advances in morality have come most often from religious saints who have not argued in favour of their moral teachings, but expressed them with authority as the result of an immediate intuition, as due to communion with God. The second is that men and women in all ages

land climes have felt an inability with their own power to realise fully the moral ideal as they have apprehended it, and have sought and believed they have obtained aid for such achievement from a divine power. It appears, therefore, that however intrinsic moral values are, and however much they call for the activity of individual wills, whether singly or in co-operation, the full consideration of the ethical leads beyond itself to the religious.

This chapter on moral values is not meant to be a formal ethical discussion after the manner of the prevailing treatises on Ethics. The majority of the well-known books on ethics are written on stereo-typed lines and carry on a number of more or less abstract and formal discussions to the neglect of any effort to build up an ethical ideal on an empirical basis with the aid of critical reflection. It is not that the problems discussed do not need attention, but that they should not occupy the centre of attention. In this subject there are few small popular works which can be recommended to the general reader. I question whether Ethics as a science has made much real advance since Aristotle. His *Nichomachean Ethics* (Cheap Eng. ed. in The Walter Scott Library) should be read by all

interested in this subject. In spite of so much recent abuse of the German view of the State, supposed to be derived to a large extent from Hegel, his *Philosophy of Right*. Eng. trs. S. W. Dyde, London 1896, contains suggestions of the questions which ethics ought to consider. W. Wundt's various ethical works contain the most systematic exposition of the subject in character not so remote from what I should find most sympathetic. Of English ethical writers of recent times, I place Dr Hastings Rashdall unhesitatingly as foremost. (See footnote above, p. 183). Mr G. Lowes Dickinson's *The Meaning of Good*. 4th ed. 1907 is, as may be expected, charmingly written. There is something similar in the point of view with my own, but the conclusion is not as clear as might be wished. Mr A. F. Shand's: *The Foundation of Character*. London 1914, though largely psychological, is pioneer work of the best type, which the serious student of Moral Values cannot afford to neglect.

CHAPTER V

Religious Values

1. It is not infrequently maintained that religion belongs to the region of the mystical and the indefinable. If the contentions so far urged are correct, the previously discussed values are all also in the last issue, indefinable. Nevertheless though indefinable they are not indistinguishable. The same is also true of the religious values. There may be some who disclaim any knowledge of their existence. But those who experience them know them as specific types of goods and bads which are associated more particularly with the emotions and with certain attitudes of the human mind. There is here no question even of the possibility of proof, any more than it is possible logically to prove the existence of the colour red or the sound of the human voice. The existence of the religious values cannot be

established except by reference to the values themselves : it cannot be refuted or demonstrated by reference to the non-religious. Appeal can be made only to two things : the individual's own experience – and that is paramount—, and the fact of religious organisations in the history of the human race.

2. Religious goods are conscious states, usually of definite emotional tones. Not infrequently they include distinct types of will attitude. There is further an implication of a reality or a condition beyond the apparent momentary limitations of the individual personality. The manner in which this is conceived, whether as Nature, or as the singularistic Absolute, or as God and other souls, has a marked effect upon the complex conscious states which are the particular religious values. As religious goods may be here mentioned, as types, a state of profound peace of mind or equanimity, a triumphant joy allied with confident activity, a feeling of reverence and awe, and a condition of mystical ecstasy which defies all description. Another expression of religious goods is to be found in the Christian triad, faith, hope, and love. Religious

experience also includes the acts of supplication and praise, of repentance and the sense of divine forgiveness, of renunciation and religious contemplation. In all these experiences is a conviction of the predominance of good over evil, a transcendence of the bads which are present in the changing course of earthly life.

3. An ancient Greek *dictum*, frequently reiterated, finds in fear the chief basis of religion. Yet fear may be said to be the bad *par excellence* amongst religious values. It is most evident in the early fear of the happenings of Nature, the storm, the thunder, and the lightning, and in the Animists' terror at the innumerable powers dwelling in the natural objects around them. Again, it has been engendered in many through the forms of active persecution on "religious" grounds, and in lurid stories of the torment of the damned. The worse form of fear is found in the condition of those, virtually in a state of lunacy, who believe that they or generally others are "lost souls", doomed to perpetual perdition. Religious bads are typified by such states of mind as could maintain that one of the joys of heaven would be to watch the torments of the justly damned.

Formalism and hypocritical self-satisfaction in one's personal character and cosmic position are the bads most common amongst those habitually taking part in public forms of religious worship.

4. The paragraphs 2 and 3 are merely suggestive, and, it is important to insist, cannot make any person aware of religious values who has not personally experienced the religious. Here, as in all the preceding types of values, we are in face of the indefinable. Religious values can only be truly known by acquaintance. Any and all description, to be understood correctly, demands some actual experience, some knowledge by acquaintance on the part of the hearer or reader. It is not possible to state just what in a particular instance constitutes the religious. There is something distinctive and the values are intrinsic. They are approved or disapproved in regard to their own nature, not simply as means to other ends. This is unrecognised when religious practices are performed or particular beliefs held on the principle that thus some future welfare, as heaven or cessation from re-birth, is attainable. Whatever element

there may be of hope of future attainment, higher and more rich than the present, the religious experience is at least in part a present intrinsic value. In other words, the individual in his private religious devotions or in sharing in corporate worship achieves an immediate satisfaction.

Theological theory has been occupied to such an extent with the universal implications of religion that the individual and particular character of the religious values has been neglected. Each religious good or bad is a state of consciousness of a particular person at a definite time. With all, even with the greatest saints, these values are experienced only intermittently. The higher the saint the more continuous and permanent they are. Here what is of significance is not religion in general (any more than health in general in the physical values) but the particular religious emotions and attitudes of this person and that. But to emphasise the importance of the recognition of religious values as particular and as the possession of individuals, does not imply any view as to whether the person alone may attain these values or only in association

with others. The task for pastoral theology is to discover how each and every individual may be led to the enjoyment of the richest and highest types of religious experience.

Some popular terms used in connection with religion, especially as concerned with valuation, have tended to give the impression that religious values are negative rather than positive. Thus, *redemption* has been thought to imply nothing more definite than freedom from sin and suffering. No positive experience has been unequivocally suggested. The terms *moksha* and *nirvāna* have brought to mind freedom from the bondage of *karma*, from the delusions of ignorance, or from desire which leads to suffering. Nevertheless religious values, goods and bads, are essentially positive. The state of mind which really constitutes *moksha* and *nirvāna* is a serene calm or peace and equanimity. Redemption is the state of the individual who having experienced genuine repentance is now fully conscious of complete forgiveness. This peace and this joy of forgiveness are indubitably positive. No less positive is the fear of the soul that supposes itself damned eternally, or the anxiety of the

primitive mind in dread of the thunder, lightning and storm, or of the Animists in anxiety as to the hidden powers in the tree or stone. What more positive than hypocritical self-satisfaction and formalism in religion?

5. There has almost always been something definitely personal in religion. Even the religions of India which have been so deeply affected by singularistic philosophical conceptions, regarding the personal as implicating limitation, have emphasised the position of the *guru* and the necessity of attaching oneself to a *guru*. To the Jains the twenty-four Tirthankaras, especially the Lords Parsvanatha and Mahavira, mean very much. None who have come into contact with earnest Jains can doubt the reality and the importance of their reverence and adoration of these Jinas, or conquerors. Muhammad for the Muslims, as Moses for the Jews, or Zarathustra for the Zoroastrians is the Prophet, looked up to as the highest type of the religious man, the revealer of religious truth and of the manner of holy living. Gautama Buddha is one of the three Jewels of Buddhism, and the faith is transmitted essentially through that other

Jewel, the order. So also Christians of "all denominations and none" regard Jesus as central. There are few who do not admit in some degree the necessity of the transmission of the religion through that personal contact which is implied in the being of the Church. As there are geniuses in the realms of music and painting, sculpture and architecture, science and philosophy, statesmanship and industry, so in the realm of religion the prophets and the saints are the geniuses. As best they may, they express their religious values in language, but they have indicated the inner spirit and the meaning of their words by a subtle personal influence. Just in so far as others come to a genuine knowledge by acquaintance of this spirit, they experience the same type of religious goods and bads. And they too lead others to participation not chiefly by theoretical disquisition but by personal appeal.

6. The individual has to judge for himself ultimately with regard to each and all values. In religion the individual may have the path pointed out to him by his religious confrères, and particularly by the teachings of the saints and prophets, but the acceptance or rejection

depends entirely on his own activity. The teaching is to be tested by personal experience : for that test there is no substitute. But it ought also to be recognised that as in other spheres of life so in religion, the " ordinary " individual must look for help from his superiors. The tyro in music, painting, sculpture and so on, must learn from the great geniuses if he is to attain even a moderate standard of individual achievement. The greatest amongst many losses and evils which Protestantism has incurred for the Christian heritage has been due to the neglect of the saints.

7. Though religious experiences are wholes, complex events in personal life indefinable in their ultimate essence, it is still possible to subject them to a certain degree of analysis. Thus a cognitive or intellectual factor, a feeling or emotional aspect, and an active or volitional tendency may be distinguished. Even though these are never found alone, one or another may be predominant in the religious life of particular individuals. A superficial empirical examination of the historical religions and the diverse sects of the great religions would suffice to show how the emotional dispositions and

active attitude vary with the beliefs. And it must also be admitted that emotional dispositions and active conation have a part in the reasons leading to the acceptance or the rejection of particular beliefs. In this connection it is perhaps worth while insisting quite frankly that in my opinion it is only rational to take into consideration in estimating beliefs, the kinds of feelings and activities with which they are associated.

8. The position which has just been stated, is not that feeling and will, or conation, should be the chief factor in forming or justifying beliefs, but that these should be considered amongst the relevant facts. From the point of view of common sense, and especially of a philosophy developed by reflection on that basis, beliefs should be elaborated and accepted by the degree of their claim to be truths, whether they do or do not conform to emotion and conation. If anything is to be modified it should be the latter. The implication of this contention is that the intellectual side of religion or the beliefs should receive prior consideration and the emotional and active brought as closely as possible into harmony

with the conclusions arrived at. Much of the discussion included in Chapter II of this book has relation to religious beliefs, and the subjects there treated will only be mentioned incidentally. Religious beliefs may be said to refer to Nature, to Man, and to non-human Spiritual Beings.

9. The world of non-human Nature, as the most obvious environment for human activity, has been variously interpreted in religious beliefs. It might almost be said that man's greatest fears have been produced by his contact with some of Nature's forces and his misunderstanding of them. Pure Nature-worship, an attitude not limited to early times and the primitive mind, does not rise to the level of intellectual conceptions. Rather it is the immediate presentation which arouses the impression of reverence and awe, of joy or fear. Animism is a distinct form of belief as to non-human Nature. According to it, there are innumerable spirits living in natural objects, and these may and do affect man for good or ill. Usually circumstances serve to bring particular spirits into prominence. Animism is associated with more fear and

superstitious practices (of propitiation, supplication, etc.) than any other conception of Nature.

Pantheism has probably arisen from Nature-worship leading on to a particular form of philosophical reflection. There is in the experience and the admiration of great expanses of natural scenery an impression of unity, or, let us say, the feeling aroused is such that no impulse is felt towards analysis. But it may be doubted whether, except in a mystical form of poetic expression or in singularistic philosophical theory, pantheism is genuinely present in human life. As far as the feeling and attitude towards Nature are concerned, the pantheistic view tends to emphasise intelligence and order, a unity of plan as contrasted with the multiplicity of cross purposes and the caprice of Animism. The more this character of intelligibility is considered, the stronger the tendency to pass from the world as it appears to a ground or "the reality" beyond it.

Historically it is at least not impossible to maintain that theistic beliefs as to the ground of Nature have developed gradually from an interaction of animistic and pantheistic tendencies. For, on the one hand, beyond

Nature spiritual being is postulated, and on the other hand, this spiritual being is one, the ground of the intelligible unity in Nature. Now while this theistic view of Nature must in its formal elaboration and expression have resulted from definite intellectual reflection, it is not supposed that such reflection is shared by all accepting the belief. Rather the belief most probably arose from a feeling of contact of mind with mind mediated through Nature. The element of caprice has remained in that until recent times it has been generally, and still is widely believed, that God has interfered with the order of Nature arbitrarily, for particular purposes introducing what mankind have denominated the miraculous. The popular belief in miracles, as something of importance in religion, has come into conflict with the principles of modern science which maintain the universality of law. A closer examination shows that ultimately the continued affirmation of the reality of miracles even by modern theologians is due to their wishing to guard the idea of God as related to Nature from losing the suggestion of purpose in reference to human aims. Investigation into the basis of

the principles of science also shows that while they are too frequently represented in a mechanical or quasi-mechanical form, and are often understood as such by leading scientists, they depend nevertheless for their acceptability as applying to Nature as a whole on the ultimate principle of intelligibility and consistency of Nature. If this were not so, there would be no ground beyond mere habit to believe that the laws of Nature will hold at any moment after their formulation. In short, it may reasonably be maintained that the teachings of modern science as to the laws and uniformities of Nature are such as to suggest that these are related to a general and consistent plan. However far science may yet be from showing by its methods the detailed consistency and the full character of the whole it works forward with this inspiration. Modern science may therefore in its ultimate presuppositions be affirmed to be a support to the theistic interpretation of Nature.

10. From the point of view of religion men have been especially interested in their own nature, above all in their origin and their destiny. Mythology gives many types of story

accounting for the origin of the human race, and these stories have formed part of the actual religious beliefs of the majority. They are mainly of the derivation of men from the gods by process of generation or by acts of intelligent creation. The limits of the present publication preclude a historical survey of the variations of these beliefs. Here it must suffice to discuss briefly the different conceptions as formulated in theological terms. The problem is two-fold: the origin of the human race as such, and the origin of each individual human being. It is predominantly the second part of the problem which interests the particular person, and the first part is chiefly interesting on account of the second. The theory of *Traducianism*, much discussed amongst Christian Scholastics of the Middle Ages, maintains that the individual person, soul and body, is the product of elements from both the parents.²⁹

29. Though the view does away with the idea of creation of each soul it pre-supposes the special creation of the souls of the first human persons. The theory of *Preformationism* maintained that all souls were created with and in Adam and are passed down the ages something like the Weismannian germ-plasm.

That this is so as regards the body is disputed by none. Modern psychology in its insistence on the unity and non-composite character of the mind has made the belief in Traducianism unacceptable, and it would be difficult to find any holding it in recent times. The idea of generation, common in mythology, has given place in philosophical theology to that of emanation. This, however, appears to imply a kind of mechanical process. It is allied with such terms as *manifestation*, *aspect*, and so on, as, for example, the soul is the manifestation or an aspect of the Absolute. No exposition gives any clear connotation to the term. The remaining conception is that of creation. It may at once be admitted that creation is essentially a mystery: it is no less so than emanation. Nevertheless, the term suggests two things which are not implied by emanation—will and intelligence. Creation connotes an intelligent act. Thus, the essential in the belief in creation as the nature of the origin of the human race and of the individual soul is the implication that each and all are part of an intelligent whole, deliberately willed. To the charge that this

is anthropomorphic, it is replied that all human thought is such in one way or another. The contention on behalf of the use of the term creation in preference to any other term is that it suggests something more intelligible and volitional and so more spiritual.

A further possible view remains: that the individual souls are eternally existent, that is, without origin. This conception has nothing in it associated with religion. It has, further, been rejected above (pages 105-108) on intellectual grounds, as Pluralism.

11. The destiny of the individual is of even more interest to most individuals than the question of origin. An empirical study of the psychology of religious values does not help us easily to solve the problem.³⁰ A sort of religious abnegation is strangely allied here with an illimitable daring and conceit. For on the one hand individuals have in all ages and climes regarded themselves so utterly insignificant as finite individuals as to abandon all belief in their continued existence as such.

30. See my *Human Needs and the Justification of Religious Reliefs* 1918, pages, 65-69 also Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson's Ingersoll Lecture: *Is Immortality desirable?*

Yet on the other hand (I am not thinking of the materialists) they have professed to long for and believe in continued existence as identified with the Absolute—the unity of *Jivatman* with *Paramatman*, of self with the universal spirit. This attitude has been and is commonly allied with the belief in the individual souls as emanations or manifestations, and their eventual absorption into the whole. For those who have not at the same time so low and so high an opinion of their worth and their status in the universe, the alternative belief remains, that they are not so insignificant as to be the mere playthings of an hour nor so significant as to be in any manner identified with the Absolute. They do not deny the worth of their souls, as distinct personalities capable of intercourse, preferably in love and friendship, with other souls. In fact, just in this intimate communion between souls immediately aware of their own uniqueness is the worth of each to each and to one another most felt. There are those who have said : If God wills it, then it is well so ; if God does not will it, then it is better thus. Many thoughts arise in reflection on such a statement. It may be supposed, for example,

that God wills all souls to be permanent and with power as in their creation sustains them. Or it may be that continuance is conditional—conditional on the self by its inherent freedom attaining a character worthy of continuance. Thus there may be a belief in conditional personal immortality, with the annihilation of those unworthy. Or the belief may be held of immortality for all, but variation in the character of the life. It is in connection with the last mentioned view that the doctrines of heaven and hell have been widely held in the religions. At the present time it is customary to pass lightly over the doctrine of hell. Nevertheless a superficial rejection is unjustifiable. In accordance with the philosophy here outlined, heaven may be described as a state of enjoyment of goods and freedom from bads, and hell a suffering of bads. Those who accept the idea of genuine freedom will admit that one's heaven or hell, or the degree of each, depends in part upon one's own attitude. They must also be prepared to admit that the attitude of the individual may be adamant, for good or evil. With genuine freedom a so-called "perverse" attitude of mind may persist

as long as the individual persists. The destiny of the individual soul is thus regarded as essentially a matter of the individual's own attitude. This appears to be implied in one way or another in most religions.

12. But the attitude of mind is not all. At the end of the chapter on moral values it was agreed that a constant experience in the lives of many persons, especially of some of the greatest saints, has been of their own inability to attain the best unaided. They have felt the need of power and they have felt power come in religious experience, through meditation and prayer, through contemplation and praise. They have felt themselves in co-operation with a higher power, and a higher power in co-operation with them. This brings us to the third special type of religious beliefs—those concerned with supernatural beings.

The beliefs concerning "supernatural" beings, that is, beings different from men and not otherwise included generally in the term Nature, are of few types. Pantheism identifies the whole, including all Nature, with the divine being, but the view has already been expressed that this is hardly to be regarded as

an actual persistent form of religious belief. As an object of religious contemplation and worship the so-called universal spirit becomes more and more differentiated from the world of Nature and man, and is credited with spiritual relationship with his worshippers. Pantheism represents an occasional variation, due to a form of rational reflection, on the way from the earliest Nature-worship towards Theism.

Polytheism has also arisen historically from a combination of the awe and reverence or fear of great Nature forces or events and their interpretation, through the influence of Animism, as expressions of spiritual powers. But Polytheism as a belief has always tended to be superseded by Theism. The gods and goddesses of the popular Polytheisms of ancient Greece and Rome, Egypt and Babylon, as of India, are the subjects of interesting mythologies, but they do not concern us here. A thoroughgoing psychological study of their characteristics and the nature of their relation to mankind might show a strong psychological ground in common with the tendency in the most emphatically theistic religions to include

angels and demons in the range of the supernatural beings of their belief. Reasons for the adoption of Theism have been stated above (pages 108-116). Though, in my opinion, no satisfactory evidence has been forthcoming for the establishment of the belief in angels and demons, strongly theistic religions as those of the Zoroastrians, the Jews, the Christians, and Muslims include the belief in angels. Considered *a priori* it seems more reasonable to suppose that there are spiritual beings higher than man, rather than that lower than God man is the highest spiritual being. And further, individuals have undoubtedly believed that they have received help and consolation from them. So long as this belief does not militate against their own activity, there is little reason to oppose it.

13. In religious worship and contemplation, in prayer and praise, the individual's attitude appears to be essentially theistic. That this is so in Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam is generally agreed. I would maintain that the theistic strain is enormously strong in Hinduism. The Shaivite in his religious experience is probably really a Vaish-

navite; he assumes the thoughts of the Advaita Vedānta as represented in S'ankaracharya's commentary when asked to discuss ultimate conceptions.³¹ Buddhism seems to have had nothing theistic in its earliest form, but I do not doubt that this was one reason of its eventual overthrow in India. Northern Buddhism, in China and Japan, has developed a form of substitute in its pantheon. For Southern Buddhism, the Buddha, as one of the three Jewels, may also be considered in the same light. To what extent there is anything of theistic character in Jainism is much disputed. Sometimes it seems as though modern Jains have been influenced by the Hindu conception of Paramatman. Sometimes it might be supposed that their reverence and awe for the twenty-four Tirthankaras, or particular ones of them, is a form of worship similar to the theistic. Or it may be conceived that their conception of pure spirituality, or the ideal, serves some of the purpose of the Theist's God.

³¹ See N. Macnicol: *Indian Theism*. London 1915. cf. the revivalist movement of the saints and the modern Arya and Brahma Samajes.

The religious experience is not one of mere belief. The knowledge of God is claimed to be a knowledge by acquaintance, a communion of human mind with the divine mind, of personality with personality. This relationship is one not simply or chiefly of knowledge but of will and feeling, of co-operation and love. The individual has to experience this for himself, but to do so, he must assume the attitude of seeking God. In other words, the goods of religion cannot be expected to come to the man who does not occupy himself at all earnestly and in the right spirit with religion. He may at most feel particular impressions in certain religious circumstances. About such communion between man and God there is something inexpressible, mystical, and it is well to admit it. Like all the intrinsic values so far discussed it is unique and immediate, and ultimately indescribable.

14. Religious fervour has, however, led to the ascription of a number of attributes to the Divine Being, such as omnipotence, omniscience, infinity, eternity, all goodness, immutability, perfection. Whether the ascription of these attributes is a necessity of the individual's

religious experience must ultimately be left for each individual to decide for himself. I wish simply to record for myself that these attributes do not all appear to be necessary for my religious experience. If I say that I do not know what infinity means, that I am not decided whether infinite is positive and finite negative, or whether both are positive, or whether the finite is positive and infinite negative, it will be easier to state my attitude to the other attributes. I am inclined to think that if I applied (as I do not feel compelled) either term to Reality, I should—at least as far as power is concerned,—say it is finite. In that case certainly I should call God finite; but I should also do so in relation to the belief that He has delegated power to others, and while they exist He is limited by them—self-limited, if one wishes to express it so.

God may be said to be omnipotent in the sense of being the source of all the power there is, but religion does not need to think of God's power as more than is necessary satisfactorily to overcome any other power. To express this differently, religion needs here no more than the belief that the divine power is supreme.

Thus, even supposing power delegated by Him to other beings (as implied in the doctrine of creation) able to be used in opposition to His purposes (as implied by the doctrines of freedom and sin), He may be conceived to have power to overcome the opposition of the combined forces of all others. This is quite sufficient for the optimistic faith in the eventual triumph of the good which is associated with the belief in the Divine power.

In somewhat similar manner God may be said to be omniscient if by this is meant the knowledge of all there is to be known. But if time and activity are in almost any sense treated seriously it may be maintained that even God does not know all the future, because this is not yet. God may be regarded as knowing the future in so far as it depends upon Him, but not in those details which depend upon the free activities of those to whom He has delegated power. All that is certain is that their power is insufficient to alter the future as dependent upon Him. To use a very unsatisfactory metaphor, He determines (and knows throughout) the warp of cosmic history. He knows the whole woof so far woven

by others who can only within definite limits know what the effects of their efforts will be, whether their intentions will be achieved, for that will depend upon the nature of the acts of others and on the Divine purpose. In so far as that purpose is the ultimate basis of the so-called uniformities or laws of nature, by knowledge of these and conformity with these human activity may most certainly attain its end.

The chief attribute which religion requires is that of Divine goodness. It seems possible to maintain this only together with a doctrine of real freedom in other beings as the source of evil. Goodness here usually implies moral goodness. By perfection may be meant the possession of the highest of all kinds of goods and of no kinds of bads. The reflective mind may observe that the view of God so far indicated does not necessarily fit in with the ascription of perfection in this sense. As a mere matter of personal conviction, I may be allowed to confess that my religious experience does not appear to require the attribute of perfection in the Supreme Being. From an analysis of religious literature and what one.

may learn about the religious life of the generality of mankind through the ages, even including many saints, it may be contended that the attribute of perfection is little more than a conception of theological thinkers, the connotation of which they have left quite indefinite.

If God is conceived as the source or ground of all other beings, He may be described as eternal, without beginning and without end, the uncaused cause of causal agents, as of much else. He is to be regarded as immutable not in the sense of a static lifelessness, a persistent passivity, but as preserving a consistency of character and purpose in the varied multiplicity of His acts.

Religion demands for its Supreme Being one sufficiently great in power to justify a confidence that good will at least eventually and fundamentally triumph over evil, a Being conscious of the lives of his creatures and ever ready to give them solace and hope whenever they turn to communion with him, a Being felt as a moral personality, loving and capable of being loved.

15. The religious attitude towards evil is much more practical than theoretical. It does

not profess to possess an answer as to why evil in any and all forms exists. Evil it regards as a challenge. On the one hand much of it is within the range of human activity, presenting a continuous opportunity for effort to remove it. Thus it is with a large proportion of physical bads, errors, ugliness, vices, as described in earlier chapters. On the other hand there are calamities and misfortunes (due, for example, to great catastrophes in Nature,) which are beyond human power to prevent. In so far as these involve suffering they demand silent submission and co-operation for the relief of suffering. Bad as some such calamities are, it ought not to be over-looked that they have an effect of deepening human character and widening human sympathy, arousing it from an almost inevitable tendency to drift into superficiality.

16. As a personal attitude religion has always shown the need of some form of expression. This has been evident for individuals alone; even more so is it found in the assemblies of religious communities. Religious practices, as forms of religious expression, are not merely an outlet for emotions but also a means of

calling forth definite feelings and cultivating particular attitudes and forms of conduct. Even from a narrowly utilitarian point of view such practices might be approved in so far as they help to produce a certain emotional momentum directed to the attainment of social ends. As associated with the development of types of spiritual character their claims are much higher. Social religious practices have the effect of increasing the recognition of social solidarity. As long as a ceremony is generally acceptable amongst those who practice it, the actual forms, if morally irreproachable, are of no particular consequence.

17. Prayer is perhaps the most universal of all religious practices. At its lowest it is concerned with requests for merely physical goods, or release from fear and from physical bads. Even at this level it implies an element of trust—and its objects are not to be despised. At its highest prayer is an expression of the aspiration of the human heart for the best and a recognition of the need of divine co-operation. It reveals the consciousness that in the highest reaches of his life man desires not to be alone. Whatever the other effects of

prayer—and concerning them there is room for difference of opinion—it is indisputable that the practice of prayer has a marked influence on the moulding of character. It develops a peaceful confidence of power and lessens the sense of anxiety of life. Let the philosophy of life recognise the fact !

A number of practices serve to arouse and to express the optimistic strains of religion. Life is rarely so over-flowing with joy that mankind can afford to dispense with any methods which cultivate feelings of happiness. Foremost are the singing of hymns, especially congregationally and accompanied by music. Lights and decorations in religious buildings, the gorgeous array of priests and choir, processions,—it would be difficult to over-estimate the worth of these in the religious life comprehensively conceived. There is an urgent call for revival of past customs in these directions and a need for further applications of religious art to adoration and worship.

18. The fact of birth has appeared mysterious ever since mankind rose to a level of intelligence sufficient to become cognisant of it. The advances of science take away none of its

mystery. In most ages and climes birth has become associated with some religious rite. The theist who looks upon the human race as a definite factor in a more or less intelligent scheme, not without reason conceives of each soul as born to take a particular part in the divine plan. It is appropriate, therefore, that with thanksgiving for the birth of a child into a family there should be also fervent prayer that it should achieve good destiny. Birth ceremonies might be made a means of drawing society to a sense of its corporate responsibility to infants and children.³²

Initiation ceremonies serve a useful purpose if they are performed at the stage of adolescence when the youth is beginning to become conscious of an inner urge to a wider life and to increasing activities. Then, if accompanied by suitable instruction, they may be a powerful and impressive force turning the eyes to those things which are good, and inspiring to social ideals. At no other time in the life of

32. From this point of view it would be an advantage to have periodically special performances of the ceremony for all the children born within the period in each particular locality.

the individual may the power of the religious organisation be so beneficially exerted.

19. From time immemorial marriage has been looked upon as possessing a religious character, and has been made the occasion of religious ceremony. If marriage means genuine affection between two persons, and the prospect of a further development of affection in relation to children of the marriage, then the religious character may be maintained from the theistic point of view. For according to Theism the highest type of value is that of personal love: the very basis and ideal of the whole intelligible scheme of things is the increase of love and the service of love. Marriage and religion, theistically conceived, are thus in principle related. The religious ceremony should be at once an expression of the happiness at the prospect of fuller realisation of love, and a form of fervent aspiration and prayer of all present for the attainment of the highest of which the married state is possible. In emphasising a cosmic side in the relation the recognition of the religious aspect of marriage ought to add to its human dignity and to the sense of responsibility with which it is entered.

20. Various reasons have been assigned for funeral ceremonies. Their retention is sufficiently justified in that they serve, as nothing else, to emphasise the transitory nature of so many of life's values and turn the thoughts for awhile on those goods of character which are most enduring.

Civilised religion has dispensed with rites of sacrifice of animals. The offering of flowers, food, clothes, money before images is still felt by many Easterners to be symbolic of homage to divine beings whom they conceive as royal personages. Better this than to forget the divine entirely. Fasting is a form of moral discipline rather than of religious worth. Self-examination and confession may be given a religious character, if it is thought that human conduct has a cosmic significance, an effect, however small, on the fulfilment of the divine plan. Meditation and contemplation may lead to a quietening of the soul, and the possibility of a keener perception of the influence of the divine. An abundance of experience has sufficiently proved the reality of the spiritual gain which comes to persons assembled together in a fellowship of silence.

21. Religious beliefs are the principles of the religious life, the skeleton which supports the whole. The practices are mainly the external shows, the protecting garb, the mode of revelation and expression. The throbbing life blood of religion is the aspirations and the hopes, the sorrows and the joys, the emotional attitudes. There are some who have discarded all forms of religious practice, who think even that they no longer accept any religious doctrines, who still maintain that to them when all such "trappings" are gone, the beatific vision of the divine is present. Especially has it been thus amongst the mystics. Even with the rank and file of those who feel the call of religious values, the immediate intuition, the present experience of a form of religious emotion is sufficient to make all doctrines and practices seem at most of secondary significance. At times the so-called agnostic, open enemy perhaps to the "superstitious" practices of religious organisations, feels the call of love, and pictures to himself a humanity swayed by it alone. At the root of religion is undoubtedly this music of the heart. One feels its chords touched most by the great powers of Nature,

the expansiveness of the sea, the vast snow-capped peaks, range upon range, the quietness of a lake, the songs of the birds and the colours of the flowers. Another is attuned to the deepest tones of the eternal by the perception of the pitiable, the terrific suffering of humanity, its wanderings in error and sin, and in his life springs up the joys of an active serving love. To some the divine becomes apparent in the lights and shades of feeling aroused by the music of the great musicians. Yet to how many the path of religion has been opened by the personal influence of prophet and saint! Carlyle would, indeed, see in religion an essential hero-worship. From one cause or another Zarathustra, Moses, Gautama, Jesus, Muhammad, have become objects of personal appeal to their adherents. It is futile to endeavour to analyse fully what they represent. They embody sentiments, ideals and aspirations of the ages, passed on from person to person, from mother to child, from father to son, from adept to adept. Humanity cannot afford to be robbed of any of the reverence, the encouragement, which these saints have engendered. Whether a time will come when one of these will reign

supreme in the hearts of men may be left undiscussed. In the meantime, each may learn from all, though he feel the appeal most of that teacher amongst whose followers he has found himself born.

22. Out of the wells of mystic feeling spring up the vital forces of the religious life. A strain of pessimism has been present in all these great religious leaders: and it is a factor in almost all deep religious life. But the pessimism is one implying a failure of the lower types of value solely to satisfy, an insufficiency of returns for activity spent on the personal gratification of the senses to the neglect of truths and beauty, virtue and religious joy. Neither is optimism found to be a permanent rest for the human mind. Bads of all types make themselves too frequently evident for pure optimism to endure. To active natures, to persons endowed with the capacity of freedom, the present and the future are to be forged by endeavour. The only religious attitude is a faith in meliorism, a confidence that inspired by the highest motives, guided by the clearest truths, human activity may achieve the fullest whole of life's values.

23. The intimate life of religion is one of changing goods and bads, leading through effort to the elimination of those ideas, practices, and feelings which depress, and to the permanence of those which give highest worth to continuance. Fear and distress, conflict, remorse and repentance are to give way to forgiveness and hope, peace and triumph, joy and thankfulness. The theist conceives the essential in the ideal to be an emotion of love between all persons, human and divine, the motive and the conclusion, the alpha and the omega of all service.

24. Religious faith is fundamentally a deeply rooted personal attitude. It is associated with particular forms of beliefs and practices according to the level of the civilisation in which it lives. Continuous association leads almost inevitably to the psychological result that the personal attitude is supposed impossible without the other factors. Thus, "faith" has become too often identified with the acceptance of traditional systems of doctrine and "faithful" with punctilious performance of rites. The force of religious fervour has been turned to conflict on behalf of obsolete dogmas and of

practices having no intrinsic value. Yet it is impossible to deny the validity of the contention that, judged by any recognised standard of human truth, the beliefs which divide the great masses of mankind are based on uncertainties, and in themselves are in the highest degree doubtful. There can be little hope for the religions until the claims of their orthodox representatives have been passed again and again through the purging fire of rationalistic criticism. The defenders of true religion have nothing to fear from the onslaught of science and philosophy on traditional creeds. They have everything to hope for in the break-down of narrowing oppositions³³ and the rise of a free faith, an undaunted spirit ready to follow the dictates of love with the eye of an ever widening knowledge. Such faith should permeate the whole of life and its activities. The only uniformity it demands is consistency of fundamental motive and aim: methods may be as varied as the intellect and skill of man can devise.

33. The oppositions between the Christian communities are more ecclesiastical than religious, concerning the seat of authority more than religious experience. The discords merit contempt and pity.

25. In the East it is impossible to ignore completely that "religious" attitude adopted by an apparently large number of men of varying ages of life, that of wandering asceticism, as a member of a monastic order or otherwise. Though it is probably correct that a very large number of these are ignorant and have adopted the type of life from other than religious motives, in this and earlier generations a vast number have indeed believed thus to find rest and peace. The course has most certainly often been adopted under the idea that chiefly by a renunciation of the goods of the physical (even intellectual and aesthetic) the highest goods would come. That attitude appears entirely mistaken. There is nothing more narrowing than physical voluptuousness, except the mere negation of such voluptuousness. Genuine rational asceticism—the course which the Buddha recognised after his enlightenment—is the simple rejection of what is known to hinder the attainment of the positive ideal. Renunciation of worldly position and power, of physical, intellectual, and aesthetic goods, this must have been the true experience of thousands of earnest souls in East and West.

Such was the asceticism taught by Jesus when he related the story of the man who sold all that he had to obtain the treasure in the field; and when he told the rich young man to sell all he had, to give it to the poor and "follow me."³⁴ More forcibly this asceticism is seen when Jesus gave up his life for his cause. No man knows when the call will come to himself to make a great renunciation for the ideals, the values, he holds highest. Let each with firm confidence of faith inspired by love await the call and pass it not!

26. As a social phenomenon religion is a historical growth. All the great religions point back to historical founders and trace a course

34. *Matthew*, Chapter 19. This was evidently meant by Jesus to be a test of the relative attachment of the man to religious and other goods. The "Follow me" would have led to some active work in the band of the disciples. The monastic life in Christendom has almost always been marked by different forms of active work, combined with regular devotion and contemplation. Christian Orders frequently pursued some social service other than that of preaching. Eastern asceticism has been too individualistic an endeavour on the part of the person concerned to attain primarily his own redemption. See the articles on Monasticism in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

of evolution during which their organisation has been developed. The modern man in search of a form of expression which will satisfy his religious needs has tended to turn from the great historical communities, so hide-bound by obsolete dogmas and effete practices, so lacking in inner spirituality. Nevertheless, there are good grounds for believing that the community is an almost essential environment for the ordinary individual's participation in religious feelings and ideals. The community is a means of transmission of personal influences and a channel for the diffusion of social aims. With few exceptions, emotions and enthusiasms shared with others in a social group are far more expansive and stimulating than similar experiences felt alone. In spite therefore of individual differences of doctrinal expression or of ceremonial or other practice, continued association with the religious community is to be preferred to a life of isolation.³⁵

27. Although any idea of a union of religions is obviously outside the realm of the practical in our generation, and probably will be for

35. If the dangers of sectarianism are avoided. See E. A. Ross: *Foundations of Sociology*. New York 1919.

many generations, one who in a land of many religions occupies the only Chair for their comparative study may well be expected to express some opinions as to their relation. It may be said at the outset that the idea common amongst many Christian missionaries of an absorption of all other religions by their own is abhorrent. There are reasons to believe that each religion has something distinctive, at least in emphasis, and it is an impoverishment of human well-being if any element of religious value is lost. The guardians of each faith have a duty to perform to pass on to mankind the best that tradition has given to them. But for similar reasons they are under an obligation to acquaint themselves to the best of their ability with the values which other religions have to offer. It may be supposed that as far as possible they will assimilate these from their own point of view. Some may abandon their original religion for another if they think that thereby they achieve a higher or a more comprehensive religious life.

The full recognition of the values of the other religions need not lead to a mere eclecticism, as some have urged. There will be

common principles and emotional attitudes. The love of God, as central, should be the supreme unifying force. The main difference may be the leadership whose attraction has led men to God. What is most required at present is a sincere endeavour on the part of the earnest adherents of the religions to understand one another. The approach to co-operation will probably be most aided by consideration of the ethical teachings associated with the various faiths. The desire for a world-peace, and the danger of a world-wide oppressive industrial capitalism leading to an enervating materialism, demand that some effort should be made for co-operation amongst spiritual forces. What may best and reasonably be aimed at is no more one religion than one State, but a federation of religious communities as the spiritual side to a federation of peoples.

Note on some practical considerations:—

The Christian churches offer sufficient opportunities for entry into their religious ministry of men who feel they have keen religious intuitions and desire to lead a life engaged in the organisation of religious worship. The greatest defect is that the churches are so often dependent for the greater part of their finances on the wealthy classes

that they are paralysed in their efforts on behalf of the general social advance. Where this is not so, the stipend paid to the minister is so small that he finds an all-round healthy human development well nigh impossible. However noble self-imposed asceticism may be in this direction, it ought to be recognised that the pursuit of the highest religious values does not necessarily imply the renunciation of any other values. Practical realisation must be very far ahead, but it may be urged that the economic difficulties of ministers of religions will only be able to be met when out of the separate religious organisations (in any one country) an efficient federation is formed.

For the progressive life of any religious community a well organised enlightened priesthood or ministry is an essential. It may be maintained that this is what almost all of the non-Christian religions lack. The defect constitutes the real basis of the menace of Christian missions to the religious development of mankind. For, to the organised propaganda of trained Christian missionaries, there are far too few non-Christians able to put forward adequately the distinctive contribution of other religions to the religious wealth of humanity. There is an urgent need in India amongst Parsis, Muslims, Jains, and Hindus of ecclesiastical establishments meeting the requirements for free educated "priesthoods" and organising religious education and activities. The tradition of a religious community may go on to some extent mechanically through the mere fact of association, but there must be a progressive degeneration in face of modern secular forces, unless definite attempts are made to present religious principles and ideals in a modern form to the rising generation. Even at the utilitarian level of the consideration of the influence of religion on secular activities the State might be advised to take the initiative in setting on foot movements to inaugurate such establishments.

CHAPTER VI

The Good Life : its Unity and its Attainment

1. In the preceding chapters the most prominent types of values in human experience have been briefly surveyed more or less independently. The questions as to their relations remain to be considered. Even from the previous discussions the mind might be easily led to the general conception of *the Good Life* as a harmonious experience of all goods and no bads. *The Bad Life* would similarly be described as a discordant experience of all bads and no goods. These conceptions suggest a different condition from that which common-sense experience usually presents, and it is to be remembered that the purpose of this small treatise is to outline a philosophy of life formed by reflection on a basis of common-sense. Two further requirements beyond the implications of the earlier chapters are evident in the conception of the good life as described

above when considered in relation to the previous exposition. There is the demand for unity and harmony, and, in view of the insistence on active endeavour for each of the values, there is need of consideration of the attainment of the good life.

2. At the conclusion of the Introduction (page 24) it was urged that the higher the mental development of the individual, the more keenly does he feel the need of finding unity in his life and the world. The search for unity has been most persistent in philosophy. Some attempts have started with an assumption of unity, but they have failed to bring the individual particulars of experience into relation except in an abstract formal manner. On account of these failures, and further, because mankind are largely occupied with individual objects and events, it was thought advisable in this book to start with the many, the particulars of experience. It was left as one of the final problems to find out how far, and in what manner, if at all, these particulars might constitute a real concrete unity, as distinct from being conceived as a mere abstract formal unity.

A philosophy of life which begins with a consideration of values may reasonably end with an investigation of the unity of values and the conformity of facts with such unity. The task before reflection is first to consider whether there is an inevitable conflict between physical, intellectual, aesthetic, moral, and religious values. It must ask whether there is anything in the nature of facts which shows unity to be inherently impossible. If the account so far given is correct the experience of the individual human consciousness consists, or may consist, of a number of particular experiences which from the point of view of values have been distinguished roughly as physical goods and bads, truths and errors, beauty and ugliness, virtues and vices, and goods and bads of religion. Do these particular experiences of various values, coming this now, that then and so on, show any relationship of significant unity? Do conscious states and events follow one another with intelligible order? Or is life, as an American is reported forcibly to have described it: *just one damn thing after another?*

The problem is difficult enough when limited to the life of the individual person: it is

much more serious when attention is turned to the wider whole of interacting persons. To be sure some of my experiences depend upon the activity exerted on me by other persons, and some of their values depend upon my activity. But can it be maintained that there is a real unity of values in my experience related consistently with consistent unities in other experiences? As things are it appears that my experience of some values is just the reason for the non-experience of such values by some others, and *vice versa*. What kind of unity exists or might exist amongst human persons? It is sometimes solemnly said that they are all particular examples of the universal concept *man*! Can anyone, in view of the pressing need of concrete unity, regard that as worthy of serious consideration, except the most formal of formal logicians and metaphysicians? In the midst of discords as mankind feels them, often painfully enough, from the merest drunken brawl to the clashes of a Great War, there is something almost to make one despair to be told by the "scientific" that human beings are a unity in forming part of one physical world, or to hear the "metaphysical" attempt-

ing to state or elucidate the conception of unity with the aid of a long string of negatives.

3. Common-sense experience does not present us with unsullied unity. Rather it reveals very much of the chaotic, very many oppositions and cross-purposes. The test which common-sense uses is that of values. Nevertheless there are obvious efforts for unity and it is inevitable that it should be asked what unity or unities are attainable, and how. If it is found that there is no ground to believe that values and facts are inherently opposed, the way out of the prevailing incongruencies must be sought. This, in its multitudinous implications, is the problem of unity as men and women in all ages and climes have in different degrees actually felt it.

4. The method of the present approach is determined by the character of the previous exposition, especially its main principle, that of values. The immediate problems from this point of view may be conveniently stated in the briefest form. If the good life is affirmed to be a unity of goods of all kinds, the first question which may be raised is: Are the goods on all sides of life compatible? Though

the question has rarely been thus explicitly formulated, by their mode of life and by expressed opinion, some have given a negative answer to it. But that has often been due to the confusion of this problem with another : Are the goods on all sides of life open to every individual ? The first problem refers to the values as amongst themselves, in their intrinsic character. The second refers to the facts of individual human experience as conforming or otherwise with values. Whatever the answers to these two questions may be, a philosophy of life which emphasises the active and social character of human experience easily passes to the practical enquiry : What social organisation appears best for the attainment of the greatest good ? Further it being granted that some degree of harmony and unity is experienced by men, it is important to consider : What is the highest experienced form of unity ?

5. The enquiry concerning the compatibility of all goods may appear somewhat formal. In fact it is distinctly concrete and, in view of some wide-spread teachings and modes of life, it is of fundamental importance. There are two aspects of the problem in relation to each

class of values. Are the different individual values of any one class amongst themselves inherently opposed or incompatible or are they consistent and compatible? Here the attention is centred on one class only. But beyond this is the enquiry: Are the individual values of one class consistent with those of other classes?

There are no grounds to believe that physical goods are inherently opposed one to another. Rather their scientific study suggests that they tend to form a consistent unity amongst themselves. Excess or insufficiency on one side or another has frequently, if not always, a bad effect even beyond the particular value itself. The greatest enjoyment of physical goods seems to be most probable of attainment when each is harmoniously related to all others. This may give at the same time the richest whole and the best of each. To take one example only: the best experiences of sex enjoyment go together with adequate good food, with a body protected from inclement changes of weather by good clothing and shelter and kept in physical fitness by moderate physical exercise. The actual constituents of the best scheme of physical values cannot be said yet to

have been scientifically decided, even in a general average manner, but it is quite reasonable to believe that science will eventually lead to the formulation of such a scheme. It would remain for each individual to introduce the modifications due to his own physical peculiarities, if he wished to obtain the highest physical enjoyment in his own case.

6. The whole of ancient and modern philosophic and scientific endeavour has proceeded and proceeds on the conviction or principle that truths are consistent one with another. Intellectual effort also aims at systematising truths into a significant whole. Though it seems quite unjustifiable to assert that an all-inclusive system has yet been elaborated, no reasons have been forthcoming to overthrow the conviction that truths are amongst themselves inherently compatible. "A sound mind in a healthy body" is a maxim which has held currency too long for its possibility to be seriously doubted or the validity of the ideal it suggests to be successfully challenged. There is no evidence to show any inherent conflict between intellectual and physical goods. On the contrary, increasing knowledge of truths

has helped in the attainment of better physical conditions, and much scientific effort has this practical purpose primarily in view. Only apparently and for a time may it appear that an individual can acquire greater intellectual advancement by the neglect of bodily requirements.⁵⁶ At least in the long run the enjoyment of real physical goods is most conducive to the development of knowledge of truths and the eradication of errors.

7. With all their multiplicity aesthetic goods are not inherently in conflict one with another. This is true even when their characteristics are fundamentally diverse. But it is another question whether all aesthetic goods can be comprehended in one aesthetic unity. Certainly no human being would claim such experience. Like the mooted system of intellectual truths all that may be asserted is that there is nothing inherently impossible in it. Further, while there seems no ground to maintain that such system of aesthetic goods would be ugly, there is equally no evidence that it would be beautiful. The unity of

36. The idea and practice of such asceticism is perhaps as rare in the West as common in the East.

aesthetic goods may perhaps be expected to be aesthetically good. There are no fundamental oppositions between aesthetic and physical goods. Healthy clothing and dwellings may at the same time be artistic. Physical well-being is often accompanied by beauty. It was maintained above (page 144) that the form of beauty to be first sought is that of the healthy well-fed and properly exercised human body. The beautiful need be in no radical opposition to intellectual truths. This does not mean that some facts (which may be described in truths) are not ugly.

8. The particular moral goods are not antagonistic to one another in their intrinsic nature. They can be conceived as all harmoniously present in one life, as embodied in personal character. Moral goods seem least of all likely to conflict with other goods. In the effort to produce the other goods and to eradicate the other bads there is a persistent call for exercise of virtues and an avoidance of vices. Physical bads are largely due to excess (denoting lack of "self"-control) or to insufficiency (denoting frequently lack of continued effort). Both of these indicate moral

bad. Physical goods demand, as a rule, some moral control of the appetites and some will power centred in industry. Veracity as a moral virtue is definitely related to the promulgation of intellectual truths. The other virtues are all consistent with intellectual goods. Again, though the attainment of intellectual knowledge is not necessarily accompanied by moral goodness, the broadest and highest type of moral character is most compatible with a wide intellectual outlook. Though it has sometimes been urged that the moral and the aesthetic are frequently in conflict, it is quite impossible to show that they are inherently opposed. The examples usually given suggest more often than not simply the need of greater emphasis on the moral. Though a person of artistic temperament frequently lacks moral strength there is no inner necessity that this should be so. Some of the greatest achievements in poetry and song, in sculpture, in instrumental music, and painting have been due to an intimate union of aesthetic appeal with moral inspiration.

9. Religious goods are not opposed to one another even though they include such diverse

states as those of the sorrow for sin and the joy of forgiveness, the element of pessimism and of confident faith. The nearest approach to what might be considered a unity of religious goods is the mystical experience. Although some, acclaimed the leading adepts of the religious life, have in practice reduced their food, clothing, and shelter to the minimum for bare existence, and have refrained from all enjoyment of sex (often representing this as most inimical to religion), it appears to be a quite gratuitous assumption to suppose that in the nature of things a rational enjoyment of physical goods is inconsistent with the highest religious attainments. That the combination of the two is of the greatest difficulty is all the more reason for serious effort to overcome it, than, in impatience, to reject one for the other. There is nothing antagonistic between the aesthetic and the religious. The beautiful in Nature has been again and again the cause of deep religious emotion. Art has from the earliest times been a means of expression of religious feelings. In history the evolution of morality and the changes of religious custom and practices have not always been parallel, and ar

appearance of conflict of the religious and the moral has sometimes arisen. No careful student would assert that they are intrinsically contradictory. Even those who maintain an Absolutist conception of the religious experience as a mystical life, "beyond good and evil," usually affirm that moral distinctions are a valid and necessary factor in the progress to the mystical experience.

More vigorous is the contention of some who believe that the results of rational reflection, that is, intellectual truths, are opposed to religious doctrines and hopes. If this is so there is a radical discord in human values as they have been understood in this book. Some who adopt this attitude would refuse to recognise the existence of any religious "goods." Rational reflection has not led me to any such conclusion. Even those who do not accept the Theism outlined in chapter II as the final intellectual truth about reality often hold beliefs which they consider religious. The enlightened theist can be convicted of no obvious error on intellectual grounds. From the point of view of his religious experience he is compelled to urge that the religious good of communion

with God strengthens and harmonises with his intellectual conclusions. Far from being a conflict between religion and reason he contends that they support one another. Trust in reason is fundamentally *only a part of* the trust in an ultimate intelligent Being. The personal confidence in a supreme spiritual consciousness *includes* the conviction of the predominant rationality of the universe, the conviction which is at the basis of the intellectual investigation of reality.

10. The conclusion so far reached is that the different kinds of goods are compatible. Attention has been centred on goods only, rather than on goods and bads, partly for brevity, and partly because the philosophy of life should concern itself chiefly with a constructive aim. Bads of different kinds are frequently not merely discordant with goods but also with one another. Disintegration, opposition, conflict, denote the presence of bads. But the philosophy of life which regards unity in some sense as a characteristic of goods is not necessarily required to show either that the bads of each class are harmonious, (or even disharmonious) amongst themselves or with those of other classes.

11. In the Introduction (pages 4 and 5) a distinction was adopted between *facts* and *values*. It needs no demonstration that the conclusion reached concerning the compatibility of values tells us nothing about facts in this sense. The consideration of how far facts do or might conform with values is a further problem, one more serious for a philosophy of life, especially with reference to the problem of unity, viewed as something concrete. For here the question is whether the possible unities or consistencies of goods are found as actual experienced facts, and if not, how they may, if at all, be so experienced. The individual consciousness is the experient and the facts of the individual life must first be considered.

At the level of physical values it is at once apparent that many individual persons are constitutionally incapable of enjoying all kinds of physical goods, are even subject through inheritance to severe physical bads. With good reasons it has been urged in different countries by quite independent authorities that a large proportion of the people are underfed and underclothed. That they are inadequately

and improperly housed goes almost without saying. The majority enjoy little or no form of vigorous beneficial physical exercise: rather the nature of their occupations is far too often such that they suffer more physical discomfort of tiredness than joy of physical exertion. As an explanation it has been maintained that the resources of the earth are insufficient for all to have enough food and clothing, and that other economic factors do not admit of human energy being spent upon the provision of good dwellings for all, even if the materials for them are sufficient. Climatic and geographical conditions enable individuals in different parts of the earth to enjoy certain physical goods, and prevent them from others. Whether the explanation mentioned be true or false it cannot be denied that in a very large number of individuals there is not at present, nor has been in the past, either a complete enjoyment of physical goods, nor have conditions allowed of that harmony and unity between goods of which the possibility was previously maintained.

12. Turning to the intellectual, aesthetic, moral, and religious, it must first be insisted that it is quite unjustifiable to assert dogmatic-

ally any limitations to the inner capacity of any individual soul. It does not follow that because in particular circumstances the individual does not manifest a power of acquiring knowledge of this or that, of appreciating this or that beauty, of attaining this or that moral virtue, or experiencing religious holiness, that he is inherently incapable of them altogether. The ultimate metaphysical nature of any individual is not completely evident, and it is arbitrary to affirm any limits to a possible manifestation of capacity for and actual acquirement of intellectual, aesthetic, moral and religious goods. It is impossible to over-estimate the importance of the recognition of this for a philosophy of life which is in any degree activistic. To this it will be necessary to return later.

Nevertheless an empirical survey of human history and of mankind at the present time only convinces one of the small amount of knowledge, the little appreciation (or creation) of beauty, the rarity of fine moral character and of the calm joy of religious holiness in individual human beings. The conditions usually described as mental defect and insanity

can only with difficulty, and that more speculatively than scientifically, be interpreted as maladjustment of a healthy mind with its physical medium, itself fit or unfit. Further, in the embodied state in which the human soul finds itself, the *development* of its intellectual, aesthetic, moral and even religious character seems to depend in however small a degree on physical conditions. The spread of knowledge, to take one example, is affected by the physical production of books. The artistic is sometimes aided, sometimes hindered, by the physical medium which is found at hand for it. The prevailing physical conditions are not always conducive to good spiritual results. But until it can be shown indisputably that the development of the human soul is inevitably bound up with the same detrimental or advantageous physical conditions they need not be considered insuperable. Such conditions may always operate in "earthly" life, but that may not be the only life.³⁷

37. The changes of the physical world may make human life on earth impossible. But the so-called physical may only be the effects of spiritual beings upon one another, and in some manner the physical may persist and vary even after a cessation of "earthly" conditions.

13. Further difficulties in the problem of unity are suggested by the consideration of some aspects of human psychology. The human mind is very restricted in the range of its attention. Its extent is not great even when what is called the "marginal" is also included. There are some who maintain that only one mental state can be in the focus of attention at any given moment. Whatever the truth as to this, it is clear that though human conscious experience is not (as it were) a series of "knife edges" but of specious presents with duration, it is nevertheless successive. Values are not experienced simultaneously but successively. Must not their unity be in some sense successive? Could that which is successive be simultaneously a unity? Or could that which is successive unite the successive? Such problems are highly metaphysical, implying ultimately the same difficulty as that of the relation of "time" and "eternity." Into the formal abstract discussion of these problems this is not the place to enter. In conformity with the method here followed the position adopted must be indicated on a basis of commonsense experience.

14. The experiences of the values are undoubtedly successive, but they have an effect beyond the occasion of their happening. They help to form distinct dispositions. The successive experiences of physical values help to build up the bodily constitution or to undermine it. The goods lead up to or preserve a physical condition increasingly capable of a high degree and continuity of physical enjoyment and well-being. But it is important to note that the development of the physical body, and its preservation in a state of health demand deliberate and repeated attention to the active attainment of physical goods. A benefit to the body once acquired may disappear unless it is sustained by appropriate activity. Even, therefore in the physical the experiences though successive are also forming a disposition which can as it were be carried forward as an achievement affecting later experiences. But this process in the physical does not extend far. The anabolism of earlier years eventually gives way to the katabolism of old age. The body not only grows but also decays, and with its decay the capacity for physical enjoyments often decreases.

The successive experiences of the intellectual, the aesthetic, the moral and the religious also tend to the formation of dispositions and to definite types of personality. Intellectual knowledge is obviously a growth in which each experience though admitted of worth itself leads on to a modification of the mental constitution, thus affecting future intellectual experiences. But here again there is a tendency for gains to be lost unless the truths are repeatedly used in one way or another by intellectual activity. Truths once known become forgotten, intellectual capacities become atrophied. Empirical evidence does not enable one to say how far intellectual katabolism is inevitable. Its necessity appears less evident when it is remembered that the mind in later years has to express itself through an increasingly enfeebled physical organism. The enjoyment of the aesthetic tends to the cultivation of a particular type of temperament. This also requires to be sustained by aesthetic experiences. Capacities of aesthetic appreciation or creation are likely to be lost unless they are used, and with the loss of the capacities, the experiences of beauty must become

less and less. Once more there is an obvious dependence on the physical body. Decaying sight and hearing may prevent the individual from many experiences of beauty.

Moral experiences lead to more or less definite moral character, affecting later moral experience. That there is normally moral growth seems undeniable, but though there are instances of moral degeneration, it is perhaps possible to maintain that moral katabolism is not normal. Personal moral character may be more persistent than intellectual and aesthetic abilities and achievements. The moral attitudes implied in moral values may be felt even though occasions for external manifestations may be rare. The moral depends less on physical conditions than any of the values previously discussed. Successive religious experiences also tend to the formation of a religious disposition, or character. There is a wide-spread opinion, hardly to be disputed, which may have a deeper root in the ultimate nature of things than, may be supposed, that the human mind turns to religion more continuously and seriously towards the end of life on earth. This, indeed, is certain, that the

religious experience depends least of all, (if at all) on the physical. Moral character and religious holiness must as a matter of fact be admitted to have the appearance of greater permanence than any other values.

15. The good life and its unity may be now considered in relation to the previous discussions. Each class of goods may be thought of as involving a unity of its own, in which all particular experiences of the kind harmoniously fit. The diverse kinds of goods, as experiences of the individual consciousness, are related, and it is required that this relationship should be that of harmony and some form of unity. Yet facts do not conform with the demand for harmony, either in each class or amongst the different classes. But besides *facts* and *values* it was insisted in the Introduction (page 6) that common-sense experience includes *activity* which may alter the relationship between facts so that they may conform more with values. As complete unity is not experienced the problem of unity gives place to a task of unification. And if history teaches us aright, this task is to be accomplished, if at all, by stages. Further, the individual can

only try to unify the experiences he has, and at no moment can he affirm these to be complete. His task is rather that of realising the greatest possible harmony and unity in experiences short of the totality of all possible experiences. The unity to be experienced is more than and different from the intellectual, or any particular side of life. If one is to give it a name, it may be called "a system or type of life."

16. The task of unification is in one degree or another, in one form or another, an obvious feature of common-sense experience. Each individual person is or should be concerned with others in the attainment of a comprehensive harmonious life in which all values or as many as possible shall find place. But with the elements of discord and lack of adjustment which are admitted to exist, some experiences of goods have to be sacrificed for others. At any stage where this is necessary complete unity is clearly not achieved. Though men try with all their resources some values have to be foregone that others may be enjoyed. But which values may be most advantageously abandoned for others? There seems to be a demand here for a scale of values or a principle

according to which judgments may be made. It is, however, open to serious doubt whether any principle or scale can be formulated to meet such a demand. A scale of values, for example, setting them out in the order of increasing worth as physical, intellectual, aesthetic, moral, religious, would not be of great help as the relative importance would often depend upon the total conditions. Judgment is sought on the total goods and bads of one situation or course of conduct as compared with other situations or courses. It is one more or less harmonious and complete system of goods (the discord being due to the presence of some bads) over against one or more other such systems. The decision often involves a calculation of goods and bads on this side and that. That there is no common denominator of values, and no very clear if any principle for making the calculation, is no ground for attempting to deny that such calculation does occur—and that often—in common-sense experience. The calculation of the greatest good obtainable in the particular conditions is casuistry. All are casuists in greater or less degree. But the decision is not simply on

present systems viewed just in themselves. Rather the higher the mental development of the individual the more distinctly does the judgment depend upon a general attitude or type of life, in other words, upon a complex of values conceived as harmonised in life as a whole. The attainment of a type of life as the individual's highest achieved unity of values may be gradual, and it will in all probability undergo modifications in the course of particular experiences. Its character may even become suddenly and almost entirely changed. A system or type of life is that unity of facts and values which on the whole, taking into account all sides of experience, yet experienced synoptically, makes the strongest appeal, or in other words, is judged most acceptable by the individual concerned. At any stage short of perfection it will include bads and discords, demanding effort to eradicate them.³⁹

38. As in some instances of religious conversion.

39. Notwithstanding great differences in detail and in main principles between my position and that of my teacher Rudolph Eucken, I wish to acknowledge his influence in the present connection. See especially his *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal* translated by me. London, 2nd ed. 1912.

17. A type of life as the kind of unity for the individual experient refers beyond the individual consciousness, in that it includes contacts with non-human Nature, with other human beings, and, if the theistic position adopted is correct, also with God, perhaps even other "supernatural" beings. The harmonising these contacts in his system of life is a serious task for the individual. Nature has to be to some extent adjusted to the requirements of the system, and in turn the system in its degree has to be adjusted to Nature. The relation of Nature to human ideals has been and is often a source of much heart-rending, even of doubt and pessimism. No explanation of the oppositions is sufficient entirely to overcome the feelings they arouse. There is some mitigation in the thought of the increasing control which mankind has acquired over Nature forces, and in the recognition that this has been possible solely because of the presence in Nature of principles of uniformity and order. Nature may not yet have been definitely found to be entirely intelligible, but reason in its efforts at the understanding of Nature goes forward in accordance with the conviction that

it is predominantly so. The need of adjustment of Nature to human requirements, and of human desires to Nature both demand moral activity, and some of the most distressing of Nature's happenings become occasions for the increase of moral goods. But notwithstanding all that can be said in mitigation, it still remains true to say that no system of life which has so far been experienced has included completely harmonious relations between human goods and Nature.

Nor has there yet been experienced a system of life in which the relations of all mankind have been harmonious and unified, although the demand for this in connection with all kinds of goods becomes increasingly apparent. Further consideration of the task and mode of unification in this direction will be given later. Incidentally it may be pointed out that it is here we meet with what might be called "caste," "nationalistic" and "cosmopolitan" types of life.

Nature and mankind do not complete the realities of life—if the account previously given is correct. There are relationships to God, and any other "super-natural" beings. The

latter will be omitted from the present discussion. God, as the source of the intelligible in Nature and as the cause of mankind, should be considered the basis of the greatest unity. He more than all is the inner inspiration of a unified cosmic plan, of which He more than all others is conscious. By His nature He should be central in the system of life. Here one reaches the ultimate conception of the theistic type of life as contrasted with the atheistic, the agnostic, the materialistic, even the absolutist and acosmist.

18. No system of life so far known contains actually a complete unity of all goods and no-bads, in other words—*the good life* as described at the outset of this chapter. It is nevertheless appropriate to ask what may perhaps lead to the best type of life, the greatest available good. Concerning this it must be emphasised that there is something especially “personal” about that system of life which any individual accepts. As a whole it has for him a unique appeal which in however small a degree, differentiates it from all others. The exact character of this appeal it is rarely possible to describe. What appears as the best type of

life as a whole depends very largely on the details discussed in earlier chapters, not to be repeated here. There is no need to deny that the general view of the type of life indicated was present at the outset and throughout the earlier exposition, for the treatment of the particular problems has been chiefly on their own merits.

All human activity is rooted in individual wills. That is fundamental. But it is equally evident that for the attainment of the best type of life containing the different kinds of goods the individual alone is almost helpless. The best is not only in character social, it is socially produced. The adaptation of Nature to the service of mankind has been successful in large measure only when many individuals have co-operated in the task. There is a great need for a reorganisation of human energy in relation to material resources. Reorganisation depends most upon moral conversion from selfishness leading to oppositions of individuals and groups, and upon intellectual advance. The need of co-operation for the increase of non-material goods is even more urgent, though it depends

in part on the production of the necessary material means. If the attainment of the most comprehensive and highest type of life for each and all is fundamentally a social task (as it is futile to endeavour to deny), requiring calculation and co-operation, conduct must be guided and controlled by the social organisation.

19. The socialistic mode of organisation advocated in chapter IV implies that the co-ordination and the control of human activity in so far as it is socially effective shall be predominantly the duty of the government chosen by the individuals as members of the society. The casuistical calculations made by the individual will be determined in considerable measure by his fundamental motive, that of the advantage of the self, or the family, or some wider social whole. From the standpoint of the moral idealism of the best type of life, the government of a people should be inspired by the sole motive of the greatest welfare of all its subjects more than of that of any section, and it is in conformity with the moral good of the individual that he shall promote such a government and accept its policy. As a definite step towards the best

type of life must be work towards the establishment of a government of which it might be said : " This is the body of men who in fair open choice with straightforwardness on the part of all, the people of this country regard as the most able to arrange and control to the best advantage of all the resources and energies of the people amongst themselves, with other peoples, and in relation to Nature." The realisation of the best type of life by any people depends largely upon the degree to which such a government is obtained.

20. Even economic considerations have forced upon the attention of many persons that co-operation between different peoples is necessary for the attainment of physical goods. Co-operation in intellectual research, in artistic appreciation and effort, in moral activities and religious organisation has been common among people of numerous countries. It still remains to be shown that the policy of competition leads to more and better results than would an all-round method of co-operation. Every people has a duty to develop to the best the resources of all kinds, from physical to religious, which it possesses. Yet if the type

of life is to be the broadest, it must include the most closely co-ordinated products and activities of the peoples of different countries. Nationalism might be maintained if the nation is regarded as constituent of a wider whole of mankind. But it can hardly be doubted that there is need for some means of co-ordinating and controlling the activities and resources of different peoples. The task of the formation of a "Federation of the World" will have to be undertaken with clearer intellectual insight, keener moral sincerity, than the League of Nations which a predominance of narrow-minded, and morally warped political midwives has deformed and enfeebled in bringing to the birth from the aspirations of the peoples who have suffered the myriad evils of the Great War.

Note on some practical considerations :

A government is meant to govern. That may seem a platitude, but it is necessary to emphasise it in view of the activities of a small but influential body representing vested interests and a selfish type of life. These object to the element of compulsion which goes with government control. The great majority of mankind are subject throughout their whole lives to compulsion, a compulsion of circumstances the most prominent factor in which is often the machinations of selfish profiteers. The worst sting is taken from compulsion when it is felt by each that all

have to submit to it, and that it is decreed by chosen representatives as the best means of obtaining the greatest welfare of all. If compulsory service for national defence against foreign armies and navies is justifiable, so is that required for the satisfaction of the primary needs of social well-being.

Physical goods as the basis of the whole edifice of human values on earth demand first attention from governments. Food, clothing, dwellings, recreation—these are too vital, too fundamental, to be left to the chances of a chaotic play of forces representing competing efforts for private profits. A common-sense philosophy of life requires here the social organisation of human labour and intellect—compulsorily, if necessary—for physical well-being. The dissipation of human energies in a thousand different ways, as in luxury trades, must be prevented till the real necessities of all are satisfied. After that let mankind work for as much luxury as they deem worth while. There is no indisputable ground to maintain that if human energies and intellect were systematically organised it would still not be possible to obtain from Nature all that is required for human physical well-being. Until an attempt at reorganisation has been made the physical conditions of the majority of mankind will remain a disgrace, a sign of human selfishness, lack of thought and moral vigour. (See the notes on practical considerations in chapter I).

The social endeavour for the highest type of life requires the best intellects at its disposal. To obtain these the system of education must be free and selective from bottom to top. As on the one hand it should be impossible for anyone to obtain admission to positions of importance in the professions or industrial control chiefly by means of the eminence or wealth of his parents, so on the other hand it should be possible for any person by competitive tests to rise to any available position for which he is best fitted, without monetary or other artificial hindrance.

The educational system of the country should be co-ordinated by government, and the character of the instruction and training should give a general appreciation of values while preserving as much spontaneity as possible for the particular manner of enjoyment of the goods. Education should include free vocational preparation according to the special fitness of the person concerned and social requirements. Only the selfish urge that the "masses are getting too much education." Though steps for wider systems of education are being taken, the present conditions leave much to be desired. Yet it is no pious hope but an earnest conviction that human intellect could devise and human wills follow methods of social organisation so that each and all might have a much greater share than at present in the interesting truths of Nature, literature, history and philosophy. A more intelligent understanding of social organisation and of the forces of life would react on the methods of social progress. The task of unification, the achievement of the best type of life, is largely a matter of socially organised education.

The fear that a socialistic system of government would neglect the aesthetic is baseless. The beauties of Nature and Art could scarcely be more neglected than at present. They have little place in educational institutions. Some few artists gain recognition, a greater number eke out a precarious existence, their work rarely appreciated. The main reason is that Art now depends for its support chiefly upon a wealthy few who have such interests. With a more systematic social organisation there would be greater opportunities in the direction of the aesthetic. The better conditions of physical existence would also be more conducive to the arousing of the aesthetic tastes of the majority of mankind. A people advanced in physical fitness and general education may be expected to make demands for knowledge, for beauty and for religion no less keen than those at present made by a "fortunate" few.

The task of social unification is in large measure a moral one. It affects actually most those concerned in finance, politics, commerce, industry, and the ownership of land. If the individuals do not themselves adopt social instead of selfish motives, their anti-social conduct must be forcibly prevented as much as possible. Those who stand for the present methods of social organisation, or rather lack of organisation, are never tired of reiterating that the way to raise the standard of living is for the workers to work harder and better. If once the motive of the general welfare instead of private profits were accepted whole-heartedly by the employers, the physical and intellectual effort of the employees would be increased by an enthusiastic adoption of the same principle. Production would be revolutionised, ensuring eventually to all the greatest amount of goods of all kinds at present possible.

21. Thus appear some aspects of the problem of unity as understood by the philosophy of life as a task of unification. It may be insisted that there are many kinds of unities, related with the various kinds of experiences. But what is the nature of physical unity in itself? Any so-called physical unity of which man is aware is only known as it is for a mind conscious of it. Has any mind yet risen to the intellectual comprehension of all as one? Far from including all, intellectual conceptions of unity only with difficulty, if ever, connate any content

except the most abstract. Has anyone even claimed to have had an aesthetic intuition of all as one? Unity for the moral is an end to be achieved rather than an actuality. The religious remains for final consideration. For the most comprehensive kind of unity, either for the individual or for human society beyond, the term "type of life" has been used. The essentially social character of the best system or type of life has been emphasised and some of its requirements indicated. In these requirements are the pressing problems of concrete unity. How great the call they make on human intellect and human patience! How great the demand they make on moral earnestness and unselfishness! Will this moral enthusiasm and patient thought be forthcoming? Either this, indeed, or conflicts and revolutions which will leave mankind still further than at present from the good life. What an appeal is here to educated and thoughtful men to think more and to work for the conversion of the ideas of men in all strata of society! What an appeal is here to politicians to renounce mere party allegiance and vested interests and to endeavour to obtain election on clear honest statements,

ideals for which they will really work if placed in power! Can we hope for a beginning of a more humane, a broader outlook, amongst those who control the majority of the capital and the industries of the world?

22. The social unity of mankind in a type of life in relation with Nature is not entirely achieved, but is an object of human endeavour. It is not yet definitely known whether it is completely attainable. Generations of men have come and gone, and will come and go before this aim is realised. On a basis of a mere humanism it may reasonably be asked whether those already physically dead are to be considered as forming part of the eventual unity. If not, the unity proposed is not the one which can be the task of human effort. Mankind strive towards a unity, a type of life, in which they may consciously share. If this is ever to be attained, the continuance of the soul after physical death appears fundamental. Thought is thus led beyond the task of unification in the various forms discussed in relation to earthly conditions, to the problem of the nature of the final unity.

23. Over against all this exposition of unity unachieved, but calling for achievement, will perhaps once again and finally be placed by some that supposed sublime notion of the Absolute. Even if it were indubitable that such Absolute existed including all goods (and incidentally it may be urged all bads) in perfect unity as facts, what is that to mankind? The idea gives no help to, it may even introduce confusion into, a human philosophy of life. Unity is merely asserted of the Absolute, but who can give mankind the slightest glimpse of the nature of that unity? Let those find satisfaction thus who can! No claims for such perfection are made for the theistic type of life reached as the conclusion of the present volume.

24. Without human love the mind of man is restless: with it, it is not entirely at peace. So have confessed the greatest saints: so have responded thousands of thousands of lesser personalities. When man has treated the problem of life not as a mere concern of theoretic speculation but as an urgent inner need he has had ultimately to seek the highest unity in communion with the Supreme Consciousness.

In submission, in co-operation, and communion with the Supreme, the soul feels itself as participating in a cosmic system of life. God, the Supreme Consciousness, is in contact with all others in relations of creator and sustainer, of intelligence and love. Each may become conscious of the unifying "principle" of this system of life, the more each rises in intelligence, morality, and religion. The highest unity is conceived as a life of personalities with a dominant creative controlling Personality. This gives scope as no other conception for the inclusion of all the goods of individual experience.

Central, working eternally for unification, is the power of the divine love. It is a historical force manifesting itself on all sides of experience. The way to the love of God is preëminently that of the love of mankind: for he who loveth not man whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen? But by whichever path the human soul is led to the highest unity of religion in communion with God, the experiences are at best intermittent. Hence an element of "divine discontent" urges on to further aspiration and hope.

25. The eventual realisation of the highest ideals and the greatest hopes can be disproved by none. No effort of human thought can show that the future is not at least in part open. The philosophy of life can recognise no arbitrary limits to the possible human attainment of the good life. And human faith is one of the most powerful forces leading to that result. But by faith should be meant nothing less than an active personal attitude confident in ultimate triumph, even though the character of the good life is only dimly perceived and only gradually becomes known. In its peering into the beyond, whether of the innermost character of the present realities or of the furthestmost future, faith has never been described better than in the words of the writer of *The Epistle to the Hebrews*: "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen"

Epilogue

With that one might close. To do so would be to commit an error all too frequent in philosophies: the omission of all recognition of humour in experience. How many of the thinkers admitted into the standard histories of philosophy have given attention to it? Diogenes in his tub, source of amusement to some, was not conspicuous in its acknowledgement. If my memory is not at fault, even so brilliant a mind as Mr. Bradley gives no hint of it either as appearance or reality. The Eastern system which conceives of the whole realm of phenomena as the sport of the divine mind suggests no significant consideration of humour as it exists empirically.

True, the problems of life are sufficiently serious and all written in the preceding pages is urged with earnestness. That is all the more reason why the "saving grace of humour" should be admitted in its manifold variety.

The philosophy of life which points to the great thinkers, artists, and saints may—indeed must—give due homage to the great humourists. Mark Twain, Phil May, even John Bunny, as typical individuals, and “Mr Punch” as an institution, are among the great benefactors of humanity.

Humour cannot be classified; certainly not defined or described. Fortunately, it may be cultivated. It is the spice which makes tolerable much of the unpleasant fare of life. It is often an expression of faith's re-action to the forces which oppose the advance to the good. The healthy laughter to which it gives rise suggests a confidence at the opposite extreme from the superficial snigger of the cynic which serves not to hide but to reveal his lack of faith. Genuine humour goes only with strong genuine faith. Let it be explicitly set down amongst life's greatest values—to those who philosophise on life's most difficult problems, indispensable. More, let us insist that it is a factor in the creative process of history, as an attribute of the central principle, the supreme being, God himself.

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