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FRANCE

Yesterday and Today

KATHARINE MUNRO

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**ROYAL INSTITUTE
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This volume aims at making present events in France intelligible by giving a concise and coherent account of French political development down to the spring of 1945. The author first surveys France from the angle of geography, population and economy, and then sketches her history before 1914. The middle portion of the book is devoted to a review of the salient features of the Third Republic, its constitution, its local administration, its legal, educational and military institutions, its imperial organization, and its political parties and divisions. The main political developments of the "between-war" period are then outlined, and the last section unfolds the tragic events of 1940, the futile policy of Vichy and its duel with Paris, the growth of the resistance movement at home and abroad, the liberation of France, and the problems facing her today.

The book is planned as a whole, and to save the reader from turning back for reference, two glossaries at the end briefly annotate and explain those names and initials which occur in the text. It is hoped that this short survey will give in compact and convenient form a background and a key to the kaleidoscopic scene of France today and that it will contribute to that Anglo-French understanding which is an essential basis of European peace.

FRANCE YESTERDAY AND TODAY
A SHORT SURVEY

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FRANCE YESTERDAY AND TODAY

A Short Survey

by

KATHARINE MUNRO



London

ROYAL INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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NOTE

A brief survey was originally intended to appear in the Institute's "Information Notes" series, but it was decided that the subject deserved more detailed treatment than was possible within the size and scope of the pamphlets in that series. The author has made use of valuable material prepared by Mr T. E. Utley and has also had the assistance of the staff of the Information Department of Chatham House.

For the convenience of the reader, details of certain personalities and initials referred to in the text are given in two glossaries at the end of the book.

I. INTRODUCTION

DURING the brief period between June 1940 and June 1944, it was possible for an Englishman to disregard France in his calculations of the future. The defeat of the greatest of our Western European neighbours, our ally and our chief link with the Continent, threw us back on our own resources; our strength and our hope lay first in the British Commonwealth, and later in the combined might of the Commonwealth, the Soviet Union and the United States. It was easily assumed that peace could also be organized by a "Big Three", or perhaps by a "Big Four" including China, and that other nations would acclaim, rather than influence, their decisions. It was easy to allow the shock of the French disaster to distort our judgement and upset our sense of proportion. Some dismissed France as decadent and doomed to become a second-class Power; others vaguely assumed the restoration of her greatness, yet left little place for her contribution in their far-flung schemes for world organization. None contemplated a post-war France hostile to this country, but few had the means or the time to piece together the fragmentary evidence of her condition. The liberation of France and of French territory by Allied forces, including the French army and the French forces of the interior, brought a renewed realization of France's determination and right to play a major part in the making of war and peace. But the fog which hung over the Channel for four years still lingers.

A good understanding between Britain and France is essential to the future peace of Europe. As Mr Eden has said, "for us, the full restoration of France as a great Power is not only a declared war aim and the fulfilment of a pledge made to a sister nation, but also a political necessity if post-war reconstruction is to be undertaken within the framework of the traditional civilization which is our common heritage." The interests of the two nations are not identical but complementary. The fact that they are not identical has sometimes been used (and not by Axis propaganda alone) to obscure the fact that they are complementary. This has been made easier by the remembrance of Anglo-French wars, and by the unfortunate circumstance that our respective policies have generally swung in opposite directions and rarely coincided. Such disparity has had tragic consequences. The present war might have been averted if France had been willing to apply sanctions against Italian aggression in 1935 or if we had been willing to take strong action against German remilitarization in 1936. The offer of total Anglo-French union in 1940 was a belated and hastily improvised expression of the realization that the defence of Suez and of the Rhine, of this island and of France, forms an inseparable whole. The post-armistice division of France and the ambiguous attitude of the Vichy Government prevented the

full use of French bases and production against us, but gave us a taste of such use. The most rabid isolationist can hardly forget the flying-bomb bases in the Pas-de-Calais. The Englishman who stakes his hopes on imperial defence must take into account the French position in the Western Mediterranean and the existence of Diego-Suarez, Dakar and Saigon. Those who look towards Russia must remember that it was the French system of alliances which linked us with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the between-wars period; and similarly the traditional friendship between France and the United States must be borne in mind. Finally, those who believe that France is finished should recall her resilience and her resurrection after other disastrous defeats.

Apart from the political and strategic importance of France and her Empire, there is the incalculable importance of her contribution to European civilization. Subtract the builders of the Ile-de-France, the creators of Chartres and Rheims, the *chateaux* and Versailles from the history of architecture; subtract the Paris scholastics, Descartes and Bergson from philosophy, Montaigne, Pascal, Voltaire, and Taine from the moralists and critics, Bodin, Montesquieu, Tocqueville, the still fermenting yeast of the French Revolution from political thought and action; subtract Moliere from comedy, Racine from tragedy, Ronsard, the Romantics, Baudelaire and the Symbolists from poetry, Stendhal, Balzac, Flaubert, Proust from the novel; subtract Couperin, Berlioz, Debussy from music, Poussin, Watteau, and Cezanne from painting; subtract Pasteur and Claude Bernard from medicine, Poincare, Lavoisier, Ampere from the sciences; subtract from Europe the French way of life and thought, of eating, drinking and dressing. Then subtract the foreigners whose genius has flowered in France: the English painter Bonington and the Spaniard, Picasso, the Italian musician Lully and the Belgian Cesar Franck, the Swiss architect Le Corbusier and the Polish scientist Marie Curie. Such an attempt at subtraction shows how impossible it is to imagine Europe without France.

The ingredients which have gone into the making of French civilization have moreover tended to give it a universal character and a universal appeal: the Roman heritage; Western Christianity; the humanism of the sixteenth, the classicism of the seventeenth, and the rationalism of the eighteenth centuries; the ideals of the Revolution; and France's geographical and historical position as a meeting-place of races and an intermediary between cultures. Those of her sons who have most vehemently denounced the ideals of "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" have rarely indulged in a mysticism of "*Blut und Boden*." For these reasons, it is chiefly through France that many nations have been drawn into the orbit of Western civilization.

Their writers, thinkers and statesmen have looked towards Paris and it is not only through imperial conquests that her influence has spread, but through her links with countries as scattered as Poland, Egypt, Roumania and the Latin American Republics. Civilization as we know it has been shaped to a large extent by the mind and spirit of France and that spirit lives to shape the future. Its essence might be summed up in the words of Clemenceau about Monet: "He takes the light and flings it on to his canvas."

GEOGRAPHY

The light of France has generally a clear, transparent quality, yet it is equally remarkable for its variety: the soft translucence of Anjou, the dank sea-fogs and low racing clouds of Finistere, the heavy, dusty glare of full midday in Provence, the mobile skies of Gascony, the warm glow of autumn in Burgundy and its rain-washed coolness in the mountain districts. France, lying midway between the north pole and the equator, from 51°9' to 42°23' N., seems to summarize all the variations of the temperate zone. The country covers two and a half times the area of Great Britain (212,659 sq. m.) and is in climate and vegetation partly Mediterranean, partly Atlantic, partly Continental. Its hexagonal form is clearly bounded on three sides by the sea, while to the south-west there is the barrier of the Pyrenees and to the south-east that of the Alps and Jura. These soaring, jagged ranges belong to the tertiary period but the highlands of the interior, the Vosges and the Ardennes in the east and north-east, the hills of the Breton peninsula, and the Massif Central, are far older in origin. Sometimes they have divided France, isolating Brittany, marking off the Romanized south or the German-speaking Alsatians, but they have never formed insuperable barriers. Rounded with age, they roll down to the plains and valleys and to the wide river basins of Paris and of Aquitaine.

The great rivers of France are not all navigable; the rushing, green waters of the upper Rhone are treacherous, the Loire fills with golden sand, and the Garonne is only partly open. Yet these rivers, and the Seine with its tributaries, mark the main ways of commerce and invasion and explain the importance of Paris, Lyons and Toulouse. Two of the oldest trade routes are the short-cut from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic across Gascony and the route from north to south along the Marne or the Seine and down the Saône-Rhone valley. Abbeville, at one end of this route, has been silted up but Marseilles, at the other, still remains the greatest French port. From the east there run routes rather of migration than of trade: from the Danube through the Belfort gap to Burgundy, from the Middle Rhine along the Moselle, and from the vast northern European plain to Flanders,

Artois and Picardy. The insecurity of the north-eastern frontier has been a constant preoccupation of French statesmen.

NATURAL RESOURCES

The well-known German dictum "to live like God in France" illustrates the attraction which the French land has always had for traders and migrants. Its variety is shown in the popular division of France into different *pays*, which correspond neither to the provinces of the old regime nor to the ninety post-Revolutionary *departements*, but to changes of soil and vegetation. There are some distinct, large regions—for instance, the widening wedge running from the Beauce to the north-eastern frontier is best for cereals and beet—but mostly it is a mosaic of land, good and bad, arable and pastoral, mountainous and flat, wooded and bare. The names of French wines or of French cheeses show how scattered are the vineyards and pastoral districts: Beaune, Vouvray, Barsac, Ribeuville, Chateauneuf-du-Pape, Banyuls, Cognac, Roquefort, Camembert, Brie, Gex. France was, before the war, the second largest producer of agricultural goods in Europe, and her produce included wheat, rye, oats, beet, potatoes, butter, cheese, timber, chestnuts, apples, pears, oranges, peaches, plums, grapes, olives, sardines, silk, wool and flax.

These riches certainly make of France a land fit for God to live in but not necessarily a land fit for a modern nation. The resources of her subsoil have not been sufficient for her needs. The most important is the raw material of aluminium, bauxite (which is called after Les Baux in southern France); her production in 1938 was 684,000 metric tons and at that time the largest in the world. After China, she is the largest producer of a less important ore, antimony. French iron ore comes mainly from Lorraine and constitutes between 20 and 30 per cent of the world production (33,176,000 metric tons in 1938). The French production of potash (over half a million metric tons of crude potash in 1938) was the second largest in the world. The resources of metropolitan France are supplemented by those of her overseas dependencies, though they supply only about 10 per cent of her total imports of raw materials. The phosphates of North Africa (the largest producing area in the world) meet practically all French requirements. The Empire produces valuable supplies of lead, tin, zinc, nickel, cobalt, chrome, manganese, graphite and iron pyrites, and under the French system, its trade in these ores (as in its far greater agricultural production) has been mainly with the mother country.¹

These mineral resources are satisfactory, especially the supplies of

¹ The relative and absolute production of different countries has changed since the war, but statistics are not yet available.

iron and bauxite, but in their development France has been crippled by one great lack, coal. There are small coalfields scattered about France, in Lorraine, near St Etienne, near Le Creusot, in the *departements* of Tarn and Gard; and in the Rhone delta there is brown coal useful for the manufacture of aluminium. Two-thirds of the French coal is, however, concentrated in the vulnerable areas of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais. The total production in 1938 amounted to 46,502,000 metric tons, only enough to supply two-thirds of France's moderate industrial needs; France was the world's largest importer of coal. Moreover, owing to difficulties of working and transporting her own coal, it was frequently more expensive than that imported. A further difficulty was the fact that very little of her own coal was useful for coking. For coke she was dependent on Germany and Holland and for coal on the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland and Belgium. Between 1871 and 1914 Germany built up her strength on the possession of the iron of Lorraine and the coal of the Ruhr and Saar, and since then it has been a constant preoccupation of France to wrest the latter as well as the former away from exclusive German control.

In calculating the natural resources of France, account must be taken of her water-power. Its sources are more evenly distributed and less vulnerable than the coalfields; the main supply comes from the Pyrenees and from the Alps. Before the war, France fell far behind Germany, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in the generation of electricity, but her production could be greatly expanded. Of the 17,600 million kilowatts produced in 1937, 52 per cent was generated by hydro-electric plants. This source of power is the more important because the life of the coalfields is estimated at only about 130 years.

POPULATION

"On this land," says Paul Vatery, "lives a people whose history consists mainly in its ceaseless work of self-formation." From this historical process, from the fusion of Mediterranean, Alpine and Nordic elements of every variety, there has emerged a character specifically French: individualist, hard-working, thrifty to a fault, either religious or free-thinking but seldom superstitious, gay but sober, clear-headed, fond of argument and logic but suspicious of change. In three things the Frenchman resembles the ancient Greek: in his capacity for enjoying life, in the (frequently factious) liveliness of his politics, and in the calm perfection of his works of art. These generalizations, however, cover a wide variety of local character and the border lands of France include Provençals, Catalans, Basques, Bretons, Flemings and Alsatians, who preserve their own languages and customs. France has

a great power of assimilation but the French State has generally tried to strengthen it by riding rough-shod over local feeling and by imposing ruthless centralization. The explanation is not far to seek: from the English backing of the Burgundian party in the Hundred Years' War to the German attempt to foster separatism after 1940, France has been conscious of the danger of disunion.

In modern times, the real danger to France has come not from the composition of her population but from its numerical weakness. At the beginning of the nineteenth century France, with nearly 30 million inhabitants, was second only to Russia and accounted for 20 per cent of the population of Europe. Between 1821 and the Franco-Prussian war, her population increased to 38 millions; but about 1860 the population of Germany shot ahead and the loss of Alsace and Lorraine weakened France still more. By 1911, France's 39½ millions were less than 9 per cent of the European total and were outnumbered by Russia, the United States, Germany, Austria-Hungary and the United Kingdom. In the war of 1914-18, France won back her provinces, but the gain in population was offset by her war losses. These amounted to about 1½ million killed and over 700,000 crippled; 57 per cent of the French soldiers under 31 years of age were lost. By 1939 the population had crept up to 42 millions, but the birth-rate was falling steadily. In 1932, it was 17.3 per thousand, in 1938, 14.5; the death-rate fell slightly but was still 15.3 in 1938.¹

The situation naturally deteriorated rapidly with the defeat of France and the capture of 1,800,000 prisoners (or a third of the men of 20 to 50) by Germany. In 1940, the birth-rate fell to 13.3, in 1941 to 12.9; the death-rate rose to 18.2 and 17.2. The rate of infantile mortality leapt up: from 66 per thousand live births in 1938 to 91 in 1940 and 73 in 1941. Those two years saw a net population loss of 366,648.² There was a recovery later and in 1943 the birth-rate rose again to 16, but in the hard winter of 1944-45, the mortality rate, particularly for infants, also rose sharply.

The fact of a diminishing and ageing population, the memory of the blood-letting of 1914-18, and the failure of the 1918 settlement to give France security, combined to produce in her a "Maginot mentality". Entrenched behind her fortifications, she hoped to avoid any further war losses and to build up her population. The Maginot myth was quickly exploded and the alternative theory, that the

¹ In France the birth-rate started to fall 100 years earlier than it did in England, where however it fell more steeply and more universally. Thus since 1900, the French net reproduction rate has fallen from 0.98 to 0.88 but is still 1 or more in 39 out of 90 departments, whereas the rate for England and Wales has fallen from 1.30 to 0.80 and is below 1 in all counties save Durham. (Cf. Kuczynski in *International Affairs*, xx, October 1944.)

* International Labour Office: *Health of Children in Occupied Europe* (1943).

mechanization of warfare would destroy the advantage of numbers, was later shaken by the stupendous losses on the chief European front. Machines, and soldiers able to manage them, have become the first requisite in warfare, but numbers may still be decisive. Programmes for post-war France generally emphasize two points, further industrialization and an increased population. The latter is the less controversial aim and General de Gaulle's cry for "twelve million babies in the next ten years"¹ echoed the demand of successive French Governments since 1918. At the outbreak of the war, M. Daladier carried through legislation for a comprehensive system of family allowances and Vichy increased these allowances; but so far such measures have provoked more mirth than births. State intervention to raise the standard of living and to decrease disease and infant mortality has come up against a fundamental mistrust of anything like the sanitary and social inquisitions of the Anglo-Saxon democracies. The present swing of opinion to the Left and the widespread misery and dislocation caused by the war may break down this resistance and there is likely to be an expansion of the admirable but limited social legislation of the Popular Front Government of 1936.

France finds further hope in three factors. The first is negative, the demographic decline in other countries, which decreases her relative weakness. The second is the existence of her Empire, which adds over 65 million to her population, as well as supplying her with material resources. Its contribution to the defence of France in the war of 1914-18 may be judged from the fact that about 250,000 North African troops and more than 200,000 colonial troops fought in Europe, while about 180,000 workers from overseas territory served in France. The third factor is alien immigration, which has grown in this century and largely accounts for population increases. In 1901 the percentage of aliens in the total population was 2.6; in 1911, 3.9; in 1921, 7.2; in 1936 there were about 2½ million (roughly 5 per cent). Certain Right-wing writers, such as Maurras, have violently opposed this "cross-breeding" or "mongrelization" of France, but history disproves their doubts as to her power of assimilation. Two past errors would, however, have to be avoided in any future policy, the French failure to attract the best type of immigrant and the fact that, though France has never limited the immigration of political refugees as rigidly as has Britain, both the Third Republic and the Vichy Government often subjected them to ill-treatment and thus actively discouraged some of the best types.

Speech of March 2nd, 1945, in the Consultative Assembly.

THE ECONOMY OF FRANCE

In the past, France has always prided herself on her balanced, varied, individualist and largely self-sufficient economy. Since 1940, however, it has been ruthlessly criticized for its part in her defeat. Economic efficiency has never yet seemed to the French an end worth pursuing for itself alone, but now weighty political, social and military arguments are being brought to bear in favour of industrialization, rationalization and concentration in agriculture and industry, and in favour of the nationalization or liquidation of those trusts which have knit up French and German industries. Before the war, France was already being forced in this direction, though opposition to industrialization came not only from vested interests but from all those who believed that the backbone of France was her peasantry. This belief has been discredited by the collapse and by its identification with Vichy's Back-to-the-Land policy, but may later swing into favour.

The change since the middle of the last century is shown by the fact that whereas then three-quarters of the population lived in *communes* of less than 2,000 inhabitants, by 1939 only half did so. Even this is a contrast to our 80 per cent urban population. Moreover, France has a great number of small towns, markets where the peasants sell their produce, buy from the small shops, educate their sons and fight their lawsuits. She has only eight towns of over 200,000 inhabitants and fourteen of 100,000 to 200,000. Paris, with its 5 millions, easily takes the lead over Marseilles (914,000), Lyons (570,000) and Bordeaux (250,000). The part of agricultural production in the national wealth has diminished but is still important (27.8 per cent in 1930). The annual value of the main industries (metallurgy, 8 milliard francs; electricity, 4.5 milliard; coal, 4 milliard; motors, 4 milliard) still fell behind that of the main agricultural products (milk, 10 milliard; wheat, 9 milliard; meat, 9 milliard; wine, 7 milliard).¹ The agricultural workers numbered 7,600,000 as against 7,200,000 employed in industry; but with the transport workers the latter predominated. France has become much more, dependent on imports since 1914; but in recent years the value of British imports was still three times, and British exports two-and-a-half times, those of France. French external trade in recent years always showed a large deficit, which was not by any means met by invisible exports, and France will presumably try to remedy its balance, as well as increasing its volume.

Agriculture

French agriculture differs from British agriculture not only by its place in the national economy but by its structure. About two-thirds

¹ G. Peel: *Economic Policy of France* (1937).

of the agricultural workers in France own their land. In 1931, out of nearly 2½ million agricultural undertakings, 1,341,112 did not employ any wage-earning labour and only 32,416 employed more than five workers. In eighteen *departements*, and especially in the south-west of France, the venerable system of *metayage* predominates; venerable since it was practised some five or six thousand years ago in Babylon. The landowner gives the *metayer* (tenant or cultivator) the use of his land, buildings and equipment, under his supervision, and shares the produce in kind or money. Broadly speaking, the north of France has large farms and the south small; but peasant ownership is the rule and small holdings are both relatively and actually far more numerous than in Great Britain.

This difference goes back to the eighteenth century. When Arthur Young visited France just before the Revolution, he found some things to admire but was more often horrified by the prevalence of absentee landlordism and by the neglect of agriculture. England was far ahead in the introduction of new methods, but these very methods involved the enclosure of common land and the creation of a proletariat which drifted into the growing towns. After the French Revolution, the lands of Church and nobility passed into the hands of a new class of small farmers. Napoleon consolidated this change by making compulsory the equal division of property among direct heirs of both sexes. This system has led to extreme subdivision. One of the marked features of the French countryside is the way it is parcelled out into small plots under different crops. One man (or woman) frequently owns scattered strips, after a fashion that is met with only in a few parts of England. During the reconstruction of France after the 1914-18 war, an attempt was made to redistribute strips and this is also a matter which the *syndicats agricoles* (Farmers' Unions) have tried to deal with, but reforms have often been blocked by the suspicion of the farmers. Redistribution was an item in Vichy's agricultural policy and was also ruthlessly carried out by the Germans. It is generally advocated now.

In France, before the war, 39 per cent of agricultural land was arable and 21 per cent pastoral; in Britain, the corresponding figures were 26 per cent and 50 per cent. It has already been said that there is a wedge of good arable land in north-eastern France. Here the country is like East Anglia, flat, with a light, fertile soil; and here in the Dark Ages the invaders from the east introduced ox-driven ploughs and strip-farming, while the south held its tiny terraced plots in severalty and tilled them (within living memory) with the wooden Roman plough. The north-east does not account for the figure of 39 per cent; crops are grown in every part of France, and before 1914 her production of wheat met over 95 per cent of her consumption. "France... made her-

self almost self-supporting, but at the expense of an unduly poor rate of yield and, as many people think, of a devitalized population."¹ Wheat growing on unsuitable land (the average yield was half that of Great Britain) was deliberately fostered by protectionist measures. The war of 1914-18 halved production and the fact that the area under wheat did not return to its pre-war figure filled French statesmen with alarm. "It is a fact," cried M. Herriot in 1924, "which might well, in becoming more widespread, upset the very balance of France, for the strength of France lies in the fact that, before all and above all, she is a cultivated field." This theory inspired French policy for the next twenty years, and was also applied in North Africa. In the early nineteen-thirties, a series of unsuccessful measures were taken to control the price of wheat or flour and to protect the farmers from the effects of a series of bumper harvests. The latest measure was the creation by the Popular Front Government of a Wheat Office, which, through the local *syndicats*, bought up wheat at a fixed price and re-sold it, and which controlled all imports and exports. No radical change of policy was introduced and this body did not resolve the fundamental clash between consumers' and producers' interests. The fact that the defeat of France in 1940 was due partly to her industrial weakness and that no "self-sufficiency" could save her, and the present political preponderance of Left-wing, industrial elements will probably lead to the introduction of free (or freer) trade in wheat and to an increase of French agricultural specialization for export. Until about 1860, England imported wheat from France. After that our imports were mainly wine, early vegetables, fruit, flowers, dairy produce, and seeds. We were France's largest agricultural customer and her market for these goods might be extended here and elsewhere.

The forestry schemes started in France in the last half of the nineteenth century have been extremely successful and about 19 per cent of the land is under woods. The area of vineyards has decreased since the last century; about 4 per cent of land is devoted to vines and fruit-trees, and about 2 per cent to market gardening. It will probably be the policy of France to increase these percentages at the expense of the small plots under crops, and to develop her large-scale, mechanized arable farming. It is, however, easy to overestimate the number of workers who would be released from agriculture by possible future reforms.

Industry

The development of French industry, like that of French agriculture, has favoured the small man. France has known nothing comparable to the violent upheavals of English economy, which drew the

¹ J. A. Venn: *Foundations of Agricultural Economics*. 2nd ed. (1933).

land-workers north to the coalfields and factories and which in recent years sent the unemployed drifting back to the south. The highest official figure for French unemployment in recent years was 479,000 (1935). The chief changes in France have come from wars: that of 1870-71, which lopped off the cotton centres of Alsace and the iron ore of Lorraine; that of 1914-18, which saw the occupation and devastation of the richest industrial *departements* and which started the trend towards concentration and rationalization; the present war, in which the Germans first attempted to suppress French industry and afterwards to reorganize it, so that, from 1942 onwards, a great number of small concerns were closed down.

The crisis of the early nineteen-thirties contributed to the process of concentration; but French industry remained very un-American—or anti-American—in structure. In 1931, 60 per cent of the industrial population worked in firms employing less than twenty persons. More recently, a P.E.P. broadsheet¹ estimated that "there were 57,000 factories with no paid employees, nearly 400,000 with from one to five, and fourteen great plants with an average of nearly 10,000 workers each." This highly individual organization suited the French luxury export trade in jewelry, perfumery, watches, glass, and pure silks. But in larger-scale production France also showed herself capable of holding her own, particularly in the motor, electricity and chemical industries. The post-war period will probably bring an expansion of this type of production, as well as of heavier industry.

Nationalization was part of the programme of the Popular Front Government and was hastened on by the increase in labour costs due to its social legislation. The collaboration of certain great trusts and industrial enterprises with Germany has provided another incentive, especially in view of the difficulties of disentangling the industrial shares which have come under direct or indirect German control. Nationalization of basic industries has been adopted as a principle by the present Provisional Government² and has been partly carried out but it is not by itself a solution of the more fundamental problem of the vulnerability of the main French industries and of that dependence on German coal and coke which has lured certain of their owners into appeasement. The economic interlocking of northern France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and north-west Germany involves problems for international settlement.

Communications

Down to the eighteenth century, France made do with the Roman network of roads, adding and repairing, but not making substantial

¹ *Planning*, No. 193, September 22nd, 1942.

² See p. 97.

alterations. She then built a comprehensive new system. The straight French *routes nationales* contrast with our winding roads and show their origins: the Roman heritage, the right of their royal builders to drive them across property, and the concern to serve the needs of an army and a centralized government in Paris. In 1932, 93 per cent of the roads were national and covered 50,000 miles; secondary roads covered 350,000 miles. The French were quick to introduce canals, now extending over 6,000 miles, but these too centre largely on Paris. The same is true of the railway system, of over 26,000 miles. By a decree of 1937, all railway companies were merged into one concern, in which the State held 51 per cent of the shares. France had an adequate Merchant Navy (now reduced to one-third of its former strength) and one of the best civil aviation services in the world, state-subsidized. She has not many good natural harbours. The naval ports of Brest and Toulon are among the best, while Cherbourg, Le Havre and Dunkirk are almost entirely artificial creations. The chief commercial port is Marseilles and others include Rouen, Bordeaux, La Palice, St Nazaire, Strasbourg. One of the first necessities for France will be to make good the widespread damage caused to communications by Allied bombing, by demolitions and by German requisitioning. Any reforms will have to take account of the difficulty of cross-country communications.

Finance

Between the two wars, France found herself hampered by the unsound state of her public finances, by unbalanced budgets, by inflation and by an abnormally high price-level. These difficulties were due partly to transient causes, such as the heavy expense of reconstructing the devastated areas and the failure to recuperate that expenditure from Germany. Partly they were due to more permanent features of French policy. France is wedded to protection. In 1860, France and Britain concluded a famous treaty which introduced some measure of free trade between them, and again the Popular Front Government took some steps to reduce tariffs, but these were temporary episodes. Protection has constantly raised French prices and reduced French exports. Again, prices were raised by the policy of levying light direct taxes and heavy indirect taxes. This conservative policy has been encouraged by the deep-rooted French dislike, and constant evasion, of State inquiries, and the difficulty of assessing agricultural incomes. A small income-tax was introduced, after many battles, in 1914 and was later increased, but still yielded a comparatively small revenue. The State was also apt to resort to a policy of financing its schemes by borrowing and thus risked inflation. Much of its expenditure was tucked away in extraordinary budgets. These hole-and-corner methods were partly due to a constitutional defect of

the Third Republic, the difficulty of getting any budget through Parliament. At the same time, the French public and French financiers have usually shown fear of inflation, of unbalanced budgets and of unorthodox policies. They have been nervous of devaluation, of lowering the value of the franc, and in times of difficulty a Right-wing Government has generally come to power, to put through a policy of deflation, of tightening the belt and cutting down expenditure.

Another difficulty of French Governments in the past was their weakness vis-a-vis the Bank of France. This private corporation had a monopoly of note issue. It was owned by 40,000 shareholders and run by a Council of fifteen Regents responsible to the two hundred largest shareholders. Only three of the Regents were Treasury officials and the Governor, though appointed by the Government, had to be a shareholder. The other Regents and the "two hundred families" represented big industries (shipping, armaments etc.) interested in State action. This oligarchy defended orthodox finance and would often block governmental action. In 1936, the Popular Front Government carried through a frontal attack on the "two hundred families" by abolishing the Council of Regents and establishing a General Council representative mainly of Government departments, partly of employers' and workers' organizations and only to a small extent of the shareholders. Under Vichy, the Bank temporarily regained its status as a private company.

France is now faced with the need to eradicate the corruption which lay at the root of a series of financial scandals and consequent governmental crises in pre-war years. Legislation by which the sources of funds and the finances of the Press would be published is also widely demanded. The main task, however, will be the enormous one of clearing up the financial aftermath of the German occupation.

II. HISTORY (TO 1914)

The Revolution and the counter-revolutionary movement still work so powerfully in French politics, ranging the forces of "progress" against the forces of "order" and rousing passion, prejudice and suspicion, that it is tempting to erect 1789 into an absolute dividing-line between the old France and the new. Yet the development of the Revolution, its successes and its failures, all that followed it, are in one sense the counterpart of the failures and successes of the monarchy, and in some ways the work of the Revolution was a continuation, an acceleration of the work of the monarchy. Continuity was strengthened by preoccupation with the same two dangers which, now in this form and now in that, now separately and now in

close alliance, have constantly threatened the existence of France: the danger from without, the danger of invasion, and the danger from within, the danger of disunion. The way in which the French monarchy met them and the armour which it provided against them have had a lasting effect.

France may be said to begin with the consciousness of these two dangers and of a common heritage to defend from them, a consciousness which grew slowly and fitfully from the long struggle of the monarchy against feudalism. Until then, there was no French civilization, though there had long been civilizations in France, from the old Stone Age culture in the south-west, to the Greek civilization which flourished in and round Marseilles (founded 540 B.C.), or the Albigensian civilization of the thirteenth century, in Languedoc. The Roman conquest left a deeper mark and gave to the three western and northern provinces of Gaul some rudiments of unity and a common centre at Lyons. Under the Romans and under the semi-Romanized Franks, however, Gaul was part of a wider whole. Charlemagne revived a vast Roman and Christian Empire but, following the Frankish tradition, divided it amongst his sons and drove between western Germany and western France a "Middle Kingdom," for which both have contended through a thousand years. France soon degenerated into a conglomerate of warring fiefs and such it was at the rise of the first French kings, the Capets (987-1328). They and their descendants, the Valois (1328-1589) and the Bourbons (1589-1793), wrested the country piecemeal from the power of rebellious lords.

The struggle to establish the supremacy of the monarchy was hard and bitter. The feudal wars were protracted because of the power of one of the French King's vassals, the King of England, who for a hundred years claimed and fought for western France. By the end of the fifteenth century, these wars were over but they were succeeded by other wars, which they themselves had foreshadowed. Thus, on the one hand, the attempts of the Dukes of Burgundy to reconstitute the Middle Kingdom were followed by Spanish attempts to link up the Spanish possessions and encircle France on the east. From this time onwards, the "danger from without" involved France in defensive wars to protect her eastern frontier. During at least two periods, however, when the monarchy reached the height of its glory under Louis XIV (1661-1715), and again under Napoleon (1799-1814) she became strong enough to go over to the offensive and not only to push that frontier towards the Rhine, but to embark on conquests far afield. On the other hand, the feudal wars foreshadowed a new form of the "danger from within", religious dissensions. In the conquest of Toulouse, the stronghold of the

Albigensians, they took on the character of a crusade against heresy; and they finally merged into the wars of religion, which took on a political character. The Protestant rebellion smouldered on into the seventeenth century, as did the spasmodic revolts of the nobility, deprived of political responsibilities and bribed by privileges and exemption from taxes, but still unruly. To combat these dangers, the Crown might have summoned to its aid the politically ambitious *parlements* (royal courts of justice and administration) or the States-General (parliament); it failed to do so. Instead, it relied on its own strength and imposed unity at the cost of ruthless centralization and, eventually, rigid religious orthodoxy. Power was concentrated in the hands of the royal agents, "the thirty kings" or *intendants* in every province. The political and social aspirations of the bourgeoisie were thwarted; their economic development and that of the farmers and peasants was limited by survivals of the economic confusion of feudalism and by the burden of taxation; Paris was cosseted at the expense of the provincial towns. There was no adequate outlet or redress for these grievances. When, in addition, the foreign policy of the monarchy faltered and France was dragged into wars only to lose her vast Empire in India and Canada, the time was ripe for revolution.

In 1789, the States-General were convened and the representatives of the commons drew up lists of grievances. They succeeded in transforming the meeting into a "National Assembly" by abolishing the distinction between the three orders of nobility, clergy and commons. At the same time, by a spontaneous movement, the Parisians stormed the prison of the Bastille (July 14th) and they and the whole countryside set up *communes*, or town and village councils, and a "National Guard" or volunteer militia. This movement was anti-feudal and centrifugal, but not anti-monarchical. At first it seemed that the Revolution might establish a "royal democracy" and a pyramid of local organs based on the *communes*. In this it failed, partly owing to the characteristic intransigence of the Bourbons, partly owing to foreign intervention and the exigencies of war, which led the Republican armies eastwards to seek "natural frontiers", and partly owing to the artificial nature of the units (*departements*) set up between *communes* and State. The failure to achieve the ideals of 1789 was also partly due to the complete lack of experience in the men brought to power, to the chaos produced by some of their experiments (e.g. the direct election of tax-collectors, judges and officers), and to their internal divisions. The chief of these was the division between the Girondins, the more moderate, "federalist" Republicans, and the Jacobins, who believed that the Revolution could only be consolidated by dictatorial methods and by the pre-

dominance of Paris. The execution of the King, convicted of treason, destroyed any possibility of reconciliation with the Royalists; the attempt first to control and then to suppress the Church alienated the clergy; and the victory of the Jacobins drove the Girondins into revolt. Control was vested in a Committee of Public Safety, the Paris *Commune* and a network of Jacobin clubs, centred in Paris and flanking the local authorities. This effective machinery was turned into an instrument of the Terror, a ruthless purge of suspects which split the nation still further. As a violent social upheaval, the Revolution satisfied the aspirations of the bourgeoisie and of the peasants and created a class of small landowners. But the beginnings of a socialist movement were crushed and when later the dissatisfied proletariat grew in strength, the beneficiaries of the Revolution rallied to the side of "order", thus perpetuating the division between town and country, Paris and the provinces. Given these deep cleavages and given a highly centralized government, it is easy to understand the violent oscillations of French politics in the nineteenth century and the self-perpetuation of disunion. Each swing of the pendulum lessened the number of experienced and trustworthy men who could be employed and would accept employment under Government.

The Revolution itself ended in the military dictatorship of one of its generals, Napoleon, first as Consul, then as Emperor. He restored order, consolidated some of the gains of the Revolution, organized the administration and, with forces which still largely acclaimed the Revolutionary ideals of "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity", led France into a series of wars more glorious, more ambitious and finally—after the retreat from Moscow and the last attempt which ended at Waterloo—more ruinous than any under the monarchy. Napoleon added to the *mystiques* of the royalists and of the revolutionaries a third, Bonapartism, an authoritarian, plebiscitary, militaristic ideal of government. His fall was followed by the return of the Bourbons, the conciliatory Louis XVIII and the uncompromising Charles X. The latter was dethroned by a revolution in 1830 and the bourgeoisie set up a constitutional monarchy under Louis-Philippe, an Orleanist Bourbon who had fought with the Revolutionary army. The later part of his reign coincided with a period of great economic misery for the working-classes and ended in another revolution, that of 1848. The satisfied peasants triumphed, however, over the unsatisfied urban workmen. The Second Republic was strangled by a second Bonaparte. Napoleon's nephew was elected President by direct suffrage; by a *coup d'etat* confirmed by plebiscites, he established himself as dictator and then as Emperor. His Empire, a tinselled, gaudy imitation of his uncle's, ended in

military defeat. France was provoked to war with Prussia, for which she was ill-prepared. The Prussian army inflicted a crushing defeat at Sedan and captured the Emperor. The Third Republic was proclaimed and its Government of National Defence retreated from Paris to Tours and then to Bordeaux. An armistice was arranged (January 1871) to permit the election of a National Assembly, in which the provinces returned a majority of royalists, who wanted peace even at the price of ceding Alsace-Lorraine and Belfort. The Parisian *Commune* demanded a continuation of the war and decentralization of government and broke into revolt. Its own excesses roused revulsion in the bourgeoisie, while its savage repression, with Prussian connivance, stirred a fierce resentment in the working masses. The triumph of the Assembly did not lead to a restoration of the monarchy. Royalism was waning in the country and, in any case, the Bourbon pretender (the Comte de Chambord) proved a true grandson of Charles X and wrecked his chances by refusing to accept the Republican flag, the tricolour. In January 1875, the Assembly accepted, by a majority of one, an amendment which led to the establishment of a Republican constitution.

"The Republic divides us least," said the statesman Thiers. That it was a compromise was clearly seen in the Constitution, which contained no declaration of principles and no preamble and which, by the simple substitution of King for President, could have served a constitutional monarchy. That indeed was the aim of those monarchists who looked to the death of the last of the elder Bourbons and the return of the present line of Orleanist pretenders. The Assembly also contained Bonapartists and elements of the Right, who mistrusted parliamentary democracy. With these partisans of "order" the Catholic hierarchy came to be identified, while the militant atheistic Freemasons were strong Republicans and often Radicals. The struggle between Republicanism and anti-Republicanism, parliamentarianism and Bonapartism, resulted in a series of crises, which shook France and deepened her cleavages and which still influence French politics.

The first crisis was in 1877, when the first President of the Republic, Marshal MacMahon, forced the resignation of the Prime Minister and on May 16th exercised his right of dissolving the Chamber; after the triumph of the Republicans in the new Chamber and in the Senate, he himself resigned in 1879. This crisis had two results. It ultimately strengthened the Chamber and the Cabinet against the Senate and the President. It also led the Republicans to forestall any monarchist plans by the following amendment to the Constitution (1884): "The Republican form of government cannot be the object of any proposal of revision. The members of families which have

reigned in France are not eligible for the Presidency of the Republic." This clause, if held to be binding, banned any peaceful change by the dwindling monarchist movement, which now resorted more and more to violent methods. The second crisis of the Republic proved that monarchism was not the only danger and that Bonapartism could exist without a Bonaparte. In 1889 General Boulanger, ex-Minister of War and darling of the Paris mob, demanded a plebiscitary Republic and threatened a *coup d'etat*; his nerve failed, however, and he fled. The third crisis was the Panama affair, the first of many financial scandals implicating Ministers of the Republic and damaging its prestige (1892). The fourth was the famous and long drawn-out affair which resulted from the condemnation of Captain Dreyfus, a French officer of Jewish faith, on a false charge of betraying military secrets. Between his first trial in 1895 and his acquittal in 1906, France was divided into two camps. The forces of "progress", the *Dreyfusards*, demanded justice and revision of the case; the forces of "order", the army, most of the Catholic hierarchy and the Right-wing upper classes, opposed revision. Anti-clericalism was raised to fever-pitch by this crisis and the Left-wing Governments of 1899-1914 passed a series of measures dissolving many religious orders, excluding priests from the State educational system, and separating the Church and State. The army (if on active service) had already been disfranchised in 1875; a purge of Right-wing and Catholic officers was now undertaken, though the opposition roused by its extent and methods interrupted it. In 1907 a law gave to the civil authorities precedence over the military in public. These measures deepened the cleavage between the two sides.

Meanwhile, the danger from without was growing. France bitterly resented the loss of Alsace and Lorraine in 1871 but the Republic was not inclined for a war of revenge. Bismarck encouraged it in a policy of colonial expansion, which was strongly attacked as a "distraction" by a public opinion ever watchful of the Rhine. In spite of such opposition, Tunisia was conquered in 1881; Annam and Tongking in 1885; Madagascar in 1895. A Franco-British incident when Kitchener and Marchand both claimed Fashoda (1898) put a stop to the conquest of the Sudan but French rule was established over the Sahara (1910), Equatorial Africa (1913) and Morocco (1913). This expansion produced friction with Italy as well as with England, though war was always averted. The French Government was moreover no more neglectful of the eastern frontier than the French people and it reacted to the Central European menace in the traditional way. As Francis I had made an alliance with the Ottoman Sultan in 1535 **and a post-war France was to conclude the**

Franco-Soviet pact of 1935, so in the early eighteen-nineties a Franco-Russian alliance was formed. In 1904, a much more revolutionary step was taken by the settlement of outstanding Franco-British differences and the establishment of the Entente Cordiale. On the outbreak of war in 1914, France could count on the support of Russia and was in the event supported by Britain. She was also able to sink her internal differences and to join Catholic and anti-clerical, monarchist and Republican, Right and Left, in the *union sacrée* against the enemy.

III. POLITICAL AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC

The political landscape of France has been formed, as it were, by a series of geological upheavals, none of which has entirely destroyed the effects of its predecessors. "Constructed by Napoleon on the remains of the foundations of the ancient monarchy," the fabric of centralized government "is so strong that it perpetuates certain relations between the Government and the governed, which no change or revision of constitution, no reform of organic laws, materially affects."¹ Political parties have been more concerned with gaining control of the administrative machine than with making fundamental alterations in it, and such alterations have not been lasting. Since 1940, another upheaval has been in progress. Vichy attempted to sweep away the Third Republic and was itself swept away. The Fourth Republic has not yet taken shape but it seems certain that much of the Third Republic will survive in it. A study of the institutions of that Republic and their acknowledged defects may therefore give some clue to the future.

THE CONSTITUTION AND ITS DEFECTS

The Constitution established in 1875 was largely, though not entirely, inspired by the English model. The President of the Republic exercised the functions of a constitutional monarch; the Senate bore some resemblance to the House of Lords; the Chamber of Deputies corresponded to the House of Commons. Senators and Deputies met together at Versailles as the National Assembly in two capacities: to revise the constitution after deciding separately that a revision was necessary, and to elect the President.

Elected for seven years, the President was irremovable, unless accused of treason by the Chamber and found guilty by the Senate. He was eligible for re-election but, after one unfortunate experi-

¹ Bodley: *France*, Vol. II (1898.)

ment, and with the exception of the re-election of M. Lebrun just before the outbreak of war in 1939, the single-term practice prevailed. The French Left Wing is traditionally suspicious both of the President and of a second Chamber, but usage so reduced the legislative and executive power of the former as to render it innocuous, though still extremely useful. The President represented the Republic, negotiated and ratified treaties, disposed of the armed forces, nominated officials, promulgated laws and issued decrees, granted pardons, chose Ministers and convened, adjourned or prorogued Parliament. These powers were legally limited by the fact that he had to obtain the consent of Parliament before declaring war or making any territorial changes by treaty, and that every written presidential act, message or decree had to be countersigned by a Minister. Certain of his rights came in the course of time to be regarded as unconstitutional. In order to become law, bills had to be passed through both Houses and signed by the President, who had, but never exercised, the right to send them back for further consideration. He had the right to dissolve the Chamber with the consent of the Senate, but after the crisis of 1877, no President dared to do this. His messages to Parliament never expressed a personal policy; he did not initiate legislation; he consulted the Presidents of the Chamber and Senate before appointing the Prime Minister and then left to him the appointment of the Cabinet. The President was rarely a great politician and never a strong partisan. MacMahon's interference to force the resignation of the Cabinet was rightly resented more than the dissolution. Soon after the last war there were further instances of presidential interference in politics: in 1922 M. Millerand is believed to have forced the Foreign Minister to resign and in 1924 he took sides with the National Bloc in the elections. On its defeat, there was a strike of potential Ministers, which led to his resignation.

The reduction of the political role of the President on the whole enhanced his prestige and indirect influence. He was required to attend the bi-weekly "councils of Ministers", the more formal meetings of the Cabinet, and could there give advice. The extent of his influence was difficult to gauge and obviously varied with his personality. It was generally strongest in foreign affairs, though the Prime Minister (Clemenceau) ousted the President (Poincare) from his position at the Peace Conference after the war of 1914-18. Limitations of presidential power were often regarded (particularly by Right-wing politicians) as one of the causes of the notorious weakness of the executive. There may be conflict in France between those who would like to see an end put to the appointment of nonentities and perhaps to the single-term convention, and a revival of

the right of dissolution on the advice of the Ministers rather than with the consent of the Senate, and those who would like to extend the President's powers further or to transform him from a "constitutional monarch" into a figure more like the President of the United States.

The functions of the Council of Ministers were much the same as those of the English Cabinet. It formed the link between the legislature and the executive, governing in association with the President and through the Civil Service. The Ministers were individually and collectively responsible to the two Houses and appeared before both to explain policy and answer questions and attacks. The President of the Republic was not bound to find a President of the Council (or Prime Minister) in the Chamber or Senate but he normally did so. In the crisis of 1877, an entirely extra-parliamentary Cabinet was formed; on June 16th 1940, again, President Lebrun entrusted the formation of a new Government to Marshal Petain. In normal times, however, the Prime Minister and majority of Ministers were parliamentarians. It was not unusual to give the posts of Minister of War and Minister of Marine to professionals and the presence of two soldiers in M. Reynaud's last Cabinet (Petain and de Gaulle) was not in itself striking. These differences between France and England show that it would be easier to introduce American forms of government into the former than into the latter. To-day the members of the Provisional Government of France are debarred from membership of the nearest approach to a Parliament, the Consultative Assembly. But those who wish to see a permanent change on these lines are probably a small minority.

The Senate was intended to act as a brake on the Chamber, and its original composition showed this. Until 1884, a quarter of its members were nominated for life and the rest were elected in such a way as to give equal weight to the vote of a small village and of a large town. The reform of 1884 partly removed this bias, and with it some of the hostility of the Chamber and Republicans, but still worked to the advantage of the smaller towns. From one to ten Senators, who had to be over forty years of age, were elected to represent each *departement* by an electoral college consisting of the local Deputies, of the departmental Council General, of the Councils of the *arrondissements*, and of representatives of the *communes*, whose number only roughly corresponded to the number of inhabitants. The 314 Senators were elected for nine years, one-third of them retiring every three years.

The powers of the Senate were much the same as those of the Chamber, but were limited by the proviso that financial bills must be initiated in, and first passed by, the latter. Early quarrels over the

degree of amendment allowed to the Senate resulted in the emergence of a doctrine that the last word must rest with the Chamber. The Senate, however, could and did employ effective delaying tactics. No machinery existed for solving deadlocks created by the refusal of one House to pass the bills of the other, but such differences were normally settled by negotiation. The Senate brought about the fall of several Cabinets in recent years. It enjoyed two special powers, that of giving or withholding its consent to the dissolution of the Chamber by the President and that of acting as a High Court to try the President, to impeach Ministers and to try persons accused of attempts against the safety of the State.

The Chamber of Deputies was elected by direct male suffrage for a set period of four years. One Deputy, who had to be over twenty-five years of age, was allowed for every 75,000 inhabitants. Various methods of election were tried, including a modified form of proportional representation. From 1928 onwards, every man over twenty-one could vote for one candidate to represent his *arrondissement*. There were generally two ballots; if the first did not give a clear majority to one candidate, a second was taken and this allowed candidates to bargain among themselves. The formation of the Popular Front was bound up with this electoral system, for it was at the second ballot that the less successful Left-wing parties supported the most successful progressive candidate.

The centralization of the administration in France has made the legislature suspicious of the executive. The Chamber in particular considered itself the true representative of the sovereign people and was jealous of its rights. The Deputies and Senators were, however, for various reasons, in a much stronger position than the members of the House of Commons *vis-a-vis* the Cabinet. The Senators were irremovable during their nine years' tenure and never came before the country as a whole. The Chamber by its victory of 1877 made itself in practice similarly irremovable for four years. The Government could therefore never threaten (as in England) dissolution and a general election; its only, ineffective, weapon was its own resignation.

The legislature was also strengthened by the system of Parliamentary Commissions. These were standing committees elected every year, on a basis of proportional representation of parties, to deal with measures coming within their various fields (Finance, Foreign Affairs, etc.). Bills put forward by a Minister or by a private member came before the committee concerned for discussion and amendment and were presented to Parliament in their final form by the *rapporteur* of the committee which sat as a body and directed the discussion. The Minister and Cabinet were, however, still responsi-

ble for such hybrid bills and might fall on their defeat. The advantage of this system was that it built up bodies of informed specialists and allowed of less hurried and less heated discussion than is possible in an overworked Parliament. The disadvantage was that the committee could obstruct the Government, that it was generally stronger than the ephemeral Cabinet, and that it could usurp the ministerial duty of leadership. The Finance Committee was particularly powerful and this fact, together with the lack of control by the Minister of Finance over his colleagues' expenditure and with the tactics of Parliament, made for unhealthy public finances. Though the Foreign Affairs Committee was less effective, since the actual processes of diplomacy were obviously out of its control, it provided constant informed criticism of policy.

Another method of exercising control over the Government was the *interpellation*, a glorified form of the "question". A member would give notice of *interpellation*, and on the appointed day would develop a full-scale attack, followed by the Minister's reply and a discussion and then by a vote designed to seduce the supporters of the Government who disagreed with the action in question. This system led to nagging, harassing and oratory rather than to constructive criticism.

In France, the private member had a far larger measure of freedom than in England today. He was allowed to bring in bills involving the expenditure of public money, and to move amendments to the budget. Though the gravest abuses of this right were abolished, the power of the private member passing to a considerable extent to Parliamentary Commissions (but not as in England to the Government), there still remained a constant temptation to make extravagant promises to constituents or constituencies. Measures to fulfil these promises were sometimes introduced quite irresponsibly, the member counting on the Senate, if not the Chamber, to throw them out and take the blame.

During the seventy years of the Republic, there were eighty-eight Cabinets, but this figure gives an exaggerated impression of instability. The changes sometimes meant only a slight shift of policy and personnel. Some Ministers (e.g. Briand) held office for long spells and others returned after intermittent absence. In spite of this qualification, instability was one of the chief headaches of Frenchmen under the Third Republic. Yet attempts to remedy it were always resisted as tending to authoritarianism. The most recent attempt at constitutional reform was made by Doumergue in 1934. His proposals would have given to the Prime Minister a power of dissolution which his opponents regarded as little short of dictatorial. As Doumergue himself held the Premiership and as

he was suspected of anti-democratic or Fascist tendencies, his scheme roused a storm on the Left and was wrecked.

Failing any fundamental reform, successive Cabinets asked in times of crisis for "exceptional" or "plenary" powers. This meant government by "decree-laws", i.e. decrees enacted in the Council of Ministers or by the Cabinet, either absolutely or subject to eventual parliamentary ratification. Such powers the French Parliament was very chary of granting; it threw out a bill for special powers in 1916 and overturned many subsequent Cabinets on the same issue. The economic upheavals of the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties broke down this resistance on several occasions. In 1924 a law allowing government by decree in certain financial matters was passed, but remained inoperative; in 1926, the Poincaré Government was given powers to raise revenue, cut down the staffs and expenditure of the Civil Service, etc., which it used sparingly and wisely. In 1934, the precedent was repeated and in 1935, Laval's Government was given wide powers to avoid devaluation, fight speculation and defend the franc. Within six months it passed 549 decrees. This excess led to a strong reaction, which was responsible for Laval's fall and partly responsible for the fall of M. Blum's Government, on the issue of plenary powers, in 1937. On the outbreak of war, however, in November 1939, both Houses passed by a large majority a bill giving to the Cabinet unlimited powers of government by decree.

These difficulties were all interlocked with the one big difficulty of French political life, the multiplicity of parties. Multiplicity had its advantages; it allowed independence of judgement and permitted adjustments and combinations of policy, instead of the sudden and total swings of the two-party system. But it added enormously to the uncertainty and instability of government. Latterly there were in the Chamber some twenty different groups. Politics had to be carried on by bargaining, by compromise, and too often by corruption. The Deputy was free from the discipline of the whip and the caucus, but he tended to represent the even narrower interests of his constituency; he was a local man rather than a party man. The rise of the Left-wing parties did something towards introducing discipline, but even they were not able to prevent the breaking-off of dissidents and independents. The Frenchman's critical spirit and love of political argument encouraged factiousness, while ambitious politicians could find scope in small groups which sometimes gave the decisive vote in debates. On reaching a membership of forty, these groups moreover acquired a right to representation on the Parliamentary Commissions, and could thus exercise an influence on policy. The Prime Minister was often a prominent member of some

small group, or an "independent", and therefore free to draw his colleagues from a wide range of parties; Briand, Tardieu and Laval have been described as "political brokers"—of varying honesty. There were more potential Ministers than in the British Parliament and they were constantly on the look-out for a chance to upset the Cabinet and get into office themselves. The virtual irremovability of the Chamber made it necessary and the multiplicity of parties made it possible, to find a variety of Governments commanding a majority. Compromise, that supposedly English virtue, was the backbone of the French system; but it meant dissipation of responsibility. The Chamber reflected public opinion more exactly and more subtly than the House of Commons did, but France could never say "Yes" or "No" to a consistent, single policy proposed by one party. This lack helped to keep alive the idea of supplementing, or even replacing, elections by the direct appeal of plebiscites. Criticism was summed up in the saying that the reform most urgently needed in France was the rebuilding of the Chamber not in its present semi-circular form, allowing of gradations from Right to Left, but as a rectangle with clearly defined sides.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The Frenchman under the Third Republic suffered less than his English contemporary from government interference in the conduct of his daily life. The individualism and social conservatism of the French bourgeoisie, of the small towns and countryside, and of the Radical Senate, resisted public control in many fields, but wherever such control was established it left less local liberty than in England. The strong French tradition of centralization drew public services away from the local authorities into the hands of the State. The difference between France and England was shown in the different proportion of local-government to State officials: in recent years the Third Republic employed close on a million of the latter, one to every forty-six inhabitants. Apart from this, the local authorities themselves had less autonomy than in England. The councils of the *departments* and of the *arrondissements* were limited like all English local authorities to the exercise of powers definitely conferred on them by Parliament; but these functions were much less in the case of the French bodies. The councils of the *communes* seemed at first sight to enjoy much greater liberty, for they had power to undertake any functions, not forbidden by law, for the good of the community. They were, however, subject to "administrative supervision", a more severe system of control and financial restriction by the State and its agents than any in England.

The main units of French local administration were the *diparte-*

ments (numbering 90), the *arrondissements* (281), the *cantons* (3,028) and the *communes* (38,014). The Revolution began with a spontaneous revival of the *communes*, in every "city, town, parish or rural community", the largest and the smallest on an equal footing, and they have always been popular, living organisms. The *departments*, on the contrary, were artificially created to stamp out the localism and the royalist and feudal associations of the old Provinces, while the *arrondissements* and *cantons* were set up for administrative convenience. Decentralization has so far failed in France because popular sentiment could only centre round the *commune*, which might split the country into tiny fragments, dominated by the largest towns, or round the large Provinces, which might foster an anti-Revolutionary movement, reaction and royalism. This second type of decentralization has been somewhat discredited by its association with the Vichy regime, which planned a revival of the Provinces. It may prove possible to co-ordinate, and infuse some life into, the varying Regions into which France is divided for legal, military, educational, ecclesiastical and other purposes.

Throughout the local administration of France there ran the dualism of elected council and State representative. In the *departements*, the former was known as the Council-General and the latter as the Prefect. The Prefect, nominated by the Minister of the Interior and appointed by the President, was at once the agent and representative of the central Government as a whole (and as distinct from the representatives of particular Ministries and Departments), and the executive head of the *departement* in local affairs. In his former capacity he saw to the execution of laws, appointed subordinate State officials in the *dipartement* (elementary school teachers, etc.), exercised wide powers over police and public health, and control over the *communes*, and acted as a link between State and *departement*. In his second capacity, he carried out decisions of the Council-General, drew up its budget, and appointed local officials. He was appointed, and could be removed or dismissed, for political reasons. He was expected to influence elections but, if the local Deputies were influential, he himself was at their mercy. Owing to this system and to centralization, a good deal of the minor corruption, jobbery and nepotism which in this country creeps into local politics was transferred in France to the national plane and hung on the relationship of the Deputy with his constituents, with the Prefect and with the central Ministries.

The Council-General was a body of from seventeen to sixty-seven members, one to each *canton*, elected by manhood suffrage for six years, one half retiring every three years. Two ordinary public sessions were held every year and members received an allowance

for expenses. The Council elected annually a standing Committee which met privately at least once a month and exercised specific functions, delegated by the Council or in its own right. The Council assessed the liability of each *arrondissement* in the *departement* for direct taxes, decided on departmental taxes and loans within the strict limits fixed by statute, and kept up departmental roads, buildings and certain social services. Its chief function was to vote the budget submitted by the Prefect, which was then promulgated by decree. The standing Committee first examined the budget proposals, and also the monthly expenditure of the Prefect. Certain items of expenditure were obligatory and could be imposed by the Prefect on both *departments* and *communes*. The Council-General could in theory deal with no political subjects and was liable to dissolution by decree. Since 1926, most of its resolutions automatically became operative within six weeks unless declared *ultra vires* by the Prefect.

The Prefect had under him regional Sub-Prefects, who acted as liaison with the *communes*, and with the *arrondissements*. The latter were of little importance, their elected Councils merely distributing direct taxes amongst the *communes* and making resolutions in defence of their own interests. The *canton* was a purely administrative division and can be disregarded.

The central Government exercised its control mainly by fixing the sources and upper limit of local taxes and loans, by supervising budgets and by imposing obligatory expenditure. In the case of the *communes* which, great and small, had an unlimited range of action, additional safeguards were set up. Most financial resolutions and all decisions to raise extra revenue required the approval of the Prefect and he could suspend the communal Council, while the central Government could dissolve it. The Council consisted of from ten to thirty-six members (54 for Lyons) elected for four years by manhood suffrage. During most of the nineteenth century, the Mayor was nominated by the central Government; the change in 1884 to election by the Council was one of the Republican triumphs. The Mayor, however, was not only the representative and executive head of the *commune*, responsible for order, public health, works and safety, and for municipal appointments, but the representative of the central Government, charged with the execution of its laws and liable to dismissal, or to suspension, by the Prefect. The budget was proposed by the Mayor, voted by the Council and approved and promulgated by the Sub-Prefect, Prefect or President. Over half the *communes* had less than 500 inhabitants, and only 186 more than 20,000. Though the minority might organize excellent services, the majority were hampered by their smallness and their poverty and this increased the tendency towards centralization.

The traditional hostility of the central Government and provinces to the large towns has already been shown. It also took the form of limiting the police powers of certain *communes* and of placing Paris under a different regime. The State had a nation-wide criminal police (*Sûreté*) and *Gendarmerie*, but in the case of Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon and Nice it also usurped the municipal function of maintaining public order and safety. In Paris, a special Prefect of Police dealt with these matters, while the prefect of the Seine and the nominated mayors in the twenty *arrondissements* of Paris exercised all other functions. The elected Municipal Council of eighty paid members was limited to advisory powers. These measures were held to be justified by the character of these towns and by the part played, for instance, by Lyons in the riots of 1848 or by Paris, always intervening in politics from 1793 to February 1934 and always excitable and extreme—whether on the Left with its revolutions of 1789 and 1871 and with its present "red belt", or on the Right with its private armies, or in its Boulangism.

The position of all these organs of central and local administration and of their officials and employees, differed from that of their English equivalents because they came under a special system of administrative law. The Revolution was determined to prevent any repetition of legal interference in executive matters, and, ever since, there have been administrative courts to advise the executive authorities and decide cases arising out of their actions. There were twenty-two regional courts of first instance, the Prefectoral Councils, and a nation-wide Council of State, which acted as a Court of Appeal from the former. The advice of these Councils was not binding either on the Prefects or on the Ministers though these were bound to consult them on certain matters; their judicial functions were more important. In addition to trying cases or hearing appeals involving Government officials, the Council of State had the power to annul acts of the local authorities, if *ultra vires*. Composed of judges and of experienced administrators, it showed a high degree of independence, and despite some early abuses, the system worked in practice rather in favour of the citizen than of the State. Justice could be obtained more cheaply and quickly than in the case of a claim against the Crown under English law.

THE LEGAL SYSTEM

The administrative courts built up a body of case law; apart from this, the sole recognized sources of law in France were the Codes and Statutes. In earlier times law was based on territorial custom, whether the custom of southern France, which was substantially the Roman law embodied in the Justinian Code, or the two or three

hundred local systems of the remaining two-thirds of France. The monarchy and its *parlements* took some steps towards unification, the Revolution cleared the ground and Napoleon achieved the final fusion and codification of laws (1804—11). Ever since the promulgation of the five Napoleonic Codes, "France has done a great export trade in law . . . The influence of the French Civil Code has been great in Europe; it dominated Baden and the Prussian Rhine Provinces for nearly a hundred years; the Codes of Belgium and Italy follow it, in many titles almost literally; its spirit is conspicuous in the codes of Spain and Portugal; and beyond the seas, in Egypt, in South America, in Louisiana, in Lower Canada, the lawyer conversant with the formulæ and the institutions of French law will find himself at home."¹

Possibly the simplest way of conveying a general idea of the French legal system in a short space is to compare it with the English, although the balance of advantages will be differently struck in the two countries. Certainly, all the advantages are not with the English system, which is in this instance much more centralized than the French. The only high court sitting permanently in Paris with jurisdiction over the whole country was the Court of Cassation which had the power of dealing with points of law raised in the lower courts, of sending cases back for re-trial and of acting as a disciplinary court for the judges. From the point of view of convenience, the French litigant with a Court of Appeal in each of the twenty-six appellate districts was much better off than the English litigant. The same consideration, the desire to secure a decision cheaply, quickly and conveniently, was notable throughout the lower courts. Every case was taken, in the first instance, before the cantonal justice of the peace, who was able to settle many of the innumerable disputes between farmers by conciliation and who summarily tried petty civil and criminal cases. Cases beyond his competence went before the Tribunal of the *arrondissement*, sitting either as a civil or criminal ("correctional") court, except for commercial cases which were heard by a court of unpaid judges elected by and from the commercial community. Civil and commercial appeals from these courts went to the District Court of Appeal; criminal appeals from the Correctional Tribunals, as well as serious criminal cases (*crimes*) went to the departmental Court of Assize. The fact that the French system provided for no jury in civil cases and that the decision of the court was arrived at largely by discussion among the judges on the basis of documents put in by the parties, instead of by the examination and cross-examination of witnesses in open court, marked a

¹ Amos and Walton: *Introduction to French Law* (1935).

notable divergence from the English system, especially as it obtains in the Common Law Courts.

English criticism, however, was apt to be concentrated chiefly on other aspects of the French system. One of these was the existence of a Ministry of Justice. It was argued that this opened the way to political influence upon the judiciary, although it has to be borne in mind that the head of the English legal system, the Lord Chancellor, is a member of the Government, that the Law Lords take part in political debates as members of the House of Lords and that the Attorney-General, who is head of the Bar and has, in practice, the reversion of high judicial office, is the chief legal adviser of the Government of the day. All these, however, have been or are members of the Bar and must act with the knowledge that there is in the background a formidable body of professional opinion which they can never lightly disregard.

It is the conjunction in France of a Ministry of Justice and an absolute division between Bench and Bar which gives the French legal system its special characteristics. The judges, by English standards, are exceedingly numerous¹ (some 3,500 in all) and correspondingly ill-paid. They have an obvious incentive to seek promotion. This is usually to be found in Paris, in the Ministry of Justice, or in the *parquet*, which initiates and conducts prosecutions and controls the detective police under the supervision of the Ministry; and although there have been no wholesale dismissals of judges since the political purge of 1879-82, members of the staff of the Ministry and the *parquet* may lose their appointments, while candidates for judicial promotion cannot easily disregard the influence of the numerous members of the Bar who combine that profession with a political career.

French critics have themselves complained in recent years that the Code needs drastic revision in the light of modern developments but it is in the procedure in criminal cases that many English, and some French, lawyers find most occasion for criticism. In French, as in English law, a man is deemed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. But this assumption scarcely accords, in English minds, with the facts of French criminal procedure, the cross-examination of the prisoner by the *juge d'instruction* before trial, the admission of evidence of previous offences and the conduct of the actual trial by the presiding judge who performs most of the functions of prosecuting Counsel in England and leaves the latter little to do except make his

¹ It has to be borne in mind that the English practice of trial by one judge (with certain exceptions) is at variance with the practice not only of France but of most of Europe. The introduction, for reasons of economy and speed, of the single-judge system in the political trials of 1944-45 has roused criticism in France.

speeches. On the face of it, it would seem that the dice are heavily weighted against prisoners in French courts. On the other hand, and perhaps for this very reason, the French jury (which exists only for the trial of the graver offences, *crimes*, and not for *delits*) is more inclined than its English counterpart to be influenced in favour of the prisoner by meretricious appeals, and to find in opposition to the opinion of the presiding judge.

THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

The development of the educational system has closely reflected the history and political struggles of France. Under the monarchy it was in the hands of the clergy and the achievements of the ecclesiastical foundations—notably the University of Paris—are too well known to need mention. From 1530 onwards the State also founded learned institutions, the *Collège de France* and the Academies, which set and maintained a high standard in the arts and sciences. The mass of the people, however, remained untouched and this system did not meet the aims of the Revolution and of Napoleon. The latter created a centralized system, the "University of France", comprising all the schools and universities grouped regionally into "Academies" under a Rector; education became a State monopoly. In 1850, this monopoly was broken by a law allowing the establishment of "free" schools (i.e. neither controlled nor subsidized by the State), and later the principle was applied to the universities. Under the Third Republic, State education and free education (in practice, Catholic establishments) existed side by side. The State, however, retained a monopoly of school licences, as well as of examinations and diplomas, thus imposing the programme worked out for the whole country by the Ministry of National Education. It forbade teaching by members of unauthorized Orders, and the study of theology in its own universities.

Education was compulsory between the ages of 7 and 14. It was free in the elementary schools and training colleges, through which elementary teachers passed. In the secondary schools, the *lycees* and *colleges*, and in the secondary training colleges and universities, a fee was charged except to State scholars. One of the chief planks of the Radical Party was the establishment of a "single school" system and the abolition of fees, but these were already small by English standards. The system was admirably organized and produced a high level of general culture' and clarity of thought and expression, and much brilliant scholarship and research. Its weaknesses were its rigidity and the fierceness of competition in the higher examinations, **the** pathway to diplomas and jobs. The State schools were designed

to be and were in fact neutral but were violently attacked—particularly the elementary schools and training colleges—by the Right Wing as the breeding grounds of a materialist outlook, of anti-clericalism and of pacifist internationalism. English observers criticized their over-emphasis on intellectual ability, the lesser importance given to character training and the small time left for games; but Frenchmen argued that moral training was the business of the home and that the period of compulsory military training developed character.

THE CHURCHES

All modern societies are faced with the problem of pluralism and totalitarianism: how far should they tolerate "States within the State"? In France, with its centralized administrative machine, captured now by one side and now by another, and its deep divisions, the problem has been more acute than here. Its oldest form was the long struggle between Church and State. The French kings—like the English—attempted to harness the religion of the majority (Roman Catholicism) to the State and varied between tolerance and intolerance of minority groups. The Catholic Church became identified with the old regime and when the Revolution, having failed to control it, tried to suppress and supersede it, a vicious circle of hostility was set up. Freedom of worship was established by Napoleon and the Concordat of 1801 reinstated the Church on his own terms, subordinating it to the State. Through the nineteenth century it would only work in full loyalty with counter-Revolutionary Governments, but when the Third Republic was established, Pope Leo XIII encouraged Catholics to support it. The struggle, however, broke out with renewed violence in the Dreyfus case and over education and led to anti-clerical legislation. The law of 1901, which only allowed religious Orders to exist if specially authorized by statute, gave rise to great bitterness. The formation of Church organizations empowered to hold property was allowed but was not sanctioned by the Pope; it benefited Protestants, Jews and others, but Catholic property was finally confiscated. On the other hand, the separation of Church and State in 1905 partly destroyed the basis of anti-clericalism and since the *ralliement*, there have always been influential groups of Catholics loyal to the Republic. The religious restrictions could not be applied to Alsace and Lorraine, where Napoleon's Concordat substantially remained.

There are large groups of Lutherans in Alsace and of Calvinists in the Cevennes and southern France, but the total number of Protestants in France is only about one million. The intolerance of the monarchy," which after 1685 drove many of them to take refuge in England, temporarily destroyed Protestantism as a political force in

France. Subsequently, they and the Jews accepted equally Napoleonic control and Republican separation.

OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

It was also long before the French State overcame its hostility to other organized groups. The Revolution suppressed the corporations, or guilds, which had set up monopolies of work under the monarchy, and to prevent their revival, workmen were forbidden to form any union or to strike. The abuses of the Jacobin and Royalist clubs led to their suppression. Finally, an article of the Napoleonic Penal Code forbade any meeting or association of more than twenty persons, unless authorized by the Government. Under Louis-Philippe, republicans and revolutionaries worked out the pattern of modern underground movements, in small but affiliated "cells". The law was consequently made more stringent and, though lifted in the first flush of the 1848 revolution, was soon re-imposed. It was not until 1881 that political meetings were allowed, upon notification of the police and in the presence of a Government official. Liberty of the press was granted at the same time. In 1884, employees and employers were allowed to form unions to defend their interests, but no political activity was allowed. Unlike the Labour Party, the French socialist movement was thus divorced from the Trade Unions and these adopted "syndicalism," the doctrine of revolution by general strike. When, however, the Trade Union movement (*Confederation Generale du Travail*) attempted this in 1920, measures were taken, though not put into practice, to dissolve it.

The law of 1901 which put restrictions on the religious orders allowed the formation of all other associations, except for illicit purposes. On making a declaration of their rules, etc., to the Government, they could acquire property and, if considered to be of public utility, could receive gifts and legacies. This tardy freedom allowed the formation of political parties. It was wisely limited in December 1935, when the "anti-Fascist laws" allowed the Government to dissolve by decree any associations which were of a paramilitary nature, or had been guilty of provoking armed demonstrations, or of conspiring to destroy the territorial integrity of the country or to overthrow the republican form of government. The laws against incitement to violence by the Press were also reinforced.

THE ARMY AND THE NAVY

The organization of armed forces is not merely a technical but a political question, subject to variation with varying regimes. In France, this has been more obvious than elsewhere. The monarchy fought wars mainly through its professional army of recruits and

foreign mercenaries, led by officers drawn from the nobility, and it made little use of the militia, or territorial reserve chosen by lot. The Revolution, on the other hand, appealed to the "nation in arms" for "total war". Its advent was marked by widespread desertions, emigrations and mutinies of officers and soldiers, and by the spontaneous formation of National Guards. The Government drew on volunteer battalions of the Guards to reinforce the dwindling army, in preparation for war with Austria (1792). The enthusiasm of the volunteers combined with the experience of the professionals, and the equipment and fortifications of the old regime, to win victories of great political importance at Valmy and Jemappes. In 1793, the army was made homogeneous and the obligation of military service was included in the Constitution. It was decreed that "from this moment until that when the enemy has been driven out of the territory of the Republic, all Frenchmen are under requisition in the service of the armies. The young men will fight; the married men will forge arms and transport food; the women will make tents and clothing and will work in hospitals; the children will make old linen into bandages; the old men will be carried into the public squares to rouse the courage of the soldiers, to preach hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic."¹ In 1798, a Conscription Law was voted, by which all Frenchmen became liable, in principle, for military service from the age of twenty to twenty-five years. This system made possible the vast scale of the campaigns, numbers engaged and casualties of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. It also brought fresh talent to the army: the Revolutionary generals were young, and Napoleon organized the formation of a military elite. The army was at first hampered by the strict supervision of political commissars but under Carnot it received a good organization and a new strategy of self-contained divisions and deep formations, which Napoleon brought to perfection. Napoleon, however, changed the character of the army by incorporating into it men of all the occupied countries. After his fall, conscription was abolished. From 1815 onwards, young men of twenty were chosen by lot to fill the small Restoration army, but substitutes were allowed. Napoleon III allowed exemption to be bought, but then belatedly tried to reintroduce universal compulsory conscription. After the Franco-Prussian war, the Third Republic carried out this measure (1872) and in 1905 excluded any exemption. At the same time, the anti-Republicanism of certain military circles led to drastic measures to reduce the prestige and influence of the regular army.

The development of the navy was rather different. It was largely created by the great Ministers of the seventeenth century and the

¹ Decree of August 23rd, 1792.

system of "maritime registration" has continued, with modifications, since then. All French sailors and fishers were registered and called up for five years' service, if needed; in exchange they were granted fishing and navigation rights and an old-age pension. The officers were largely aristocratic. The navy reached its height in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and excelled at privateering warfare, but at the Revolution two-thirds of its officers emigrated. This blow was followed by losses at Nelson's hands, from which it never fully recovered. In the nineteenth century, despite the brilliant pioneer work of the Second Empire in the development of the ironclad warship and the major part which the French navy took in colonial development, it was limited after 1815 to minor actions. In 1914, its tonnage was only 37 per cent of the British, in 1919, 23 per cent. This falling-off of naval power was mostly due to the waning of Franco-British, and the waxing of Franco-German, rivalry. To many naval officers, however, it appeared to be due to neglect and, hankering for the days of the monarchy when France had disputed the mastery of the seas with England, they became anti-Republican and anti-British.

Thus the old line of cleavage and suspicion appeared in military and naval matters. On the one hand, there were those who advocated a strong professional army and navy, well-equipped and ready, if necessary, for "defensive attack"; these were regarded (and with some justification) as "reactionary". On the other hand, there were those who followed the Revolutionary and Republican tradition and who believed that the "nation in arms" must triumph over any attack. The more extreme mystics of the "mass levy" and the pacifists were unwilling to spend money on the services or even on equipment. It was often forgotten that the army of 1793 was made up of one battalion of professionals to two of volunteers. Moreover the desire for a citizens' army was generally combined with a desire to reduce the military service, and consequently the efficiency, of the citizens. Abroad, this distinction between the defensive "democratic" conscript army and the "militaristic" professional army was not grasped. French "militarism" and French strength were calculated in sheer numbers of men, without reference to the proportion of professionals to conscripts, the quantity and type of armaments or the extent of French colonial commitments. Abroad and at home, the real situation was obscured by prejudice and misconception.

The war of 1914 -18 had many repercussions. First, the tremendous losses induced a shrinking from bloodshed and a consciousness of the numerical weakness both of the present and of the future generation. This attitude was symbolized by the expenditure of military budgets not on offensive weapons but on the costly Maginot line, which was to protect the population, industries and territory

of France from any German attack. In the reaction after the war, France's professional army fell to 50,000. The general expectation of a long period of peace, the effect of inflation on service pay, and the fact that cuts in military expenditure were popular as measures of economy, reduced the quality as well as the quantity of personnel. The highest posts were staffed by older men, such as Marshal Petain and General Weygand, who found it impossible to break away from the conceptions of the 1914-18 war, the war of positions, which had crowned their own careers. Between them and the younger generation, who absorbed the lessons of the rapid mechanical advances from 1918 on, there was a gap, the missing link of the dead.

The navy suffered under similar difficulties. France adhered to the Washington Agreement (1922) and to the Treaty of London (1931), limiting naval armaments. She laid down no capital ships until 1935, by which time (as the Minister of Marine pointed out) her naval strength was only about 30 per cent that of pre-war days. These agreements increased the hostility of naval officers to the Anglo-Saxon Powers, for in 1922 the latter brought pressure to bear on France to make her accept parity, much below their own strength, with Italy. Yet Italy had coasts on only one sea and a much smaller, and nearer, Empire. The refusal of France to attend the Naval Conference of 1927 and the difficulties she raised at the London Conference in 1930 were largely due to her refusal to accept the Italian contention that parity had been granted in principle as well as in fact. Another difficulty with the Anglo-Saxon Powers arose because, in default of capital ships, France proposed to ensure her imperial communications by an expansion not only of light craft, aircraft and bases but of submarines. The latter were regarded in France as essentially defensive, and in Anglo-Saxon countries as essentially offensive, craft.

The weaknesses of French military policy could be seen when a scheme for military reorganization was finally put forward in four bills, three of which became law in 1927 and 1928 and the fourth of which was dropped owing to a Socialist change of front under Communist attacks. This fourth bill was to have provided for the mobilization and organization of the whole nation in war, in the true Jacobin tradition; a similar law was finally passed ten years later. One of the other laws reduced the period of military service to one year and the two others dealt with the regular army; later in 1928, France also embarked on the Maginot defences and created a separate Air Ministry. The legislation of 1928 laid too much emphasis on the role of the infantry and it reduced the *cadres* below efficiency level. The total effectives of the French army were fixed at 523,769 men, of whom 289,994 would be French conscripts, 106,013 French

regulars, and the rest North African or colonial troops. But of the metropolitan French regulars, 55,000 were to be stationed overseas, 11,300 would be absorbed by army services, and only 39,700 would be available for home defence and to serve as an *encadrement*.¹ Only a few critics pointed out that Germany's *cadres* numbered 250,000. The numerical superiority of the conscripts, faith in them and in the new Maginot line, outmoded conceptions of warfare and a disinclination to scrap France's equipment for newer armaments, all combined to blind the General Staff and the politicians to the dangers and possibilities of von Seeckt's small, swift, highly-trained striking force. It was not until 1940 that France heeded the voice which in 1934 had said: "To build our defences solely on the resistance of fortifications manned by novices would be absurd."²

IV. OVERSEAS FRANCE

The differences between the French and British Empires might be roughly summed up by saying that the one is centripetal, the other centrifugal. The countries of the Commonwealth could be arranged in a progression moving (though sometimes haltingly) from the dependence of Crown Colonies towards the independence of Dominions. Overseas France falls into a different pattern: its most "advanced" territory, Algeria, is nothing like a Dominion; it is technically a part of France. The imperial ideal fostered by the French Revolution held out to the natives of the Empire the prospect not of collective liberty but of individual equality: French citizenship, enfranchisement, the right to send Deputies and Senators to the French Parliament, the chance of becoming a Cabinet Minister (like the West African Blaise Diagne) or Governor of a colony (like the late M. Eboue, a negro from Martinique). This ideal of "assimilation" is more generous than any British ideal but it has grave defects. In the first place, it was difficult to give to peoples numbering nearly seventy million, and of varying degrees and types of civilization, a voice in the affairs of metropolitan France; immediate "assimilation" was therefore toned down to "association". The French system of colonial organization was, however, naturally based on the French system of local government; it was highly centralized and left less scope to local initiative and self-government than the British system. Again, if assimilation meant a transition from primitive savagery to French civilization, its benefits were obvious; but the more highly developed societies—Annamese or

¹ See S. C. Davis: *The French War Machine* (1937).

² Charles de Gaulle: *Vers l'Armée du Matter* (1934).

Arab, for instance—were unwilling to give up their indigenous civilizations and, even if they did not resent Westernization, wanted at least to have it both ways and to retain their language and customs. The disadvantages and dangers of assimilation were clear to many French colonial administrators and one of the greatest of them, Lyautey, formulated a different doctrine, "to practise protection and not direct administration." "Instead of dissolving the old ruling *cadres*" he wrote in 1894, "use them. . . It is thanks to this system, moreover, that we have in ten years achieved a prosperous Tunisia; and thanks to the opposite system, which consists of disrupting all local forces and governing on rubble, that we have at the end of fifty years a vegetating Algeria.*¹ The French Empire shows in varying degrees and mixtures the application of "assimilation," "association" and "protection".

The first French Empire was created by and for the central Government. Yet its support for the intrepid explorers, sailors and missionaries, the sturdy traders and colonists, the brilliant leaders who built that Empire, was fitful and its policy was short-sighted, though not more so than that of other imperial Powers of the time. It tried by means of the Colonial Pact to create a "closed" Empire and to subordinate colonial to metropolitan interests; it fostered monopolistic companies; it held the leading-strings too tightly; and it was easily distracted by more pressing preoccupations in Europe and especially on the Rhine. By 1815, all that remained of its conquests were the five towns known as the Indian Establishments; the island of Bourbon (Reunion); the coast of Senegal; French Guiana; Guadeloupe and Martinique; and the islets of St Pierre and Miquelon. The next colonial venture was the conquest of Algeria, begun in 1830 by Charles X, partly as a distraction for the public and partly to stamp out piracy in the Mediterranean. Later, Napoleon III, also eager for distractions, established French rule in Cochin-China. All these territories might be described as "assimilated"; they all sent representatives to the French Chamber and Senate. In the "Old Colonies", full French citizenship was acquired automatically at birth; in Algeria and Cochin-China it was acquired by the assimilated elite. Northern Algeria, lying close to France, was (apart from Reunion) the nearest approach to a "colony of settlement", such as France had lost in Canada. It was regarded as an extension of France, came under the Ministry of the Interior, and constituted three French *departments*.

The rest of France's overseas territories—which in all cover well over 4½ million square miles—were differently administered. Their acquisition has already been touched on. The loss of Alsace and

¹ Lyautey: *Lettres du Tonkin* (1921).

Lorraine and the relative decline of France's population led her to seek compensation abroad; though sometimes, as in the case of Egypt, the menace on the Rhine held her back from expansion overseas. The Third Republic sought and developed strategic strong-points (Cam-ranh Bay, Saigon, Diego-Suarez, Jibuti, Dakar,* Bizerta) and forestalled any foreign occupation of land surrounding its existing possessions (Tunisia and Morocco, the hinterland of West and Equatorial Africa). It sought man-power, developing a colonial army, partly by conscription, to supplement its own; half a million colonial soldiers and nearly two hundred thousand workers served in Europe in 1914-18. Conversely, French emigration to the colonies was discouraged. France also sought resources, particularly agricultural supplies. She was jealous of the development of competing industries in the colonies, continued the "closed" system and imposed high protective duties wherever she was free to do so, despite Lyautey's theory that "colonies cannot be made without free trade." This often meant a stunting of colonial development, though there was some improvement, especially in public works, under the influence of the Radical leader M. Sarraut's policy of *mise en valeur*. In early days the concessionary companies did much harm in Africa, but this was gradually rectified. Though forced labour for public purposes was not abolished, it was restricted. In the Old Colonies and in Indo-China, labour legislation was advanced and the Popular Front Government did much to extend the metropolitan laws to other parts. The success of public health services was shown in increases of population, most striking in Indo-China and Algeria. Education was in the past too rigid and based too much on French requirements, but a reaction towards more practical training had begun. French was used as the medium of instruction in West and Equatorial Africa, owing to the diversity of languages, but in India, Indo-China and Madagascar elementary education was in the local language. Higher education was in French and many university students went to France. French research overseas, in medicine, in anthropology, in Oriental languages and civilizations, reached an extremely high standard.

The political structure of Overseas France was varied. In Africa for instance, the metropolitan Government ruled Algeria, through the Ministry of the Interior, the protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Federation of West Africa and the colonies of Equatorial Africa and Somaliland, through the Ministry of Colonies. The Union of Indo-China comprised the colony of Cochinchina, four protectorates (Annam, Laos, Cambodia, Tongking) and the leased territory of Kwangchow-wan. Centralization, however, gave a certain unity. In the

dual organization of the protectorates, where native institutions were flanked by a French administration, the real power lay with the latter. The Governors, Governors-General and Residents corresponded roughly to glorified French Prefects. Recent years showed a tendency towards large groupings and deconcentration, but little decentralization. The powers of local assemblies, whether wholly or partially elected, were restricted. Like their French counterparts they dealt rather with economic and financial, than with political, questions. In West Africa a measure of indirect rule existed but the tribal chiefs became, like the elected mayors in France, agents of the central Government. In certain territories, the *Delegations financières* exercised control over the local budget; but some assemblies were purely consultative. This was the case for the highest body, the *Conseil supérieur des Colonies*, which united representatives from overseas in discussions concerning defence, administration and economic policy.

The complete difference between the "centripetal" and "centrifugal" conceptions of Empire has led to constant misunderstanding and sometimes to serious difficulties. For instance, it contributed to what Sir Harry Luke has called the initial "administrative paralysis" of the Franco-British condominium set up in the New Hebrides in 1906, and to complications in the Levant States, handed over to France under mandate in 1920. It was as hard for France to apply General Smuts' conception of mandatory duties as it would have been for South Africa to adopt the French attitude towards race. The consequent uncertainty of French policy in the Levant added to the difficulty of governing countries bounded by artificial frontiers and inhabited by a population already disillusioned, sensitive, deeply divided and highly developed. Arab nationalism, which in the post-war years led to revolts and disorders in North Africa, was stronger and more exacerbated in Syria. France nevertheless endowed the Lebanon with a parliamentary constitution in 1926, while the first elected Syrian Parliament met in 1933. In 1936, France negotiated treaties of independence with the two States, but her own internal disagreements and the darkening international situation prevented her from ratifying them.

On the outbreak of war in 1939, France planned to use the produce and man-power of the Empire even more fully than in 1914-18 and to reward it by a progressive increase of civic rights. A sudden stop was put to these plans by the French defeat and the armistice. The French territories were like the overseas branches of a company which has gone into receivership. They were centralized, used to looking to Paris for directives and economically tied to France; Frenchmen and French citizens were in the minority and a great

proportion of them were officials, timid and routine-minded, or soldiers, obedient to any apparently legal Government and blinded by faith in a French Marshal; they knew moreover that Vichy was pledged to neutrality and the defence of the Empire against all comers; they feared the weight and efficiency of Axis armour—and indeed the fighting in Indo-China against the Japanese, in 1940, was a repetition in miniature of the French disaster. After a brief period of indecision, unrest and hesitation, most of the Empire gave its allegiance to the Vichy Government. In July 1940, however, the New Hebrides declared for General de Gaulle and by the end of September most of Equatorial Africa, the Cameroons, the Pacific possessions and the Indian Establishments had rallied to him. This gave to the Allies valuable resources, bases and communications and to the Free French Council for the Defence of the Empire a nucleus of French territory, from which its sway was gradually extended. In November 1940, Gaboon was won over with little bloodshed; the Allied advance into the Levant States met with stiffer resistance but they came under Free French authority in July, 1941; in December, 1941, Admiral Muselier occupied St Pierre and Miquelon; in 1942, British operations in Madagascar and Free French operations in Reunion were speedily carried out. Finally, the events of November, 1942, resulted in the destruction of the authority of Vichy in North Africa, West Africa, Somaliland and the Carribean.

The war brought about various changes in French imperial policy and relations. It speeded up the tendency towards deconcentration and larger groups. The Vichy Government gave to General Weygand the position of a pro-consul in Africa, while General de Gaulle appointed a single High Commissioner for all the French possessions in the Pacific. North and West Africa were brought into closer co-operation and the old scheme for a Trans-Saharan railway was revived and begun under the stimulus of German plans for a "Eurafrican" economy. The Empire broke away from its economic subordination to France. The Free French territories were obviously cut off, but Vichy established economic and customs autonomy for Indo-China and the French Committee of National Liberation (F.C.N.L.) continued this policy. Overseas territories were short of manufactured goods and tried to develop some industries, which were encouraged by the flight of capital from France into, for example, Morocco. The Vichy Government made vague promises of independence to the Levant States; the Free French made much more definite declarations in 1941, with British backing, and by 1944 they had begun to hand over power to the local authorities. However, other important political changes made by the F.C.N.L. pointed in the direction of increased centralization and assimilation. Delegates

from all overseas territories were summoned to the embryo Parliament, the Consultative Assembly. In Algeria, Jews had long been enfranchised, while Moslems could only gain the vote by losing their "personal status" under Koranic law; the F.C.N.L. proceeded to grant French citizenship to the Moslem elite without this stipulation. A conference held at Brazzaville in January, 1944, discussed means of increasing the material welfare and reforming the political organization of Overseas France. On the whole, it seemed in favour of a centrally planned economy and a decentralized administration. It discussed three ways of giving effective representation to the Empire: increased representation in Parliament, the formation of a federal imperial and metropolitan Chamber and the institution of a better, but still mainly advisory, Colonial Council. The solution outlined by the Provisional Government seems to be a flexible federal system, or "French Union". Federal representation would be given to France and the other members of the French commonwealth (*communaute*) according to their degree of development. There would be certain federal services and federal laws and standards, as well as local laws, and there would be federal as well as local citizenship. France would retain the direction of foreign affairs, and it is unlikely that she will altogether abandon her "centripetal" ideal.

Despite the collapse and the division of the Empire into Vichy and Free French zones, the authority of France was maintained throughout the Empire. It was, however, badly shaken in one distant and isolated territory, the Union of Indo-China. Directly France fell, the Union was faced with Japanese demands for military facilities and Siamese irredentist claims. At first, these were successfully resisted by diplomacy and by fighting, but Indo-China could not hold out long. Militarily, she was weak. Economically, she was cut off from France, the source of over half her imports and market for nearly half her exports. Diplomatically, she could find little support; Great Britain had just closed the Burma Road to China and the United States had scarcely begun to limit the supply of war materials to Japan and Siam. In 1941, France was forced to cede 25,000 square miles of Cambodian and Laotian territory to the latter. Japan had already obtained three air bases and during the year tightened its economic and military grip on Indo-China. The collapse of the democratic Powers in the Pacific left the Union completely at the mercy of Japan, **but** in spite of Japanese economic dictation, the presence of Japanese forces and an agreement for "common defence", a semblance of French sovereignty was preserved. In 1943, however, Kwang-chow-wan was occupied and taken over completely by **Japan**, and in protest Chungking terminated the French lease by a **unilateral denunciation**. Later in 1943, the F.C.N.L. **announced its**

intention of fighting till the aggressors were expelled from the Union and of making far-reaching reforms in administration, after total liberation. It began to prepare an expeditionary force and to organize an underground army. In March, 1945, Japan forestalled action by occupying the whole territory and placing the Vichyite authorities "under their protection" and setting up an Annamite Government. Fierce fighting broke out, in which the Resistance forces were hampered by lack of arms. The Provisional Government reaffirmed its intention of liberating Indo-China and giving it a New Federal Government, with Indo-Chinese representation, and an "open-door", autonomous economy, within the new "French Union".

French authority was also shaken in the Levant States, where the Nationalists had always resented the French mandate. There was a fundamental clash of opinion over the interpretation of various declarations of independence made by the Free French in 1941. The Syrians and Lebanese argued with more and more intransigence that these were unconditional and already operative, while the French held that full independence would only result from the formal termination of the mandate and the conclusion of Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese treaties. In 1943, elections were held and parliamentary government was restored. The new Lebanese Government proceeded defiantly to assert its independence and the drastic counter-action of the F.C.N.L. precipitated a crisis. By the end of the year, however, the situation had been eased by an agreement between the F.C.N.L. and the Levant Governments for the transfer to the latter of most of the powers hitherto exercised by the French. The transfer was gradually completed but the French retention of the local levies, or *Troupes Speciales*, led to agitation and riots, which increased at the beginning of 1945. There was, moreover, a far deeper cause of tension in the inheritance of years of mutual Franco-Arab and Anglo-French mistrust in the Levant. In the middle of May, the French Delegate-General brought proposals for treaties, but his arrival coincided with that of some French reinforcements. The Syrian and Lebanese Governments then broke off negotiations, and strikes and riots followed. Their suppression led to armed conflict and the shelling of Damascus. The British Government reluctantly took local control of the situation and further bloodshed was averted. It was evident that the chances of a settlement which should reconcile traditional French interests with the rising nationalism of the Levant States and with Arab aspirations in general were seriously endangered.

The loyalty of the Empire proper has been a remarkable testimony to French policy. While recognizing certain faults and the urgency of some reforms, French opinion strongly rejects the idea of inter-

national trusteeship for her colonies, though not for territories formerly held under "B" mandates. On this question, her views have roughly coincided with those of the United Kingdom and of Australia, with whom she has reached agreement on certain Pacific problems. Various committees of the Provisional Government are at work on schemes for colonial development and though those dealing with strategic matters (such as the expansion of bases at Dakar) will doubtless be fitted into international security plans, any interference in political matters would be resented.

V. POLITICS AND POLICY OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC

POLITICAL DIVISIONS AND PARTIES

The English observer was apt to view the politics of the Third Republic as an uninitiated visitor looks at an exhibition of surrealist paintings. One canvas, certainly, he could easily recognize by its sweeping outlines and its hammer and sickle; elsewhere, he could catch glimpses of familiar colours and forms; but on the whole it seemed to him a puzzling display of politics for politics' sake. The catalogue was, moreover, no help at all. For one thing, the titles often varied in Chamber, Senate and constituency; for another, they seemed to bear little relation to what he saw, or to be self-contradictory. What could he make of "Socialist-Communists", of "Socialist-Radicals", or of the group which was registered and worked in the Chamber under the title "Not registered"? How could he guess that "Independent" meant "reactionary", or that the Radical Left was to the right of the Radicals? He had to master the fact that these were known in the Senate as the "Democratic Left", while the "Democratic Left" of the Chamber was known there as the "Republican Union". At election time, he heard much of the candidates of the "Democratic Alliance", but in Parliament it apparently disappeared. Nor could he find any trace in Parliament or constituencies of the seemingly influential *Action Francaise*. Moreover, these groups and parties, based on all the different permutations and combinations of political solutions devised by a lively and argumentative people, were not static; they appeared and disintegrated, shifted and changed, with kaleidoscopic rapidity.

For the guidance of the bewildered observer, French politics provided the rough-and-ready classification of "Right", "Left" and "Centre". This classification sprang from the circumstance that in the Assembly of 1789 the nobility took its stand on the right of the chairman, the Third Estate on the left. It was this Left which made the Revolution and waged the Revolutionary wars, and which

started the *mystique* of the Left in France. In 1871, again, the Right of the National Assembly stood for monarchy and peace, the Left, especially Gambetta and the Radicals on the extreme Left, for republicanism and a continuation of the war. The early crises of the Republic were, directly or indirectly, concerned with questions of the regime and its defenders were always on the Left. Hence the Republican slogan "No enemies on the Left", and hence the somewhat shamefaced Leftish nomenclature of the French Conservative parties. The idea of Right-wing Republicanism seemed to Frenchmen paradoxical, even absurd. Yet a Right-wing Republicanism grew up, partly by the rallying of former opponents to the regime, partly because, as they fulfilled their programme, the older Republican parties were pushed over to form a new, satisfied Right. There was an uneasy truce between the forces of "order" and the forces of "progress", but their bickering might still revive old vendettas.

Before these political divisions could be healed, other dissensions split the country. The Revolution had satisfied the peasants and the middle classes, but the revolutionary movements of the urban proletariat (in 1848 and 1871) had been suppressed, and its economic and social aspirations thwarted. With the consolidation of the Republic and the rise of industrialism, its demands were formulated and pressed by the new Left-wing movements, Socialism, Syndicalism, Communism. All these movements attacked the structure of the Republic and might have been expected to destroy the theory that Republicans had no enemies to the Left. The new parties could not indeed claim to be the defenders of the Republic established in 1871 but they could claim to be the true heirs of the spirit of the historic Left. Its work, they said, was incomplete; liberty, equality and fraternity must be carried into the economic sphere; the Revolution could not be crystallized in the forms of a nineteenth-century Republic; it was a living force—and a perpetual movement to the Left.

This challenge had two main effects. First, it opened a new political field, created a new set of problems, a new touchstone of "Left" and "Right", new divisions and new suspicions. Secondly, it compelled a more rigid discipline of parties. The older Republican groups were very loosely organized. They were mostly alliances in Parliament, with no roots outside it and no single platform. Would-be Deputies proclaimed their individual programmes and, when elected, registered themselves as belonging to this or that group, or to several at once. With the rise of the Socialist party, discipline gradually spread towards the Right. The Radicals already had a tradition of local committees, reminiscent of the Jacobin clubs, but the Conservative groups remained more individualist. The chief organization of the so-called Centre, the Democratic Alliance, was an electoral

league which supported candidates of moderate views but did not tie them to any definite programme or call them to account. The chief organization of the Right, the Republican Federation, was also more of a league than a party. By raising new issues, however, the Socialists also brought some confusion into the alignment of parties. For instance, in 1900 those Catholics who rallied to the Republic founded a "Liberal Action" party, with an advanced social programme. The old political yardstick of anti-clericalism relegated this party to the extreme Right; but by the new economic standards it was more to the Left than most Radicals.

The co-existence of old and new divisions explains some of the confusion of French politics. It proved impossible to form a united, moderate party. M. Siegfried¹ has remarked that the Centre in France was less a meeting-ground than a water-shed, so razor-edged that opinion must slide down it to Left or Right. Another writer has recalled an incident in the Chamber when a politician of the moderate Right challenged Poincare, the great leader of the Centre, to find any difference in their opinions, and Poincare retorted: "There is the whole religious question!" From time to time, two groups would try to break away from their past and come together under a new name, but agreement was generally limited and ephemeral and the alliance only added to the multiplicity of parties.

The divisions between the French parties often seemed to the English observer unreal, and their programmes theoretical. For, since the system made it impossible for any single party to hold office and take the full responsibility for legislation over a period, he constantly saw supposedly hostile groups in power together. He was used to judging his own parties not only by their principles but by their practice. In France, he could only say: during the four years after such-and-such an election, the Chamber inclined to the Left, or Right. The heterogeneous and varying Ministries had to correspond roughly to its general trend, but even this was fluid and often incalculable. In the five elections held between 1919 and 1939, neither the Right nor the Centre ever gained an absolute majority. The Left did so three times but in each case a financial, political or international crisis occurred and produced a sort of landslide towards the Right. The 1919 election was a victory for the "National Bloc", a continuation of the war-time union of parties, from which the Radicals and Socialists had shaken themselves free. The Right and the Centre both won over, the Left under, two hundred seats. From 1919-24 Cabinets were therefore predominantly Centre or Right-wing. 1924 was a victory for the "Left Bloc", a limited alliance of Radicals ready to take office and Socialists ready to back

¹ A. Siegfried: *Tableau des Partis en France* (1930).

them. Yet the Republican-Socialist Briand was Prime Minister both before and after this electoral swing (in 1921-22 and in 1925-26), while in 1926 a financial crisis brought back the Prime Minister of 1922-24, Poincare. These two statesmen again held the premiership after the elections of 1928, which gave the majority of seats to the Left, but not so decisively that it could stand against a coalition of the Centre and Right. They were succeeded by Radical and Centre Cabinets. In 1932, the Left again gained an absolute majority but a political crisis in 1934 discredited the Radicals, and Centre politicians were once more called in. In 1935, the Radicals, Socialists and Communists united to form a Popular Front, which swept the country in the 1936 election. For a year the Socialist leader, M. Blum, was Prime Minister, but the Radicals who succeeded him leaned more and more to the Right. These shifts and changes meant that it was easier to study the programme than the practice of the parties.

By 1939, the old royalist opposition to the Republic had practically disappeared from the Chamber. A few remaining monarchists were grouped with the extreme nationalists as Independents, on the far Right. They came mostly from the west of France. Also mainly drawn from the west were the members of the Agrarian Party, founded in 1927. This party was accused by the Left of representing only the interests of large landowners but its membership included farmers of all types. It claimed to be the only party which put the interests of the French peasant class first, and to be neither of the Right nor Left, though it took its place on the Right in the Chamber. The main body of Right-wing opinion found its expression in the Republican Federation (U.R.D.), or the groups allied to it. As its name stated, the Federation had accepted the Republic, though the degree of its loyalty varied. It wanted a stronger executive and some of its members held authoritarian views. It was supported by, and supported, big interests and the upper bourgeoisie, capitalists and Catholics. It was strongly anti-Socialist, objected violently to State control in economic matters and preferred indirect to direct taxation. It was clerical and wanted to strengthen the influence of the Church in, for instance, educational matters. It believed in the virtues of a social hierarchy and for that reason would have rejected the equal division of inheritances. In foreign policy it was traditionally nationalist, demanding an increase of French strength and security. Its diversity is shown by the fact that it included men as different as M. Marin, a staunch Republican and anti-appeaser, M. Ybarnegaray, a member of the French Social Party (P.S.F.) and Vichyite *attentiste*, Henriot, an authoritarian, defeatist "collaborator", and the Resistance leader, M. Debu-Bridel, now in alliance with Communists inside the *Front National*


On the extreme Right Wing of the Centre were to be found the Popular Democrats, the successors of the "Liberal Action" party who had worked their way Leftwards. They fitted ill with their neighbours, refusing to abandon any of their loyalty to Catholicism or any of the passion for social justice which they derived from their Christian principles. The support which they, the Young Republic (which joined the Popular Front) and the Catholic trade unions and youth movements consistently gave to measures such as the eight-hour day and workmen's compensation did much to destroy the old identification of Catholicism with reaction. Their foreign policy was one of firm support for international law and collective security against aggression. Though small in numbers they were regarded as an important link between the Left and Catholic opinion.

It has already been said that the Centre lacked cohesion. The Popular Democrats were counterbalanced on the extreme Left of the Centre by the Radical Left which, conversely, "voted with the Right on questions of interest, with the Left on questions of politics."¹ This group, however, was recently absorbed into the two main parties of the Centre, the Left Republicans and the Democratic Left, both supported by the Democratic Alliance. Whenever the Centre disintegrated, the Left Republicans showed a tendency to vote with the Right, the Democratic Left with the Left. Apart from that, their policy was similar. In times of crisis, the Democratic Alliance often gave France leaders, men of undoubted loyalty commanding wide support: a Poincare, a Reynaud. It was Republican and moderate, anti-clerical but not violently so in the Radical fashion. It was anti-Socialist, being opposed to State intervention and to the conception of class warfare. It was the party of small industries rather than of big business, and its supporters were in some ways more "reactionary" than those of the Republican Federation. The big industries were readier for collective bargaining, and could more easily introduce such reforms as the forty-hour week, than the small firms. The latter were also more inclined to demand protective tariffs, as the only mitigation of complete *laissez-faire*. In finance, the Democratic Alliance could, with Poincare, be sternly orthodox and unbending in its deflationary measures, or it could, with M. Reynaud, be among the first advocates of devaluation. Its ambition was to woo the Radicals away from the Left. The divergencies of the Democratic Alliance came out particularly in foreign policy. Of its leaders, Poincare' wanted a strong, independent France; Barthou tried to build up collective security and the Eastern Alliance; M. Reynaud looked mainly to the Anglo-Saxon alliance; and M. Flandin was strongly pro-Munich and later a Vichyite *attentiste*.

¹ Siegfried: *op. cit.*

The heart of the Third Republic, according to a well-known saying, was on the left centre and it might have been found just to the left of the official "Centre", in the "Unified Radical and Radical Socialist Republican" party of the Chamber (or "Democratic Left" of the Senate). The Radical party summed up much of the Republic. Its stronghold was in southern and central France, the country of small holdings and market towns, as opposed to the feudal and Catholic west and the industrial and Socialist or Conservative East. It was essentially the party of the small man, pledged to the protection of his savings, his products, his property and his individual rights. It was also the party of Republican orthodoxy. "Radical" was the pseudonym chosen by Republicans under the Second Empire and the Radicals have held consistently to the belief that they could only realize their ideals in and through the Republic. Their ideals were those of 1789 or 1792 and their chief aim was to establish the supremacy of "the sovereign People" and the equality of all citizens. The principle of popular sovereignty demanded first and foremost an attack on all concentrations of power, influence or privilege not controlled by the People—the monarchy, the Church, the professional army, the Senate, the judiciary. Equality meant a certain equalization of wealth, through direct taxation of the rich and social legislation for the poor, and equalization of opportunity. To educational reform the Radicals devoted a good deal of energy, since the demand for State control—and later for a free, single system of schooling—combined an attack on clericalism with an affirmation of egalitarian principles and its success would give to the Republic a powerful weapon of propaganda.

By 1914, the Radicals had enjoyed long periods of government and had achieved the major part of their early programme. The Republic was established, the Church separated from the State and its monastic and educational institutions brought under control, the army disfranchised, and a mild income tax introduced. The Senate was not abolished but had become Radical, while the principle of an elective judiciary had fallen into the background. With this fulfilment the divergencies of doctrine amongst Radicals became more obvious. To some extent they echoed the divergencies of 1789. For some, the supremacy of the sovereign People meant the supremacy of the State: M. Daladier, with his centralizing tendencies, his pose as a strong man, and his demands for plenary powers, represented this line of thought. For the majority of Radicals, the supremacy of the People meant the supremacy of the Chamber: the young Clemenceau, who was nicknamed "the destroyer of cabinets" symbolized this jealous control by the Deputies. For another brapoh of Radical thought, the supremacy of the people could



FRANCE

Main Railways

Industrial Areas
Scale



Land Over 3000 ft.

exercised through the constant pressure of local committees. C issues brought out other conflicting tendencies. The Radicals agreed in their suspicion of the professional army, but whereas of them were pacifist, others attacked only the military caste were inspired by the Revolutionary ideal of "the nation in ar It was sometimes difficult to predict which strain would preva: 1914, the Radical party loudly demanded a reduction of mil service which the Radical Government refused to put into e later, the Radical Clemenceau led France to victory while the Ra Caillaux was condemned for treasonable relations with the en The Radical Premier, M. Daladier, wavered between pacifism Jacobin patriotism up to September 1939, and on the collap; France in 1940 the party was torn between the two tender Again, in the nineteenth century the Radicals were united in demning colonial expansion. After 1918, however, it became that some of them had done so only because of a preoccup with the Rhine, and the chief demand for the economic develop of the Empire came from M. Sarraut. Other Radicals were opp to all imperialist adventures, either because they were adven or because they were imperialist.

In economic problems, Radical dissensions were even marked. Ambiguity was shown in the very title "Socialist Radi There was no traditional policy on the questions brought to the by the Left-wing movements. Some Radicals inclined tow *laissez-faire* and social conservatism, others believed that Socia was the application of Radical ideals to economics. The party tl fore denounced the class struggle and affirmed the sacredne: property, but stated that "private property should give way w ever the interests of the owner are found to be in manifest coi with the interests of society." Radicals and Socialists could common ground in their opposition to the trusts, big business monopolies, the new "occult powers" which must be broken a: monarchy and clericalism had been broken. They were also opp to excessive indirect taxation and to deflation—many of the Gov ment employees, whose wages were sacrificed to balance the bu being Radicals or Socialists. The Radicals were, however, eq opposed to devaluation, which might endanger small saving exchange-control and to the capital levy. When, as in 1926, apparent pliancy to Socialist pressure paused a financial scare, retreated into economic timidity. It was the Radical Senate w overthrew the first Popular Front Government in the nam orthodox finance, and Radical schemes for social reform were pered with caution.*

To the right of the Radicals there was a heterogeneous g

called the "Independent Left"; this included the small advance guard of the Catholics, the Young Republic, which had thrown its lot in with the Left. To the left of the Radicals, there was, from 1905 onwards, a varying group of Republican-Socialists. It has always been small, but noted for its high percentage of prominent Ministers: Briand, Painlevé, Paul-Boncour, and others. Its original members refused to accept the revolutionary Marxism of the Socialist party, and wanted to introduce Socialism gradually under the Republican regime. Having achieved the separation of Church and State, they were tolerant of Catholicism. They were among the most ardent supporters of the League of Nations. They formed a loose alliance rather than a party and they included at least one member—Millerand—who showed authoritarian tendencies. The real authoritarianism of the Left was, however, to be found in later formations of "dissidents". Such was the short-lived Neo-Socialist group which broke off from the Socialist party in 1933 under the leadership of Deat, Marquet and Montagnon. Its slogan was "Order, Authority, Nation" and it demanded participation in bourgeois Governments and the voting of military credits, to arm France against Nazi Germany. Deat also produced a "French plan" for the creation of an economic body "endowed with the necessary powers to lay down, control and determine all national activities", for the conciliation of Capital and Labour and the establishment of a "social price". M. Blum roundly denounced the Neo-Socialists as "Fascists", but they never officially left the Republican Left-wing fold. In 1935, the Secretary of the Communist party could class Deat's plan as "anti-Fascist". Without renouncing his authoritarianism and planning, Deat, however, became increasingly pacifist.

The history of the French Socialist party, and of the Trade Union movement, has been largely that of an internal struggle between reformist and revolutionary tendencies. Remembering the suppression of the Paris *Commune*, the French Socialists were not at first inclined to regard the Republic with any tenderness. At the end of the nineteenth century, however, the reformists under Jaures prevailed over the Marxists led by Guesde, and they allied themselves with the Radicals to defend the regime against the Right. This type of alliance was condemned by an International Socialist Congress in **1904**, and in 1905 the French Socialists united to form "a party of fundamental and irreducible opposition to the whole bourgeois class", the "French Section of the Workers' International" (S.F.I.O.). Jaures, however, kept alive the tradition of electoral alliances with the Radicals. In 1914 the International broke down; Jaures was assassinated and Guesde joined the Government. As the war went on, pacifist and revolutionary tendencies grew stronger on the Left.

In 1920, a majority of the party adhered to the Third International and split off to form the Communist party (S.F.I.C.).

Meanwhile, in 1906 the Trade Union movement (*Confederation Generale du Travail*) had reaffirmed its belief in "direct action" and its dissociation from politics. Before 1914, it organized a series of strikes and was pacifist and internationalist, but on the outbreak of war it rallied to the Government under its "reformist" leader, M. Jouhaux. In 1918 it drew up a minimum programme of nationalization and State regulation of industrial conditions, which was partly conceded by the establishment of an eight-hour day and the legalization of collective contracts. This success won over the majority of the C.G.T. to reformism though some of the Syndicalist and Communist unions attempted action by general strike in 1920. The Communist unions were finally ousted and formed their own *Confederation Generale du Travail Unitaire* (C.G.T.U.). The Christian unions also remained apart from the C.G.T. in their *Confederation Francaise des Travailleurs Chretiens* (C.F.T.C.). Though the C.G.T. refused to play any direct part in politics, it came to collaborate more and more with the Socialist party and with the Government and exercised its influence through such bodies as the National Economic Council. In spite of this, social legislation was but slowly introduced and ineffectively carried out until 1936.

The Socialist party and Trade Union movement in France were, then, unlike their British counterparts in being divorced from each other and in having a revolutionary, Marxist or Syndicalist, tradition. Their evolution also differed fundamentally owing to the divergencies in British and French industrial organization. The C.G.T. was strong amongst miners in the north and in the big industrial towns, but its chief support came from the vast numbers of well-organized State employees. Even so, the proportion of the total population in the Trade Union movement was small. The S.F.I.O. like the C.G.T., had to compete with its Communist rival for the industrial proletariat. But it soon realized that it must appeal to a wider membership, to whom orthodox Marxism would be unpalatable. It dropped some of its collectivist programme and drew a distinction between big property and small, promising to safeguard the latter and to improve rural conditions. It thus gained a foothold in agricultural districts, in the Radical Midi and Provence. Its policy of peace and international conciliation had, moreover, a wide appeal in the years of war-weariness and disillusion.

The S.F.I.O. distinguished between the political and the social revolution; the former must be accomplished when the time was ripe, but meanwhile the latter could be prepared and begun under the present regime. Its provisional programme therefore included

social security, the nationalization of public services and natural monopolies, the shifting of tax incidence from smaller to larger incomes, and the capital levy. In order to achieve these reforms, the S.F.I.O. allied itself with the Radicals at the second electoral ballot and bargained with them in Parliament, giving support to Radical Cabinets in exchange for measures of social and economic legislation, but refusing to take office. This semi-alliance was not enough for its reformist wing, which was in favour of participation in bourgeois Governments and which in 1933 split off from the S.F.I.O., together with the Neo-Socialists. Soon afterwards, a wave of anti-Fascist fervour, provoked by the rise of Hitler and by the activities of the French Fascist Leagues, swept across France and broke first the barriers between Socialists and Communists and then those between Socialists and Radicals. The S.F.I.O. agreed to join in a Popular Front Government, "to act" as their leader, Leon Blum, said, "within the framework of the present regime, whose very vices we have denounced. The question is whether there is a possibility of at least securing within the present regime relief for those who suffer, and of creating a peaceful transition from this society to the society which remains our aim." In more concrete terms, this meant pursuing an expansionist policy, raising money wages, launching public works and introducing the forty-hour week. In international affairs, both the S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T. were somewhat hesitant, being torn between support for collective security and pacifism, which permeated a considerable minority. The group of Trotskyites led by Pivert in their denunciation of all "imperialist wars" was, however, small.

The C.G.T., true to its traditions, refused to participate in the Popular Front Government but it gave it official support. In 1936 an amalgamation of the C.G.T. and the C.G.T.U. took place. It was followed by an outbreak of spontaneous strikes, which showed a recrudescence of belief in extra-parliamentary methods, if not in the extreme doctrine of "direct action". The C.G.T. then met the employers' federation and by the "Matignon Agreements", embodied in subsequent legislation, gained substantial concessions: recognition of collective bargaining and of the shop-steward system, compulsory conciliation, the forty-hour week, paid holidays and a rise in wages. There were still divisions between the advocates of direct and of political action, between extremists and moderates, and between the pro- and anti-Munich groups. After Munich, Daladier modified the legislation of 1936 by a series of decree-laws, which the C.G.T. answered by calling a general strike. Its failure was followed by dismissals of union leaders.

The programme of the French Communist party was orthodox.

It rejected all gradualism and preached an unrelenting class struggle. Capitalism could only be overthrown by revolution, to be followed by the temporary dictatorship of the proletariat and by the final withering away of the State. Meanwhile, reforms within the bourgeois regime could not help and might hinder the revolution, which would be both political and social. The Socialists were violently attacked for their concessions and the betrayal of their Marxist principles. The party was anti-imperialist (supporting any colonial revolt), anti-militarist and sceptical of the League of Nations. A change came in February, 1934, when a Franco-Russian rapprochement took place and when anti-Fascism swept France. The party revived the Jacobinism of 1793, and began to work for a broad, anti-Fascist, patriotic and democratic front. Its membership, which had been at low ebb about 1930, leapt up and its hold spread from the "red belt" of Paris, the industrial *departement* of the Nord and the railway unions, to new districts and classes. It supported the Popular Front Government, but refused office—a position similar to that previously taken by the S.F.I.O. vis-a-vis the Radicals. Like the S.F.I.O., it was accused of trying to dictate policy without accepting responsibilities. It often opposed the less radical measures of the Government, such as devaluation or non-intervention in Spain, and the Socialists suspected it of fomenting strikes to force their hand. Its attitude in foreign affairs was one of firm resistance to aggression by Germany and Italy, but it defended the Russo-German pact. It voted military credits in September 1939, and supported the war until the Russian invasion of Poland, when it achieved a sudden *volte-face*.

To sum up: these divisions of party corresponded partly to political differences and partly to divisions of class and economic interest. The French tradition of political vituperation made it difficult to judge the actual degree of disunity. It was sometimes exaggerated, sometimes dismissed with an echo of an opinion given in 1875: "We present the spectacle of a calm people with agitated legislators." Certainly there were conflicts of interest between the large-scale industries and the small firms, the peasant owners and the urban proletariat. The predominance of the "small man" and the special position of the peasant-freeholder (often regarded as the backbone of France) prevented startling extremes of wealth and poverty and instability of employment but also kept down the general standard of living and held back social legislation, thus encouraging discontent. Such conflicts were reflected in politics. They would not, however, have been insoluble had it not been for the fundamental malady of mistrust. Mistrust was the legacy of old divisions. The Republic had tried to base itself, like the English settlement of

1688, on practical expediency rather than on abstract principle, but behind the Republic there was the Revolution. The Right-wing parties never quite forgot the possibility of a counter-revolution, while the Left-wing parties revived the Revolution militant in their Marxism or Communism; each side suspected the other of using the Republic to achieve its own ends and of being loyal only so far as suited it. This suspicion threatened, time and time again, to make the Republic unworkable, since it led to obstruction in both the political and the economic sphere, and difficulties of government in turn undermined confidence in the regime and its rulers.

There were also sharp divisions on issues of foreign policy. To some extent, these divisions reflected purely political prejudices, preferences for democratic, Fascist or Communist allies. To some extent they reflected wider affinities, which corresponded only partially if at all to party prejudices. Isolationists were mainly to be found on the extreme Right, pacifists on the Left; but there were defeatists and appeasers in all camps. Various schools of thought seized on one aspect of French development and French interests and sometimes stressed it to the exclusion of others. It was possible to argue that France was a Mediterranean and Latin country and that she must look to a "Latin bloc"; this idea drew certain Catholic and reactionary elements to the side of Fascism, in advocating an Italian or Spanish alliance. Again, it was possible to argue that France was an Atlantic and imperial Power; business men inclining towards an authoritarian Conservatism could find common ground with Liberals and Radicals in demanding an alliance with the Western democracies. For others, again, France was primarily Continental. Some of them stressed the importance of a balance of power and of maintaining France's European, and especially Eastern, alliances; thus there were men of the Right and Centre who welcomed a Russian pact and deplored Munich appeasement, in unison with Communists. Some, again, wanted above all some form of European unity: economic unity, political unity, a Federal Europe, or even a United Europe dominated by its strongest, most central Power. In Radical and Socialist circles especially there were dreams of such unity and a tendency to accept an "inevitable" German domination, which traitors attempted to exploit in 1914-18 and again after 1940. But apart from this, strong divisions of opinion made French foreign policy fluctuating and hesitant.

THE OPPOSITION TO THE REPUBLIC

The Left-wing parties believed that the Republic was a step in the right direction, but too short a step; they went back to its Revolutionary source and attacked it in the name of its own prin-

ciples. The old Right regarded it as a step in the wrong direction, starting from wrong principles. This opposition was fundamental, but the old Right was partly discredited by its own tactics, partly won over by the successes of the Republic in war and peace. There remained a dwindling number of irreconcilables amongst the landed aristocracy, the upper bourgeoisie, the Church and the (still disfranchised) army, who were mindful of past struggles and present slights.

These and other malcontents often gravitated into the orbit of the *Action Francaise*, which usurped a position of authority on the extreme Right. This group was founded at the time of the Dreyfus affair to combat Radicalism and secularism, to prepare a spiritual regeneration of France and to preach "integral nationalism." It was drawn more and more into political, but extra-parliamentary and violent, action. Its leaders, and especially Charles Maurras, have never been afraid of working out their opinions rigorously and brilliantly to logical conclusions. It sought to lead France into the path of tradition, authority, hierarchy, patriotism. Starting within the framework of Republicanism, it came to advocate an absolute monarchy—undeterred by the Pretender's repudiation. Founded largely by free thinkers, it came to acclaim Catholicism—though banned by the Pope (1926-39). It cultivated regionalism and believed in the desirability of a corporative State, guided by an elite, and a patriarchal society. Its patriotism eventually found expression in the motto "France alone, only France", and it always opposed the "France, but . . ." of other groups. Its own ultra-nationalism was, however, full of exclusions: no Freemasons, no Communists, no Jews (this on political not racial grounds), no "half-breeds". In action it practised a Machiavellian ruthlessness; any means were justified in the pursuit of the national interest, which it identified with its aims. Its readiness to resort to violence was hardly conducive to national unity and the destruction of political morality seemed a curious foundation for spiritual regeneration. Herein lay its chief menace; not in its private army, the young rowdies known as the *Camelots du Roi*, nor in the (relatively small) number of its adherents. Its influence extended further, through its press, keeping alive old hatreds and systematically undermining confidence in the regime. Standing aloof from Parliament and from the responsibilities of government (though individual parliamentarians shared its views), it developed a destructive criticism, typical of perpetual opposition. In the nineteen-thirties it helped to warp French judgement by denouncing the Left-wing parties as the main internal danger to France and the subordination of French to British policy as an external danger equal to that of German aggression.

If the *Action Française* was the unorthodox successor of the old Right, there were other anti-Republican movements which resembled Bonapartism and Boulangism in that they could not accurately be written off as "Right" or "Left". These movements were fostered by the internal and international crises of the nineteen-thirties. The defects of the Constitution have already been noted, and under the stress of the economic crisis, they became more obvious. Successive Governments tried to remedy their weakness by the temporary expedient of plenary powers, but came up against the unwillingness of Parliament to sign away one jot of its sovereignty and against the suspicion of the opposition. A strong Right-wing executive seemed to the Left a stage towards "Fascism", while to the Right the Popular Front Government seemed "Bolshevik". The difficulties in the way of reform led some to reject parliamentary methods outright and the widespread demand for a strengthening of the executive sometimes degenerated into a cult of authority. There was also an epidemic of plans, which often advocated the establishment of some non-parliamentary, "non-political" body to control the economic and monetary system. To this loss of faith in parliamentary efficiency there was added a more dangerous loss of faith in parliamentary morals. Some corruption undoubtedly existed, though the gutter-press which specialized in fabricating scandals was hardly pure. If, as a section of the public had become convinced, the Chamber was a den of thieves, then the formation of armed bands to overthrow it by violence might seem a justifiable and logical step. The idea of "sending legality on holiday" was part of the rhetorical stock-in-trade of the Socialist leaders, and some of their renegade followers took it seriously. The quick death of the Weimar Republic at the hands of Hitler was an encouragement. The desire for a violent solution reached a head in February, 1934, when a period of economic crisis and deflationary policy coincided with a resounding scandal. Stavisky was a shady financier, in whose frauds some Deputies and a Minister of the Radical Government seemed to be implicated. It was suspected that the Government had not stopped short of murder in trying to hush up his case. This suspicion, heated to fever-pitch by the anti-Republican press, brought adherents of the *Action Française*, of the para-military leagues and of the Communist party into the streets to demonstrate against "parliamentary corruption", and into armed conflict with the police. Three days later, the Communists threw their lot in definitely with the Republicans. The suppression of the February riots and the petering out of disturbances during 1935 marked the decline, though not the extinction, of militant anti-Republicanism. The strikes of 1936 showed a desire to supplement parliamentary by "direct" action, while certain Right-wing gangsters

still hoped to discredit, if not to overthrow, the Government by acts of violence.

This movement of opinion, then, ranged from a vague discontent and demand for stronger government and for moral regeneration to organized and armed opposition. The most important of the organized groups was the *Croix de Feu*. This was primarily a body of ex-servicemen who wanted to introduce into civilian life the virtues of comradeship, honesty and responsibility. It came under the leadership of Colonel de la Rocque, who endowed it with a military organization and a vague political programme. The class struggle was denounced and a society based on corporations of employers and workers, and on the family as a civic unit, was dimly outlined. There would be "work for all at adequate wages". The nation needed a leader who would guide it in the way of tradition and honour. Abroad, France would pursue a policy of power, preferably in alliance with Italy. The oratory of La Rocque at mass meetings or reviews of his shock troops was mainly expended on calls to action and exhortations to prepare for "D-Day" and "H-Hour", when the Fiery Cross was to seize power. In 1936 the Popular Front Government put the "anti-Fascist laws"¹ into effect by dissolving it, along with the other chief leagues. In the past the *Croix de Feu* had not been above taking money from Right-wing Governments and it now made an honest woman of itself by settling down as a Right-wing party, the French Social Party (P.S.F.). A number of Right-wing Deputies joined it, including M. Ybarnegaray, who was among the opponents of the Munich policy of appeasement. Those who had been attracted by the militarism and demagogy of the party drifted away from it.

Of the other leagues which took part in the February riots, the *Jeunesses Patriotes* was founded in 1924 by the industrialist Taittinger. Its main aim was to combat Communism and its method was the training of mobile shock troops. The *Solidarity Francaise* (Renaud) and the *Francistes* (Bucard) were supported by the scent manufacturer, Coty, an admirer of Mussolini. They were characterized by a violent anti-Semitism, a cult of "leadership" and of the corporative system, and a display of all the trimmings of Fascism, coloured shirts, belts, firearms, etc. The *Solidarity Francaise* was Bonapartist, while the main plank of *Francisme* was collaboration with Germany and Italy. A less glamorous organization was the Federation of Taxpayers, which was violently anti-Socialist and advocated "direct action" by a tax-strike and an assault on the Palais-Bourbon.

In the countryside, and especially in the West (never noted for its loyalty to the regime), the *Croix de Feu* had its rural counterpart. In

¹ See page 39.

1932 the price of wheat fell disastrously low and there were movements of discontent in the country. A demonstration of farmers, in Paris, invaded the Corn Exchange. Committees for action, and committees for selling produce, sprang up to supplement the parliamentary Agrarian party. In 1934, these movements fused in the "Peasant Front", under a demagogue called Dorgeres. The Peasant Front was to fight against deflation and for higher prices for the producer, for the protection of "national labour", and for the defence of the Republican regime; but it demanded that the family, profession and vocation should be the basis of the State and of the economic system. Dorgeres demanded for French agriculture "the leading place in the Nation" and affirmed in the teeth of the facts that since 1860 France had consistently and ruinously followed a free trade policy and fostered the industrial classes. At the same time, he hoped to find allies in the towns. The Peasant Front stirred up discontent at mass meetings and "Greenshirt" bands were trained. Dorgeres loudly threatened an attack with pitchforks on the Chamber (for which he stood unsuccessfully), but added with some common sense that the "illegal seizure of power" only seemed possible "if we can induce our rulers to abdicate" and not to use machine guns against the pitchforks. He also advocated action by refusal to pay taxes but this campaign collapsed in the face of Government threats in 1935. In October, 1935, the Agrarian party gave a death-blow to the movement by repudiating Dorgeres and his methods.

After the dissolution of the Fascist leagues, some of their members, who had been attracted by a pseudo-Leftish demagogy, were drawn into the French Popular Party (P.P.F.). This party was founded by a renegade Communist leader, Jacques Doriot. In 1934 he had prematurely demanded a Popular Front, had been expelled from his party, and turned bitterly against his former associates. Still officially of the Left, he went into the wilderness with his own group of "dissidents" and took up a wildly anti-Communist, anti-Russian and pro-German attitude. His programme included reform of the Republican State, a strengthening of the executive, the establishment of assemblies representative of economic activities, "defence" of the working and middle classes, various social reforms and an attack on the financial influences corrupting Parliament, the administration and press. Some members of the party expressed an open intolerance of parliamentary methods, and it included a number of thugs eager for street-fighting.

All these groups were, more or less openly, prepared to overthrow the Third Republic by violence. So in theory were the Socialists, Communists and Syndicalists, but the vast majority of them were law-abiding, unarmed citizens who (especially after 1936)

had put the Revolution in cold storage. Had Germany been both aggressive and Marxist or Syndicalist, some of them might have been regarded as a potential fifth-column; but in the circumstances of 1933-39, the action of that part of the bourgeoisie which supported and financed the leagues against Radical and Socialist Governments was criminal folly. A small minority went further and became traitors. After the dissolution of the leagues there was set up an underground organization known as the Secret Committees for Revolutionary Action (C.S.A.R.) or more commonly, as the *Cagouards*. The "Hooded Men" committed various acts of terrorism, designed to discredit the Left and its Government and to foster unrest. They were partly financed by some unscrupulous capitalists, such as Deloncle, and by other, rabidly anti-Communist but probably duped, subscribers. But their funds, arms and orders came largely from Germany, Italy and Spain. They were rounded up in 1937.

The conscious fifth-column was extremely small. It numbered a few men of the type of Deloncle; a few paid traitors such as Ferdonnet, the French Haw-Haw; a few intellectuals and smart Parisians, such as Fernand de Brinon, who were won over to a blind adulation of Germany and constituted the *Comite France-Allemagne*, the organ of Franco-German cultural rapprochement. Even these would have said that collaboration with Germany was inevitable or desirable in the interests of France. The anti-Republican groups touched a wider circle, but their floating, shifting membership was still a small minority of the nation. Anti-Republicanism was naturally not synonymous with anti-patriotism. Most of these groups did not will, still less work for, a German victory; but they were guilty of contributing to disunity, of impairing French strength in the vital years before the war, and, in 1940, of accepting defeat and even collaborating with the victor. Yet a wider circle was formed by those Republicans whose loyalty was lukewarm or whose judgement was faulty: authoritarians of the Right, pacifists of the Left, defeatists of all shades, and, worst of all, authoritarian-pacifist-defeatists of the Deat type; short-sighted, suspicious men, who feared the Republican Federation or the Socialist party more than the German army; industrialists, who thought in terms of cartels flung far across, and annihilating, national boundaries; working-men, who thought the international unity of their class a substitute for guns against Hitler. For all these faults France has paid in full.

FRENCH POLICY 1919-39

France emerged from the war of 1914-18 with two main demands in internal policy, the reconstruction of her devastated areas and the restoration of her finances. These aims were, however, closely

linked with the international question of reparations, the payment by Germany of partial or full compensation for war damage. The other two aims which loomed largest in French minds were even more directly dependent on the peace settlement, namely, the restitution of Alsace and Lorraine and of France's 1814 frontier and the organization of security against, or failing that, of security in, future wars. This last point must be dealt with first.

From 1918 onwards, France was acutely conscious of her demographic and industrial weakness and of her vulnerability. She could not easily forget her million-and-a-half dead, the low birth-rate of the war years which would be felt in 1935-39, and the fact that the devastated areas represented one quarter of her productive capital. She sought to ensure her future security by various means. The first was to strengthen her own defensive position, particularly on the eastern frontier; the second, to perpetuate the relative weakness of Germany; the third, to conclude a series of defensive alliances; the fourth, to create a strong international, and more particularly European, organization. None save fanatics believed in the efficacy of any one of these policies alone. They were pursued simultaneously and it is only possible to say that, on the whole, the Right Wing trusted more to the first three and the Left to the last two. With the breakdown of these policies, especially the second and fourth, a fifth gained ground, that counsel of despair known as appeasement.

At the Peace Conference France pursued all the four policies mentioned above. She was like a convalescent who wanted measures taken to prevent or cure any recurrence of illness, only to be assured by her friends that faith in the non-existence of disease was sufficient to abolish it; any failure of this faith cure would afterwards be ascribed to her scepticism. But France, and especially the France represented by Clemenceau and his successors in the National Bloc Government of 1919-24, was sceptical of the value of Wilson's "definite guarantee by word against aggression" and demanded some more tangible security before giving way to her own war-weariness and to the clamour for demobilization and reduction of military service voiced by the Left. She attempted to get as many of the objectives of the first and second policies as possible embodied in the Peace Treaty itself. Her eastern frontier was strengthened by the return of Alsace and Lorraine but she had to abandon her claim to the Saar territory, included in the 1814 boundaries, and to content herself with the 1815 line and with the control of the Saar mines for fifteen years. The Saar was placed under the League of Nations and at the end of fifteen years the Saarlanders were to choose between a continuation of the *status quo* or transfer to France or to Germany. France gained a temporary economic instead of a permanent strategic

advantage. As regards the German frontiers, France's initial demand was for the detachment from Germany of the territories west of the Rhine and for an Allied occupation of the Rhine bridgeheads. To this the United States and Great Britain objected strongly. France was finally induced to consent to a very limited measure, the demilitarization of the Rhineland and its occupation by Allied forces, which would gradually be withdrawn over a period of fifteen years. Her consent was given in exchange for a stipulation that evacuation would depend on German fulfilment of the peace terms (including the disarmament clauses) and for an Anglo-American promise of an immediate guarantee against German aggression. On President Wilson's defeat, the American, and with it the British, promise fell through. A modified British offer (in 1922) was judged insufficient, since it did not cover the demilitarized zone nor Germany's eastern frontier. It was inevitable that France should remember this episode with bitterness and that she should contrast her situation with that of Britain who had satisfactorily disposed of her own chief dangers, the German fleet and colonies. In 1923, when France was attempting to gain her aims single-handed, she fostered separatist movements in the Rhineland and Bavarian Palatinate and gained some recognition for the autonomous Governments set up there. But British opposition led to the withdrawal of French support; the movements collapsed early in 1924 and with them the attempt to reverse the settlement.

Despite this instance of dissatisfaction with the Treaty of Versailles, France was on the whole satisfied with its provisions. French opinion insisted on its maintenance as the basis of the European system. This fitted in with the conception of respect for treaties as the only basis for international relations, but conflicted with the German view of the treaty as a *Diktat*, and with the British emphasis on peaceful change and the substitution of treaties negotiated on an equal footing for those imposed by the victors. The maintenance of the Versailles Treaty also fitted in with France's fourth line of policy. The Treaty included the Covenant and, from the first, France attempted to make the Covenant and the League of Nations an effective substitute for alliances. In 1919, Clemenceau tried to endow the League with coercive powers, but already the United States and Britain were beginning to shy away from definite commitments and sanctions. In 1922, again, both the French experts and Lord Robert Cecil were at work on plans which finally coalesced in the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (September, 1923). The gist of the Treaty was that "while a joint and several obligation was to rest upon all signatories to assist any of their number against a war of aggression . . . the duty to engage in military, naval or aerial action was restricted to States situated on the continent

in which such operations took place,"¹ This scheme seemed to place too great a burden on the ubiquitous British Commonwealth, and was rejected. France constantly and consistently held security to be a prerequisite and not a consequence of disarmament, but she adhered to one international agreement for the reduction of armaments, the Washington Naval Agreement. In 1923, the National Bloc Government also decided to reduce the French period of military service to eighteen months.

The maintenance of the Treaty of Versailles also determined France's third policy, that of alliances. This policy was complicated by two factors. The first was the importance attached, rightly or wrongly, to the ideologies and forms of government of prospective allies; the second was the disintegration of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires. Whereas previously a single alliance could secure the friendship or neutrality of vast tracts of territory, it was now necessary to cement together blocs of small, ill-armed and mutually suspicious States. In the West, after a brief period of friction, France concluded a defensive military agreement with Belgium (1920); but the traditional Eastern alliance was harder to reconstruct. Russia was engaged in a revolution which cut her off from Europe and which seemed to many to threaten European security; this suspicion was increased by the Russo-German understanding reached at Rapallo (1922). In Eastern Europe, France had, moreover, a common interest with the "anti-revisionist" succession States. She therefore gave military help to Poland against Russia, and concluded a treaty with her in 1921. She supported her claim to Upper Silesia and her attempts to reverse a plebiscitary decision in favour of its return to Germany. Over this there was some Franco-British friction, allayed only by the eventual partition of Silesia (1922). In the Levant, France made a bid for Turkish friendship and also took over the territories allotted to her under mandate, but at the cost of dangerous clashes with England. In 1924 France also concluded a treaty with Czechoslovakia.

The foreign policy of the National Bloc Government was tied up with its internal policy, as has already been mentioned, by the question of reparations. The Government shared the prevalent belief that Germany not only should but could pay substantial compensation for the devastation of war. This belief, coupled with a conservative desire to avoid any increase in taxation, led it to finance its vast programme of reconstruction by means of loans and of inflation. The short-term effects of this policy were signally successful; the region over which the war had raged was speedily and efficiently restored and French production and exports had soon reached their

¹ Gathorne-Hardy: *A Short History of International Affairs* (1938).

pre-war level. Except for a brief slump in 1921, it was a period of expansion and of full employment not only for French workers but for the influx of aliens, who in numbers more than made up the war losses. From a financial point of view, the results were however, disastrous. Between 1913 and 1926 the note issue was raised from 5½ to 58 billion francs, without adequate cover, and war-time loans were almost equalled by post-armistice borrowing. The only alternative to obtaining reparations seemed to be a budgetary deficit, against which there was a widespread prejudice. The position of France was worsened by the fact that her debtors in Eastern Europe were unable to pay her, whereas her creditors refused to link the question of war debts with that of reparations. Despite some abuses, France had not greatly overestimated her damages; what she overestimated was the German capacity to pay, but this she was unwilling to admit.

France had not only an economic interest in reparations. She saw in them another obstacle to German revival. England, on the other hand, was anxious to restore Germany's prosperity, with which her own was closely linked. This discrepancy became increasingly obvious and encouraged German recalcitrance—a factor perhaps overestimated in France and underestimated in England. Again, the payment by Germany of "compensation for all damage done to the civilian population . . . and to their property" was one of the terms of the Peace Treaty, and as such France insisted on its strict observance. Total and annual sums of reparations were agreed on in 1920, though Germany accepted them only under pressure. Owing to the collapse of her monetary system, she then defaulted even on a reduced scale of payments and a moratorium became necessary. France, led by her Prime Minister, Poincare, now wished to secure "productive pledges" of future payments, by occupying the industrial area of the Ruhr. This was done in January, 1923, with Belgian and Italian support, and despite strong British opposition. Germany countered with a campaign of passive resistance, and the "productive pledges" seemed chiefly productive of discord between the Allies and of a further collapse of the mark and disturbances in Germany. Poincare was confirmed in his suspicion of bad faith and it was not until German resistance was broken that France was willing to put the question of reparations into the hands of a committee of experts. The Dawes plan was accepted in 1924 and started a period of reconciliation. The mirage of fabulous compensation now vanished and France was left to deal with the after-effects of her financial policy.

It was largely a revulsion against Poincare's unbending attitude which brought the Left Bloc into power in 1924. Its programme was

one of reconciliation with Germany, of evacuating the Ruhr, re-inforcing the League of Nations, re-establishing relations with Russia and improving those with England; at home it aimed at reversing the policy of religious toleration (exemplified by a resumption of relations with the Vatican) and Millerand's authoritarian tendencies, and at overcoming the financial crisis by direct taxation or a capital levy. The Left Bloc Cabinets had to contend with difficulties. They had to put down the revolts of Abd el-Krim (which spread from Spanish to French Morocco) and of the Druzes (which spread through Syria). But their main stumbling-block was the financial situation. The first Herriot Cabinet of Radical Ministers supported by Socialist Deputies fell in April, 1925, because it authorized a secret issue of bank notes. In the next year, six Cabinets and seven Ministers of Finance proposed vain schemes for dealing with inflation. Their external financial policy was more successful, since the Franco-American and Franco-British debt questions were settled by treaty in 1926, but extremely unpopular, since these settlements were not linked with the question of reparations; the treaties were consequently not ratified for three years. In July, 1926, a demand for full powers to deal with the internal situation roused fears that a capital levy would be introduced under Socialist pressure. There was panic, a run on the banks and flight of capital abroad, and a rapid fall of the franc. Unity and confidence were only restored when Poincare took over the premiership and formed a Government of "National Union."

Poincare put through a policy of drastic deflation. Borrowing was stopped and a sinking fund for the debt established; extra taxation was imposed and cuts were made in the civil and military budgets. State employees suffered but otherwise there was a rapid recovery. It was felt in the year 1928-29, when exports rose by 14 per cent. The franc also steadied and in 1928 could be stabilized at an advantageous rate. Between 1929 and 1932 the French gold reserve was doubled. In 1927-28, France consolidated 72 per cent of her tariffs in commercial treaties but she had later to resort to quotas, as she could not adjust them. The first two years of Poincare's financial policy were very successful, and he was also able to introduce various reforms in local government, social insurance and electoral methods. The 1928 elections resulted in what was practically a plebiscite for him, though his rule was cut short by illness.

It was chiefly in the field of foreign and military policy that the influence of the Left-wing Chamber of 1924—28 could be seen. The advent of M. Herriot coincided with that of MacDonald and led to immediate Franco-British co-operation in international organization. At the London Conference (July-August, 1924) it was agreed

that any disputes arising out of the Dawes plan should be settled by arbitration and that France should evacuate the Ruhr; this was done within a year. The two Governments also set in motion the drafting of a scheme for compulsory arbitration in all international disputes. By the Geneva Protocol, refusal to accept arbitration would be proof of aggression and entail automatic sanctions, economic and military. This scheme was open to the same British objections as the Draft Treaty. In the autumn of 1924 it enjoyed a brief acceptance but it was rejected in the following spring by the new Conservative Government of Britain, owing mainly to its unpopularity in the Dominions.

This episode increased the French tendency to concentrate on European security. M. Herriot had already described the League as "the first rough draft of the United States of Europe" and his attitude was shared by his Republican-Socialist successor Briand, who dominated French foreign policy from 1925-31. Briand dropped the idea of a general scheme and took advantage of British willingness to enter into a limited commitment. The Locarno Pact (October, 1925) was brilliantly successful in temporarily satisfying the French desire for guarantees against aggression, the German desire to substitute voluntary agreements for dictated terms and the British desire to see "fair play". The Pact consisted of a treaty of mutual guarantee, covering the Franco-German and Belgo-German frontiers (including the demilitarized zone) and signed by Germany, France, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Italy; arbitration conventions or treaties between Germany and France, Belgium, Poland and Czechoslovakia; and Franco-Polish and Franco-Czechoslovak treaties for mutual assistance against German aggression.

Locarno initiated a period of *detente*. France felt sufficiently secure to agree to an Allied evacuation of the first Rhineland zone (completed in January, 1926). A year later, the Allied military control in Germany was ended. It was part of Briand's scheme to bring Germany into the League of Nations, and this was achieved in September, 1926. Another result of the *detente* was the appointment of a Preparatory Commission on Disarmament (December, 1925) but its meetings served chiefly to illuminate differences of opinion. France still refused to consider disarmament apart from security and insisted that any disarmament must take place under international supervision. She was also an advocate of the idea of an international force. The French view conflicted with the British, and by the time a compromise had been worked out, discussions were complicated by Russian demands for total and immediate disarmament and by Germany's insistence on her right to equality. Ingenuous observers believed that this failure was offset by the spectacular result of a

proposal to renounce war in Franco-American relations. This proposal was extended into a universal renunciation of war, embodied in the Kellogg Pact (or Pact of Paris) of 1928. Briand, however, was still searching for a more practical contribution to peace. France showed herself conciliatory in accepting the Young Plan, which gave Germany a voice in the discussion of reparations and removed foreign control over their payment, and in agreeing to the final evacuation of the Rhineland five years before the original time-limit of occupation (June, 1930). It was at about this time that Briand launched an ambitious plan by which he hoped to perpetuate the benefits of the "Locarno spirit": a plan to draw "revisionist" and "anti-revisionist" League members together in a loose European Union. The preliminary discussions did not augur well for unity and they were interrupted by the announcement early in 1931 of an Austro-German customs union, which France believed to be the prelude to political union and which was entered into against Austria's pledge. France, as the defender of the *status quo*, added financial pressure to verbal protest. The economic structure of Central Europe, already weakened by the repercussions of the American crisis, crashed into chaos, and with it all hopes of European unity.

Meanwhile, France had not neglected the policy of alliances. M. Herriot had, in 1924, followed the example of Italy and Britain in recognizing the Soviet Government. Closer relations were, however, hampered by Russian repudiation of debts, by suspicions of Soviet activity and propaganda, and by what seemed to be a Russian attempt to wean Eastern Europe away from the League and Locarno. The renewal of the Russo-German understanding in 1926 increased the uneasiness of France, which was not dispelled until the Soviet Union gave clear evidence of a change of policy. Meanwhile, France concluded a treaty with Roumania, directed against any Russian move there. She also completed her Eastern European system of alliances by a treaty with Yugoslavia, but delayed its signature until 1927 in the hope of securing Italy's adherence to it. Italy was still hovering between the "revisionist" and "anti-revisionist" camps and French opinion was sharply divided on the question whether she could or should be won over to the latter. France and Italy were divided by ideological hostility, by Italian jealousy of France's position in Europe, North Africa and the Mediterranean, and by Italian naval competition with France. There were outbursts of Italian animosity, culminating in a series of bellicose speeches by Mussolini in 1930, but these storms alternated with periods of calm.

In 1928, under the Poincare-Briand partnership, and with the

stabilization of the franc, the increase of trade and low figure of unemployment (below 1,000), the comprehensive Social Insurance Act, the reduction of military service, the safeguard of the Maginot defences and the Kellogg Pact, France seemed to build on a solid structure of prosperity and peace. In 1931, the first cracks were obvious. Poincare and Briand were both dying, and Tardieu and Laval were the rising men. Europe was in the throes of economic crisis and recrudescent nationalism, and though France was comparatively untouched and M. Tardieu promised a "policy of prosperity," the budget was showing the strain of increasing military expenditure and of an ill-timed decision to raise Civil Service salaries. Credit was restricted and there were demands for industrial and agricultural protection. France, the chief short-term creditor of Europe, only agreed unwillingly to the Hoover Moratorium and was still more unwilling to recognize the death of reparations, which were not buried until the Lausanne Conference (1932). The impunity with which Japan attacked Manchuria made the fragility of collective security clear. The Disarmament Conference, meeting early in 1932, was an anachronism. M. Tardieu put forward a scheme for an international force, with the sole effect of again provoking Anglo-French discord. Soon afterwards he was swept from power by the general elections, which returned a Left-wing majority. Almost simultaneously, the Prussian elections resulted in a nationalistic victory.

The Left victory in France was based on the usual alliance of Radicals and Republican-Socialists in office with Socialists supporting them, and produced the usual instability. The economic crisis seemed to the Radical leaders to preclude any introduction of the far-reaching reforms, such as the 40-hour week, demanded by the Socialists, and to necessitate a policy of wage-cuts and deflation. The attitude of the German delegation to the Disarmament Conference, whose demands were in effect for German re-armament, seemed equally to preclude the Socialist policy of unilateral disarmament to the 1928 level, and the French delegation continued to insist on effective collective security. The first French Cabinet fell in December, 1932, on the question of war debts. M. Herriot wanted to pay them as the necessary price of Franco-American friendship and Franco-British unity; Parliament refused. In the next year, five Cabinets were brought down. Public discontent with this weakness was exacerbated by economic troubles and by fear of, or admiration for, the aggressive and authoritarian Germany of Hitler. In February, 1934, unrest was brought to a climax by the Stavisky scandal and by the anti-parliamentary riots which followed it. The chief effects of the crisis were, first, that it led to the replace-

ment of the Left-Wing Cabinets by a Government of "National Concentration" under Doumergue and eventually to the advent of Laval; secondly, that it deepened the cleavage and bitterness between Right and Left; thirdly, that it compelled the Left parties to sink their differences and to work out the programme of the '*Rassemblement Populaire*' (1935) and to form a Popular Front; and fourthly, that it combined with international events to produce a strong wave of anti-Fascism.

Meanwhile, the system set up to consolidate the gains of the 1918 victory received its death-blow. At the end of 1933, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and from the League. Hitler then presented a list of requirements, including permission to create a conscript army and the return of the Saar, which must be satisfied as the condition of continuing negotiations. Britain and Italy were prepared to make at least partial concessions, but France absolutely refused to condone this open repudiation of the Versailles Treaty. As she saw it, it struck at the very basis of such security as she enjoyed and no possible British guarantee could compensate for that. So much was clear, but it was also clear that there was no way of enforcing respect for the Treaty, save in the last resort, war. For war, however, France was not prepared, physically or psychologically; the very idea of "defensive attack" was abhorred except on the extreme Right. She was therefore powerless for the present and had either to build up her own strength and system of alliances or to take the way of appeasement. It was the tragedy of France that she failed to make the first policy effective.

The revival of Germany put a premium on Italian friendship, and when in 1933 Mussolini proposed an Italo-Anglo-Franco-German *combinazione*, M. Daladier consented. Its scope was limited but it seemed to Poland to give Germany a free hand in the east, and she consequently cut adrift from her Western ally and concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany early in 1934. From February until his assassination in November, 1934, Barthou was at the French Foreign Office and it became his aim to restore the Eastern Alliance. Its keystone was to be a Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance; Russia was to be brought into the League; there was to be an Eastern Locarno, a pact of mutual guarantee between Russia, Germany, the Baltic States, Poland and Czechoslovakia; and France's other alliances were to be strengthened. Only the first two of these points were achieved. The attempted Nazi *putsch* in Austria temporarily aligned Italy with the anti-German Powers, and Barthou hoped to fit her into his scheme. His successor, Laval, was prepared to go much further and to make Italian friendship the basis of his policy. He at once reached an amicable agreement with Mussolini,

whereby the latter pledged himself to the maintenance of the *status quo* in Europe, in exchange for concessions in Africa. Mussolini rightly deduced from this that France would raise no serious obstacle to his projected conquest of Abyssinia. Britain, on the other hand, was prepared to allow Hitler a certain latitude in breaking the Versailles Treaty, but her imperial interests would not allow, and public opinion would not tolerate, Italian aggression.

In March, 1935, France, who had embarked on a programme of increased armaments, decided that in order to keep the metropolitan army at its normal level of 350,000 she must raise military service to two years during the lean period of 1935-39. A few days before, Hitler had announced that Germany already possessed an air force, and a few days afterwards he added that conscription was being introduced and that the German army would number some 550,000 men. As in 1934, France protested and took preventive, but not punitive, action. In April, at Stresa, France, Britain and Italy affirmed their condemnation of Germany's action, their loyalty to Locarno, and their determination to preserve Austria's integrity. In May, the French Government signed the Franco-Soviet pact though it was not ratified until 1936. The value of this anti-Hitler front was seriously reduced by the action of Britain, who on June 18th (by an unfortunate chance the anniversary of Waterloo) signed a naval agreement with Germany. In October, the converse side of the discrepancy between French and British policy was shown. Italy attacked Abyssinia and Britain dragged an unwilling France into a half-hearted application of sanctions. By the Hoare-Laval plan, the latter hoped, but failed, to regain Italy's friendship. The Stresa front was dead and Laval had merely added to the discredit of collective security.

It was not only the bankruptcy of Laval's foreign policy which led to his downfall in January, 1936. During the first months of 1935, M. Flandin had wrestled with a decline in French production and trade and an increase in unemployment, and had attempted to avoid both deflation and devaluation. His policy of "cheap money" was, however, opposed by the Bank of France and he was soon succeeded by Laval as Premier, with wide powers. These Laval used to enact a drastic programme of deflation and retrenchment and the manner, matter and quantity of his "*decrets de misere*" roused resentment, without resulting in recovery. Opinion was swinging to the Left, and there was discontent at the laxity with which Laval applied the "anti-Fascist laws". It was clear that the Popular Front would sweep in at the elections, but for the few intervening months a stop-gap Government was formed. This Government drew the logical conclusion from recent events, that France must rely on Russian and British support, and it proceeded to the ratification of the

Franco-Soviet pact. Hitler had also assessed the situation correctly. He stigmatized the pact as incompatible with Locarno, refused a judicial inquiry, and marched into the Rhineland. He banked on the popular British view that German self-determination mattered more than French self-preservation, on France's paralysing fear of acting alone, and on the validity of his own observation that one concession leads to another. France hesitated; Britain did not stir; and the double breach of Versailles and Locarno, which destroyed France's freedom of action and her power to intervene on behalf of her Eastern allies, which (in the words of Mr Eden) cut away "one of the main foundations of the peace of Western Europe", met only with mild reproofs, futile proposals, counter-proposals and questionnaires.

When, in June, 1936, the Popular Front came to power, nothing had happened to heal French dissensions. Its advent, indeed, ominously provoked a serious flight of capital and a wave of spontaneous strikes, evidence of recalcitrance on the Right and impatience on the Left. The questions which the Popular Front had to face, the economic crisis, foreign policy, rearmament, were all liable to rouse deep antagonisms and suspicions. Its own unity was precarious and its programme concealed contradictions. M. Blum's economic policy, for instance, combined an attack on the moneyed interest, and measures increasing production costs (such as raising wages and lowering hours of work), with a demand for increased direct taxation, to balance the budget. It was a case of the goose with the golden eggs. Again, the French price level was now about 20 per cent above the world price level, and such devices as the Wheat Office only touched the surface of this problem. Eventually, M. Blum was forced to resort to devaluation, though trying to minimize its repercussions by a Tripartite Monetary Agreement with the United States and Britain. His social legislation was in itself admirable but it added to a budget already swollen by armament expenditure. The measure most welcomed by workers was also most unsuited to France's situation: the forty-hour week and holidays with pay, which decreased manpower at a time when the total labour supply was insufficient for restoring the normal level of production. The Blum experiment only brought a partial relief even to workers, and such measures as bringing the Bank of France and the armaments industries under national control only temporarily staved off disillusion. While to the Communists and to the militant trade unionists the Government seemed intolerably hesitant, to the Radicals in Chamber and Senate it seemed to be endangering the whole French economic structure. In June, 1937, the Senate therefore refused a grant of plenary powers and M. Blum (apart from one brief reappearance in 1938) gave way

to Radical Cabinets which moved steadily towards the Right. In November, 1938, M. Daladier suspended most of the 1936 legislation by decree, and called in the Centre politician, M. Reynaud, to put through a frankly conservative policy of deflation, heavy indirect taxation, the encouragement of private enterprise, the reduction of the civil budget and an increase in armaments. This brought brief, belated prosperity but left much bitterness among workers and especially the trade unionists, who failed to stop the decrees by a general strike.

The retreat of the Popular Front from its electoral promises was due partly to its own mistakes, partly to the antagonism of business circles, and partly to the growing menace of the international situation. For dealing with this situation, France's foreign policy proved totally inadequate. The gradual undermining of the bases of her security had left her more than ever dependent on her allies and unable to pursue a strong line of her own. The Popular Front chose to follow chiefly in the wake of the British Government. Had France been more united internally and stronger externally, she might have succeeded in drawing her Western and Eastern allies together in a Triple Entente, as before 1914. But though men as far to the Right as General Weygand defended the Russian pact, it was the object of violent controversy and Right-wing prejudice. There were still politicians who wanted to substitute for it an Italian alliance. This idea was kept alive by the attitude of Britain, who, by one of the many discordances of French and English policy, was now angling for a rapprochement with Mussolini. The French Government had to reckon not only with sharp divisions of opinion on the merits and demerits of the Russian, Italian or British alliances, but with a widespread horror of war.

The programme of the Popular Front slurred over the fundamental discrepancy between collective security and disarmament, between anti-Fascism and pacifism, and implied that "prohibition of the private trade in arms", "repudiation of secret diplomacy" and "greater flexibility" of treaty adjustments could still in 1936 contribute to the "defence of peace". A similar escapism was evident during the major international crisis of 1936-38, the Spanish civil war. In August, 1936, M. Blum took the initiative, which met with strong British concurrence and support, in proposing a policy of non-intervention. What was noteworthy was not so much the proposal as the way in which the French Government clung to this policy long after Spain had become the battleground for German, Italian and Russian arms. In 1938, when M. Blum returned to power, his Foreign Minister relaxed the arms embargo in favour of the Spanish Government and showed some independence vis-a-vis

Britain, but this was a brief interlude. France had been without a Government during the German annexation of Austria, and the second Blum cabinet came too late to do more than protest. In April, it was succeeded by another Radical Cabinet, under M. Daladier, whose defeatist Foreign Minister, M. Bonnet, again left the leadership to the British Government. This abdication was the more surprising since the next victim on the German list was Czechoslovakia. The Franco-Czechoslovak alliance was an important part of France's policy in Eastern Europe and had been carefully worked into the Franco-Soviet pact, so that any French move in defence of Czechoslovakia would automatically bring Russian support. It was the final proof of France's weakness and blindness that she not only sacrificed Czechoslovakia but greeted the Munich settlement with a relief equal to that felt in England and only mitigated by greater shame. This unrealistic attitude was encouraged by the Prime Minister, who in October said that he had always "firmly desired" Franco-German collaboration and that "whatever the differences of their political regimes, the two nations which have so often confronted one another on the battlefields must understand that in modern times war is never a solution and that it is possible to solve all questions by the loyal *entente* of all peoples." On December 6th, 1938, France and Germany signed a declaration, similar to the Chamberlain-Hitler one, renouncing war. In March, 1939, the destruction of Czechoslovakia was completed. France allowed the British Prime Minister to offer a joint guarantee to Poland, by which the Western Powers might still hope to convince a sceptical Russia that they were not buying Germany off at the expense of Eastern Europe. This attempt, and subsequent negotiations for a Triple Entente, came too late. On August 23rd, the Russo-German pact of non-aggression was signed. The Eastern Alliance had collapsed. On September 3rd, two days after the German invasion of Poland and six hours after the expiry of the British ultimatum, France reluctantly declared war. "To die for Danzig?" had been the mocking question of the pacifist Deat in May; in September, the French *poilu*, grim and unenthusiastic, replied: "*Il faut en finir*"—"we must put an end to this."

VI. RECENT EVENTS (SEPTEMBER, 1939-MAY, 1945)

DEFEAT, OCCUPATION, LIBERATION

The deep-lying causes of the collapse of France in 1940 have emerged in the preceding pages, her weakness in population and industrial development, the corrosion of her whole system of

security, her military unpreparedness, her dissensions. The part of each cause in the final disaster cannot yet be assessed. For some of them, Frenchmen do not bear the sole blame, but for some there can be distinguished three concentric rings of responsibility in France. First, the general public. The average Frenchman regarded the war not as an adventure but as a job to be done, in 1939 as in 1914 or in 1870. Only a few groups were opposed to it: certain "realistic" defeatists, some of them in high places; a few "idealistic" pacifists and Trotskyites; and from mid-September on, the Communists. The latter lost ground, though the immediate suppression of their party and the ultimate imprisonment of their Deputies roused some resentment and eventually worked in their favour. The long boredom of the "phoney war" did not destroy French morale but it encouraged wishful thinking about the impregnability of the Maginot defences and the possibility of a bloodless victory. Such wishful thinking characterized the period between the two wars and was a factor in France's unpreparedness; there was little pressure of public opinion demanding an increase, or better use, of military credits. This was, so to speak, the outermost ring of responsibility. The second was that of politicians who did not realize, or did not allow the public to sense, the gravity of the political and military position, who encouraged escapism by idle boasts of French strength or idle talk of disarmament, by their policies of appeasement, which lingered on as defeatism, and by their official optimism and stringent censorship of all criticism after the outbreak of war. This responsibility must be divided between the successive Cabinets and Ministers of War and the Chamber, which so often overthrew them and capriciously prevented efficiency. Against the innermost ring, the General Staff and military advisers of France, the indictment stands: first, that they did not provide in sufficiency, or use with efficiency, modern weapons (tanks, aeroplanes, machine-guns, etc.), that they had only 89 divisions ready to meet the German attack (as against 94 which had barely stemmed that of 1914) and that of these divisions, only one was armoured. Secondly, that accepting the assumption of a war fought behind fortified defences, they failed to extend the Maginot line to cover the north-eastern frontier. Thirdly, that they finally staked all on a rash and ill-prepared counter-offensive in Belgium.

It was on May 10th, 1940, that German forces attacked the Low Countries. A spearhead of the French army, together with the B.E.F., thrust north to engage them. The Germans made a flank attack, broke through at Sedan, reached the sea and spread north towards the encircled forces and south towards Paris. Wherever they could, the French fought valiantly: Prioux's troops covering the Dunkirk retreat, de Lattre de Tassigny's men at Rethel, the

men who fought on tenaciously in sectors of the Maginot line for days. But they could not withstand the weight of German armour. As they retreated south they found the roads blocked by panic-stricken refugees, streaming away from the third invasion within memory. In this chaos the army disintegrated into small, isolated groups. Chaos was the dominant impression of the Government, as it retreated from Paris to Tours, from Tours to Bordeaux. Defeatism gained ground in the Cabinet, which M. Reynaud (who had succeeded M. Daladier as Premier in March) had recently reorganized on as wide a basis as possible. Italy declared war; there were millions of refugees, and over a million prisoners; the Germans were in Paris. The situation seemed to justify the forebodings of those who harboured a fundamental lack of faith in the Republic and those who believed that the war was a mistake or doomed to failure. The Minister of War (Petain) and Commander-in-Chief (Weygand) were for an armistice and the preservation of the remaining reserves to "maintain order" and for the future. They were supported by an all-party group of Ministers and by parliamentary circles under the influence of Laval and Marquet, who favoured a "deal". There was a tussle between them and the resisters (including M. Reynaud) who wanted to hold out in Brittany or North Africa, hoped for American help, and were unwilling to go back on the pledge to England not to sue for separate terms. A last-minute offer of Anglo-French union met with insufficient response and the defeatists won the day. M. Reynaud resigned on June 16th and Marshal Petain formed a new Cabinet. A proposal to send part of the Government to North Africa fell through, though some parliamentarians left for Algiers. Negotiations were started immediately. On June 22nd, a Franco-German Armistice was signed at Rethondes, in the setting of the 1918 Armistice, and a Franco-Italian Armistice followed two days later. "If the war is not over by October, we are criminals," remarked the head of the French delegation at Rethondes.¹

It was the essence of the French problem from June 1940 onwards, that a temporary situation was indefinitely prolonged. The preamble of the Franco-German Armistice stated that Germany aimed at preventing a resumption of hostilities, securing safeguards for the war against England, and preparing a "new peace" in reparation of the wrongs inflicted on her by the Allies' responsibility for the wars of 1914 and 1939 and by their breaches of the 1918 peace terms. The Armistice stipulated the cessation of all hostilities and the treatment of fighting Frenchmen as *francs-tireurs*; the occupation of three-fifths of France; measures of demobilization, disarmament and demilitarization; the payment by France of the costs of occupa-

¹ L. Marchal: *Vichy: Two Years of Deception*, 1943.

tion. The French Government was to be theoretically independent, but must co-operate with the occupying authorities in the north and west; it was to retain a small army, afterwards fixed at 100,000, part of the fleet, the rest of which would be disarmed but not used by the enemy, and the Empire, which it must defend. All French prisoners of war were to be kept by Germany till the peace. As the war was prolonged, an unequal contest developed between Germany and the Vichy Government, the former using the uncertain fate of the prisoners as a lever to obtain concessions beyond the Armistice terms, and the latter trying to use the fleet and Empire as bargaining counters.


At first, the majority of Frenchmen were too much crushed by the magnitude of the disaster and too much blinded by faith in "the victor of Verdun" to reason or revolt against the Armistice. But one voice made itself heard immediately. General de Gaulle, a brilliant soldier and persistent advocate of military mechanization, had been drawn into the Government by M. Reynaud, the chief supporter of his unorthodox views. He played an important part in the Anglo-French discussions which immediately preceded the Armistice, and flew to London on June 18th, 1940. From there he launched a series of broadcast appeals for continuation of the fight from overseas and denunciations of the Government and the Armistice. His message was summed up in his own words: "France has a lost battle, she has not lost the war." On June 25th, he was officially recognized by the British Government as "the leader of all free Frenchmen wherever they may be, who rally to him in support of the Allied cause", and an agreement was drawn up concerning the constitution of Free French forces. Despite the failure of a Franco-British attack on Dakar, by October 24th de Gaulle had won over sufficient French territory to warrant the creation of a Council for the Defence of the French Empire.¹ It became the policy of the United Kingdom to help this Council to extend its rule, while the policy of the United States, which together with the Soviet Union, Canada and the neutrals maintained diplomatic relations with Vichy,² was directed towards strengthening the more resistant elements there and in North Africa.

On June 25th, Marshal Petain explained to the nation that to prolong the struggle would have meant useless bloodshed, that the Government had therefore decided "to stay in France in order to maintain the unity of our people and to represent them in the face of the enemy", and that it remained "free". In ironical comment on

¹ See p. 47.

² The U.S.S.R. broke off relations with Vichy in June, 1941, and Canada in November, 1942, just after Vichy had broken off relations with the U.S.A.

this "unity" and "freedom", the Government then moved to Vichy in the Unoccupied Zone. In the north and west of France, in all the richest industrial and agricultural areas, the French Government had only delegates, and in Paris the notorious de Brinon as "ambassador". All civilian intercourse between the two zones was stopped, and there were "forbidden areas" in the north-east.



For this desperate situation there seemed to the men of Vichy to be two remedies, representing two lines of political evolution. The one was a *reductio ad absurdum* of certain Right-wing, and the other of certain Left-wing,

ideas. The group of men round Petain, who were influenced by reactionary Catholic, "mediaevalist" or Royalist political doctrines and often admired Franco or Salazar, believed that the defeat was "born of laxity", of lies, and of the false ideals of the Third Republic. The Marshal himself spoke in the sorrowful and indignant tones of an Old Testament prophet. If France repented and adopted a healthier national life, she would ultimately rise again to greatness. This diagnosis, often echoed abroad, corresponded to a feeling of guilt after the defeat. It exploited a widespread dissatisfaction with the faults of the regime, a dissatisfaction which existed even in its stronghold. A meeting of the National Assembly was voted by the Chamber (by 395 votes to 3) and Senate (225 to 1)¹ and was held on July 10th. About three-quarters of the representatives were present, the Communists being still in prison and the rest dispersed. By 569 votes to 80, with 17 abstentions, it gave full powers to "the Government of the Republic, under the authority and signature of Marshal Petain, to promulgate in one act or more a new Constitution of the French State. This Constitution should guarantee the rights of work, family and country. It will be ratified by the nation

¹ This solitary vote was cast by the Comte de Chambrun, a descendant of the Revolutionary hero, Lafayette.

and applied by the assemblies it has created." On the following day, Petain constituted himself "Chief of the State" and sole source of all legislative and executive authority, and adjourned Parliament. Like so much else in Vichy, this was a temporary measure pending a definitive settlement which never came, but it left a clear field for the "renovation" of France through the "National Revolution".

The second remedy was put forward by men who had been influenced by socialist, pacifist or syndicalist ideas. They believed economic organization to be more important than political sovereignty and held that France should be integrated with the New Order, and that the workers of the world could profitably unite under Hitler. Others might collaborate out of fear or self-interest—certain business and professional men did so—but these were the apostles of collaboration. In July and August, two rival leaders attempted to set up a Single-Party system and to drag Vichy into the path of National Socialism. Their names were Deat and Doriot. They were thwarted by the reactionary group; but the most powerful and subtle, and the least principled, advocate of collaboration was Laval, who had been called to the Vice-Presidency of the Cabinet on June 23rd. On July 11th Petain appointed him his successor, and in October, Minister of Foreign Affairs. From this strategic position, Laval tried to manoeuvre France into collaboration and oust Italy from Hitler's favour. The time was favourable: a complete German victory over England seemed inevitable and in the absence of accurate information, a good deal of anti-British feeling had been aroused by the supposed insufficiency of the British expeditionary force, by its withdrawal from Dunkirk, and by the British lack of confidence which led to the preventive bombardment of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir (Oran) on July 3rd. But anti-British is not synonymous with pro-German, and Laval's ideas made little headway. When in October Laval engineered a meeting between Hitler and Petain at Montoire, the Marshal's mind was more full of grievances about the German misapplications of the Armistice terms than of cordial sentiments. Though a policy of collaboration was officially inaugurated, the interview settled nothing. Germany continued her Shylock-like policy of extortion and dismemberment. Attempts to foster a Breton separatist movement and to treat Breton prisoners of war as "non-French", and the detachment for military purposes, behind which a political motive was suspected, of the partly Flemish-speaking Nord and Pas-de-Calais, were followed by the annexation and Germanization of Alsace and Lorraine, with a sudden deportation of thousands of local inhabitants. Vichy protested against the deportations and French opinion was profoundly shocked. In spite of this rift, in December Laval embarked on a plot for enticing the Marshal to

move to Paris, where the Germans were trying to revive Bonapartism. The plot was discovered by the "reactionaries**", Laval was arrested, and a new phase of policy began.

Meanwhile, the more doctrinaire collaborators had made Paris their headquarters. Doriot, like Laval, still hoped to "permeate" Vichy and to use the prestige of the Marshal, but Deat went into frank opposition. He launched violent attacks on Vichy for its policy of "wait and see" (*attentisme*) and for its dismissal of Laval. Early in 1941, he founded the *Rassemblement National Populaire* (R.N.P.), which had only scant success in the trade-unionist and socialist circles it was designed to attract, but which constantly threatened to overthrow or supersede the Vichy Government, with German help. It formed shock-troops and even staged a march on Vichy, but its main weapon was propaganda. Its programme was full collaboration with Germany and it contrasted the economic chaos of the present, and particularly the struggle for bare existence in the Unoccupied Zone, with the potential plenty of a planned "Eur-african" economy. It attacked Vichy's reactionary "National Revolution" for its Catholic, "pro-Monarchist" tendencies, and made much of its own Republicanism, anti-clericalism and anti-capitalism. It also attacked Communists, Gaullists, Jews and Masons. Doriot's programme was much the same, only with more emphasis on anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism and without the anti-clericalism; his tactics, however, were different. He revived his old French Popular Party (P.P.F.) in the Occupied Zone, with German subsidies, but he extended its activities over the Unoccupied Zone and into North Africa. He was appointed to the Vichy National Council and professed himself a Petainist. There were at various time *Doriotistes* in the Government. Behind this facade of "respectability", however, he built up a force of armed thugs, who committed brutal outrages. After Laval's eventual return to office, measures were taken against his organization and he then began to prepare his shock-troops for a revolutionary seizure of power.

Deat never lost hope of setting up a Single Party and a Single Youth Movement, but this was prevented by rivalry between the R.N.P. and the P.P.F. Both attracted into their orbit smaller bodies: the *Cagouards*, revived by Deloncle as a "Social Revolutionary Movement", Bucard's *Francistes* and the "French League". Their only joint action was through the "Legion of anti-Bolshevik Volunteers", founded in July, 1941. Its members, who were extremely small in number, wore German uniform, took an oath to Hitler, and fought on the Russian front. It gained some support in reactionary circles and was tolerated in the Unoccupied Zone. Vichy made an attempt to reorganize it as a "Tricolour Legion" in 1942-43, but

under German influence it was given back its old title and purpose.

It was therefore under a perpetual barrage of threats and abuse from Paris, based on accusations of a non-co-operative attitude towards Germany, and of criticism from London, based on accusations of complaisance towards Germany, that Vichy attempted its pitiable tight-rope act on the Armistice terms. Laval's dismissal had provoked the Germans to a show of force, by which Vichy was brow-beaten into a more conciliatory attitude than had been hoped for by some of its early supporters. The conviction grew, however, that the war might end in a stalemate, in which France would play the part of mediator. The main object of Admiral Darlan, who early in 1941 took Laval's place as the Marshal's successor and chief Minister, was to preserve the fleet. The Germans played not only on Darlan's own weaknesses, his vanity and his Anglophobia, but on the weaknesses of the whole Unoccupied Zone, its haunting fears concerning the prisoners, 1,800,000 of the young men who were to rebuild France, its terrible shortage of food and work, its difficulty in paying the colossal occupation costs. The latter were first fixed at 400 million francs a day, then reduced, and finally raised to 500. Another difficulty was the division of France into zones; the stringent partitioning was eventually relaxed and administrative unity was achieved at the cost of economic collaboration. By the use of blackmail, Germany could force the fulfilment of the Armistice terms beyond any reasonable interpretation and even demand concessions contrary to them.

It was only in Africa that Vichy was able to pursue its *attentiste* policy with any success. Both North and West Africa had, after some hesitation, declared their loyalty to the Marshal. The main reasons for their decision have already been given, but in addition there existed a good deal of sympathy with Vichy's ideology and some anti-British and anti-Gaullist feeling, particularly after what were considered the unjustifiable attacks at Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar. This was coupled with hostility towards Germany and a desire to rebuild France and her army. These sentiments exactly matched those of General Weygand, whom Petain, in the autumn of 1940, appointed Delegate-General for all French Africa. Weygand was able to hold out against the German and Italian Armistice Commissions and to pin them down to their terms. Towards the United States he maintained a strictly neutral attitude, signing an economic convention with them but leaving to others the negotiations for the rearmament of North Africa, which he held to be contrary to the Armistice and his word. In August, 1941, Weygand blocked a German attempt to get help for Rommel. He narrowly escaped dismissal then and was forced to resign in November. The German demands had already been granted in principle and an agreement with Japan for the "common

defence" of Indo-China was concluded (July, 1941). Concessions had also been made to the Germans in Syria to assist the Iraqi revolt. When this led to an invasion of the Levant States by Allied forces, Germany tried, by emphasizing Vichy's pledge to defend her overseas territories against all aggression, to embroil France in war with England. Both sides, however, steadfastly refused to declare war. The fighting was hard and bitter, partly because Vichy wished to prove its ability to fulfil the pledge, partly from a sense of military honour, and partly because the presence of Free French forces gave to the operation a flavour of rebellion. In 1942, conditions were different and Madagascar only put up a token resistance.

It was the crime of the Vichy Government that it clung to a policy which was demonstrably unsuccessful and which drove it from concession to concession, and that it did this in order to put through a programme of "National renovation", which the nation rejected. The fact that the Government abused the system of "administrative internment", M. Daladier's equivalent of our "18B", that it established special courts for trying political offences, that it set up concentration camps, that it enlarged the police force and tried to bring it more rigidly under its control, that it issued instructions to judges, and that Petain arrogated to himself the right of trying members of previous Governments, showed that opposition was expected and found. Despite this, Vichy went ahead with its "National Revolution". It aimed first at creating an authoritarian State. The new Constitution never got beyond the stage of drafts, but meanwhile elected bodies were swept away. Parliament was suspended and the larger local councils were abolished and replaced by appointed bodies. One pre-war criticism was met by the establishment of Regions, but in the Vichy framework this was a reform of local administration, not of local government. Vichy aimed at setting up a corporative system and instituted a Labour Charter. It was to abolish the class struggle and replace unions by social committees, representing employers, technicians and workers, but it was scarcely put into practice. Agriculture was to take pride of place in the national economy but the "Peasant Corporation" also misfired. Economic difficulties, as well as public opinion, militated against experiments. Educational reforms were devised to increase the influence of the Church and of family life. The upper bourgeoisie and the Catholic hierarchy were partially won over by this legislation but a breach was made by Vichy's anti-Semitic laws, which gradually approximated towards the Nazi ones and called forth strong Catholic protests, by the deportation of Jews and finally by the conscription of workers for Germany.

Vichy recruited its Ministers mainly from 'non-political' tech-

nicians and service men, and political parties were officially abolished. Apart from Doriot's organization, only two political movements survived in the Unoccupied Zone, the *Action Française* and La Rocque's party, now called "French Social Progress". Both were opposed to the Paris collaborators, Maurras emphasizing his doctrine of "France alone" and La Rocque taking a stronger line against the Germans for which they imprisoned him in 1943. Youth movements survived, or were created, in greater variety. The nearest approach to a Vichy Single Party was the *Legion Française*, founded in 1940 to replace all existing ex-servicemen's organizations and headed by the Marshal. It propagated a mystical cult of Petain and was nationalistic, anti-Communist, anti-Masonic and anti-Semitic in tone. It was originally largely anti-collaborationist and was forbidden in the Occupied Zone, but was never popular, particularly as its activities included informing. It finally fell under the control of Laval and was disrupted from within by a picked body of thugs, the "Service d'Ordre Legionnaire" (S.O.L.). This inner organization was founded by an *ex-Cagoulard*, Darnand, who strongly supported collaboration, but, unlike Deat or Doriot, on extreme Right-wing grounds.

While Vichy was building castles in the sand, a ground-swell was rising. From the autumn of 1940, when the failure of the German offensive against England rekindled the hopes of Europe, Resistance grew. Only a few could escape to join the Free French, whose small forces played a gallant part in the war. Their exploits—raids into the Fezzan, the stand at Bir Hakim, the contributions of the "Lorraine" and "Normandie" air squadrons operating from England and Russia, and of units of the navy and merchant navy in the Atlantic and Pacific—kept alive French military honour. In September 1941, the "Council for the Defence of the Empire" was changed into a "French National Committee" (F.N.C.) in London, which was not only to continue the fight but "to represent a nation which has no other means of expressing itself" and to act as a provisional *de facto* Government. Meanwhile, in France, small groups of men and women came together to print and spread news, to help escaped prisoners and airmen, to organize sabotage, explosions and "accidents", to carry on clandestine scientific work or political discussion, and to publish the works of writers whose theme was the bitterness and the hope of 1940-44. Already in 1941, these groups started to form "zone-wide", if not nation-wide, organizations. Up till June of that year, the position of the Communist party had been equivocal and its attacks had been mainly directed against Vichy, but after the German invasion of Russia, its whole underground network was brought in to strengthen the Resistance movement. At the beginning of 1941

a Central Office of Information and Action (B.C.R.A.) was set up in London to co-ordinate underground activities and dovetail them into Allied plans, and towards the end of the year contacts were established between the Resistance movements and the F.N.C.

To sabotage and assassinations, the Germans retaliated by shooting hostages. In December 1941 Petain launched appeals which, with one exception, demanded a cessation not of German reprisals but of the "deplorable" attacks on the enemy. This did much to destroy his prestige and a few weeks later he publicly confessed that he only enjoyed a "semi-freedom". German pressure was growing and Darlan's concessions were rousing anger. In February, 1942, the Government set on foot the Riom trials, by which a number of members of the Popular Front Government came before the Supreme Court for Political Offences, set up in 1940. The Germans intended this to be a war-guilt trial, but the Court turned it into a trial to disclose the responsibility for the defeat. The evidence revealed grave defects of military organization and of equipment, and the speeches of M M . Daladier and Blum threw much of the blame back on to Petain, both as Minister of War in 1934 and as Vice-President of the Supreme Council of Defence. The trial was followed with excitement and led to an underground revival of the old parliamentary parties. It was stopped for obvious reasons by the Germans and by Petain. Next month, Germany faced the latter with the alternative of taking back Laval, or being replaced by a Deat-Doriot Government. In April, 1942, Petain therefore entrusted to Laval "the effective direction of the internal and foreign policy of France", a practical dictatorship. Laval at once proclaimed an ideal: "This war carries within it the seeds of a real revolution. In the New Europe, socialism will prevail, a socialism that will take into account the national character and aspirations of every nation." In fact, Laval was brought in to put an end to the "wait-and-see" policy of Vichy and to raise an army of workers for Germany. This he proceeded to do by the atrocious system of the *releve*: for every three industrial workers who left voluntarily for Germany, one prisoner of war with agricultural training would be released. If your children are not released, said Laval to the peasants, blame it on the workers who had reserved jobs in 1939-40 and will not help you now. At the same time, factories were closed down to force unemployed men into the scheme. Between June and August 4,000 factories were closed; 42,000 workers went to Germany instead of 100,000 promised by Laval; and about 1,000 prisoners were released. Eventually it became necessary to resort to mass deportations by force.

The tragi-comedy was soon played out. On November 8th, 1942, the Allies landed in North Africa. Three days later, the Germans

marched into the Unoccupied Zone of France. The French fleet, carrying the futile policy of Vichy to its bitter end, gallantly sank itself in Toulon harbour. A small part of the Armistice army, under General de Lattre de Tassigny, rose but was quickly suppressed; most of the army remained apathetic until it was disbanded. Petain had lost even his "semi-freedom". He again appointed Laval his successor and practically abdicated in his favour, endowing him with legislative power. This was in answer to the claims of Darlan, who now made an appearance in North Africa as the deputy of the virtually imprisoned Chief of State. The American authorities were in touch with the underground movement but they had counted on General Giraud, a distinguished soldier recently escaped from Germany, to rally the regular forces. Giraud, however, arrived too late from France and meanwhile the landings were opposed. In this situation Darlan, still head of the armed forces, offered to swing the whole military and civilian administration of the Vichy Empire in on the side of the Allies. His offer was accepted and Darlan insinuated himself as High Commissioner for French Africa, later installing Giraud as military chief and setting up an Imperial Council. This "temporary expedient" of the Americans was militarily justifiable but the perpetuation of the Vichy regime in Africa roused violent resentment among the clandestine movements and the Fighting French under General de Gaulle. On Christmas Day, Darlan was assassinated by a young Royalist, and General Giraud succeeded him. An uneasy rapprochement between him and General de Gaulle was slowly brought about and was facilitated by Giraud's repudiation of all legislation passed since June 22nd, 1940. On June 3rd, 1943, a French Committee of National Liberation (F.C.N.L.) was set up in Algiers under their joint aegis. General Giraud was then pushed into the background, fading first from the political and then from the military scene. The trial of, and death-sentence on, the ex-Vichy Minister, Pucheu, was not a condemnation of the Vichy regime itself but of "collaboration". It symbolized, however, the end of "Vichyism" in imperial and metropolitan France.

The events of 1942, the Riom trials, the Laval policy and the Allied landings, gave a tremendous impetus to the Resistance movement. The different groups brought together men of all opinions, but they were predominantly Left-wing. This was due to a natural surge of anti-Fascist, Jacobin and Republican feeling, to the reaction from Vichy's Right-wing ideology, to the suppression of the Left-wing Parliament of 1936 and the steadfast attitude of some of its members, to the persecution of Socialists and Communists, to the "collaboration" of big business men, such as Renault the car manufacturer, and to the sufferings of the urban working-class as compared with the

rural population. In 1940, the Socialists had been split into two groups, those like M. Blum who took a firm, resisting line, and the defeatists, who followed Faure. The "Faure-ists" steadily lost their backing but the resisters grew in strength, especially in the towns, where the trade unions also played an important part. From 1941 on, the Communists gained ground enormously, partly as the "party of martyrs", with their many dead, partly because of admiration for Russia, partly because they combined an efficient organization with a "non-party" attitude, and finally because they took no responsibility for the failures, defeat and abdication of the Third Republic. The members of the Resistance groups who did not agree with the specific aims of the Left-wing parties were yet mostly at one with them in their revolutionary fervour, demanding a clean sweep of the past and far-reaching "structural reforms". As the Gaullist movement was enlarged to include not merely the "Free" but the "Fighting" French and as representatives were smuggled out of France to join it, it also took on a more Left-wing tinge. In the spring of 1942, the French National Committee was recognized by the Socialist party and also by the three main movements of the Unoccupied Zone, *Combat*, *Liberation* and *Franc-Tireur*, who had now started to work together as "United Movements of Resistance" (M.U.R.) in political and para-military action. In June, the internal and external Resistance groups agreed on a joint manifesto, denouncing both the Third Republic and the Vichyite regime; demanding the restoration of French sovereignty, the election of a National Assembly by all French men and (for the first time) women, the end of totalitarianism and of private interests acting against the national interest, and security at home and abroad; and reaffirming the ideals of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. In January, 1943, the Communist party also sent a representative to London.

The Occupied Zone contained groups more numerous, more active and more autonomous than the Unoccupied: *Organisation Civile et Militaire* (O.C.M.), *Liberation-Nord*, and the Communist-inspired *Front National* with its military organization, *Francs-Tireurs et Partisans Francais* (F.T.P.F.) were among the most important. The total occupation of France swept away barriers, and the new unity was reflected in the formation, by M.U.R. and some of the northern groups, of a broader "Movement of National Liberation" (M.L.N.). The occupation was followed by the disbanding of the Armistice army and by an intensification of the *releve* and deportation of workers. These measures led thousands of young men to take to the hills of the Cevennes and Savoy, to the *maquis* (literally, bush or scrub-land), where they formed guerrilla bands. They were supported by the opinion of almost all France and were openly encour-

aged by some of the Catholic hierarchy and Protestant pastors. Military preparation for Allied landings on the French mainland now became increasingly important. The F.T.P.F. and other military groups were combined in the French forces of the interior (F.F.I.) though the former retained a certain autonomy. Allied arms were smuggled in and sabotage was directed by code through the B.B.C. and by Allied Intelligence and B.C.R.A. officers. In the spring of 1943, the whole Resistance movement was crowned by the formation of a "National Council of Resistance" (C.N.R.), on which all the main groups, parties and trade unions were represented. Representatives of the movement were also sent to Algiers, either to join the F.C.N.L. (which had gained some international recognition) or to form, with Gaullists and former Deputies, a Consultative Assembly to advise and debate on its policy. Early in 1944 the C.N.R. agreed on a programme for the prosecution of the war and for political and economic reform. The main points were a purge of all "collaborationist" and Vichyite elements and the establishment of "economic democracy" by abolishing the trusts and big monopolies and nationalizing credit and basic industries.

The ground-swell of opposition could by now scarcely be ignored by the "collaborators". Darnand's legionaries (S.O.L.) had done good work for them against the Allies in North Africa, and in 1943 Laval organized them into a "French Militia". In the north, the toughs of Deat (R.N.P.), Doriot (P.P.F.) and Bucard (*Francistes*) formed a "Revolutionary National Militia". The underground movement also had its "Patriotic Guards" (G.P.) ready to police the liberated areas. The Germans were meanwhile strengthening their defences and their grip on the administration. Laval's collaboration did not seem whole-hearted enough and more trustworthy pro-Germans, Darnand, Henriot and finally Deat, were brought into the Cabinet. Mistrust of Laval was justified, for he was making a last attempt to ride in on the tide of anti-Vichyism by reviving Parliament; but Parliament refused to be revived. Nor did the workers respond to Deat's final cajoling.

On June 6th, 1944, the storm broke, crashed against the German fortifications and swept away the puny structures of the Deats and Lavals. The Allies landed. To the nucleus of French forces, which General de Gaulle had formed in England, had been added the army of North Africa and, under such Generals as de Lattre de Tassigny, Juin, Leclerc and Koenig, they had fought through Tunisia and Italy. They now returned first to Normandy and then to Provence. The F.F.I. were placed under General Koenig and carried out systematic sabotage and guerrilla warfare. On August 18th, the C.N.R. called the people of Paris to arms and before the Allied

troops could reach the capital, the F.F.I., the police and the whole population had risen and attacked the Germans from the barricades.

PROBLEMS AND TENDENCIES SINCE THE LIBERATION

As the fighting ebbed away to the east, France was left to face the damage of the defeat, the long occupation and the hard-won liberation. It was estimated that, apart from the toll of high mortality rates, her dead amounted to 380,000: about 100,000 killed in the 1940 campaign and over 30,000 since; 150,000 victims of Allied and German bombing; 150,000 victims of political executions and some 100,000 known to have died in prisons and concentration camps. Over two million of her population were in Germany: about 780,000 prisoners of war, 300,000 deported Alsatians and Lorrainers, and the rest political prisoners and workers deported from France or taken from prison camps.¹ A million houses had been destroyed, four million damaged. French industry was producing at only 30 per cent of the 1938 level. The land under crops was reduced by about a third and in the east had suffered from German methods of collective, intensive farming; livestock had declined in quantity and in quality. The total costs of the German and Italian occupation amounted to 946 milliard francs. Monetary circulation had risen from 114 milliards in 1939 to 620 milliards in the autumn of 1944, and this inflation was reflected in a rise in the official cost of living of 100:296, not to speak of the black market. But the key difficulty was transport. Starving towns were cut off from rich agricultural districts, coal-miners from pit-props, industries from raw materials and coal. This meant unemployment for half a million men. Over 4,000 bridges and nearly 5,000 km. of railway had been destroyed; of the pre-war figure of 11,800 railway engines, only 6,500 remained and only 2,800 were usable; many stations and canal-locks had been damaged. Lorient, St Nazaire, La Rochelle, Dunkirk were still in German hands, and other ports, such as Le Havre and Rouen, destroyed. The winter, with its hard frosts, the failure of the Arnhem manoeuvre, and Runstedt's counter-offensive, held up reconstruction. In default of effective legal rations the French people lived largely by the black market. Plans based on the assumption that the Allies would be able to send over a million tons of foodstuffs and raw materials to France had to be readjusted when it became clear that this was far too optimistic, and that military demands on production and transport would leave little surplus for civilians.

Apart from these economic difficulties, there were problems of political adjustment. The F.C.N.L. had already become a Pro-

¹ There are no official figures; these, from *Liberation* May 8th, are lower than many estimates.

visional Government in Algiers and on September 9th, 1944, thirteen of its members were grouped with nine new Ministers, drawn from metropolitan Resistance movements and parties, in a Provisional Government of National Unanimity under the presidency of General de Gaulle. The Consultative Assembly also moved to Paris and was greatly enlarged by the inclusion of more metropolitan representatives. Despite these fusions, there was a danger of dual power. At the centre, the Government was indeed supreme. The C.N.R. continued to meet but had no official status. The Assembly remained purely advisory, though constantly clamouring for control over Ministers and for a part in legislation. In outlying districts, however, the lack of communications made it difficult for the Government to exercise authority. It appointed Regional Commissioners and Prefects to replace the Vichyite officials and nominated municipal councils, but local government was left largely in the hands of the ex-clandestine Departmental Committees of Liberation (C.D.L.). There was also a dual organization of regular and ex-clandestine military and police forces, the F.F.I, flanking the army and the G.P. beside the police. Some of the F.F.I, were at once joined to the First Army and went forward into Alsace; others undertook the fighting against the pockets of German resistance along the coast and in the interior. The whole organization was placed under the War Office and gradually merged completely into it, while the G.P. were placed at the disposal of the regular authorities. In its anxiety to return to legality, the Government decided to hold municipal elections in the spring and elections for a constituent Assembly later, but as soon as possible.

These decisions roused criticism. The defenders of the Government held that it was canalizing the new forces of Resistance, but to its critics it seemed to be damming them up. The Consultative Assembly could not claim to be an elected body but it felt itself to be representative of the nation, and chafed at its limitations. The C.N.R. hoped to strengthen its hand by preparing a new form of "States-General", reminiscent of 1789, at which representatives of the C.D.L. were to put forward the demands of the people. The decision to consult the people directly, by-passing these intermediaries, was democratic enough, but already there were fears that the elected Assembly would not be a sovereign constituent and legislative body. On this issue, however, the critics eventually parted company, the Resistance and Left-wing groups opting for an entirely new body, elected by proportional representation, and a new constitution, while the Radicals and Moderates wanted a return to the forms of 1875. A similar division appeared over the municipal elections, when the Radicals upheld the eligibility of ex-parliamentarians who had voted for **Pétain** in **1940**.

The Government sided with the Resistance groups against them, but allowed individual cases to be decided on their merits. The decision to hold local elections in April-May revived familiar apprehensions about female suffrage. The grant of votes to women was welcomed—it had been advocated by almost every party in pre-war days, though always rejected by the Senate—but the Left especially argued against holding any elections at a time when, in the absence of prisoners and serving soldiers, these votes would predominate. The merging of the F.F.I. into the army raised the old question of the "nation in arms". The conception of the small, professional army had been attacked by M. Daladier at Riom and was again attacked in the Consultative Assembly by Resistance and Left-wing delegates. While some rural areas complained of the zealous but rough justice meted out by the F.F.I., and the G.P., the Government's political purge seemed to the Resistance movements too slow and too lenient—despite the fact that juries for these trials could be drawn only from their ranks.

There were other causes of friction. The phrase "too slow and too lenient" summed up the feeling that the Government was shifting away from a revolutionary position. It was applied to the measures taken against profiteers of the occupation and to economic and social legislation. By the spring of 1945, however, the programme of the C.N.R. had been partially fulfilled. The coal-mines of the northern *departements* were nationalized; so were the Renault works. General de Gaulle, on March 2nd, reaffirmed his Government's intention of nationalizing all power production, electricity, coal, oil, as well as all means of transport, and of nationalizing, or controlling, credit. Another, more social than economic, demand was met by the creation of *comitds d'entreprise* in all undertakings employing more than a hundred workers. On these Works Committees, employers, technicians, and workers were to be represented and they were to make suggestions as to the management of the concern, as well as fixing conditions of work. On these questions, there was a conflict of application rather than of principle: was nationalization a means of bringing order out of chaos, or a delicate experiment unfit for troubled times? Should it be carried out only by the elected delegates of the nation? Should not all concerns with over fifty workers have Works Committees and should these not have more effective powers of control? There was resentment over, the continuation, with modifications, of some of Vichy's economic framework, its Central Office of Supply and its Organization Committees. Though measures were taken to raise wages, to control prices and to increase direct taxation, and though the methods of the Finance Minister (M. Plevin) were actually modelled on those of Britain in war-time, it was felt that he aimed chiefly at restoring

business confidence. The C.G.T. protested at the inadequacy of wage-rates and the Government's tardiness in carrying out its promised attack on the trusts and "economic feudalism". When a conflict between M. Plevin and M. Mendes-France, the Radical Minister of National Economy, led to the latter's resignation, he complained of political interference by the Bank of France. M. Plevin's victory was regarded as a victory of old-fashioned, Liberal, *laissez-faire* principles" over the new, revolutionary conception of "structural reforms". It was also felt that more radical measures would have ensured a better food supply. In more strictly political fields, the Ministry of Information, the censorship and press organization were criticized. The Government came under strong attack for its decision to prolong for several months the subsidies to "free" (or Catholic) schools, granted by Vichy. This revived in its full force the old clerical-versus-anti-clerical quarrel and nipped in the bud a possible alliance between the Left Catholics and the Socialists, who ranged themselves with the Radicals and Communists against the measure.

In the face of concrete problems of reconstruction, the unity of the Resistance movement disintegrated. It provided French political life with a new spirit, a new team of men, and new general aims rather than with a detailed and practical programme. When the Consultative Assembly took over the Senate House, the old parliamentary parties aligned themselves from Left to Right while the Resistance delegates generally sat in the centre. But though some hoped to see the movement form a permanent political force and some (particularly the Communists) demanded a "single list" of Resistance candidates at elections, no permanent fusion was achieved. The original, numerous and mixed groups, however, sorted themselves out into three or four main bodies of distinct political tendencies. The *Front National*, which claims a vast membership, approximates to the Communist line. Its leading lights (such as M. Debu-Bridel of the Republican Federation) are drawn from varied circles, and it hoped to form the nucleus of a single, united Resistance movement, but in this, too, it follows the present Communist directives and it may itself disintegrate if they change. The M.L.N., has agreed on a near-Socialist policy, rejecting complete State control of industry but demanding measures of socialization. Its membership covers a wide variety of opinion, but falls into two main groups: an active Left minority, which favours union with the F.N.,¹ and a moderate majority, which insists on remaining independent. The most important group within the minority is *Franc-Tireur*, which has infused a

¹ The F.N. and this minority have now (July) come together in a new M.U.R. (*Mouvement Unifié de la Renaissance*).

new vigour into Radicalism and revived its more Left-wing doctrines. The majority includes *Combat*, once the most ardently Gaullist of all movements and then the most disillusioned; it insists that not only nationalization but internationalization of raw materials is the basis of peace. Another moderate Socialist group is the "Labour Union", formed by an alliance of the largely trade-unionist *Libération-Nord* and O.C.M.¹ O.C.M. had at one time an authoritarian, Right-wing tinge, but it has moved to a Socialist position. Its chief publicist has advocated measures which would bring the French political system closer to the American. Many of the members of the Resistance movements are at the same time members of one of the older political parties, but in one case, party and movement have fused. The former Popular Democrats have united with Left Catholic trade-union and underground groups (but not the Young Republic) in the new "Popular Republican Movement" (M.R.P.). It has been strongly—in some opinions, too strongly—represented in the Provisional Government and seems destined to be the chief Catholic party of the future.

The Government ranged from moderate Conservative to Communist, but although the Socialists decided to keep their members in the Cabinet and although the Communist party swung into line early in 1945, the opposition now beginning to take shape was Left-wing in tone. It was at first difficult to tell how far the Left-wing bias of the Consultative Assembly reflected the mood not only of the hard-hit urban districts but of the country as a whole, including the rural districts which had suffered less and even profited by the black market. The municipal elections of April-May gave an answer to this question; they showed that there was a general Leftward swing, most marked in the towns but perceptible throughout the countryside. The answer was, however, confused by the part played by personalities in all local elections, by the permutations and combinations of alliance tried out by the parties and Resistance movements at the first and second ballots, by the difficulty of classifying some of them and by the fact that others fought on vague general platforms and not specific party programmes. The Communists, for instance, did not appear as such but ran under the label "Lists of the Patriotic, Republican, Anti-Facist Union." In some cases, however, these lists included Resistance members, in others Conservatives; and in one instance the Communists allied themselves with the Baron de Rothschild against the Resistance list. In spite of such fluidity, it was obvious that the Socialists and Communists had swept ahead and should they form a single working-class party, their majority would be

¹ The majority of the M.L.N. have now come together with O.C.M. and *Libération-Nord* in a "Democratic and Socialist Resistance Union" (U.D.S.R.).

overwhelming. This idea has been proposed by the Communists but so far opposed by the Socialists. The Left-wing groups were strengthened at the elections by the support of the C.G.T., which to the dismay of some of its supporters thus broke its traditional neutrality. The Republican Federation and the Democratic Alliance showed a sharp decline, due to the association of Right-wing ideas with Vichy, to the widespread feeling that the bourgeois *cadres* had failed, or betrayed, France, and to their own lack of unity and organization. The M.R.P. did well at the first ballot but did not improve its position at the second, when the other Left-wing groups closed their ranks and generally excluded it. The Radical party has its popular heroes, such as M. Herriot, and still controls more *communes* than any other single party, but it was too much bound up with the Third Republic not to share some of its discredit. It lost heavily to the Socialists and its revival is likely to depend on that of the "small men," who have lost their businesses and their savings in the war. The general Leftward trend would have made any frankly reactionary propaganda of the *Action Francaise* type absurdly misplaced, but there were tentative efforts to resuscitate organizations like the P.S.F., with a vaguely revolutionary programme.

It was natural and right that, after the stifling years of German occupation and Vichy rule, Frenchmen should reassert their differences of opinion on the ways of attaining their aims, and it was equally natural and right that they should be united as to those aims—the defeat of Germany and Japan, the re-establishment of France's international position and the building-up of international security. Few would have denied that France needed for the future a more industrialized economy and a larger, younger population. All were agreed that she must secure the Saar and share in the international control of the Rhineland and the Ruhr basin. France was able to renew her traditional Eastern alliance by a treaty with the Soviet Union, which had already granted to the F.C.N.L. fuller recognition than had this country or the United States. To the extreme Left, this seemed to offer a sufficient basis of security, but the majority of Frenchmen are anxious for a Western alliance as well. Relations with Britain and with the United States have been close and cordial, despite a suspicion that Britain has fostered Arab Nationalist claims and aspirations at the expense of French interests in the Levant and that the United States is unwilling to see all the French colonial bases and Indo-China restored to French sovereignty. Such friction was the natural result of the years of separation and of humiliation, and France found it easier to renew her contacts with the smaller Powers who had shared her fate. Those years could not be obliterated at one stroke and she felt their burden in other ways. It was a bitter

blow to French enthusiasm and to French pride that France could not equip more forces, that, as General de Gaulle put it, she could wield only a broken sword or a borrowed blade. Yet her First Army played a brilliant part in the advance into Southern Germany and as this final onslaught was being made, she took her rightful place again in the council of nations. She will contribute her experience and her restored power to the organization of peace. When, on May 7th, the Allies accepted the unconditional surrender of Germany, France and Britain stood side by side, as they had stood in 1914—18 and in 1939-40, bound by a common striving towards the same ideals.

APPENDIX I
NAMES WHICH RECUR IN THE TEXT

- BARTHOU, L. (1861-1934.) Member Democratic Alliance. Minister of Foreign Affairs February 1934. Assassinated November 1934.
- BLUM, L. b. 1872. Lawyer and author. Leader of French Socialists (S.F.I.O.). First Socialist Prime Minister 1936-37 and in 1938. Tried at Riom 1942. Deported to Germany. Freed May 1945.
- BOULANGER, GENERAL. (1837-1891.) Professional soldier. Entered politics and swept to popularity. Minister of War 1886. Elected deputy by six constituencies 1888, and by Paris 1889. Threatened *coup d'etat* but fled.
- BRIAND, A. (1862-1932.) Republican Socialist leader. Prime Minister 1909-11, 1915-17, 1921-22. Dominated French foreign policy 1925 onwards, in Locarno period.
- DE BRINON, F. b. 1887. Journalist, advocate of Franco-German collaboration, admirer of Hitler, sponsor of *Comite France-Allemagne*. Interned 1939. After collapse Vichy "Ambassador" to Paris and Secretary of State 1942-44.
- BUCARD, M. b. 1895. Distinguished service 1914-18. Journalist and founder of *Francisme*.
- CLEMENCEAU, G. (1841-1929.) Physician. Great Radical leader. Member of National Assembly 1870. *Dreyfusard*. Prime Minister 1906-9. Led France to victory as Prime Minister and Minister of War 1917-20, and played a major part in Versailles settlement.
- DALADIER, E. b. 1884. Mayor of Orange. Radical leader. Prime Minister 1933, early 1934 and April 1938-March 1940. Tried at Riom 1942. Deported to Germany. Freed May 1945.
- DARLAN, ADMIRAL F. (1881-1942.) Professional naval officer. Chief of Naval General Staff December 1936-40. Minister of Marine June 16th, 1940. Vice-President Cabinet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, etc., February 1941-April 1942. Pétain's heir and head of Vichy forces 1941-November 1942. Set up as High Commissioner for French Africa November 1942. Assassinated December 1942.
- DARNAND, J. b. 1898. *Cagoulard* and extreme Right-wing "collaborator". Founder of S.O.L., Head of French Militia 1942-43. Secretary for General Security and head of police 1943-44.
- DEAT, M. b. 1894. Teacher of philosophy and journalist. Deputy (S.F.I.O.). Founder Neo-Socialist Group. Minister for Air January-June 1936. Paris "collaborator" and founder of R.N.P. and M.R.N. Minister of Labour 1944. Escaped to Germany 1944.
- DEBU-BRIDEL, J. Member of Republican Federation. Resistance leader, pseud. "Argonne". Member of Communist-inspired *Front National*.
- DELONCLE, E. b. 1890. Industrialist and engineer. Founder C.S.A.R. and M.S.R.
- DORIOT, J. (1888-1945.) Former Communist Deputy and Mayor of St Denis. Founder P.P.F. "Collaborator" active in both zones. Escaped to Germany, killed in air-raid 1945.
- DOUMERGUE, G. (1863-1937.) Radical Deputy 1893 onwards. Ministerial posts 1902 onwards. Senator 1910. President of Republic 1924-31. Prime Minister 1934.
- DREYFUS, CAPTAIN A. (1859-1935.) Professional soldier. Jew by religion. Arrested 1894 on treason charge, wrongfully condemned; sentence quashed 1906. Case divided France into two camps, for and against re-trial.

- FAURE, p. b. 1878. Secretary-General of S.F.I.O. Deputy. Minister 1936. Leader of pacifist Socialists 1914-18 and 1940. Excluded from S.F.I.O. November 1944.
- FLANDIN, P. E. b. 1889. Member Democratic Alliance. Centre leader. Minister of Finance 1931-32. Prime Minister 1934-35. Minister 1935-36. Minister of Foreign Affairs January-June 1936. Strongly pro-Munich. Vichy Minister of Foreign Affairs December 1940-February 1941.
- GAMBETTA, L. (1838-1882.) Lawyer. Republican and Radical leader. Proclaimed Republic 1870. Member Government of National Defence 1871. President Chamber of Deputies 1879. Prime Minister 1881.
- DE GAULLE, GENERAL c. b. 1890. Professional soldier; distinguished service 1914-18, 1939-40. Advocate of mechanization. Secretary-General to Supreme Council of Defence 1932-36. Under-Secretary of State for Defence May 1940. C.-in-C. Free and Fighting French forces 1940-43. President F.N.C. (1941), F.C.N.L. (1943) and Head of Provisional Government September 1944.
- GIRAUD, GENERAL H. b. 1879. Professional soldier; distinguished service 1914-18, 1939-40. Prisoner of war 1940. Escaped. C.-in-C. French forces in North Africa 1942. High Commissioner December 1942. Joint President F.N.C.L. 1943. C.-in-C. 1943-44. Now retired.
- GUESDE, J. (1845-1922.) Leader of Marxist wing of French Socialists and S.F.I.O. Minister without Portfolio 1914-15.
- HENRIOT, P. Leader of anti-Republican, defeatist elements of Republican Federation. "Collaborator". Minister for Information 1944.
- HERRIOT, E. b. 1872. Mayor of Lyons 1905-41, 1945. Radical leader. President of Chamber of Deputies 1936-2. Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs 1924-25, 1932. Minister 1926-28, 1934-36. Deported to Germany. Freed April 1945.
- JAURES, J. (1859-1914.) Great leader of reformist wing of French Socialists. Pacifist, but patriotic belief in "nation in arms." *Dreyfusard*. Assassinated 1914.
- JOUHAUX, L. b. 1879. Secretary-General C.G.T. 1909-40. Reformist. Deported to Germany. Freed May 1945.
- DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY, GENERAL. b. 1889. Professional soldier; distinguished service 1914-18, 1939-40. Attempted resistance to total occupation 1942. Escaped to North Africa. Commander, First Army. Commander-in-chief 1944-. Signed document ratifying unconditional surrender of Germany.
- LAVAL, P. b. 1883. Lawyer. Mayor of Aubervilliers. Opportunist. Began as revolutionary Socialist but became "independent", leaning more and more to Right. Advocated Italian, later German alliance. Senator 1926-40. Ministerial posts under Painleve, Briand, Tardieu. Prime Minister 1931-32. Minister of Foreign Affairs 1932, 1934-35. Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs June 1935-January 1936. Vice-President Cabinet June 23rd-December 13th, 1940. Plain's heir, Chief of Government, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Information April 1942. Acquired full powers November 1942. Escaped to Germany and Spain 1944-45.
- LEBRUN, A. b. 1871. Ministerial posts 1911-19. Senator 1920 onwards. President of Republic 1932. Re-elected for seven years, April 1939. Withdrew from public life after French collapse.
- LYAUTEY, MARSHAL H. (1854-1934.) Professional soldier and great colonial administrator. Minister of War 1916. Resident-General in Morocco 1912-26.
- MACMAHON, MARSHAL. (1808-1893.) Professional soldier. Succeeded Thiers as President of Provisional Republic 1873, In 1877 provoked crisis of May 16th. Resigned 1879.

- MAGINOT, A. Minister of War 1928, responsible for Maginot defences.
- MARQUET, A. b. 1886. Mayor of Bordeaux. Associate of Deat and Laval. Neo-Socialist. Minister of Interior July-September 1940.
- MAURRAS, c. b. 1868. Polemist and author. Monarchist leader. Editor of *Action Francaise* 1908-44. Provided in his paper the basis of Vichy doctrine. Condemned for intelligence with enemy 1945.
- MILLERAND, A. (1859-1944.) Republican-Socialist. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister January-September 1920. President of the Republic 1920-24. Overthrown for political interference. Since leader of Republican Federation group in Senate.
- RETAIN, MARSHAL P. b. 1856. Professional soldier since 1878; distinguished service 1914-18, especially at Verdun. Vice-President Supreme Council of War, 1920-30. Member of Supreme Council of Defence 1931 onwards. Minister of War 1934. Ambassador, Madrid 1939-40. Vice-Prime Minister under Reynaud May 1940. Prime Minister June 16th, 1940. Head of French State 1940-44.
- POINCARE, R. (1860-1934.) Great Centre leader. Ministerial posts 1893 onwards. Prime Minister 1911-13. President of the Republic 1913-20, Prime Minister 1922-24, 1926-28, 1928-29.
- PUCHEU, p. (1899-1944.) Business man. Vichy Minister of Production 1941, Minister of Interior July 1941-April 1942. Condemned for "collaboration" and executed, Algiers, March 1944.
- REYNAUD, P. b. 1878. Lawyer. Member Democratic Alliance till October 1938. Ministerial posts 1930 onwards in Right-wing Governments. Minister of Justice, then Finance, under Daladier April 1938-March 1940. Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and National Defence March-June 1940. Deported to Germany. Freed 1945.
- DE LA ROQUE, COLONEL C. b. 1887. Professional soldier, distinguished service 1914-18. Founder Fascist League *Croix de Feu* (Fiery Cross) and P.S.F. Petainist. Active in Unoccupied Zone. Imprisoned by Germans 1943 and deported. Freed May 1945.
- SARRAUT, A. b. 1872. Member of great Radical family of Toulouse. Deputy 1902-24. Senator 1926 onwards. Many ministerial posts and Governor-General Indo-China 1911, 1916-19. Minister of Colonies 1920-24. Prime Minister 1933, January-June 1936. Arrested by Germans 1944.
- STAVISKY, S. (1886-1934.) Shady financier believed to enjoy connections with and protection of Government. Scandal caused fall of Radical Cabinet and riots, February 1934.
- TARDIEU, A. b. 1876. "Protege" of Clemenceau, Poincare. Part-author Versailles Treaty. Nationalist; "independent*" but depended in fact on Right Centre; founded small Right-wing group. Authoritarian. Prime Minister 1929-30, 1932.
- THIERS, A. (1797-1877.) Statesman and historian. Founder, Executive Head and President of Provisional Republic 1870-73.
- WEYGAND, GENERAL M. b. 1867. Professional soldier since 1888. Chief of Staff to Foch 1914-23. Chief of General Staff 1930. Vice-President Supreme Council of National Defence 1931-35. C.G.S. and C.-in-C. May-June 1940. Minister of National Defence June 15th-September 1940. Delegate-General North Africa 1940-41. Deported to Germany. Freed May 1945.
- YBARNEGARAY, J. b. 1883. Lawyer. Member of Republican Federation and P.S.F. Ministerial posts May-September 1940. Deported to Germany. Freed May 1945.

APPENDIX II

GLOSSARY OF POLITICAL TERMS AND INITIALS

- ATTENTISME:** Term coined by Deat in Paris press attacks to characterize Vichy's "wait and see" policy.
- B.C.R.A.:** *Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action*. Started 1941 by Col. Passy to co-ordinate underground with Free French and Allied action.
- BONAPARTISM:** Loyalty to Bonaparte dynasty (Napoleon I and III) or to their type of authoritarian, militaristic regime, based on popular plebiscites.
- BOULANGISM:** Loyalty to General Boulanger (q.v.) or to authoritarian, plebiscitary Republicanism represented by him.
- CAGOULARDS:** "Hooded Men"—see C.S.A.R.
- C.F.T.C.:** *Confederation Francaise des Travailleurs Chretiens*. Central body of Catholic Trade Union movement, founded 1919.
- C.G.T.:** *Confederation Ginirale du Travail*. Central body of Trade Union movement, founded 1902. Merged with C.G.T.U. 1936.
- C.G.T.U.:** *Confederation Ginirale du Travail Unitaire*. Central body of Communist Trade Union movement 1921-36.
- C.N.R.:** *Conseil National de la Risistance*. Central, directing organization of Resistance 1943 onwards.
- COLLABORATION:** Policy of Franco-German rapprochement, after French collapse, or any action by Frenchmen tightening the economic, political or military hold of Germany on France.
- COMMUNE:** Unit of local government. Often refers to revolutionary Paris Commune of 1871.
- C.S.A.R.:** *Comitis Secrets d' Action Rivolutionnaire*. Anti-Republican terrorist movement suppressed 1937, revived by Deloncle as *Mouvement Social Rivolutionnaire* (M.S.R.) after collapse.
- DREYFUSISM AND ANTI-DREYFUSISM:** see Dreyfus.
- F.C.N.L.:** (Fr. C.F.N.L.) French Committee of National Liberation set up in Algiers 1943, to replace F.N.C. and Giraud's administration.
- F.F.I.:** *Forces Francaises de l'Interieur*. Unified military organization of Resistance movements, afterwards merged into the army.
- F.N.C.:** (Fr. C.N.F.) French National Committee 1941-43; replaced Free French Council for the Defence of the Empire (1940-41).
- FRANCISTES:** Fascist League founded by Bucard 1933, suppressed 1936, revived 1941.
- F.T.P.F.:** *Franco-Tireurs et Partisans Francais*. Communist-inspired military organization, later merged into F.F.I., without losing its identity.
- G.P.:** *Gardes Patriotiques*. Underground militia used after liberation for police purposes.
- JACOBINISM:** from Jacobin clubs, founded in Paris and then provinces, 1789 onwards, which became more and more powerful and extreme. Their ideal was both revolutionary and patriotic and aimed at creating strong, centralized State. Hence Jacobinism—loyalty to similar ideal.
- M.L.N.:** *Mouvement de Liberation Nationale*, Resistance movement formed by fusion of M.U.R. and three Resistance movements of North zone, 1942
- M.R.N.:** *Milices Rivolutionnaires Nationales*. Deat's unified militia.
- M.R.P.:** *Mouvement Ripublicain Populaire*. Left Catholic movement uniting former Popular Democrats, Catholic underground movement and Trade Unions. -

- M.U.R.: *Mouvements unis de la Resistance*. Unified Resistance movement of South Zone, grouping *Combat*, *Liberation*, *Franc-Tireur*. Later merged in M.L.N. For a later use of these initials, see footnote p. 98.
- o.c.m.: *Organisation Civile et Militaire*. North Zone Resistance movement of authoritarian, later socialist tendencies.
- POPULAR FRONT: Alliance of Radical, Socialist and Communist parties formed at *Rassemblement Populaire* of 1935. Agreed on anti-Fascist "reformist" programme and won elections of 1936. First P.F. Government (1936-37) mainly Socialist, its successors mainly Radical.
- P.P.F.: *Parti Populaire Francais*. Founded by Doriot 1936. Existed in both Zones after 1940, but known in south as *Mouvement Populaire Francais*.
- P.S.F.: *Parti Social Francais*. Party formed by La Rocque on dissolution of *Croix de Feu*. After collapse existed in Unoccupied Zone as *Progrhs Social Francais*. Most of its leaders arrested by Germans in 1943.
- RELBVE: "changing the guard." Policy of sending workers to Germany in exchange for prisoners of war.
- R.N.P.: *Rassemblement National Populaire*. Debt's (would-be) Single Party, formed in Occupied Zone after collapse.
- S.F.I.C.: *Section Francaise de l'Internationale Communiste*. Communist Party, formed by adherence of main body of S.F.I.O. to Third (Communist) International in 1920.
- S.F.I.O.: *Section Francaise de l'Internationale Ouvriere*. Socialist Party, formed by union of French Socialist groups in 1905.
- S.O.L.: *Service d'Ordre Legionnaire*. Extremist shock troops formed by Darnand from elements of *Ugion Francaise*. Fought Allies in North Africa. Later reorganized as "French Militia".
- SYNDICALISM: Doctrine of "direct", not political, action by Trade Unions culminating in revolution by a general strike.
- U.D.S.R.: see footnote p. 99.
- U.R.D.: *Union Republicaine Democratique*. Name used by chief group of Right-wing Deputies representing the conservative Republican Federation in Chamber.

APPENDIX III

BRIEF LIST OF BOOKS (IN ENGLISH)

General

- Bodley, J. E. C.: FRANCE. 1898. Macmillan. 2 vols.
- Dutton, R., and Holden, L.: THE LAND OF FRANCE. 1939. Batsford. 9s. 6d.
- Fleure, H. J.: FRENCH LIFE AND ITS PROBLEMS. 1943. Hachette. 3s. 6d.
- Maillaud, P.: FRANCE (World Today Series). 1942. O.U.P. 3s. 6d.
- Ritchie, R. L. G. (ed.): FRANCE (Companion for Modern Studies.) Methuen. 20s.
- Siegfried, A.: FRANCE, A STUDY IN NATIONALITY. 1930. Yale University Press (Milford). 9s.

Historical

- Marriott, J. A. R.: A SHORT HISTORY OF FRANCS. 1942. Methuen. 15s.
- Thompson, J. M.: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 1943. Blackwell. 32s. 6d.
- Tilley, A. (ed.): MEDIEVAL FRANCE. 1922. Cambridge University Press. 35s.
MODERN FRANCE. 1922. Cambridge University Press. 35s.
- Woodward, E. L.: FRENCH REVOLUTIONS. 1934. O.U.P. 7s. 6d.

The Third Republic

- Brogan, D. W.: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN FRANCE (1870-1939). 1940. Hamish Hamilton. 21s.
- Middleton, W. L.: THE FRENCH POLITICAL SYSTEM. 1932. Benn. 12s. 6d.
- Pickles, D.: THE FRENCH POLITICAL SCENE (Nelson Discussion Books No. 15). 1938. Nelson. 2s. 6d.
- Vaucher, P.: POST-WAR FRANCE. 1934. O.U.P. (Home University). 3s.
- Werth, A.: THE TWILIGHT OF FRANCE 1933-40. 1942. Hamish Hamilton. 12s. 6d.

Foreign Policy

- Jordan, W. M.: GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM 1918-39, 1943. O.U.P. 15s.
- Thomson, D.: FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY. (Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs No. 67). 1944. O.U.P. 6d.
- Wolfers, A.: BRITAIN AND FRANCE BETWEEN TWO WARS. 1940. Harcourt. Brace & Co. (N.Y.) \$3.75.

Events Since 1939¹

- Armstrong, H. F.: CHRONOLOGY OF FAILURE. 1940. Macmillan (N.Y.). \$1 • 50.
- Edelman, M.: FRANCE: BIRTH OF THE FOURTH REPUBLIC. 1944. Penguin. 9d.
- Fortune, G. and W.: HITLER DIVIDED FRANCE. 1943. Macmillan. 6s.
- de Gaulle, C.: SPEECHES, VOL. I. 1942. O.U.P. 3s. 6d.
- de Gaulle, C.: SPEECHES, VOL. II. 1943. O.U.P. 3s. 6d.
- de Grand' Combe, F.: THE THREE YEARS OF FIGHTING FRANCE. 1943. Wells Gardner. 1s.
- Le Verrier, M. Gex: FRANCE IN TORMENT. 1942. Hamish Hamilton. 6s.
- Levy, L.: THE TRUTH ABOUT FRANCE. 1941. Penguin. 9d.
- Marchal, L.: VICHY: TWO YEARS OF DECEPTION. 1943. Macmillan. 12s. 6d.
- Tissier, P.: THE GOVERNMENT OF VICHY. 1942. Harrap. 15s.

¹ The books in this list all contain interesting information and impressions. No authoritative work on the period has yet been published, but more substantial studies such as Kammerer, A.: LA VERITE SUR L'ARMISTICE (Paris 1944) are now beginning to appear.

