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IDEA-MEN OF TODAY

IDEA-MEN OF TODAY

By VINCENT EDWARD SMITH

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To VIRGINIA

Whose Insights Rival Her Inspiration

FOREWORD

The disagreements, vagueness, instability, and complexity of contemporary thought have long discouraged the careful scholar from attempting an over-all book that could pass as a history of recent and present-day philosophy. The hope for such a work is by no means the aim of this volume.

The much less pretentious claims of the present study can be understood from its genesis as a whole. It began as a series of summaries for college discussion groups, and though greatly expanded and even supplemented with new topics, it still remains a series of essays outlining the basic principles of present-day philosophers. The student and the educated layman, unwilling and — without direction — unable to read through the vast output of contemporary philosophers, have not had a satisfactory guidebook toward a general view of present-day thought, apart from its historical and systematic detail.

Part I traces the background to the contemporary scene, though — again as an incomplete history — those doctrines alone have been stressed that have important and direct relevance to the issues in the present.

Parts II and III, grouping present-day philosophies for one reason or another into two large families, discuss fifteen present-day thinkers, typical, important, influential, prominent when not in doctrine at least in influence. In these two sections the primary objective is to outline the basic principles of the various philosophers with criticism interspersed only where it clarifies exposition. Each chapter is then followed by a skeleton of critical remarks, in accordance with the original study-club purposes of the essays. In the criticisms, every effort is made to be constructive before taking issue with the men involved. The negative criticisms in each case

are aimed at one or more of the doctrines which show what viewpoints of the philosophies in question are either wrong or inadequate for sound reason.

Part IV sketches two issues that were found weaving their way throughout preceding chapters.

To his wife, the author is profoundly indebted not only for her constant encouragement but for her critical assistance as well. The manuscript was read by Dr. James Collins, of St. Louis University, and the Rev. Dr. Ferrer Smith, O.P., of the Dominican House of Studies, Washington, D. C. Though the author bears the responsibility for the final form of the book, he wishes to point how immeasurably he has been helped by these discerning readers and to thank them sincerely for their care and competence.

A great debt is owed to Mr. J. Paul Spaeth for technical and moral support in building this book from a series of short essays. Gratitude is expressed to the sisters of the author for typing the final draft of the manuscript.

Finally, thanks are also due to the editors of *The Thomist* and of *Thought* for permission to borrow portions of articles which the author wrote for their pages and has here used in Part III.

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IDEA-MEN OF TODAY

PART I

CHAPTER 1 THE EBBING OF A TIDE

Philosophy does not surge up out of a vacuum, and it never appears ready made. Born of man's tormented search through the world and through his own self, it matures by digesting what other minds have found in the depths of the real. It thrives on experience and also on the reports about experience which other minds have made and which must ever be submitted to experiential check. A philosophy takes a long time to grow. It usually takes a long time to die.

When a philosophy is infected with grave error, it is rather easy to do an autopsy after it dies and to localize the germs that cost its life. However, where truth meets a death of neglect and exposure and rejection, the post mortem is very much more difficult. It never wholly succeeds.

Scholastic thought came to remarkable grips with deep truth in the thirteenth century and held the line, more or less, for a hundred years before beginning to let go. Two centuries later, it had virtually lost its hold upon both reality and the minds of men. But why did it relax, or rather why did men release it? The transition from the medieval to the modern age is even more baffling to the historian of ideas than to the chronicler of events.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF DOUBT

One of the longest shadows between the medieval and modern outlooks is certainly the period of the Renaissance. The Humanists,

who charmed the European mind from the late fourteenth to the early seventeenth century, were much more than literary critics. The Renaissance was a cultural, social, political, and philosophical movement. It was certainly theological. By the time it had flown its course, the European mind had lost altitude and began to busy itself about the world at the world's own level. Somewhere within the minds and hearts of the leading Humanists are at least trickles of the major doctrines now flooding through present-day thought.

The Renaissance in general turned men from a universe of hierarchy and fixed their eyes on things of this world alone. It came to exalt nature skimmed off from its higher causes and discoverable meanings, and when it philosophized about man, it urged him to turn inward for experiences closer to a natural "mysticism" than to a rational and scientific knowledge. It gloried over social and political life, to the detriment of monasticism. Its attention to purely secular value came to another focus at the point which many of the Humanists made of experience and even of experiment as something ultimate. Modern empiriological* methods came into being as the Renaissance closed; Galileo died in 1642, and Newton was born the same year. The beauty and power of mathematics were likewise impressive to Renaissance man. In general, wherever the Renaissance spread, it abetted a skeptical view of the intellect. It did not glorify reason, as modern slogans say, but belittled it. Beauty was lifted above truth as a human aim, and the stress on experience strained reason itself into the background.

René Descartes (1596–1650) appeared on philosophy's eastern horizon as the Renaissance was setting in the west. Actually, Descartes's broader ideas had been dawning in European thought for several centuries, and Etienne Gilson has shown how immensely this new philosopher, rebelling against scholasticism, actually

* This term, taken from Jacques Maritain, will be used henceforth to characterize the empirio-mathematical methods of what is called "modern science." To speak of "empirical method" does not remind us that "modern science" is also theoretical. *Empiriological* will be taken to include both the theoretical and experimental aspects of the modern "scientific" approach to the real. So-called "scientific method" will be called empiriological method. After all if philosophy is also a science, the term "science" should not be reserved for such studies as physics and chemistry and biology alone.

Scientism will later be used to characterize empiriology when it is elevated into a complete philosophy. It goes without saying that it is scientism and not the empiriological method in its proper place that genuine philosophy opposes.

borrowed from his enemies. But for practical purposes, Descartes can be viewed as a starting point to sketch in the background of present-day philosophy, even if the later scholastics foreshadowed him and even if the story of the Renaissance is necessary to draw the picture of modern philosophy to full scale. It was Descartes's achievement to have sown important ideas which passed into the modern tradition and which live on not as answers but more as problems which each new generation of philosophers seems vainly trying to solve.

The seeds are in a core. And the core of the Cartesian fruit is a view of knowledge. Amid conflicting opinions which divided philosophers and called for stern norms to settle truth once and for all, Descartes decided to question all fact and all principle and, on a rigid ground, to make a new beginning for human thought. But the old ground had to be cleared; an absolutely new beginning could not accept any pre-existing material of fact and principle. This old ground Descartes vacuum-swept with a universal methodic doubt, calling all views into question in order to elaborate a methodic deduction of genuine truth.

But a universal doubt, even if only methodic, had its drawbacks already for Descartes. He seemed fully aware that to doubt everything would never give thought a basement for a new beginning. The grounds would not only be swept clean; there would be no grounds left. Even Descartes had to have at least one positivity to initiate a reconstruction or to initiate anything. This pivotal and positive evidence Descartes reached in the principle, *cogito, ergo sum* (I think, therefore I exist).

The fact of his own subjectivity, Descartes felt that he could not question in the sweep of his doubt. Whatever thinks exists—such evidence seemed to Descartes as plain as day. Had he carried his doubt to the bitter end, he should, of course, have doubted his thought, his existence, and the "ergo" that coupled them. It remained for Hume to turn the Cartesian method on this residue of truth that Descartes left undoubted and to darken philosophy into the complete skepticism. Whether logical or not, Descartes took the *cogito, ergo sum* as a self-styled "first principle," and from it he attempted to derive all other truth.

It would be tempting here to track Descartes's footsteps as he argued to the existence of God and to the reality of a universe

beyond his thought. But this chapter can only be concerned with the aspects of earlier modern philosophers that provide direct background for the problems and principles which the ensuing chapters will bring to a contemporary focus. The typical present-day philosophy will turn out to be a fragment of that dynamite of doubt which Descartes released into western thought. In general, the contemporary intellectual will prefer to begin his philosophy by thinking about himself. He will want the problem of knowledge to be settled before his mind can be trusted to explore reality. He will be skeptical in spirit.

Descartes, even when his head was in philosophy, always had his heart in mathematics. What he wanted, as a philosopher, was the peculiar kind of deductive proof which can only be enjoyed in the science of quantity. But even mathematics can never be purely deductive; a datum is needed to begin the derivation, some intuitive grip on facts and principles which are then developed by mathematical rule. The reduction of all knowledge to the *cogito* was nothing but the quest for an intuition from which, with mathematical nicety, everything else could be deduced. Descartes was conscious of this dream to model philosophy along geometrical lines. He held out the hope that, by a mathematical method of cross-questioning, nature would deliver her innermost secrets.

Mathematical reality is clear and distinct. So, Descartes seemed to think, was his *cogito, ergo sum.* This mathematician among philosophers came to think the clarity and distinctness of ideas tested whether they are true. So much alive has Descartes remained that when logical positivism (Chapter 6) defines philosophy it invokes the Cartesian idea of "clarification." Philosophy is made to deal with the clarifying of sentences.

In the realm of psychology, the net effect of Cartesianism was the separation of the soul from the body of man, thus returning across Aristotle to the Platonic view. For Descartes, the essence of mind is thought or, more properly, "a thinking thing." The essence of body, human and otherwise, is extension. So much obsessed with the nature of thought that he really cut mind away from body, Descartes was a radical dualist, and this character was a blight that he passed down to his present-day descendants. For Descartes the body became a machine; and mechanism quickly exploited such an opening. The mind was off in its private world,

unable to span the gap to external reality; modern idealism was being born.

It remained for the successors of Descartes to follow through to idealism, for he himself accepted an external world. But what kind of world could a disembodied "thinking thing" accept? Without a final character, the Cartesian world was mathematical enough, but unfortunately it was not a world. It was, like man's body, nothing but quantity. Mechanics, Descartes claimed, was the philosophy of nature, and mechanics for him meant geometry, the deductive, the clear-cutness of circles and squares and points. Descartes favored the practice, now come to full maturity, of abandoning the study of matter to mathematical physics. If the world is sheer quantity, then mathematics and not philosophy is the agency to study it; and, of course, where final causes are banished from physics, the way to attack matter is to look not outside of it but within it, smashing it like the atomists of our atomic age.

Descartes stripped the world of its inner significance and made it a potential thing exploitable by the genius of man. By its insight into form, the great scholastic thought was able to say that the world is an imitation of God and that every being is somehow a reflection of His Thought, invested thus with an eternal significance. Descartes turned his back on this intelligible and meaningful universe. His effect was to deny form. He forged a world where things are in no way dependent on God's intellect but only on His will. This robbed the realities of our universe of that inner meaning and nature which Aquinas so robustly described in them. It denied their intrinsic intelligibility and opened the experimental road of studying things not in themselves but only in terms of outside determinants. It shook faith in that eternity of truth which even God's will cannot change. When the eternal character of truth is discarded, all there is to truth goes with it.

By Descartes's time, the spirit of philosophy had, of course, come a long way from its earlier summits. With Descartes, the descent became more rapid than ever. He stalks through the whole of modern scientism which has been largely the pursuance of his doubts, his methods, and his dualism.

But underneath the mathematical formalism of Descartes, there is another tendency that has only recently reached its tidal stage. While stressing the discursive and the deductive, Descartes also had

an intuitionist strain that is at variance with his larger views. For example, his "first principle" stands out as an intuition, and in discussing ideas, he steered toward the view that they are innate. He distinguished between an idea, objectively (or materially) considered where it is a state of mind and formally considered where it refers to something beyond itself, to an object. He attached considerable importance to the idea in its material sense, giving it an existential tone.

It is the intuitive side of Cartesianism, the *cogito* principle and the doctrine of ideas, that prefigures a doctrine now running counter to scientism and called existentialism (Chapters 10–14). Existentialists will turn out not to be so concerned with the *cogito* of Descartes as with the *sum*.

In his view of will, Descartes again prepared the way for existentialism. He emphasized the experienced character of will. He pointed to it as indivisible and hence ineffable. He ranked it higher and nobler than intelligence. His final system thus has two sides, although he showed the one only at intervals and, as a mathematician, would have preferred to submerge it into mathematical forms if only he could have done so.

THE DESCENT TO SENSISM

Cartesianism migrated to England and there, beginning with John Locke (1632–1704), had a checkered career. Locke had inherited the tradition of British empiricism which had come down through Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes. It is Locke's concern with the problem of knowledge that sets him in the broad shadows of Descartes.

Locke's chief accomplishment in metaphysics was to deny the validity of man's ideas on substance. Though he did not deny that substances exist, he came to hold that the mind knows only its ideas of substances and not the substances themselves. Thwarted in the aim of explaining and proving an intellectual knowledge of the outer world, Locke descended to a type of sensism that rejoined the ancient stream of British empiricism.

He made an historical distinction, suggested by Descartes and hazarded by Galileo in empiriological physics, between secondary qualities, like color and sound which are known only by one sense, and primary qualities, like extension and movement, which several

senses can grasp. The primary qualities, he went on, are objective, but the secondary ones are formally in the mind and not in the objects. The empiriological verdict that color, for example, is only waves and corpuscles emanating from an object and impinging on the retina to form an image, has prompted many a philosopher since Locke's day to march along behind him.

Since Descartes's time the philosophical program that he launched has been a stopgap adventure. His sons and grandsons and great-grandsons have been irritated by his failure to go all the way in his subjectivism, his radical dualism, and his mechanism of mere quantity. In a large measure, modern philosophy has been a process of making Descartes more Cartesian, plugging up the loopholes that he left by his denials and by his doubt. Thus it is, for instance, that George Berkeley (1685–1753) drove home a decision that Locke had stopped short in applying his principles. If the subject does not know external substances but only his ideas of them, then what right has he to conclude that outer things apart from the ideas really exist? If objectivity is denied to secondary qualities, then why not go logically on to the view that primary qualities are also subjective?

Berkeley thus took Locke's Cartesianism and squeezed it dry until a pure idealism remained. To be known, things require mind, he reasoned, and they are thus somehow in a subject. But to give them an external rank was for Berkeley a complete gratuity, prompted by the inadequacies of our language. In a more positive way, Berkeley held out that spirituality alone is real and that the stuff which looks like matter is actually a world of ideas. *Esse est percipi:* to be is to be perceived. The reality of the human spirit, Berkeley did not deny. He held to the existence of a soul, of ideas, of God as the cause of both. But with this spiritual frontier, Berkeley's world came to an end. He was in reality a Lockean and remotely a Cartesian, charging both men to be consistent.

But a loophole remained, and far more significant on the modern scene than Berkeley is a man who in a way did for him what he had done for Locke. He is David Hume (1711–1776), skeptic and sensist, who once again diverted Descartes to meet British empiricism. Berkeley had denied the reality of external things, but spiritual substance he left standing amid the denials. Hume tightened up the methodic rigor which Descartes had

demanded. How, he asked of Berkeley's idealism, can even spiritual substances be known to exist? Hume saw the natural fact, which Aristotle had emphasized against Plato, that all knowledge must begin in the sense world and that spirit, when known and defined, must be referred at least by contrast to the direct experience of matter.

But Hume began in the sense world and, unlike Aristotle, never got out of it. In his divisions of knowledge, he defined impressions and ideas as perceptions. Impressions are in general what traditional philosophy has called sensations, but they also include emotions. Ideas, the work of spirit in Aristotle and Berkeley alike, are defined by Hume as "faint images" of impressions. For Hume, the idea of substance becomes but the image of collected qualities which the senses piece together from their impressions; this sense image of a substance, as an aggregate, holds true if the substance is matter or "spirit." Hence, Hume is a sensist. He has Descartes's ambitions but he roots his "first principle" in the sense order which he never grows beyond.

The notion of cause would naturally be a problem for a man of Hume's bias. To be a cause is to be a substance at work in the outer order and, by the abstractions which deal with causality, there is an effective sign of mind's spirituality. Descartes had denied true finality, but he left motor causality as an admitted fact. To banish the idea of the efficient cause from modern thought remained for Hume to accomplish.

Hume said that causality is nothing but sequence. When two events succeed one another often enough in time, he argued, the mind is led to "expect" the second thing to follow the first by the tyranny of habit. The trees are rocking in the wind, say—a fact which would lead normally to the conclusion that the wind is *causing* the movement. But no, Hume argues, the sway of the trees is not *because* of the blowing but simply *after* it. When this process is observed several times, habit forces us to expect one event upon the occurrence of another. This, according to Hume, is mistakenly believed to be a causal connection by the ordinary mind. Members of a so-called causal sequence are simply associated with each other, and Hume's philosophy is properly called Associationism.

With the Humean dismissal of substance and cause, the world

becomes but a series of phenomena, succeeding one another in space and time, and mind is melted down to a sheer stream of states, unable to identify itself as the spiritual reality which Berkeley had left it to be. Such notions as Hume's pierced deeply into modern philosophy, especially in Britain and America. Today, substances and causes are generally regarded as superstitions. Today, it is conventional to enshrine Hume as having decreed the final word against their rights to a hearing in philosophy.

The empiriological methods have welcomed Hume for taking the world to be phenomena; Hume has become the excuse to substitute descriptions of things for truly causal inquiries. Expectation as the grounds for so-called causal connections led Hume to conclude that knowledge is valid when it predicts phenomena, announcing what to expect. This view is an appropriate account of present-day physical theories which are taken not as explanations but as tools to forecast future experiment. In psychology, Hume split the unity of man even more than Descartes. He abetted the atomism of the behaviorists and of the Freudians which long afterward emerged. He hardened the skeptical, sensistic, materialistic bias of modern Anglo-American thought.

THE RISE OF RATIONALISM

Meanwhile in continental Europe, Descartes did not lie buried. Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) was haunted by Cartesian mathematical methods until he reached a philosophy that reads something like a textbook in Euclidian geometry. In the attempt to repair the disaster of Cartesian dualism, he took the extreme view that not only is man a single unit but that absolutely everything is a single substance. Though a definite influence on later German idealism and an attraction for Bergson, Spinoza is alive today more by his method than his doctrine. For his contemporary vitality, the most important of Descartes's successors on the continent was Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716).

Like Descartes, Leibniz was an eminent mathematician and even dreamed of reducing logic to mathematics, forming a universal calculus.

Descartes had left a disjointed world to torture man's perennial thirst for the unity in his universe. Soul and body, mind and matter, and even—with the Cartesian rejection of form—God and the

world were sliced off from each other, and it was obvious that the more Cartesian one became the less synthetic he would have to be. Or else one could be arbitrary and halfhearted like Descartes.

Leibniz viewed the world as much more active than Cartesian quantity could picture it, and at its base, he posited atoms of activity called monads. Where Cartesian quantity makes matter passive, monads are indivisible dynamic units; inertia yields to dynamism. Where Cartesian matter was all alike, the monads all differ among themselves. Each of them is capable of representing others and, with the exception of God, each possesses extension. In the higher monads, representation becomes conscious. But even the lowest of them mirrors all the others by its representation, and with a mathematical technique precise enough, all the monads in the system of the real could be known from one alone.

By investing the monads with extension and representation, Leibniz could regard his achievement as cementing the Cartesian rift between matter and mind. He was plugging loopholes, and by this time, as the issue of Descartes, there were many of them. But for every gap that was stopped a number of new ones always seemed to appear; philosophy was falling apart.

In the case of Leibniz himself, there was for instance the problem of causality. How can body-monads influence mind-monads? Leibniz answered by an appeal to pre-established harmony where God orders all things in the beginning and arranges mind and matter like two clocks that do not influence each other yet unwind with the same speed. This doctrine was later developed by the founders of empiriological psychology into the so-called psychophysical parallelism. Mind-action, like thought, parallels "bodily" action, like sensation. But there is no mutual influence of a causal kind.

In reality, the doctrine of pre-established harmony is but a refined and roundabout way of putting the radical dualism which appeared at the birth of modern philosophy and is forgotten more than solved by contemporary thought. Scientism, treated in the next section of this book, avoids the evidence for mind and is busied only about matter. Existentialism withdraws into mind. The split personality of Cartesianism that still appears in the present is certainly apparent in the mind-body relation as Leibniz conceived it.

By reference to the clear-cut contemporary issues, Leibniz is also important for his principle of continuity. All monads have both

"thought" and extension, and each is graded upward in proportion to its power of clearly representing the rest. There is thus a continuous ascent, running from the lowest monad to the highest, and this unbroken chain Leibniz enacts into his principle of continuity.

The spiritual tone to the monadology would seem to put it above the grosser roars of contemporary scientism. But in reality, the principle of continuity was a philosophical preparation for the doctrine of evolution. Monads, the mirrors of what is outside of them, would entitle scientism to say, for instance, that it grasps man by studying the lower levels of matter and by reducing him in the end to an unsolved formula of inorganic chemistry.

To approach a more technical side of Leibniz, and to show what was most mathematical about him, reference should be made to his notion of pre-established harmony, with its twin series of events that run at the same speed but have no causal intercourse. This is what the mathematician means by his definition of a function. If *A* varies when *B* varies, *A* is a function of *B;* gas pressure, for example, is a function of gas volume. Empiriological physics and the philosophers who court it are in general persuaded that Hume was right. They have replaced causality by functionality.

Finally, the notion of continuity has become embedded in the mathematical techniques to which the empiriological method now looks to referee its experiments. A function must be what is called continuous in order to be satisfying. *A* must vary continuously as *B*. If there are any breaks over the range, where *A* no longer varies with *B* in finite fashion, the relation of *A* to *B* cannot be handled fully or at least complacently with a mathematical or an empiriological nicety. The idea of continuity is thus a convenient excuse for scientism to ignore and even deny the ontology of being versus nothingness. Because he cannot reckon with the breaks between things, the empiriological physicist, as such, never studies being. Being can only be understood with respect to nothingness, which means with respect to itself. Continuous functions, never daring to introduce the rupture of non-being, never really study being as such, in itself, as it *is*. To prefer continuity and function is, of course, good empiriological method. But it is fatal in philosophy, where being is studied in itself.

THE UNION OF SENSISM AND RATIONALISM

Immanual Kant (1724–1804) is one of the three or four really crucial figures in modern philosophy. Though a descendant of Descartes, he rivals his predecessor in influence. Like all good post-Cartesians, he set out to solve the Cartesian dualism that has riddled modern philosophy, and like his less pretentious forbears he fell on the same battleground and is buried in the same ruins. Mathematics was a model for Descartes, but in Kant, Newtonian physics is enthroned instead. Why does empiriological physics advance into settled knowledge, while philosophers continually disagree? By the time Kant had answered this question, he had roped off the sense world as the only area of available truth and left Newtonians to exploit it. He had banned metaphysics to the realm of untested and unverifiable opinion, to what the logical positivists finally construe as "meaningless questions." Kant thought his mission was to anchor Newtonian physics, explaining why it was certain and public knowledge and why empiriological method should be a model for all human thought.

It is a long story that edges toward this climax. First, *a priori* judgments, independent of experience, are ruled valueless, and pure *a posteriori* knowledge is contingent and hence of no scientific interest. Kant therefore trains his fire upon the synthetic *a priori* judgment, where the raw material comes from experience and the form, he says, from the mind. Sensation is first a disturbance produced in man by an unknown and unknowable mystery outside of him. Man responds by overlaying this experience with space-time forms.

But Kant saw, contrary to Hume, that sheer sense knowledge was not enough to account for the necessary character which judgments carry and which the laws of physics enjoy in an intense way. To close the chasm between the contingency of sense and the necessity of law, Kant postulated a scheme of twelve *a priori* categories which the understanding, a function above the senses, buckles on the data of the space-time world. Necessity, Kant made to emerge not from things but from the mind that interprets them. Man, he would say, never knows things as they are but only as they are interpreted. When present-day quantum physics urges

that we never know reality undisturbed and as it is, it is carrying on the critical spirit which has made the post-Kantian world so scrupulous. When Bertrand Russell (Chapter 5) says that we do not know a table but only our experience of it, he is preaching good Kantian gospel, and when a relativist like Arthur Murphy holds that truth varies with viewpoints, he too is another contemporary Kantian.

With reason beaten down until it could form but sterile tautologies, Kant honored only judgments of experience as reliable knowledge. An empiriological physicist himself, credited with the nebular theory of the world's origin, Kant wanted to do for philosophy what Newton had done for empiriological physics. Kant fenced off experience as the only proving ground in philosophy; beyond experience is the land of meaningless questions. In this respect, Kant was stringing along with Hume who influenced him, but he felt that Hume did not account for the evident necessity in empirical laws. Superimposing on Hume's sensism a whole philosophy of the *a priori,* Kant met up with Leibniz who had virtually reached the conclusion that knowledge, the issue of a pre-established harmony, had to be innate. Kantianism is a patchwork of Hume and Leibniz, locking man up in experience but equipping him with a preset stamp to impress on experience when it comes through his mill. Kant wanted ontology to surrender to Humean analytic; his synthetic judgments are a Leibnizian overlayer to save empiriological physics from the doom it would meet if analysis alone were applied and the world were atomized away.

To go beyond experience, Kant says, is a constant ambition of reason, but it cannot test its conclusions. It fails to frame a metaphysic that is valid and verifiable; its only trophies are the quarrels which have divided and conquered philosophers. Moreover, Kant goes on, reason contradicts itself, leading for example when we follow one of its arrows to the conclusion that the world is limited and, when we take another road, to the proof that the world is infinite. Such a dialectic as this led Kant to his doctrine of the antimonies which are the four major contradictions to which reason allegedly plunges when it works alone.

However, pure reason is not without some merit, Kant argues. The ideas that it dreams up have a certain "regulative" value. They are guides to life, and they emphasize, for instance, order and cause,

leading to new fields of experience where the more reliable powers of man can go to work. But such "regulative" ideas are of no metaphysical worth. They are like the rules of procedure in contemporary logical empiricism (Chapter 6). Only empirical judgments are meaningful, and they in turn are not metaphysically necessary. The concrete of experience is always poured into the wooden molds, the products of the carpentry of the mind.

On his *a priori* platform, Kant could not claim a knowledge of the ultimates. But he detoured around the wreckage, which his anti-intellectualism had left, by his doctrine of practical, as opposed to pure, reason. This is the field of doing rather than thinking, the moral rather than the intellectual order. Since metaphysics was passed off as a mere play of ideas, Kant classified the traditional "five ways" of proving God's existence as sheer ontological arguments, where the mind moves from thinking of God to declare that God must exist. But the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and freedom of will Kant stoutly wanted to retain in his universe. He called in practical reason to save them. These three truths are necessary to explain the fact of moral law, Kant argued. Without them, this law would lack meaning, and the deep gnawings of the human conscience would be left unexplained.

In this practical order, where the will moves the intellect, Kant rested his moral philosophy on the so-called categoric imperative, an immediate command to do or to avoid, unenlightened by reason's counsels or by an ulterior purpose like an end which reason discerns. In morality, Kant is a modern Stoic. Virtue for the sake of virtue, law for the sake of law, are the message that he brings, and he takes the loftiest achievement in the moral order to be sheer and stolid "good will." The will is thus marooned from the intellect. It is "autonomous," and its aim, if Kant is right, should be good will for its own sake without reference to any attraction beyond itself. The will is usually labeled a blind faculty; Kant even makes it deaf since reason cannot truly prompt it but must leave it in the end to its solitary adventures. Kant is a formalist in morality. He insists that mere virtue, law, duty, and will are to be cultivated and obeyed, without respect to content, circumstance, and the larger pattern of life which the intellect discerns and calls upon the will to realize in practice.

All these ideas have drawn Kant's relation to contemporary

thought to vast proportions. Philosophically speaking, the nineteenth century belonged to him. And if the twentieth is moving more toward Nietzsche's goals, the mutation is a logical evolution from Kantian germs. Kant was a partial idealist, and from his premises Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel marched on to idealism in absolute form.

But idealism is really the least of Kant's lasting achievements. He harnessed knowledge to area of experience, and it later rode onward to a radical empiricism in philosophy like that of positivism and pragmatism today. New honors were heaped on the empiriological disciplines by Kant's view of physics as the official custodian of all matter's secrets. Today, Kant has been weakened by the collapse of the Newtonian physics on which he stood and on which the contemporary researcher now no longer relies. But even in defeat Kant advances. The new quantum and relativity mechanics which have challenged Newton came into being largely from following Kant's advice of examining method first, and from purging method of all that is nonobservable or, in Kant's language, beyond experience.

Kant was anti-intellectual. Metaphysics in the world that revolted against Aristotle has never recovered from Kant's attack. The demise of intellectualism everywhere apparent in the western world is largely owed to Kant's *Critique*. He admired empiriological physicists for making experience conform to their own measures in experiment, and his philosophy simply annexes this procedure, with the measures being the *a priori* forms and categories. Kant emphasized rules like the logical empiricists, forms like Bertrand Russell, analysis like the Freudians, antimonies like the Marxists. He glorified experience like John Dewey.

In the practical order, Kant was the philosopher of Lutheranism, despoiling religion of its intellectual element, of its creed, and leaving it as morality alone and then making morality a matter of will. The idea of good will as the essence of Christianity, regardless of creed and cult, is of Kantian vintage. He opened the way for religion to become a matter of sentiment, an emotional phenomenon, or as the naturalists now say "the ornament of a rich life." James spoke of the *will to believe*. Business, science, and politics are set off by the Kantian scheme into a public world, but religion, not being intellectual, has nothing to say in these public parliaments.

Because the ultimates are attained by Kant through will or practical reason, philosophy is defined today more as a study of values than a probing of meaning. This is the case with naturalism and pragmatism.

Existentialism springs also from Kant. Heidegger views his philosophy as a probing of the Kantian *a priori,* a pace beyond Kant in the analytic method. In praise of Kant, Heidegger has written a book, and he sees his existentialism as the fruit of a thoroughly critical attitude, looking to the capabilities of the knower before gazing outward upon the "known." Jaspers is concerned with the Kantian practical reason, with the immediacy of the categorical imperative, and with the search after the thing in itself which Kant called transcendental. The will is existential in Kant's view, a mysterious surge into the dark ontology which reason is powerless to illuminate, an act rather than a fact, the mystery of mysteries where man drinks deepest of ultimate things. Kant thus continued the split personality of Descartes who on the one hand braced himself upon mathematical reason and on the other elevated will into the highest of human talents. These two men were in many ways as similar in their doctrine as they were powerful in their influence.

THE SYSTEMATIZATION OF IDEAS

The next chapter in the biography of modern philosophy is the idealism of Hegel. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) had perhaps the finest speculative mind that modern philosophy has produced, but he surrendered it to a project that kills all philosophy, the denial of the principle of non-contradiction. Spinoza desired to reduce the real into a system geometrically articulated; Kant also emphasized system, giving it a physical rather than mathematical cast. In Hegel, a project is launched to achieve a systematic view of all reality on metaphysical grounds and under idealist skies.

Like Kant, Hegel began with the study of mind or idea, but he ended by identifying idea with reality. Ideas, he held, are not only all we ever know. They are all that exist. For Hegel, in fact, the world is an Absolute Idea in development, where the various parts and phases are tightly knit into a system and where the philosopher is charged with tracing the lines along which the

system unfolds, seeing the world as both ideal and real, a being and a process, an ontological and a logical evolution at the same time.

Ideas, Hegel proposed, are always born in the subject of thought. But experience suggests them since the ideal and the real are intertwined in a single fabric. Things are thoughts as Cartesianism would imply, and what is beyond thought, as Berkeley said, is unthinkable. But these ideas that are realities, these things that are thoughts are not just gratuitous projections. A whole is under development, and man, a part of the whole, is the servant of its laws rather than the legislator of his own standards. In both ontology and his brand of logic, Hegel denied the principle of non-contradiction, equating being with non-being and thereby forging a universe of process where there is constant conflict as one reality lashes against another and eventually flows into it. A thing, in this view, does not exclude its opposite but entails it. It lives by dint of this opposition and would lose both being and sense when once this opposition disappeared. From the friction between a thing and its opposite, a new reality is sparked into being and begins a new clash by evoking the opposition needed to sustain it as real.

In his effort to systematize the real and to map its development, Hegel had the notion of triadic stages. First comes the positing of something, say being, and then after the *position* there arises an *opposition,* say the non-being. From the ensuing fray, a new fact leaps into existence as a *transposition,* for example, motion. There is thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, forming what is called the dialectical triad, the most fundamental law of all reality. Hegel would apply this threefold scheme universally, accounting thus for the origin of everything and predicting the return to the Absolute as the aim of all process.

That the finite realities which thought directly treats are not self-explanatory Hegel clearly saw. He erected a system to support them. He saw the finite world as the Absolute moving from an original purity, across a space-time history, and back to itself again as the climax of cosmic processes. The triads are the forms through which all the motions flow, and when a synthesis is reached from one opposition it really turns out as the thesis for the next stage as the process grinds on and on.

For example, quality might be posited and would evoke quantity for both its being and its meaning, which are the same thing. From the resulting feud there arises quantified quality, which explains how the same reality that has color can also have a determinate shape. In society, to take another and very famous example, there is a master who dominates and a servant who submits. This opposition precipitates a new society as time goes on, where a man dominates himself and his lower instincts, rather than lords it over others, and where detachment is practiced rather than the surrender to others by force.

Moreover, Hegel's dialectical method is not only geared to explain generalities. He wishes to show as parts of his cosmic system of idealism how the largest star and the tiniest atom came to be as they are, how society was born and grew, and how cultures wax and wane. He wishes to show that the Absolute is everywhere, thus imparting sense to the thing-in-itself which Kant had shut off in the unknowable.

The finite mind cannot grasp the whole. The momentary present is the point where the future slides into the past, and it is this past, more or less settled in form and capable of recall, that man really conceptualizes. The past is where the essences of things subside into a more or less stable mold, since the present is fluid and the future has not yet settled down into an experienced reality. But as the system further unfolds, the order in the past might be revised since it takes its meaning from the aims of a whole and is thus liable to revision as the future unveils new aspects of things—like a sharpshooter who changes his angle as he moves closer in toward the target. The thesis of yesterday is known. But the synthesis of tomorrow may put it into a new context, revising its being and its meaning. The thesis is not annihilated by this triadic Hegelian whirlpool. It is subsumed as in the case of the master-slave dialectic where the new emergent really bears the marks of his embattled predecessors but dominates both as a higher reality.

Hegel's universe is a flux of constant mediation. Nothing really stands alone in what it is or what it means. The present mediates between the past and the future. Essence softens the opposition between being and non-being and is a prototype of being in its finite form. It is neither being nor non-being but between them,

and that is how Pascal described the finite. Mass mediates between quantity and quality. Essence is determined because it is past, like the water from Niagara which has been captured and turned into electric power. Any abstraction, because it leaves something of the whole and the Absolute out of its bounds and takes only a parcel, is relative knowledge. Not by conforming the mind to reality is truth acquired but by forming a system "outside" the individual mind. Historical descriptions, not supra-historical insights, yield man as much as he can hope to learn about the realities and relations of his world.

Hegel's impact has been both practical and speculative in western thought. Both the Nazis and the Communists, enemies on the battlefield, claimed him in different ways as their ally. Kierkegaard's reaction to Hegel set off existentialism, and later existentialists like Jaspers and Sartre are finding him even a positive source of doctrine. Because of his entreaty to descriptions, he was a phenomenologist. Both James and Dewey in this country are attempts to solve Hegel's problems, proposing pragmatic methods to unravel the system which Hegel approached by pure thought. Hegel is likewise responsible for a whole current of idealism in England, notably in the philosophy of F. H. Bradley, who like his model had a fine speculative mind.

In France today, Hegel is almost being reborn not as an idealist but as a reaction against the positivism which had long dominated French thinking. In this new setting, Hegel is being interpreted both in the light of existentialism and in the more salutary movements which attempt to give sense to finite reality, where positivism had whittled it down to meaningless phenomena. In the whole of western thought, the study of history became more fascinating in the wake of Hegel. In Italy, he has lingered into the recent war through the writings of Gentile and Croce but has now weakened his hold. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Hegel was a favorite in the United States and has played a surprising role in shaping our philosophical enterprises. What hurt Hegel most, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, was his practical disregard for the experimental disciplines which captured the imaginations of so many modern men and led their thinking to other channels.

THE DYNASTY OF KANT AND HEGEL

In a profound way, the latter part of the nineteenth century did very little in philosophy except to ride onward with the Kantian and Hegelian tides. Positivism was sweeping France and being exported overseas. This philosophy, fathered by Auguste Comte (1798–1857), reflects the twisted Kantian interest in experience and is recognizably Kantian in viewing descriptions, by empiriological methods, as the only valid reports on the universe. Comte saw positive knowledge as nothing more nor less than a cataloguing of fact, and in making it reportorial, he frowned upon genuine explanation through principle. He admitted as reliable the method of physics alone but only after he had pruned from it the use of hypothesis and theory, so fruitful before Comte's time and since. The highest knowledge for Comte became a kind of history, measuring and describing "positive" fact but never ranging beyond such an inventory. The empiriological disciplines are thus allowed to rule in philosophy, and empiriological facts are made the ultimate in knowledge. A species of evolutionist, Comte divided history into three periods: the theological, which ascribed all events to deities; the metaphysical which dealt in "abstractions"; and the positive, which describes reality by empirical law. This division has been loudly applauded. It is a convenient way to dismiss traditional thought by accounting for its success, as the result of man's ignorance, and for its failure, after illusions were shattered by the blows of empiriological methods. Comte saw as supreme among the sciences not metaphysics but sociology and is generally regarded as the father of this new discipline. He fostered the spirit, still flourishing, of studying society and man only by describing customs, usually among primitive peoples who are simpler and, according to evolutionism, closer to original nature. The empiriological method, that became almost a philosophy in Kant, is here let loose and unguided in the study of society, culture, art, and religion, and in this way empiriological method is spread over the whole range of human experience. Positivism is an original and important doctrine that the following chapters will frequently recall. In a sense, it is a descendant of Kant as a method and was favored, in its historical bias, by Hegel. But in another way, positivism is a kind of reaction to idealism and a return to the study of fact.

In 1906, America witnessed a revolt from idealism in the form of the Neo-realists, such as Ralph Barton Perry, Edwin B. Holt, Walter T. Marvin, and Walter B. Pitkin. This school, surfeited by the sterile self-defenses of idealism, went to the other extreme of virtually denying ideas. The New Realists all held more or less that the mind could engage in direct traffic with experience without the meditation of an idea. Though a monism in its view of knowledge and a psychological materialism, the uprising of the Neo-realists was the first widespread rebellion against Kant and Hegel in America and was a hint of much that has since transpired in contemporary thinking.

G. E. Moore, in the British journal *Mind*, had published an essay in 1903 where he roundly denounced idealism for being solipsistic. This paper is generally regarded a fulcrum in philosophy which influenced the rise of realism in both Britain and America. Russell and others accepted Moore's verdict in his own country, and to it also, the realism that reared up in America owes much of its success if not some of its origin. Except for the final gasps of Hegelianism in England, the central role of sociology in France, and some short-lived experiments like Critical Realism in America, the remaining important doctrines of modern thought will be found to be our contemporaries.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROPHET?

There is, however, one solitary and enigmatic figure who founded no school but who could stand as either a prologue or an epilogue to contemporary thought. He is Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) whose death at the beginning of this century is a surprising coincidence with the doctrines and deeds of men who today seem pointed in line with Nietzsche's forecasts. Nietzsche sang of the Will to Power which he identified actually with life itself. He praised the strong, the selfish, the man of action. His hero was the "yea-sayer" who accepted life's fullness of struggle and storm, without attempting to understand. He called for a "re-evaluation of values," a project to recast the whole of man's individual and social beliefs in the explosive mold of his Will to Power. Really it was a call for a *trans*-valuation which put values on a revolutionary new level. Nietzsche saw that it was illogical to retain the traditional moral codes of right and wrong

when modern premises blurred the distinction between right and wrong into moral indifferentism. As the issue of the dynamism which is reality Nietzsche foresaw the oncoming of a Superman, who would plunder the weak and live by the law that "might makes right." "God is dead" — Nietzsche wrote, an ominous commentary on the way in which the world has lived and acted and thought in the twentieth century.

Nietzsche contrasted the Apollonian and the Dionysan man. Apollo, for the Greeks, was the god of art — which leads to quietism by its very nature and encourages idle dreaming rather than a face-to-face stand in embattled reality. Apollo became in Nietzsche's vocabulary, the synonym for all that was inert, retreating, detached, intellectualist, escapist, and moral, though Nietzsche admired the integrity and balance of Apollonian life. Dionysus, on the other hand, was the Greek god of life, action, and revelry. He is the man of deed who puts his prow into the wind and accepts reality rather than attempts to reason it into order and law. All men, Nietzsche said, are dominantly either Apollonian or Dionysan. A Dionysan is immoral, an Apollonian is moral. Nietzsche believed that the best society would be one in which a small handful of immoral, strong Dionysan men lorded it over the vast mob of moral, weak Apollonians.

Christianity was bracketed with Apollonian systems because it exhorts sympathy, which Nietzsche took as a sign of weakness, and because it does not steel men to charge head on and blindly where angels fear to tread. Nietzsche believed that by destroying Christianity he would destroy man's sense of guilt and restore his innocence. Faced with the problem of the world's origin and destiny where atheism prevailed, Nietzsche revived the ancient Greek doctrine of the eternal return. He solved the problem of how history began by holding that it repeated itself. He closed it off into the self-sufficiency of a circle where the eye, moving around the circumference, returns to its starting point. Even the Superman, after scaling his heights, crashes down to begin emergence all over again.

Is this the century of Nietzsche? He inspired much of Nazism, and if he is not the philosopher of Communism, he may be one of its prophets. He enshrines the power principles which Communism uses in practice and predicts continued social revolutions

in an atheistic universe. His evolutionism, his urgings to physical courage in a rough and tough climate of explosive matter, and his praise for the Dionysan doer who lives close to the physical jungle from which he sprang—all of this strikes a responsive chord in naturalism. Nietzsche's egoism is a distilled form of the subjective preferences in modern and contemporary thought. He is the champion of power politics and of the cult of empiriological disciplines because of the power they pack into man. He exalts the control of nature by which experiment proceeds and by which it has persuaded philosophy to plagiarize empiriological methods. Nietzsche's thought also appears in Freud and more especially in Alfred Adler, an early disciple who bolted Freudianism. He is definitely at home among the existentialists. Karl Jaspers frankly acknowledges him as a forerunner, and Heidegger in a sense carries out the "re-evaluation of values" that Nietzsche invited in his "post-Christian" world. Among other things, Nietzsche stands for the truth, slowly working its way out in practice, that it is inconsistent to live according to a code of morals when the stones on which it is premised have been turned into pagan sand.

Nietzsche's death was a prophetic climax to the life he advocated. It took place in an insane asylum at the very end of the nineteenth century, whose spirit he seemed to wrap up and impart to its successor.

Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, and even Nietzsche—these are the leading philosophers who provide almost a dress rehearsal for what is to come on the following pages. A more complete setting of the stage would have to widen out to a study of the revolutions in religion which took place in the sixteenth century and are still rumbling on, prompting the subjective spirit of modern thought and leaving an external world that is morally indifferent to the moral indifferentism of empiriological methods. A more complete backdrop would have to include likewise the impact on philosophical thought produced by Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton; Boyle and Dalton; Darwin, Schleiden, and Schwann; Planck and Einstein.

But this book is about formal philosophy and formal philosophers, and even here space has permitted this chapter to mention only the issues of the immediate past which refer directly to the ensuing discussions. If modern philosophy is only a part of modern thought

which includes both theological and empiriological dimensions, it will be found to be a typical part of that thought, governing attitudes toward theology and toward "science." In a way, the typical modern college graduate, either because of his own practical interests or because modern philosophy is dead or dying, has renounced speculation as of no value and no certitude. But the lack of philosophy, opposition to it, or neglect of it in favor of the pursuit of "science"—all of this constitutes a philosophy. True indifference is impossible, for the question still remains whether this indifference is right or wrong.

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PART II

CHAPTER 2 DEWEY'S DISCOVERY OF THE INSTRUMENT

Naturalism and the Human Spirit, a symposium that appeared in 1944, records a tidal stage in present-day American thought. Edited by Y. H. Krikorian, the book is a series of fifteen essays penned by as many thinkers from New York to California. It begins with an article by John Dewey denouncing as supernaturalism whatever is not empiriologically tested, and it ends with an essay by John Herman Randall whose closing paragraph is a plea for faith in the empiriological method.

It was as fitting that John Dewey should open this volume as it was that Fideism in so many words should appear at the end. More than any other man, Dewey gathered the strands of past and present thinking in America, of its classroom theories and its cultural practice, of the idealism that was fading as the nineteenth century closed and the realism being dyed to replace it; and he twisted the braid into the typical cloak of American naturalism. Unlike the similar symposia of the Neo-realists and the Critical Realists, the Krikorian book does not announce a program. It records accomplished fact. It measures the strides of a giant contemporary movement. It is largely a progress report of Dewey's own influence.

The opinion that man is only a branch of nature's family tree and has grown an empiriological method to work himself into a finer and fuller socio-cultural adjustment is the central theme of

naturalism. It was the achievement of Dewey to have put this thought into emphatic and popular forms, harmonizing its various elements, using history and philosophy and the empiriological disciplines for support, repeating and developing his message in a prodigious literary output, and influencing the group that in turn makes a profession of influencing, namely, American teachers. Philosopher and educator, logician and moralist, Dewey has probably swayed American thought more deeply and more widely and more lastingly than any other philosopher of the century.

In 1859, the year that Darwin published his *Origin of Species,* Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont. His mother came from a family active in politics. A lady of culture, she was influential over her children. The father, a grocer with pioneer roots, had attained a notable literary taste by self-education and handed on to his children both a culture and that self-reliance which had earned it the hard way. The religion of the family was Congregationalist.

Graduating from high school at fifteen, Dewey entered the University of Vermont which was then under the spell of Scottish realism and later, through Professor James Marsh, of German idealism. In 1879, Dewey graduated with an enviable academic record.

The next two years were passed teaching high school in Pennsylvania. But the taste for philosophy, whetted especially during his senior year in college, lured Dewey into borrowing money to resume his education. He enrolled at the Johns Hopkins University, the scene of friendships and interests and influences that were to guide him on his later course. Hegel was prominent among Dewey's teachers, chiefly in George S. Morris and G. Stanley Hall, both of whom had studied in Germany in keeping with a typical American style of their day. As a result, Hegel came into Dewey's life, and Dewey never really got rid of him.

In 1884, Dewey joined the faculty at the University of Michigan and returned there after a year at the University of Minnesota. At Michigan, Dewey struck up a close friendship with George H. Mead which was to continue when the two men later moved to Chicago. Though publishing little during his lifetime, Mead shared the ambitions which had already started to hum in young Dewey. Mead wanted to consolidate the philosophical and empiriological

approaches to reality by means of social psychology. By this time too, Dewey's heart was in the bold program of William James.

James (1842–1910) had studied in Europe and returned home with his luggage full of Kantian and Hegelian plans to systematize reality and man. But like Dewey, he objected to the abstract and depersonalized dimensions of mere system. It lacked an apparatus for testing its joints and sorting out the truth from the fanciful. James wanted a criterion, a method, a test.

Meanwhile, in 1878 another American, Charles Saunders Peirce (1839–1912) had announced a doctrine called pragmatism, a way of making ideas clear by tracing out their consequences. Here indeed appeared to be the secret for which James was yearning. He jumped at Peirce's idea. Indeed he jumped so hard that he went far beyond Peirce. He widened out pragmatism until it became not merely a way of clarifying ideas but an intensely practical way of life that identifies truth itself with the practical. For James, an idea is true if it works, leading to what is termed an experienced "satisfactoryness." "'The true,'" he said, "to put it briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving." James boasts of understanding truth by "making" it. He praises "truth's cash-in value in experiential terms."

But with all this emphasis on the brutally pragmatic, an interest in religion tugged at James in his over-all ambition. His book, *The Will to Believe,* records how he honestly struggled to protect and preserve religion. But he made his belief pragmatic and Kantian in spirit; it concerns only the will.

It would of course be a serious mistake to relate James and Dewey too closely. James was a philosopher of religion; Dewey's goals are more social and cultural. Then too as Ralph Barton Perry has well remarked, James saw man perplexed by problems where he must fight his way out by a pragmatism of will; Dewey moves into the same set of problems to offer man not the solution of will but the tools of intelligence, in particular the empiriological method. Yet if they are not parts of the same track, James and Dewey are certainly parallel rails, and contemporary American thought in fact has been steaming over both of them.

James and Hegel and Mead had been joining forces for Dewey by 1894, when he was named to head the department of philosophy

and psychology at the University of Chicago. Here it was that in both philosophy and pedagogy his influence fanned out to nation-wide proportions. He was given charge of an experimental school, a laboratory for his ideas, and perhaps even the birthplace of what is now called Progressive Education. After a decade, Dewey broke with the officials at Chicago, and in 1905, he joined the faculty at Columbia University, where he taught in both the philosophy department and the Teachers College, continuing both his interest and his influence in American education. Apart from academic leaves that enabled him to lecture on three continents, he has remained at Columbia ever since, as professor and then as professor emeritus. Despite his age, he is still very much mentally alert, and his articles still appear in philosophical journals.

Among the typical works in the long bibliography of Dewey's writings are *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry; Reconstruction in Philosophy; Experience and Nature; Art as Experience; Human Nature and Conduct; Democracy and Education;* and *Education and Experience.* Dewey's thought can be sampled by noting the number of his titles that refer to experience. It is of course a time-honored realism to take experience as the subject-matter of philosophy; for Dewey it is method.

THE NATURE OF NATURALISM

Dewey did not create naturalism, and though it is hard to see how it can grow much further without suicide, he has not said the last word about the subject. Naturalists like to trace their ancestry back to Aristotle who, in the well-known maxim, brought Plato's heaven down to earth. The Forms that Plato had consigned to a separated world, Aristotle held to be in some measure within the experienced universe. But naturalism makes out that Aristotle did not go far enough and that Greek thought lost its nerve, as Gilbert Murray says, before it could do for Aristotle what he had done for Plato. The Greek culture died away. The naturalization was stopped before it was found how earthy was this earth to which Aristotle lowered heaven. According to naturalism, the trend which Aristotle started lay centuries unfollowed, and it was only in modern times, especially in the Renaissance and the empiriological spirit which grew out of it, that the naturalization papers of the universe started again to be processed.

Dating especially from the influence of Rousseau and the French Encyclopedists, who tingled again with the old Greek nerve, modern thought has driven its roots deeper into nature, the naturalists say, and each age has brought it further along in the descent which Aristotle began when nature and not a separated world became man's natural home. There in the sense world, as Hume had said, is all the knowledge man can reach. There, by the use of empiriological methods, man can adjust himself to nature by controlling her. Darwinism favors the view that nature is not only the home of man but his birthplace. According to naturalism, man is a product of nature, reflecting only her energies, obedient only to her laws, and plunged, like the rest of matter, into a Darwinian struggle for existence. When death overtakes him, he lies down to sleep in his material home.

The armor of man in the organic struggle to survive and succeed is the empiriological method. Historically born as thought moved out of its so-called infancy, this method is the instrument of man to carve out his destiny and to bring about the adjustment in his socio-cultural life which is the counterpart of adaptation on the level of the animals. On being asked for the credentials of this method, Dewey responds that it works, producing tangible and testable results. Randall would emphasize the so-called public character of empiriological conclusions. In Ernest Nagel's views, naturalism can point to "identifiable bodies" in experience which answer its questions and assure its realism. But the real truth is embodied in the plea for faith that twines *Naturalism and the Human Spirit* to its conclusion.

As Sterling Lamprecht says, naturalists are opposed to all dualisms such as mind and matter, God and the world, nature and intelligence. For a sketch of naturalism's ontology, Dewey is even more incisive—by his references to the continuum in nature, an echo not of Aristotle but of Heraclitus. Dewey appeals to modern empiriological physics to support him by its "revolutionary" view that nature is only flux. Dewey is Hegel, the philosopher of flux, navigating the stream with pragmatic oars. Though an essay of G. E. Moore in 1903 ended the rule of idealism in the English-speaking world and began a march back to realism, it is difficult to decide whether Dewey joined the parade or whether he did not, like the existentialists, attempt to undercut the critical problem,

letting the subjective or objective status of things remain undecided so long as an idea "works." To the end, Dewey remains faithful to the idea of continuity, superimposing on it the newer dynamism of Darwinian evolution.

In this continuum between events in nature and between nature and man, Dewey spreads out the experimental method to organize the flow, to channel it for human expansion, and to chart on its purely naturalistic waters the temporary patterns of all human ends. For Dewey and for naturalism, mind is not spiritual but organic, a complicated case of the same physico-chemical functions and relations at work lower down on the evolutionary scale. Thinking is viewed as a physiological affair, like eating and sleeping and building a fire; its purpose is the filling of need.

For the naturalists, this need is always social and cultural, and their chief problems are values like goodness, beauty, democracy, and even religion, all naturalistically conceived. In the social orbit, Sidney Hook has been preaching a materialism of economic democracy, and Lamprecht, referring to religion, writes like Hume that it "ought to be the ornament of a rich life, not the driving passion of a fixed commitment."

Dewey's whole philosophy is the prototype of naturalism. It enjoins man to enlarge and enrich his life in the continuum of nature by using the empiriological method to balance himself with his socio-cultural environment. Such a description involves at least three major points: (*a*) the logic or methodology of Dewey; (*b*) his view of nature and of man; and (*c*) his theory of human goals or values. This division follows the logical order but not the way in which Dewey's thought developed nor the manner in which his leading ideas can be exposed and understood. It is more convenient to discuss first his theory of nature and of man and then his concept of ends, since both themes in Dewey's own words, describe the purpose of his philosophy. His logic will come last as the tool for integrating nature and value, the universe and man.

THE WORLD AND MAN

Man, Dewey holds, does not find his environment ready made. On the contrary it is an "ungoing, unfinished, and ambiguously potential world" that greets him when he begins to think, and never lets him alone. At one time, Dewey continues, philosophers

dreamed of fitting the world into the formalism of Aristotle's logic. At one time, eternal truth and immutable objects, absolute origins and fixed ends, were favorite themes of learned thought, and man, towering above the rest of nature, pledged his love and even his life to laws and a Lawmaker outside of him.

But today, according to Dewey, that tide has receded. Instead, empiriological method has flooded out the so-called formalism of the past, replacing fixity by flux, the rigidity of ends by an accent on means, and mind the spiritual power by man the child of nature. According to Herbert W. Schneider, nature is the mother of man, is indeed "more like a matrix than a mother, more like a soil to a plant than a mother to a child." It is from nature that man has come, in nature alone that he lives, and to nature that he returns when death subdues him.

Naturalism gets rid of the past as Communism does. Aristotle was a mental giant, and to flick him off with the usual name-calling of his modern enemies can avoid public embarrassment but ought not to quiet a truly inquiring conscience. Therefore, naturalism uses the formula that Aristotle was adequate to the circumstances of his age, but that the modern empiriological disciplines have simply outgrown the Aristotelian shoes, moving from a world of substances into a pluralism which forbids identities and rigid classifications. Where Aristotle sought to abstract, empiriological physics proposes only to measure. Where Aristotle pointed to substances, modern methods are more interested in relations. The heterogeneity of a qualitative world in Greek thought has been planed down to a more homogeneous universe today, where man and nature are essentially of the same fiber. In this evolutionary naturalism, Aristotle is blissfully embalmed in the past.

As evolution swings ever onward in the world, it is said, the physico-chemical energies that form man are locked in struggle that keeps life constantly in the balance. Life is a sea of tensions, where every order is matched by a thousand conflicts and where hazards close in on even a momentary achievement. To man, gazing upon his home in nature, life is divided from the lifeless only by the consequences which it effects. With still greater physico-chemical complexity there emerges mind.

This continuum of nature and man, and of matter and mind, must be approached cautiously. Naturalists do not want to say that

all differences are blurred even when their statements would lead to a Heraclitean dynamism. They would apply only the empiriological method, with its equality signs and its equivalence between action and reaction; and yet despite this equalitarian bias, they venture to speak of hierarchy: at least they find levels in the world.

Here it is appropriate to introduce one of naturalism's favorite terms, anti-reductionism. Classical materialism, say that of Haeckel or Moleschott or even Democritus, tries to reduce all reality to one type of being and for that reason is called reductionism. But naturalism in the main opposes this ambition. It claims that matter, life, mind, and even the various qualities in the bosom of the universe are irreducible. Whether or not this anti-reductionist stand is compatible with a total reliance on the empiriological method is another issue. That a continuum would not admit of levels, that equalitarianism rebels at hierarchy—this does not strike the naturalists as a serious challenge. Their broad spirit certainly lies with materialism, but they somehow insist it is a materialism of a new sort. The basic structure of the world is not substance or stuff or billiard-ball atoms. It is pattern or relation. It is combination, dynamic interaction. All things are constituted by different networks of tension, different patterns of stress and strain, energies that struggle in different ways.

Naturalism is pluralistic in its world view largely because of this anti-reductionism. Life, mind, the various qualities which are sensed or felt, and any other levels owe their originality to the peculiar relational tensions which they embody in such a way as to make each level irreducible. How, to repeat, does all this logic fit in with the insistence on the continuum which, if we go by frequency of mention, is even dearer to naturalism than its anti-reductionist stand? In a truly continuous universe, levels are not possible, at least logically. Maybe this logical incommensurability explains for a naturalist why there are problems and struggles. At any rate, Dewey and his cohorts try to hold that all things are the same in raw material but differ only in the way this matter interacts. They think that each level, by its characteristic combination of tensions, is irreducible to any other.

Technically, levels are supposed to be formed by a concourse of "events" and "relations." An event, with agnostic vagueness, is

taken generally by contemporary thought to be an ultimate unit of content in a given problem, but it is more of a dynamic unit than a thing with stuff and structure. Like Whitehead's "actual entity," an event is a kind of atom in a dynamic flow, more like energy than matter, more like act than fact. Though events are organized by relations, naturalism would part company from other modern views by denying that relations, orderings, and patterns are entirely creatures of logic. They are as real as what they organize, and naturalism concludes that different combinations of events make for real differences in the experienced world, differences of nature and of level. Actually, this logic would make everything unique and forbid Dewey and his cohorts from applying the empiriological method which the absence of generality among unique things would darken into nonsense. Without a positive criticism of such an effort to reconstruct hierarchy only to end in radical pluralism, the dilemma might simply be stated that either the method of Dewey's logic or the cosmology of his naturalism must be abandoned. They cannot coexist in consistency and peace.

In naturalism, mind and matter are not clashed in the way that dualism urges. Mind, naturalism says, is only matter in new patterns and tortuous relations. It is as though differences in complexity made for differences in kind. Mind is known by the consequences it can produce, and its only claim resides in these effects. Is this a mechanical view of mind? By no means, naturalism clamors: mind is not a mechanism like levers and cogwheels; it is more an affair of process, pattern, relation, and interaction, which are the ultimate weave of all things if naturalism is right. A part of the continuum rather than a spectator, mind shares in the Darwinian struggle, the organic imbalance, the constant flux, which makes life always "a precarious and perilous existence." The life of nature and of mind alike is risky business where every moment is a gamble and every triumph a threatened defeat. This is a rough and tough world, a stormy, unconquered, and challenging one, and not being fully made as evolution speeds along, it has an unexplored frontier of the indeterminate that, when man is facing it, may move from the rear to strike him down. Lest the elements of conflict lead to dualism, Dewey hastens to add that they all spring from the same soil in nature like wheat and the weeds.

Life can get out of step with nature, and in the lower world,

death might easily ensue. But with the emergence of mind, the loss of stride can become conscious of itself, and man can deliberately recast his old habits to recover that rhythm with nature that he has lost. In one phase of his development, Dewey accepted the Watsonian theory of behaviorism but later found that the reflex arc was much too narrow and too rigid a mechanism to take the whole man into account. For naturalism, experience is an *inter*action between organism and environment, the most important thought being in the italicized prefix. Much more than a theory of reflexes, this notion is closer to *Gestalt*-psychology or what Jan Smuts calls "holism." Bertrand Russell calls attention to this fact in appraising Dewey. A habit is a mode of response, fixed and somewhat general for Dewey, rather than an atomic reflex. There is too much physical mechanism to a Watsonian reflex. A habit, Dewey holds, is a product of organic life in coping with a perilous environment, and in man, it can be revised and readjusted by the tool of mind.

The roots of Dewey's thinking are really embedded in biology. This might be suggested by pointing out that experience, as interaction, is also described as the adaptation of an organism to its environment. Such a view is compelled to make all values organic ones and to make man's life an episode in that same struggle to survive and succeed which Darwin portrayed among the lower kingdoms. Some evolutionists leave the biological when they get to man and hold that the psychological activity of mind, though an ultimate product of animal evolution, has acquired a new and meta-biological dimension. But Dewey never gets beyond biology and never gets man above adaptation.

In psychology, for instance, Dewey would repudiate Descartes and Leibniz and any other view that wants to make even sense knowledge representative, a spectator of events outside of it. Sensations are not "gateways to knowledge" but "stimuli to action." They are shocks that an organism receives and that compel it to readjust itself by proper biological action. Dewey's theory of inquiry is a theory in biology more than in logic.

But an organism is not passive, waiting inertly for something to disturb it. It is active and aggressive: it is on the prowl. It is charged with energies and tensions to enlarge itself, and it acts upon its surroundings as much as they act upon it. That is why, though

adaptation is a satisfactory way of describing experience, interaction is better because it emphasizes the mutuality between organism and environment, even though it might fail to recall the biological tone pervading Dewey's thought through and through. *Interaction* has lately become *transaction* in Dewey's vocabulary.

If experience is the matter for philosophy and also its method, human thought is always its captive, never drawing out of it what Aristotle called ideas. For Dewey, the empiriological method, the new organon that dethrones Aristotle's logic, does not authorize the so-called spectator truth-theory where man, starting in experience, gets at its meaning by seeing a general truth which it embodies. For Dewey, the world is a continuum of flow, and to abstract the definite out of it is to break up what cannot be divided. The flow is better described by adjectives than by substantives – not saying "religion," "politics," "intelligence," "I," "you," but "religious, political, intellectual, my, or your experience." Thus Dewey believes that he does justice to reality, by allowing mind to take only pragmatic perspectives on a flowing and unbroken whole.

Substance, where it exists at all, is at most the logical subject of a judgment and has no counterpart in a nature separated from man. Experience is not a matter for knowledge to grasp, and as later developments will bring out, valuing rather than knowing is the ultimate aim of Dewey's thought. Much more important than *knowledge* are the terms *being* and *having*. Experience is not known until it *is*, or it *is had*, making knowing a kind of valuing. If there is any aspect of communication which experience allows, the process is one of pointing it out to others. There is no communion through intelligence and reason.

An appeal to the continuum and the stress on *inter*action enables Dewey to decline a decision in the battle between idealism and realism. Cleavages between subject and object, mind and matter, arise, he holds, "within experience," and man is a part of any inquiry which he conducts. This is similar to existentialism, which likewise claims to work below the critical problem and to stand, if one may borrow from Russell, on neutral ground or among neutral entities. Where Dewey speaks of *inter*action, Kierkegaard speaks of *interesse*. In Dewey's case, where the empiriological method holds the only legal title to thought, the critical problem cannot be raised or settled; so in his empiriological mood, he may

well turn away from a question that is asked and answered only in a genuine philosophy.

Describing things empiriologically, Dewey can account for neither the beginning of his flux nor the origin of man within it. He would, of course, relegate such issues to the geological and biological disciplines and prefer to concentrate not on the remote beginnings of a world and of a race but on the psychological genesis of individual personalities. In this area, it is said, experience and nature thrust themselves upon a man literally before he knows it. Society and culture burden him with the weight of habit before he is aware of his back. For habits are ever socially conditioned. They are social in aim. They are formed by organic life itself and settle into their important place within man's make-up before his maturing mind can screen them. This is an "ongoing" and wholly intermediary world, which gets neither to absolute beginnings nor to ultimate ends. Naturalists are willing to begin *in medias res,* and they are still struggling in midstream when life finally loses its balance with nature to the point where death occurs. Aptly does another naturalist, George Santayana, write that "nothing would be lost by joining the procession wherever one happens to come upon it, and following it as long as one's legs hold out."

In the ongoings and undoings of the Dewey world, the empiriological method offers man a helping hand. It is essentially a method of controlling or commanding; a taskmaster among habits, it can reform their ranks to meet new needs or favor new aims. Since habits are formed under the stress of social pressure in the early years of life, Dewey makes the paradoxical observation that "the acquired is the primitive." In almost a paraphrase of Rousseau's return to nature, man's life becomes the constant effort to throw off his harmful or useless habits and, in habits that serve him well, to widen their horizon for meeting new circumstances. Man, formed one moment by social habits acquired from his surroundings and finding already the next moment that the habits must be changed to meet evolvingly new situations, discovers his conscious life to be a perpetual process of self-correction. In one sense, the improvement of habit is the only aim of man, an improvement that makes him more resilient and adaptive in himself and more integrated with nature in whose continuum he lives and labors.

Language is the supreme achievement of mind. The form for

handing culture onward, it is a sure index of the social conditioning in man, and Dewey sees little farther than man, the social animal. At both the individual and social level, language integrates man by economizing effort. It aids his memory by what it summarizes; it develops a sense of conscious expectancy by what it predicts. It even results in reasoning and in mathematical discourse. In a fashion redolent of Watson, Dewey hints that thought is a kind of subvocal speech, where the thinker is simply talking to himself.

But language is only a habit, organic in origin and in nature and subject to revisal whenever man's challenges require it. It fixes meaning, like the stains on the slides of microscopy, and just as it is wrong to move from dead tissue to a theory of life, so a common fallacy is the leap from the order of symbolic meaning to a "picture" of dynamic and unpicturable reality. At most, language has only indirect reference to existence, Dewey says, and mathematics has none.

Historical systems in the past have exploded, Dewey argues, by trying to fit reality into their language forms. Thus the substance-accident ontology of Aristotle is allegedly the mere projection of his subject-predicate logic. But when Galileo and Locke drove modern man to the view that accidents are only in the mind and when Hume had made his case that so-called substances are only phenomena, Aristotle's logic, Dewey stresses, was forced sooner or later to join this wreckage of his metaphysics, leaving only the empiriological method to rule a world where modern physics had already proved its mettle. Empiriological method and empiriological physics lead, if Dewey is believed, to naturalism.

WHAT MAN SHOULD DO

Given this picture of things, what can or should be done with it? This brings up the second of the three main marks in Dewey's thought: his attitude toward human goals or his moralism. He professes a supreme concern with values, especially sociocultural ones.

Dewey discerns a wide margin by which the social and cultural progress of man has lagged behind his triumphs in empiriological disciplines, declaring that the chief ambition of his philosophy has been to close that gap by bringing social thinking up to date.

By his own admission, his thought belongs not to speculation but to morals. Its chief business is control, and its products are in conduct, democracy, art, and education, in what is commonly called the field of value. In the naturalistic universe, man has been seen ever tormented in "a precarious and perilous existence"; when the parade of evolution races by him, he breaks step with nature, becoming a problem to himself, and even a social misfit. To the promotion of the reintegration of man in nature Dewey dedicates his whole work.

To disengage the meaning which Dewey attaches to value is a difficult and disappointing task. His looseness of language often matches his obscurity of thought. It is easier to understand what Dewey claims man is than what he says man ought to do; for on the basis of what man is in naturalism he really ought not to do anything. When Dewey goes on to speak about morality, reason is strained more than ever to keep up with his meaning, let alone to seize it as the truth.

Dewey would agree that his is not a philosophy of content but only a technique, experience itself being defined not as matter but as method. Method answers not the question *what* but the question *how*. Further, Dewey embraces the empiriological method as his only organon, and apart from its other limitations, such a system can hardly debate what *is*, never what *ought to be*. Naturalism is more ethnology than ethics. In a genuine sense, there could be no morality at all if it were only a branch of physics and chemistry.

With a now familiar cadence, Dewey points out how his proposals differ from the ethics of Aristotle. Now that the scholastic universe has been inundated by flux, the concept of fixed ends can no longer be tolerated, naturalism says. In its stead, there arises the notion of "ends-in-view."

Ends-in-view are described as the "projections of empirical consequences." They are pragmatic rather than truly final, and temporary rather than permanent. They are the tentative objectives set by man in working out a problem. They organize present thought, guide present action, invest present life with a definite motive, and when attained, they equip man with a new vantage point in his struggle for survival and enrichment. Means and ends are in the same flux and even at the same water level. They are not heterogeneous and hierarchical. In the sequence of planned actions,

man singles out this or that event which he will struggle to realize; it becomes an end-in-view and means are deployed to achieve it. Means are the pattern of man's sequence of actions when he views them at close hand. Ends are the very same series viewed at a longer range. If and when ends are chosen and especially when they are attained, they turn out to be nothing but means toward some new objective. This is a universe of means, an intermediary and continuous world. And of course if such a premise be admitted, then ends perish and means monopolize reality.

Human aims are the products of nature and of the society which nature has fashioned. When man, pressured by his natural and cultural imbalances, sets his goals, they reflect his art and often his cunning as he struggles toward a happier harmony with his worldly home. To educate man is to teach him how to express himself and to control his web of circumstances so that a full and resilient life may be spun. It is to slant habits with a healthy social orientation and to limber man to keep his pace with the ever evolving world, in which his opportunities are always on the march and his empiriological method must bring him up to them.

Dewey speaks of man as striving to "fulfillment," but it is difficult to see just what is being fulfilled, except what are called organic needs. In the dynamics of the Dewey universe, fulfillment is always sought but never truly attained. Values are worthy, they are values, simply because they lead to new likings and new values. The continuum has neither beginning nor end to its ongoing character.

It must, of course, stoutly be denied that even a momentary fulfillment could ever have meaning, where in an infinite series, "experiences are used to lead us ever onward and outward" in Dewey's own words. Still he calls nature good, and man becomes good by fidelity to her, availing of the dominion she has bestowed on him to command and control her forces in his constant struggle to equilibrium and integration.

It would be unfair to Dewey to call him a hedonist by intention. Lower creatures follow their impulses, and even in man, Dewey would insist that there is impulse before there is intelligence. But he does not want desire to dominate thought. He does not want the blind to lead the seeing. Desire, he holds, does not

know what is good or what is better—there is no such a thing as the best—and hence intelligence, as mind evolves in the individual, must take over the controls from the blind and automatic pilotage of will. Intelligence can recast acquired habits, diverting their dynamism toward aims holding out a greater integration and enrichment which the blind will would never foreknow.

In the Dewey world, religion is of course a far cry from dogma. It is not even a fixed moral code. But it does serve a genuine purpose and, serving it, becomes a value to be embraced. It sustains and enlarges man's life, bringing him peace in action and in thought and charging his career of strife with a sense of totality. It is a social inspiration and organizing force by committing us to goals pursued together. But religion is not absolute. It is another of man's tools for hewing a place more firmly and fully into nature, and it changes like everything else.

Ethics too is of only naturalistic cloth. It owes its evolution to what Dewey calls "incommensurables" in human conduct. In the map of life, there are forks in the roads not just at intervals but virtually always. Standing at an intersection, man asks himself which is the *better* course. He must choose. He must make an ethical leap, and there is no sure knowledge of what is ahead, no general law to assist him.

Choice is imposed not because a universal knowledge is indifferent to individual cases as such. It involves only competing particulars to be handled strictly at their own level. Choice is not enlightened by a future and universal end, since it is focused on present tendencies and wants immediate consequences. Experience constantly evokes value judgments from us, but they are always about the here and now, never about ultimates and absolutes.

A paper for example swings in the typewriter as these lines are written. Realism in its best sense would authorize the judgment, "This is paper," simply from inspecting the texture of the white sheet and combining the results with past experience and present intellectual insight. For Dewey, the paper is known not by what it is but by what is does. It is something for writing, something for burning, something for folding into a wrapper. In the sense that all judgments imply doing something with the object judged—evoking imperatives like "Write! Burn! Fold!"—

judgments always involve choice and always bear a value character at their heart. That is why Dewey wants to sell men not a system for knowing but a way of valuing. Yet ubiquitous as value judgments may be, they are never ultimate and never absolute, and they do not concern such fixities at all as their subject matter.

This method of valuing in terms of consequences Dewey calls instrumentalism. Pragmatic in spirit and in broad outline similar to the philosophy of James, instrumentalism is perhaps the most pervasive and permanent theme in Dewey's naturalism. Unlike pragmatism, it is more of an appeal to intellect than to will, but like the gospel of James, it is a doctrine of action, aims, value, and eventually morality. It claims that the true and the right are in conduct that works.

"Logical ideas," Dewey says, "are like keys that are shaped with reference to opening a lock." And this is not only logic but ethics. It is not the idea that is important but the lock and its opening. It is not things that matter, so much as relations. In rejecting the philosophy of substance, Dewey turns his back forever on the intrinsic character of realities and hence their intrinsic truth and goodness. He attends only to their extrinsic relations. Things are good, they are valuable, only in terms of the consequences which they bring. The value of everything is outside of it. "Handsome is that handsome does. By their fruits ye *know* them"—this is Dewey where he is most Deweyite. If water means thirst-quenching to a man in the desert, he argues, "so far as it may not mean it, it is perhaps not water."

In embracing this view, Dewey is obedient to his venerated empiriological method, where the law of inertia is the leading light and where everything studied reduces to a complete passivity, being nothing in itself and wholly the sum of outside forces. If such an approach is taken far enough, it leads to a universe that is a vacuum. Where nothing has any reality in itself, nothing *is*. Dewey espouses the empiriological construction of inertial and transeunt activity that is supposed to be our universe. "A thing," he concludes, "is much more significantly what it makes possible than what it immediately is."

Actually, of course, pure possibility is nothing. Only in terms of the actual can possibility be understood and even exist, as a possibility. If the Dewey universe can be dignified by any name,

it is close to what Aristotle called prime matter. Dewey would not stop at bringing Platonic Forms down to earth. He would want to abolish them altogether.

Darkening the corridors of his "precarious and perilous" world, Dewey would gird man to venture forth into nature with the instrument of empiriological method. With this tool for testing his thought and action, man is briefed to view as good or bad whatever may or may not have propitious consequences in adapting him better to his social and cultural changes. Like a rat in a maze, man must pick his way cagily out of his present problems, and other things are valuable to the extent of aiding his escape. From childhood to death, he is always intent on something. The interaction between himself and his environment he cannot possibly evade, as interest and effort grow in rank to become more important than contemplation.

Like the rest of man's achievements, his physical "sciences" take their origin within common sense, as it struggles with nature and experience. But the difficulty has been in the past, Dewey says, that the empiriological methods have not worked backward to ordinary life after proving their competence in other countries. Instrumentalism is an ambition to bring back the prodigal son to the common sense world that gave it birth and to apply the pragmatic experimental tests not only in physics and chemistry but to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

Like Sidney Hook, Dewey is acutely interested in the problem of democracy which, it is said, forms the purest air for the naturalized man to achieve his destinies, since it favors freedom, self-expression, inquiry, and experiment. The loose character of democracy permits the constant readjustment that naturalism finds necessary in its dynamic and evolutionary universe, and above all, according to Dewey, democracy ignores the absolutes that turn man away from nature toward another world. Where men are leveled in rank and not hierarchical in authority, the continuum which is nature is copied by society itself, and the ideal is for the state to cease being an authority and become only an administration.

In the value field, art too has always been high among Dewey's favorite themes. He sees thinking and living as belonging only to art, where works are done and, if it is good art, done well. Art

summarizes experience. A fine art is an integrated work where distinctions are lost between sense and intellect, objective and subjective, universal and individual. It thus provides an ideal of what life itself should be, a continuum; it is a better ideal in this respect than law or precept and, in the ultimate, better even than philosophy. Man himself is primarily not a thinker for John Dewey. In the nature of things, he is an artist, a tool-making, tool-using, tool-intoxicated animal.

Urging men to art through science, to conduct through instrumentalism, and to fulfillment through democracy and religion, Dewey lacks the optimism of James and the aesthetic quietism that will later be shown in Santayana. He speaks little of death as the common experience of man, and when he does, the same questions could be raised that faced the officials of the United States Army in World War II when men were doubting why they should offer up their own lives. Such questioners, in the army or out of it, would find no hope in the impersonalism of John Dewey who says:

> When we have used our thought to its utmost and have thrown into the moving unbalanced balance of things our puny strength, we know that though the universe slay us still we may trust, for our lot is one with whatever is good in existence. We know that such thought and effort is one condition for the coming into existence of the better.

THE INSTRUMENT FOR MAN

The sketch of instrumentalism has already made passing reference to Dewey's logic which he prefers to call the theory of inquiry. As Morris Cohen reminds us, Dewey does not present an account of how we ought to think but merely describes a way of thinking that has been successful. Unable to climb above the interaction by which experience was defined, inquiry is an event within the continuum of nature and in man's case is socially aroused. It is not thought but a transaction, not a formal affair but a material logic in the Hegelian sense. Philosophy is basically a reconstruction of both experience and of itself. It is a criticism in the modern and somewhat negative sense of the word, taking what it finds and, without going beyond nature, making instrumental decisions for new problems and fresh "ends-in-view."

Social pressures interact with man. Nature challenges him. Willingly or not, he is obliged to convert the perplexities which he only feels at first into data that he can grasp, and objects that he can control for a solution. Adumbrating a word and perhaps even a concept used by Karl Jaspers, Dewey finds man constantly involved in a "situation" or in a more colloquial term, in a fix. In the initial atmosphere of such experience, there is something immediate and undefinable so that at first one does not know what his problem is or what he really wills as a satisfactory solution. In the original form of a situation, when it first breaks upon consciousness, there is a totality about it. It is a "contextual whole" and is not rationalized so much as sensed and felt. But the feeling here is not an emotional one, for intellect, will, senses, and emotion are discriminated as the problem is formulated and do not appear separated at its onset.

A problem is thus not equivalent to a situation but is derived from it. The situation, vague, total, and perplexing, arises from the "existential matrix" of the continuum and has no loftier standing than any other organic need like hunger and thirst. In a word so trumpeted by Heidegger and Sartre, situations are preflexive and precognitive, and their very recognition is the first stage of inquiry.

An advance is made when a problem is formulated. At this stage, data make their appearance, but where data, etymologically and by common consent, usually mean "the given," Dewey prefers to brush away such a view as part of the so-called spectator theory of truth. He wishes to put fresh accent on the continuum to which even inquiry is forever fettered. Accordingly, data are said to be not given but *taken*, as though man, the artist, not only chiseled his marble but first blasted it from its natural quarry. Like everything else in the Dewey world, data, meaningless in themselves, derive their sense from the aims whose attainment they promote. Problems are always matters of intent, and their solution is designed to retrieve that stability which the indeterminate situation has disturbed. Data suggest this solution. They are means to its achievement, and they have no other value and meaning.

Untested data are not enough. Discerned and *taken* in the light of an ulterior objective, they must be checked operationally

in such a way that on the memory of past experience or through fresh experiments to test their worth, the thinker traces out their consequences. The easiest way out of a problem, of course, would be to stab at the first suggested answer that comes along and then settle back until another problem and another stab. Less careful minds are inclined to such impulsive comforts. But the genuine thinker faces all the difficulties and makes all the reservations which any answer requires. He keeps suspending his judgments and making new tests of his tentative solutions, so that inquiry is continued and finally works toward a "scientific" system.

In the person of Descartes, modern philosophy began with a doubt, and as a whole, it has never gotten beyond it. Unlike Leibniz or Kant, Dewey does not try to escape the doubt. He recommends a doubting attitude as a means of enriching inquiry with a safer and suppler set of habits for living and likewise as an attitude for pedagogy to impart in the development of independence among student minds. In this light, "formal discipline" stands in contrast with "real thinking." Principles, for Dewey, are at most hypotheses or postulates to be scrapped when their deduced consequences fail to solve man's problems and to be provisionally entertained while they work.

According to Dewey, knowledge is only an event within nature and follows her law of constant expansion. Knowledge is a tool, as variable as the problems which it solves. Espousing fixed ends and eternal laws, philosophers of the past allegedly did not take expansion of knowledge into their outlooks, and as a result, it is said, they were trapped in death chambers when empiriological method supposedly exploded the traditional view of the universe.

Endorsing the relativity of knowledge, Dewey is not interested in truth as a goal, and hence knowledge, the highest and noblest of acts in the Aristotelian view, descends to a humbler role. This instrumental function of knowledge can be seen from the formal definition of inquiry which sums up the foregoing introduction to its nature:

> Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of an original situation into a unified whole.

What was at first a vague attitude is turned by inquiry into a definite and articulated one. Inquiry leads man to take a stand. The breach in the interaction between man and his milieu temporarily unbalanced his status in nature, and inquiry, when it ends, settles him down again until the next challenge happens along. This integration or "unified whole" or settled mind at the outcome of inquiry is termed *belief*, but it is not what is usually called a mental state. Organic and vital, it involves the whole bearing of the total man, exactly as the original situation which unsteadied him.

Better even than the term *belief* and much better than *knowledge* is the expression *warranted assertion* as the aim and outcome of inquiry. After an objective has been formed and the data have been *taken* and tested, a warranted assertion can be made as the answer to a problem; the elements of a situation have been analyzed and are now warrantably connected; a definite pattern of thought and action allays the unrest which the situation had aroused.

Habits have been reformed in the course of inquiry. Freshened and brought up to date by what Dewey terms "reconstruction," they fit man better for the task of living. It is not that a knowledge has been won, so much as a human life has been settled. There is not so much a victory of *knowing* as of *being* and *having*. Something new is had when the inquiry closes. Something new is.

As realism argues its case, knowledge can only occur if its object is unaltered while the knowing is going on, and in a similar way, the subject must retain its identity throughout the process. Such a view Dewey's world could never tolerate. Inquiry is a natural event like eating and sleeping, where mind is simply physico-chemical energies conjugated into subtle pattern. If knowledge should change its object, as an animal changes its food by a digestive process, the whole reality of cognition, as realism could show, would disappear. Where knowledge is like eating, knowing being, to take an extreme case, would be to turn it into something else. In the case of being the something else can only be the non-being, and Dewey's organic view of knowledge would require man to annihilate a subject that he set out to know.

Dewey limps up to face this problem. "As *undergoing* inquiry," he writes, "the material has a different logical import from that which it has at the *outcome* of inquiry." And if these words are taken at their letter they only restate the traditional realism where truth makes a logical and not real addition to being.

However, Dewey has already repudiated genuine formal logic and its *ens rationis*. He has embraced instead a material logic of an Hegelian type and insisted further on the "controlled transformation" which inquiry effects. The subject of warranted assertion has thus been changed by inquiry in not only a logical but a real way, and this is apparently implied in the statement: "Inquiry is concerned with objective transformations of objective subject matter."

Much more than a relation of thought to object, this logic is a relation of things to things. This is a good point to rephrase the philosophy of the continuum which drove Dewey to ignore the distinction between subject and object and to take a neutral stand in criteriology. Thought and thing, events in nature, are continuous. Inquiry is not perched on a pedestal aloof from nature. It is in nature and alters it, even in the endeavor to give sense to alteration. At one with nature, our attitude toward nature "marks only an increase of distinctions in an original subject-matter."

What Dewey means by judgment serves only to bring his instrumentalism into deeper relief. The copula, which traditional logic affiliates with an *ens rationis* and also with the mind's success in reaching being as existing, is here taken in a temporal sense and at its deepest level stands not for being but for operations. The subject of judgment is the focus of a problem and, nature being a continuum, a focus of suggestions for its solution. On the other hand, the predicate selects a possible answer among the suggestions and directs the operations which verify the judgment finally elaborated. *This is sweet* constitutes a judgment. The subject, of course, is not a substance but only a logical reality, standing more for a perplexity than for something definite. The real force of the judgment is *this sweetens,* and the assertion is only warranted after operational tests. The predicate thus suggests experiential checks to solve a problem flowing out of the sub-

ject. The predicate is joined to the subject only on the evidence of these tests, and the copula between them bespeaks "functional and operational correspondence."

Judgments and propositions are not the same. Judgments are always between things, where one thing indicates another as a sign relates to what it signifies. Propositions deal not with things but with symbols and their meanings in the mind. Propositions relate concepts rather than things. Like language which makes them possible and which they manipulate in a wonderful way, propositions do not refer directly to existence and at most they are simply aids in deriving the consequences of ideas. They fix things in number and in class, and they suggest possible solutions for full inquiry to test. But they can go no further. When the showdown comes, only experience and existence and operational tests can warrant assertions. Propositions are subordinate to judgments.

Dewey's logic seems a natural sequel to his world view, but it was largely in terms of this logic that such a world view was painted in the first place. It is interesting to note Dewey's dogmatism despite his plea for openness and freedom and a secularized democracy. For him and his naturalistic colleagues, there could not possibly be an approach to reality except through empiriological methods. Bolting the door to any truth uninstructed in the password of the empiriological fraternity is an intolerance in inquiry that is certainly not tested, not warrantable, undemocratic, and, in the best sense of the word, unnatural. It was fitting, then that *Naturalism and the Human Spirit* which Dewey opened by an attack on the supernatural should be closed by Randall with a plea for faith. The new faith is blind and wholly unprepared by rational evidence. It is a faith not in a past, which has already been, but in a dark and indeterminate future which, on evolutionary premises, might be anything. It clarifies no mysteries but makes everything mysterious.

C. I. LEWIS

An important American philosopher who in a way can make a transition from the outline of Dewey to the study of the philosophy of Bertrand Russell, is C. I. Lewis, author of such important books as *Mind and World Order* (1929) and the widely

quoted *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* (1946). By intention, Lewis is a naturalist and his work is directed, somewhat like Dewey's, to clarify value and ethics. But his means to that end take him into the more Platonic world of Kant and Russell, the world of analysis and of logic. Like both Dewey and Russell, he enshrines the empiriological method.

Lewis makes an important distinction between analytical and empirical knowledge. The first is flavored by Kant; it is *a priori* knowledge that does not refer to existential fact but to logical meaning. In analytical knowledge, we simply define our terms, make "apprehensions of our own meanings, and statements intended to explicate these." Here we relate meanings to each other. Knowing truth analytically is knowing what we mean. In empirical knowledge on the other hand there is fact, experience, experiment. Such knowledge bears on the future as the locus of goals which give meaning to present action. "To know," says Lewis, "is to apprehend the future as qualified by values which action may realize; and empirical knowledge is essentially utilitarian and pragmatic." Lewis is a "conceptualistic pragmatist," assigning meaning and value to ideas in terms of their consequences.

The remainder of Lewis' maturer philosophy does little except to explain and evaluate the analytical and empirical categories of human knowledge. After declaring that analytic judgments have no existential references, he decides that empirical knowledge is at most belief and is always provisional, no matter how high the probability may be. In a way, the first type of knowledge has certainty without truth and the second has truth without certainty. Lewis would ardently deny that he is a skeptic, but without the certainty of objective truth, skepticism must be the logical victor over even the best of intentions. And that charge can certainly be leveled also at Dewey.

SOME CRITICAL REMARKS

Benedetto Croce, the Italian idealist, has written a book on what is living and what is dead in Hegelianism. A century hence, a similar book might approach the philosophies treated in these pages to separate the wheat from the chaff. Aquinas and Augustine were both of the opinion that no philosophy is ever completely

false. All make contact, however weak and nibbling it may sometimes be, with at least a grain of truth. And error usually takes the form of a truth torn from its natural context and carried to extreme.

John Dewey dismisses Aristotelian thought with choice epithets about dogma and the supernatural and with an appeal to evolutionism, where it is insisted, Aristotle, philosopher and logician, finally sank in the rougher seas of modern and sensistic flux. But Aristotelianism has a much broader approach than Dewey thinks. It is even, to use his favorite word, organic, thriving on truth wherever it may be. It can certainly assimilate the truths which Dewey emphasizes and develops, while avoiding the germs of his errors.

Santayana applies to Dewey a remark that Georges Sorel leveled at James: he expresses and justifies the guiding spirit of American civilization which has ridden instrumentalism to mechanical successes that rank among the wonders of the world. It is in the area of the practical and especially the productive that Dewey's thought has positive worth, and the American genius was using it before Dewey and continues to use it where he is hardly known. Dewey simply polishes this facet of an American spirit into a philosophical respectability.

In the order of making, like the building of a house, washing its windows, or creosoting its frame against the termites, the big aim is to get the job done and to do it as easily, as cheaply, and as suitably as needs would dictate or luxury would prefer. The interest is on the end, and in respect to a productive task, considered alone, other things assume the role of instruments *taken* to promote a favorable outcome of inquiry. The farmer, spraying his fields, is a pragmatist, organizing his means to get the job done and taking whatever short cuts he discovers that save his efforts and improve his crops.

The experimentalist is also a pragmatist in his laboratory. He uses a familiar "cut-and-try" method, where materials are of value only to the extent of making his experiment "go." An empiriological theory, Max Planck declares, must be judged only by its works, since this is the only manner by which an empirical test can be empirical. Were it not for instrumentalism in the empiriological order, testing theory and prompting the experimenter in his prob-

lem of making equipment operate, the great parade of modern empiriological progress would never have had a drummer to play it on.

The desire to ease human drudgery and to get the most out of the least is more ancient than its triumphs in this age of machinery and conveniences. Even the history of the hammer would certainly show that the instrumental spirit did not begin with Dewey or even with Galileo and modern physics. The wonder of Gothic architecture would never have developed if beauty had not called on an instrumental spirit for assistance and sometimes for even more. The Gothic arch developed out of the Romanesque largely to permit windows and still support the roof, and the flying buttress, instrumental in great measure, was developed to reinforce the walls.

It is Dewey's shrewdness to have discerned and emphasized the instrumental character of human making, and to have studied it for its own sake. To him is owed subtle and forceful descriptions of what making, as such, involves and of the attitude that man must assume to improve his production at its own level. Only in so far as matter is potential is it controllable, and if controlling is an office of man, as the master of nature, to that extent he must study the potencies of things to gain a hold on them. Perfect control would imply pure passivity, indeterminacy, flux, the continuum. Dewey's outlook on the world as a continuum of flux merely describes what the empiriological method would view as the "ideal case" of controllable matter.

Obviously he stacks the cards in favor of control by viewing the world as only a continuum and hence controllable. On his own terms, he should wait until the end of the empiriological enterprise before making judgments about the whole field it covers. But the fact is that his method is one of control and his world is one of mere continuum, and so his logic and ontology are consistent to that extent.

Dewey's sketch of situations, problems, data, objectives, hypotheses, warranted or practical certitude, in brief his whole outline of inquiry teems with sharp descriptions of what is called making or production, art as opposed to science. His references to "ends-in-view" are likewise valid in art where the aim is always man-made and the ultimate aim is man. If man is only a maker, Dewey has

captured him in his instrumentalism. But what about the thinker of universal truths and the doer obligated by law?

The defects of Dewey are much more serious than his insights. He has brought man down to earth at the expense of a permanent eclipse of his sun. Making is not the only or indeed the principal activity of man. His mind is slanted to know truth, his will to embrace the universal good, and without the guidance of these twin planets, his life becomes aimless and unchartable.

Dewey's own writings are a telltale contrast to the principles he champions. As a writer, he is not a practicing naturalist, conducting inquiry and making only warranted assertions. He is a spectator, standing on the bank of the flux he describes and discovering within it certain islands called men and pebbles called things. The flow is thus not pure and not indeterminate. Dewey is using as his "tools" the universal principles of being and thought without which, as Aristotle put it, not even a word could be uttered and understood.

Immediate knowledge, like that of the principle of identity or of non-contradiction or even like being as existing and as known, Dewey would stoutly deny. On his empiriological grounds, knowledge must alter whatever it grasps, and all judgments become individual and instrumental and purely tentative.

Such a universe would truly remain unknown and unknowable even with empiriological methods. True knowledge must leave both subject and object as unaltered; the stable and unchanging are required at both poles. Then too, in order to make judgments, knowledge compares things, thus showing both the need and the fact of its universal character. Knowing things by comparison, it knows them universally. Knowing things as unaltered, it must know them immediately; otherwise, it would pursue its object through an infinite sweep of mediations and, infinity being uncrossable, would never know anything at all. If knowledge must be universal and in some way immediate and Dewey denies that such characters can exist in knowledge or anywhere else, there is something drastically out of line in his theories.

To make all evidence, meaning, value, and even all reality extrinsic to itself is to deny that things have anything intrinsically and to open the way to a nihilistic universe as opposed to a universe of being that, in an immediate sense, truly is and, in

an immediate sense, is known in some general but still meaningful fashion.

If Dewey merits all this criticism, then a view of education while taking account of his suggestions in their proper places will still aim to develop an inquiring mind but the inquiry will lead also to higher levels where a measure of philosophical settlement can be reached.

"Experimental naturalism," writes John L. Childs, "signifies, in the first place, the unqualified acceptance of the principle of organic evolution." Apart from the larger problems which show that a realist's acceptance of evolution can definitely not be "unqualified" (Chapter 16), the whole Darwinian doctrine rests on mere theoretical evidence and once more italicizes the new faith which naturalism must evoke from its devotees. Evolution unqualified takes no account of a soul transcending time and space. It prefers to overlook cogent argument which introspection marshals regarding the soul, and it retreats instead to cloudy theoretical evidence from a dim and distant past—a past that in the first place only a transcending spiritual mind could think backward to discern.

It is a common fallacy of our age, and Dewey is one of the worst offenders, to extend the rights of empiriological method through the whole hierarchy of knowledge because it has bludgeoned the mineral world to some extent under controls. Dewey is true to the tradition of Francis Bacon who rejected Aristotle for a philosophy of "works," but he is false to the dynasty of human reason which asks what works are for and what things *are,* objectively and uncontrolled.

Water is good for the garden, but a thundershower is bad for a new suit or a spring dress. A method can only apply in the light of a premethodic evaluation of a subject-matter. Method is only a technique, and what goes into it, what comes out of it, what it does to things as they pass through—all of this is for a higher discernment than the method employed. Above all, empiriological method, measuring and quantitative as Dewey admits, can never ascend to the level of values. What is good or bad cannot be decided by geometry any more than a rottenness at the core of an apple can be detected by measuring its circumference.

The impact of Dewey and of the naturalists in general on the

practical and academic life of America today can hardly be underlined blackly enough. Populating our college faculties and influencing our youth, they reach from border to border and from university life on downward through the elementary grades.

But the needs of cultural and national and certainly individual life are running directly counter to naturalism's principles. Now more than ever there is need to reaffirm the fixed and objective laws, controlling those who control men's destinies and prompting each conscience to obey the law, even when unpoliced. If personality is but a tool, with nothing imprescriptible and intrinsic in the way of being and of dignity, the state can coerce it as its simple instrument, and a herd life, like Communism, would have every reason to claim a natural status. How does Dewey's instrumentalism differ basically from the Marxian notion that values are extrinsic, bestowed on a thing by outside labor alone? Communism is a surprisingly close translation of the continuum.

In brief, the naturalists who boast of being rigorous and scientific, are naïvely unaware of how arbitrary they really are. To quote Randall's plea once more, they cling to a faith. In a genuine way, it is a faith without hope, and with no conceivable motive for charity, it would kill the society and culture which naturalism aims to vitalize, integrate, and enrich.

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CHAPTER 3 BEAUTY AND SANTAYANA

There are two ways of being dualistic. One is to recognize the duality of principle which experience flashes into our mind's eye when we open it. The other way is to be self-contradictory, so that readers can interpret one's philosophy in two ways. The first dualism is realistic and one of depth; the second is one of obscurity. It is unfortunately often believed that if man can be obscure enough he must be a great man and have a great message. Such homage has often been paid to Einstein and Whitehead and perhaps less often to Santayana.

If a philosopher must stand trial before his critics, George Santayana is the object of a hung jury. Though a self-styled naturalist, his cohorts reject his apparent dualism. The stricter positivists, though finding him a fellow in their anti-metaphysical campaign, view his larger spirit as more poetic than philosophical. In a genuine way, Santayana was hinting before World War I at what Heidegger and Jaspers were shouting in the thirties. In an equally strong sense, he moved in the shadows of William James to reach a position more Deweyite than John Dewey.

On more than one point, Santayana suggests the scholastic view of things; but this resemblance is completely betrayed by his omnivorous materialism. Herbert Ellsworth Cory was deeply moved by Santayana's book, *The Sense of Beauty*, yet Cory would have been the first to oppose the principle from the same book that a thing "is good only because we desire it."

There are many who plead a lack of understanding of Santayana. There are some who detect his inconsistencies which are, after all, but the adulthood of a materialism. In a deep respect, Santayana is almost post-modern — riddled by the rejection of all theories of meaning and admitting quite frankly that modern

thought, in the surrender of reason, has only animal faith to live by. Santayana, taken in this light, has gone beyond James and beyond Dewey in the naturalization of man.

The bifurcated life of Santayana already suggests the opposing trends in his philosophy. His mother, a Spaniard by birth, had been married to an American, but after his death, she remarried in Spain. Of this second marriage, George Santayana was born in 1863. At the age of 9, he left Spain for Boston, never to drift again to his native land except for brief visits. He matriculated at Harvard after the usual preparatory schooling, and it was here that he furthered his earlier expeditions into philosophy, studying under the two recognized masters, William James and Josiah Royce. Another influence on the faculty was George Herbert Palmer, a scholar of Hegelian hue, who was unusually gifted in the history of philosophy.

Precocious reading in his boyhood had set Santayana very much ahead of his fellow student-philosophers. Early in life he showed that spirit of critical independence which came to the surface of his philosophical speculation and marked, to a great extent, his whole personal history. The great lectures of James and Royce rolled off young Santayana, leaving, he records, "more wonder than serious agreement." While Royce was preaching his modified Hegelian claims and James was in the opposite corner, cheering the rights of the concrete, Santayana quietly read such pessimists as Leopardi and Schopenhauer and hedonists such as Lucretius, his constant companion in a pocket edition.

But when Santayana forsook Harvard to study in Germany under Paulsen, and in an atmosphere charged by Hegel and Kant, he took with him much more of James and Royce than he perhaps had expected. His final philosophy seems at times like the ghosts of these two men still disputing with each other under the assumed names of the Life of Reason and the Life of Spirit.

What Santayana absorbed from Paulsen was a new zeal for the Greeks, especially Plato and Aristotle. The rank that he later assigned to art and aesthetics stamps him as a true son of the Renaissance, even to the point of discovering the ancients for himself and, as though unaware of the Italian Humanists, re-enacting their spirit in his own intellectual development. A decade

after his experiences in Germany, Santayana took time out from his teaching in America, to enroll at Cambridge for a year's additional research into Plato and Aristotle.

In 1889, at Harvard, Santayana graduated to his doctorate and to the faculty. Eighteen years of teaching won him esteem as a brilliant lecturer, if somewhat erratic and temperamental. In the philosophy department, James and Royce were still big names, and their friendly yet fierce disagreement had by this time assumed the aura of a tradition. Santayana stood above the fray; at least he remained outside of it. Retreating to the quiet of his Platonic heaven, he has always remained lyrically indisposed to polemics, and Bertrand Russell well says of him: "His literary taste is incompatible with controversy, and his most incisive criticisms are aphoristic rather than argumentative."

In 1907, Royce died, and Santayana moved up to his professorship. But five years later, after his mother's death, he resigned his post and has passed almost half of his long life in Italy and in England. Not since 1914 has he returned to the United States. He resides at present in a Catholic convent in Rome.

Santayana's religion is as inconsistent as his philosophy. Officially, he claims to be a Catholic, but a declared materialist, he does not practice the faith of his Spanish fathers. Russell says that Santayana's Catholicism is "aesthetic" and "political" but not "theological," whatever that could possibly mean. From the earliest of his public pronouncements until after the recent war, Santayana continues to insist that he is a Catholic by sympathy and that, in his own words, there is only one "alternative between Catholicism and complete disillusion; but I was never afraid of disillusion, and I have chosen it."

Santayana's leading books may be divided into two classes. The first is a series of works generally entitled *The Life of Reason* and including volumes on *Reason in Common Sense, Reason in Society, Reason in Religion, Reason in Art,* and *Reason in Science.* The second series bears the general title, *The Realms of Being.* It is prefaced by a work called *Scepticism and Animal Faith* and includes *The Realm of Essence, The Realm of Matter, The Realm of Truth,* and *The Realm of Spirit.* Besides his feats in philosophy, Santayana has been successful as a poet, novelist, and lighter essayist. Even his philosophical works bear the imagery and the

lyrics of Santayana, the poet. There are few other men who have made their literary mark outside their native tongue.

THE LIFE OF REASON

For what there is of it, the difference between the picture of Reason and the later portrait of Spirit can be best measured by developing the negatives of both and superimposing them.

Reason here must never be confused with rationality in the usual sense but is almost the exact opposite. It connotes a wholesale naturalism, summing up pre-Socratic sensisms, transforming Platonic aesthetics, and reworking Aristotle without his metaphysics of being and of knowledge. Without this "first philosophy," Aristotelians will not recognize their master. He becomes a hollow sign. But it is precisely that symbolic role which Santayana wants Aristotle to play. By contrast to Platonic detachment from this life, Aristotle becomes the symbol for the natural, and in the naturalist cliché, he brought Plato down to earth. In his *Ethics* Aristotle is supposedly much more interested in man, the political and social animal seeking to found a city, than with the personal perfection which keynotes moral thought among the medieval schoolmen.

The ideal of the Greeks was one of harmony, and their great achievement lies in art. But the finer and more speculative proportions of Plato and Aristotle, Santayana blots out of his new Hellenism. Plato is praised for his myths, for his lifting of the good and of the beautiful above the true, and for his discernment of the mind that could idealize. But the real philosopher of existence, it is added, was not Plato. It was not even Aristotle. It was Heraclitus.

Santayana views existence as a flux, and sensation is the only arm of knowledge available to man in swimming through it. Never does Santayana turn from sensism and dynamism even in his latest works which describe the Life of Spirit. The Life of Reason is boldly proclaimed as a merely animal life, turned not to knowledge and the true but to the aesthetic contemplation of things and toward the control of them for the winning of "the maximum of satisfaction eventually possible."

It is a convenient transition to remark that Santayana's views are much more logical than the philosophies which James and

Dewey erected on roughly the same heritage of premises. Openly in fact did Santayana object to the later and pragmatic James. Pragmatism and instrumentalism, whatever the intentions of their followers, are primarily theories of meaning whether directed to the good or the true or, more generally, the valued. They seek to impart an outlook, an attitude, a way of living realistically. Dewey to the contrary, it is rather easy to show that if there is no ultimate meaning and eternal truth available to man, then to exalt method, to seek meaning any time and anywhere, to speak of the true and good, is both futile and contradictory. This is crystal clear to a logical mind. Santayana puts it in writing.

Frankly defiant of meaning and of method, and turning away from genuine reason which could never really survive in a naturalistic jungle, Santayana takes the road neither of truth nor of values nor of religion. He wants rather to sell men the aesthetic contemplation of the immediate and the joy which the moment might confer. Thus he writes in the first book of his earlier series:

> The Life of Reason is the happy marriage of two elements—impulse and ideation—which if wholly divorced would reduce man to a brute or to a maniac. The rational animal is generated by the union of these two monsters. He is constituted by ideas which have ceased to be visionary and actions which have ceased to be vain. Thus the Life of Reason is another name for what, in the widest sense of the word, might be called art.

By the time Santayana began his study of Reason, Herbert Spencer had promoted evolution to the rank of a philosophy, and Santayana seems to have read both Darwin and Spencer. If he had not met Spencer before, he at least felt his influence while at Cambridge. Naturalism has for one of its premises that man is continuous with nature, and the central argument for this doctrine is evolution. As he met Spencer in his philosophy, so did Santayana meet Bergson. But unlike these two evolutionists he logically asserted that if man is only an animal he should be counseled to act like one. Pragmatism becomes an illusion of man, and science one of his masks.

In Santayana's outline of society, reason's goal becomes the satisfaction of instinct. Mother Nature goes beyond the nurture of individuals to plant in men the instinct for reproduction and

for a harmonizing life in the family unit. Occupational complexities, growing with time, and the need for protection against neighboring tribes throw men together into a state. Government thus evolves out of nature, naturalistically conceived, and after it has already become an accomplished fact, men vainly try on logical grounds to justify its existence.

Religion in the Life of Reason is a symbolism much more than a significant guide. But Santayana finds its so-called myth, poetry, and superstition richly adapted to his aims for man. Loyalty, pure and simple, Royce had proposed as a moral code. A similar note appears in Santayana under the name of piety. The most striking example of such a virtue is "the pious Aeneas" and thus "Piety, in its nobler and Roman sense, may be said to mean man's recurrent attachment to the sources of his being and the steadying of his life by that attachment." The source of man is nature, as Santayana sees him, and thus there is urged a filial piety to the cosmos, with the dogmatic aspect of religion as its symbol.

In *Reason and Art,* the way out of this brutal and evolutionary world takes the form of aesthetic satisfaction. Art finds its basis in instinct and its apex where man becomes a creator, rejoicing in an immediate reward. Far from being an inertial and mathematical mechanism, nature is presented as a plastic flux, where every moment brings a fresh onrush of tensions and where art is the form for stabilizing them. By art, man moves closer to his home in nature. By art, he captures nature and contemplates it. By art, he realizes the highest of his hopes and delights his whole being with an aesthetic charm. Thus, Santayana closes his treatment on art with the view that "the emergence of arts out of instincts is the token and exact measure of nature's success and of mortal happiness." Aesthetics and not modern physics is the model Santayana holds up to men.

If Santayana in his premises extols the empiriological method as the sole repository of knowledge, he would deny in his conclusions that knowledge is meaningful. Like Reid and the Scottish school which helped to mold Dewey, Santayana prefers common sense to abstract theories, and like James and Dewey, he rebounded from Hegel to a defense of immediate experience alone. Though proud of his materialism, he rejects empiriological physics and casts his lot with Heraclitus more than with Democritus, the

patron of Newtonian science. In the achievements of man, empiriological physics is wisely toned down for its failure to touch the ideal or to suggest values. Above it is dialectic which, in Santayana's epistemology, organizes impressions in the light of goals. But even dialectic is not supreme, yielding, it would appear, to the self-styled post-rational morality of Santayana where the best guides of men are "nobler passions" and "fortunate prejudices." At the heart of this morality is Santayana's constant aestheticism which beats in various rhythms through the whole *Life of Reason,* making it in sum neither intellectualism nor a voluntarism but a life frankly governed by the emotions. Like Ernst Cassirer, Santayana prizes art more than science.

THE ROLE OF ESSENCES

The later expressions of Santayana in his *Realms of Being* began to appear in 1927, more than twenty years after the final volume of his earlier series and fifteen years after his academic retirement. Meanwhile, in 1920, a new philosophical movement was stirring in America with the publication of *Essays in Critical Realism,* a programmatic book jointly authored by Durant Drake, Arthur O. Lovejoy, Roy Woods Sellars, C. A. Strong, Arthur Kenyon Rogers, and Santayana. However at odds in other respects, this group agreed on a view of knowledge which stood sharply opposed to earlier American Neo-realism (Chapter 1).

In 1906, the Neo-realists had published a similar symposium, agreeing that the external world was directly reached in human knowledge and that no mental state, like an idea, need bridge the gap between knower and known. Just such a mediating state was what the Critical Realists urged, and it became not simply a backstage medium like an idea, doing its work, quietly and unconsciously, until man, having known the external world, turned inward to examine his mind. The mental mediator, not the object represented, became in Critical Realism the initial matter for direct apprehension. Hence, although a kind of protest vote against the materialism of the Neo-realists, Critical Realism stood from its outset much closer to Kant than to Aristotle. It was much more critical than a true realism, where the object is known, first and primarily, through the medium of an idea and where the medium is only known secondarily and by reflection. In technical

expression, true realism requires that the idea be the *medium quo,* not the *medium quod.*

The Critical Realists gave different names and different values to this intermediary. Santayana, for example, called it an essence, an indication of the final direction which his philosophy was about to take.

Opposed to essence is existence, and the very mention of such terms cannot help hinting at a possible scholastic flavor in Santayana. Baker Brownell, his former student, has written: "In this respect Santayana is less a modern, perhaps, than he is Greek or scholastic. He still separates essence and existence."

But if there is any whisper of scholasticism in Santayana, it is at most an historical accident that comes from the Greek sources which he used and which the medievals deepened and developed in their genuine philosophy. Not until World War II did Santayana read St. Thomas and then apparently only because the conditions in Rome made it difficult to get such books as would have been otherwise desired.

Essence and existence, as Santayana describes them, are not just different from Aristotle's thought; they are against it. Aquinas raises his philosophy on the metaphysical Aristotle which Santayana tears down. If there is any likeness between scholastic philosophy and Santayana it is only in vocabulary, and Brownell was playing with words when he allied Santayana to the scholastics.

World War I, when Santayana was already in his European exile, was a profound and lingering shock to this man who has always pleaded to be sensitive to the delicate beauty in the world. It may well be wondered whether his doctrine of essence is not an issue from his wish to escape the hard fact and harder problems that really require philosophy to seek not the plastic rubber of naturalism but the wrought iron of eternal truth. Santayana's "essence" may be to some extent at least, the child of World War I that met its traditional namesake in World War II, through the reading of Aquinas. It was apparently but a casual meeting, and Santayana has continued to go his casual way.

There are two worlds in Santayana's later philosophy. There is a dualism, but it is one of obscurity and contradictions. There is opposition in the world, but the world is only matter. Existence is the flux of all reality, and essence vaults into the mind "from

nowhere," when existence is experienced. Essence "floats in," as Whitehead says in apparent criticism of Santayana. It has no meaningful connection with experience and flux and existence. It has no meaning at all.

Such a view is not a complete novelty in the history of thought. Santayana himself would track it to Plato. There is a suggestion in it of the psychophysical parallelism begun by Leibniz in his doctrine that mind and body monads do not compenetrate each other but run together like clocks ticking concurrently. From another and wider viewpoint, "essence" here is a broad reminder of Royce's idealism, while existence is a vestige of the dynamic and pluralistic universe of James. In a way, where the Forms of Plato were rubbed into the material earth by the *Life of Reason,* they go back to their separated state and even beyond it in the *Realms of Being.*

It is easier to criticize Santayana's philosophy of essence than to follow him in its elaboration. In arguing the case for the distinction between essence and existence, Aquinas stood on the strength of the human mind to attain certainty. It is in the exactly opposite frame of mind, not from certitude but from skepticism, that Santayana, as it will later appear, marks off essence and existence. "Let me push skepticism as far as I logically can," he writes, "and endeavour to clear my mind of illusion, even at the price of intellectual suicide." The opening volume of the *Realms of Being* sounds the keynote for its whole campaign. It is entitled *Scepticism and Animal Faith.*

ANIMAL FAITH

The existential world is so tensely unstable that Santayana says "nothing given exists." As in Dewey, philosophy must begin in midstream, unable to trace the flux of existence to its origins and fated only to follow it through the future, with no assurance that headwaters will ever be reached or even that they exist at all. But even a sensist cannot satisfy the mental unrest which is a sure sign of his supra-sensory nature. Granted that existence or change is experienced by man, how can he conclude from his feelings to the reality of their objects? Here Santayana proudly drapes himself with that mantle of the skeptic which post-Cartesian thought has been ever squirming to avoid. The fact

of an existing world and of its constant evolution is known only by animal faith and is always open to doubt. Lest this animal faith be taken metaphorically, Santayana hastens to league it with hunger and fear, adding that it is not a form of knowledge so much as a spurt of action.

A realist would be helped in the pursuit of Santayana's meaning by viewing his division of essence from existence as a faint glimpse of the two levels in human activity and even in nature itself. His plea for existence as irrational and simply immediate, unconceptual and only dynamic, may well be a hint that the sense world is not intelligible of itself but is only *given* to intelligence. Essence on the other hand may well be a pale shadow of reality as known when the intellect culls meaning by abstracting and raises its raw material to a new and intelligible light. If the two levels are incompatible in Santayana's final thought, it need only be remembered that he is building on the Cartesian split in modern philosophy where essence and existence can no more get together than matter and spirit. Insofar as man isolates identities in things, he is not certain of change, Santayana goes on, much as Einstein wrote that insofar as mathematics is certain it does not pertain to reality and that as far as it pertains to reality it is not certain. This comparison has all the more weight when Santayana compares his essences to mathematical figments.

Santayana was willing to brave "intellectual suicide," but apparently he lost his nerve. All of man's mental attitudes, he came to say, are matters of belief with knowledge being described as "true belief" just as Taine defined genuine knowledge as a "true hallucination." But Santayana drove on much further, and when he had come to the end of his effort to "push skepticism as far as I logically can," he discovered that skepticism itself was a form of belief and that a skeptic, when he presents himself as skeptical, must always be dogmatic. Nietzsche called skepticism a disease, and Santayana concludes that it "is an exercise, not a life."

It is impossible to doubt everything, including one's own skepticism. Life is too short and too brutal, and the skeptic, fine-combing his mind to complete his doubt, is always forced to act in the practical order before he finishes. Skepticism is not thought and not life. The impossibility of practicing it is the surest sign that it does not meet the demands of reality and is not a realistic

attitude. To use the phrase of Gilbert Murray, the "failure of nerve" is naturalism's, not Aristotle's. Pursuing its premises to the ultimate form would require not only intellectual suicide but physical suicide as well.

Of the folly of complete skepticism, Santayana seemed dimly persuaded. He was willing to become a fideist, willing, when he found a complete doubt to be intellectually absurd, to forsake intelligence and espouse an animal faith. He trusted his reason only where it destroyed reason. But unlike his fellow naturalists, such as Dewey, he did not deny reason and then ask men to be reasonable and methodic. He saw that modern premises, if they are followed logically to their wilderness, must leave man to unreason, nature to unmeaning, and life to what he expressly called "disillusion."

In the figure of Santayana, life is a sport where the hunter pursues his prey on the animal faith that it lies ahead, in our steaming tropical forest where all things struggle for existence. But the chase never leads to the capture as Sartre more wisely concludes when he stands on modern premises to despair. Like Lessing, Santayana is more concerned with the thrill of the quest than with the shot which brings the quarry down. Knowledge exists to "salute" its object rather than to "embrace" it, and Santayana prepares for man a manual of salutes to present to evolutionary matter as it passes by him.

But like the Marxian metaphysics and like the continuum proposed by Dewey, Santayana's materialism is not of the classical type. If there is only brute mechanical matter, it would be a neutral and unmoving thing rather than the restless and goal-ward universe of motion that "salutes" our senses. But Marx and Dewey and Santayana and Whitehead get around the static preferences of their brute matter. They spiritualize it. If the materialism of Santayana is really probed, it holds to a vitalized and even a spiritualized matter, fueled somehow from within by its own native forces and racing more to order than to an entropic death. In a more technical phrase, matter is described by Santayana as having patterns called *tropes*. The world, organized by *tropes*, rushes onward against a drag that Santayana, reversing Aristotle's hierarchy, calls not matter but form. In adapting an animal to terms with its environment and in aiming to ease the

burden of living, a *trope* on the animal plane becomes hardened into habit and, especially in the case of man, is passed on downward through the generations.

But a *trope* is not a thing. Substance is the stuff of existence that is always a-flow, and a *trope* is simply a pattern organizing events within a context by binding them with antecedent and consequent moments in the flux of things. Motion is the substance of the world. Heraclitus is revived and restored to power. But motion is molded by *tropes* which confer a relative and somewhat specious stability on things that would otherwise be chaotic.

On more than one score, evolutionism is the focal point in Santayana's whole philosophy. But at the same time there is a strong suggestion of a dualism between matter and form, events and their *tropes,* motion and the "degrees of permanence" which the material world discloses.

Santayana belongs in one very important way with McDougall and Lloyd Morgan who preach a philosophy called emergent evolutionism. They favor a mysterious definition of matter in which nature is virtually vitalized and the emergence of novelty is acclaimed as nature in its normal activities. Behind this banner of emergent evolution, Santayana seems also to be marching.

ESSENCE AND SPIRIT

Dormant on the foothills of nature, he claims, is the so-called *psyche,* which begins to emerge on the level of plants and then of animals and may be best defined as a system of *tropes.* Man, whose only reality is matter, depends also on the *psyche* for organic life. But there is a new realm of being that emerges on the human level, the realm of *Spirit,* or mind which has for its object still another new realm of being, that of essence. By contrast to Spirit, the *psyche* is occupied with biological needs. Its birth has been the material tensions of the world, and so long as these tensions are held in something like balance, the *psyche* stands smoothly and instinctively at man's service. The realm of the psyche is vegetative and somatic.

But Spirit's career opens a new realm, that of thought and consciousness. The activity of Spirit is intuition, its object the realm of essence. Intuition carries confessedly a Cartesian meaning

here but is even more difficult to focus than the notion of intuition in Bergsonism. In fact not only the activity of Spirit but Spirit itself is an evanescent concept to define, as if to parallel Santayana's own admission that it is an evanescent reality in existence. "Spirit," he writes,

> is an awareness natural to animals, revealing the world and themselves in it. Other names for spirit are consciousness, attention, feeling, thought, or any word that marks the total *inner* differences between being aware or asleep, alive or dead.

Not the least of the difficulties of this passage from *The Realm of Spirit,* perhaps the last of the major works that Santayana will write in philosophy, is the failure to withdraw the previous insistence from *The Realm of Matter* on "the dominance of matter in every being even when that being is spiritual." Spirit seems to have emerged from nature with the power to dominate its own causes. It penetrates to the realm of essence which has no connection with the dynamical existential stream that cast man adrift and finally ashore. Since *The Realm of Spirit* is the closing volume on the realms of being, it may well be taken as Santayana's finished version of philosophy with the exception of a book on politics completed but not yet published. His dualism is more apparent and more contradictory than ever. It is also as obscure.

Unlike matter or the *psyche,* Spirit does not struggle to get ahead in the work-a-day world. It wishes rather to settle down to the cool and calm retirement of contemplating essences, which thrill man, presumably, with a near-beatific delight. Essences are charged with "aesthetic immediacy." They are not abstracted from reality nor can they be applied to it to give it a meaning. Separated from existence, they enjoy only a logical standing and are known by intuition while existence is grasped by animal faith.

Essences are stamped with identity and quasi-permanence, whereas existence is permeated by change. They flit into the mind "from nowhere," and to nowhere do they return, since knowing whence they come and whither they go would put them into the class of changing things, and change or motion is exactly what essences are not. Eternal, immutable, and infinite in number, they savor of "possible worlds" as Leibniz used the term. Of the realm of essence Santayana says:

> It is simply the unwritten catalogue, prosaic and infinite, of all the characters possessed by such things as happen to exist, together with all the characters which all different things would possess if they existed.

To take a sensist at his word, essences are appearances. Infinite in number, they make for the continuous universe of Hèraclitus and of Hegel and in an even more striking way recall the Leibnizian principle of continuity. It is of course not logically possible to reconcile this idea of the continuum and of infinity in the realm of essences with the sharp and immediate character that Santayana claims for them. But Santayana abandoned logic when he forsook intelligence and rushed at reality with only an animal faith to light his way.

Like Kierkegaard and his contemporary descendants, Santayana singles out leaps that occur in knowledge. With logic forced into exile, thought can no longer move consecutively to its conclusions; it must leap and bound, and Santayana frankly confesses this fact, in pointing out the gaps between the sense world and the sense organ and between essence and existence.

The first leap takes place in response to an external stimulus which affects the senses and arouses the realm of Spirit. Jumping from the sense modification imparted by the stimulus to the existence of a stimulating world outside the mind is an act of animal faith. The second leap is that of intuition when Spirit, without the reference which an idea makes to a real object outside of it, becomes conscious of an essence.

Santayana always emphasizes the retired and inner character of Spirit. It is drawn in upon itself. His descriptions of it in terms of "light" and "actuality" are twentieth-century analogues to the Cartesian play on clarity and distinction in ideas. He seems impelled to posit intuition as a leap for the same reason that Descartes, in his split of body and soul, finally appealed to innate ideas as a theory of knowledge. Bertrand Russell followed a similar course in arriving, with Frege, at a theory of "types" which are not too far removed from the "essences" of Santayana. The whole later epistemology of Santayana is, and he would be the first to admit it, a Platonic one, but it is a Platonism materialized and hence even de-Platonized.

Despite the importance attached to the intuition of essences, it

is not knowledge but more of an aesthetic experience. From the first of his writings to the very last, Santayana is busied about the beauty of being rather than about its truth, and his philosophy is an appeal to men to rejoice in the beautiful, immediately felt and immediately satisfying. All other experience is at best a shadow, seen by the cave man of Plato and leading, when its pattern is traced sunward, not to the active life of Dewey but to the quiet of enjoyed "contemplation." Santayana's world has deep points of contact with that of Dewey, and his philosophy is properly called a naturalism. But in the final phase of his system, he ranks man as an aesthetic much more than as a social animal.

One of the interesting phases of Santayana's thought which can help to grasp what substance there is to his philosophy is the difference between his Life of Reason and his Life of Spirit. His earlier sympathies seem to lie more with the garden variety of naturalism which opposes all dualism, puts man in continuity with lower nature, and lays great weight on a Darwinian struggle for existence which affects everything. His later thought reaches the conclusion that man is an aesthetic animal whose highest activity is to contemplate essences that dart into the mind "from nowhere" and have no meaning. Does the later development of Santayana contradict his earlier naturalism?

In *The Realms of Being,* there is a great deal of repetition of what has been previously accepted on the relations of man and nature, but there is an important additional emphasis on the realm of Spirit and its object, the realm of essence. Santayana would characterize his later expression as different only in "temper and level" from its predecessor. Both Spirit and Reason, he claims, are basically material and thoroughly animal in nature. They are both emergent characters from the organic world, and they are both concerned with animal appetite. Reason is beamed upon the workaday pragmatic life of man. It is, Santayana would say, the voice of Aristotle, and there is no doubt that it is more than a whisper of William James. Spirit on the other hand is more liberal and leisurely in its operations. It does not apprehend what is meaningful or useful or pragmatically true for a given goal. It comes to rest in the essences that it intuits and is content there in an aesthetic isolation. Here there is the voice of Plato and perhaps, with certain modulation, that of Royce.

Reading the *Life of Reason* in retrospect reveals that the seeds of the later Santayana were planted in his earlier writings. He always shows a fondness for Plato, and he always seems less interested in knowledge than in aesthetic experience. The posterior directions which his thought took are mapped by the emphasis which his earlier works had put on such motives as the ideal, the mythical, and, when conceived as a measure of man's happiness, the artistic. In this sense, his maturer thought simply gives emphasis and concretion to themes that were latent earlier and evolved to their full expression, like his *psyche* emerging into Spirit. Even in the life of Spirit, Reason still enjoys an exalted role as the servant of the spiritual realm and as the tool of the aesthetic animal for practical life. Thus Santayana writes:

> Between the spiritual life and the life of reason, there is accordingly no contradiction; they are concomitant; yet there is a difference of temper and level, as there is between agriculture and music.

But if there is no conflict between Reason and Spirit, it may still be asked if there is civil strife dividing the realm of Spirit against itself. When singing his loudest lyrics to the reality of Spirit, Santayana is still insisting that he speaks of animal and material realities which alone populate our universe. He reminds his readers that he is a materialist. And the readers have to be reminded.

In this respect, like James, Santayana is very difficult to pin down. This much should be said here against him: It is not enough in philosophy to describe and to narrate. Such is, at different levels, the office of the poet and the empiriological physicist. In a larger sense, it is the office of phenomenology as Husserl conceived it and as it was practiced in different ways by Scheler and by Heidegger.

But the philosopher must explain. It is Cartesian, Kantian, and mathematical to postulate as Santayana does. A realist would immediately deny that matter is capable of all the movements and the tropisms, the self-propulsion and even the spirituality which Santayana ascribes to it. But Santayana is not interested in explanation. The heart of his thinking has an aesthetic beat. He raises the aesthetic above the meaningful and the certain. He stands in the lineage of Hegel who admittedly penned a vast and impressive philosophy, sublime to contemplate and struggling to be more or

less consistent with itself, but alien from the start to that experience of men which the philosopher ought to explain.

It may well be wondered whether, having ventured to a vague discernment of the dualism which traditional philosophy finds incarnate in man and even in nature, Santayana's finger is pointed to anything further, a possible third stage of thinking which would give not only a nominal assent to the reality of spirit but a realistic account of its primacy.

Such questions as this are often idle ones, and their answers can only be taken in a similar vein. In Santayana's case, it should be remembered that *The Realm of Spirit* published in 1940 was actually projected and outlined seventeen years earlier in *Scepticism and Animal Faith.* Those intervening years brought no considerable changes in his final and polished expressions on the nature of Spirit, and there is no indication that continued meditation on the subject is leading him any further toward the tradition whose vocabulary he borrowed and whose theology he has always held in high esteem as the only alternative to "disillusion." He has a closed system. He has a closed mind. Now that he has fully expressed his system with the book on politics, yet to appear, he seems content to roost in it as his years move beyond their middle eighties. In the natural course of things, no radical change in his view can be anticipated. Still nimble in mind, despite his years, he lives in a Catholic convent in Rome, enjoying his ecclesiastical atmosphere as a thing of beauty and a work of art, content that his world of Spirit is only the spirit of the world.

Aside from his literary achievements, George Santayana is more than a philosopher trying to deliver a message. From the distance of his reviewing stand in Italy where he has spent long years of retirement, he has sketched the deeper hues of the modern philosophical rainbow, which leads not to meaning but to a dross, meaningless world where man is only an animal with an animal faith and should catch what he can in the way of animal enjoyment. Much more than James or Dewey, Santayana is bold enough to follow through the premises of modern American naturalism. To read his thought is but to see naturalism, made a little more naturalistic in obedience to its own inner logic.

Without an ultimate meaning, there is no meaning at all. Without a supreme and unchanging value, nothing is good or valuable;

life is turned into a jungle, where animal men lead animal lives and follow the fancies of the moment, which is symbolized by Santayana's aestheticism.

James was illogical when he dived from his pluralistic platform to a theory of truth or goodness, and Dewey is arbitrary in his homage to the empiriological method. Both were afraid of disillusion, of intellectual suicide, of facing the animals that their premises uncage. They were guilty of the failure of nerve.

In his conclusions from naturalistic premises, Santayana is more logical. His final "salute" to reality would be that man is an aesthetic animal, who should seek no meaning and should only admit any method as a matter of caprice. The moment should be enjoyed for the moment's sake, unhinged from larger schemes of truth and value and without referring at all to the future. Everything about the Santayana world is mysterious since animals cannot study its causes and since a purely natural faith can never lead to any certainty.

In Santayana's system, matter is endowed with occult tropes and man, with a magical power of intuiting he knows not what; for essences, coming from nowhere and returning there are mystery-ridden entities that are hard to distinguish from mere dreams. Life moves not rationally but by leaps and bounds.

Thus does Santayana, an ultra-modern man, ride his premises to their conclusion, and the world that Descartes wanted to reduce to clear and distinct categories shades into the darkness and indistinction of utter chaos and utter mystery. Because Santayana does not have much body to his philosophy, men who want to reason their way to genuine knowledge will hardly find him helpful. But he is definitely an object lesson on the ultimate destiny of modern premises.

Santayana combines the typical strains of modern philosophy. His larger spirit is certainly Cartesian, if only because it is Platonic. Kant turns up in the distinction between essence and existence, an analogue to the noumenon and phenomenon of Kantian origin. Darwin is apparent in the dynamism of emergent evolution, and the sensistic skepticism of Hume is as forceful in Santayana as at any time perhaps since Hume himself. Royce's notion of the person as an accomplishment more than as a "given," is evident in dynamism of Santayana, and essences, proposed in the program

of the Critical Realists as a thesis in epistemology have ended, like the rest of typical modern thought, by indicating nothing beyond themselves and thus embalming man in his own subjectivity. Santayana has not simply repeated his intellectual ancestors, and he has not been satisfied with the watered-down naturalism of men like Dewey who lose their nerve. A highly original thinker, he has pushed modern and contemporary thought close to the bitter end that was fated for it when modern man abandoned his march through the world of ontology and started concentrating on his own mind, his own thought, his own power, and his own egotistical importance.

SOME CRITICAL REMARKS

It may be wondered whether Santayana wants himself to be taken seriously in a world where life is sport and where the highest of man's feats is nothing but the play of spontaneity. He is difficult to criticize for the reason that like the existentialists in Europe he stands perhaps on the threshold of a new age and, while summing up its faults, edges faintly toward a dualism which opens up new vistas for the future.

It is certainly to Santayana's credit that he saw motion in the depths of the universe, though his final impression of it is grossly overdrawn. Scientism has largely forgotten that matter is a mobile reality and cannot be rustled into the static categories of mathematics and mathematical physics. Santayana even speaks of "degrees of permanence," which is certainly acceptable to a realist. But the difficulty is that his previous stand in utter dynamism would invalidate such differentiations. Credit is likewise owed to him for reaffirming, however crudely and incipiently, the two levels of reality in man and the hierarchy between organic and spiritual life. But once more his wholesale materialism would not tolerate a hierarchy.

An Aristotelian would certainly join him in his desire to be a rational animal rather than a pure spirit and in his preferences for the Greeks over the Hindus, but a rational animal is rational, and Santayana forgets it. It also is natural for man to live in the universe and to feel at home in it, as Santayana declares. It is only in the post-Cartesian climate where matter has been isolated from spirit that nature has become an enemy of man rather than a

friend, a wild and chaotic force to be neatly controlled by experiment and to be subdued, on a more grandiose scale, by industry. Nature is good and is intended as a co-operator of man, showing him the meanings of their common Maker and providing him with the needs for a genuine human fulfillment and for a fully natural satisfaction. The difficulty is that Santayana does not see nature as it is. His aestheticism, like method in Dewey, is a colored glass, smoky and obscuring rather than transparent to the full light of nature. Santayana's aestheticism attempts to provide a kind of beatific vision in this life. Heaven for him is on earth.

In his final evolution, Santayana moved ahead of his fellow naturalists, and credit must likewise go to him for this achievement. Though grossly inadequate as a realistic philosophy, his realm of essence and his realm of spirit are the testaments of a materialist that animal experience is insufficient to satisfy not only a taste for luxury but a basic need in man's make-up. It is not simply the useful that man seeks. He longs to transcend the world and to rest in a goal that is immediately possessed and satisfying in itself. If he is an animal, then, as Susan Gaspel has written, he is the only animal that seems to have something missing in his inner self. Santayana's arguments are evident neither in themselves nor by deduction. But his insights are richer than his logic, so that deep down under his materialistic biases and his poetic way of putting them there may be the feeble beating of a heart that is capable of a stouter pulsing than outer symptoms reveal.

In negative criticism of George Santayana, it may surely be said that like so many other of the philosophers treated in these pages, he is guilty of the fallacy of self-invalidating language. If reality were as he describes it, then the mystery and magic of its flux, the faith that is an animal blindness, and the ineffability of his intuited essences would not permit the descriptions which he gives. They would not permit description at all. Without accepting the notion of being as concretized in everything that exists and without adopting the first law of being which is the principle of non-contradiction, no meaningful discourse would be possible and no understanding could be expected from a reader or a listener. As Cardinal Newman said, to think correctly is to think like Aristotle. Turning their backs upon Aristotelian rigor which honored first principles and from which metaphysics emerged as a necessity in

experience, the modern thinkers quite illogically make free use of such metaphysical principles in practice and yet by their theoretical denial of them, thereby invalidate everything they say.

A central issue in Santayana is that of the soul, for on the answer to this problem there hinges the definition of man and of his power to transcend a world that Santayana describes as sheer flux. Psychology without a soul is the product of seeking the soul in the wrong places and not knowing what one is seeking at all.

In proving the existence of a thing, it is quite proper to begin with a nominal definition. What does the word "soul" mean? The second step is to demonstrate that there is a real thing corresponding to this nominal definition.

Now Santayana admittedly does not range beyond the senses, and if, as Stephen Pepper says, Santayana's value-theory is based solely on pleasure, desire, and preference, it becomes in the end a hedonism in which the ultimate norm of morality is emotional resonance. A sensist in knowledge would be expected to be a hedonist in ethics. But a realist, when he defines the soul as spiritual, as not composed of parts, and as not a prisoner of dimensionality, would insist by his nominal definition on the area where the soul is to be sought. It cannot be known by sensation and will not arouse an emotional throb by its discovery. As a spiritual thing, the soul is above sensible objects. It cannot be seen or felt. As a spiritual thing also and as recognized through an idea, its discernment will not move the emotions, which come into play only when stirred by images.

These limitations do not form a prejudice that a realist takes with him in pursuit of the soul. They simply explain what he is trying to show.

A final prefatory remark in proving that man has a spiritual soul is the relation of image to thought. Thought never exists without images. They support it by giving it material, and even in so-called "imageless thought," there is always at least the image of a word. But though these are concomitant images rather than thoughts they are easily mistaken for thought itself because with all thinking they are simultaneous. It is easy to suspect why modern thought was persuaded to follow Hume when he defined an idea as a faint sense impression. Modern man wants to form an image of the soul or an image of an idea before accepting either; he wants a

purely intellectual knowledge to move his emotions into a smug and satisfied estate.

Introspection reveals without question that thought is supra-material. Ideas are known to be real by reflecting on the process of thought itself, and one can even have an idea of an idea. Ideas determine lives and make history; they earn our bread and produce our art; they lead us firmly and logically to a knowledge of God. But the idea that earns the bread, unlike the bread, cannot be weighed. The idea of an artist cannot be framed like the picture it inspires. Its dimensions cannot be plotted on a Cartesian graph. It cannot be felt.

Who has ever tried to say that his thought is red or blue, hard or soft, parallel or perpendicular to the plane of the body? An object like a table and like the body of man can be dissected, and even to the senses the parts are recognizable. But the parts of an idea, while granted, for argument, that there could be parts, would still be ideas, so that ideas could never be known by dissection. Moreover, to split the idea of a man or the idea of table into physical parts would involve their localization which is impossible. An idea has no right or left, front or back. It has no dimensionality. We say that an idea is in our head because the supporting image is there. But an idea, considered without the image, cannot be fastened to a location.

Physical bodies are always dimensioned, and they are limited by their boundaries to a particular complex of space and time. But man transcends these physical frontiers of things, forming ideas that apply to all men, to all bodies, and indeed to all beings. A being that can form an idea of a being must be a partless and hence spiritual thing. For the idea which it forms is also a being and includes its own self in its contents. Thus if *A* is a being and *B* is the idea of being, then saying that *A* is *B* is equivalent to saying *A* is *A* or, in a sense, simply saying *A* without the *is*. This analogy, though slightly mathematical, testifies to the partless character of the soul, its spirituality, its degree of immanence which is so intense that the subject and object of its actions are in a way identified.

The immediacy which Santayana ascribes to essences, as intuited, suggests the immanence and reflective power of man's mind. Nor could he discuss an evolving world, with a past behind it and the future stretched out ahead, unless he surpassed all the individual

existents of experience to reach characters that are not of time and space. "Realm," "Essence," "Matter," "Truth," "Spirit," and all the other leading ideas of his philosophy are general notions that move beyond individual dimensions and even beyond dimensionality itself.

The general is not but a dim model of the individual, despite the protests of Hume and Mill. Outside the individual, there are other individuals. But outside of being there is non-being or nothingness. This means that the scope of the human mind, by contrast with all bodies, is infinity itself and, because there is nothing beyond being, is absolute at least on such general notions as that of being. Dimensions are finite and relative, and they are no more an intense case of the non-dimensional or the infinite than a single book is a whole library or a penny is all the money in the world. The human mind is limited only by the non-being or bounded by nothing. It is thus unlimited.

This penchant for infinity in man is evident likewise from his will which only an infinite object, simultaneously possessed, can satisfy. The soul cannot rest in individual objects, for there is always a limit to their potentiality for happiness and always a something beyond which looks promising and worthy of trial. By knowing the infinite and by seeking it, man shows the non-dimensional and non-corporeal nature that makes him so much more than the material and the animal and the Darwinian struggler. The discernment of his soul, it must be repeated, does not stimulate his senses or shake his emotions. If it did, it would be material; that it does not only witnesses its primacy.

On the horizon of infinity, man can transcend the ongoing flux and detect the absolutes that give it meaning. Being is a beacon whose light floods through all reality, and knowing the light makes even the shadows a part of the original spectrum. In a universe of being, man can think and act in a friendly world where even the venture into new territory of experience, because it is a being and is peopled by beings, gives him the impression of having been there before. Through a knowledge of the beings that he finds around him and within him, he can sight his goals and marshal the means with the surety that outside being there is nothing.

Philosophy in the twentieth century has been gathering to attend the demise of human reason, first afflicted by the Cartesian doubt

of metaphysics and then killed by the Kantian denial of it. Perhaps the panegyric which Santayana pronounces would remind naturalism that it cannot get along on its own resources and needs new realms to support it. But spirit and essence are only names in Santayana, and idle words are small comfort to survivors.

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CHAPTER 4 THE ORGANIC WORLD OF WHITEHEAD

A tree cannot be put together again by the axe that chopped it into pieces. One of the deep-down tragedies of our age is the dream of restoring the unity of our universe by continuing the very same empiriological method that dissects it. The modern temper is extremely analytic, unwilling and unable to speculate and inviting mere theory to perform the synthetic task that only real principles can accomplish. The typical modern method has been depicted by Max Planck in terms of the old political maxim: divide and conquer! And the culture of the modern age is becoming as atomized as its uranium.

On such a scene, there is high ambition in the thought of Alfred North Whitehead that cannot help arousing the champions of realism to sympathetic attention to his achievements. His aims are avowedly synthetic. They urge a speculative philosophy. They would heal the modern schism between body and soul, man and nature, God and the world. To an age standing under the long and deep shadows of Descartes and of Hume, Whitehead pleads for causality which is not only efficient in character but even final. Against the scientism which, as Bergson showed, is deaf to the thunder of cosmic motion, Whitehead proposes a philosophy of organism. Where modern man prides himself on being modern, Whitehead proposes to comb through the past to profit from its accomplishments. If he gazed on nothing else, he certainly saw great problems that his contemporaries had not only failed to answer but even ceased to raise.

But Whitehead is more suggestive of certain forgotten truths than successful in his solving of present-day problems. He often answered extremisms of one kind with those of another. For instance, his reaction against the dead and static world of empirio-

logical physics was a complete Heraclitean dynamism. In theodicy, pantheism befell him, and in psychology, he sank to an evolutionary and naturalistic syncretism of some weak elements in modern thought. His views of knowledge, though they claim to be a realism, are more allied to the scheme of the Neo-realists which is not true realism at all.

Alfred North Whitehead was born in England in 1861. His father, who was a schoolmaster and minister, led him early in life to the taste and thrills of knowledge and favored him with the fortune of a classical education that has since become rarer and rarer in technical training. In 1880, he enrolled at Trinity College, Cambridge, where, first as a student and then as a teacher, he was to remain for more than forty years.

The Cambridge of Whitehead's day was comparable to the Harvard of the James-Royce golden age. Important names not only adorned the faculty, but there was frequent discussion among the professors, a kind of modern academy of the ancient Plato whom Whitehead so admired.

Toward the close of the nineteenth century, Hegelianism invaded England, but it somehow by-passed Whitehead who had not yet matured into philosophy. His studies at Cambridge were exclusively in mathematics, and until late in life, he remained a professional mathematician. His slow, steady growth toward philosophy seems to have gone on outside the curriculum, where it moved in a somewhat organic style under the light of the Cambridge "academy" and wrestled with the questions which his own mathematics was arousing. Leibniz dreamed of a universal calculus that would push mathematics through the whole empire of traditional logic. Whitehead caught these ambitions and pursued them through his first published adventures. He collaborated with Bertrand Russell on the *Principia Mathematica,* where the dream of Leibniz edged closer to coming true, only to disappoint Whitehead, the mathematician, and to prepare for Whitehead, the philosopher. His writings in philosophy began during World War I.

In 1924, when Whitehead was 63, he joined the faculty at Harvard University and taught there until he was made professor emeritus in 1937. He died on December 30, 1947, at the age of 84.

To follow Whitehead's intellectual biography with a measure of detail would be a tempting way to introduce his thought, were it

not that the space required would greatly exceed the limits of an introduction. From mathematics, he plunged into logic and then began to go behind his symbols to search out their relation to the mind and to the world. In this way, Whitehead found himself squarely in the philosophy of modern physics, where he met epistemology and cleared the ground for his theory of eternal objects which in their final dress resemble Platonic Forms. Whitehead, the philosopher of physics, was then driven into cosmology, where he always started from epistemological premises; he came at last to the notion of "events" which later were more fully defined and then christened "actual entities." On his own authority, the description of "actual entities" and "eternal objects" tells the whole story of Whitehead's final thought, a cosmology that began in mathematics and then moved outward toward the real world in search of content, meaning, stability, and the connectedness of matter both in itself and with a knowing, experiencing mind. His early views of "events" and "objects" foreshadowed nearly all that he was later to say.

No one can read the later works of Whitehead without puzzling over his sources and his use of them. He claims allegiance first of all to Plato. He also admits strong influences from Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Hume, Kant, and Bergson. He believed that the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries hold secrets that have never been expounded and exploited. He gives the impression that philosophy had little except Plato before this period. Though claiming that western thought is nothing but "a series of footnotes to Plato," he seemed smugly unaware that the middle ages wrote some long and important footnotes in the series. He had an interest in history, but his knowledge of the subject did not measure up to the interest. He sees the history of thought not through history's eye but through Whitehead's. On more than one score, he resembles Hegel, and he is even closer to the neo-Hegelian, F. H. Bradley. In the genealogy of his thought, unusual debt is likewise owed to Einstein, as the sequel will show.

Whitehead's most important mature work is *Process and Reality.* Especially notable among his other later works are *Modes of Thought; Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect;* and *Science and the Modern World.*

ACTUAL ENTITIES: UNITS OF THE WORLD

A little truth goes a long way in contemporary philosophy. Dewey, fascinated by the success of empiriological physics, usurped its method for all knowledge. Obsessed by the priority of the idea-world among the achievements of men, Santayana rejected its relations to anything beyond itself. Whitehead discerned the motions of the world and denied that there is anything else.

In the subterranean dungeons of the universe, Whitehead finds a Heraclitean flow. Unlike Bergson and more akin to Leibniz, he sprinkles an atomism through his dynamic universe, with units called, not monads, but *actual entities.*

Already he becomes difficult to follow. If the world is only flux, there is no abiding identity that would permit definition, nor are there things like atoms and entities and actualities. It is easier to unite atomism and dynamism on paper than to think out the impossible universe which Whitehead proposed to map. He might have said in the title of his masterpiece not process *and* reality but process *is* reality, and the book should have ended at the title page. If all is flux, as Aristotle argued against Heraclitus, nothing can be differentiated and nothing can be said.

The actual entities, called events in the author's earlier vocabulary and sometimes called actual occasions, are units of process. They are "throbs of energy," "drops of experience," "pulsations of actuality." They cannot be said to *be* but only to *become.* Uncreated and essentially creative, they are the ultimate beads of all reality. They include both God and the universe, man and nature, mind and matter. If the universe is stable and if there are patterns of tight organization, the order is the clustering of these actual entities, growing together as they advance and giving all things an organic character. Whitehead calls his thought a philosophy of organism, but the *organic* apparently means little more than the *organized,* and both of course are incompatible with sheer flux.

But this description of actual entities now becomes far more entangling. Actual entities or occasions are termed units, and yet in a later context, they will be split into component acts or aspects of experience called prehensions. They are potentials for every becoming, so much so that one actual entity can combine

(concresce) with any other. But potential for everything which is the meaning of prime matter, they are also called actual, which is the synonym for form.

In a more technical language, the potentiality to join with any other actual entity is called the principle of relativity. It entitles Whitehead to say like Leibniz that the entire universe can be described from the standpoint of any of his monadic units chosen at random. This thought might be put into concrete form by the fact that Whitehead's universe, like Hegel's, is a system, and to trace out the meaning of any part involves a complete step-by-step coverage of the whole. Every actual entity is a mirror of the rest.

But this analogy does not fully portray the principle of relativity, and must be supplemented by Einstein's theory which enchanted Whitehead as it did so many others who shade their physics into philosophy. According to the Einstein theory of relativity, there is no privileged and immobile point for describing motion, nothing like the stationary earth of geometric astronomy or the immovable ether which classical physics espoused as the absolute locus of motion. Einstein permits a physicist to choose any frame of reference he wishes for describing motion.

Whitehead's picture of actual occasions is in many ways painted by Einstein's theory that greeted him from empiriological physics. Both men have a dynamic view of things. So mobile is an actual entity that its *what* is its *how*. Both men hold to the equivalence of all points of view for describing reality since there is no absolute standard for measurement. One actual entity invades the history of every other one, forming an immense cosmic system, so that the omission of any part will alter the whole, and so that no occasion can be described in insulation or be invested with a standardizing priority in terms of which other actual entities could really be evaluated. When measured and measured only, two interdependent things allow neither to be really independent or ranked one above the other.

Stretched toward its neighbors, an actual entity tends to form "societies" which are low grade or high grade depending on the stage of progress. On a cosmic scale, Whitehead is an evolutionist, not in the strict Darwinian sense but in the more philosophical vein of emergent evolutionism. The production of novelty is nature acting naturally and requires no further principle to explain it.

As in Bergson, there is a constant creative advance. The past provides data for the activity in the present, and the present builds the future from what it finds.

Those who would expect an erstwhile mathematician to provide rigid proof for his statements would be annoyed by Whitehead's apparent refusal to leave the plane of description and to arrive at a genuine explanatory science. Philosophy, though apparently broader than sheer empiriological methods, is anchored by Whitehead to mere historical description, running a little wider than the other disciplines but merely unifying their reports.

WHITEHEAD AS A DYNAMIST

Whitehead is unrelenting in his protest against the so-called bifurcation of nature. In this regard, he is a naturalist, rejecting all dualisms and hailing reality as an ongoing and engaging continuum of mere flux. He is naturalistic in his evolutionism, in the biological undercurrent of his organic philosophy, and in his aims for man which are not in knowledge but in feeling. Where Dewey spoke of *having* and of *experiencing* as loftier and more integrating than knowledge, Whitehead exalts feeling as his standard for meaning and value and sometimes defines feeling as "an emotional tone." This emotional approach savors also of Santayana. Like the more garden variety of naturalist, Whitehead makes much of man's biological legacy from an evolutionary past but is not equipped to chart his ideals through a blind and evolutionary future. Life for Whitehead is nature at a certain milestone in its evolutionary ways, and mind is nature at another. He is a naturalist also in the slant he takes toward art, language, and religion.

In the matter of vocabulary, it must be noted that Whitehead is not only vague and hence disloyal to his earlier mathematical niceties; but he constantly uses words in strange senses. *Actual entity* is a case in point. What is actual as such is really not dynamic but the term of a dynamism, and in this respect is contrasted with the potential. Whitehead would be less confusing if he had said *mobile entity* or simply *mobility*. When he speaks of creativity, he does not mean the production of something out of nothing. As Edward J. Lintz has shown, he means creation in the artistic sense, i.e., from a pre-existing material. Usually when he says *feeling*, he means an unconscious type, and when he uses the word "God,"

it is difficult to know what he means at all. Words should enlarge their ordinary meaning or preferably new ones should be coined only when old words fail to cover the freshly discovered facts or principles. But Whitehead apparently adopts, as a point of method, what he holds as characteristic of the universe he describes: that there is a constant plunging into novelty and an eternal flow of words as well as things. Not the least of the worries in studying Whitehead is his use of the empiriological disciplines which he condemns as inexact and as static in viewpoint and then calls upon to support him in his dynamism.

As the evolutionary march goes on in things, actual occasions amalgamate to form a "nexus" which is defined as "a particular fact of togetherness." It is this compound rather than the simple monads that charge into the direct experience of men and must be analyzed by philosophy. Where actual entities form a nexus or event, their relations, their connections, their junctures are not on a different level from the actual entities. They are given, concrete, experienced, and capable of being felt.

In a more realistic approach to the universe, relations are in a hierarchy with the matter that they relate. A woman and her child can be seen with the eyes, but the relation of maternity which joins them is not on the same level of concretion, and involves a higher abstraction in order to be known. For Whitehead, as for James, this hierarchy does not obtain. Relations are "given" like the things they relate. They are wholly concrete, or they do not exist. This is what he means by his so-called ontological principle. This is why also he will later be shown to emphasize in man not abstraction but feeling, a physical, concrete, experienced resonance. For him everything is a matter of fact.

Actual entities are instances of something more generic in all reality which Whitehead labels creativity. Fleeing from his mathematical background and moving by detours in the same general direction as Bergson, Whitehead strokes out a world of "creative advance into novelty." Unlike his French contemporary, he does not scruple over a proof of his proposition except to repeat on a philosophical level the dated theories of physics like the theory of relativity, which tends to the view that all is motion.

"Creativity," he says, "is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact." This creative advance is essentially

unifying, loosed into a manifold that has no beginning and sewing it together as time goes on, in a process that has no end. The growing together is aptly termed "concrescence"—a word that bespeaks both the dynamic and the concrete character of world-movement and conveys an added meaning of growth to unity. Essentially the production of the new, concrescence has for its components nothing but the actual entities which are the ultimate units of creativity.

But Whitehead does not settle for this general description. His fuller philosophy brings in the notions of prehension and feeling. where he finally sheds completely the mathematical cloak of his earlier thought and matures into a philosopher of organism. "Prehension" is a typical term of Whitehead's, vague in definition and wide in use. It is broadly synonymous with the operations of an actual entity. But it has the further and more important sense of the selection, on the part of an event, of the other occasions to join with it in the concrescent process. It connotes appropriation, discrimination, tendency, unification. One actual entity prehends another, "taking" it (*prehendere*) unto itself.

THE CAUSAL UNIVERSE OF ORGANIC FEELING

"Feeling" is used at times in the same sense as prehension. But in a more precise terminology, the actual entities, charging onward in the creative process, sift their environment with osmotic care, rejecting what is bad or indifferent and accepting only what is fitting in their concrescence. It is the positive or accepting prehensions that are called feelings.

In the final outcome of his thinking the organic world of Whitehead is simply a world that is organized, and the theory of concrescing actual entities is an endeavor to describe that organization. Feeling is not only a mark of animals and of men. It stamps all actual entities from within, arming them with an inner principle of selective motion and propelling them over a definite route in history that would otherwise be a zigzag of indetermination.

Whitehead categorically rejects the inertial view of things, sensing that the realities in the cosmos are each invested with an inner source of movement that tradition calls nature and that Kierkegaard saw as "inwardness." Far from being totally passive

like prime matter, the realities of our universe have a character from within to make them featured rather than formless and to empower them with tendencies to respond in original ways toward outside stimulation. Of this great truth, so smugly ignored by scientism, Whitehead caught a laudable glimpse, though his final report on the whole issue is confused and exaggerated.

In this same context, his account of actual entities could lead, when interpreted, to a truth that runs counter to the analytic bias of empiriological physics. According to the "ontological principle," the reason for an actual entity must be an actual entity. Though in need of refinement, this thought intimates the traditional stress on self-evidence which is not a logical construct overlaid upon a being but is the being itself and as it is. Whitehead's view as stated would lead to the conclusion that the evidence for an actual entity must be another actual entity, and his thought thus continues the discursive and inertial tone of physical method, understanding all things by what is external to them. Realism, viewing an actual entity according to the ordinary meaning of the two terms, would hold that the evidence for it is the actual entity itself. A thing is what it is from within, and recognized as such, its nature cannot be demonstrated but only forced on us by its own self-evidence. So Whitehead was perhaps only sensing a truth without ever succeeding in grasping or stating it. He objected to a completely inertial universe, and the objection should have led to an insight into nature and self-evidence. His major blunder was to declare that the non-inertial is uncreated and essentially creative.

More fully probed, the philosophy of feeling involves a datum to be prehended and a so-called subject which prehends and which might be any actual entity. Seeking "satisfaction," the subject aims to absorb the datum into its concrescent process, and in so doing, it brings both final and efficient causality into its organic career and also into the philosophy of organism. The datum is the settled world, as it is met by an actual entity treading its historic route; the datum is the occasion for a new step forward in the prehending advance of the subject. From the given, "dative" world, it is feeling that sorts out what is relevant to the concrescence and prehends what is positive, transforming the objective datum into a subjective estate, like food that is ingested by an animal and made part of its own organic nature. A cow would prehend only the datum of

herbs, a lion only of meat. Concrescing subjects are thus invested with prehensions that characterize them from within, a fact that again sets Whitehead on the side of sound reason. But the realism of this insight is deserted by his doctrine that all is flow.

Feeling is a causal process, involving efficiency and finality and hence a rejection both of Descartes, when he excluded finality from his physics, and of Hume when he replaced efficient causality by mere sequence. In true causality, there is not a mere succession of beings but their inner independence. Whitehead suggested this truth by his doctrine of "causal efficacy."

What is causally efficacious is immediate and concrete. It is not a mere phenomenon floating into the world without cause or connection outside itself. It is a subject, formed as in Bergsonism by a past and empowered by this inherited actuality, to feel, to prehend, to transform its dative world. For Hume and for the a-causal philosophy that he begot in the modern approach, the present world becomes independent of the past one and the future, of the present. But causal efficacy makes a subject something definite and original and immediate. It is something concrete and hence efficacious. It stores the past that it has inherited and discharges it into a settled world that yields its datum. A mere phenomenon, like a patch of color, could not cause, but the subject, in the Whitehead world, has "an experiential togetherness" about it. It is a concrescent actuality that does not disjoin the events of time into a sheer sequence but unites them in a "togetherness" and acquires thus an identity, subjectivity, originality, in short causal efficacy.

A subject can feel, and this is the decisive point. A man in a darkened room will blink when a bright light is flashed into his eye, Whitehead argues, and he will say that the light not only preceded the blinking but caused it. When pressed to give a reason for his statement, he will say that he *felt* the causal process. He is involved in causal efficacy.

In the process of causation, Whitehead ascribes activity quite naturally to the subject, and though he is by no means consistent or at least clear on this point, he argues at times to the activity of the datum. The typical modern trend, of course, would be to view the datum and even the agent as indifferent, inertial, determined only by outside influences and having no internal

efficacy. Hence Whitehead's attempt to restore efficient causality to the post-Humean world is a logical proposal. But unfortunately it cannot survive his previous descriptions of the universe in terms of flux.

A final cause is a "lure," and since a feeling subject is the agent, it is "a lure for feeling." It is the aim of the subject, determining what that subject will be, and because of aims, the processes of the subject are organically determined rather than random and wild. Purpose is not a man-made thing, any more than Whiteheadean actual entities or traditional natures are fashioned from the ambitions of men. Purpose is enmeshed in the world of Whitehead from within its actual entities and within their various concrescing combinations. But how can purpose thrive on Heraclitean soil, or rather on Heraclitean seas?

The subjective aim, which defines the final cause and binds the actual entities of the world into a determinate concrescence, plies through the universe to bring its subject "satisfaction." This stage is simply the outcome of process, where a subject fulfills its destiny by being no longer concrescent but, in a measure, concrete, where the real has finally become realized. Is this an ultimate stage in which a unit of process suddenly comes to a standstill, with no more worlds to conquer by prehending? No, for the subject really passes into a "superject" where it is no longer self-possessed and original in its feeling but hurled into a status of "objective immortality."

A superject is difficult to define. In a general way, it is a subject that has been satisfied, attaining its subjective aim. But in another sense, a superject loses its subjectivity and becomes an objective fact. It is higher than an ordinary object since it is enmeshed in a loftier stage of process which it continues to qualify, like an electron once isolated but now bound into an atom. Every subject tends to be a superject, and its passage is not death but some sort of advance.

A plant, for instance, is a subject that prehends water but graduates into a superjective status in an emphatic way when it is digested by a cow. A drop of water from the dim ages of the past might have been absorbed by one plant and made fertilizer for another, after the first plant had died. Perhaps by this time part of a human body, the water continues on and on

in an ever more complicating network of things, where it was no longer water after its first excursion into a plant but where it still remains forceful in some way to alter the face of present reality. The water is no longer a subject, but its career in other contexts is immortal. Not being a subject, it is a quasi-object and its immortality is thus called objective. A superject is not private, like the water existing and acting toward its own subjective aims. It is more public and universal. The tendency of subjects to become superjects is another way of describing the cosmic processes, and in a way, this tendency is the perpetual passage from private fact into public fact, from individual to universal, from subjectivity to the "objectivity" of superjects.

Hegel seems definitely alive in Whitehead's doctrine of evolutionary stages. In the appearance of a superject, there is a prehension of the subject by the world that yielded data for the subject's aims and now makes the subject itself a datum for a new and higher concrescence. Like the actual entities which knead it into a "togetherness," a subject turns out to be a momentary throb of energy in the large evolving cosmic scheme which absorbs it in due time, pounding the world ever forward in that creative advance which had no beginning and is fated to have no end. But the subject, in its short life and by its fleeting subjectivity, has deflected the course of the Heraclitean river, and it can never flow the same again. The world is changed for its existence, different for its aims, better for its novelty, and more unified for its prehension into a superject. Nothing really perishes in a world that is perpetually being born into novelty. The superject is not an object like the ordinary dust and ashes of man but a sublimer form of being than it enjoyed as a subject in its own right. Where all is organic, nothing dies.

"THE REFORMED SUBJECTIVIST PRINCIPLE"

The outline of Whitehead's thought has thus far been running in reverse with a view to sketching first the larger lines of his organic universe to the unfortunate neglect of his epistemology which inspires everything else in his philosophy. Like Descartes and the long file of modern men behind him, Whitehead really begins his philosophic enterprise with a self-styled "subjectivist principle." In the provisional empiriological world and with the

rivalry between philosophies where each claims a monopoly on the truth, who is to say what is really true and false and what public norms can be used to decide debated issues? Santayana solves such questions by an appeal to animal faith, which Russell will second in the next chapter. Dewey has the simple answer of invoking the empiriological method to settle all questions. Whitehead is closer to Santayana than to Dewey, closer because he makes the criterion of truth a matter of "feeling." But he is not really interested primarily in truth as a goal for men, and "feeling" is not to be confused with emotion, though there is certainly a basis for such confusion.

First of all, "feeling," though it is sometimes associated in man with an "emotional tone," is more physical than conscious, and its weave is not psychological but more holistic in the materialistic sense of the word. More than an emotion, "feeling" in the Whiteheadean sense is a resonance between things, and the ideal is for man to beat time with the rhythms outside himself and thus be adjusted, satisfied, or, as Whitehead also puts it, "interested." Here is where the analogy with Dewey carries weight. We do not know the truth; we "feel" it. We do not use our intelligence to contemplate; we use all of our being in quest of the interesting. Our aim is satisfaction, and satisfaction is felt.

Whitehead admits the affinity of his doctrine on feeling with the notions of intuition in Descartes and Bergson. But it is only an affinity. Unlike Descartes, for instance, he does not exalt mind into the starting point for philosophy, and this is at least one reason why the subjectivist principle, otherwise Cartesian in background, is claimed by Whitehead to be reformed in his organic philosophy. It is not mind but one's own body that is primarily felt and in Whitehead's thought becomes the locus where meaningful life gets under way. All further feeling is related to the body as a reference point, where the body, to repeat, is not taken in a psychological but in a biological sense, and where the organic is more important than what we ordinarily mean by consciousness. Feeling is in the same class of operations as adaptation, with the emphasis on the subjective resonance or well-being that adjustment brings to the organic body.

Another way of putting this rather elusive notion of feeling is in Samuel Alexander's term of "enjoyment." Dewey would say

that experience is *had,* Whitehead that it is felt. Alexander says that experience is enjoyed. Enjoyment does not mean sense pleasure for any of the trio of naturalists. It means the well-being of a being. It is enjoyment in the following senses: I enjoy good health; I enjoy an idea; I enjoy a typewriter, meaning that I have a typewriter. Feeling, in Whitehead's own words, is akin to enjoyment in Alexander's terminology. The meaning of things is decided by feelings like delight or disgust, love or hate, hope or despair, which bring things to a stand in their environments. But the full appreciation of Whitehead's point requires the subtraction of the conscious and the psychological aspects from such examples of feeling and the focusing on their organic and biological character alone.

Extreme caution is thus required in the discussion of feeling. At least by intention, Whitehead is not a hedonist, any more than Dewey or Santayana. That his views would open the way to a *carpe diem* attitude, especially when he denies a personal "subjective" immortality, is another question. But what he intends to emphasize more than anything else is the concrete "holistic" character of man's bearing to his world, in accordance with the ontological principle.

Another way of describing the reformed subjectivist principle is in terms of experience. Abstractions do not move the feelings but raw experience, cast into image, sets them going. Experienced events like lightning and thunder, explosions and earthquakes, and, on a more minor scale, any of the objects in the sense world evoke our feelings. It is with experience that Whitehead would start philosophy, by experience that he would develop it, and in an experience that he would end it if it could ever end. Experience is immediate and felt, and taking bodily experience as a norm for "judging" or more properly for feeling, the thinker fans outward from this organic base in quest of things, bounding backward to his body to test his findings by whether they are really enjoyed and then moving again toward an outer world for new data. The universe, understood from the reference point of the body, is thus understood only by its organic reference or its resonance against the body or by its "lure for feeling." It is not surprising that it should be called an organic universe and that philosophy should likewise be called organic.

Whitehead's "reformed subjectivist principle" is more like that of James explaining emotion than that of Descartes in his intellectual intuition. James obverted the relation between mind and body in his theory of the emotions. Where common sense and Aristotelian philosophy would insist that we cry because we are sad, James held that we are sad because we cry. He put body before mind, and this is what Whitehead does also when he holds that psychological life begins with the "feeling of the body as functioning" and pins down all of its later experience to the organic body as the reference point. Feeling in Whitehead has much in common with emotion in James, but again feeling must be taken as very much wider than the emotional and as more akin to Dewey's *having,* Alexander's *enjoyment,* Bergson's *intuition,* and certain doctrines of the existentialists that must await later chapters to be explained.

FROM ORGANISM TO EPISTEMOLOGY

The cosmology of Whitehead is not evolved as a study of real objects, given as objectively existing and reduced to objective reasons and causes and laws. Whitehead reaches cosmology through an epistemological toll road. And the toll is heavy.

The opening remark in a sketch of his epistemology should recall the primacy he accords to feeling. There is, he asserts, the "feeling of the body as functioning," and the "withness" of the body is felt in every experience or the experience is simply not real. This felt functioning of the body which opens man's intellectual adventures is not an illusion. It traces its origin backward through an evolutionary genealogy where actual entities have ground through historic routes to form the subject in its existence and to equip it for its present "knowledge" through feeling. If concrescence is universal, man is but a high-grade product of prehensions, inheriting his subjectivity from the success of a dateless evolutionary past which has made him as one of its novelties and will make his knowledge or the outcome of his knowledge, as another. Feeling his body as functioning, man then finds himself greeted by a world that feeds solid data to his organism.

In genuine metaphysics, knowledge is viewed as an intentional movement in the order of formal causality. The immediacy between

subject and object is so intensely lived that the thinker becomes what he knows, at the same time owning both his own form and the form of the object. Cartesianism and especially Kantianism wrecked this realism in philosophy and degraded knowledge into a transeunt process, where the knower is removed from his object like a radio set from a broadcasting source. Knowledge has come to be thought a mediate process rather than immediate, transeunt rather than immanent, efficient rather than formal. And the story of the shift is virtually the whole history of modern philosophy.

Whitehead never overcame his mathematical past to the point of seeing the true immanence which organism and above all intelligence involves. To account for knowledge, he has to patch, and the cloth that results is no more adequate to explain intellection than Kantianism, naturalism, and even the Neo-realism which his views suggest.

The dative world is considered exterior to man in Whitehead's intentions, and when man meets it in experience, it first wears the character of "presentational immediacy." At this stage, a thing is not consciously prehended but simply present to the subject as a contemporary. Populating this world of presentational immediacy are sense data, such as colors and sounds, the phenomena where Hume settled down never to move beyond them. The subject does not make a meaningful, feelingful interpretation of this immediate presentation; this initial stage is one of pure awareness that will later ripen into something else.

In other words, this immediate world must be prehended by the subject, and the prehension is owed to causal efficacy or what in the commoner vocabulary is called efficient causality. In this way, there is a prehending of the object by the subject, feeling the world as a datum and acting on it, through feeling, to relate it to itself in a concrescence. The description of knowledge has not yet passed above the stages of efficient, transeunt, and Kantian dimensions.

It never does pass above them. For the final evolution of Whitehead's theory of knowledge does not rescue it from all the fatal weaknesses of Dewey's and Santayana's naturalism. The final stage of knowledge is called "symbolic reference," where the two previous stages, presentational immediacy and the

causal efficacy which responds to it, are in some way related to each other. There is a type of reference here between symbol and meaning, image and object, man and the world. But this is not a universal term nor a universal meaning as in the more orthodox view of knowledge. Symbolic reference forms a store of experience; it suggests feeling and culminates in it; more than a victory of man which could at most be a temporary triumph in a world of creative advance, symbolic reference is a weapon for enhancing further experience and new feeling and added interest. A proposition for instance does not stand on the truth it embodies. It is "a lure for feeling," and the satisfaction of man is not attained until the feeling, lured by the proposition, has been felt.

Low-grade organisms lack symbolic reference, though they have modes of presentational immediacy and causal efficacy which are earlier stages in the symbolizing adventures of men. Man alone is the symbolic, linguistic, and truly judging animal. His symbolic reference is essentially unifying, and its elements are causal efficacy inherited from the past and presentational immediacy that is contemporary and is a new field for feeling to prehend. Whitehead wisely emphasized that there must be some "common ground" between causal efficacy and presentational immediacy if symbolic reference is to relate them. The world of the past which man inherits must have similar components to the world that he faces in the present, or it would be impossible to explain how past experience can have valid application in the here and now. But Whitehead was also a dynamist, emphasizing that novelty is perpetually being born into the world. The past, culminating in causal efficacy, must be compared with the immediate present, thus making symbolic reference different from the modes it unites into its suggestive summary to lure feeling.

There is a margin of freedom in the symbolic stage of knowledge because of this lack of complete determination between the known past and the novel contemporary world. And because of the precarious texture of symbolic reference, uniting the prehended past with a strange and novel present, the danger of error in human thought can never be overcome. The meanings of symbols are in the long run something tentative that the future creative advance is apt to revamp and is surely fated to enlarge. For there is no universal knowledge in a world of flux, nothing

that could guarantee a thinker that, for example, wherever he met a man he could be sure that man would be a rational animal. The "common ground" is not a genuine universal. Thus in his own way, Whitehead was again a naturalist preaching like Dewey the "perilous and precarious" nature of existence.

But there is an acute difficulty about Whitehead's view of knowledge which may help to focus the view itself. Since "knowledge" here is not intentional but a feeling effected on a datum, how can the immediate ever be known at all? To be grasped by a Whiteheadean subject, the immediate must be seized at a point where it is no longer immediate but changed, and committed to the past. When known, the object is no longer what it used to be, remaining what it was while being known and hence a type of formal causality. When known, it is absorbed and prehended and felt. The whole process transpires in the efficient order, and the efficient cause alters what it affects.

Where all is in motion, both the object and the thinker burn their bridges as they cross them, and the initial datum has floated down the river by the time the act of knowledge is completed. As Hegel said in a similar situation, we only know the past. Even more critical for Whitehead's view of knowledge is his subjectivist principle, where personal experience is the center of reality and whatever is known or felt is grouped circlewise around it. No one, beginning like Descartes with his own subjective modifications, has ever moved beyond his own subjectivity, and Whitehead is no more successful than less pretentious post-Cartesians.

A FOOTNOTE TO PLATO

Every philosophy of dynamism must somehow grapple with the issue of experienced stabilities where all does not seem flux and flow but forms a differential structure, a definiteness that authorizes definition. This problem Whitehead partially answers by an appeal to Plato and a theory of "eternal objects," like the prototypes of Plato's separated world. As actual entities become, prehending each other in concrescent process, there is an "ingression" of the eternal objects from a quasi-Platonic world, and it is such ingressions, coupled onto the concrescences of actual entities, which type the experienced world into various patterns

with stability and a name. "Any entity," Whitehead says, "whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world is called an eternal object." Whitehead is here writing his footnotes to Plato. An eternal object is viewed as a pure potential and also as a form. To list such objects—whiteness, elephant, man—would be to catalogue the Platonic archetypes.

The mention of eternal objects has been adjourned until now for convenience of exposition. In truth, they rank with actual entities in importance for Whitehead and in sublety for his readers. They join Plato to Leibniz, both of whom Whitehead resembles more than any other of the kindred spirits he cites.

Eternal objects are a second source of unity and stability in the dynamism of the creative advance. The actual entities move under their own steam to the concrescence, hence unification, of the world, and they are met along the route by eternal objects, which ingress into their itineraries. But now comes another taunting question: even admitting the postulates of Whitehead, how do the eternal objects know when and where to ingress? The answer turns the key to Whiteheadean theodicy.

In a way, there is a threefold character to the God of Whitehead. Without consciousness and considered as the absolute of potentiality, the primordial nature of God does not antedate the rest of reality but arises with it. For the actual entities are all creative but uncreated, and God is only one of them. In His primordial nature, God evaluates the eternal objects and decides their relevancy to present processes. These objects are not God, and they do not arise from His being. God's primordial nature is His view of them—a doctrine that makes God dependent on things outside of Him as Edward J. Lintz has indicated.

God is the mediator between eternal objects and the world, and in this unifying role, He sets the subjective aims or final causes for all actual occasions. As relevant to each creative advance, evaluating it and patterning its goals, God is the supreme "lure for feeling" and the supreme reason for the "novel togetherness" which actual entities, by their aims, and eternal objects, by ingressions, bring constantly to pass in the universe. God is the final but not the efficient cause of all other things. He is one among many when viewed as an actual entity. He is

not infinite. He is not omnipotent, and He is not unique in being uncreated.

Even as a final cause, God is apparently not absolute. For the world only approximates His plan as man only approximates truth. By leaving this margin of unfulfilled willing in God, Whitehead hoped to explain the originality of actual entities in their operation and the fact of freedom among the race of men. By this stricture on divine aim in the universe, Whitehead also could dismiss the question, whether God is the cause of evil.

The consequent nature of God is God in the world. In a virtual pantheistic fashion, like many dynamists before him and somewhat like his contemporary Samuel Alexander, Whitehead saw God as a product of the world's creative advance and a sharer in that "novel togetherness" which is the meaning of concrescence. The consequent nature of God is conscious; by contrast also to His primordial nature, it is actuality and fullness; He is the evolving result of His own subjective aim, since it was He, in the quasi-beginning of things, who organized and evaluated the prehensions of other actual entities. God is affected by the world. He feels its reactions upon Himself. Continuing in this same theodicy, Charles Hartshorne has recently presented a God who is likewise affected by His creatures and who is, moreover, a "concrescent" being — "the self-surpassing surpasser of all."

By His God of feeling who is enmeshed in the history of a world that His primordial nature has mapped, Whitehead believed that God is more personal than the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle. He viewed God as saving the world when it sinks into His consequent nature and as "tenderly" understanding man who is a "fellow sufferer." God is "the poet of the world" and the religion of His subjects is a matter of feeling. But like His primordial nature, His consequent nature is dependent on creatures, evolving with them and letting them involve Him in their advance.

The third view of God is as a "superject." A superject is always a public fact of sorts, where a subject, having attained satisfaction, passes into an objective immortality as the initial stage of a new and higher concrescence. In His superjective nature, God qualifies the world as the world has qualified Him; the world is better because God is satisfied. There is a tone to a man's life when things are going right with him, and there is a similar state

in the world where all is well. God as a superject is a misty notion that Whitehead has not emphasized at any length. His strongest statement and an example of his vaporous language is the following: "The 'superjective' nature of God is the character of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances." This is only a milder example of the confusion of tongue in a man who insists on the primacy of experience and the concrete.

OBJECTS AND ORGANISM

The discussion of theodicy was introduced by the inquiry into eternal objects and into their relevance to the various concrescences to which they apply. With God as the evaluator by virtue of His primordial nature, the question of relevance has already been answered. But there still remains the problem of individuation where there is not simply a question of man in general but of *that* man or *this* one? Is there an eternal object for every individual? Public facts, known and recognized by everyone, and typified by the example of man-in-general, Whitehead called universals; private facts are qualities or characteristics. But making such a distinction, Whitehead denied that the gap between universal and individual is fundamental. He called it a distinction of reason, holding that each prehension, as a component of an actual entity has a private as well as public aspect and that the private side of prehension is but a stage in a creative advance to a superjective status. Whitehead, perhaps because he was mathematical and perhaps because of his bias toward empiriological physics, was so inclined to emphasize the public aspect of things that he put little stress on subjects like consciousness and personal freedom and never even adverted to the issue of personal immortality except to mention God as a power for personal unification. An actual entity is particular and yet it is a mirror of all other actual entities, being present to them by the principle of relativity. In this way, Whitehead by-passed the problem of universals. It really is out of place in a system dominated not by ambitions to know but by the lure of feeling which is always concrete and changeable. Private and public, particular and universal, and even subjective and objective are not considered essentially different. Where flux alone is real, everything can become everything else.

The eternal objects are in a different class from the actual entities that they inhabit by ingression. Both subject and object are involved in an act of experience, and hence an eternal object can be subjective or objective, making for that common element which obtains between an agent and his datum and which becomes, in the knowledge act, the "common ground" of symbolic reference.

Plato contrived his theory of Forms to explain knowledge. Whitehead, pretending to write a self-styled critique of feeling, posited eternal objects for similar epistemological reasons. Though usually passed off as a cosmologist, Whitehead never really got beyond epistemology. He never came down to earth, he never started on hard, stony, stubborn reality as Aristotle did. Plato had not yet arrived at the notion of abstraction, which was first seen by Aristotle, and Whitehead has forgotten it. His prehensions and concrescences, his ingressions and his symbolic reference are all physical and physically experienced. By their concrete character, they fuel feeling, and by the eternal process in the world, there is a constant parade of them so that the very fixity of knowledge which Plato sought through Forms dissolves itself into the universal flow. "Eternal objects" resemble Santayana's essences, except that such objects are considered real while essences are not.

The theory of eternal objects hails a return to Whitehead's mathematical preferences for the formal and the static and the eternal truth which his metaphysical ambitions never disengaged. Since God seems dependent on eternal objects as the pre-existing "material" for His evaluations, they seem to stand as the supreme realities of the universe that govern all other things, including Divinity itself. Thus, at the end of his journey, Whitehead appeared to repudiate the aims of his departure. Instead of the dynamism with which he began there is a catalogue of static Forms as the highest realm of reality. This exalted place of static Forms makes a transition to the following chapter on Bertrand Russell.

SOME CRITICAL REMARKS

The philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead may be summed as a philosophy of process. The drops of the flow are called actual entities, surging with creativity and tending to a "novel together-

ness" which is defined as concrescence. Central to their natures is the talent for prehension, which is in turn an operation, an experience, a selection, an appropriation of other actual entities; when prehensions are positive, accepting rather than eliminating data, they are called feelings.

Feeling is ubiquitous. By the reformed subjectivist principle, which is Whitehead's starting point, the reference of things to the feeling body is the substitute for truth in the pattern of human thinking. In the outer world that man experiences, feeling is also the inner organizing principle of things, specifying their responses and pushing them onward to achieve their subjective aim. This aim is identified with final causality, and a final cause is a "lure for feeling." But, contrary to Hume, Whitehead reserves a place for efficient causality in his world. Man for instance has causal efficacy.

Relating cause and effect, tracing symbols to their meanings and subjective modifications to their objects—all this is carried on through symbolic reference. But there is no real intentional action in Whitehead's philosophy, and knowledge is more of a transeunt process than the work of immanence and organism and formal causality.

Finally, cosmic process is overlaid by the ingression of eternal objects, evaluated for their relevance to a given stage of concrescence by the primordial nature of God, who, by His consequent nature, evolves with the creative advance of the world itself. God, as a superject, is the pragmatic resonance of God in the universe.

As a whole the philosophy of Whitehead, while lacking in formal disciples, has been considerable in its influence. He is usually mentioned with more reverence than acceptance, as he is sometimes cited with the assurance that he is beyond the rest of us and that the centuries ahead, when other men catch up with him, will bring him into his own. His emphasis on organism, feeling, evolution, and experience as an ultimate was bound to win with plaudits of the naturalists, and his studies in logic endear him to logical empiricism (Chapter 6). Hugh R. King, a defender of Whitehead's metaphysics, thinks that modern Thomism can find him a new "pagan ally" as St. Thomas himself found Aristotle. John Wild, an Aristotelian, finds that doctrine of "causal efficacy" can be given a truly realistic turn against modern atom-

ism (Chapters 5 and 6). Other indications of the many directions of Whitehead's thought can be found in his comparison to Heidegger by a dialectical materialist who discussed his views on feeling. Joseph Needham, another dialectical materialist, finds the organic philosophy in line with Marxian dialectics. Whitehead is thus widely acclaimed as a philosopher, even if only few would venture the boast of completely understanding him.

As a philosopher of organism, Whitehead is not organic but eclectic. He vainly tries to wed the Platonic Forms to Leibnizian monads, but the impediments to the marriage are insuperable. How can the absolutely mobile combine with the completely static or potential? How can the utter novelty of a concrescent world form at any time a permanent foot to be fitted by the eternal shoes of eternal objects? The subjectivist principle, of Cartesian vintage, does not allow an emigration to an outer world at all, as existentialism is acutely aware, and to speak of actual entities and their historic routes, of the light outside of man that makes him blink, of eternal objects and of God—all of these are at odds with a philosophy that begins with a subject and its feeling, and, by all logic, must be stymied there forever. Locke, Hume, Kant, Descartes, Leibniz, Bergson, and Plato are grafted together by Whitehead only because he is eclectic. It is the language more than the thought of Whitehead that is unusual.

There is something to be said in Whitehead's favor for his rejection of an inertial world and his decision that there are ultimate inner principles in actual entities. There is a grain of truth in the remark that things have inner specifying agencies which Whitehead calls "feeling." He is suggestive also when he speaks of causality, even though he does not in the end sufficiently distinguish the efficient cause and its effect and even though, in final causality, he is inclined to confuse subjective aim with self-causation. In an over-all view, he is laudable for insisting on the organization in the world, though in the end his universe is not a unity like an organism but a mechanism like a system. Yet with all these tastes for deep truth, Whitehead stands condemned because the so-called mysterious character of his thought is owed his vision of a metaphysics without being and of a knowledge theory without the intellect.

If actual entities are radically mobile, it is vain to search

out subjects, organization, and concrescence. A universe of flow has no differences and determinations, as Aristotle argued against Heraclitus. Everything becomes everything else, and nothing ever really is. On dynamic premises, how can Whitehead speak of "grades of permanence," "compulsive stability," "subjects," and "superjects"? He claims that actual entities achieve organization of their own power and are supplemented in this accomplishment by eternal objects. But his first principle is at variance with the eternity of flow, and the second organizing agency is an *ad hoc* suggestion, where, as in Plato, objects are fitted into a universe that has nothing in common with them because it is flux while they are Forms. In a more basic sense, the existence of actual entities has to be proved and not dreamed up by poetic fancy. The account of them must be buttressed by experience.

Whitehead's system thus is weak at its premises. If they fall, the whole systematic structure crumbles on top of them. And if they are not to be judged by their inner truth but are to be validated only if a successful system can be woven out of their combinations, then Kierkegaard's powerful polemic against Hegel (Chapter 10) can be invoked against Whitehead.

The theodicy of Whitehead smacks of pantheism, both in primordial nature of God which is His view of eternal objects and in His consequent nature where He is one with the creative advance into novelty. On both counts, God is not the cause of the world. Actual entities are uncreated, and God is an actual entity like the rest of things. God is finite and dependent. He is not really a tender God, despite Whitehead's description, for He does not extend His power and presence to all things, and thus there are potential objects for His tenderness that elude Him.

Whitehead does not begin with experience and explain its nature. Did he do so, instead of jumping to rather naïve conclusions about God, the poet, the fellow sufferer, the evaluator, he would find that the objects of experience lack a sufficient explanation and require the existence of a perfect Being who is both creative and provident. Nothing finite can be uncreated since of its own nature as a finite thing it would be dependent on something outside of it. It would not have the full perfection of existence necessary to be, from all eternity, by its own intrinsic nature. Nothing real can move itself, for it would then be

potential to be moved and actual as the mover and would thus involve the contradiction of being potential and actual at the same time and in the same respect.

God is His own sufficient reason, but the principle of causality in no way applies to His being. As Aristotle and, much more clearly, Aquinas said of God, He is the supreme archetype. All the perfections of existence are prefigured in Him, and a thing is possible only because it can mirror something of His being. Aquinas and, to a certain extent, Aristotle put the Platonic "eternal objects" not outside of God but in His essence. That Whitehead did not do so only indicates his failure to understand that Aristotle and Aquinas wrote incisive "footnotes to Plato."

Great truths are simple ones, and it is only because the human mind, discursive and confined to work by judgments, is imperfect by reason of its complexity that it so often fails to reach the simple truths which the rare genius discovers and calls to the attention of his fellow men. The modern mind has grown to think that its solutions to the problems of the universe, when finally decided upon, will turn out to be very complicated. It admires a man who knows many facts and who can repair complex machinery. Its model is often the statistician. Its heroes are Einstein, Fermi, Bohr, and Heisenberg, the masters of the complex subatomic machinery explored by mathematical physics. Surprisingly enough, great advances even in empiriological physics are often simplifications that, when presented for the first time, appear almost naïve.

But Whitehead treads a different avenue. He refuses to admit being and its principles, intelligence and its universals, the soul and its immortal end. Only on such principles can the world of nature, torn apart by modern man, be given back to common sense for personal integration and for the progress of culture. Only on such principles can the universe be organized.

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CHAPTER 5 RUSSELL'S ASCENT TO LOGIC

Modern philosophy is largely the case history of a doubt. During the three centuries since Descartes died, his ghost has remained to harry men's minds and devastate their philosophical ambitions, leaving everywhere the grave markers of thought as one system after another has come and gone. Contemporary scientism is likewise haunted by Cartesianism. As Leibniz, Locke, Kant, and Hegel had their day of drawing conclusions and then perished when the Cartesian doubt was extended to their premises, so the philosophy of today seems nothing but a passing traveler that tomorrow's doubters will overpower. To an age clamoring for security, the majority voice of philosophy was never more disappointing.

A typical child of Cartesian stock is Bertrand Russell. He scruples with persistent doubts, skipping from one postulate to another to avoid the fate of his fallen ancestors in the post-Cartesian world. His philosophy is almost wholly a study in method. He searches, like Descartes, for one supreme method to ground all certitude and found all science. He wants a method to end all methods except his own. He is Cartesian too by his zeal for mathematics, and loyally modern in his preference for analysis.

Russell's long years have not always breathed the peaceful air that tradition associates with the pursuit of wisdom. Born in England on May 12, 1872, he lost both parents in his infancy, and his father, a free-thinking veteran of English liberal politics, committed him in his will to be brought up by free-thinking guardians. The will, however, was broken in court, and young Russell, against his father's wishes, was exposed to a Christian background in his grandparents' home. He reaped the benefits

of governesses who spoke French and German, learning both of these tongues at an early age. But in the matter of playmates, he writes that his childhood was lonely.

At the age of eighteen, Russell went to Cambridge where he won high honors in philosophy and came to know the Cambridge notables, among them Professor Whitehead. Idealism was the rage of the University then. It used to be said that when Hegel died, he went to England. Young Russell was among the many who succumbed to the neo-Hegelianism. Among the others whom he read were Mill, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Kant and Leibniz also swayed his views, but their period apparently came later, letting him graduate as an Hegelian more than anything else.

Russell's background is a broad one. His first position was on the staff of the British embassy in Paris, and he was next in Berlin, a student of economics and sociology. Knowing foreign languages, he was able, unlike an ordinary traveler, to go beneath the crust of other cultures, and his perceptions of socioeconomic affairs in Germany came to the fore in much of his early thinking.

The year 1898 found Russell as a lecturer at Cambridge, and then in 1900 came a turning point in his thought. He went to Paris for the First International Congress of Philosophy, where he heard the Italian logician, Peano, on the platform. Peano launched a project to express arithmetic with instruments from logic, and used only three basic concepts and five basic axioms to make his stand. Much of Russell's work consists of a pursuit of Peano's goals. Already Russell had shed the Hegelian convictions of his earlier years, especially through the influence of G. E. Moore, a British realist, and Leibniz, philosopher and mathematician. Peano's brilliance at the Paris Congress lured him further from Hegel and in the direction of an analytic philosophy.

Sharing a top rank with Peano in the shaping of Russell's maturer thought is the German logician, Frege. Peano's chief claim was the internal articulation of arithmetic by logical means. Frege went much higher. He aimed to reduce arithmetic itself to the order of logic and thus to lay it out not only with a consistent internal structure but on a rigorous basis. In both directions, Russell followed his pioneers, and as the result of his efforts, he not only took mathematics to be a branch of logic but, in one

stage at least, ascribed to philosophy a similar descent, leaving logic as the supreme science.

With Whitehead, he coauthored the *Principia Mathematica,* a work that drew heavily upon Peano, Frege, and other logicians but, as a highly original and deductive synthesis, marked a turning point in the history of philosophy in the early years of this century, when it appeared. When Whitehead graduated into his philosophy of organism, Russell remained behind, still trumpeting for logic as an approach to the clarity and distinction which Descartes had set as the aim of knowledge. On logic or method all of his important works take their bearings, and if he is remembered, it will be in this field.

But when Russell comes down from his mathematical clouds, the weather of life is often rough. He opposed conscription in World War I, and because of this, he was denied a British passport when invited to join the faculty at Harvard. His pacifist writings brought him a six months' term in jail, where he wrote his *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy.* Tendered a teaching post at the City College of New York in 1940, he was the center of such a storm for his views on morality that the offer was eventually withdrawn. Domestic peace was also not among his gifts. The first two of his three wives divorced him.

A prolific writer, Russell has left a long bibliography ranging over many fields of knowledge. In these pages, only his theory of knowledge, chiefly his logical method, will be considered. For it is here that both his influence and his originality really reside. In this field, some typical works are *Principles of Mathematics, Analysis of Mind, An Outline of Philosophy, Our Knowledge of the External World, Inquiry into Meaning and Truth,* and *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits.*

THE METHOD OF LOGICAL ATOMISM

It is always hard to focus upon the leading idea of another thinker, since one's own philosophy must be darkened in the effort to see the world as others see it. In Russell's case, the problems are doubly acute, since he has shifted his views a number of times and, despite defenses from his admirers, has been a party to several different philosophies. After an academic career devoted to a reduction of the knowledge problem to logic,

he turned up with *Human Knowledge* in 1948 to confess that logic is not philosophy and that knowledge must be based on a psychological attitude called belief. Rejecting Dewey's logic at an earlier date for being a philosophy of action rather than of truth and ideas and logical lucidity, the later Russell defines knowledge in terms of "acting appropriately." After a half century of battle with the Cartesian doubt, Russell writes that "all human knowledge is uncertain, inexact, and partial. To this doctrine we have not found any limitation whatever."

Only the final edition of Russell's thought can be sketched here, using his later works where they disagree with his former ones and the early works where his final writings are silent upon a given subject. A typical strand that threads a great deal of his thought together is his logical atomism, a subject that he first formally broached in 1918 and that he has constantly emphasized since.

By logical atomism. Russell means that the world is to be understood entirely analytically by man and that there is no meaningful whole which the parts, mechanically united, cannot explain. In the zone of modern physics, atomism is clear enough; it simply means studying matter by breaking it up. But the atomism of Russell is of a logical and even psychological variety, aiming not to know matter but to know knowledge. It aspires to isolate the unit "ideas" that are the building blocks of thought and then to regulate their combinations to assure a scientific rigor for the conclusions.

Descartes was after a first principle from which knowledge could set out with a sure foot. He retreated in his search until he came upon the *cogito*. It is also primitive facts that Russell hunts down in his logical atomism, and once they are cornered, thought becomes a matter of combining them or, as will be later seen, using them as the raw material to make constructions in the logical order.

Genuine realism in philosophy shows how human thought begins with the general idea of being, as vague, spontaneous, and undifferentiated at the common sense level. Thereafter, there is an arduous but progressive sweep of knowledge to the summit of metaphysics, where the initial idea of man has been clarified, defended, and purified, and where the knowledge of being is backed by certainty of a metaphysical rigor.

This approach modern thought in general has rejected. The British empiricist tradition which Russell carries forward holds in particular that the human mind begins its life by knowing individuals and not by knowing being in its general sense. In one terminology, Russell called the ultimate and unanalyzable individual which sets the mind in motion an event, and in the amoebic stage of his so-called realism, just after the Hegelian period, the world of events was pictured as external and objective. He was then a dualist, dividing matter from mind and viewing the mental in terms of states that affect the self, with the self in turn known by intuition. In this framework, Russell made his famed distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description.

Broadly judged, acquaintance has the meaning of immediate knowledge, while descriptions are inferred or at least mediate in nature. Atomizing thought to know knowledge rather than attending to the general and primary fact of knowing being, Russell once held that the self was known by acquaintance. But he replaced this view with the doctrine that we are never aware directly of things, whether they are outside of us or inside of us. The mind makes immediate contact only with sense data.

This Humelike decision against our knowledge of substances, whether our own or that of things, moves closer to the idea of why Russell's atomism is called logical and why it is so central in his philosophy. It shows Russell going through the cycle which leads from Descartes to Berkeley and to Hume. How does man know, for instance, a table that he claims to observe in the kitchen? If Russell is right, he is "acquainted" only with sense data, the color, the hardness, the size, and the shape. The rest is "inferred." For Russell, that this is an object, a table, a thing, is not directly apprehended. It is not really experienced; it is not a matter of direct consciousness. It is more like a conclusion than an immediate knowledge.

Such a step in the direction of Hume swings the door wide open to solipsism. But Russell is unwilling to pass through it. He tarries to plead that sense data are not simply subjective impressions but are lodged somehow outside the mind. They are one type of knowledge by acquaintance, and the knowledge of our mental states, as personal and subjective, is another. Just as the table,

opposed to sense data, is inferred knowledge, so the self as the locus of the mental states is also known in a mediate way. Thus far this account adds up to dualism. Russell has always posed as a realist.

Meanwhile he was holding out for a view that there is a dualism in external reality itself, between things and relations. This amounts to a distinction between particulars and universals, where events with proper names are set apart from the way in which they are qualified by the common characters that language represents by adjectives and verbs.

The whole problem of relations has been a disputed territory in modern thought. For men like Bradley, relations are the primary things about the real; they are wholes and they lead the mind to accept monism. On the other hand, thinkers like James hold out for relations as "given" like any other entity, a stone, for instance, or even an atom. Such a view leads to pluralism.

This latter view is the one that Russell favors, and with good reason he has been charged with a Platonic ultra-realism. Denying abstraction just as Plato antedated its discovery by Aristotle, the reasoning of Russell never struggles away from its Platonic superstructures. He holds that universals such as sensible qualities and similarity are known by acquaintance.

THE DOCTRINE OF NEUTRAL MONISM

But logical atomism, if it is logical in more ways than one, could not tolerate a dualistic universe, and Russell was alert enough to press his premises onward to a further destiny. If acquaintance is really direct, how can a dualism be detected between mind and matter? On an atomistic platform, the prime facts, more fully analyzed, are not exterior sense data but mental states and, as existentialism argues, no distinctions can be authorized between the physical and the psychic, subject and object, mind and matter. As a critic of Heidegger has argued, existentialism moves toward a neutral world by its analytic, and it might be appended that a neutral world must always blur distinctions to become monistic in the end. Logically enough, Russell called his later philosophy a neutral monism, where the dividing line between matter and mind is now erased and where the two

apparent opposites are merged into a nameless, neutral stuff that can be best depicted as an atomism of "events." William James is credited with formulating this philosophy of neuters in his doctrine of "pure experience," but he in turn inherited the idea from German philosophy, especially from the positivist, Ernst Mach. James's view was adopted more or less by American Neo-realism.

Succinctly put, neutral monism holds that whether a given complex is mind or is matter hinges not on the natures of the basic events in each case but solely on the way in which they are combined. In Russell's own example, thought and thing are related in the manner of a postal directory in which two listings are made, with the names arranged once in alphabetical order and the second time according to address. In the first case, there is an analogy to thought, and in the second to things.

Since the names (or stuff) are the same in both cases, differing only in arrangement, the deeper dualism of experience is undercut. What vestiges remain, for example, of the difference between mind and matter, form a dualism not of fact or of nature but simply one of "causal laws" which in one case are psychical because of their combination, and in the other are purely physical. The difference is really a matter of relation.

When Russell landed upon the idea of neutral monism, he was still obeying his analytic method and riding his atomism onward. But why did he stop short with even a duality of relation or of law, instead of going all the way to an utter solipsism? To explain this "failure of nerve" which existentialism is bold enough to avoid, Russell, the epistemologist, must be mingled with Russell, the logician; and Russell, the man, must be set against the backdrop of his intellectual ancestry.

Like Bacon and Hume, his distant relatives in the British empiricist tradition, Russell shows a peculiar fervor, almost a pragmatic one, for the fruits of knowledge. In this respect, he embraces the principle of economy which is historically but erroneously called Ockham's razor and which affirms, in its classical form, "Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity." So conceived, philosophy becomes the endeavor to account for reality with the minimum number of principles, as though simplicity were not the effect of truth but its very cause or core.

Empiriological method is interested in the minimum theory needed to get results in the laboratory and ignores philosophy as superfluous. Russell likewise is bent on formulating a workable system of thought from the fewest possible presuppositions. In the laboratory or in life, a logic must work successfully, and the logician's task is to make it do so simply and economically.

It is such a view of knowledge, whatever its origins or its self-defense, that inspires Russell, as a would-be realist, to apply a constructive technique on the atomic data that analysis yields; and where thought would perish by locking man into his own mental states, he is led to renounce his atomism rather than force it indefinitely and existentially forward. Russell believes that it is simpler to account for experience by neutral monism than by a dualistic view but that solipsism does not account for experience at all.

This willingness to compromise, which puts Russell midway between Dewey and the men to be treated in the following chapter, appears in the cleavage which Russell makes between analysis and belief, which stops analysis. It is easy to see that a wholesale analytic would atomize reality into an infinite series of events and their components, and would fail to provide a starting point for putting things together again in judgments. A genuine realist would argue thus, and so argues Russell, too. Unable to resolve the world by logical analysis, he turns to psychology and comes up with the conclusion that (synthetic) knowledge must begin in belief, a somewhat blind and brutal attitude like animal faith in Santayana. Russell is willing to discuss it as "animal inference." Logically, he admits that he and the rest of us should be skeptics, but skepticism is psychologically impossible. So knowledge begins in belief and is elaborated by logic. Belief and logic are parallels of the much earlier division of knowledge into acquaintance and description.

But logic is not merely a reasoning process. In fact it is hardly a reasoning process at all. It involves construction which Russell, Platonic as he is, would like to develop into the only tool of knowledge and the simplest way to form a system that responds to experienced reality.

THE METHOD OF CONSTRUCTION

Dewey defined philosophy as a reconstruction. But Russell's language, like the general tone of his thought, has a different sense. For him, construction has a logical meaning rather than the organic or valuational sense it has in Dewey. It may be compared to the model building or the logical construct by which empiriological physics pictures the real—for example the "planetary" structure of atoms—in order to predict experiments. For instance, a table becomes a construct in the later Russell, a hypothetical thing which is posited to account for the table-shaped, table-colored sense datum known by acquaintance. Other minds are constructs, and so are such things as electrons, waves, and points, which populate the empiriological world. Indeed, the older division of knowledge now begins to assume the form of acquaintance versus construction, with inference regarded as something to be avoided, whenever possible. The construct is Russell's way of revenging himself upon the Humelike analytic in the first stage of his thought where substances or things are supplanted by simple data of sense, and there is no means left for putting things together again.

Russell's self-styled "supreme maxim in scientific philosophizing" states: "Whenever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities." When this statement is probed far enough, it will yield the whole secret to logical atomism, if it does not sound the most characteristic note in the whole of Russell's past and present thinking in philosophy.

There are a number of ways of approaching this "supreme maxim" to grasp its rather simple and yet elusive message. First of all, it carries all the flavor of neutral monism which rejects a dualism of nature, and reduces all duality to context alone. Inference, of course, does require a dualism between the immediate evidence of the premises and the mediate evidence of the conclusion drawn out of them, but constructionism gets around the difficulty by adhering to the surface of the immediate alone.

Another way of seizing Russell's machine is by reference to Ockham's razor or the principle of economy. It is simpler to treat the world of objects as a construct than to complicate knowledge by setting things into a status apart from mind. Besides, inference is greater in complexity than description. So Ockham's razor slices

off the world of substance and of inference, to preserve only the branches of knowledge that are laden with fruit. Construction is easy, simple, immediate, capable even of empiriological test.

Mach held that physical laws are simply economies of thought, and though this idea has not been adopted verbatim by empiriological physicists, it has sounded a note that is easy to detect in their attitude toward knowledge. Newton had paid at least lip service to the principle of economy in his famous dictum: "I frame no hypotheses." But Newton failed to practice what he preached, and the physics of the twentieth century has forsaken his basic notions. Mach directly influenced Einstein in empiriological physics, and Russell owes him a debt in his logic. In fact, Russell is realizing Mach's ambitions by the judgment he puts upon constructionism. Constructions are economical.

Constructions are ways of freeing man from ontological law that he cannot tamper with by control but is bound to acknowledge as real and objective and absolutely binding upon him. To accept such metaphysical principles as that of non-contradiction or that of causality would thus require a dualism and again dethrone mere economy of thought as the ultimate norm of truth. There are hints in Russell's works that constructionism emigrates from logic to psychology where man is envisioned as constructing his common sense world from the paltry data presented by his senses.

Still another facet of constructionism is the rights it confers upon description. What is described must always be continuous, having no leaps and hence unbroken from point to point like an area that is temporally and spatially consecutive. Taking a single but telling example, to describe a circle involves that my pencil be kept solidly on the paper throughout the process, without jumping from point to point.

Since description cannot tolerate leaps or breaks in its material, an outer world separated from the mind or an effect distinct from its inferred cause can have no meaning in a philosophy like that of Russell's. Such a system refuses to study being and to become an ontological science, and the break between being and the naught, the fact of being existing and known in itself, cannot be admitted into it.

For there is a genuine leap between mind and object, cause

and effect, such that one is not the other and such that each has a measure of originality from within itself. That originality cannot be grasped in terms of anything but itself, a fact discussed by genuine philosophy as the intrinsic intelligibility of being. Where being and its principles are disavowed and where there is no such a fact as a difference in things, the hiatus between being and its opposite, and hence the leap between inner and outer worlds, cause and effect, matter and spirit, God and the world, and all other dualities must be passed over unheeded.

All this explains a little more fully why Russell's world is monistic and why he subverts the hierarchy which inference involves to set up his puppets of constructionism.

KNOWLEDGE BY DESCRIPTION

Russell's early works divided knowledge into acquaintance and description. As shown by the foregoing parallels, there is a sense in which constructions are descriptions, but such a view takes description in an ordinary and orthodox use of the term. In a more technical vein, knowledge by description is not the same thing as constructionism. Constructs are built up from acquaintance; descriptions are not, and so for Russell they are unsolved problems rather than answers which his theories can give.

A descriptive phrase assigns a property to a single subject with which we are not acquainted as in the sentence, "Scott is the author of *Waverley*." Russell regards such propositions as being not about Scott, for example, but about the characteristic, the author of *Waverley*. As a logician, he is not so much interested in things as in properties or relations. He wants to get away from the notion of things or substances and build a world of constructs from sense data. But description presents a problem since the subject is not known by acquaintance and yet requires the mind to assign it a definite attribute like "the so-and-so." Descriptive knowledge in a world of acquaintances and their constructs becomes what Stebbing has called "logically inappropriate." They must be translated.

Take the statement: "Scott was the author of *Waverley*." It is a complex proposition and, translated into a language of "acquaintance" it means, according to Russell's view: (*a*) at least one person wrote *Waverley;* (*b*) at most one person wrote *Waverley;* and

(*c*) there is no one who both wrote *Waverley* and is not the same as Scott.

Now this appears a rather ingenious device but does not look very profound. At first sight, it seems like nothing more than a complicating of the obvious; statements should be proved from truths that are simpler and better known, and Russell's procedure looks like just the opposite. But there is an inner lining which brings out the genius of Russell in logic and in mathematics but dwarfs his ambitions to account for the things of real experience.

His first two propositions (*a* and *b*) translate the idea of continuity which a purely logical or constructive or, in the usual sense of the word, descriptive pursuit of things must apply exclusively and with detail. Imagine two line segments *AB* and *CD* separated by an infinitesimal gap, like that between two toothpicks laid end to end. Beginning at *A*, the mind can move continuously toward the gap *BC*, and it can do the same thing by beginning at point *D*. It can thus draw indefinitely close to the gap without reaching it.

However, where, like the gap, things are discontinuous, where they stand out in themselves, where they are not understood in terms of outside approaches and extrinsic evidence but in their own originality and natures, the logical, mathematical, discursive, descriptive, and constructive method is fated forever to be inadequate to study things in themselves and as they are. To grasp a thing as the term of a line or through its continuity with what is outside of it may be good mathematics or good logic. It is valid if and when and where constructionism is admitted. But it is not ontology. It does not understand things as they are.

The example of the broken line is only suggestive. A better and more exact example to illustrate *a* and *b* can be drawn from the mathematical theory of limits, where one quantity, from above or from below, approaches indefinitely near to another, like a polygon increasing the number of its sides and tending to become a circle, or like a series of numbers that grow smaller and smaller and tend to zero. There is at least one person who wrote *Waverley* and at most one person who did so. The truth lies in between, so to speak; it is a limit, as though the midpoint of a line were approached indefinitely near from the two sides and defined in

terms of these continuous approaches but never in itself. For a mathematician, such a method of getting at things does its job at its own level. Continuity, construction, purely formal logic —all are members of one family, and it is to the credit of Russell that he discerns their kinship.

In the case of *c* above, a new analysis must be opened, somewhat like that performed by *a* and *b*. But where is this logic leading? Obviously an infinite series is in the making, and in his maturer *Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* Russell seems to give up in his efforts to reduce descriptive knowledge to the analytically known world of acquaintance:

> No proposition containing *the* (in the singular) can be strictly proved by empirical evidence. We do not know that Scott was the author of *Waverley;* what we know is that he was *an* author of *Waverley*. For aught we know, somebody in Mars may have written *Waverley*. To prove that Scott was *the* author, we should have to survey the universe and find that everything in it did not write *Waverley* or was Scott. This is beyond our powers.

In Russell's system, then, descriptive knowledge is truly "inappropriate," to use Stebbing's term, or, to use Russell's own words, "every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly out of constituents with which we are acquainted."

Another favorite example of description is: "The king of France is wise." This means: (*a*) at least one person is the king of France; (*b*) at most one person is the king of France; and (*c*) there is no one who is king of France and is not unwise. What was said of *a* and *b* in the preceding example can be reapplied here. The third proposition also has a mathematical flavor. It suggests the indirect proof by which Euclideans show, for instance, that parallels do not meet. At least, it is an indirect approach to the king's wisdom, and this is the important point of method. For the wisdom is identified by the indirect, by something outside of it, by the not-wise, by the technique of continuity which approaches things by limits and terms of other things but never gets to things as they are in themselves. There is no leap or break, no clash of being with its opposite and thus no grasp of being in itself. Thus Russell can write, "Speaking generally 'not-*p*' must be defined by what it *expresses*." The *"not"* has a kind of positive or objective status, making the universe into a plenum, a continuum, a

construct, a monism where all is neutralized into a nameless indifference of events.

Russell's theory of descriptions is symptomatic. Modern methods frequently tend to become a study of logical predicates rather than ontological subjects, and the theory of descriptions is typical of a deductive streak in present-day thought because it starts with a characteristic or quality and attempts to get it back into the thing which bears it in the universe. Russell would like to build subjects out of relations, "things" as constructs from sense data, and ontology as a branch of logic. Aristotle was sounder and saner when he derived the predicate from the subject in necessary judgments rather than, like modern logicalism, the subject from the predicate. In typically modern methods, every predicate, like anything else, must have its reality outside the subject, and the problem is to get it back. If we start by analyzing things instead of sense data and relations, our logic does not face the infinite series which the theory of descriptions must open.

Max Black points out the difference between constructionism and descriptions. Constructionism has to do with vocabulary and descriptions with syntax, Black reports. The first deals with material words like "table" and "dog," whose objects are constructed out of sense data; descriptions deal with logical or connective words, like "the," "and," and "of."

Without admitting the existence of things and, of course, without knowing such things from within and as they are, the theory of descriptions never really touches realities at their own level: "at least . . ." falls short of the real subject; "at most . . ." overshoots it; and "not-wise" is removed by infinity from the positive something which it ought to clarify.

A philosophy that authorizes no dualisms of nature and is really powerless to distinguish fact from fancy must take a stand on propositions where purely imaginary existence is involved such as "the golden mountain" or "the present king of France." How are we to interpret the proposition, "I met a unicorn?"

Such symbols as "unicorn" or "golden mountain" or "the present king of France," in fact any word of phrase taken by itself, Russell calls incomplete symbols, deriving their meaning from their larger context (in technical language they take their sense immediately from the propositional function); they are indefinite, meaningless,

unusable expressions in themselves, and the precise ambition of the theory of descriptions, whether used on historical subjects like Scott or on imaginary realities like a unicorn, is to make language definite and provable in content. Incomplete symbols depend on a universe of discourse to complete themselves, to accord them a genuine definition, and to remove ambiguity by fitting them into univocal categories of existence.

This is another evidence that descriptions relate things by what is outside of them but never in themselves. Truth depends on context, terms on proposition, propositions on functions, things on their continuity with what is exterior to them.

A PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

Like Dewey, Bertrand Russell is extremely engrossed with the problem of language but in a different way and for a different end. In many respects, as in this theory of description, his thought is aimed at clarifying language, and, as the next chapter will show, he gave a new and philosophical impetus to the study of words, sentences, and meanings.

Common sense, Russell would say, appears at first to be caught up in a vicious circle. How can language be discussed without using it? To define "word" seems to involve a circular definition, since words must be used in the process.

From this snarl, Russell escapes by distinguishing two languages, an object language which is analyzed and a logical language which performs the analysis. Language can be made a "thing" to be examined by a secondary language, and, in fact, the secondary language can be examined by a tertiary one. And so *ad infinitum*.

Carnap, Tarski, and others christen this so-called logical or secondary language a meta-language. But it was Russell who first suggested that languages could be staggered into a hierarchy and that the vicious circle, of examining a language by itself, could thus be completely averted.

When Russell stated the three propositions which his descriptive assertions involved, he was in reality using a secondary or logical language to discuss his original statement. To declare that "Scott was the author of *Waverley*" is not quite the same as to say: "It is true that 'Scott was the author of *Waverley*,'" since the second proposition is not the first but about it.

Russell pours heavy criticism on ordinary language. He finds it not only inclined to a vague and inexact account of our world but likely to make that account self-contradictory as the next section will show. "Table," for example, is a misleading word. It gives the impression that we are acquainted with what, as a matter of fact, we must construct out of sense data. A word like "is," which even Rousseau glorified as an index of how man differs from the brute, Russell calls a "disgrace" to the human race because it is allegedly ambiguous in meaning both existence and identity.

So Russell dreams of forming an ideal language containing only "logically proper names" which are modeled not upon things but upon the matter of our acquaintance. Such a language would avoid pitfalls like those which produce paradoxes and contradictions. It would lay stress on words similar to demonstrative pronouns. Yet Russell wisely stops shy of the positions reached by some of his disciples and discussed in the following chapter. He does not believe, for instance, that language is something ultimate. On the contrary, he sees it as referring beyond itself, to the "furniture of the world," even though his monistic, sensate, and constructive premises would forbid him to distinguish mind and matter, word and meaning, thought and thing. In fact, Russell finds in language some confirmatory evidence for his perennial belief that there is in the world a dualism of universals and particulars: there are substantives on the one hand and adjectives and verbs on the other. But typical of Russell's shifts in view is an article published in 1950 arguing that there is no such thing as a particular since it is always complex.

THE REDUCTION OF MATHEMATICS TO LOGIC

In the foregoing setting, Russell's studies on logic in its more technical sense can now be made more significant. Though a volume in itself his logic will be found to throw light into some of the darker nooks that the preceding outline has left, but even this new light will leave long and puzzling shadows.

Symbolic logic, though suggested by Leibniz, is a by-product of the great nineteenth-century advances in mathematics. It claims to dispense with relations as entities which make an intrinsic reference to a subject and without which the subject cannot be un-

derstood. It accords to relations an autonomy in a symbolic world and then conquers them with mathematical weapons.

Symbolic logic took a vast leap forward when Hamilton proposed to "quantify" the predicates of propositions. Such a view turns with full fury against the very nature of a proposition or judgment, which is truly hierarchical, so that a universal subject might have a particular predicate and vice versa. A judgment is not a matter of quantity; it is not an equation. An equation is not hierarchical but equalitarian. Its quantities are joined by an equality sign, so that no real change is made when the sides of it are transposed.

The net result of Hamilton's proposal, which was actually known and rejected by Aristotle, flattened out judgment to the level of an equation and reduced reasoning from truly syllogistic inference to a matter of substituting in mathematical equations and solving a problem in algebra. Hamilton allowed quantity to usurp all relations.

In the final impetus for the growth of symbolic logic, Russell has probably done more than any other man of our century. Drawing heavily upon Peano, Russell proposes a threefold division in his logic: (*a*) propositional calculus; (*b*) the calculus of classes; and (*c*) the calculus of relations. They are almost more than a three-ply division of a single logical system. Each is virtually a logic in itself.

Russell is an ultra-realist, according the same objective and neutral status to both universals and particulars. The pivots of his threefold logic—the proposition (more technically, the propositional function), the class, and relations—are not abstracted. They are given, like things or substances. They are irreducible atoms in logical atomism, the stuff for constructionism to build into a system and a world.

Russell's immediate objectives in this regard are to elaborate the laws of combination within the propositional, class, and relational logic, using the minimum number of undefined terms and principles to do the job. What a proposition means and what a relation means can easily be divined, except of course that relations are taken as Platonically subsistent. Relations are not rooted in a subject. They are not abstracted from it. They do not enjoy their independence only in the mind.

Though the logic of classes can be worked out independently of

the propositional calculus, there is suggested a way of relating the two. Thus, a propositional function is a strictly symbolic reality in logic, like "x is a man" and written as $f(x)$. It becomes a proposition when a value like "John" is substituted for x, and all such values of x which make $f(x)$ true are called a class. Here, the notion of class, like anything else, is not known so much in itself as in terms of its outside (propositional) relations; and though a class is irreducible in its own domain, it can be clarified by reference to the propositional function which Russell views as more basic.

Symbolic logic is properly concerned not with comprehension (intension or connotation) but with extension (denotation) only, and hence Russell can state, "The intensional view is in the main irrelevant to Symbolic Logic and to Mathematics." And this concession is fairly critical, since it amounts to a renouncing of the search after content and to an interest only in vacuous forms of human thought. Russell, fortunately, does not follow out his statement, either in principle or in practice. If he did what his premises command, men would have nothing to think about, and nihilism would eventuate. Subjectivism of the most radical sort would prevail.

An equally crucial phase of Russell's logic is the split between so-called material and formal implication. A material implication is more of a "factual" relation, while formal implication, or what G. E. Moore calls entailment, is more strictly logical. A material implication exists between propositions: that John is a man implies materially that John is mortal. It is never the case that the first proposition is true and the second is false. This is similar to the implicit analytic statement in C. I. Lewis. Formal implication, on the other hand, can be illustrated by propositional functions like: "x is a man" implies "x is mortal" for all values of x. To say that "x is a man" implies "x is mortal," involves material implication, as the preceding example of John's mortality indicated. Formal implication exists when the material implication holds for all values of x. The first is the class of the second, a generalization of it. But it is also something more. For it states not what always is the case but what must be so. The relation is more logical (formal) than factual (material).

A logician would like to reduce all implication to that of the formal type, but Russell has frequently found the world unwilling

to accept the dictates of his logic on other scores. Here he has to settle for material implication as the basis of the formal type and something of an obstacle in the project to logicalize reality as far as he can. Material implication might be profitably put forth in the example: "John is a man, *therefore* John is mortal." It refers more to content than does formal implication, which is concerned chiefly with logical forms: "x is a man" implies "x is mortal."

In the example of material implication, the *therefore* indicates a definiteness and a finality, and such proportions are really out of place in Russell's constructed world of neutral entities where continuity and indifference should prevail above all else. Russell seems to admit this difficulty. Material implication is thus not co-equal with the formal type but, as far as possible, subordinated to it as an object language to a meta-language so to speak. Material implication is somewhat as the raw material for the formal type which states rules and is, as logically prior, the final test of correctness and consistency. At the risk of appearing naïve, material implication can be considered as an equivalence like $x = y$, and representing this entire equation by a simple expression z, formal implication equates it to something else. Formal implication is a generalization of the material type, a subsumption of it within a higher class. But material implication has never been successfully reduced, and the ambitions of modern logic to the contrary, it still stands by itself, like water in a cup which refuses to be treated as though there were cup alone.

There is no true hierarchy of matter and form, being and thought, nor even of implications and languages, in a world where quantity is given a monopoly and where equality signs are its protective legislation. Where formal implication is given front rank in human thought, the world fades away into a contentless, beingless phenomenon. Predicates cannot be directly related to each other. They can only be related through substances or things that, despite scientism, really exist and, despite Hume, are truly known. But the reality of being and the necessity which it alone can guarantee are too big a subject to be discussed here.

"THE UNDECIDABLES"

A vicious circle is once again set in motion when logic, viewed as the supreme science, is invited to examine its own foundations.

Its own laws must be used to examine themselves or a meta-logic must be constructed, if the basis of the logic is to be firmly moored. In this light, Grelling made a classic distinction between heterological and autological expressions. The second type of signs apply always to themselves: thus *short* is a short word and *polysyllable* is a polysyllabic one. Terms that are heterological do not apply to themselves: *long* for instance is not a long word but a short one and *monosyllable* is far from monosyllabic.

Kurt Goedel is credited with showing that symbolic logic must always remain heterological. Its central concepts, its basic tools, its fundamental principles must always be undefined by the system in which they apply since a given notion cannot examine its own self but requires a principle outside of itself for its description and its defense. These undefined terms, assumed without proof and provable outside their own system only by other undefined assumptions, Goedel called "the undecidables." Since he published his thesis on the subject in the early thirties, symbolic logicians have been forced to settle for the restrictions which his reasoning imposed. Every system has undefined terms, provable in a meta-system by other undefined terms, leaving always an undecidable margin of assumption and never allowing a system to be completely closed and final.

As the result of Goedel's strictures, modern logic has tended to become a game in which you start with a minimum number of undefined terms and see how far you can develop them. When a stalemate results, it is customary to change the rules of the game and start it all over again. The fundamental questions in the mathematical and logical approach to the real, which Russell favors, are undecidable.

Where a thing, a principle, a word, a concept is made to apply to its own self, there are always paradoxes, and one of the chief concerns of modern logic has been to avoid or explain or conquer them. There is a well-known cliché that "no general statement is true" and another one that "to every rule there is an exception."

But if the first assertion holds, since it is a general statement and is disqualified by what it says about general statements, it is not true either, and a paradox of unmeaning results. The same analysis applies to the second statement.

Jourdain presents this famous paradox: an observer is shown

an index card on which is written: "The statement on the other side of this card is true." Turning the card, he finds the following assertion: "The statement on the other side of this card is false." Now what is actually true or false? Obviously, the observer can get no meaning from the combination on the card. Another classical example is that of the Cretan who says: "All Cretans are liars."

To solve such paradoxes, Russell appeals to Frege, one of his masters, whose ideas he developed into a so-called "theory of types." A type, broadly viewed, is a kind of rule which determines the domain where a statement may have meaning. It is a criterion which sorts out logical classes, ruling where one class may be substituted for another and where such a transfer would be invalid. For example, Aristotle and Socrates are of the same type since both are philosophers. However, Socrates and the sculptor, Phidias, do not belong together.

Among other things, a type forbids a class to belong to itself, apply to itself, validate or invalidate itself. Where a class or a sentence is made to refer to its own self, the assertion is neither true or false but nonsense. As a result, the general statement in the example above does not apply to its own self, and the Cretan, when he accused his fellow men of being liars, was not including himself in the indictment. Types, like languages studied by meta-languages and logic scanned by meta-logics, are tapered into a hierarchy. But their final resting place, like the other basic notions and laws of modern logic, is really among "the undecidables." Even types cannot apply to themselves when they are set into a rigorous system.

In the theory of types, Russell once anew takes refuge in Platonic Forms. Types also bear resemblance to Santayana's essences and to Whitehead's eternal objects. Perhaps their closest historical analogue is Kant's doctrine of regulative principles.

THE NATURE OF NUMBER

Russell's genius belongs more to mathematical logic than to logic in its Aristotelian sense. One of his great achievements is to attack the problem of the nature of number with the machinery of his logic and to develop the science of mathematics, especially arithmetic, through the use of logical constants. In classical mathematics, number is unity in plurality, or multitude organized into unity.

But Russell would argue that unity in such definitions presumes the notion of number and that a more scientific definition of it must be tracked down by other means.

When an orange, a dishpan, and a clock are seen togther, it is said of course that they are three objects, but how can the number 3 be rigorously derived from this experience or applied in it? According to Russell, the number of the three objects is a member of the common class, which is 3. "Number is the number of a class."

In another room or in another context, let us suppose a knife, a fork, and a spoon. To get at what Russell means in his definition of number, the two sets of three objects have to be compared. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the objects in the first instance and those of the second. To each and every member of the first set of objects, there corresponds one and only one member of the second. The "sums" are thus members of a common class.

Actually, Russell is here following out the line traced by Georg Cantor, one of the great mathematical geniuses of the modern epoch, who held that the concept of "equal number" logically precedes the notion of number. The idea of "equal number" appears in the form of the one-to-one correspondence. When the mind notes two classes whose members correspond one-to-one, it says or can say that the classes are members of a higher common class which is called their number.

Number is thus "the class of all classes" or "a common property of a set of similar classes. . . . " Poincaré suggests a parallel to this approach when he regards mathematics as the science of "giving the same name to diverse things."

Armed with this definition of number, Russell can now stride forward into the historical problems of infinity and the continuum. If a term is taken away from a class, leaving a class similar (equal) to the original, the class is called infinite. Moreover, there is nothing outside the infinite that sets it into a class of greater extension, and so Russell puts infinity into the intensional order.

In developing his philosophy of infinity, Russell is once anew indebted to Cantor, who began with the notion of one-one correspondence between two series (of numbers, events, things — it does not really matter) and then defined the infinite in terms of the indefinite extension of this process of correspondence through a

kind of mathematical induction. Cantor starts enumerating a series, set in correspondence with another one, and the infinite turns up as a kind of rule for continuing the enumeration.

Cantor arrived at the notion of orders of infinity or, as he termed it, at transfinite numbers. For instance, the number of finite integers is not itself a finite integer. If to all finite integers and their fractional combinations like ⅔ and ½, there are now added all square roots and their combinations like $\sqrt{2}$ and $\sqrt{2+\sqrt{2}}$, an even higher order of infinity appears.

In this concept of orders, the idea of a meta-language and a meta-logic returns to the forum of mathematical logic, and a whole hierarchy of transfinite numbers rears up, with the higher related to the lower as a kind of meta-number.

Together with Dedekind, another important theorist in modern mathematics, Cantor inspired the philosophy of the continuum in Russell. Historically and in modern thought, the problem of continuity is closely linked with the debates about infinity, and both are formally joined when Cantorians ask: How many points are there on a continuous line of any length? They answer, of course: An infinity!

For Russell, continuity (say all the fractions between 1 and 2) is treated as a problem of series which, viewed from the outside is without gaps and, taken from within, bears what amounts to an infinity of subdivisions in each member of the series. A self-styled logical atomist could hardly regard a whole in any other way than as a sum, even when the components have to be infinities. It is by regarding the distance between two numbers as a sum, as an infinite series of fractions that grow smaller and smaller, that Russell endeavors to solve Zeno's paradoxes.

Russell's views on mathematics are contested by at least two other modern schools. Formalism, led by David Hilbert, uses an approach that is almost wholly logical in nature, without regard for the atomic data which Russell somehow draws from the real world in his logical atomism as the raw material for constructions. Even more than in Russell, formalism is like a game of chess where rules are made, amended, and repealed to make the play come out. Consistency of form more than a reference to reality is the sole ambition of the formalistic spirit.

Intuitionism, led by L. E. J. Brouwer, is regarded by Russell as a more challenging adversary of his approach to mathematics. Here the method is to stay within the realm of intuited experience, where the mind can grasp the content of mathematical entities instead of attending only to vacuous and merely consistent forms. So rigidly against the formalistic approach is the direction of intuitionism that it even waives the principle of the excluded middle, alleging that it is too "meta-empirical." A principle may be three-valued: (*a*) true or (*b*) false or (*c*) indeterminate.

In principle, Russell rejects intuitionism. But his precise case against it has never been fully developed. In fact, he has said very little in his entire career in the way of justifying the inductive method which the empiriological attack upon the real so constantly and so successfully exploits. His stress is almost wholly on the deductive side of reasoning, on rules, forms, relations, and universals. He is Platonic in spirit, in fact, often in word, and certainly in his ultra-realism.

SOME CRITICAL REMARKS

Bertrand Russell records a tidal stage in contemporary philosophy. He is opposed to naturalism because he struggles after truth, lucidity, and consistency of form rather than the dynamic, valuational, and organic objectives of men like Dewey; he leaves Plato to his heaven instead of bringing him to earth. But it is not a Platonism like Santayana's that Russell proposes. He is interested in truth more than in beauty; in logic more than in aesthetics; in knowing more than in having, feeling, enjoying, and experiencing. So he even parts company with his erstwhile collaborator, Whitehead, who forsook logic for a cosmology of organism, feeling, and dynamism that puts him in the company of the naturalists.

The foregoing outline began with the logical atomism of Russell and ended with his logic. This division is in accord with his own patterns, for he writes that the two kinds of knowledge by acquaintance are the facts of sense data and the laws of logic. Atomism sifts the world of sense into events, and logic constructs them into a rigorous system.

Russell's general direction would ideally be the total deduction of experience by logical law, but in the framework of British empiricism, he has too much respect for fact to push his program

to a complete Platonism. His atomism comes to rest in a neutral world, the locus of the "givens" which logic constructs into the universe of knowledge. But logic turns self-conscious and when it questions its own privileges as a supreme science, Russell sweeps it through a hierarchy of languages and a theory of types. From logic also he derives the foundations of mathematics.

There are hints in Russell of a domain of reality beyond that studied by empiriological methods, but he is unable to reduce it with his favorite instruments of logic. Man's traffic with it takes place in terms not of scientific rigor but only of belief, and in the end, it is this element of belief that saves Russell from skepticism and gives his system whatever claims it has to being realistic.

In his own way, Russell is much more moderate than the analysts who follow in his wake and will be studied in the next chapter. Where empiriological physics alone would atomize the universe away, he curtails its scope to lay it at the service of higher categories like those of human belief or the continuance of civilization which, he believes, mere empiriological method puts in peril. Where his logical atomism would analyze thought away, Russell reins it back to begin the work of construction. He seems to discern the irreducible character of intension and extension, of material and formal implications. In a deep way, he is an intellectual pragmatist, choosing the easiest way to make thought fruitful but unwilling to abolish thought by following any one of his analyses to the very limit. Russell would deny that ultimates are meaningful, and so his philosophy seeks in the main an economy of thought and effort, using logical analysis and construction but willing to compromise where his logic would destroy what belief prompts him to retain.

Russell's whole scheme, wide in its scope and dense with technical detail, is much too vast for adequate evaluation in a single essay. Perhaps the most glaring of its extremisms is to allow the so-called scientific method to impersonate philosophy. In the more circumscribed field of the empiriological disciplines, Russell has said some weighty things that both account for his triumphs and point to the danger of allowing a system like his to become the repository of all that man can meaningfully say about his world. There is a place for Russell's view in the genuine philosophy that he rejects. But it is only a place, and the difficulty is in getting modern logic to stay there.

When the final estimate is put upon the value of empiriological disciplines – modern physics and chemistry and biology and the like – they will undoubtedly appear in the order of an art to control nature and, in this respect, will be shown as closely akin to the art of logic. Man has taken steps, as obviously he should, to achieve that control with greater ease and economy. That is why Ockham's razor is forever being wielded in empiriological methods.

Since, in the empiriological view, thought is a part of nature as modern physics intimates and as naturalism insists, the general aim of empiriological methods can be fruitfully furthered by controlling thought itself. This is where symbolic logic becomes so important. Considering only the inert and discursive and controllable aspects of thought, it gives man more leverage in exploiting nature by ignoring the eternal and unpliable verities which may be called, paraphrasing Goedel, "the uncontrollables."

In a world of quantity and inertia, symbolic logic works well. In the crude empiriological method of the common sense world, in the art of making mechanical things, and even in the arts of grammar and rhetoric and logic where man must still control a medium, symbolic logic is rich in possibilities. But it improves only the tools of empiriological methods, without touching – or by touching only indirectly – the truly intellectual insights and reasonings which concern "the uncontrollables."

Neutral monism fits logically into the ambition to control and exploit. What has a nature from within, and is hence not neutral but determined, resists man's efforts to manipulate it; its laws must be accepted rather than constructed and controlled. The principle of non-contradiction, for instance, is not neutral. It is neither made nor unmade by man and cannot be controlled in any fashion. As another example, man is a rational animal, and all the atomic power in the world cannot alter that fact. It could kill man, maim him, change his color or size or civilized status. But it would not make him incapable of reason, while he remains a man.

It is the pretensions of Russell's thought outside empiriological methods; it is its extension over all meaningful knowledge, that a realist must flatly reject. Enough has been said in the foregoing pages to show his sensism, his skepticism, and his solipsism if his thought is to be taken as a philosophy.

The mind of man is not aware of the individual atomic datum

as the starting point of its intellectual knowledge. It begins with a knowledge of being as immediately giving evidence of the principle of non-contradiction. Without the primacy of this idea of being and this first principle of being, no statement could ever be made at all. That we differentiate between things, as our judgments always show in their distinction of subject from predicate, indicates that we are in possession of the first principle and hence the first fact of being before all else in the intellectual order. Otherwise, we could not think relations involving *is* and *is not* nor express them in intelligible form. Rousseau said that man differed from the brute in terms of the little word *is*. The two copulas *is* and *is not* are separated by the distance of infinity, by the gap that stretches from being to nothing, and where being is understood with respect to nothing, being is understood in terms of itself, in brief is self-intelligible. Fact and evidence here join hands.

Initiating his philosophy in this way, man travels in a direction far different from the course that Russell has run. For he has begun not with an undecidable or a heterology but with being, beyond which there is nothing. In ontology he is not allowed to construct; he is bound to obey what he discovers. Reasoning from the first fact and the first principle, independent of his thought, man finds a hierarchy that is more than merely logical. It is a real one, running from the inertia of matter to the fullness of being who is God. In such a universe, there is no neutrality, no indifference, no continuity and constructionism and infinite series. Things are what they are, and the noblest of man's mental acts is not to construct but to recognize, not to search through the idle forms of logic in his own mind but to configure his thought to beings as they are in the firm world of ontology. Where things have being intrinsically and thus have intrinsic meaning also, the paradox loses its keenness. A principle, a fact, a being need not be clarified by reference to an axiom beyond it but may well carry its own inner clearness and light, its own evidence.

Whatever else might be criticized in Russell's world is really a matter of detail from here on. He is a forceful example of the modern confusion between mathematics and logic, which dates from Leibniz and even from Descartes. Logic is primarily the art and secondarily the science of reasoning; mathematics is the science of something real, and it is secondarily an art. Logic no more

belongs to mathematics than it belongs to physics or even metaphysics, and the relations in mathematical logic are annexes to mathematics rather than belonging to logic in its strict sense.

To think rationally, as Newman says, is really to think like Aristotle. Aristotelian logic, the natural reasoning of the human mind, serves to steer symbolic logic straight; it feeds it problems and principles, and goads its progress. If reasoning is but the combination of equations, there would be no progress in thought and nothing new in the conclusion that was not in the initial equations. That modern thought makes progress shows clearly that it does not think entirely in terms of the equations which it glorifies. It connects things but it does not treat them as equals. In this respect, it mounts through the logical hierarchy that a syllogism really is, in itself, and through the real hierarchy on which the syllogism draws for its material. Without hierarchies and in a purely equational world, not even symbolic logic would make progress. It is to the merit of Russell that he senses the need for hierarchy; but logical hierarchy is not enough.

Symbolic logic is an achievement of modern and indeed of nineteenth-century philosophy, and Russell has given it fresh impetus through his patient, analytic, and ingenious efforts. As an adjunct to man where he can dominate nature, symbolic logic stands on its own merits. But neither logic nor any other art can claim to be an ontology which does justice to experience and explains the world of things and of thoughts that experience reveals.

Russell is to be credited with many of the vast strides which this new logic has taken and with insights into the control of empiriological method where such a method wants in turn a better control over matter. But what is needed to complete it is not a meta-language or even a meta-logic but, in the genuine sense of the word, a metaphysic.

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CHAPTER 6 FROM LOGICALISM TO SEMANTICS

Bertrand Russell marks a tidal stage in the flow of contemporary thought. His philosophy, vigorously written and voluminous in form, has splashed over into other areas, stirring fresh currents in several fields and inviting the whole of philosophy to become mere logic. One of its earliest achievements was to round off logical positivism, and logical positivism in turn aided the forces already converging to produce semantics.

Logical positivism or, in a later term, logical empiricism stands as a rival to naturalism for acclaim in present-day America, and to it semantics is so closely allied that they form the opposite slopes of the same tidal wave. In its more or less official form, logical positivism began in Vienna where especially during the 1920's scholars in many fields had joined in a kind of seminar to discuss methodology and the interrelations of the various branches of learning. The direction of this group can be charted from the fact that the positivism of Ernst Mach and of Henri Poincaré was taken almost as a premise, and the problem became to see how far or how successfully such a premise could be extended. Among the early leaders of the Viennese Circle was Moritz Schlick, who was later murdered by a fanatic, and Philipp Frank and Hans Reichenbach, both now teaching in America.

A definite tone was given to the Viennese Circle by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his book *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922), written in the spirit of Russell and emphasizing in a rather novel way that philosophy's problems are those of language alone. With slight alterations, that same spirit is alive on the American scene in men like Rudolf Carnap and Charles Morris who are today equipping semantics to answer questions that older philosophies sought through ideas or at least sense images. Philosophy's office

becomes the statement of conditions that make a sentence true or, what really amounts to the same thing, philosophy must formulate sentences in such a way that they exactly express empiriological findings (semantics) and permit recombinations of sentences (syntax) whose results in turn can be tested with laboratory rigor. Logical positivism wants to construct a set of symbols that accord singly and in combination with the data measured by modern empiriological methods.

Meanwhile, C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, taking their rise from the field of communication and literary criticism, had written *The Meaning of Meaning* (1923), driving in independent fashion to the same broad conclusions that Morris was reaching in the late forties. Another important effort was *Science and Sanity* (1933), in which Count Alfred Korzybski brings semantics to bear upon problems of psychotherapy. More popularizing works are Stuart Chase's *The Tyranny of Words* and S. I. Hayakawa's *Language in Action.*

But the more solid versions of what now is accepted as semantics are Carnap's works, especially *Introduction to Semantics* and *Meaning and Necessity,* and Morris' works, *Foundations of the Theory of Signs* and *Signs, Language, and Behavior.* It requires only a glance at the periodical indices to note how fascinated the contemporary mind has become with the problem and meaning of words. When Locke and Hume got rid of universals, modern philosophy was condemned to nominalism in theory, and semantics reaches deliberately for a nominalism in practice.

POSITIVISM INVADES LOGIC

That Carnap and Morris are typical of contemporary semantics sets the whole subject squarely in the lineage of Russell and, to a great extent, of Wittgenstein, though it is heavily mortgaged to behaviorism as a later section will show. Claiming Russell as his guide, Wittgenstein regarded philosophy as the logical clarifying of thought and laid out its subject matter not as the real world but as the propositions yielded by the empiriological disciplines. Thus, philosophy does not produce propositions of its own. Directly, it has nothing to say about the world, and it is anything but an ontological science. It turns a purely logical analysis on the statements made by the empiriological disciplines like chemistry, biology,

and physics. Such studies as these have a universal charter for the study of fact. Philosophy becomes not a "doctrine" but an "activity."

Carnap and Schlick brought such notions as these into sharper focus. Schlick was greatly impressed by Wittgenstein's ideas, and Carnap later moved from Berlin to join the Viennese Circle and become one of its most prominent and prolific members. Through Carnap and Schlick, the new logical expressions toward which the Viennese positivism had been heading finally took a more or less permanent shape. Both of these men held "activity" in Wittgenstein's sense to be a method for testing sentences. Verifying a sentence came to be regarded as the naming of the conditions which make the sentence true. As the issue of their debates and especially through the strong language of Schlick, the real driving force of the group, the Viennese positivists came to the important agreement that "the meaning of a statement is its method of verification." Out of calculated respect for the modern premises which logical positivism carries forward, the method for verifying became that of modern physics, and the new school of thought has sometimes been called physicalism.

The test of meaning which the Viennese group, as a whole, agreed to accept is closely akin to the operationalism of P. W. Bridgman who writes in his *Logic of Modern Physics:* "In general, we mean by a concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations." The meaning of a statement is the empiriological rule for verifying it or the empirical operations by which it is tested.

Both logical positivism and operationalism agree in extending their canon of meaning not only throughout the physical disciplines but to the farthest corners of all knowledge. Problems that empiriological methods cannot handle, problems of a genuine metaphysics and ethics and philosophy of nature, are called "meaningless questions" by logical positivists; for Bridgman, they are "verbalisms." Such a dismissal of metaphysics can appeal to Russell's theory of types, which claims to measure off the area where a class or a proposition has meaning and belittles statements outside of it as the margin of nonsense. Brouwer said that propositions can be true, false, or indeterminate; in logical positivism, they are true or false or meaningless. For A. J. Ayer, a British descendant of

Wittgenstein, there are two types of meaningful statements: tautologies, like *A* is *A*, and deductions from "scientific" hypotheses.

To a realistic mind, preferring to let the facts speak rather than to apply an arbitrary limit to what they can say, logical positivism labors from the very start in an atmosphere heavy with prejudice against the metaphysical facts and principles implied by any kind of thinking. Naturalism is loaded likewise with the same bias, where, it was seen, whatever is not empiriologically warranted is called a "supernaturalism." The unfortunate part of this contemporary prejudice against genuine philosophy is that it is not an exception but something close to the average in America's learned thinking and writing.

THE LOGIC OF LANGUAGE

In the ambition to clarify propositions, logical positivism does not appeal so much to *what* these symbols represent as to their *how*. It is not so interested in reality as in rules and the rules of course are those of combination.

A delicate pivot has been reached in the outline of this new and positivistic spirit, where a critic must decide what it seeks to combine by its logical machinery. It is not thought in the sense of ideas, for to raise the problem of the nature of ideas is one of those meaningless questions. It is not Humean sense perceptions either, the raw material that Russell uses in his constructionism.

Though differing among themselves, the logical positivists or, in their maturer broadening, the logical empiricists take language as their datum. Their material for combination is not thought or sense experience so much as symbols, words, propositions, sentences. Though Wittgenstein is no longer the gospel he once was, logical empiricism still retains his counsel that philosophy works with the propositions which are the issue of empiriological research and that it questions the meaning of those propositions with the same kind of method that justified their enunciation in the laboratory. The metaphysician in the genuine pursuit of his vocation is interested in truth. But this new and logical obsession of modern philosophy is primarily after meaning.

Now the area where meaning is an issue is, primarily, most frequently, and by the common consent of men, the area of words. It is not proper to ask whether a word is true, but it is highly

proper to ask what a word means. To say "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is of interest to both the historian and the logician of language. The first is concerned with the facts or truth of the case; the second wants to know what the statement means. Logical empiricism is not busied about the truth of fact or even the truth of judgment, where the mind conforms itself to reality and sees things as they are. This whole region of truth, of fact, of reality, of knowing "what is the case" in the world of outer experience logical empiricism commits to modern physics. It wants primarily to clarify the language of the physicist by asking him what he means by his statements and requiring him to answer through the use of his own method.

So it is a safe conclusion to state that logical empiricism, wherever it is true to itself, takes words and sentences as its data. It goes from meaning to reality in its general spirit, goes indeed from mind to object and thus inverts the order of genuine ontology which makes truth the important thing and shows thought to take objective truth as its measure; the procession is thus from object to mind. This reversal of the realistic view of knowledge takes place under the cover of confusing meaning and truth. Instead of searching meaning through truth, logical positivism seeks truth through meaning. And the catastrophe of beginning philosophy with our words is as great as the Cartesian debacle of beginning philosophy with our thought.

Whatever else logical positivism may be after, it has evolved into a normative discipline, pursuing the rules for relating symbols among themselves and to objects, and cautious to assure the mind of a scientific attitude to the universe through a scientific system for combining its expressions. Russell laid heavy weight on language. But even more scrupulous in this regard is logical empiricism. Russell, a would-be realist, never forsakes his notion that philosophy, even when he identifies it with logic, can report on "the furniture of the world." But his self-styled descendants tend to make their philosophy entirely a logic of language. In fact Russell openly renounces the direction which logical empiricism claims to give his thought. He holds, he says, a greater respect for Hume and Berkeley, who both admitted extra-linguistic facts such as sense data in the first case and ideas in the second. The concern with language puts logical empiricism only a step from semantics,

and as the purely logical analysis in modern thought went on, semantics arose quite naturally to meet it.

Carnap entitled one of his earlier works *The Logical Construction of the World* and in it, by the swing of Ockham's razor, he reduced his undefined starting point for construction to a minimum of one concept, the remembered relation of similarity. Such an endeavor to systematize thought turned out, however, to be an over-simplifying of logic, and it required a number of *ad hoc* assumptions to bolster it. Carnap outgrew this stage of his thinking and turned his analysis upon syntax.

But here again he was apparently disappointed. Syntax, pure and simple, disregards the content of language and attends only to the laws of combination. It deals with sentence structure or the arrangement of words, and the primary facts about meaning really escape it. Russell stops his atomizing with events and even with sense data, and thereafter begins his positive construction. But syntax is only hollow form with no events, no matter, no atoms to sustain it. Though Carnap, more analytic than even an eventism would permit and more like Hilbert than like Russell, has always seemed to aspire, even in his latest works, to model his logic into a system of syntax, reality has always opposed him by its reminders of content that words and sentences represent. The pure syntax of thought has thus remained an unfulfilled ambition. Efforts to construct it have yielded semantics as a by-product.

Morris and Carnap divide their study of language into three parts. The over-all science of signs is called semiotic, which is a Lockean term coined from the Greek. Within this large area are: (1) pragmatics, the study of signs with reference to their user and evolving itself from psychology, ethnology, and sociology; (2) semantics, the study of signs in relation to their object, the designatum; and (3) syntax, the science of signs in their mutual interrelationships. Semantics, a word first used by the French thinker Michel Bréal (1897), is sometimes loosely used to cover the whole field of semiotic, and the same is true of another term, semasiology. In the course of the following remarks, terms will be used in the stricter sense which Carnap and Morris prefer in their threefold division.

CARNAP BECOMES A SEMANTICIST

In elaborating semantics, Carnap announces his fidelity to his older canon of verification, aiming not at intrinsic meaning but at the conditions which make a sentence true. The question is never really *what* things mean but *how* they do so.

In the ideal case, Carnap would hold, factual knowledge would not be needed to verify statements, but logical rules similar to those of syntax would carry the whole burden of meaning. Morris and Korzybski are not so optimistic in this respect; they both look more realistically to psychology for aid. But Carnap, preferring pure analysis, seeks at most to uncover the rules for applying a symbol to its *designatum*. Though warily leaving space for psychololgy to explore how the mind gets to initial data from the world of objects, Carnap is more fascinated, once these data are grasped, with logical deducibility and truth rules.

Thus a sentence is said to be L-determinate (L-true or L-false) when its truth or falsity can be established by logical rules only. Otherwise, there is only the truth of fact which is contingent in content and formulated into a synthetic *a priori* judgment, as Kant used the term. In both of Carnap's divisions, truth is identified with a set of rules that determine what a sentence means. The modern physicist, following Bridgman's counsel, would be expected to use all the rigor of operationalism in order to arrive at a factual proposition and when asked its meaning he would simply point to the rules or operations that make it hold. Examining such factual propositions, logic thus graduates into a system of semantical rules to relate statements to what they designate or a system of purely syntactical rules to relate statements among each other. It is the latter field that Carnap emphasizes.

At the summit of his system, Carnap would like to construct a complete set of "truth-tables," similar in form to a mathematical handbook. With such an array, given a statement S_1 known to be true or false, one could then look into a corresponding column to find if S_1 or S_n, other statements in the same language, are true or false. Thought is thus supposed to operate like a slide rule; language becomes a problem in engineering. Morris even suggests that thought is an engine.

In articulating his system, Carnap must invoke such terms as "false," "implicate," "equivalent," "disjunct," and other relational

words that fit one symbol to another. They are self-styled radical concepts which a given system must presuppose but cannot define by its own resources. So once again arises a problem not of discovering but of deciding; there is always the undefined margin, of what Goedel termed "the undecidables." Carnap eases out of the difficulty by an appeal to a meta-language which studies the initial language of a logic; and when meta-language is questioned and becomes heterological, a meta-meta-language is constructed. And so *ad infinitum*. Words become concrete realities by being poured into quotation marks and talked about as things.

Carnap would like to navigate toward semantics by using syntactical rules to plot his way. But in semantics, the emphasis is more on meaning where it makes reference to fact, and even Carnap intimates that syntax implies semantics and is subordinated to it. The conclusions of a syntactical logic are thus required to be adequate; this means that they must point to fact as the ultimate designatum. Carnap admits that his logic, however consistent as a deductive machine, must end its efforts by pointing to individuals that are not just structures within a verbal or mental system but are factually true and physically verifiable.

Since semantics is charged with relating a sign to its *designatum*, logic is really evolved and tested by its adequacy to something beyond itself. But when the verifying of the fact is more fully followed out in the approaches of Morris and Korzybski, the method they will apply will turn out to be also of a logical, positivistic, empiriological make. Pressed far enough, Morris and Korzybski thus would be compelled to verify fact or, better, to assign it meaning, by a resort to the very same procedure that Carnap uses to predict or deduce fact, and one or the other approach becomes superfluous. If there is a unified method for all disciplines, a dualism of method is automatically excluded. There is no dualism in pure formal logic, and in a world where in the ideal case content would be reduced to sheer forms, there is no dualism at all. On the platform of logical empiricism, it is difficult to see how semantics can be differentiated from syntax, and it is not surprising that one always tends to intrude upon a discussion devoted to the other.

Syntax is admittedly more formal than semantics. A body of rules for combining and arranging words, it is often believed to dispense with reference to a *designatum* or content which calls logic back

from its purely formal labor by ever challenging its adequacy. As an analogue to his L-system (where statements are L-true or L-false), Carnap lays out a syntactical scheme, called the C-system, which ideally is wholly an affair of rules since the words or sentences within it may be chosen at will.

Unlike the semantical logic, syntactical logic is not yoked by the radical concepts which required a meta-language to define them. Still, there are certain primitive terms like "sentence," "direct C-implicate," and "directly C-false" so that even a syntactical system within its own gates runs up against enemies to its purity and completeness.

But how are syntax and semantics to be related? Obviously, semantics has a priority of some sort, just as the world compels man to advert to the reality of electric current before measuring its laws of combination. So too semantical rules and requirements must always be met in practice by the C-systems, but pure syntax provides a model of what semantical logic should struggle to be. The ideal is to bring semantics and syntax into a complete parallel.

David Rynin, who shares the general spirit of logical empiricism, argues against the tendencies to model semantics on syntax. Meaning, he says in effect, is always prior to formulation and dictates the rules for a formal system. Semantics thus takes precedence over syntax.

THE CRUCIAL PROBLEM: INTENSION

Carnap could not tread the ground he has covered without meeting what is perhaps the chief issue in modern logic, the relation of intension to extension. Intension or comprehension is the content of an idea or a term and corresponds to what Aristotle would call the metaphysical or direct universal. Extension refers to the range of objects in which that content, considered alone, can apply, and so it is called the logical or reflex universal. Modern logic is almost wholly extensional, and when Carnap proposes, in *Meaning and Necessity,* to frame an intensional logic, he seems at first sight to be swimming against the whole current of modern formalism. But what does he mean by *intension* and *extension?*

Two signs or terms, he begins, have the same extension if they are factually equivalent and the same intension if they are L-equivalent. Tearing words from their usual senses, Carnap would

take the extension of a sentence to be its truth value: Scott is human. Such is actually and factually the case, and so the historian or the psychologist or whoever is interested in the humanity of Scott is concerned with the extension of sentences.

Intension, on the other hand, lies embedded in a sentence taken as a proposition: "Scott is human." The reference is not to matter but to form. Considered intensionally, a sentence is verified by semantic rules, while from the extensional viewpoint, the knowledge of such rules is not enough and the issue is one of empirical fact.

Carnap's view like Lewis' does violence to the conventional meaning of intension and extension and confuses, more than it clarifies, by giving new nominal definitions to old and accepted words. Though intension belongs to logic, it likewise crosses over into the factual or ontological order according to the time-honored account of the comprehension of terms. On the other hand, extension is properly the logical universal rather than the ontological one. Carnap has switched these meanings into reverse. He makes extension more an experienced matter which induction examines, while turning intension into a logical entity primarily patterned out of rules.

Words may be ambiguous, and if there is one thing that logical positivism is after it is the removal of ambiguity. It began indeed under the patronage of Wittgenstein who regarded philosophy as a clarification. It aims to construct an entirely univocal language and logic. It would make thought as mechanical as a typewriter.

To Carnap then it is a scandal when a purely mechanical view of thinking can be turned in such a way that a term does not have the same extension as intension. Given a term in ordinary or in logical language, how are we to know whether to take it in an intensional or an extensional sense? That man is a featherless biped is an extensional statement; that man is a rational animal is an intensional one. How are we to know what meaning to bring to mind on hearing the term *man*? And how are we going to get intension and extension together?

In general, intension for Carnap tends to convey the extension of a term, which may then be empirically checked. Intension is always of a property, while extension is of a class. But this only restates the ambiguity which any term involves; it does not erase it.

Carnap therefore comes to the rescue of thought with a proposal to construct a neutral language by using a suitable meta-language to formulate his definitions. In the neutral system, a single term stands for both intension and extension and averts what is viewed as the customary ambiguity occasioned by the double reference of the ordinary sign. Ernest Nagel, evaluating this endeavor of Carnap, rightly points out that intension and extension come back to life in the meta-language which so maneuvers them in the object language that they can be neutralized into a logical, as opposed to factual, equivalence. Nagel rightly asks what has been gained in economy since the distinction that is abolished in an object language is reinstated by multiplying entities elsewhere.

However, there is something to be said for Carnap's ambition if not for his actual accomplishment. Ambiguity can be conquered only by the identity of intension and extension, but logic is not the conquering hero in this regard. In genuine metaphysics, intension and extension are identified in the reality of being. But real being is not for logic to study. It is not a genus, a category, a property, a logical predicate. Since anything that is is being, the intension of being is the same as its extension, or more exactly, being simply does not have these properties.

To say that being is does not allow for error or ambiguity but states the simple fact that Carnap tries to reach by the use of Ockham's razor. But Carnap never reaches the simple goal he is seeking since he must complicate a meta-language to simplify language and then, if his neutral language is to be truly universal, turn its simpler structure backward upon the complex machinery which its production has required. There is another point too. If a term had the same intension as extension, how could it be linked to other terms since it would stand ineffably like a demonstrative pronoun, resisting all comparison? Or again, unless extension and intension are preserved in their usual sense, where they are not the same but exactly inverse to each other, an ultra-realism must result like that in the middle ages where logic was identified with ontology. For all one knows, Carnap might prefer a nominalism or an ultra-realism in order to retain at any cost his identity of philosophy and logic. But if a nominalist or ultra-realist position in philosophy can be refuted, there must be something seriously wrong about any view of logic which requires them.

Carnap, working in the broader spirit of Russell and in closer attachment to Wittgenstein, comes only indirectly to a view of the world. His chief stock in trade is syntax, and he tends to take his stand on the nature of the world only as this is developed out of syntactical minima. The resulting ontological cavities of Carnap's system are filled by Charles Morris and to a certain extent by Alfred Korzybski, who are both concerned with the semantic problem though often bridging over to what is technically termed pragmatics.

CHARLES MORRRIS' BEHAVIORISM

Logic is not the only tributary to contemporary semantics. Of equal moment is the psychology of reflexes which arose with the experimental work of Pavlov (b. 1849) in Russia and was elaborated independently by John B. Watson (b. 1878) who popularized it in this country under the name of behaviorism. In this view, man's actions are all taken to the bundles of automatic responses, where a stimulus impinging upon the body sets off a mechanical arc that goes through a sensory nerve, to the spinal cord or brain, and back through a motor nerve to release an appropriate reaction.

What is central about the reflex arc is its wholly mechanical character. The same stimulation, repeated over and over, causes a habit in the responses we make to it. We groove our reflexes, like the ruts which a wagon deepens in the field each time it travels the same route. Such a grooving is called a stimulus-response bond (an S-R bond) by Edward Thorndyke (b. 1874), a prime mover of reflex psychology in American education.

The atomism which modern physics applies to matter and which Russell applied to thought is turned here upon the very nature of human personality. Psychology is studied as physiology and physiology as physics. Under the auspices of evolutionary biology, it has become customary to view man as a more complicated network of the same kind of atomic reflexes bundled to form lower animals. Reflex psychology seeks to transfer its studies on animal reflexes to the learning process at the human level. In the "white rat theory" of man, as John Wild puts it, when a laboratory rat works his way out of a maze, its methods are supposed to guide pedagogy in the psychology of human learning.

Pavlov's experiment with a dog is the classic example for

illustrating reflex psychology. Over a period of time, a bell is sounded just before the animal is fed, and after the repeated association has been made between the sound and the feeding, the bell is rung this time without putting food before the animal. The dog is then examined and, apparently at the sound of the bell alone, is found to be secreting saliva with no food before it. Such a reaction is called a conditioned reflex by contrast to the unconditioned or adequate stimulus occurring when the food is also present. Morris has a similar dog in his discussions, which is trained to appropriate response by means of a buzzer.

All of this is considered a buttress for Hume and his Associationism, where mere repeated sequences prevail in mental life and with the occurrence of one phenomenon the percipient is led to expect the one usually following it. Man is viewed as a package of automatic mechanisms touched off independently of each other when the right button is pushed by the environment. There is no unity left to man, no totality about his actions, no freedom to dominate himself, no responsibility, no essential difference from the "white rat."

Pavlov's views have been taken as a triumph for mechanism in biology where, it is said, one force acts on another to produce a purely automatic click. His work fitted neatly into the Darwinian preferences of modern thought and is still being hailed by dialectical materialism in its studies of learning and persuasion. It joined the cell theory in anatomy to favor a purely atomistic view of life. In the form given to it by Watson, behaviorism had an early influence on John Dewey and has generally been of wide range in American educational theories. Finally, it provides semantics with the fuel for its logical engines.

The Ogden and Richards book, Morris, Korzybski, and Hayakawa are all drenched with behaviorism or reflex psychology, though Richards has since modified his earlier views. A word is like any other stimulus, and when we hear it, the image of an object surges somehow into the purely organic complex that is mind, like the reference to food at the sound of a bell.

Ogden and Richards exemplify the reflex by the striking of a match; on seeing the process often enough, man is led to expect the lighting of the match after he rubs it on the sandpaper. Korzybski instances the hay-fever patient who sneezes when

a flower is brought into the room and discovers later that the flower is artificial; his response is labeled automatic. Responding to signs in all of these systems is a pure mechanistic affair. The rubbing of the match is a sign of the lighting, and the flower of a hay-fever stimulus. Hayakawa speaks not of the psychology of knowledge but of "neurology." Morris claims to sink his foundations in "a biological basis." Korzybski wants to make knowledge out of "electro-colloidal" phenomena.

In a more precise sense, Morris defines a sign in terms of a disposition to respond. Even in the absence of a stimulus-object like the food, the buzzer initiates a measured disposition toward the object and is called a sign. In a kindred way, a word is the sign of a thing, disposing a man to behave as though the original thing confronted him and in that sense engendering an incipient response. Alexander Bain (d. 1893) defined belief as "that on which a man is prepared to act." Russell suggests a similar description of knowledge in terms of "acting appropriately." If *A* evokes the same tendency to act that *B* does, then *A* is the sign of *B*. So knowledge in behaviorism is a surge of mechanical energy which the physiologist can measure; knowledge is a nervous activity, like weeping or the twitch of a muscle. A word, just like a bell or a match, is entirely a physical thing, as mechanical as a ball bearing. In a purely physical view of man, a dispositive or preparatory stimulus which is a sign is no different from the more overt action produced when the adequate stimulus, the thing, the food, the signified object, is present. A word is a little thinner than the object; but it is of the same physico-chemical dimensions.

A combination of signs, as in a sentence, is called an ascriptor in Morris' rather erudite vocabulary. There are four types of these: designative, appraisive, prescriptive, and formative ascriptors. These rather typical illustrations of semantics can be sketched by a recital of the five "modes" of signification.

1. An identifior is a sign that refers the percipient to a definite location in space without describing what is in the space in the form of content. When a child is searching for her doll, her mother would use an identifior by merely pointing to the place where the doll is with an appropriate gesture or with a word like "There!"

2. A designator indicates the characteristics of a thing but says

nothing about location. "Green," "typewriter," "doll"—all would be members of this group. As the predicates of propositions, these signs would form designative ascriptors.

3. Appraisors and their ascriptors involve value attitudes and set their objects against a preferential scale. "Good," "cowardly," and "worst" would be examples of this class of signs since they presuppose value standards and indicate a preference for one object over another.

4. Prescriptors are imperatives, commanding ourselves or others to a course of action like "No smoking!" signs in a filling station.

5. Formators include all connective words like "or," "if," "and," and "therefore." Relating signs to each other within sentences, they prevail upon the individual to modify his behavior according to the way they qualify other signs. One must allow for alternatives, for instance, if a sentence is disjunctive; if the sentence is hypothetical, one must be disposed for conditionality.

Such are the five modes of signifying and—since the first two modes are alike in being declarative—it is easy to see that there are four ascriptors. It was argued already that instead of going from thing to words, from object to thought, and from objective truth to judgment, semantics tends to reverse the procedure by attempting to move from meaning and mind to the world. If this is true, Morris must search out distinct objects in experience corresponding to the cases of each type of ascriptor. He must embrace an ultra-realism which is a revenge of ontology on minds that confuse it with logic.

As the objects of all five modes, Morris discerns distinctive properties of situations and lists them respectively as *locata, discriminata, valuata, obligata,* and *formata.* They groove the mechanisms in the mind like buzzers conditioning a hungry dog, and in the absence of a hierarchy in being or knowledge, they have equal, separate, and physical status in existence. In Aristotle, of course, an identity, its character, its value or goodness in itself, and the obligations it necessitates upon man are the same being outside the mind. The unity, truth, and goodness of a thing are the thing itself regarded in different lights by the mind and not, as they would be in Morris' scheme, divided into three different compartments.

If the world is so atomized that each mode of judgment bears upon an isolated character in reality, Platonic ultra-realism is

renewed. There is no common ground for unifying experience, bringing *discriminata,* for example, into both a living and a logical communion with *obligata* or *valuata.* Where the universe is leveled, as in Morris' extreme formalism, even *formata* win the same rank in existence as *locata.*

On Morris' premises, it is difficult to argue why all objects should not be experienced as *designata,* pictorially thought and algebraically described. The cleavage of fact, value, obligation, and logical forms, whatever it may otherwise be, cannot be detected by mechanical instruments. Things are what they are in the sense world. If man transcends this world of direct experience to judge what ought to be, he is viewing by his intellect relations that are not given like buzzers or bells but beckon him teleologically onward toward a destiny that is not yet fulfilled. "Ought" and "is" are not side by side but structured into a hierarchy, untouched and untouchable by mechanism.

Morris distinguishes among the adequacy, truth, and reliability of signs. When it attains its purpose, a sign is said to be adequate. If it is informative, it must convince; if it is valuative, it must be effective; if it is incitive, it must persuade; and if it is systemic, it must be correct. The functions of signs are thus divided according to the four kinds of ascriptors, and the measurement of adequacy must take account of the purpose which the ascriptor is presumed to serve.

An ascriptor which denotes its object is called true; otherwise it is false. And here again an ascriptor must be judged by the object, *locatum, valuatum,* etc., which it is intended to denote. A sign is a pointer, and if the object is really where the finger points, the sign is true. Even Richards, though he has scrapped much of his earlier thought, retains a similar view in literary criticism; the final test of meaning must be something that can be pointed to.

The reliability of a sign is the statistical average of its success as a denoting guide. For instance, if the buzzer sounded ten times and the food were presented only nine times to the dog, the sign would be 90 per cent reliable. The suggestion that the reliability of signs can be measured is regarded as a triumph for the Morris theory.

Moreover, by setting against the fourfold division of ascriptors

the four functions which a sign may have in connection with its adequacy, Morris tabulates a complete inventory of the universe of discourse, reducing it to sixteen principal subdivisions ranging from "science" with its designative-informative character to metaphysics which is called formative-systemic. The end result is that "science" patrols the world that is, and metaphysics, shorn of its rights to study the real, is a merely logical synthesis ranking in the last analysis "with logic, rhetoric, and grammatic."

Watson defined thought as a subvocal speech, and Morris in the discussion of "post-language symbols" is ready to go along with this view. Thought, at any rate, shares the fate of words by being reduced to mechanical symbolisms. Thought is talking to one's self. Man is an engine, and semiotic is the engineering of his language. Thought's course through the arc that our reflexes have grooved for it is really the workings of "behavior upon behavior."

In spite of all the biological underpinning of his semiotic, Morris acknowledges that "man is characteristically the linguistic animal." In this connection, it ought to be said that if man parts company from the animal by being linguistic, then it is certainly not good method to study language, his differences from the brute, only by what he shares with the brute, the biological.

Signs, Language, and Behavior has not been well received in the circles where one would expect its appeal to be greatest. The reason has not been that it is behavioristic or over-formal but that it has not submitted itself enough to that potent economizer of the modern logician which is Ockham's razor. It has been deemed top heavy with undefined terms. It has too many "undecidables."

Morris views semiotic as the means of unifying the sciences and, when pressed to clear up his heterologies and put his principles on a rigorous basis, he would hold that his aims are self-justifying "to those who have the scientific enterprise at heart." But those who would govern themselves by their head rather than their heart would not look favorably on this self-defense.

Morris envisions semiotic on a practical level also, holding it up for the bettering of individual and social life generally and for the advancement of psychotherapy. Better understanding between men becomes a matter of gearing our reflexes into a smoother and suppler state. For as Chase and Hayakawa maintain, disagreements are quarrels over words.

In *The Open Self*, a more recent work, there is evidence that Morris is thinking himself away from the narrow and impractical confines of his earlier doctrine on signs. He seems faintly aware in this later thinking that a self which is open and growing and pliable cannot be explained by mechanical pushes and pulls and that semantics gives only a partial picture of the vast and deep reality which is man. But *The Open Self* will not solve the problems which apparently bother Morris. It simply transfers his quest from the verbal and logical orders to a field that is more naturalistic.

THE APPROACH OF KORZYBSKI

The element of psychotherapy is emphasized by Alfred Korzybski (d. 1950) in a large pedantic book, *Science and Sanity*. In a manner much like that of naturalism, Korzybski aims chiefly to set forward the clock of human life and to bring society and culture up to date. While "science" has advanced, man has not, the story goes; on the contrary, he has relied on Aristotle's language (which was misnamed logic) in a day when the Aristotelian account of the universe no longer holds. Even Newton has been dethroned by the new and non-Euclidian mechanics of the relativity and quantum theories, and if psychology is to be truly scientific, Korzybski urges it to take these physical systems for its model.

But what is this new universe of modern man? Russell pictured it as a monism of events, and logical positivists, withdrawing logic into linguistics, exempt themselves from describing it except perhaps in Carnap's hazy term that an object is a "descriptum." Korzybski's account is that the basic fact of the universe is "structure."

This looks like an evasion at first sight, as though we are simply told that the universe is a universe after all. Korzybski, therefore, goes on to define his basic stuff as "a complex of ordered and interrelated parts."

Now if there is anywhere that a clear-cut and unevasive language should be expected, it is in semantics, where the chief interest is the meaning of words and an important aim is the removal of ambiguity. A sober analysis of *Science and Sanity* reveals, however, that "order" and "relation" are listed among the undefined terms which plague all symbolic logicians and are given the polite but not very rigid treatment as "undecidables." In the second place

"parts," which occurs in Korzybski's definition, would have to be itself redefined in terms of structure again. That leaves only "complex" which is not a very satisfying definition of anything, not to mention the universe.

Korzybski's general idea, however, can be gathered by other and unsemantical means. His cosmology is an imitation both of quantum mechanics in its account of the world through tiny wave-particles and of relativity mechanics which reports on the universe as the non-Euclidian configurations of an all-embracing field, uniting matter and energy.

Somewhat at variance with logical positivism, Korzybski would say that Aristotle's mistake was to limn out a cosmology by starting from language and that the new and non-Aristotelian logic must settle first upon the structure of the world and mold its language accordingly. The word *is* would be legislated out of existence in the new algebra of thought. Korzybski finds it only a source of error and confusion. Aristotle met a similar grudge against the logical copula and records that thinkers, "like Lycophron, were led to omit 'is,' others to change the mode of expression and say 'the man has been whitened' instead of 'is white' . . . ."

But in spite of his option for modern physics, Korzybski declines at first sight to follow along with its atomism and prefers instead a non-atomistic, "non-elementalistic" language. The *non-el* system, as he calls it, might thus seem a return to Aristotle. But it is not as distant from atomism as the word would indicate. The whole psychological undersoil of Korzybski's views is really a form of behaviorism. In this respect, he is in general agreement with the more common approach to semantics which he regards as simply another lane on the superhighway he would build for men. By deflating the proposition and emphasizing the term taken in itself, Korzybski is even more atomistic than the semantics descending from Russell. His system is as "elementalistic" as any behaviorism must be.

The reason for emphasizing the term grows out of Korzybski's intentions which differ from those of other semanticists. He is not so much interested in truth as in value, not so much in abstract logic as in experience organically significant. For this purpose, a term is more concrete and a proposition abstract. A term provokes an organic reaction but a proposition is more of a logical structure.

Korzybski, somewhat like Morris, very much like Dewey, and certainly like Freud and Marxians to be studied later, has a message for men. He regards himself as a new messiah, who can right the mind of man, cure his evils, conquer his errors, settle his quarrels, and adjust him to the world in which he lives. Korzybski points his work to a theory of evaluation rooted in the "electro-colloidal action and reaction of the nervous system." He is bent upon getting man into stride with the latest paces of empiriological physics. By loosening his reflexes and reforming them about the broader bones of relativity and quantum physics, man is presumed to become not the slave of words but the master of himself, uninhibited, free, and sure of his ground.

The failure of man to overtake his modern empiriological advances Korzybski ascribes to our tendency to "copy" animals in our nervous processes. He is willing to concede that man and animal are not twins, though he sees the difference as one of degree only, one of complexity. Animals go only over a limited range in their ability to organize; they cannot reach the altitude which man attains by "abstraction."

What Carnap does by inverting the meaning of intension and extension, Korzybski does to the term "abstraction." He can illustrate the whole process by the diagram of a machine, where "abstraction" turns out to be a mechanical sorting like the separating of cream and milk in a centrifuge. In the usual meaning of abstraction, man attends to a fewer number of characters than his senses present to him; he disengages what is essential and relinquishes incidental detail. But in Korzybski, abstraction means the seeing of more detail than the animal does, a counting of more stars, the atomizing of the material world, the reading of a finer print in the nature of things. Man can thus construct wider categories for a higher and more complicated organization of his universe.

Korzybski depicts "abstraction" in terms of a "structural differential," where the world is put through sieves of various sizes and classified into mechanical categories. Hayakawa adapts this notion of a "differential" into an "abstraction ladder." All the steps on the ladder are cut from the same wood; there is no real difference of abstractive orders and in fact no abstraction at all but simply a question of more or less detail in the sense world which the mind

attends. Both Korzybski and Hayakawa would accept Hume's analysis that ideas are "faint" sense impressions.

Because of this higher organizing power, man is urged to cease his imitation of animals and come into his own as the child of his empiriological disciplines. Attention to the details and to the differences among things has enabled modern physics presumably to explode the older generalizations of men and to provide new categories of things and of thoughts. Man is cautioned to rebel against the language forms which insist on generalizing his knowledge when a closer attention to individual detail would disqualify generalizations and make human thinking more realistic, organically valuable, and scientifically adjusted.

Perhaps the chief caution that Korzybski proposes is the urge for delayed action in responding to stimuli. The world he pictures is a plural one, so different from point to point in space and in time that nothing is ever twice the same. Common sense, he would hold, does not advert to detail and is inclined to identify two things, like two cows or the same cow at different times, overlooking diversities which are more distinctive of reality than likenesses. So instead of rushing out to identify the typewriter at home with the typewriter in the office as common sense does, the intelligent man will withhold such a spontaneous impulse, delay his action, weigh circumstances, and finally make a considered response which allows for differences in the outer world and guards the mind against error.

Parenthetically it should be remarked that there is a great deal of truth in Korzybski's caution even though it rests on flimsy premises. Of course man ought to weigh and consider alternatives. That, after all, is the seal of his humanity. Hesitation, rather than a blind plunging into the world, is roughly a synonym for self-possession which in turn is a sign of personality. But the denial of identities in the world is a denial of mental activity as well. Thought could not work, it could not grasp things, it could not compare them unless there were stabilities in the real world and likenesses that permit of comparison. Only on such premises is it possible to fulfill Korzybski's counsel to hesitate and delay and consider.

For Korzybski, man is a "time-binding" animal, capable of beginning his work not from the zero level but from the point to

which the preceding generation had advanced. This temporal endowment is a bulwark of human progress and ranks man above the animal kingdom. That the onward march has been slowed is traced again to the barrier of Aristotelian logic and Aristotelian language. Hedged in by this survival from antiquity, lives have been wrecked, values have floundered, integration has been lost, and psychoneuroses have developed. Empiriological disciplines, like modern physics have thus been squandered by men, and Korzybski, holding out the promise of semantics to men, envisions his self-styled "discoveries" as a new dawn.

Thus far, nothing has been said about "emotive" as opposed to "referential" meaning, one of the earliest problems that challenged semantics. From the days of the Ogden and Richards book, semantics has felt equal to the purely factual or algebraic statement, but its confidence has been shaken in the face of expressions like poetry and drama—and, in general, wherever there is stress on the emotive tone which every statement involves if man is a true unit.

Morris' discussions and divisions, especially his prescriptors and appraisors, were designed to plug up the loopholes in the earlier semantics, but the cost of setting up distinctive objects like *obligata* and *valuata,* separate from *designata,* is a high and Platonic price to pay for the solution. In a more recent symposium on emotive meaning, Richards definitely retires from his earlier semantic position and casts his vote against the reflex theory.

But while Richards was moving out of his semantic approach to the emotions, another author, C. L. Stevenson, was moving in to apply semantics not only to emotive meaning but to ethical valuations. In his *Ethics and Language* (1944), Stevenson espouses semantics not so much to solve the problem of ethical valuations but to prevent the problem of emotive meaning from being over-simplified. There is a rich insight into this decision to make semantics not a positive doctrine but a criticism, an aid in defining terms, classifying thought, clarifying meanings. But criticism presupposes a positive standard, and Stevenson's, if it is positive at all in the last analysis, is hardly adequate.

The emotions are often presented in positivism as enemies that the technical mind must conquer in the struggle toward Pure Science. Stevenson correctly insists that they have their rights and

even their meanings. A sign—a disposition to respond—will lead to knowledge if it has "descriptive meaning" and to emotional excitement if it has "emotive meaning." "Electron" is in the first category of signs; "Hurrah!" is in the second; and it should also be pointed out that "Fire!" is a good example of how both meanings are combined.

"Emotive meaning" enters into questions of ethics, where man is to be "persuaded" to a course of conduct. Emotional signs are "persuasive" ones; they are in fact peculiarly contagious like the expressions "Hurrah!" and even "Fire!" In this way, emotional signs are considered promising to do for ethics what descriptive signs can do for physics and chemistry. Such at least is the ultimate direction which Stevenson seems to be taking.

The problem of emotive meaning, the problem of value and obligation, is still wide open. As long as confusion prevails about where values exist (in the mind or in the real or in both), about whether ethics is descriptive or normative, and above all about the nature of man with his body and soul, his senses and his intellect, his reason and his will, the answer to the value-problem is not likely to get much further than the current tendency to deny that values, ethics, religion, and other such sanities can really be meaningfully discussed. Naturalism fares no better. Where logical empiricism would like to reduce the good to the true, naturalism seems interested in considering the true to be only the good.

SOME CRITICAL REMARKS

Semantics has been shown to be an historical offspring of logical positivism which was joined along its path by reflexology. Taking its cue from Mach and Poincaré and stimulated by Russell, Schlick and Wittgenstein and Carnap advanced to the thesis that philosophy is only logic, clarifying propositions of the empiriological disciplines with no parliamentary voice of its own in the real world. In quest of its goals, logical positivism laid down the law that the meaning of a statement is its method of verification and thus turned logic into a description of rules for testing the meaning of propositions.

Semiotic was elaborated by Carnap and Morris to complete the formalism to which logic is fated when taken alone, and they were joined in their study of language by Ogden and the earlier Rich-

ards, by Korzybski, Hayakawa, and Chase. Semantics relates a sign to its designatum, yielding the rules for signifying and denoting.

Semiotic has a logical aspect where the rules are patterned on syntax with a view to predicting the extension of signs through a purely formal system. Here signs are combined like things, so that the combination in the symbolic world can be tested at any time of interest for their correspondence with the fact which empiriological laboratories can measure. Linguistic as a theory of meaning and logical as a study of combination in symbols, semantics finally has a psychological dimension, where the relation between object and sign is direct rather than reasoned, syntactical, discursive, and formal only. In this ambit, semantics draws heavily upon behaviorism.

Logical positivism has fatal weaknesses. Its view of philosophy was roundly criticized by the late L. S. Stebbing when she wrote that a proposition cannot be clarified on purely logical grounds. One cannot clarify his thought, she went on, unless he thinks about what he was thinking about. It is only by reference to an object, rethought or retested outside the mind, that the meaning of a proposition can be made clearer. That puts philosophy back into the real world, from where Wittgenstein had banished it, and if it is to be a true critic, clarifying the propositions of physics, then it must take a definite stand of its own in this ontological order or else just repeat what the physicist reports. Above all, it must set up and defend the norm for deciding on what is clear and what is not and on when something is clearer than it was.

Miss Stebbing also pointed out the solipsism of the Wittgenstein school, whose emphasis on logic forces man to begin his philosophy not, for example, with the perception of a table but with the perception of the experience of a table. Once a beginning is made with subjective impressions, the thought in Descartes, the forms in Kant, the ideas in Berkeley, sensa in Russell, language in logical empiricism, there is no escaping from skepticism and solipsism.

The canon of meaning can also be challenged since it can only be meaningful if it submits to a test like that it enjoins on any other meaningful statement. The truly rigid mind, to paraphrase Joad, is reduced to the dismal circle of verifying verifications or, in Bridgman's framework, operating on operations. Regarding the principle of economy, Rulon S. Wells has shown that not mention-

ing an entity in a system does not mean the absence of this entity in implied form.

It is, however, a merit of logical positivism to insist on clear definitions. It should remind every philosopher to be as clear and precise as the depth at which he is working will allow. Terms should be defined before usage. But clarity is a matter of degree. What is clear to the expert may not be clear to the layman. A certain vagueness, Miss Stebbing has shown, is a merit of language, enabling a word to be applied to more than one object. But the vaguest of ideas has a measure of clarity; otherwise it would not be definite enough to be recognized. What is vague in itself, like matter, may be clear to man, and what is clear in itself, like God, may be vague to him. But vague knowledge is not ignorance, and logical positivism fails to honor this middle ground between perfect insight and perfect error.

Though the critical spirit of logical positivism has much to commend it, it goes to a fatal extreme when it abruptly rules out all knowledge that cannot be experimentally tested and, in the insistence on clarity, fails to advert to the obscurity of its own foundations. The theory of types which it uses to examine itself, though valid in its proper place, has become a convenient way of dignifying a vicious circle and making it palatable to human intelligence. Logical positivism ought to be more logical—also more positive. Positive value it certainly has in its proper place. Thus I. M. Bochenski and Ivo Thomas, contemporary disciples of Aristotle in European philosophy, have found the new logic surprisingly fruitful in helping to classify philosophical ideas and to illustrate philosophical principles. But the new logical techniques provide only aids, suggestions, illustrations for philosophy. They do not take its place.

It is also to the credit of logical positivism that it sets empiriological method apart from "the uncontrollables" so that its destiny can be furthered, to dominate what man is capable of mastering. But unless modern physics is subjected at last to a metaphysics, logical empiricism becomes a meaningless thing, floating on the heterologies of the undefined.

Semantics can likewise be assimilated for what truth is concealed in it. Like symbolic logic, it gives the empiriological mind more of a hold on things by treating them as transeunt or inert. It isolates

in man only what can be approximated by measurement, and what is measurable can be controlled. That semantics will aid grammarians, be suggestive to literary critics, assist the psychiatrist in his clinic, enable him to construct better testing facilities, and help the historian of languages in his intricate research—all of this is possible and probable. But to look upon semiotic as a means of unifying all the sciences is to turn all of them into machines. Semantics can at most be the devil's advocate, questioning the various sciences but unable to understand their answers which are in ontology while they are logic.

From the negative angle, there is devastating evidence against semantics in its secret hopes to enclose the whole field of meaning within its own boundaries. Even syntactical forms, in the concrete, apart from the criticism that they are equations rather than judgments, are only as valid as the material channeled into them, and in this psychological dimension where mind meets object, the Morris-Korzybski approach must face a storm of difficulties. Though Morris cites recent behaviorists, Hull and Tolman, it is an historical fact that reflex psychology has been on the way out in the clinic. In fact, its decline was already in progress at the time of the first edition of *The Meaning of Meaning*. The clinical psychology of today has moved a long distance from the physiological approach of Watson and Thorndyke. It is more holistic, emphasizing not atomisms but totalities. It appeals more to the will of a patient instead of measuring his nervous reactions; it is not so much neurological as psychological, although admitting the use of reflexes to test for symptoms. Semantics befriended a psychology that was slowly edging its way from the clinic and the classroom, while semantics was charging in.

Kurt Goldstein, in his book, *The Organism* (1939), marshals his experience as a psychopathologist into an incisive attack on reflexology. His positive theme is that psychology must consider the total man in a total situation rather than dissect him into reflexes and his world into atomic stimuli. Goldstein argues the case that there is no such thing as a reflex, except perhaps in disease where the organism loses its centering and thus its integration. (Technically, he describes this as dedifferentiation.) Conditioned "reflexes" never develop spontaneously in animals, it is stated, but only under the discipline of human trainers; when

the training ceases, the reflexes vanish being no longer meaningful for the organism as a whole. What behaviorists call "reflexes" are, it is argued, always reactions in artificial circumstances when certain portions of the organism are isolated from their larger contexts and when the "reflexive" response thus has no meaning which is natural and total.

What are ordinarily termed "reflexes," Goldstein goes on, are not mechanical but vary according to the total condition of the organism. A rabbit, dropped from any position, will not plummet down in blind obedience to the law of gravity. From no matter what angle it may be released, it will tend to turn and to land on its feet. In man, the so-called Babinski reflex is the extension of the toes when the sole of the foot is stroked; it indicates a lesion in the spinal cord. But if the total situation of the patient is appropriately altered, the reaction may be reversed as the organism, a whole, seeks to adapt itself to its changed environment. All such data and the many more which Goldstein describes in technical detail run counter to the direction of behaviorism and behavioristic semantics. They argue more toward Aristotle.

Philosophically speaking, the semanticists miscarry the nature of a sign. They imagine that thinking can be made as mechanical as getting gum out of a penny machine. A sign or a word is that which represents something other than itself to the thinking mind, and like mind, it is vital and immanent in its ultimate reference. In the physical order, a word spoken is but a sound, obeying the laws of acoustics just like a clap of thunder or the whistle of a train. But the mind thinks into it more than its physical dimensions. It remains what it is, a mere sound, but at the same time, it is something more, the bearer of meaning at the service of man.

How a thing can remain itself and at the same time know or be known is beyond empiriological methods with their atomism that would separate the two levels. As an analogue to this intentional action of thought on thing, there is the character of a word or sign. Here again, where a thing is itself and from another angle something more, the secret to the real facts escape the empiriological method.

In an example taken from Aristotle, a picture, which is a good instance of a sign, has a twofold character. It is a picture, and it is a likeness. And to refute modern atomism, one might subjoin the

reminder that there is no partitive phenomenon here, where part of the painting would be a picture and part a likeness. The whole picture is both a thing and a likeness, and this is the typical character of a sign. There is a single reality that has two natures, and the apprehending mind, unable to split them into atoms of *designatum* and *valuatum* and the like, thinks both of them at the same time.

Louis Lachance provides a stimulating background for the unity and diversity which signification involves. He interprets language in the light of Aristotle's insights into matter and form. In the above example, the picture, in the physical world, would be an analogue to matter, and the likeness would correspond to form if Lachance's proposal is carried out. Both matter and form, distinct in themselves, are identified in the composite which they constitute by their union. It is such a framework of hierarchy, rather than atomism and sensism, that corresponds to the facts about language, and it is the facts, after all, which must be honored above easy theories and alleged economies in the order of human logic.

And yet without that identity, a word could never get together with its meaning nor could the mind join up with things. A word or a sign, according to the foregoing definition, has two aspects: it is; and at the same time it is representative.

Finally, unless the doctrine of signs be ultimately grounded where fact and evidence, being and truth, reality and law are inseparably one, all meanings become extrinsic, unable to penetrate to the heart of things whose pulse they convey to the thinking mind. Unless a thing is known intrinsically it simply is not known at all. And if everything is known extrinsically, nothing is known.

Words are not ultimates, and they are not the sources of all man's misunderstandings and his neuroses. They are molded by thought and changed when thought changes, as it sees new corners of reality. In depicting a tense moment or in hearing a gripping story, man is not aware of words. It is only the specialist who usually has to struggle for them; and here too, he is concerned only with their adequacy to represent what lies outside of them. A play on words is still the lowest form of humor, and words, when too great heed is paid to them for their own sakes, tend to make for self-consciousness and often for artificial minds. Brooks Atkinson is right when he points out the fallacy of training writers

by working on their words; they should, he says, be taught to live more intimately the things they treat, and words will follow naturally like light from the sun.

In disagreements over issues, reference is made not to words but to the objects giving sense to them. Symbols are vacuous in themselves. The best way to teach the meaning of a word is to give examples from the extra-linguistic regions of experience. Words are vehicles, but the thought or thing that rides them is of a loftier rank.

Semiotic, like the logic which mothered it, is engaged in the throes of reducing the number of its undefined terms. But because this reduction can never be complete, the process is endless, and the entire structure of semantics, like the sciences which bow to its direction, is fated to settle forever on a basis that is undecidable and hence unmeaning. It is not likely that man, whom Aristotle aptly pictures as desirous of knowing all things, will long rest content in the belief that his hopes must float upon a dark and unfathomable sea that forever lies outside of meaningful study. For man is reasonable. As Locke wrote, God did not make man a two-legged animal and then leave it to Aristotle to make him rational.

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CHAPTER 7 FREUD'S ANALYSIS OF MAN

Horace plucked a deep chord when he wrote, "I am a man, and nothing human is unappealing to my mind." Despite the dazzling triumphs of modern methods on the purely material world, the primary cosmic interest of men spirals inward on themselves. Man, writes Heidegger, is a being who can question his being, seeking to unfold the secrets of thought, the mystery of freedom, and the questions of human origins and goals.

Naturalism seeks to integrate man in a socio-biological framework; it is largely an ethical system. Semantics wants to anchor man's knowledge. One's own death has become an intriguing subject for the existentialists, and the ultimate social goal of man is an organizing principle of dialectical materialism.

Scientism is aware that its aim of reducing the whole of reality to empiriological categories must stand its final trial by answering the question: what is man? Man is the highest peak of visible creation, unique in the possession of thought and of freedom and in the evidence that his destiny is not fulfilled by his present mode of existence. There are many profound questions hidden in the problem of man. Horace, when he wrote of his humanism, was certainly singing an anthem of thought and research.

Psychoanalysis got its start as an approach to the problem of mental disease, but like the rest of reflection, it swelled into a complete outlook on man. Today it stands not only as a method but, for Freudians at least, as a philosophy, proposing ultimate viewpoints in sociology, ethnology, ethics, art, and even religion. In many ways, it is a social craze that enters, like politics and the weather, into polite parlor conversation. Literature has borrowed from psychoanalysis for character, motive, and plot. The surrealism of Dali, with its grotesque colors and shapes, is supposedly a picture of the Freudian "unconscious."

Like so many of the other thinkers treated in these pages, Sigmund Freud, the father of psychoanalysis, was born in the era of Darwin whose *Origin of Species* reached print in 1859. Freud's birth in Moravia on May 6, 1856, antedated this event, but his subsequent philosophy caught up with it. At four, his family moved to Vienna which Freud was later to make the capital of psychoanalysis. A book on nature by Goethe, a philosopher as well as a poet, inspired Freud to study medicine, but after completing his studies, he renounced practice to do clinical research in neurology. He crossed paths with a famed neurologist, Joseph Breuer. Among other things, Breuer recounted to Freud a case of hysteria that he had cured by hypnotizing his patient and inducing her to relive her earlier experiences and to re-express her past feelings about these older events that paraded again before her. A year later, Freud, at 26, was in Paris studying hysteria and hypnosis under Jean-Marie Charcot, one of the greatest neurologists of the century. He also studied with Bernheim, the founder of a new school of neurology at Nancy, France.

The greatest influence on Freud was Breuer. From Breuer's techniques in dealing with hysteria, Freud evolved his therapy of "free association" which was to become the matrix of his whole later doctrine. According to free associationism, a patient with a mental disease is urged to disclose all his thoughts and images as they come to mind so that an analyst can piece together a map of forgotten experiences which are causing the neurosis. By 1895, psychoanalysis had been fully born, and within a decade a whole school of psychoanalysis had arisen with headquarters at Vienna. In 1908, the First International Congress of Psychoanalysis convened, continuing as a biennial event thereafter. Freud's popularity spread throughout the world.

Freud lectured in America and throughout Europe. He has been widely read and often quoted and quoted even when he has not been read. His influence remains powerful even after his death which occurred on September 23, 1939, in London where, as a Jew, he had fled in 1938 to escape the Nazi aftermath of the Austrian *Anschluss*. Typical works of Freud are: *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, The Interpretation of Dreams,* and *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex.*

FREUDIAN ANALYSIS, A STUDY OF MEMORY

Memory has been a favorite theme for empiriological psychology ever since its birth less than a century ago. It is after all the only one of our cognitive powers that directly refers to the time element, and it is almost a truism that the empiriological disciplines traffic only in time and space, halting whenever these elements are absent. From one aspect, Freudianism is nothing but an inflated theory of memory, in which the accent falls not so much on what we remember as on what and why we forget. In the end, Freudianism finds that nothing is really forgotten but lives on in a vast dormitory below consciousness, awaiting some sort of recall. But this nonconscious past is not really asleep. Like Dewey and Whitehead, Freud was a dynamist, and he viewed the complex of forgotten impressions as in constant tension behind the blinds which consciousness draws over them. They constantly tug at the active conscious life of the individual for release and re-expression.

This region of latent impressions Freud called the "unconscious." It was the storehouse that theory seemed to require in pursuing Breuer's famous case of the hysteria-ridden girl whose past, Freud believed, was somewhere living on within her and causing her distress.

On this view, the unconscious is not really all that its name implies. True enough, it is beyond the vision of the conscious present, but it somehow warps our conscious life, affecting even its normal attitudes and producing of course its extremisms of disease. In the Freudian theory of memory, all experience, when it is forgotten, really enters the unconscious to survive and, there, attempts to explode its way back to consciousness. There is a constant build-up of these hidden impressions since we forget much more than we consciously retain. In fact, the growth of the unconscious ranges beyond one's personal life and into the lives of one's parents and their ancestors and through the whole evolutionary past. Man inherits what the past has accumulated and adds to it in his own individual life.

In the normal course of things, the career of consciousness is triumphant over the dark, unconscious forces that seek to emerge from their repression into the daylight. Freud accounts for this

victory by his theory of the "censor" which beats down the unpleasant past and is especially on guard against the emergence of states contrary to social ethics. Unaware of society's codes, the infant does not at first evolve a censor. But he cannot consciously remember all of his experience, and so a portion of it, indeed the greater part of it, is *suppressed.* As he grows in mind and body, society in the form of his parents clamps down on his urges, and he is taught to pattern them into a social conformism. It is here that *repression* comes into play and becomes more and more powerful as the growing individual becomes more and more aware of social ethics.

Freud does not do justice at all to the social nature of man, as embedded in his very make-up and as a part of his full personality. This strain of thought appeared in Alfred Adler when he broke with Freud and founded his school of "individual psychology." For Freud, the individual is more to be atomized in himself rather than related normally and naturally to a society organized for the common good. In Freudianism, society is not a requirement of nature but more of a convention in the Rousseauean sense; in its recognized form, it is more of a handicap than a help to the nature that Freud ascribes to man. It stifles man's natural expressions. The censor stands at the doorway to the unconscious, beating back what nature would dictate but society would forbid.

The power of the censor keeps the peace in social appearance but it aggravates the unconscious to put the individual at constant war within himself. When defeated by the censor, the unconscious struggles all the harder to express itself, and the censor in turn must struggle all the more to keep its upper hand. Where man must both satisfy nature and conform to social canons, the tension within him ever mounts.

But the underground is tricky. When the latent states of the unconscious mind cannot emerge under their own identities, they disguise themselves and work their way to the surface in symbolic form. Masked, they get past the censor into conscious life, coloring all our actions and our attitudes with a symbolic attachment to the unconscious mind. Freud never draws a hard line between the world of symbols and what they symbolize. In practice, every expression of man becomes symbolic, and when it is asked what is being symbolized the answer fades off into foggy theory. But a

fuller probing of this point requires reference to the doctrine of evolution which is central in Freudian philosophy.

EVOLUTION AND SYMBOLISM

Haeckel in the last century coined a maxim: "Ontogeny is a recapitulation of phylogeny." This is a rather concise phrasing of the belief that in embryonic development, say that of man, an (ontogenic) individual beginning as a one-celled animal goes through all the stages that led up to man in historical (phylogenetic) evolution, having at one time gill slits like fishes and at another hair like the lower animals. Though this maxim has been abandoned by the latest biology, it made a great appeal to Freud and takes an important place in his theory of psychoanalysis. He held, for instance, that a man is in constant evolution from conception until death and that, moreover, the full story of his present psychic states goes back not only to pre-natal life but to the life of his parents and of their forbears in the evolved world of animals, back indeed as far as the simplest organisms which began the evolutionary march from merely mineral resources.

In such an account of life's origins, heavy stress is put on instincts which Freud viewed as "drives." Where Pavlov and Watson viewed man as a bundle of reflexes, Freud saw him as a packet of drives. An instinct is not only unlearned; it is unconscious, at least in origin. For Freud, it is, moreover, essentially a dynamic thing, ever operating in either overt fashion or below the threshold of consciousness. It is not just the weapon of animals for survival and success in the attainment of organic needs. It is the fundamental unit of all psychic life. Hunger and thirst, thought and will, love and sex—all are basically an affair of instinct, so that the drive is to Freudianism what the reflex is to the behaviorists.

A drive need not be conscious like the thirst for water. At its origin, in the embryo of man or in the dim past of his animal ancestry, it is unconscious and unrepressed. Consciousness derives from the unconscious, like man evolving from matter. It is the product of evolution, and, moreover, as it develops in a given human individual, it climbs in the psychological order through the same evolutionary stairway that was mounted by lower forms which reached their climax in the *homo sapiens*. Hence, the emergence

of consciousness in individual human life, which began in a one-celled animal status, recapitulates the steps leading up to consciousness in the evolution of the human species as a whole. Freud gave a psychological twist to the maxim from evolutionary biology.

The product of the evolving unconscious, which is conscious life, turns out to be almost an accident. Nature, originally unconscious, develops an offspring that turns against it and dominates it as an effect greater than its cause. The ultimate stuff of man is thus the complex of unconscious drives which have evolved into the human species and which repeat their evolutionary pattern in each individual man. Freudian psychoanalysis is drenched through and through by evolution; without this gospel, as Rudolf Allers has shown, Freudianism would be radically changed.

Semantics was seen to involve a hollow formalism, and to a great extent, this is also true of Freud's philosophy. Symbolism is its stock in trade. It is not simply that occasional drives, masked to evade society's reprimands, break through the ramparts of the censor. Freudian psychoanalysis, a psychology without a soul, may have by-passed the truly *psychic* nature of man, but it is thoroughly *analytic,* turning this atomism on symbols. Thus, the whole of conscious life becomes symbolic of urges from the unconscious, and this unconscious network in man is again symbolic of the animal drives on the evolutionary scaffolding below him. The real stuff of man is the unconscious; consciousness is only the locus of symbolisms. The unconscious in turn is symbolic of man's earlier evolutionary history. So true Freudianism must regard consciousness as peopled by symbols of symbols, and the regression goes indefinitely back through the lowliest of organisms. Nothing in man is ever truly what it seems. The conscious side of man that is usually regarded as the mark of his dignity and self-possession and personality is always make-believe. It is always a camouflage of merely animal inheritances, and the Freudian psychoanalyst sets out in his clinic to unscramble its code.

On Freudian premises, it is extremely difficult to mark off the dividing line between the unconscious and the conscious. Consciousness is something degenerate, a misfit into an otherwise evolving world, an anti-natural climax to evolution that yokes nature with a censor for its urges. A product of blind evolutionary

drives, why does it suddenly become symbolic instead of merely continuing the blind discharge of unconscious energies at their own level?

Parenthetically, it ought also to be remarked that it is empirically very difficult, either in somatic medicine or in psychiatry, to reach an adequate definition of normal health. Outside of the statistical method, it is customary to define normalcy in terms of persistent adequacy to meet the demands of the surrounding world. But in Freud's view, where consciousness is the play of symbolisms and disguises, man seems always trying to cover up. He always seems abnormal. Where society is hostile rather than helpful to human development, man could face it best by getting rid of consciousness altogether and returning to his birthplace in the animal and even vegetative and mineral worlds. Bergson may have been paraphrasing the idea of self-possession when he defined consciousness as a sort of hesitation, a word that is also advanced by Whitehead. Consciousness implies a kind of withdrawal into self, not a blind plunging into the stream of experience. If consciousness implies a hesitation, then it is always a selectivity, a censorship, a repression. Every conscious man would be its victim. Everyone would be abnormal.

THE UNCONSCIOUS AS A MATRIX

From the unconscious drives, two types of derivative instincts emerge, one directed toward the ego, the other toward objects. How this development takes place is an interesting chapter in Freudianism.

Evolution results in "layers," encasing one another, beginning in the misty evolutionary past and continuing through the personal history of the individual before being passed on to his descendants. Thus, one experience overlays another in what Allers, an incisive critic of Freud, likens to the rock strata studied in geology. In the Freudian philosophy of memory, where nothing is ever lost, experiences are piled on one another in the unconscious as each moment passes. From the mosaic that results, the ego- and object-instincts take their rise, the one embellishing the individual and the other relating him to his world.

Genuine philosophy would of course agree that there is something like a censor in every man; it defines moral conscience and

sets it into a whole moral economy with God and not social conventions as the ultimate norm for its dictates. But the Freudian censor has no such spiritual nature or divine basis. It is born of the same flesh as the instincts which it regiments, being in itself nothing but a bundle of drives that relate man to his environment. It is a complex of object-instincts and like the rest of man's nature grows ultimately from the unconscious.

Regarding the ego, Freudianism makes capital of the pleasure-principle, namely, that the basic urge in man is to orient his life to the maximum amount of pleasure. But after a while, Freudianism says, man is overtaken by the reality-principle; he is forced to curb his hedonism and to shape his life according to society's prevailing codes. The reality-principle is not a new and different drive; it is only the pleasure-principle in disguise since the satisfaction of man hinges also on the social impressions that he makes in life and turns even a hedonist at heart into a law-abiding and respectable citizen for his own good.

Freudianism so emphasizes the importance of sex in the life of man that it has been charged with being a pan-sexualism. Though not all instincts are of a sexual nature in this new tide of philosophy, there is such an acute accent upon the subject that hardly any other theme of comparable importance is mentioned. Tracing out the origins of the ego- and object-instincts, Freud finds that the fundamental drives are Eros and the urge to destruction, the tendency to death. In the Freudian vocabulary, sex is taken in a sense very much wider than in ordinary speech, and in the account of human evolution and individual growth, erotic urges are given a far-reaching role. Another name for Eros, Freud says, is *libido,* a word that has passed from the clinic into common currency.

Similar to whatever other drives there may be in man, the libido is essentially dynamic and is constantly pressuring for expression. This is true no less of adults than of infants, and Freud was willing to rank the libido alongside repression in the explaining of neuroses. The often-cited Oedipus complex is a term of Freudian vintage; it means the attraction of a child to the parent of the opposite sex. It is the libido that keeps the censor busy and, in disguise, really dominates the conscious life of man. In work and in play; in the projecting of ambitions and their fulfillment; in culture, art, and

even in religion, the libido provides both blueprints and the energy to follow them out.

Practically all of Freud's studies have been made on the abnormal, and even his closest approach to the study of normalcy brings this out; he entitles one of his books *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. Here, Freud proposed to psychoanalyze misspellings, slips of the tongue, the vagaries of absent-mindedness, and other trivialities, pushing them back to their sources in the libido.

An error in reading, for instance, arises from a repressed impulse according to Freud. The word actually on the paper is similar to the word associated with a repressed urge, and the urge grasps at the occasion to force its way out into expressed form. Everyone has had the experience of trying to remember the name of a person, a place, a book, and of finding himself unable to do so on the spur of the moment, though he knows that the memory of the given object will later come to him. In Freudian psychoanalysis, such hesitation would be extremely significant, showing a certain repugnance or repression that might yield a clue to a whole host of tensions in the unconscious.

All of this psychopathology in apparently normal life shows once anew how hard it is in Freudianism to deny that all of us are mentally sick. In a subsequent chapter, Sartre will be quoted as saying that we are what we are not. Since Freud puts a mask about every man, this same contradiction would be his doctrine as well. Though holding that there is no hard and fast frontier between the normal and the abnormal, Freud is not justified in discussing normalcy at all since there is nothing empirical that corresponds to it and since he himself, as a man, must be driven by the very same instincts that he examines. It can certainly be urged against Freudianism that it must set up the libido to examine the libido since both patient and analyst are of the same fabric.

Dreams have always been of interest to men, and it has often been said that they are able to forecast the future. Today psychology knows differently, finding in dreams not so much a plan of the future as a footprint of the past. Freud has written a book on dreams, and he gives to the subject a prominent role both in the theory and practice of psychoanalysis.

The censor is born from the clash of the individual against society, and its function is to repress those urges which would be at variance with recognized social practice. It is an ally of consciousness and is especially vigilant during the conscious moments of the day. But at night it relaxes. Past the sleeping sentry, the unconscious is able to push its repressed impulses, expressing them in the form of dreams.

It is not said that dreams directly embody the repressions that lurk in the unconscious mind. Even in dreams, the repressions are still disguised and symbolic. Yet in some way or other, they represent the unconscious forces that the censor has been able to conquer during conscious life. Dreams are thus defined by Freud as "wish-fulfillments." They take weird forms. They are vague and elusive. Often they have but a remote contact with remembered experience when they are examined the next morning. Yet the very things that they combine are deemed significant, and it is the work of the psychoanalysis to trace their rich symbolism to deeper sources.

"The dream has a meaning," Freud was fond of saying. But why is it that so often the meaning is incomprehensible? Much of this mystery in the meaning of a dream is attributed to the censor who inhabits the day-world and does not grasp the language of the dark, unconscious night. Besides all this, the full unraveling of a dream would be embarrassing or unpleasant, and the censor pragmatically avoids such a process. Even without the censor, symbolization makes the unconscious world so complicated that the skill of an expert must be enlisted to divine a dream.

The Freudian psychiatrist is always concerned about the dreams of his patient. Through their dim and flickering light, he can move into the unconscious and otherwise censored libido, tracing out the causes of neuroses and, by simply enlightening his patient, bringing about a cure. "Free associationism" was an early doctrine of Freud, suggested by his knowledge of Breuer's therapy in cases of hysteria. In fact, the whole idea of associationism is a typically modern one, an extension of the psychology which David Hume pushed destructively forward when he denied efficient causality and pointed to the habit of associating merely temporal sequences as the origin of the notion of a cause.

PSYCHOANALYTIC THERAPY

The first aim in a Freudian analysis is to persuade the patient to lay bare all of his thoughts and images in whatever order or nature they come to him. The order is important. Since "causes" are nothing but associations, what occurs together in a complex of psychic states is causally significant; it provides the psychiatrist with an access to the sources of a mental disorder. As the patient proceeds with his story, the psychoanalyst is ever alerted to detect "causal" connections, the pattern which associations take.

Studying the mind through "free associationism" can be made possible by the simple and straightforward revelation of the patient. But it is difficult for a patient to speak without holding back. Even in the clinic, the censor stands guard over repressed urges and throws up a barrier of resistance against them. The psychoanalyst must somehow break down the barrier. When he fails in a diagnosis, he can always blame the censor which resisted his questioning. Especially in Freudian analysis, the full unburdening of a problem often takes time. When the censor has not been outmaneuvered by the analyst but holds the line of its resistance, the patient must return later in the hope that the next time the censor may be more relaxed, allowing symptoms from the unconscious to creep by it.

The definition of a dream as the escape of symbols past the sleeping censor makes it a ready tool for analysis through "free associationism." Besides disclosing what is presently in his mind, a patient is especially advised to give a full account of his dreams with all of their fine print that he can remember. The psychoanalyst scans them for clues that will break the code of the unconscious.

But even in the report of dreams, what is remembered and what is expressed must both get by the censor, and a species of "resistance" is once more encountered. Once more the analyst must use his art not only to search through the symbolism expressed, remembering that it is in some way censored before it reaches his ears, but he must also try to outwit the censor, resisting his efforts and keeping perhaps the deepest symbolisms almost completely hidden. If man is an atomism of drives which have piled experience layer upon layer, then he should talk on indefinitely in the clinic, Freudianism holds, and any apology that his mind is a blank or

that he cannot remember is taken as a sure sign that the censor is blue-penciling his report.

In therapy, psychoanalysis attempts to bring about a release of tensions. By being shown the causes of his disease and the way they have expressed their symbolisms in his conscious life, the patient is frequently "cured" through the psychoanalysis. Freud speaks of the "economy" of psychic life, meaning here that inner "energies" tend to congregate into complexes but that the "mental apparatus" seeks to prevent this. It would prefer to scatter the "energies" through the whole of man rather than concentrate them toward a single task or in this or that complex. According to Freud, "Mind seeks to keep as low as possible the total amout of excitation to which it is subject." There is an economy on the part of mind, the use of Ockham's razor in the psychological order. By keeping down excitations which arise when his efforts are concentrated, man can live with greater ease and lesser strain. Again, there is an emphasis on the pleasure-principle, since a life that idolizes the maximum of ease is the same as a life that is dedicated only to pleasure. In Freudianism, psychotherapy must thus involve a scattering of the "energies" which have become annucleated into a complex and have disturbed the balance of a man. Where "energies" are scattered, there is a greater suppleness in coming to terms with environment.

It is often not enough that a patient tell his story and hear the deciphering of his symbolisms. In Freudianism, "transference" often assumes a capital role. Here, the psychoanalyst persuades the patient to make him the reincarnation of his older and now revived experiences. Freud writes:

> The characteristic of transference is that it substitutes the physician for a figure of the past. To put it another way: a whole series of psychological experiences are revived, not as belonging to the past, but as applying to the person of the physician at the present moment.

Transference may be positive when it is friendly to the psychoanalyst and negative when it opposes him. It includes not only the expression of images but more dynamically the venting of the emotions. In this way, the patient reveals and expresses his hidden urges.

With typical Freudian flavor, the most important element in transference is the libido as expressed in its disguised form. The whole process involves much more than a simple confession of the past. It is a reincarnation and reliving of it, where the analyst ceases to be a mere adviser and becomes a substitute for a past object. Transference is, of course, only a methodological device and not a permanent state of things. At the end of a psychoanalysis, even the transference must be analyzed away as a simple trick to restore the patient to a full and frank facing of reality, with an awareness of his symbolisms and disguises.

Everyone's life has its turning points, though at the times they occur one is unaware of the full meaning that they will assume throughout the future. Freudians acknowledge such crossroads, but in a philosophy where consciousness is almost a defect, the crises take the form of shocks or "psychic traumata" that, once experienced in their unpleasantry, are covered over by succeeding layers in psychic life. In analyzing mental disease, Freudians are chiefly interested in isolating the forgotten shock, the trauma in the past that has formed the dominant mental outlook of the patient in his present troubles; they want to drag out the traumatic event from its hidden recesses in the unconscious and to bring it forth for reliving and then for explaining away.

Freudians speak often of "guilt complexes," bringing psychoanalysis from its original field of investigation into the moral order but dealing with the guilt in non-moral and purely psychological terms. Ethics, of course, is deemed a matter of custom only. The true science of man is psychology and nothing else. In the Freudian theory of "sublimation," the entire ethical and to a great extent the aesthetic life of man is derived from symbolisms of the unconscious.

THE THEORY OF SUBLIMATION

Sublimation, as an idea or as a term, was not originated by Freud. He simply extended its meanings and made it into a complete theory of society, religion, and even art. Sublimation is the replacing of one aim by another and higher one, in the ordinary meaning of the term. When a woman loses her husband, she may sublimate her grief by taking a trip to Europe. The process is truly, in Freud's own words, one "of replacement or diverting of interests."

Freud does not maintain that the whole of man's higher psychic life is simply a diverting of sexual interests and urges, but he accords a prominent place to such elements in accounting for art and religion. Both result from instincts since Freud recognizes nothing else at the roots of psychic life. But he seems to imply that art, even if not religion, need not be simply a structure of the libido. The prime mover is the unconscious which is supposedly a broader reality than the libido though in practice it is hard to find a distinction.

Roland Dalbiez has rightly pointed out that in Freud's theory of sublimation the higher activities derive from lower instincts, thus violating the principle of causality. Such a charge can be made on a much wider scale and against the whole Freudian notion of evolution.

Art is a sublimation of man's lower nature, and in both the production and appreciation of it, the libido is at work, even if it is not the only agency. With a Viennese background, Freud showed deep sympathy for art and seemed to regard it as the one field of human endeavor which could not be fully psychoanalyzed. But in view of the doctrine that the unconscious is the matrix of outer expression, this lofty idea of art can hardly be at home in the rest of Freudianism.

Freud is much more severe on religion. He views it as a neurosis, and like the rest of mental diseases, its origin is traced to the libido which is sublimated in religious rites. When Freud was at his peak in popularity, interest was also high in both ethnology and sociology to study the mentalities of primitive peoples. Freud borrowed from such research and capitalized on the interest in it. He reached a view that religion is a form of totemism and morality a species of taboo. So Freudianism rounds out its character as a complete philosophy. It has an ultimate view on man in terms of an evolving unconscious; on society as a matter of social contract, artificial rather than natural in character; and on morality and religion as sublimations of lower instincts.

THE FREUDIAN MAN

But what about the end of man?

Evolutionists are usually optimistic, though there are exceptions as in the case of Edward von Hartmann. In fact, the theory of

Darwin was regarded as a triumphant sign of the inevitability of progress which had come to be a widely adopted belief in the nineteenth century. Though Freud straddled the issue of progress, he saw a death instinct in man and in his later view ranged this instinct side by side with the libido. He argued to the death-tendency by the same evolutionary premises which lie at the heart of his thinking. He held not only that one form of life descended from another but that the whole organic world evolved from the inorganic. The instinct for death is but the expression of this ultimate origin of man and his tendency to return to it.

But the instinct for self-preservation is not thereby abolished. This instinct, Freud argued, is directed only against accidental death that would impede man's natural and normal return to an inorganic resting place that was his old home. The preservative instinct thus works to safeguard the instinct for death, allowing it to run its course unhampered. As a conservative and hence "self-possessing" drive in man, the death instinct is the true mark of an ego. It is a synonym for the ego-instinct in the final formulation of Freud's thought.

Freud is at one with the naturalists. Nature is man's mother, and death is the long voyage home. Meanwhile, though the individual perishes, his work lives on in his offspring, making sex the principle of life and the instrument of fertility and of human progress.

Freud's most polished account of psychic life is of great interest and once again takes its rise from the "layer" theory of evolutionary development. He speaks of psychological "topology." There are three strata which the topology reveals: the *id,* the *ego,* and the *super-ego.*

Of these, the first is of supreme importance and acts as the material for the other layers. The *id* is a complex of all the primeval instincts of man. It is animal and sexual in nature. It is material. It is unconscious. And when later layers are wrapped around it, it is the locus of repressed urges. The *id* is inherited from animal parentage. It is another way of saying the libido and is obedient to the pleasure-principle. Freud calls it a "reservoir of instinctive impulses."

The ego develops out of the *id.* Continuing his "layer" theory, Freud finds in the ego a "superficial portion of the *id.*" The ego

is a creature of inherited instincts but it is also modified by the external world. As such, it is conscious and capable of reviving those portions of the past which the censor does not repulse into the unconscious. Unlike the *id* from which it sprang, the ego no longer obeys the pleasure-principle, pure and simple; it bows before the reality-principle which is the pleasure-principle in disguise.

The reference to the conscious ego as a "superficial portion of the *id*" shows again that the distinction between the conscious and the unconscious is not sharp and clear cut. The conscious is simply the unconscious in a peculiarly symbolic form. The difference between matter and life and mind is only "superficial."

The super-ego is still a further evolution of the *id* and the master of its own causes. It is the locus of moral ideals and, as such, takes its bearing on society's ethics and conventions. In this layer, the censor get its armament and here too sublimations are projected to form morality and religion. Fundamentally, the super-ego, like the *id*, is not really conscious. Though repressing his urges, man is not conscious of the censorship which goes on behind the scenes of his personality. The conscious ego dwells between the *id* and the super-ego; it is the theater of their conflicts, though the actors are always masked and unidentified.

Inhibitions are the chief accomplishments of the super-ego. What is consciously held back and thus is subject to voluntary recall and revelation is really a part of the ego and not of the super-ego. Like the famous bridge of sighs in Venice where condemned men caught a brief glimpse of their city while walking between enclosed buildings, the ego is a strange interlude of light between two unconscious "layers" where one urges man to pleasure and the other constrains him by the facts of social reality.

In concluding the outline of Freudianism, it should be remarked that there are several types of psychoanalyses. Alfred Adler parted company with Freud in declaring that sexual instincts are not the ultimate fabric of human personality. He founded a school much more salutary in character called "individual psychology." Here, the basic force in man is "the will to power," the tendency to seek authority and influence; it is challenged by another urge, "the will to community." Reflecting on the will to power, an idea stemming from Nietzsche, Adler

introduced into psychology the notion of an inferiority complex which supposedly develops in men when confronted by problems to which they are not adequate. With Adler's concepts, it is possible to give a fruitful definition of normalcy, motive, adequacy, symbolism, and complexes.

Jung, another Freudian psychologist, likewise bolted from the strict school that his master organized at Vienna. Jung's system attempts to reconcile the views of Adler and of Freud, dividing psychological types as extroverts or introverts. The extrovert is the Freudian man, tending to sentiment and sexuality. The introvert is the Adler type, focused on superior goals and on spiritual realities. But neither of these types is found in a pure state, Jung holds. In the concrete, man is a mixture of the two, though one complex may gain ascendancy over the other. The Jung approach has been lauded for attending to man as both flesh and spirit, engaged in what St. Paul called the "war of members."

Jung and Adler admit the unconscious, and they advocate the study of it through psychoanalysis. They differ from their master, Freud, in turning away from his almost total attention to the libido.

SOME CRITICAL REMARKS

Freud's philosophy may be summarized as an attempt to swim the stream of evolution in reverse, analyzing man into a creature of animal instincts that emerge from the unconscious to take a symbolic and disguised form in his conscious life. Urges that violate accepted social standards in ethics are repressed into the unconscious by a censor, which the super-ego, the complex of moral and religious ideals, keeps at its beck and call. The most important drives in the unconscious *id* are of a sexual nature, but there is also the death instinct innate in every living thing.

Neuroses are treated by studying repressions through the method of "free association." They are caused by sexual drives, and their cure is aided by the method of transference. But conscious life is shot full of symbolisms; the psychoanalyst must get behind the symbols to what is symbolized, and if he goes along far enough in his analysis, he must go back through the whole evolutionary process that is completed by man as a species and as an individual.

Finally, sublimation is a symbolic fruit of the unconscious, and

its loftiest achievements are morality and religion. The *id* is the matrix of all conscious life and also of the super-ego.

Freudian philosophy may be picturesquely characterized in the title of Allers' book, *The Successful Error*. Psychiatrist as well as philosopher, Allers challenges Freudianism to produce a single clinical case which without question could not have been cured by non-Freudian techniques. Newton's laws were believed unassailable in the nineteenth century, and yet today Einstein has sold empiriological physics a completely different bill of goods that makes Newton only partially correct. That Freudian psychiatry claims to cure neuroses and that its undoubted errors have apparently been successful does not put its whole theory in the area of settled fact.

Emile Coué, a French psychiatrist who borrowed much but by no means all of Freudian techniques, showed cures of neuroses through auto-suggestion. The cures claimed by the Freudians may be largely the outcome of suggestion induced in a patient rather than a proof that man is only the animal which Freud pictures. Axel Munthe, though he dealt chiefly in somatic medicine, records the experience of many a doctor when he writes in his diary of "curing" many patients with harmless, neutral tablets because they were not ill in the first place but simply thought they were. The mere suggestion that they were taking medicine made them feel better. Sound psychiatrists know that the decision of a neurotic to visit their offices is the first positive step toward a cure. Confidence in a psychiatrist is even more important in therapy than confidence in a physician treating a somatic ailment.

Besides the questionable conclusions which Freudians draw from their cures and then generalize into a complete philosophy of man, they must first dispose of Adler and of Jung before they can rule the field. This does not deny that sex may play a large role in certain mental disorders, but the Freudians have by no means established that sex is the only or the weightiest factor at work in all their patients.

Freudians ought to be the last to deny that a false explanation of facts might be accepted by the ego to put it at peace regarding the causes of mental disorder and thus to eliminate the disorder itself. There is so much make-believe in the Freudian man that submission to a false account of his troubles would be easily

possible on Freudian premises. If man is as readily deceived as Freud says, then he can certainly be deceived by Freudian analyses.

The cures of neuroses, claimed by Freudian and other types of psychiatry, ought to be compared with the traditional definition of life as the capacity for immanent activity. Though this idea will be explained more fully in Chapter 16, it can here simply be stated that in immanent action the unity of the agent is so intense that the cause in some way acts on itself; cause and effect, subject and object, are in the same being and in a way are the same thing.

Where immanence prevails and where, in fact, the agent has even a spiritual nature, the description of an effect comes very close to getting at the cause. Description here merges with explanation. A thoroughgoing analysis of symptoms is an analysis of the agent producing them. A good diagnosis of a mental disorder can well be both a diagnosis and a cure. A convincing description of symptoms, even if it is incomplete or untrue, may give a patient the confidence to face reality again, taking himself in hand, freed from his burdens by being the master of their alleged causes. Man is the only creature who can, even in advanced age, perpetually begin his deeper life all over again. By reflection or, in the words of Fulton J. Sheen, by "making the unconscious conscious" man can return to old crossroads, regret the path that he once took, and strike out on a different course that leads to different goals. But there is more to immanence, spirituality, and reflection than Freudian premises can ever explain. Psychotherapy through the deciphering or description of symptoms, such as those of a sexual nature, and turning back the clock through reflection in order to make a fresh beginning of mental life—both of these require factors beyond Freud and beyond an *id*.

Allers rejects both the method and doctrine of Freud, holding that one cannot be taken without the other. Dalbiez, another sharp critic of Freud from the viewpoint of technical psychiatry, maintains that the method of Freud may be retained without accepting the philosophy of the libido. Mortimer Adler and Jacques Maritain, from the philosopher's viewpoint, second the opinion of Dalbiez.

Between the views of Allers and those of Dalbiez, there may well lie a middle course that would do justice to both opinions. Psychoanalysis, like any other psychiatry, is not really a science;

it is first of all, like medicine, an art, applying to individual cases of *making* what the strict scientist studies on a universal level. Medicine, for example, can study man by its own methods only from the viewpoint of biochemistry and biophysics, but the physician who reflects on his work must and does reach the conclusion that the fundamental principle of therapy is in the patient himself.

Life is immanent. One of its achievements is to repair the harm done to it in injury or sickness. Though he can only study biochemistry and biophysics and though he can introduce physical techniques developed only out of these realms, a doctor is at his best when he helps nature in its normal recuperative efforts from within itself rather than forces his physical and chemical approaches to their very limit. This is where medicine throws off a strictly scientific character and shows itself as an art.

A similar approach, analytic like chemistry and physics, may also bear fruit in psychiatry. Such a technique cannot be forced, untempered, any more than the physician can conclude that man is nothing but a physico-chemical machine because he reacts to physical and chemical therapies. The analytic approach in mental disease, like physics and chemistry in somatic ailments, would be part of a much larger scheme, including whatever empirical techniques the art of psychiatry may require but ever conscious of the immanent character of the patient which inclines to cure itself. If medicine treats somatic diseases by an appropriate use of analysis and if man is a tight union of body and soul, then mental diseases ought not to be entirely out of reach of the analytic approach, taken in its proper and judicious place. Accepting a psychoanalytic method, one may agree with Dalbiez, and in sharply restricting it, respect the keen insight of Allers.

In this context, mention should be made of the non-directive counseling techniques which display the immanent character of mind and which Freudians must likewise answer if their philosophy of man is the true and only description of his nature. The non-directive approach in psychiatry was initiated by Carl Rogers and is continued also by his disciples, notably among them Charles Curran. This method argues that there is a therapeutic principle within the individual for psychic as well as for somatic disease, a fact that simply translates the idea of immanence. In treating a patient, the counseling psychiatrist does not impose his own

will but simply reaffirms and clarifies what the patient says. The patient talks his own way out of his problem by coming to see it as he brings it back before his conscious view and by finding as he proceeds, the causes, reasons, and remedial attitudes. Curran analyzed the non-directive therapy of one patient and charted his progress on the road to recovery in clear-cut and even mathematical language. He concludes his book, *Personality Factors in Counseling,* with a chapter showing that non-directive therapy really recovers from an empiriological viewpoint the older account of life in terms of self-motion or immanence.

But throwing out the interpretation of a fact does not repudiate the fact. Teleology would be less significant in man if that vast cumulus of past personal experience which cannot be crowded into the narrows of present consciousness should disappear completely from his being and lose all meaning in his life.

It is to Freud's credit that he emphasized the importance of childhood when habits begin hardening and the proper social environment has so weighty an influence. Then too a habit that is not invoked here and now and is not act in the full sense is not a complete potency either but somehow midway between the two and thus capable of exerting a virtual influence even when not consciously and actually exercized. There are clues in the nature of habit that might help to explain Freud's success with the concept of the subsconscious. Certainly one may agree with him that when experience is forgotten it need not lose all influence over conscious life.

Apart from his general notion of habit, Aristotle drew an important distinction between merely remembering on the one hand and recollecting on the other. This division is likewise of importance in connection with Freudianism. Remembering something like lines of poetry or formulae in empiriological physics is often so natural as to appear almost automatic. But in recollecting there must be a conscious effort, Aristotle intimates. Sometimes the effort fails. It is as though we are aware of what we wish to recall to mind before the recall itself and search our minds to bring the memory out into the open. Psychiatry can certainly help this process of recollection and unravel the mesh of habits which always exert at least a virtual influence on the conscious present. But to set up the goals of man and to orient his life with the moral

direction that in the end can alone make it humanly adequate – such projects are something else.

Besides the arguments against Freud from the viewpoint of empiriological psychology, there are strong criticisms from the philosophical viewpoint. Among his other incisive attacks upon it, Allers charges Freudianism with being materialistic; hedonistic; extremely subjective, interpreting even criticisms against it as the products of the critic's own repressions; impersonalistic since it roots the ultimate reality of man in an unconscious *id.*

It may also be said that, considering man as an atomism, Freudianism disregards the evident fact of his unity. It is thoroughly deterministic since freedom has no place in a world regimented only by blind drives. It stands on the questionable facts of evolution and even extends this doctrine from biological to psychological dimensions. It belittles man's loftiest attainments in morality and religion. Because of its emphasis on symbolism, it is ultimately unrealistic and formal: its species of evolutionism turns everything into a symbol of a symbol with nothing really genuine. Though its adherents would often dispute the point, Freudianism ultimately denies all responsibility in its materialistic determinism. It must do away with conscience as the victim of repressions.

What is the value of Freudianism, apart perhaps from the methodological considerations mentioned earlier? Some critics have seen in Freudianism a dim view of what theology means by original sin. But Freud's doctrine – and he would be the very last to see it as an illustration of any theology – is more of the Lutheran doctrine that man is totally corrupted, than it is the Catholic view. Besides, Jung comes much closer to the genuine view of man than Freud.

Freud neither coined the term, nor introduced the concept, of the unconscious. His cumulative layer theory may be but a shadow of the dynamism and growth and integration of human personality as life goes on. But such a maturing cumulus of experience and impression and habit does not have the sinister character which Freud puts on it. Starting from the *id* as a substructure, Freud interprets man in terms of the lowest of his powers, and taken alone, they are no longer recognizable as human.

Freudianism has been a good excuse for many to avoid metaphysics and to take an easy explanation of human nature. For

many too, it has seemed to give a scientific respectability to conduct for which man otherwise looks in vain to obtain license. But success, or ease, or freedom from morality, or the escape from metaphysics are not the tests of philosophy.

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CHAPTER 8 THE DIALECTICAL WORLD OF MARXISM

To the vast majority of western men, who either in their own persons or somewhere in their families, suffered and feared and hoped throughout World War II, the years following our military victories have been laden with disillusionment. It is not only that the war was ended by a weapon that spread more fear than it vanquished. Even more alarming has been the belligerent and brutal attitude of Russia—its crushing of human freedom, its vetoes, its broken promises, its endless stalling in the United Nations and in the councils of foreign ministers, its refusal to make peace even after all the woes its people had suffered from the German armies. To the ordinary lay observer here in America, the post-war antics of the Soviet foreign office are usually deplorable and almost always mystifying, often feared but seldom fully grasped.

Communism, however, is much more than a run-of-the-mine economic or political system, and an alertness to the metaphysical vision before the Kremlin will prepare for the expediency, deceit, and terrorism of Soviet policy by showing their natural place within the philosophy of Marxian Communism. Mendacity, territorial expansionism, the fertility of a veto, and the wisdom of a blockade are required or ratified by Marxian metaphysics. Such diplomacy, after the war brought Russia closer into the western conscience, should not have been surprising; it should have been expected or at least allowed for. And such diplomacy will not relent until Communism alters its metaphysical commitments.

Karl Marx, the father of Communism, was primarily a philosopher after his earlier ambitions had turned toward poetry. It was only later that he moved into economics, finding there an answer to his philosophical problems. Contemporary Soviet leaders renew

Lenin's urgings that theory must be explored to direct practice, and what is often called the party line today is nothing but the conclusions and sometimes even the premises of a philosophy called dialectical materialism. Ordinary speech bears witness to the philosophical under-force in Communism. We refer often to the Soviet way of life and to Marxian ideology, and a way of life, like ultimate ideas, involves not merely circumstantial values but a whole metaphysical perspective. A deeper knowledge of Marx, the philosopher, would help in the understanding of the Politburo.

Like the system which he advocates, Marx had a stormy life almost from the date of his birth in 1818 until his death in 1883 as a political refugee in England. A native of Trier, Germany, he came from Jewish parentage, but at the age of six, he was baptized with his father and six of the other children in the Evangelical church.

Karl Marx spent a year of his higher studies in Bonn, and then his father, struggling to support a large family, managed to give his son the high academic opportunity of enrolling at the University of Berlin. This institution, in those days, meant Hegelianism, and Marx was among the many who felt Hegel's influence in the profoundest way. He moved with the left-wing Young Hegelians into an anti-religious and atheistic version of their master. Later he wedded Hegel to a complete materialism, influenced no doubt by a study of Democritus and Epicurus, which became his doctoral dissertation. After finishing his academic work, he renounced the academic life and chose a career in journalism.

As a journalist, pamphleteer, agitator, and revolutionary, Marx was banished from his native Germany and later from France and from Belgium. He finally took refuge in England where he died and where he still lies buried. In the course of his exiles, he met numerous other radical philosophers, political revolutionaries, and economic agitators who moved through troubled Europe in the middle third of the nineteenth century.

Outside of Hegel who inspired Marx at an early stage of his education with the dialectical dynamism that came to dominate his thought and who suggested the general pattern into which his final ideas were to be fitted, a crucial influence on Marx was Friedrich Engels (1820–1895). Their thoughts and deeds and personal fortunes were closely associated, beginning in 1844 and

lasting until Marx's death. Engels too was an Hegelian; he had gravitated to socialism through his contact with conditions in England where he had gone to represent his family in business.

Marx looked upon Engels as his collaborator, and Engels earned that title in every sense. In a personal way, Marx leaned on Engels for moral and for a great deal of financial support. The linking of Communism and the "scientific" movement is owed in great measure to a long polemic which Engels wrote against another German socialist, Eugen Duehring; here Engels drew heavily upon empiriological theories to support a materialized Hegelianism. Engels has almost as much right to the authorship of Communism as has Marx.

David Strauss and Bruno Bauer, also left-wing Hegelians, had been hacking at the foundations of Christianity through biblical criticism. Bauer, who reached the extreme view of atheism, had a direct influence on Marx, and Strauss was a stimulus to another direct and even more important influence on both Marx and Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872). Feuerbach produced a strongly anti-religious and materialistic version of Hegel, deifying man rather than God and reducing all knowledge to sensation. He said, in terms of his oft-quoted maxim, "Man is his own God." *Homo homini deus est.*

But the nineteenth century could not be claimed by Hegel nor entirely by any philosophical system. In France and in England, socialism had been born, and the earlier economic liberalism of Adam Smith and David Ricardo in England had loosened older views on the nature of progress and held matter up as infinitely exploitable, hence worthy of all man's efforts. In political economy, Smith and Ricardo were liberals. They atomized matter, and they atomized men from each other. But other currents were also in motion in the middle of the last century. Saint-Simon and Proudhon were proposing socialism in France and came surprisingly close to anticipating all the ideas that Marx uttered about property, if indeed he did not actually borrow many of his points from them. Robert Owen was a socialist in England. His paper was the first to employ the expressions, *Communism* and *Socialism* (1827). Bakunin, a professional Russian agitator, and Lassalle, a lawyer from Düsseldorf, were among the many socialists who crossed each other's paths in the Europe of the mid-nineteenth

century and whose forces were eventually consolidated in the First Internationale (1864).

A century later, the influences of all these thinkers is still reverberating, especially from the final philosophical synthesis which Marx gave to Communism in his massive tome, *Capital*. As Lenin points out, it was the achievement of Marx to have combined the classical philosophy of Germany with the socialism in France and the political gospel of British liberalism. But since the over-all tone in Marx's synthesis and in the present outlook of Communist Russia is Hegelian and philosophical, the most challenging theme in Communism is its metaphysics.

MATTER AND DIALECTICS: THE FIRST LAW

Outside the dialectical method, Marx took very little from Hegel. When Marx was in Berlin, Hegel had hardly been cold in his grave and was still warmly studied and discussed. But for the original inspiration of his philosophy, Marx went back to Democritus and Epicurus who were the objects of his doctoral study and impressed him with a lasting materialism.

Dialectics was not new with Marx, and neither was materialism. But when the two outlooks are forged together, a new figure looms up into philosophy. Marxians are quick to point out that because of dialectics their views diverge sharply from the older classical materialisms and also from the modern materialisms which, Engels said, began in England and came to maturity in Bacon and Hobbes. Such thinkers, it is argued, were the forerunners of dialectical materialism which is the heart of Communism's metaphysics. Presumably, their pioneering insights fell short of the later Marxian formulas because of historical circumstances. As Marx and Engels point out and as Lenin repeats, the older materialisms of the ancient and modern worlds were too mechanical, too non-historical or non-dynamic, and too abstract, aiming only to interpret things rather than change them. Moreover, even dialectical materialism according to its own nature could only be born historically and in time and as a child of dialectic. Modern thought, torn since the seventeenth century between materialism and idealism, is allegedly seeing the confluence of these two currents in the metaphysics of Marxism.

Hegel envisioned reality to be in constant flux, moving through hree stages called thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Into the same riadic mold, the Marxian view is cast, and the dynamic flow that vas Hegel's world appears afresh in Communism. But where Hegel ıad said Idea, Marx said matter, and so the idealism of Hegel is, o quote Marx, turned "right side up." Instead of a dynamism in the vorld of thought, Marx detected a radical flow of matter as the only hing real in the universe or anywhere else.

Marxian philosophy describes the triad of all movement in terms ɔf three laws: the law of the unity of opposites, the law of trans-ormation from quantity to quality, and the law of negation. They ıre laws of metaphysics, laws of thought, laws of nature, laws of ociety, laws of matter which is the only reality that exists.

The first law states that matter contains its own contradictions. Everything embodies its opposite. It exists by virtue of what ancels it. It moves because it is self-contradictory.

This view, which Hegel propounded by logical subtleties, the Marxians develop from an anaylsis of empiriological disciplines: ɔhysics, chemistry, and biology. In electricity and magnetism, there ıre always positive and negative polarities. The mystery of motion, vhich has annoyed philosophy from Zeno to Bertrand Russell, is ılso described as a mixture of contradictory elements. Thus Engels ays that a thing in motion is positioned at every stage of its rajectory since it is somewhere. Yet at the same time the mobile hing has gone beyond its position, touching in the present moment he periphery of the place it will occupy in the next.

What keeps our universe together? It is a combination, the Marxians say, of attracting and repelling forces. Were it not for heir repulsive forces, stars would crash into one another, and if ɔodies were not yoked together by attractive energies, the universe vould explode. Essentially the same problem must be tackled by empiriological physics when it accounts for the coherence of atoms vithout denying the repulsive forces that keep the atom from collapse. D'Alembert, a nineteenth-century mathematical physicist, ıttempted to build the whole of classical mechanics on the simple easoning that there are motive and constraining forces acting on ıll bodies at all times.

Electricity was one of the favorite fields of Lenin when he set ıbout to confirm Marx and Engels in the theory of oppositions.

Electricity can be made to work only when there is a resistance to current flow. Every machine requires friction, or there would be no contact between its parts and with the external machinery to which it delivers power. In addition to electricity, some examples cited by Lenin for the law of opposites are + and − in mathematics, action and reaction in physics, the combination and resolution of atoms in chemistry, and class warfare in the social order. Lenin even takes cover in logic, where there are judgments like *John is a man* and where, it is argued the opposition between the particular (*John*) and the general (*man*) is overcome by combining the two terms.

Biology is found heavily laden with examples of contradictories. In the stages of metabolism, for instance, a living thing is always a little more than it actually is by dint of the food material assimilated from the outside world. In a similar way, a living thing is perpetually dying, ridding its body of waste material and moving downhill to old age. Toxins provoke the secretion of anti-toxins. The sympathetic and para-sympathetic nervous systems tend to cancel each other's actions. There are veins and arteries, motor and sensory nerves, cold and heat receptors in the skin. All of this is grist for the Marxian mills.

In 1859, Charles Darwin published his *Origin of Species*, an influential document that took hold in many fields of thought. In it, Darwin proposed his theory of evolution on a so-called scientific basis. He accounted for changes of living species through accidental variations in individuals and held to a survival of the fittest in a colossal struggle for existence. The cosmos came to be viewed as an immense battleground where the victory of survival goes to species best suited, by naturally occurring accidental changes, to cope with the environment of living and non-living matter.

It would be folly to attempt, in a few sentences, to evaluate Darwin's influence or importance; through his efforts, the doctrine of evolution caught fire in modern thought, and the foregoing chapters have already emphasized how forcefully the fire burns on. As applied to the present question, Darwin's notion of struggle seemed to confirm Marx's theme of the war in the world between contradictory forces. Marx grabbed at Darwin's idea as a sign of the dialectics in nature but accused Darwin of being bourgeois and too extreme. Life could thus be viewed as the product of

organized matter, clashing against destructive forces and seeking equilibrium with environment.

Man, according to Marxism, is also the seat of opposing powers and principles. His biggest battle is that of earning a living and doing it in spite of competition with other men. At the economic level, competition is the counterpart to the Darwinian struggle in the biological order.

Then too, man is a composite of individual and social tendencies; there is the feminine and the masculine sex; there is the state and the person and, of course, capital and labor.

When Marx and Engels were writing of dialectics, empiriological psychology had not yet won its independence. But psychologists, since, have offered numerous principles that seem to conspire with Marxian metaphysics. The conflicts emphasized by Freud, the two wills described by Adler, the conscious and the unconscious as viewed generally by all psychoanalysis — all of these themes appear to pipe on the Marxian view of the real.

But in the concrete, Soviet psychology, following the path of Pavlov, has preferred reflexology to psychoanalysis, and in this view, man becomes a bundle of reflexes whose co-ordinate development is life. A recent victory of the Lysenko school of genetics in Russia decreed that environment, not heredity, is responsible for the human personality. Man can be shaped by training his reflexes; as Marx wrote, man is the totality of his surroundings.

The world vision of dialectical materialism is wholly of a dynamic kind. According to Engels, "motion is the mode of existence of matter." Matter without motion, the description runs, is as unthinkable as motion without matter. This is an Hegelian remnant in the Marxian system. But Hegel had only logical, deductive arguments in favor of his flux, whereas the materialists who follow him in the dialectics ground their system in supposed empirical evidence. Radioactivity and the transmutation of the elements prove to Lenin's mind that matter is naturally moving and changing and that the boundaries between the various substances are not fixed but essentially ill-defined and fluent.

The logical and deductive aspects of Hegel enter the world of Marx, Engels, and Lenin only after allegedly exploring matter in a more empirical fashion. Thus, matter moves, it is said, because of the contradictory elements which experience everywhere dis-

covers in it. It is the high-octane mixture of opposing forces that propels matter on its way. This view is supposed to put atheism on a scientific basis. Motion is no longer the product of a push from a Newtonian God. It is an explosion from within matter itself, a spontaneous combustion of the world.

Two centuries ahead of Marx and Engels, Descartes had laid down that the explanation of matter was to be sought within its geometrical boundaries. Marxians obey this rule of thumb so typical of modern thought. With matter changing through internal oppositions that account for all of its movements, the dialectical materialists conclude that it is self-moving; they dispense with the need for a Prime Mover and a First Cause. Denying the principle of contradiction, they deny the God whose existence the principle proves.

For dialectical materialism, matter is struggle, motion, development, and history. As Engels writes, "Motion is therefore as uncreatable and as indestructible as matter itself." In the wake of the Napoleonic wars and more remotely of the French Revolution, rebellions and their rumors thundered through the middle of the nineteenth century. All of this seemed to bolster Marx and Engels. Men and their societies, like the universe and its parts, were seen on the march. Motion was viewed as the essence of things.

LAWS OF QUANTITY AND OF NEGATION

The second dialectical law states that quantitative changes when prolonged sufficiently will give rise to changes in quality. This law is of definite Hegelian vintage, and it is an effort to account for differences in spite of the singleness and sameness which monism requires. But Marx and Engels were turning Hegel "right side up." They went beyond his logical devices and sunk their second law into evidence from empiriological disciplines.

In the mineral world, a linear rise in temperature will change ice into water and finally into a gas. It is well known that hydrocarbons change chemically with the addition or subtraction of one or more of the component atoms of carbon, oxygen, and hydrogen. Indeed, chemical changes in such compounds are often the affair of rearranging the ingredient atoms without even changing their numbers. The atom-building of the contemporary nuclear physicist, adding or subtracting protons from a substance and thereby chang-

ing its chemical character, is presumably an even more striking revelation that quantity can change the quality of things.

In the area of biology, Darwinism is the final court of appeal for the second dialectical law. Changes of species that survive are supposed to prosper by superior quantitative equipments; the giraffe, for example, is theorized to have been a short-necked animal that stretched to get food ever higher above the ground as more low-lying pastures became unavailable. Competition is not just the life of trade. It is a principle of fertility among living things, and Marx views man as its product. Man too changes in quality by a response to changes in quantity. What could be more Marxian than to say that the *kind* of life a man leads depends on *how much* money he earns?

The net result of this second law is to simplify the structure of the universe, accounting for diversity not through a Supreme Intelligence that put irreducible parts into place but through a unitary material principle internally capable of its own differentiations. Cartesianism reduces matter to mere quantity, and Locke continues this view on a modified scale. Both men were moving along the pathway of empiriological physics which reduces quality to mechanical waves and corpuscles and denies that there is such a thing as being at all. With no being to explain, there is really no occasion to raise the question of God's existence if empiriological physics is really the philosophy of the world.

Kant attempted to remedy the impasse to which scientism was headed. He posited the "thing-in-itself" behind the phenomenal world but at the same time he denied that this underlying substrate could be known. Post-Kantian physics has rejected Kant and has resumed the pre-Kantian march of reducing matter to Cartesian quantity or to what Hume, Locke's successor in England, called phenomena.

Now the Marxians take a rather unorthodox view of empiriological disciplines which a succeeding paragraph will attempt to disengage. Here it should be noted that though they emphasize quantity and make it, as in Hegel, the root source of quality, they are opposed to the Cartesian and Humean reduction of matter to quantity or phenomena. They are Kantian in holding for the existence of a thing-in-itself, but they are anti-Kantian in affirming that this thing is knowable and, to some extent, known.

For Marxian metaphysics, the law of the transformation of quantity into quality does not mean that quantity is all there is to matter or that reality can be known by mere mathematical analysis. What it does mean is that by continuing the same kind of change, a change in quality will eventually occur. But just as the Cartesian and Humean premises, pursued far enough, make God's existence irrevelant as a question and unscientific as an answer, so the Marxians get away from natural theology by endowing matter in the first law with the fact of motion and explaining by the second law the different kinds of motion that occur. Sidney Hook finds Marx a fellow naturalist.

The final law is called the negation of negation. In the Hegelian triad, the synthesis of the third stage meets with another antithesis, and so a synthesis at one level is the thesis for a new pattern of development. This process goes on and on according to the Marxians, and a thing is not simply stymied by its opposite but made a part of a constant evolutionary ascent in the material world.

A position is destroyed by opposition, but in the very negation there is progress so that the synthesis or transposition breaks forth with a new and better reality than its predecessors. To use an example from Engels, a grain of barley planted on suitable soil loses its identity. It is negated. But from the very negation of the seed there emerges a whole new plant, living, growing, flowering, producing many more grains than the parent seed. The eggs of insects can be submitted to a similar analysis; the first filial generation in turn produces eggs that are negated to produce the second. Geology discloses rock formations which indicate a series of successive negations or destructions following upon one another as chapters in the biography of the earth. The destruction of the identity of one age was the material for the formation of the next.

According to Engels, mathematics also tends to support the law of negations. Negating the quantity a gives $-a$, and negating the negation by multiplying two $-a$'s yields $+ a^2$, the original positive quantity on a higher plane. In the same way, Engels continues, the calculus is founded on a negation. The initial data may be any quantities, x and y. To study their rate of change with respect to each other, we reduce the quantities to o and thus obtain a pure rate without any content left for the original x and y. Instead of y/x as a numerical ratio, we have o/o, Engels adds.

The history of men and their philosophies is taken as another index of this law of negations. Dialectical materialism maintains that one society negates its predecessor, often using force, just as the French Revolution ended a "feudal" regime and introduced the bourgeois culture. Bourgeois society today is being negated by proletarianism on the one hand and capitalism on the other, and a new revolution is in the making.

Philosophy moves on a similar escalator. Originally materialism held the field, Engels says, but this gave way to the concept of a spiritual soul and ended in idealism. The two opposing views are presumed to be today undergoing a dialectical fusion in Marxian metaphysics where matter and motion, thought and thing, are reduced to the same status not in a mechanical fashion but in a materialized form of Hegelian idealism. Desanti, a contemporary French thinker with Communist leanings, sees the dialectical view made evident by the whole history of philosophy where the ideas of one age always react against the principles of the generation preceding.

Soviet pedagogy does not disdain the study of past thinkers. Such pre-modern philosophers get treatment similar to their reception among Dewey and his fellow naturalists. They are all preludes to dialectical materialism and are to be studied for the ways they answered the problems of their own ages. Aristotle is said to have grappled with a set of historical circumstances and woven his philosophy from the challenges of his own environment. From the way in which he met the issues of his own day, say dialectical theorists, there is a lesson for coping with contemporary problems. It is not the Aristotelian principles that are important. The methods of Aristotle and the grasp of their historical conditioning impart valid rules on the way in which matter, man, and ideas are developing. Ideas, like mineral and living things, are on the move, and Marxian philosophy is interested in the laws of the evolution.

DIALECTICS AND MODERN EMPIRICISM

This new materialism of Marx, Engels, and Lenin is, a critic is constantly reminded, quite different from preceding systems where matter alone was recognized as real. The older doctrines did not, it is added, wear the dialectical character which Hegel detected in the real but warped into an absolute idealism. Yet Hegel, great

and universal as his mind was, seemed blind in his formal system to directions which the physics and chemistry of his time were charting out. He took almost no account, for instance, of the atomic theory, proposed by John Dalton, one of his own contemporaries. It is the empiriological knowledge of modern thought that Marx, Engels, and later Lenin turn against Hegel and in favor of a dialectics that is materialistic.

But the relation of dialectical materialism to empiriological physics, chemistry, and biology is not very clear. Lenin, for instance, holds that what the western world calls scientific knowledge ignores dialectics and exaggerates the mechanical. He wrote a long polemic against positivism, like that of Ernst Mach, but it is largely by the pursuit of Mach's ambitions to anchor thought to the observable sense aspects of the world that modern twentieth-century physics has scored its signal gains. Einstein admits the direct influence of Mach on the development of his theory of relativity, and quantum mechanics, the other giant innovation of our century, also owes much to the critical spirit of Mach. Contemporary physics then has made brilliant strides by a resort to what dialectical materialism formally condemns and by ignoring the thing-in-itself which the Marxian materialism formally advocates. Though Marxians base their self-defense upon evidence from the empiriological disciplines, they must interpret "science" and thus go beyond it to reach the grounds of their metaphysics.

In the writings of Lenin and his present-day Soviet disciples, there are really two meanings of empiriological "science." In its first sense, "science" is not just repeated after the empiriological researcher delivers his data to philosophy; certain broad lines of direction are disengaged, notably the oppositions in the material world. What is ordinarily called "science" is prolonged and abstracted into a kind of meta-science.

Empiriological physics, chemistry, and biology are taken more literally in the second meaning which "science" has for the dialectian. Marxian metaphysics presumably is confirmed or "reflected" by science in its ordinary sense. In this ordinary and western and orthodox meaning, "science" is too analytical for the Marxist. It fails to attain that total view of the real without which the fruits of analysis have no meaning. In the words of Engels,

"science" is equipped to explore the details of the cosmos once its philosophical dimensions have been philosophically settled.

But such a qualification of the empiriological disciplines still leaves them with tremendous power. They are alleged as confirmatory evidence of the dialectical view of things, and from the days of Marx down to the very present, they have been heavily stressed by Communism's theorists. Thus Lenin writes:

> The fundamental characteristic of materialism lies in the fact that it arises from the objectivity of science, from the recognition of objective reality, reflected by science.

It is an historical fact that dialectical materialism has been embraced by a number of prominent empiriological minds, including Frederic and Madame Joliot-Curie in France and Joseph Needham and J. B. S. Haldane in England. Philosophers following the empiriological method in their study of society have sometimes, through naturalism, wound up in the suburbs of dialectical materialism. But up to the present time, the positivism of the Anglo-American world has in general moved in a direction quite different from that which Marx, Engels, and Lenin have outlined. The absence of the majority of first-rate empiriological minds from Communism's lists indicates at once that the so-called scientific basis which Marx, Engels, and Lenin pretended to give their system is obviously an exaggeration.

A stunning case of Communism within empiriological ranks was the conviction of Klaus Fuchs, one of Britain's foremost physicists, on charges of Soviet espionage. His confession is a telltale example of Marxian dialectic, since he pleaded a "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde" personality, one side of which was pleasant and even patriotic while the other side was conniving at the overthrow of what he stood for in outward life. In loyal Marxian spirit, Fuchs was enacting the dialectic of opposites, furthering Marxism of course by his espionage as a professional physicist and practicing Marxism in his private life as a kind of personal philosophy.

Lewis S. Feuer has assembled clear facts to show that the Soviet attempt to dictate to "science" has caused Russia empiriological achievements to lag behind the recent vast strides in western research. In biology, the Lysenko school which now dominates

Soviet genetics excludes the "gene" theory of T. H. Morgan in accounting for heredity. This has caused even such a dialectical stalwart as J. B. S. Haldane, a keen student in biology, to question the Soviet verdict favoring Lysenko. For a long while Einstein was rejected in Russia, just like Mach, his predecessor. For better or for worse, the high courts of Soviet intellectual life have now reversed their earlier stand against relativity.

In the dialectical view of things, matter is active of its own nature. Such a philosophy is akin to a theory of classical physics which saw a *vis viva* in matter; it is not in line with the more common Newtonian concept of *vis inertiae*. For Communism, matter has a self-moving force that makes it virtually vitalized and even spiritualized. But the physics of today emphasizes the inertial view of things. It was the achievement of Einstein to have shown that even energy has inertia. The Soviet academies which decree the empiriological theories that are to prevail are frowning upon the very factors in western methods which have speeded our laboratories to their brilliant triumphs.

The great aim of the empiriological method is to predict and to control the cosmos rather than to pronounce on its ultimate nature, and such an aim prospers best when attention is paid not to matter's activity from within itself (*per naturam*) but to the passivity of the world before man's power. In the concrete even Soviet empiriological research actually seeks and stresses the possibilities of control. Biologists in Russia are centering on such problems as genetics, reflex actions, and longevity with a view to control life and especially to lead man onward to the true Communism which, doing away with the present Socialist state, will witness the spontaneous and communistic behavior which a dictator must now enforce from above. Physicists of the Soviet Union are busied about the mechanization of Russia, keeping their theory into a close and pragmatic alliance with practical needs.

But the larger view of matter which Communism takes actually goes contrary to the "scientific" directions which it regards itself as prolonging. Such a criticism, however, is only meant in an historical sense. It does not mean that positivism is right in philosophy and that Communism is wholly wrong. In fact, dialectical materialists are closer to the true matter-form account of the material world than the one-sided version of things in present-

day western scholarship. Without admitting that matter is only motion, it must certainly be recognized that matter is mobile. And the essential principles of motion are opposites: matter and form.

Marxians have a dim sense of that dualism in our world. This is true not only of Marx and Engels and Lenin but of the Russian people, generally. It is expressed by great writers like Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy. Marxism too has a sense of absolutes, and so has the Russian people as a whole. For example, there is an old tradition that the earth is God's and must not be traded off like an ordinary commodity. Thus Raskolnikoff, the hero of *Crime and Punishment,* is told by Sonja, his love, to return and kiss the ground that he defiled by his murdering. Russian Communism takes advantage of all these traditions. It says, for instance, that a man may own his own home and the fixtures inside of it, but he may not own the ground on which it stands. There is an appeal here to the older notion that the soil is too sacred for marketing.

The stress on motion in the world, the report on oppositions in matter, and the sense of purpose and of absolutes—all of these aspects of dialectical materialism are not to be totally rejected. As so often happens, a partial truth has been exaggerated, and error becomes a truth carried to extremes. It could even be pointed out that in Marxism the importance which dialectical matter acquires by its connection with the absolute is a reaction against the philosophy of Locke and the theology of Calvin, where the outer order was peeled off from intellectual and moral significance and abandoned to a mechanical and indifferent status. The ties of economics, politics, and society with the moral and religious orders cannot be cut. Marxism recalls, but completely over-plays, the realism that everything in man's life, his work and play, his study and recreation, his buying and selling, has a bond with the absolute and becomes invested with an absolute significance.

As a final word on the speculative side of Marxism, especially in its relation to empiriological methods and to Hegelianism, two philosophical controversies are worthy of mention. These have competently been summarized by John Somerville, though as a whole he is over-sympathetic to Soviet speculation.

The first major debate raged through the 1920's between the mechanists and the dialecticians. It was a struggle to decide whether Marxian philosophy was a mechanistic affair, viewing the world

as a simple aggregate of parts in the manner of Cartesian physics or whether Hegel's dialectic must be scrupulously applied.

At the helm of the mechanistic group were Timiriazev, Stepanov, and Axelrod. They took their stand against Hegel and on the premise that Marx had refuted the metaphysics of flux; when Marx and Engels had finished their job on Hegel, it was added, only the dialectical method survived but this could be made to ratify the mechanism which post-Cartesian physics was enforcing experimentally. Dug in on the other side were Deborin and Luppol, influential disciples of Plekhanov in his effort to relate Marx with Spinoza's dialectical monism. The anti-mechanists, therefore, viewed dialectic as broader and deeper than modern physics; they held out for a more synthetic view of things than mechanism can ever allow. Empiriological physics, said the dialecticians, constantly changes in viewpoint, improves its method, re-forms its principle. But the same dialectical directions can ever be observed. According to Deborin and his group, apart from a philosophy of flux the dialectical method could not be retained.

In April, 1929, the Soviet intellectual world assembled for the Second All-Union Conference of Marxist-Leninist Scientific Institutions. After a debate by the leading parties in the dispute, a vote was taken which sided with the Deborin group and pledged that the direction of Soviet thinking must be away from mechanism and toward the dialectical view. This effectively settled the mooted issue, and Communist theorists are now trying to show that such thinkers as Dalton were not affiliated to Descartes but actually allied with a dialectical philosophy.

Storming out of this controversy came another in which the issue was materialism versus idealism. Deborin's dialectical group was accused of flirting with Hegel's idealism in their opposition to the mechanists, and it was further alleged that they were losing touch with practical economic and social factors, which ideas are supposed to foster and interpret. The Deborin faction was accused of reviving the older idealistic menshevism. Agitated by Mitin and Yudin who opposed Deborin's ideas, the controversy burst into an open flame in 1930, and in the end brought the great Deborin into defeat and disrepute. As an aftermath to the struggle, Soviet philosophy became wholly oriented toward the practical aims of

government economy and toward the larger emphasis on the study of history which is viewed as a laboratory of dialectical laws.

Thus Alexandrov, perhaps the most renowned of contemporary Soviet philosophers, has written a book on Aristotle whose principles are not presented to be ignored but rather to be studied and admired as an effective answer to the problems of a given age. But now, we are told, western thought has matured. No longer is Aristotelianism an adequate organon for thinking and acting. Yet in moving man toward his present advanced status, Aristotle played his part and played it well. In the study of his works as the solution of his own problems, there are, we are told, some clues for solving our own: there are illustrations of dialectical development. At a certain moment in history, Aristotle shows the dialectic in action.

THE DIALECTICS OF MAN

In Marxian dialectics, man like the rest of reality is matter and only matter. True, he is crowned as a thinking animal, but thinking and mind for the Marxians are nothing but matter in a new and more complicated form. In many ways, dialectical materialism agrees with the naturalism of men like Dewey and Sellars.

For Marxism, thought breaks the world asunder and then puts it back together again. If what is put together is the same thing that was taken apart in the first place, a spiritual soul has certainly accomplished the task. But Marxians will have none of this "idealism." For them, mind and matter cannot be divorced.

Thus Russian writers speak of the mirror (*otobraznie*) theory of truth. A more literal translation would be "picture theory," for *otobraznie* connotes not a spiritual likensss but a physical picture like the image of the bank in a stream.

The test of the picture as a mirror of the real is essentially a pragmatic one. Sellars has shown that dialectical materialism is much closer to the pragmatic than to the positivistic view of things. In fact, Lenin stated this in so many words, and he repeats Marx and Engels when he insists on the close relation between theory and practice. These two levels ought not to be distinguished, according to Marxian-Leninist dialectics. The Soviet Academy of Science has for its aim to spread ideas to guide practice. What has

no relation to practical has no meaning at all in Marxian metaphysics. Even art, music, and literature derive their meaning from the class consciousness which they portray and inspire.

But Communism is of a different color from pragmatism as proposed by James, Schiller, and Dewey in the Anglo-Saxon world. Pragmatism in this western sense is only a method. It says nothing about ultimates and basically does not pretend to know things so much as to evaluate them or "make" them. It has no preconceived idea, its adherents say, of what the world is, of what man's place in it ought to be, or what the future will be like. It simply charges headlong into experience to unfold its value for human betterment, through the use of practical tests.

Communism on the other hand is quite systematic. It has a vision of what the world is and of what it is destined to become. It wants man's mind to conform to the things that exist and operate outside of it, and pragmatism tests that conformity. Such a conformity of mind and world, like the rest of the Marxist universe, is always becoming. Knowledge is always relative and approximate, as Lenin says. But the evolving mind of man is ever drawing closer to the full conformity of mind and matter, where thought would be a perfect mirror of things beyond it.

In point of fact, pragmatism and dialectical materialism are both descendants of the Hegelian family tree, and it is not astonishing that they turn out to be so closely related. Rubenstein, the Soviet psychologist has written that "we get our deepest knowledge of the world in the process of changing it." Soviet pedagogy believes that a teacher, far from simply theorizing in a normal school, should be placed in the classroom so that he can teach by learning and learn by teaching. This is a close parallel to Dewey's psychology of education. Lenin condemns ordinary materialism because it seeks only to study the world and not to alter it. Dewey makes substantially the same charge against nearly all of past philosophy which is regarded as a "spectator theory of truth" and which is indicted for preparing man only to contemplate, not to act.

On the socio-economic level, Communism is best known for its views of class warfare. Chronologically, Marx was first an Hegelian and afterward a political economist, and that still remains the order of logical importance in Communist doctrine. Marx sensed an agreement with Saint-Simon and Proudhon, the French socialists,

that capitalism and private property were doomed. For a long time and in a fretful way, he racked his own mind to prove the thesis, delaying his book, *Capital*, for weeks, months, and years. Finally, he discovered his cherished premise. It was the theory of class warfare.

Classes in society follow one another, oppose one another, transcend one another, in ways that simply reflect the dialectical laws governing matter as a whole. Their ebb and flow is determined by control of the methods of production, Marx wrote. Thus in any historical society a cleavage always breaks forth between exploited and exploiting classes. In Roman times, slaves were divided from the Roman citizens. At a later date feudalism emerged with its rift between lord and serf. Today capital and labor are at odds. In all cases, the mode of production set the style for the societies, and as production changed, societies evolved along with it.

The culture of the west which emerged from the French Revolution is termed the bourgeois culture, and Marx and Engels describe it as constantly tending to change its modes of production and as chronically revolutionary. In the dialectical movement through history, social structures find themselves unable to stay abreast of the changed modes of production. They break down and re-form about the latest economic realities until in turn a new economy evolves and breaks down in its own way to inspire a still later and newer social pattern. The exploited class ever rises against the exploiters, but each new society, thus generated, produces new cleavages and new classes, again in terms of underdog and overlord. Finally, the continuing string of revolutions arrives at the égalitarian state where classes, having decimated one another, no longer exist and where a truly classless society prevails.

Class warfare, at its very heart, is always a struggle to gain control over production. The oppositions in the region of physics and the Darwinian struggle in the biological area take shape in man's world as the economic battle over the means of production. A man lives according to the class to which he belongs, and the class is styled according to its economic circumstances. This is what is known as economic determinism, which is Marxian dialectics applied to history and society. It says in brief that human life is essentially determined by economic factors. Tell me how you make your living, a Marxian says, and I will tell you what you are.

As a man earns his livelihood, so are his virtues and his vices. If he is rich, he lives handsomely, and if he is poor, he has little except an empty pocketbook. The class to which he pertains tells the whole story of his habits, his opportunities, his home, his family life, his health, his recreation, his educational development, his vacations and what he does with them. It is economic circumstance that swings elections and conditions literature. It is material needs that inspire ambition, affect nerves, produce wars, and make education what it is. Class consciousness will determine, for instance, whether a philosophy or philosopher will be accepted or ignored. Ideas are economically conditioned. They are designed for income, prestige, leisure, or some other class satisfaction. They are always social and directly related to a class. Even a religion is painted as the fruit of economic factors. It is, says Lenin, the opiate of the masses, and with the betterment of their lot, the need for religion will supposedly disappear.

In its dialectical career of negation, history reflects the diminishing of private ownership and the progressive concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. According to the Marxians, Fourier was right in detecting the present trend to do away with men in factories (manufacture) and to replace them with machines (machinofacture). The machines themselves are produced by men, but this production is also economized in time, requiring fewer and fewer hands because more and better machines are developed and these in turn are set to the task of building still more and even better machines. The process continued over the years results in the forming of a "reserve army" of unemployed, Marx says. They cannot work because the capitalist finds it cheaper to do without them.

But there is another and more important doctrine, the theory of "surplus value" which Lenin dubbed the cornerstone of Marxian economics. It means simply that the worker cannot buy back the fruits of his own labor, because the capitalist derives a profit from the hands of his employee and takes more out of them than he gives back. Capitalists become richer in our bourgeois culture, the worker becomes more and more proletarianized or dispossessed; the middle class between the two extremes gradually shades out of existence, some of it graduating into capitalism and most of it descending to the proletarian ranks.

The gradual enlarging of the "reserve army," which machines and the profit-motive put out of work, and the continued hoarding of "surplus value" by the capitalist results in a polarized contrast between the wealthy few and the proletarian masses. From the tension, the workers arise to band together against the system which oppressed them, and the final revolution of society ushers in Communism, or more precisely, Socialism. Socialism is an interregnum between capitalism and Communism. As Lenin says, a dictatorship of socialism, as in the U.S.S.R., must preside over the minds of men until they are trained into a spontaneous communism of spirit, and at that point, the state will "wither away."

According to Marx the economist, there is no such thing as an intrinsic value in things. All value is put upon the real by the work of labor, and the capitalist who has given nothing to the final product has no right to reap a profit. The wood in the desk, taken as wood, is considered to be of no value and might have rotted away in the forest had not the hands of a carpenter formed it into its present value as office equipment. Work and truth for Communism and for certain pragmatisms are synonymous terms, and the labor theory of value is but another way of emphasizing the close relation between theory and practice, thought and action, mind and matter, which is a favorite gospel of the Marxists. If an idea is true, it works; if it works, it is true—these statements are interchangeable.

The worker is now but a leaven in the revolutionary processes of history. Though determined by economic motives and not really free in the true sense, he is not entitled to assume a fatalistic view of things. Dialectical materialism, especially the Soviet propaganda of the present, actually speaks of man's freedom in spite of the economic determism which is the denial of human liberty.

The references to human liberty are clarified a little by the peculiar concept of freedom in Marxian theory. Freedom is not the power to do or not to do, which is an ethical matter, but the power to make things, which is a matter of art. Thus Engels writes:

> Freedom therefore consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature which is founded on a knowledge of natural necessity.

Freedom, Engels also writes, is the ability to appreciate necessity and to submit to it rather than suffer it blindly. As in naturalism,

the problem for man is to get into stride with nature, and to free himself from servitude to matter by controlling it. Knowledge is power, as Bacon wrote, and by modern standards, the powerful man is free.

Thus, Soviet thinkers insist that men, even though economically determined, should not lie supinely down and let the inevitable roll over them. They are called upon to forward the processes of history and to co-operate in the making of the Communist state. There they will find a new freedom where wants are satisfied and there will really be nothing to choose.

Hegel had a finality about his dialectic. He regarded the realities of the world as wending their way back to the Absolute from which they arose. To a certain extent, the dialectical process also terminates in the Feuerbachian world; man ends by divinizing himself. But Marx gave no concrete evidence to justify the final conclusion of the dialectical process in his materialism. In fact, there is indication that even in the Communist state, the dialectic will grind on and on, instead of terminating. There seems to be an infinite series in the Marxian world and, more concretely, the continued evolution of Communism into something even more utopian than utopia. This point looms up as one of the numerous internal contradictions in the Marxian metaphysics.

SOME CRITICAL REMARKS

The Marxian dialectic is open to obvious criticism for denying the principles of identity, non-contradiction, and the excluded middle and proposing the three dialectical laws to take their places. A curious situation arises here since the first and genuine metaphysical principles must be used to discuss the dialectical laws which deny them. If the denial is carried out, the human mind cannot think, judge, write; it cannot carry on disputes and dialectical operations. It is no wonder that in our western tradition, where a word means what it says, our State Department complains of semantical difficulties with the Russians.

Western philosophy has always insisted that for a thing to be and at the very same time, for it not to be, is impossible and absurd. For Hegelian and Marxian dialectics, this coincidence of opposites is the supreme reality of the universe. It is useless to dispute with a man who denies the principle of non-contradiction.

Aristotle said that such a man would be like a plant since even an animal has some vague and material recognition of first principles or the dog would not distinguish food from the master's stick.

The Soviets cannot possibly mean what they say in their union of opposites. They would quickly fire an engineer who built a tank that was not a tank. Their Stormoviks are not powered by non-gasoline, and even if the fuel were mixed with an equal amount of non-fuel, like water, the engines of an aircraft would sputter and never attain the power to take off.

A realist, of course, would agree that there is opposition in matter but would deny that there is contradiction. Differences are not formed by absolute negation but by contrary properties, each of which is positive but does not cancel the other. Contradictories are not productive of new beings. They are not the seeds of progress. They would destroy one another, leaving a nihilism in the end. A dog is what it is. If it were at the same time a non-dog it would be nothing.

Marxism pretends to be prophetic as well as philosophical. It claims to see the pattern of future historical developments and to provide a concrete plan to implement historical goals. But in the Marxian dialectics, there is no basis for going beyond Hegel's notion that meaning is only available from the past and that our whole view of things may need revamping, pending the future disclosures of the real as history unfolds. The dialectical method applied to history is at most only one of retrospection, and on its premises, a man may make of the future what picture he wishes.

In fact, he should be free to interpret not only the future but anything else. Since nothing in matter is infinite but is always opposed by some limiting principle, everything in the universe can be somehow tortured into an argument to confirm Communism. Soviet theorists will even close their eyes to oppositions in matter when facts can be made to serve some other dialectical purpose.

For instance, Soviet scientists in recent years published the results of their analysis of the solar constitution and concluded that the explosion of the sun was impossible. But why not? If reality is constituted of oppositions, the disintegration and even explosion of the sun should be anticipated rather than rejected, and above all the argument should not turn upon the mechanism of astronomy if the mechanical and western slant on the world is inadequate.

Granted that matter is bifurcated but not self-contradictory, what brought and brings the contrary principles together? They cannot merge of their own accord. Even if they existed from all eternity, they would be eternally insufficient to justify themselves or their reactions and so, far from explaining God away, the contrary oppositions in matter are all the more reason for arguing to His existence.

The second dialectical law cannot account for the differentiations in things any more than the first can explain their being and their motion. Quantity is a plurality of parts. It says nothing about the kind of parts in question and is studied in the second or mathematical order of abstraction which is no longer in full communion with the physical world. Quantity does not have the fertility which Marxism accords it. It has no content and is sheer partitiveness. Quantity is always a quantity of something. It is a measure of the material thing that has it, but it is not its cause. It is inert, not mobile, undifferentiated and not heterogeneous. So, repeating the same thing over and over again does not produce the novelty in the material world which Communism pretends to find. The animal world did not evolve by a repetition of action. A living thing does not perform different operations by continuing to execute the same operations as it has always done. Changes in quality can produce quantitative changes, but such a statement cannot be categorically turned around.

The third law of development, by its historical, geological, and biological examples, again shows how dialectical theorists can torture the facts. The mathematical instances which Engel alleges to support his dialectic are pointed cases of the flimsy and false, but supposedly scientific, bases on which the Marxians, as a general rule, rest their case. In multiplying $-a$ by $-a$ to get $+a^2$, there is not simply a new negation. Multiplication is really multiple addition, and there is thus the aspect of addition in the example of Engels rather than substraction or negation.

In a similar way $0/0$ is not the correct algebraic form of the typical expression in the calculus (the derivative); $0/0$ is mathematical nonsense, and it cannot be dealt with either in the calculus or in any other branch of mathematics. Calculus studies not the ratios of 0's but the ratios between limits of increments; it is often and perhaps inaccurately called "the science of infinitesimals." But an infinitesimal is not zero.

Lenin's favorite example from radioactivity and electricity should not give his disciples the comfort he found in them. From the empiriological point of view, the natural breakdown of radioactive elements is really a piece of evidence that the universe is running down and not winding up in an evolutionary advance. Electricity, too, can be turned against Lenin. Current will only flow in a circuit where there is a potential drop, and the tendency of the cosmos as a whole is (the second law of thermodynamics) for the higher potential to reach the level of the lower one so that no current will flow at all.

The Soviet view of empiriological physics seems often twisted and sometimes even naïve. The so-called scientific premises which Communism arrogates to itself often appear like nothing but Procrustean after-thoughts to bolster a preconceived revolutionary theory that casts doubt on the scientific honesty and philosophical open-mindedness of its adherents. An Italian writer recently remarked about the dogmatism which enshrouds the dialectical first principles. They are not even considered questionable, and the effort of present Soviet thinking is only to confirm and illustrate them, never to recall them to the forum of discussion and submit them to rational analysis. After all, if dialectical materialism is true, it should be dialectically superseded as time goes by.

The stress on the economic and on the way in which it determines ideas is neither wholly false nor wholly true. Individuals and societies may well surrender themselves to a materialism at times. But as Sorokin would authorize one to say, this sensism is always destructive and not progressive. There have been whole societies and there are still many men who surmount the economic, viewing it in thought and in action as a tool and not as an origin or an end. Christopher Dawson, an anthropologist as well as a philosopher of history, has said of his study of primitive art:

> It shows us that man was spiritually creative before he was economically productive, and that there is no necessary relation between the economic development of a culture and its spiritual quality.

Man thinks before he makes. He is a philosopher deciding what things are before going about his more practical work of controlling matter. If ideas arose only in response to economic need, they would be starkly equal to their causes and there would be no progress

but an utter equilibrium between man and his environment. There would be none of the spontaneous, spiritual, and creative spilling over of the human mind which has made the fundamental history of men much more the story of ideas than the cataloguing of outer fact. Communism crowds out the spirit of man which has made for progress and can even surmount time and space to glance backward over its historical route and note the milestones of its achievements.

Marx was better as a prophet of fact than as a philosopher of principle and often good at diagnosis even when he was wrong in its proposed cures. Nothing that is good in Communism's panacea for society is original to Communism itself. What is good in Marxism is what sound ethics has always advocated. The Christian revolution is practical, unlike the Marxian; for what it advocates is not a bloody warfare between classes but a moral revolution in souls. Yet Marx did embody a large measure of truth in his criticism of bourgeois culture from the historical point of view. His predictions about its future are in many respects coming to pass. But his cure is worse than the disease.

This brings up the question of the concrete action which western culture must launch if Communism is to be checked in its present world-wide advance. Many oppose Communism because it would take away their wealth or, if they have more moderate incomes, deprive themselves and their children of economic opportunities.

But to oppose Communism for economic reasons is to play into Communism's hands. It is to admit the economic determinism which Marx preached and which he correctly prophesied would lead to class warfare. It must be recognized with regret that the economic motive, so powerful in present-day western culture, may save our nation from attack by Russia but still deliver it to a Marxian defeat. The plain facts are, for example, that most college students look upon their universities as trade schools. It should, they think, prepare them chiefly for making a living. They want perhaps to be doctors, lawyers, engineers, or businessmen, and they value their various subjects only as they contribute to this practical and economic end. History and literature, philosophy and religion, classical and often modern languages are all too frequently only tolerated as requirements for a degree. The primacy of the economic in determining man's life and the values that he puts

upon things are what Communism stands for. To make economic success, either consciously or unconsciously, the ultimate aim in life and to turn education into a sheer tool for eventual economic gain is to conspire with the Marxians rather than to oppose them.

Education should not aim chiefly to equip men to earn a livelihood. In fact, the Steelman report to President Truman emphasized that the practical engineering bent in American education was discouraging the development of good theorists even in the empiriological disciplines. And without such theory, there would not even be engineering. The great ideas in a culture or a nation or a science are produced by men who love ideas and truth for their own sakes and are not forever measuring their work in terms of dollar return. Such pragmatism has held up the advance of American theoretical physics and forced it to borrow nearly all of its leading ideas from Europe. With European markets of ideas now closed or censored, American theory is on its own. The pragmatic theme in Communism will also continue to retard the theoretical physics of the Soviet Union.

Another practical factor in American education which is appropriate to mention here is the refusal to bring God into the classroom and the emphasis on values which, even when they are not economic, are this-worldly alone. Such a secularism opens the way for Marx. As Lenin said, revolutions are not made by revolutionaries only. He advocated that all atheists, dialectical or not, be enlisted as preparations for Commnism. Practical atheism, the refusal to gear one's life toward supra-terrestrial ends, encourages the belief that whatever paradise there is must be found in this world. And Lenin promised such a paradise.

Communism proposes to widen the scientific method, so popular in the modern world, and to apply it to social problems. It fills with its own absolute the vacuum created by the modern ignoring of God in human life. In many ways, Communism fulfills tendencies now prominent in American secular education and secular life. It is a naturalism in an intense way. It is completely secular. It promises security for all. It claims allegiance to modern "science" and proposes to run life as scientifically as a laboratory. It is an easy medium for scientists who want to extend the benefits of their work to humanity and to distribute such benefits "scientifically." Needham and Haldane should not allow us to forget that when

economic conditions are no longer booming as they have been in the United States, so-called scientific minds now parading in American philosophy could easily capitulate to the Marxian formulas as a solution for social problems.

If Marx did nothing else, he provided the lesson that man cannot live by bread alone and for it, while expecting his society to go on in an atmosphere of prosperity and peace. Where bread alone is lived for, the social and economic disorder, so created, will eventually take away the bread to live by.

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PART III

CHAPTER 9 BERGSON: A REACTION AGAINST SCIENTISM

Though too critical of our age to receive its testimonials, one of the truly great thinkers of the centuries was our contemporary. Henri Bergson has been hailed by Jean Laporte and Etienne Gilson as the greatest French thinker since Descartes. Although Bergson died with many admirers but no disciples as René Le Senne remarked, his spirit somehow crowds across the whole present generation of French philosophy. Strict Cartesianism perished almost with the man himself, but three centuries have not been able to eclipse the Cartesian spirit. In a similar way, Bergson without Bergsonism lives on.

If his formal doctrine is apparently dead in his own country and abroad, it is largely because the Cartesian ambition is still too locked in its own *cogito* to see the vaster unities which it denied to things and which Bergson, by almost a protest vote, worked to reinstate. Where Descartes had sheared nature from man, body from soul, form from matter, and the world from God, Bergson, when he is on the broader roads by which his thought must be judged, points toward the deeper organizing principles in things that scientism overlooks.

Such a eulogy does not mean that Bergsonism is an adequate or even tenable philosophy. It is an extremism, a danger, an error; literally examined, it is a radical dynamism and it stands condemned. But in its larger contours, where Bergson is a spirit

hounding man toward the concrete and is not a philosopher denying intellectual values, where Bergson is a critic of modern methods and not a technical system-maker who misconstrued the nature of life, here the genius of Bergson is in contact with the great minds of the ages. The final events of his life came close to an open alliance of his mind with that of traditional thought.

Like Dewey, Bergson was born in 1859, the year in which Darwin published his *Origin of Species*. The coincidence foreshadowed Bergson's own affinity for evolution. His parents were Jews, the father of Polish stock and the mother being English. From this latter fact and from a childhood spent partly in England, Bergson had a good command of the English language.

In school he was an outstanding student. Like Michelangelo and Francis Bacon, he seemed to have universal talents. He had rare gifts in mathematics. He knew physical sciences. He would doubtless have made his mark in the classics or literature, art or politics. That he settled upon philosophy as his life's work is an index that his mind preferred the universal themes, where all of his other talents, interests, and opportunities could be harmonized.

Bergson's higher studies were carried out under such influences as Ravaisson, Ollé-Laprune, and Emile Boutroux and admittedly under the strong shadows of Jules Lachelier and Maine de Biran. This whole group represented what Ravaisson called *spiritualism*, a general name for a direction of thought which opposed mere empiriological method and which exalted introspection into mind and personality as the hope of philosophy. Bergson viewed his final philosophy as belonging to this tradition; he acknowledged a deep debt to his predecessors in spiritualism. But his school-day preferences ran much more toward Mill and toward Spencer than to their French adversaries, and he moved with these two English minds into a materialism at great variance with his maturer thought.

Bergson taught at various lyceums in France for seventeen years, and after two years of lecturing at a teacher's college, he was named in 1900 to a chair at the Collège de France, the highest active academic honor in French philosophy. This post he held until his resignation in 1921, relinquishing his chair to an erstwhile disciple, Edouard Le Roy. As a tribute that Bergson was much

more than a philosopher teaching a system of technical detail, he was awarded the Nobel prize for literature in 1929. Many other honors were heaped on him during his life—in France, in England, and in America where he was a guest lecturer at Columbia University for the year 1912–1913. His later years were marred by declining health, though his mind continued to remain extremely active. Humiliated by the events in his native land which brought physical tragedy to his race and great mental torment to himself, Bergson lived to the age of 82, dying on January 4, 1941. The unusual request stated in his will must be reserved for later discussion after examining his intellectual itinerary.

The mere recital of Bergson's biography, with the mention of his academic and literary triumphs can only present a skeleton of the man he was. From his early days as a teacher, he was a veritable magnet of men, commanding their attention by the beauty of his style, pervading their minds with the force of his depth-perception, and sealing their interest with the appeal to personality which he never ceased making in his philosophy. Speaking without notes and without memorizing his lectures, he brought his thought as intimately into the living world as he claimed the mind should go. When he reached his exalted post at the Collège de France, by tradition more of a learned laboratory where scholars give public lectures and not a school where credits are obtained, his weekly appearances were Parisian high lights, with vast throngs storming the hall for admission. Similar honor was paid him in England and America. Though a man of rare learning, he was convinced that philosophy should be brought down to the people; and as few others, he succeeded in making that difficult descent.

His books belong to literature as much as to philosophy. His finely chiseled style and his rich metaphor seem to unite with the beauty and simplicity of the life he proclaimed. The most important of these works are his *Creative Evolution* which gives his general view of the cosmos; *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion,* which carries out his earlier themes on a moral and religious level; *Time and Free Will,* a treatise on psychology; *Matter and Memory,* another study of man with stress on the mind-body problem; and his *Introduction to Metaphysics,* the best separate study of his doctrine on intuition.

THE NEW HERACLITUS

Newton saw an apple fall from a tree and, the story goes, was led by the accident to his theory of universal gravitation. Rousseau's whole system fanned out from a chance occurrence also, the reading of an advertisement. While taking a walk one day in the city of Clermont-Ferrand during his early teaching career, Bergson was meditating, he records, on the paradoxes of Zeno when it suddenly flashed into his mind that mathematics took no account of genuine time but dealt only with an outer and symbolic husk of duration. As Mozart claimed to have heard all of his pieces in a single instant of inspiration, so the whole mansion of Bergson's thought seemed blueprinted in that fateful walk.

Bergson was not the first to be fascinated by the idea of time. Augustine gave up in his attempt to form a clear idea of it, and Kant was so impressed by its dominion in the real world that he put it above the real and in the mind of man. In Bergson's case, there issued a violent stand against Kant and against the physico-mathematical method which Kantianism boasts of grounding. To appreciate his new approach, Bergson challenged men not to look outward from the transcendental ego of Kant but to gaze inside themselves where the flux of reality can be forcefully felt.

Today, Bergson said, I am not the same person as I was yesterday. Time has coursed along. Today's experiences, in turn, are disposing me for tomorrow's. New thoughts, new images, new emotions are charging through my being, and with the assimilation of each of these, there is a perpetual growth of my personality.

In a famous metaphor of Bergson, the mind is like a snowball, rolling along continually in time and ever growing as it moves. Heraclitus had propounded a similar view when he said that no man can swim in the same stream twice. Cratylus, his disciple, held that no man could swim there even once. Santayana had the example of a man running down the bank to swim again in the water where he had bathed upstream. But it turns out that the bank has been in constant motion also. In a Heraclitean paraphrase of Bergson, this new philosophy would hold that the snowball can never roll twice over the same snow and that the mind is like the snowball.

Bergson frowns upon the modern methods of counting and

measuring the material world. He enjoins man to reflect on himself. In such an act, the very addition of the reflection changes his personality that he tried to reflect upon, so that he can never recover what he was when the reflection began. More snow is packed around the periphery of the ball, covering the preceding layer and hiding it from view. In a kindred manner, Bergson invites his readers to reflect on their freedom, and he would lead them to the conclusion that it is indefinable because it is pure motion. Irreducible to a concept, it can only be experienced.

Armed with the apparent introspective evidence that thought and will, the person of man, are forever a-flow, Bergson assaulted in his earliest work the so-called psychophysics of Gustav Fechner and Wilhelm Wundt which treated vital action in terms of measures and gave a quantitative report on what is purely qualitative. From this area, he widened out into an attack upon the whole empiriological method of modern thought and even upon the claims of orthodox philosophies. As if continuing to expand the travelogue from his walk in Clermont-Ferrand, he grew ever more eloquent on the theme that reality is pure duration or motion and that this wholesale flux is totally unsuspected, unsought, and untouched by conventional approaches to the real.

Time for the mathematician, said Bergson, is only a line in space, and when the physicist adopts a mathematical formalism to depict his subject matter, he confuses this static line with the real dynamism of physical time. In this mathematico-physical scheme, time ceases to move at all; the moving world is pictured by a series of immobilities; the idea of succession is buried under its dead substitute which is not a continuum of moving moments but a juxtaposition of points.

In modern physics, the future and the past, Bergson added, are nothing but segments of a line in space, as though they were not heterogeneous to each other and to the present which is now flowing. Let the tempo of time be stepped up, Bergson often said, and all events would transpire two, three, or n times faster than their present rate; but with his clocks likewise accelerated, the empiriological observer would never know the difference.

The typical tool of modern physics is the calculus. But this mathematical discipline attacks a moving object by splitting its trajectory into intervals, so that once anew motion descends to the

level of a mere mosaic. Einstein's theory impressed Bergson. He wrote a book on relativity, viewing it as a vote for the motions of the world which classical physics completely ignored by its atomism and eluded by its language. But despite its intentions, relativity is also evaluated by Bergson as a system of measurement in which lines and points replace motion, and time again is a simple geometry of clocks.

A realist would second Bergson in his criticism of empiriological methods. Motion does evade them, and when they soar into the mathematical order, they lose hold of the rich mine of physical experience which number and measure cannot detect. But when Bergson invaded the territory of genuine philosophy and claimed to find there only the idols which modern empiriological methods were worshipping, he went too far. He reached a point where in reality even his own habits of thought and the value of their written expression would lose meaning. Kant deserved the severity of Bergson, but Kant is not philosophy. The concept in Kant is not really a thought but a mathematical point, a frame of reference. It is neither acceptable in a realistic ontology, nor does it do justice to the vitality of the human intellect. Kant's doctrine of the concept should obviously have been over-turned, and because of it and of the positivism which it bred, the criticism against Bergson might be tempered by its historical occasion.

But it was the opinion of Bergson, as it was of Kant, that the human mind tended naturally to illusion. He brought his powerful introspective tools and his literary elegance to the task of essaying proof that the mind always spatializes the dynamic and always stops the clock of temporal flow while it substitutes its concept of immobility. Man, said Bergson, feels at home only among geometrical solids, and he tends to frame the whole of experience in this three-dimensional mold. Redolent of James, Bergson declared that intelligence is pragmatic of necessity and that man is a *homo sapiens* only after being first a *homo faber*. Logic, he argued, is only a degenerate geometry, and the whole of empiriological physics is only a "logic spoiled."

It is true that in the climate where Bergson matured, there was nothing really living and present in the way change and mobility were explained. There was the materialism of Le Dantec in biology, the historicism of Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl in sociology, the

psychophysics of Ribot and Taine. Laplace's notion was resounding through the empiriological disciplines, that a mind transcendent enough could see the whole future in the past and present, as though the whole of reality were really given and as though nothing could be truly new. Bergson made the same charge against the universe of Leibniz where all change was "pre-established" and was in a way given before it occurred. In all these doctrines, the mind is unable to do justice to the novel element which motion begets and which leaves more to the world at the end of a change than there was before.

Bergson continued to call up examples of duration, concluding that the universe of modern physics did not really endure. He pushed his attack on common sense, holding that it too turned a living time into a spatial ghost. In the Bergsonian world, there was hardly anything but novelty, "the continual elaboration of the absolutely new." He proposed a world that was nothing but time, change, and even chance, where "we are creating ourselves continually." The snowball could never turn into even a snow man. It could never pause long enough in its rolling. But unlike in Heidegger, Sartre, and even Jaspers, time is not a mere limit; rather it is a liberation of men, and as the past "gnaws" into the future it invites man to join it not by intelligence but by intuition.

THE INTUITION OF TIME

The notion of intuition is an original and at the same time a most difficult doctrine in the philosophy of Bergson. He sets it off against analysis, the ordinary habit of the mind which moves around its object, symbolizes it, translates it into an alien tongue, composes it with other objects into judicial form, but never goes inward to its real nature. Jacques Maritain, once a disciple of Bergson at least loosely, contrasts perinoetic and dianoetic intellection. Analysis in Bergson's view is certainly perinoetic. It immobilizes what is moving and enduring and turns what is simple into a plurality. Consider, Bergson was fond of saying, the swinging of a human arm through an arc in space. Viewed analytically and from the outside, this movement has the aspect of multiplicity, and the observer could never succeed in exhausting the divisibility of its trajectory. He could cut inches into fractions of inches, but he could never reach the smallest fraction of the original curve.

But from within, the movement is one and simple, and the agent is fully aware of the fact. From the agent's viewpoint, there is none of the infinite series or the interrupted states by which the observer considers the operation when he measures it. It is just a difference between the many and the one, the divided and the simple, the static and the mobile, which sets intuition apart from analysis.

As a first approximation then, it should be remarked that intuition does not remain on the peripheries of its objects. It changes over into them. It bathes in that Heraclitean stream where a man can swim only once. Having dived into the stream, it moves as the water flows instead of standing on the bridges overhead to analyze the movement from a distance. This physical identifying of subject and object, which intuition provides, Bergson expresses by the term *sympathy* in the original etymological sense of "feeling with . . ." His view is stronger than that of empathy, an idea introduced by Theodore Lipps to describe an aesthetic experience. It is difficult to find an analogue to Bergson's theory of knowledge in the whole history of philosophy, unless it be the notion of "ecstasis" in Plotinus.

As a form of sympathy, intuition moves into the mobile and moves with it. It calls on imagination to complete it and certainly, at least in its higher phases, on the will. A unique act, it pierces into the identity of its object and realizes, without forming a concept, what it has of the mobile and the ineffable. Where intelligence analyzes and counts, intuition becomes the thing that it knows and does so physically. Where common sense spatializes, intuition becomes one with duration coursing through the real. Where mathematics constructs solid bodies, intuition stays with experience at its own and fluid level. Where philosophy conceptualizes, intuition is a concrete experience.

But this intuitive power coiled to spring into reality and vibrate with reality's own inner rhythms is not only for an intellectual elite or for what will later be called the moral aristocracy among us. Though in its highest sense intuition is achieved only by the few who have prepared themselves for the experience in an ascetic way, a dim insight into the mobile nature of reality is available to all. The simple reflection on ourselves, it is argued, enables us to grasp by intuitive sympathy that ceaseless flux that is, on a

profounder plane, our very life and being and the being of everything else. Attention to the passage of time inside of us and even outside of us leads to the grasp of that pure energy which is motion and is everything. Think long enough about freedom, Bergson entreats, and you will find that it is a process.

But man, the maker, ordinarily squirms away from these inner probings of his own being. He prefers to naturalize his intellect in a geometrical world. Bergson refers to the "morseling" of reality as the natural desire of the human intelligence, a tendency to chop the fluid world into neat and static solids. When pressed for an ultimate reason behind this principle, Bergson works over evolution until he concludes to a pragmatism in the lower nature which produced man.

DIVERGENT EVOLUTIONISM

Creative Evolution is the source book of Bergsonian cosmology. MacDougall and Lloyd Morgan speak of *emergent* evolution, and their term may be adapted to characterize Bergson as a *divergent* evolutionist. He develops such a scheme in *Creative Evolution* and then applies it to the moral and religious spheres in *The Two Sources.*

In his early thinking, Bergson favored the evolutionism of Herbert Spencer who combined Darwin and Kant. Evolutionism was steadily gaining ground as Bergson reached maturity; in fact *The Origin of Species* was the birthmark for the philosophy of his generation. But the genius of Bergson did not simply repeat biological theory and pass it off as philosophical fact. The last pages of *Creative Evolution* reject Spencer on the familiar score of morseling reality.

There are even stronger arguments against Darwinism and neo-Darwinism for their naïve view that mechanical and even accidental variations could be the root cause for the vast and ordered panorama of the living world. Weismann had already slowed down the Darwinian march by showing that the somatic cells of the body are out of contact with the germ cells that account for reproduction; there is no experimental evidence that acquired characteristics are hereditary and there is even evidence that they are not. Modern evolutionisms have not shown sufficient respect for Weismann's logic.

But Bergson was much more decisive. He opposed all mechanisms. He challenged the whole view of studying life as a system of cogwheels. He found in Darwinian evolution a mechanical projection of man's own tendencies to study things by mechanizing them. Such obsession with the mechanical often prompts a materialist to argue: "There is no soul in man because I have never seen it under a microscope."

According to Bergson, finalism, as typified by Leibniz, is likewise a human taste transferred to the cosmos. In such a view as a Leibnizian pre-established harmony, he went on, movement becomes a quasi-mechanical realization of a planned whole. It is as though all were given and nothing could be truly new. It is as though man, the fabricator, were asking the cosmos to be built like one of his own machines. How can movement take place when all is given and pre-established?

Nevertheless, though rejecting the historical forms of teleology, Bergson allied his own views to a type of finalism. The bearer of the finalizing thrust was not an Aristotelian form or a Leibnizian monad but a new face in philosophy which Bergson called the vital impetus (*l'élan vital*).

The identity of this new reality can be best sorted by a reflection on motion and on the pure duration which the earlier Bergson had exalted into the first and only principle of things. The vital force, he maintained, existed at the origin of all process and is spreading out, like the concentric circles of a wave, as it now charges through the material world.

Who or what started the impetus, who packed the powder into it for what Bergson called its pyrotechnics in the cosmos, the author does not say, though it is difficult to back up the charges that Bergson was a pantheist. The arguments for the existence and nature of the vital impetus are largely a description of its activities. Thus does Bergson, an archfoe of empiriological methods, adopt their descriptive techniques anyway, without bothering to move beyond for a discussion of first origins and ultimate ends. The vital impetus is simply "there" to be observed and followed in the trail it blazes and known more by examples than in its true self. This inconsistency of repudiating analysis and then using it should not be astonishing. To deny first principles and the very nature of intelligence and then to go on and form a philosophy is to go

directly contrary to the skeptical position which all anti-intellectualisms ought to take.

Characteristic of the vital impetus is both a cumulative tendency and a tendency to dissociate or split up into fragments that in turn energize new areas of space in a kind of chain reaction. But this dissociation or mobile tendency is not merely a mechanical affair. It is a swelling and an advance. It tends to promote organization. Passing from one generation to another, the impulse gains like the familiar snowball, bulging out into plant and animal life and finally acquiring sufficient riches to produce man.

But what is the reason for the delayed action? Why does not this tremendous surge of vital energy course at once to the achievement of man, omitting all the intervening evolutionary stages? The answer is that matter opposes the vital impetus. As in a magnet within a field of iron filings or as in electricity flowing through a wire, there is a reluctance or resistance to the vital movement as if an Aristotelian matter, the drag element on motion, refused to be coerced by the form. "When a shell bursts," said Bergson, "the particular way it breaks is explained by both the explosive force of the powder it contains and by the resistance of the metal. So of the way life breaks into individuals and species."

Matter may be called dissociative also, but the dissociation of the vital élan is of a different order and kind. The division of the vital impetus is one of spontaneity, generosity, and the desire to share its superabundance. Matter on the other hand tends to immobilize itself, to resist, and when it divides the vital energies charging into it, what it really aims at is the conservation of itself; it has an associative, annucleating character, and so it fights off the vital impulse. Like a watershed dividing the water or like an airplane wing splitting the flow of air, matter is the inertial factor in the path of the vital current, and where matter appears, there individuals and species are born. Yet matter's separative and divisive character does not always seem to block the vital impetus. In a way, it furthers it since the impetus itself is dissociative, and when matter forces it to split, it really does what the vital élan would tend to do of itself.

All philosophers have their contrary principles. In Aristotle, it was matter and form. In Alfred Adler, it is the will to power and the will to community. In Freud, it is the instinct for death and the

instinct for "life." In Alexander, it is space and time. Bergson was acute enough to see the contrarieties in our world which even the primitive, pre-Aristotelian cosmologies had proclaimed. He regarded his vital impulse as enriched by cumulative and dissociative tendencies. He even pointed out that they are antagonistic in one way and complementary in another, divisive and unitive with the one equally necessary for the other's activity.

A student of biology as well as of the other and more physical disciplines of modern times, Bergson supplied copious examples of a technical sort to back his claims for the bifurcated tendencies in life. On a large scale, the plant world represents the cumulative or conservative aspect of the vital impulse. Stationary, the vegetables spend no energy in search of food. They rather store energy for themselves and for the animal life that feeds on them. Nature, since it requires this stationary and cumulative form of life allowed the plant world to remain after it had developed the nervous system in animals. Animals in turn are active and mobile, reflections of the dissociative bent in the vital impetus. They seek their food; they move; they react to stimuli because of a nervous system.

Realistically enough, though plant life is portrayed as cumulative and the animal world as dissociative, Bergson would not admit that either tendency is found in pure form among the two lower kingdoms of life. But he does hold of these regions that there is a sufficient difference between plant and animal to exemplify the existence of his two tendencies. The co-operation of the two kingdoms, with the world being the familiar balanced aquarium and terrarium, can be explained by the fact that the two tendencies were originally combined and hence, when separated, still behave in that harmony that always strikes our admiration.

The cumulative tendency, charging matter first with merely vegetative life, finally spills over into action. Animals are more supple than plants. They are less constricted by space and more versatile against opposition. They expend more energy, and by the variety and spontaneity of their movements they reflect a greater originality, discontinuity, and dissociation than the plant, cumulative to a notable degree, is able to boast. As the process of life swells onward through the evolutionary course, higher and higher species are produced; for one of the basic marks of the impetus is the creation of the absolutely new.

It is no wonder that the existence of the vital impulse should escape the notice of the empiriological disciplines. They start out with the moving and work toward static forms which are their final report on the real. They have no conscience for growth and development; they view all progress as a mechanical association of the previously given, without adverting to life as a scattering, dissociative, and contagious thing that always becomes more so. In this sense, Bergson views himself as climbing back up the stairway which empiriological physics descends. The more the vital impetus grows, the harder it is to keep it from splitting, out of its own spontaneous élan; but this dissociation which increases with evolutionary advance is the exact opposite of the mechanical view which sees the whole of evolution as a trend toward mechanical unity. It is the presence of this inner directive principle in the world which leads Bergson to cast his lot with some sort of finalism rather than with mechanism.

At the apex of its achievements, the vital impulse so prevailed over matter as to produce man. But as the plant was both cumulative and dissociative with accent on the former and as the animal, endowed with both tendencies, shows more of the latter, so man owns a bifurcated nature. At the human level, the contrast is between intelligence and instinct.

But Bergson reverses the order which these two faculties occupy in the traditional hierarchy, taking instinct as akin to intuition and renewing his attack on intelligence as an exercise in geometry. Instinct at the non-human level is painted as a faculty of spontaneity; it is essentially a biological realtity and is orientated toward organic operations. It is spontaneous and effervescent. It is simple and sure of itself. It is an index of the animal's transcendance of lower life. Intelligence on the other hand is more cumulative. It holds back; it is hesitant. It is essentially not a vital surge that puts man back into the stream of life. It is a toolmaking faculty that prefers to work not on life but on matter, to work in the geometrical fashion which permits duration to be ignored. The intellect is essentially pragmatic in the Jamesian sense, and it is only on the solid, if Bergson is believed, that man can get a hold. Intellect is prone to store energy rather than spend it, and so it parallels once anew its counterpart of matter which tends to block the vital impulse and to concentrate rather than grow.

The customary Bergsonian concreteness once again offers numerous examples from the animal world to show the nature of instinct, its aims, its successes, and its vitality. Like intelligence, instinct makes instruments; the swallow builds a nest, the beaver a dam. But the striking characteristic of instinctive action is a simplicity of operation and a perfection of result. Man's work is more calculating and less organized. It requires special efforts and a careful attention to all detail. It is less immediate, less spontaneous, and less satisfying in its results, since a human tool is not completed by one stroke but is always open to improvement. In this sense, man's products are less organized than the fruits of instinct and less efficacious.

But as the plant stored vital energy until it over-flowed into the animal world, so there comes a time in man's intellectual career when he accumulates enough of the vital élan to enjoy a surplus. It is then that man can recover the vitality which the development of intelligence has cost him, and instinct, recovered at this human plane, is what Bergson means by intuition.

In fact, man has never lost this instinctive power. It remains within all men as one of the two ubiquitous tendencies of the vital impulse, lurking on the fringes of intelligence until pragmatic man can rest from his geometrical labor and call it back to action. In this new context of its evolutionary progress, instinct can receive a "push" from intelligence itself and thus reach heights wholly impossible in its lower estates. No man is wholly devoid of that consciousness of his own being or of that flux which freedom witnesses and time proves. The philosopher's task is to lead the way to these moments of sheer motion and vitality, to spread them, to unite them in their wholes, and to point from all the evidence thus gathered to the nature of mind, its origins and its history. In such opulent moments, time is freed from the spatial and static molds where the intellect relegates it in order to pursue pragmatic ends. Freedom becomes alive and felt. Gathering the past, present, and future into a single sweep of intuition, the mind lives backward to its origins and forward to its goals. It sloughs off the geometrical shell by which the intellect obscures the nature of things.

So instinct, at this human level, is by no means a purely animal

affair. It has a much loftier form and, as a scholastic would say, it resembles its animal counterpart only by analogy.

MORALITY AND RELIGION

Bergson spent more than twenty-five years in the preparation of his final great work, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.* Seldom has a study of its size been so patiently prepared and so eagerly awaited by a philosophical public, interested as it was in the final direction of Bergson's great mind. In many respects, this important work repeats on the moral and religious scale the same themes that run through his cosmology. But from another viewpoint, it strikes out toward a new dimension which brought Bergson close to the traditional religion of his country.

A vaster study of Bergson, setting him against his background and showing that, as a true philosopher, he learned, when he could, from men whom he opposed, would have to expand on the views of Durkheim and of Lévy-Bruhl, his contemporaries. These descendants of Auguste Comte were outstanding spokesmen for sociologism, the study of man by historical descriptions of his cultural habits and social customs and especially by a study of the primitive mind which, as evolutionism would proclaim, reflects human nature untainted by the arbitrary conventions which it later adopted. When you oppose a man in an argument, it is highly effective to take his own method and derive results at variance with his. To a great extent this is what Bergson did. In his earlier works, he had criticized the descriptive method as taking only snaphots of historical processes. Now he examines the data of sociology and ethnology to crown his philosophy with a theological meaning.

The Two Sources, by its very title, already indicates allegiance to the divergency of principle which the earlier mind of Bergson had detected in the universe as a whole. In the moral order, there are two motives, one of pressure and one of aspiration.

From the first comes an ethic in which duty and obligation are predominant norms, and among the societies where this morality is found are very primitive peoples. For their minds, it is argued, remained close to lower nature, their predecessor in the lineage of evolution. There is more of the cumulative spirit than a sponta-

neity, and this is shown by the primitive stress of formalism and ritual. A moral law is a command, like an unbreakable law of nature, and habits harden into a conformism rather than loosen themselves toward genuine vitality and progress. A society favoring this morality is a closed one. It is static and conservative. It corresponds much more to the preference of intelligence than to the flow of the vital impetus which, on the animal level, is exhibited best by instinct. Society pressures the individual into action rather than takes its own from the originality of the individuals comprising it. In this respect, there is a residue of habits held over from the animal stage of evolution where the individual exists for the species and there are pronounced gregarious instincts. This static morality of the closed society views obedience as a resistance to self.

The open society is something different. Here the moral force is in the form not of pressure but of appeal, and reversing the slope of the closed society, the propulsive energy is from individuals rather than institutions and custom. More especially, there are "moral geniuses" whose own personal inspiration scatters among others with the contagion of the vital impetus. Such personalities are not coldly and calculatingly intellectual, weighing values by the mere give-and-take of justice and pragmatically seeking their own rewards for labor. They are spiritually centered, and their spirit has a way of stirring others. Of such a cloth are, for example, the founders of religious orders, who awaken in the minds of others a wish to be disciples. Indefinable in their power, they create a new atmosphere in which emotion and inspiration abound.

Reversing or at least expanding a previous terminology which allied the intellect with formalism and convention, Bergson describes the closed morality as infra-intellectual and the open one as supra-intellectual. In this same vein, he speaks of two kinds of emotions, one rather animal in nature and following upon a mental interpretation, the other charging out beyond intelligence and creative of ideas rather than obeying them. Great artists, Bergson writes, experience such creative emotions, and great moral leaders spread them as their seeds rather than find them as the fruits of their moral doctrine. This means simply that the supra-intellectual emotion is the vital impetus, working in the realm of spirit and pulling men after them like the snowball on the snow.

To a rank outsider who has never caught the atmosphere of

these moral geniuses, their communities look undesirable, unworthy, or at least without meaning. But a man who has felt their vitality knows that he is lofted above his old life, and he does not care to return to it. Instinct and emotion in this supra-intellectual dominion are other ways of describing Bergsonian intuition. Between the infra-intellectual morality and the supra-intellectual one stands intelligence, according to the final vocabularly of Bergson — intelligence, the pragmatic fabricator of things, which mediates between the lower and the higher moral codes and puts one into the service of the other.

The open and closed moralities are the divergent principles of the vital impulse, but here as elsewhere Bergson declines to isolate his two tendencies. They work side by side, and even where the morality is closed and static, the open one lingers at its fringes. Present morality in western society is a mixture between individual impulsion and social constraint. Indeed, the higher morality will always require the lower not only to prepare its arrival but to provide the vehicle for its expression. Yet there is a difference in dignity, power, and vitality. The closed morality must be constantly expanded to support the higher vitality pumped into it. It must keep itself supple so that the vital impetus will not be suppressed.

In religion, as in morality, there is a duality of type. One class of religions is static, and like its counterpart on the moral plane, it is much more the servant of intelligence than its liberator. Bergson's expeditions into ethnology justify the conclusion, he claims, that the static religion is a "defensive reaction against the dissolvent power of intelligence." It is the notion of death which prompts the vital impulse to develop the idea of religion in this static type of society. For intelligence, pragmatic as it is, effects a conquest of nature and leads that progressive advance of men which is called civilization. In this fashion, the environment is tamed or limited, and the intellect, aware of such limits, develops a depression which the vital impetus offsets by religion.

Religion, in Bergson's own words, thus compensates for the disappointment of the intellect over the limited character of what it does. For the vital impetus is far more optimistic than intelligence. To oppose the intellect's conception of closures and of death, it turns man to an afterlife. Pessimism surely results when the intellect measures the distance between the achievements of men

and their desires, and it is the vital impetus, pointing toward another world where justice will be done, that restores even the scales of this life into a balance.

But far different is the dynamic religion. Like its analogue which is the open morality, it is simply the vital energy freed from the restrictions of matter and intelligence, and flooding the soul with the bounty of its being. The prototype of dynamic religion is the mystic. In him, the vitality of animal instinct is retrieved and hoisted aloft until a physical contact is established with the reality that is God.

After a painstaking study of mysticism, Bergson rejects the non-Christian varieties as inauthentic. Plotinus, though claiming the experience of ecstasy never got beyond the preliminary stages of mysticism; the Buddhists, to take another example, show by the cold and purely contemplative life they lead that their religion has not transported them deep down to the divine springs of truly mystical experience where the consequence is warmth and action and a social message.

As examples of Christian mysticism, Bergson singles out St. Paul, St. Theresa, St. John of the Cross. He examines their testimony on their experiences, he studies their lives, he compares their work. He finds them in remarkable agreement with each other in the report on their experiences and in the dynamic life patterns which they were driven to adopt.

But who or what is the object of mystical experience? Bergson declares that it is God, and Divinity is not here a blind cosmic force or any pantheistic identity. The God of Bergson is the God of the Johannine gospel and of St. John of the Cross. God is love. God is generosity. In the experience of the genuine Christian mystics, there is an intuition of God, and as the aftermath of their mystical elevation, they moved back into the world to inspire men by their love and to love men by their inspiration, as if—still resonating with their experience of Divinity—they were bearing God's love to all men. Mystics are the true dynamic energies of society. They are its saving "moral geniuses." They stir it toward new progress and fan out the sparks of their mystical ardor into other hearts and minds. They are a tribute to the dissociative success of the vital impulse.

Why is it, however, that to non-mystics mysticism seems so much

of an esoteric and even incredible way of life? There are many today who would look upon mysticism as outmoded; some who would even scoff at it; others who would plead a lack of understanding.

The explanation of all this is that an outsider looks upon a mystic with the eyes of an intellect. He does not advert to that vital energy on the fringe of his own intelligence which mysticism intensifies and carries forward. The mystic does not speak the language of the non-mystic. If an observer, instead of trying to analyze mysticism by his intelligence, would call upon his vital élan for appreciating the mystic, he would not only understand but follow the truly vital way of life, like the man who came to mock but remained to pray.

What, after all, was the authority of accepting Livingstone's report on Africa? Men simply knew that what he described was a geographical fact and that they could make the same safari if they had the time, money, and interest. So it is with mysticism. There is no basis for denying the spiritual map they so carefully draw, especially since every explorer going over the road returns with the same story. Turning inward upon the flux of existence, all men can likewise discern in paler form the purity and the power that makes the mystic real and his message a realism. Vibrating around intelligence is the intuitive, emotional, supra-intellectual periphery which is a survival of previous animal instincts and is capable of plunging every man beyond intelligence and beyond himself.

The decisions to which Bergson was driven in *The Two Sources* could not but rework his own spiritual vision. He had often expressed his admiration for Aquinas, and his concordance with him on numerous issues. In *The Two Sources,* he rejected Judaeic mysticism in declaring for the Christian type as the only authentic experience of Divinity.

Finally, Bergson gave his intellectual assent to the Catholic faith but withheld baptism in the wish, as he explained it, not to desert the fellow members of his race then persecuted throughout most of Europe. In such a state of mind he died, and in his will asked that a priest rather than a rabbi pray over his body. The Archbishop of Paris permitted this to be done.

In appealing to men to "live back" intelligence to its roots,

Bergson thus finally came to the source of life itself and, in a way, to the source of supernature.

SOME CRITICAL REMARKS

This chapter began with a eulogy of Bergson and a declaration that he belongs not only among the world's great geniuses but to that broader intellectual corpus which is called "perennial philosophy." Taken verbatim, the foregoing analysis would not at first sight appear to justify such an evaluation. Indeed, to find the philosophies prefiguring Bergson's it is not to the middle ages but to Plotinus and even to Heraclitus that one must revert. But there is a fortunate distinction made by Maritain between the Bergsonism of fact and the Bergsonism of intention, and in this latter spirit, Bergson seemed flying with the truth of perennial philosophy but at a different altitude.

The three convergent lines of his thought — in psychology, cosmology, and morals — all appear directed toward profound truths, at least toward their fragments. All reformers must turn against the age which they reform, and Bergson was an alien in the world of scientism which has provided the climate for twentieth-century man.

It is to the glory of Bergson, if one may use Gilson's phrase, that he insisted on the tight connection between the notion of knowledge and the nature of life between the highest act of knowing and the highest vital action. Modern methods have converted mind into a reference point, removed from the world it examines and playing the role, in the ideal case, only of an instrument recording data.

The epistemology and psychology of realism would strongly second the spirit, if not the letter, of Bergson on this point. Intelligence, for a genuine realist, is nothing but the highest form of vitality where the immanent action, characteristic of life, is so intense that there is a self-reflection in the ambit of knowledge and a self-determination in the activity of will. Intelligence is living, or rather man lives humanly by the life of intelligence. To turn the mind into a mere register of data, like a piece of litmus paper, is to kill it, and Bergson attempted to call the mind from the tomb in which Kant had buried it. But reason was too well embalmed by the undertakers that followed Kant to hear the call of Bergson,

and for the time being, his message, especially in America has been lost.

Also in his study of knowledge, Bergson was right in his indictment of the empiriological disciplines for reducing their report to quantity, unsuspecting that matter is mobile and that motion is the first and most striking manifestation of nature. The Kantian categories and the positivism which Kant bred fall under the same blows; they never come to terms with the deeper stirrings of nature which refuse to be fitted into formalism and measure.

Genuine philosophy, on the other hand, considers being with reference to motion in the first order of abstraction and with reference to existence in the third. It insists that being and the general truths about it can be known with certainty, not in the concept which is only an initial phase of knowledge but in the judgment where knowledge takes on its proper character as knowledge. When Bergson attacked the efficacity of ideas, he never showed a clear grasp of what he was opposing. He seemed ever to confuse an idea with its concomitant image. He did not advert amply enough to the act of judgment, in which concepts are combined, as the logician says, and existence is met, and being, as it is in the exterior order, is truly known.

In this light, Gilson views the completion of essence both in real being and in our cognition of the real as bringing the essence and our knowledge of it into relation to something beyond essence, beyond the concept, beyond the intelligible, namely, the reality of existence. It may have been a weak grasp of this truth that Bergson enjoyed but exaggerated. True philosophy must be a study of the concrete, the existing, the real, and a good effect of Bergson has been to recall a genuine metaphysics to a reconsideration of such a salutary existentialism.

In elaborating the second theme described in the foregoing pages, that of cosmology, Bergson showed a firm grip on the dualistic character of nature, which Aristotle had discerned before him and had treated in his doctrine of matter and form. The universe that Bergson opposed was the pluralism of modern analytic methods, the indifferent world of positivism, and the mechanical evolutionism that sprung from Darwin. The universe that he substituted, though greatly overdrawn and hence to be carefully criticized before acceptance, shows a respect for the

dissociative tendency in things which is evidence of matter and for the cumulative principles of nature which are called forms.

Man is at home in a matter-form universe where the objects of his mind and of his will are familiarly proportioned to his own matter-form structure and operation. There is great merit to Bergson when he argues from the original unity of the vital impetus to the affinity between man and the world in which he lives; in this Bergsonian universe, the mind should not be frightened like a stranger or impelled to control and coerce the environment as though it were nothing but an enemy. Bergson saw that tremendous chasm which scientism had dug between man and nature, and he attempted to close the gap by requiring man's physical identity with the real world in intuition.

Finally, the Bergsonian divisions of morality and religion are not without wholesome parallels and genuine value. There are obviously two ways of obeying a law and leading a life, one out of fear and the other out of love. Love of course is the higher motive; it is the fullness of the law. On the supernatural plane, the gospel urges charity against the eye-for-an-eye and tooth-for-a-tooth morality which Christianity supplemented. Bergson provides many rich analogies for traditional moral philosophers and theologians.

But despite all the positive contributions of Bergsonism and despite the suggestions which it inspires for a genuine metaphysics, it cannot be accepted at its face value. In a general way, it was already answered by Aristotle when he refuted Heraclitus. A world of pure motion would blur all distinctions in things, dissolving them into a continuum; and with the denial of first principles thoughts like things become impossible. Experience and reason reject this dynamism. Indeed, it is a sheer impossibility to detect that flux in our own selves which Bergson held discoverable to introspection. For to probe our changing states, there must be somewhere within them an abiding standard that retains its identity throughout the changes.

There may be, there obviously is, a changing world outside of us, and there is equally strong evidence for change in man. It is difficult to put a physical finger or the light of imagination on just what there is in us that persists in change. But we know that it is the same self throughout its changes. We know that Bergson,

the venerable octogenarian, was the same person who took a famous walk in Clermont-Ferrand. He grew constantly in between; he became a teacher, a writer, a biologist, a psychologist, a philosopher. He was accumulating new knowledge and new experience even in his last days. But throughout the rich career which Bergson enjoyed, he remained the same man and the same person. When in 1928, it was announced that he had won the Nobel prize for the preceding year, he was the same man when he received the honor as he was the year before when he earned it.

His intuitionism goes too far when it calls for a physical insertion of the knowing subject into the pure duration which he is supposed to intuit. Knowledge, truly enough, becomes its object; but it does not do so physically. It becomes what it knows intentionally and while remaining itself. Knowledge implies the identity between the subject and object but at the same time the consciousness of their distinction. Without this latter qualification, the knower would lose his own identity in the object and hence his knowledge of it. The knower would not know that *he* knew because the *he* would have vanished.

Bergson's doctrine of mysticism occasioned reams of literature. Actually, the discussion and solution of this question belongs not to philosophy but to theology since it involves an experience which no creature in the state of nature can accomplish, the intuition of God.

The possibility of mysticism is not to be disputed. Mysticism is a fact, and the questions remaining are what it is and how it can be. In an area beyond the boundaries where philosophy has its writ, the answer lies in man's obediential potency to God and in the character of supernatural grace.

The Bergson morality also errs by excess. In emphasizing the so-called supra-intellectual "emotion" which is termed a cause of ideas rather than the effect, there may be a hint of what the scholastics called syndaeresis, the tendency of the will to do good and avoid evil: this is a spontaneous natural thrust of the will and cannot be derived from intelligence. But in its final contours, the Bergsonian morality underestimates intelligence and could easily lead to "a morality of sentiment" despite the author's rejection of such an ethic. It may also be objected that philosophy, unaided by theology, could not inspire that moral aristocracy which

enkindles the dynamic religion and is the work of charity more than natural love.

But with all of its obvious exaggerations. Bergsonism commends itself to further probing by "perennial philosophy," so that its deep insights might be digested and assimilated into that historical organism of thought, eager for truth wherever it may be. Henri Bergson towers above the field of battle where modern philosophies have fought each other and then perished while fresh forces moved up to continue the fray.

Ben-Ami Scharfstein, an American scholar, has challenged the originality of Bergson, making him out as the synthesis of existing ideas rather than a new enterpriser in philosophy. It is true that when Bergson began his philosophical career, there were deep stirrings against scientism in men like Fouillée and his stepson, Guyau; in men like Maine de Biran, who exalted the sentiment of enthusiasm inside of man as evidence of his deeper dynamism and whom Bergson acknowledged as a master; in men like Ravaisson and Lachelier who belonged to the tradition of French spiritualism, where Bergson deliberately put his own thought.

But there was more than plagiarism in that fateful walk in Clermont-Ferrand. There is more than a mosaic in Bergson's system. He moved far beyond his tributaries in that stream of life and thought which he pictured, and in the end, by the deeper and hence more unifying view of things that he felt he had come upon, he was the most original mind since Descartes, which Kant considered as a mere continuator of Cartesianism rather than a pioneer.

Aquinas, for example, could likewise be considered as a mere synthesizer without being original, if Scharfstein's standards are reliable. What Aquinas did was to probe deeply enough into the real to dig out the principles uniting the partial views in other systems. A similar honor belongs to Bergson.

But the laurels are not awarded in philosophy for originality. It is the realism of a doctrine which counts. In this sense, Aquinas towers even above Bergson since, in addition to being original, he was a realist. For that reason, too, his corpus of realism can easily dominate the partial truths in Bergsonism itself and thus achieve on the intellectual plane that revision of Bergson's thought which his final views in religion would make appropriate.

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CHAPTER 10 KIERKEGAARD'S DESCENT TO THE INDIVIDUAL

To be or not to be—such was the question debated by Hamlet, one of the most mysterious and melancholy characters in world literature. In an even more crucial and soul-stirring way, the same problem was posed in philosophy and in life by another melancholy Dane, Soren Kierkegaard. But Hamlet found the question easier to ask than to answer, and vacillating as he was, he left the audience to doubt whether he ever formulated a definite answer at all. Kierkegaard's achievement was to discover the answer within his own question, making for a solution even more mysterious than Hamlet's and more keenly challenging to a philosophical realist.

For Kierkegaard, the answer involved a whole new philosophy that lay dormant for a century and has come vigorously to the fore in our own day in the form of existentialism. It is a philosophy that revolts against the abstractions which have appealed to modern man and urges him toward the concrete. It turns him away from a study of objects and enjoins him to look within his existing self for the probing of the mysteries of being. It rejects the logic of judgments and of syllogisms and exalts experience over experiment. It reacts from the impersonalism of modern philosophy to accord to individuals the supreme reality of the universe.

Kierkegaard's life, true to the revealing character which his thought assigns to the concrete, was in various ways both a sign and perhaps even a cause of much that he unsaid in past philosophy and much that he said in his own. Before outlining his "system" of thought, his biography will prepare for some of the puzzling problems which his written works have bequeathed.

Kierkegaard was born in Copenhagen in 1813, the youngest of seven children. His father, a shepherd boy who rose to become a wealthy dry-goods dealer and then at the age of forty suddenly

retired, had a singular effect on Kierkegaard, the child, and Kierkegaard, the mature philosopher. From his father he inherited, he declares, imagination, dialectic, and melancholy.

After a childhood, normal with a few exceptions and permeated by the religious education which his father had carefully supervised, Kierkegaard matriculated in 1830 at the University of Copenhagen where he was to spend ten years of study preparing for a degree in theology and a career in the ministry of the Established Church of Denmark. His famous *Journal,* an intellectual diary and one of the richest works of its kind ever composed, was begun in 1833 and continued with only minor interruptions until death cut short his life in 1855.

On his twenty-second birthday, Kierkegaard's life took a deep and dramatic turn through a soul-shaking event which he called "the great earthquake." It is believed that his father revealed to him at this time that, while shepherding his flocks long ago, he had cursed God and also that he had seduced a servant girl whom he later married and who later in life became Soren's mother.

Whatever the nature of "the great earthquake," it overwhelmed the young man. The revelation, coming from this steel-boned hero whom he so admired and obeyed, alienated Soren from his father and sent him spinning into a despair and debauchery that lasted intensely for a whole year and required two more years for a full recovery. He felt, it appears, that there was a curse on his family and that his father's long life was a punishment rather than a blessing. But slowly he came out of this torture and depression. On his twenty-fifth birthday, he was reconciled with his father, apparently impressed by the sincerity of the elder's confession and by his own maturer views on human weakness.

During his prodigal period, Kierkegaard met Regina Olsen, and he fell so violently in love with her that it almost turned the pair into a Danish Beatrice and Dante. Then, still at the height of infatuation, he abruptly broke off his engagement with Regina for a reason that is another of the Kierkegaardian secrets. It is surmised that his decision was prompted by the consciousness of the family curse, the feeling of his own guilt, or the premonition of an early death. He never gave up loving Regina, even when she later married. She remained a crucial influence across his life, a theme for his thought, and a backstage character of both his aesthetic and

religious works. Underlying his decision to break off with her, there may be, as Jean Wahl observes, the failure of his philosophy to reconcile a love for man with love for God. Thus Regina Olsen would symbolize in the life of Kierkegaard the terrestial values that must be completely sacrificed to serve God.

A more complete account of Kierkegaard would have to include his skirmish with *The Corsair,* a Danish comic paper, which lampooned him but in the end only deepened his sense of self-righteousness and that feeling of being alone in a world that was dominated by the worldly. His series of articles collected under his editor's title, *Attack upon Christendom,* the summa of his views on the Established Church, would likewise require considerable attention to historical backgrounds for a more complete understanding. Kierkegaard launched out in this work against the recently deceased and highly venerated primate of Denmark, Bishop Mynster, and against his panegyrist and successor, Professor Martensen. The whole Established Church, Kierkegaard insisted, was no longer the Christianity of the gospels; instead of attending to content, it had allegedly descended to a mere formalism; instead of inwardness, it stressed externals of worship; instead of spirituality, it had embodied itself in the material. Christianity, for Kierkegaard, had no truck with externals. He says in the *Attack* that

> . . . inasmuch as Christianity is spirit, the sobriety of spirit, the honesty of eternity, there is nothing which to its detective eye is so suspicious as . . . Christian states, Christian lands, a Christian people, and (how marvelous!) a Christian world.

Kierkegaard was stricken unconscious in October, 1855, and died the following month at the age of forty-two. From childhood, he was afflicted by a spinal ailment, and death seems to have resulted from this condition. In harmony with the controverted nature of his life and thought, there was a storm over Kierkegaard even at his burial in the family plot. A nephew, claiming the right to speak as a sympathizer with Kierkegaard's aims, protested against the proposed eulogy by a minister representing that general class of churchmen so hotly opposed by the dead man, especially in the *Attack.* The nephew, not being an ordained minister, was finally silenced, but the scheduled speaker refused to deliver his oration.

THE REACTION TO HEGELIANISM

Existentialism, which began with Kierkegaard but by no means ended with him, is at heart a simple doctrine, and the mystery enfolding its tenets for the average lay reader is owed to the fact that simplicity is difficult for man to grasp. Once there is a perception of the central intuition in existentialism its finer lines seem like repetition.

Because of his psychological approach, Jean-Paul Sartre is oftentimes clearer in his mode of expression than Kierkegaard, predominantly the theologian; Karl Jaspers, the moralist; and Martin Heidegger, the metaphysician. Reflection, according to Sartre, cannot achieve that noble aim of self-knowledge which is preached by Socrates. In the reflective act, the subject bends backward on his own experience, but in the nature of bending *back*, the moment of thought is posterior to the moment of the experience. So the reality of experience eludes us.

In another way, this same opening principle can be worked out of the contrast, proposed by Locke and seconded by Kant, between thought and experience. Thought, in the opinion of existentialism, must remain outside of experience to grasp it, and because thought *is not* experience, it cannot reveal what experience *is*. The net effect is that the real meaning of ourselves and of our lives, which realism searches out of experience, slips away. As Kant assured the modern mind, intellectual knowledge can never grasp what reality *is*—except as conceptualized, hence de-ontologized, de-existentialized, de-realized.

Kierkegaard's slant on man is at times aesthetic, at times ethical, but in its final form it is theological, concerned with the problem of being a Christian according to the significance of the title, *The Point of View for My Work as an Author*. As a theologian, he has had a singular influence on Karl Barth, Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, Emil Brunner, and other leading Protestant theologians of our times. Kierkegaard was focused upon the relation of history to eternity, of approximation to faith, of aesthetics to ethics, of the individual to the general principle and to God. Thought, detached contemplation, conceptualization, systems, and generalities—such alleged formalisms fail to grasp the stuff of things and especially of man.

Kierkegaard assaulted the problem of being a Christian from three directions, not by an arbitrary choice but because in three major fields which he explored he seemed always moving inward toward the same intersection. In his *Stages on Life's Way*, commenting on the three existence-spheres — the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious — he says:

> The aesthetic sphere is that of immediacy, the ethical is that of requirement (and this requirement is so infinite that the individual always goes bankrupt), the religious sphere is that of fulfillment. . . .

These spheres have been compared to Hegel's dialectical stages, and in a way they are meant to reflect the progressive growth of personality.

Kierkegaard reacted against German romanticism. He was a new Socrates among the new sensists who were singing the praises of material beauty and immediate pleasures, and he could well be presented against the romanticist background through his discussion of aesthetics, his first major academic interest and the subject of his doctoral dissertation. But an introduction ought to begin with material familiar to beginners, and it is easier to start almost where Kierkegaard ended, with his ethico-religious doctrines.

The atmosphere of thought in Copenhagen where Kierkegaard lived and in Berlin where he visited four times was charged with the philosophy of Hegel, who had died in 1831, the year before Kierkegaard entered university. From the Hegelian, J. L. Heiberg, a professor at the University, and from the writings of Professor Martensen, Kierkegaard received a strong dose of Hegelianism. As a reaction to Hegel, Kierkegaard's thought can be most easily approached.

Hegel had enshrined the Idea. This plenary reality, he went on, is revealed by history and is known by the reduction of all things into a system more or less coherent as far as it is unfolded but always open to further development as time passes on. Thus, in the strong language of F. H. Bradley, a neo-Hegelian, an idea becomes true, not when it conforms to reality in the Aristotelian sense, but when it is integrated into an "arrangement of ideas, self-consistent and complete." The highest ascent of human knowledge and the deepest contact with value is made as the mind tends to the more and more universal, the more and more abstract, the

more and more logically architectonic, which is capable of assuring wider organization and system.

Kierkegaard struck boldly back against such a view. In philosophical and theological dimensions, he perceived the important truth that every individual is unique and cannot be fitted within a system. Plato and Aristotle, long before, had underscored the note that any science is always of universal truths. Only the general and the abstract can be systematized. The individual cannot.

Yet, as Kierkegaard said in so many ways, individuals alone exist in the real world, and a philosophy, pretending to study the things that are, cannot afford to exclude the existing world from its courtroom. Roger Bacon said that one individual, because it exists, is worth more than all the universals in the world. In his revolt against systemism, Kierkegaard was merely groping backward in the general direction of an old Aristotelian truth. Mere system does not explain the individual, the concrete, the existential. Systemism might be called an essentialist metaphysic since it bears up abstract essences without regard for their concrete existing character.

In morality and religion, systemism likewise fails the individual. The individual is an individual situation, as Jaspers would say, is offered only a universal principle by Hegelianism to solve a practical problem, and Kierkegaard rightly insisted that the universal could not cover individual circumstance. To give a universal principle to an individual is, quoting Lichtenberg, like giving a cookbook instead of food to a hungry man.

As Kierkegaard strongly emphasized, a system can never be truly known and evaluated until it is completely worked out; so long as it remains incomplete, there is always the danger that further facts will not fit into its requirements and will thus call for a thorough revision of apparently settled principles in order to take fresh data into account.

This is shatterproof logic, and it is telling against Hegelianism where only part of the developing system can be known since the present is still becoming and the future may break forth with new data that might reshuffle the whole. "*Wesen ist was gewesen ist*—Essence is what has been." Sartre took this principle out of Hegel to show, like Kierkegaard, that a system does not report to the mind on the living present.

If history alone can instruct man, its ultimate meaning, ever developing according to dialectical laws, eludes the individual, thinking here and now. The future, when it freezes into the past, may mirror new and revolutionary secrets on the real. As in the so-called scientific method, which has many analogies to Hegel and to systemism, tomorrow's discoveries may make today's ideas obsolete.

Bradley wrote that "thought is compelled to take the road of indefinite expansion," and John Dewey, influenced by both idealism and empiriological methods, wants philosophy to provide a pattern "to lead us ever onward and outward." Both Bradley and Dewey are aware that the systematic approach to reality must bore across the infinite series to reach a stage of knowledge which is final, complete, and truly certain.

Speaking of historicism and systemism as preached by the Hegelians, Kierkegaard says in perhaps his most important work, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript:*

> System and finality are pretty much one and the same, so much so that if the system is not finished there is no system. I have already in another place called the reader's attention to the consideration that a system which is not quite finished is an hypothesis; while on the other hand to speak of a half-finished system is nonsense.

Supreme Court verdicts, to modernize a simile of Kierkegaard, may well contain dissenting opinions. But if an objective reality is found that is at variance with a whole scientific system, there must be a recasting and reprincipling of the entire systematic structure to achieve a coherent presentation of the all. Then, just when today's ideas are tucked away into a neat and satisfying system, tomorrow may again bring a dissenting vote from reality.

If the conclusion of the system is lacking, the whole structure itself is open to question. For the characteristic of a system is that it must be complete. If a doorbell is missing from a house, the house may still be inhabited. But with systematic science, where all principles are universal and hence equal to each other in force, the story is different: the missing conclusion, unlike the doorbell of a house, has the retroactive power to destroy the whole structure, from its fundamental premises onward. "If the conclusion is lack-

ing at the end, it is also lacking in the beginning," said Kierkegaard, "and this should therefore have been said in the beginning."

In a more formal and thesis-like way, Kierkegaard propounds two principles on systemism, first that a logical system is possible and, secondly, that an existential system is impossible.

But conceding its possibility, what is the concrete significance of a logical system? It prescinds from the existential and the living dialectic. It begins with the universal and the abstract. Moreover, says Kierkegaard, "a dying away from the self is involved," since the individual in the ideal logic of Hegel is not an historical reality. He is what modern empiriological physics would call an observer. He is not on the march with history. He stands on the sidelines, watching history move by. It is as though a leader would give the command, "Whole battalion, about-face!" and then fail to about-face himself.

In systemism, man is a spectator looking at reality as though he were not a part of it but a passive, inert, instrumental, purely logical entity, or as Kierkegaard dubs him, a "ghost." Systemism, in a way, is like the case of Raymond Lully who, long before modern methods were born, had envisioned a thinking machine that would do for logic, if the right premises were fed into it, what the comptometer does for numbers.

But an existential system, Kierkegaard insisted, is impossible. Systematic thought, like reflection as Sartre portrayed it, is wholly inadequate to the real. To penetrate reality, thought must abrogate itself. It is thus no longer a universal thought but immediate experience. T. S. Eliot has written that if an ethnologist studied a primitive tribe as it is he would get so deeply inside of his object that he would lose the outsider's viewpoint which made the tribe an interesting and worth-while object to study. The present instant is something ineffable, an atom of eternity, and existence can only be met in such a moment. "It may be seen, from a purely abstract point of view," Kierkegaard says,

> that system and existence are incapable of being thought together; because in order to think existence at all, systematic thought must think itself as abrogated, and hence as not existing. Existence separates, and holds the various moments of existence discretely apart; the systematic thought consists of the finality which brings them together.

In his definition of time, Aristotle recognized that the present, past, and future are not homogeneous. Kierkegaard would add that the past is not capable of rendering the meaning and reality of that ineffable instant in the present, precisely because it is not on the same level in the hierarchy of time. The instant is the warp of eternity, the perpetual "now," the ever vivid present, and the past is the only dead timber remaining after the present fire has subsided.

The theory of recollection in Plato is abstract and essentialist by Kierkegaardian standards. It holds that a general principle taken from the past can substitute for the originality of the present and be its double. Man, in a concrete situation, asks who and what he is; he searches through the mysteries of his concrete existence; he is not man in general but this or that individual, and generalities fail to account for the deepest and most personal weave of experience.

But unable to find his place within a system, man can still make his way by looking within himself, as Socrates had urged long ago. He can recapitulate himself in the instant, making time stand still and coming thus to a knowledge of his own abiding and original self-possession. He can achieve his presence to his own self by "repetition," which is a perpetual renewal of self-consciousness and which Kierkegaard even describes as "consciousness raised to the second power." It is not a spontaneous consciousness of the ordinary man but is deliberate and controlled. By this self-presence, man drills inward toward an appreciation of existence. Thus it is argued, "spiritual repetition is possible, although in the temporal life it is never so perfect as in eternity, which is true repetition."

The present thus has no medium like systematic, homogeneous thought in terms of which it can be translated. It is unique. It is *in* the instant, and the knower must be indistinguishably and hence non-systematically there with it for whatever hold he gains on existence. He must be it. "The Instant *is* and *the* man is there, the right man, the man of the Instant."

Kierkegaard's logic was directed against Hegel both as a systematizer of reality and as an advocate of studying reality historically. Encouraged by Hegel who had stimulated a universal interest in history by viewing it as a revelation of the Idea in its development, theologians of the time attempted to

apply the historical method to theology itself. They tried to make faith a matter of reason by showing that historical evidence is absolute, like history as Hegel had envisioned it. They tried to argue from their present historical position to the Gospel narratives as though matters of faith were all available to the philosophical speculation, which Hegel had conceived. The rationalism of the nineteenth century, with its historical directions that led to the works of Strauss, Bruno Bauer, and Harnack, was already under way.

Once more Kierkegaard rose up with full steam against Hegelianism. Historical reality, studied in a systematic way, is not commensurate with eternity and eternal happiness. It had long ago been recognized that there must be a proportion between cause and effect. Aristotelianism could not understand man's ultimate end as the beatific vision because it could not find a proportion between man's finite acts and the reward of seeing an infinite God. It was Aquinas who added to the Aristotelian view that grace is a participation in infinity, rendering man capable of beatitude. Kierkegaard, another Aristotle, rising up against a nineteenth-century system of Platonic universals, stated that historical research could only approximate the past and "an approximation is essentially incommensurable with an infinite personal interest in eternal happiness." Historical research did not bear on either the infinite or the personal, Kierkegaard could say, and as William James, a later reaction to Hegel said, it is not disinterested.

Kierkegaard did not, of course, foresee the great interest in history that was to boom through western scholarship in the form of positivism, evolutionary biology, paleontology, ethnology, and other such inductive descriptions. He could not, naturally, have forecast the French sociologism of Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl, who preached and practiced the method that research into history and pre-history, from primitive societies on downward, is the only available way of studying man, the social and even the personal being. Nor did Kierkegaard know of the much later development of Freudian psychoanalysis which treats man, in sickness and in health—and according to Freud he is always sick—as though his present problems and perplexities could be unraveled by tracing them genetically to childhood and then to prenatal life, to

the biology of his parents, all the way back through the course of evolution. Kierkegaard did not foresee the full blossom of so-called scientific method which in each generation believes itself to approximate closer and closer to ultimate realities but frankly admits it could never have an all-embracing theory that would gather in the residue of unexplained supposition which today must always leave over for tomorrow and the day after to probe further. As in the purely historical approach which, no matter how far back it goes, must always admit of a moment beyond where it chooses to begin its descriptions, so in the so-called scientific method, the fundamental particles can always be further divided, never reaching an ultimate, simple, and settled picture of the real.

Kierkegaard did not anticipate all this. But though writing against approximation in a particular philosophy at a particular time, his critique really answered, before they were born, the discursive methods so prevalent since the last half of the nineteenth century. As Wahl put it, his theory of truth is a theory of faith. He was interested in proving that no approximation to faith is possible. Reason cannot approximate faith. The schoolboy, who was rated sixty-nine in his examination instead of the required seventy, still failed no matter how close he came. The pedestrian, who almost got across the tracks in front of the Twentieth Century Limited, was still struck and killed. Thus it is with history versus faith and versus eternal happiness. No matter how much scholarship may be poured out in pure history, there is no continuity between reason and faith. Reason does not taper off into faith, like a polygon increasing the number of its sides indefinitely to become a circle; "for nothing," Kierkegaard goes on, "is more readily evident than that the greatest attainable certainty with respect to anything historical is merely an approximation."

THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The universals in systematic philosophy are progressively reorganized in an indefinite expansion, but the individual exists immediately and absolutely. He clamors for guidance here and now. Reason approximates by discursive and historical and systematic methods, but there is a "leap" between reason and faith

that cannot be spanned by a bridge built out from reason on the one side to meet faith on the other. Here there emerges the dim gray light of notions that are to take shape as existentialism.

Kierkegaard's critique of Hegel is rather simple and straightforward. What he proposed as a substitute is a debated issue. Thus some critics like Wahl and de Waelhens hold that Kierkegaard leads straight to Heidegger and Sartre and to the atheistic existentialism which has hit the headlines in our own age. Others like Reidar Thomte and James Collins, both of them astute expositors of Kierkegaard, take a brighter view. Collins finds that Kierkegaard on the whole is sympathetic to the Aristotelian tradition, and there is no doubt, as Gilson observes, that Kierkegaard has taught philosophy once and for all that it cannot go its way in that easy disregard for existence which has wrecked modern speculation.

There is spacious room for the wholesome interpretation which Collins so ably gives. He presents the Kierkegaard of intention, who is by no means the Kierkegaard inspiring the atheism of present-day minds that claim him as a source. But the fact is that Kierkegaard did not follow through his own principles and that his contemporary descendants have completed him on many issues. It is important to discover what a man meant to say, but it is even more important to determine what he said really meant. The following paragraphs will endeavor to disengage leading principles in Kierkegaard's writings to see where they go as their logic is followed out. It is not the Kierkegaard of intention but the Kierkegaard in execution of his principles which will be in the spotlight and will thus come to a focus at a different slant on Kierkegaard than the one legitimately taken by Thomte, Collins, and the Italian critic, Cornelio Fabro.

Who or what is this existing individual, so disproportionate to the Hegelian abstract universal? As Kierkegaard puts it,

> Existence constitutes the highest interest of the existing individual, and his interest in his existence constitutes his reality. What reality is cannot be expressed in the language of abstraction. Reality is an *inter-esse* between the moments of that hypothetical unity of thought and being which abstract thought presupposes. Abstract thought considers both possibility and reality, but its concept of reality is a false reflection, since the medium within which the

> concept is thought is not reality, but possibility. Abstract thought can get hold of reality only by nullifying it, and this nullification of reality consists in transforming it into a possibility.

Much will be said later on, both in Kierkegaard's thought and in contemporary existentialism, about possibility. A possible being is not one that exists here and now but one which *can* be. The emphasis is not on the *be* but on the *can*, according to Kierkegaard. If thought de-existentializes the real, transforming it into a possibility, then Kierkegaard can apply the old scholastic maxim: *ab posse ad esse non valet illatio.*

The existing individual, "possibilizing" his being, can never know himself or reality by thought. To know his own existing individuality, to think it universally as pure intellection must do, he must abstract from this existing individuality. Thus a contradiction looms up: existence is individualized, the thought of it is universalized; how can they get together? This is really the crucial problem of existentialism.

Hegel and modern systemism extol only objective knowledge, as Kierkegaard phrases it. Heidegger will argue in the following chapter that we must first examine the questions which we put to being to determine by the nature of the question what kind of answer is possible. Kierkegaard, though not as extreme as Heidegger at least by intention, argues a similar case. Disdaining as he did the "objective" Hegelian approach which could not, because of its universality, include the most important entity in the world, the unique existing individual, Kierkegaard stands for an approach to existence by existence itself, an immediate approach to the immediate. By emphasis at least, Kierkegaard is anti-intellectual.

Every individual is an original being, isolated from the guiding voice of universal principles, unaided by thought and speculation which are on a different level from individuality, compelled to lead his life by an abrupt movement which he and he alone can initiate. If thought is our guide, Kierkegaard asks, if principles must first be recognized before action can be deployed, an infinite regression must occur. Take the case of reflection. We reflect on ourselves, it is said. But to know that we are reflecting, we must in turn reflect on the first reflection, or as Kierkegaard says,

> How do I put an end to the reflection which was set up in order to reach the beginning here in question? Reflection has the remarkable property of being infinite. But to say that it is infinite is equivalent, in any case, to saying that it cannot be stopped by itself; because in attempting to stop itself it must use itself, and is thus stopped in the same way that a disease is cured when it is allowed to choose its own treatment, which is to say that it waxes and thrives.

After the series of reflections which will uncover us to ourselves is once under way, how does it end? It does so, says Kierkegaard, by a resolve of the reflector, by an act of will, by a decision that Sartre will later term completely gratuitous and radically contingent. It is the subject who stops the reflection; it is not being or the self-evidence of being, as Aristotelianism would say. In bringing the reflections to a halt, the decision of the subject informs him what he is. It is this absolute, abrupt, spontaneous act on the part of the subject which conditions his whole life, his whole philosophy, his whole moral view.

Louis Lavelle, who is Kierkegaardian in many respects, maintains that being is discovered to the human mind in the actualization of the mind's own thinking of reality, in the "act accomplishing itself." Gabriel Marcel defines philosophy as a reflection on reflection. These views are analogous to Kierkegaard's. Being is apprehended, philosophy, theology, religion are born, in that *process* by which the thinker's subjectivity comes to consciousness of itself. It is, as it were, a thought of a thought, where thought and object, idea and self, are indistinguishably united.

What Bergson called the natural metaphysics of the human mind centers its energies on things thought about, not thought itself. But in the process of thinking about things, thought may be considered as a being or an event under way. The dynamism in this process is what Kierkegaard appears to underline.

A final approach to this view may be made through the terminology of consciousness. A distinction may be made between two kinds of consciousness: concomitant, when associated with an event like a thought actually taking place as a mental state and *con*-known at the moment of its occurrence; and reflex, when it is consciousness of a psychic event known by "bending back" and examining the object or event (like a thought) as a distinct

object or thing. Existentialists hold that experience, if it is known at all, must be disclosed in concomitant consciousness. Such an experience is pre-ontological, pre-scientific, pre-reflective, it is emphasized. In its rich, dynamic folds, subject and object presumably cannot be separated. Reflective consciousness is outside the dynamism, the experience, the reality, the existent, completely beyond the meaning of being.

What produced this psychic event, associated with pre-ontological concomitant consciousness, which indeed in the absence of distinction between subject and predicate, is pre-ontological consciousness? The decision of the subject itself, is the answer. Hegel held to an infinite mediation between one reality and another, one reflection and another, reflection and reality. But the original decision of the Kierkegaardian subject, is unmediated and hence isolated and absolute. The unity between thought and object is so strong that thought, if it can be identified at all, is really the concrete object. Here, where the individual makes a decisive resolve in his own subjectivity is the mystery and meaning of reality.

In such a light, it is logical that Kierkegaard should make the highest task of the existing individual that of becoming subjective, of realizing and repeating what he is from within, realizing and repeating through this non-cognitive, pre-ontological confronting of self with self, this act accomplishing itself. Every human being, he writes, has a specific gravity to tend toward what he is not. Kierkegaard would have man strive to become what he is—to realize in the dynamic sense of that word—his own subjectivity. Thus he writes:

> I should suppose that education was the curriculum one had to run through in order to catch up with oneself, and he who will not pass through this curriculum, is helped very little by the fact that he was born in the most enlightened age.

Man must will decisively to be himself. At the focal point of concomitant consciousness, the emotions, the will, and the intellect are ineffably united, and here alone is realized that infinite personal interest in eternal happiness which is unapproachable by an historic, approximating, systematic pathway. To quote Kierkegaard again:

> Christianity is spirit, spirit is inwardness, inwardness is subjectivity, subjectivity is essentially passion, and at its maximum an infinite, personal interest in one's eternal happiness.

For an abstracting Hegelian type of thinker, truth is objectified, and existence can only be thought by being abrogated. But for the genuine lover of real wisdom, truth is the probing of one's own inwardness. The purely objective and universalizing mind is indifferent to the existing individual. The individual can only recover and recognize himself from within.

This Kierkegaardian slant on truth may again be clarified by considering process. Even in Aristotle, thought may be described as an appropriation of the real. It is an apprehension, an assimilation, a becoming of the object with the object remaining objective while yet being known. For Kierkegaard, the secrets to the real involve likewise an appropriation, yet what is appropriated is not objective being but subjective process. Truth is the personal mode of appropriation, and the less dependence there is on an object to stimulate and mediate the realization, the more perfect does the personal truth become. A self-realizing and subjective dynamism is of interest to the individual; he is passionately and personally interested in it, as opposed to the de-ontologized, dehumanized, observer-like role assigned to the knower in Hegelianism. All men, Kierkegaard says, need not think of the same object; they need not have a common faith nor an organized religion. The important thing is this mode as a mode, this process as a process.

Readers will recognize Kierkegaard's thought as suggesting that general tradition of Protestant theology which came from Luther and thrived on the Kantian morality of formalism, categoric imperatives, and the autonomy of the human will. The tremendous role of inwardness, passion, subjectivity, process, privacy, individuality, and the absolute character of man before God, unmediated by objective agreements, objective practices, and objective ethical law—all of this furnishes vocabulary and concepts for the so-called Evangelical Theology of men like Barth and Brunner.

Kant's notions are almost literally transcribed in the statement that "there is an absolute duty toward God; for in this relationship of duty the individual as an individual stands related ab-

solutely to the absolute." Even more than Kant, Kierkegaard is the philosophical skeleton for Lutheranism. It is apparent from Kierkegaard's general emphasis that works do not matter. Faith is justification. Charles Duell Keane, a Kierkegaardian in American Protestant theology, has argued thus. And Kierkegaard himself writes:

> But too often it has been overlooked that the opposite of sin is not *virtue,* not by any manner of means. This is in part a pagan view which is content with a merely human measure and properly does not know what *sin* is, that all sin is before God. No, *the opposite of sin is faith,* as it is affirmed in Rom. 14:23, "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin." And for the whole of Christianity it is one of the most decisive definitions that the opposite of sin is not virtue but faith.

But Luther had ninety-five theses, Kierkegaard said. He in turn has only one: subjectivity, spirit, passion, inwardness, interest, faith, in a word existence.

Repeatedly Kierkegaard defines existence as a type of striving, a doctrine that will illuminate his modal definition of truth and his reference to subjectivity as a process. As he forcefully says:

> The principle that the existing subjective thinker is constantly occupied in striving does not mean that he has in the finite sense, a goal toward which he strives, and that he would be finished when he has reached this goal. No, he strives infinitely, is constantly in the process of becoming.

Kierkegaard agreed with Lessing, a German dynamist, that truth lies in the search for an object, not in the object sought. It is another case of "act accomplishing itself." If God held truth in one hand and the eternal pursuit of it in the other, He would choose the second hand according to Lessing. Religious truth concerns the individual and the individual alone, and it is the personal mode of appropriation, the process of realization, the subjective dynamism that counts. Of Lessing, Kierkegaard writes approvingly.

But if we are constantly occupied in the immanent striving of our own subjectivity, how are we to ascend to knowledge of a transcendent God whom traditional thought declares to be known even by reason. Lessing and Kierkegaard declare in typical fashion

that there is no bridge between historical, finite knowledge and God's existence and nature. This gap can only be crossed by a "leap."

Faith is a completely irrational experience, and yet it is, paradoxically, the highest duty of a Christian. Though as Thomte observes, it is not a spontaneous belief, faith is nevertheless something blind, immediate, and decisive. It has the character of an "act of resignation." It is unmediated and a-intellectual, much like Kant's proof for the existence of God.

Nature makes no leaps, according to the maxim of Leibniz. But faith, according to Kierkegaard, must do so in a radical way. There is no mediator between God and man like an established church, an historical revelation, and an articulated tradition. All of this presumably falls under the blows which Kierkegaard delivered against philosophers like Hegel and churchmen like Martensen.

Every individual must make the "leap" for himself. Faith has neither rational content nor motives of credibility. It is not an act of the intellect, commanded by the will. It is wholly and infinitely in the will, in the decisiveness, inwardness, the infinite interest of the subject. There is a complete, abrupt, irrational discontinuity between religion and everything else. That is why Kierkegaard found it contradictory to speak of a "Christian world." Man was to reach God by an act of inwardness, gathering all of his forces into the intensive unity of a pure, an infinite decision:

> Like the spring of a wild beast upon its prey, like the blow of the eagle in its swoop — so it is that the decisive effect is produced: suddenly, concentrated upon one point (intensive). And as the beast of prey unites shrewdness and strength; first it remains perfectly quiet, quiet as no tame beast can be, and then collects itself wholly in one spring or blow, as no tame beast can collect itself or raise itself for a spring — so is the decisive effect produced. First quietness, so quiet as it never is on a still day, quiet as it is only before the thunder — and then the storm breaks loose.

The task of being a Christian is always the task of becoming a Christian, becoming subjective. There is no public censorship in this highest act; man is his own censor, greater than the censor of the Roman Republic. In pure becoming, we really become

nothing since there is no terminating aim to the process and since it is only terminated by the selfishness or sin of man.

Christianity is thus always a paradox. The greatest thing in the world, it is nothing. It is not a doctrine; it is an act of existing. It unites the finite and the infinite, the historical and the eternal. Immanent, it can only be completed by a "leap." It is an act of infinite resignation in its first stage, allowing the infinity of God to pour into it in the second. It is timeless and yet requiring time. We make ourselves and lose ourselves in the same act. Faith demands suffering and pathos. It is an existential act and an existential transcendence which reason finds absurd. *Credo quia absurdum.* It is an either/or relation in which man becomes as nothing versus being.

Kierkegaard could not have Regina and truly love God. Religion demands complete subjectivity, or it is not religion. It must sacrifice the temporal completely, or it is not of the eternal. Subjective, it has nothing to do with the historical. It is the quest of historical knowledge and the attention to the creaturely limits at the heart of the historical which are sin.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANGUISH

A paramount issue in the thinking of Kierkegaard is his doctrine of anguish or dread. By his own norms, the metaphysics and psychology of personality are the same thing, and so an example from psychology may introduce the metaphysics of dread in a familiar language.

Dread is not fear in the ordinary sense. Fear is always the fear of a definite object, recognized and menacing. Dread is the fear of ourselves. It is the fear of nothing.

What is it that evokes the first psychological state in each individual and puts him into the parade of history with a personal history of his own? What is it that awakens him to consciousness of himself and of the world about him? In empiriological physics, where the law of inertia reigns, a thinker is envisioned as being acted on rather than acting and, in a more brutal way of putting it, as an instrument recording data. In such a view, knowledge is not the act of a subject, seizing the real; it is inertia, determined by outside influences. Man is converted into a purely passive being, like the Hegelian "ghost."

But experience shows this view to be inadequate. There comes a point in the knowledge relation where man is awakened and reacts. And this rise to consciousness cannot be the effect of another object, acting inertially, or an infinite series would be opened, where one thing acts on another without end.

So man must awaken himself. As Kant emphasized, he must be conscious, so to speak, before experiencing knowledge. He is something in his own right before anything can affect him. Yet how do we explain this process by which self awakens self to consciousness? Here is where the notion of anguish or dread makes its appearance.

Dread is defined by Kierkegaard as "the possibility of possibility" and again as "the alarming possibility of being able." Before awakening to that consciousness which we ourselves have actualized, we were merely possible. Since this awakening could never take place inertially through the action of the objective world on our consciousness, there must again be an absolute qualitative "leap" by which we bring ourselves, as it were, into conscious existence. And why must this be a "leap"? Simply because there is no continuity between possibility and existence, any more than between reason and faith. By making a thing more and more possible, e.g., the fact of evolution, we would never make it actual. The isolation of the individual, this state where, unguided and unmoved by anything that is outside of him, he must bring himself to consciousness and existence, discloses the meaning of dread.

Kierkegaard even speaks of dread as being anterior to possibility. It is the state of realizing, as it were, that our possibility depends for actualization on us and us alone. It is the primitive state which no individual can escape, because it is individual, and where no outside help can be found, since even the decision to seek or accept the help leaves the responsibility for seeking or accepting squarely on our own shoulders. But dread is not only the pristine experience of men. It pursues them through their whole lives. Every decision must eventually be made in that lonely isolationism of existence which only a "leap" can transcend.

Two officers were discussing during the last war whether servicemen should be cited for awards on the basis of combat deeds in the line of duty. One officer said no: the awards were

only for heroism beyond duty's call. Another said yes: for the recognition of duty and the decision to do it were gratuities from the individual's own generosity. He could have chosen not to do his duty. The decision was his own spontaneous, individual, and inward choice.

As Kierkegaard says.

> One may liken dread to dizziness. He whose eye chances to look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy. But the reason for it is just as much his eye as the precipice. For suppose he had not looked down.

Sartre, adopting the notion of anguish or dread in the Kierkegaardian tradition, illustrates this example. Fear would be occasioned by the possibility that someone would push us over the precipice; dread is owed to the fact that we might hurl ourselves down into the abyss. It is ourselves who are the restraining force. Unaided, the restraint must be a qualitative leap. Since the "leap" is irrational and gratuitous, it might just as well have been the contrary decision: to plunge ourselves down.

Sartre likewise presents the following example: a soldier loading shells into his cannon might have fear of being under fire the following day when the battle is drawn. Dread would be associated with the fact that the responsibility for what he does under fire, the decision where to retreat or where to dig a foxhole, rests with him and him alone.

Anguish or dread is thus alarming; "there is the egotistic infinity of possibility which does not tempt like a definite choice, but alarms and fascinates with its sweet anxiety." Dread is the fear of nothing, the fear of ourselves. Possibility cannot force us into action from the outside, because it is infinite and hence indeterminate, nor from the inside because it is possible only.

Dread is the sealing sentiment of our subjectivity and inwardness. There is no fleeing from it and no seeking of it. To flee or to seek would be decisions fermented from dread itself. Isolating man and proposing an infinity of possibility, dread is essentially ambiguous. It affords an ambit of choice in which there is no reason for going in one direction rather than other and we are alone with ourselves.

In ethics and religion, Kierkegaard emphasizes the notion of

resolve and decisiveness. The spontaneity of this decisiveness is again psychologically probed and defended. Each individual, in his own little way, is an absolute. His path through life he must cut alone. He can move by leaps and bounds but never under the benign influence of reason which tradition declares to be a preamble to faith and even an instrument to find motives of credibility.

Kierkegaard was primarily a philosopher of religion when he was philosophical at all. He was concerned with the problem of sin which Lutheran tradition solves in a peculiar way. What is it that made Adam sin? It was not the concupiscence of a fallen nature birthmarked by sinfulness; Adam had no such nature with its wounded character. Adam's sin was original in the etymological sense. Kierkegaard examines it in the light of the concept of dread.

Sin came into the world not by multiplying sinfulness, as Hegelianism would require, but by a qualitative leap. It was possible for Adam to sin, but his sin became actual through the medium of dread. What else could mediate between possibility and actuality in the Kierkegaardian dialectic?

Sin occurs in general because every man tempts his own self. Never by a quantitative increment of sinfulness does sin come into the world. Dread, the possibility of possibility, the alarm produced by the nothingness which surrounds and isolates the individual, brought and brings sin into the world. So it has been with all sin since that in Paradise. "The possibility of freedom announces itself in dread." Sin cannot be explained. It always involves a leap, whereas explanation must be consecutive.

God is discovered, Kierkegaard says, by turning toward our guilt. With a human nature essentially depraved as Luther suggests, every individual must first experience guilt psychologically and so, "if the finite spirit would see God it must begin by being guilty." To posit guilt is to eliminate dread and attain repentance; it is as though to feel guilt is to feel remorse and to realize from the psychological viewpoint that the opposite to sin is faith. The interruption of the dynamic striving to be what we are and to come to a purer subjectivity entails sin in the broad sense. The recovery of that dynamism is faith and the saving experience of men.

But the question is, does Kierkegaard really come to a knowledge of God? It was apparent to him that the subjective selfhood

which he so championed was never realizable, and only as a pure self can we know God. Man can never become completely himself simply because he is never completely inward. He is always dependent on objects and always unable to accomplish the operation to which nature ordained him. He is always interrupting his march toward God. He becomes false to his destiny. He is frustrated. He commits sin. "So regarded man is not yet a self." Defining subjectivity, Christianity, faith as the relationship of self to self, Kierkegaard writes:

> For despair is not a result of the disrelationship but of the relation which relates itself to itself. And the relation to himself a man can never get rid of, any more than he can get rid of himself, which is moreover one and the same thing, since the self is the relationship to one's self.

In more popular language, this relationship may be clarified by stating that man is not related to himself except as far as he knows other things. There is thus no pure mode of appropriation but always a mediating object. Man is not a pure relation since all his relations require both subject and object. Despair becomes man's sickness unto death, to use one of Kierkegaard's titles. The more we flee it, the more conscious of it do we become.

We cannot become ourselves and thus know God. We are always becoming. Thus the final significance of Kierkegaard, at least in the area of intelligence, is despair. The high ambitions which he held out for subjectivity and for Christianity have emerged from his final philosophical synthesis as irrealizable. Gloomy, guilty, and disintegrated, man must stalk the earth in vain. In *Sickness unto Death*, it is written:

> Hence the self in its despairing effort to will to be itself labors into the direct opposite, it becomes really no self. In the whole dialectic within which it acts there is nothing firm, what the self is does not for an instant stand firm, that is eternally firm.

Loneliness and frustration are the lot of man.

As Collins has argued, there is a powerful strain in Kierkegaard to see man as more than an isolated atom and even to propose a view of man in general. All men have in common, for instance, that they are alone before God, and there is a general likeness among them all in terms of this common condition. But if the principles

developed by Kierkegaard in his attack on Hegel are to carry over when he proposes a philosophy of his own, there is no possibility of recognizing the general and no hope of knowing God so long as the knower remains a self. What Kierkegaard intended, he could not logically justify, and in urging man to inwardness, subjectivity, utter dynamism, and to a purely relational character as the ideal, he cut the ground from under his efforts to restore religion in a rationalistic age. The price of his defense of religion was an undermining of reason and thought, and this is the meaning of Kierkegaard for the existentialisms which, aided by violating his texts, have grown out of his doctrine in the present age. But the consequences of a doctrine do not destroy its intentions, and Kierkegaard's critical insights do remain as a lasting and positive inspiration for the reconstruction of philosophy.

SOME CRITICAL REMARKS

Soren Kierkegaard reacted to Hegelianism which viewed the world as a developing Idea and took truth to be the reduction of reality into a complete and coherent system. According to Hegel, man can only approach the developing world by studying its history which articulates the Absolute.

Kierkegaard discerned that Hegel left no room for the most significant reality in all experience, the human individual, and so man was enjoined not to look outward to inspect a system but to take cognizance of his own being by introspective experience. Kierkegaard extolled not the objectivity which man views as a spectator but the subjectivity which he enacts. He took a dynamic view of personality which historical knowledge can only approximate, and when he had finished his picture of man, he left him no way to get out of himself toward God except by a "leap." This leap is faith which is born out of guilt as guilt is born ultimately out of dread. Kierkegaard's fundamental principles lead to the conclusion that man can never be a pure self, as an object of rational knowledge, and so the philosophy which began by rejecting Hegelian truth came finally to despair at getting to any truth at all.

A realist finds much of positive value in Kierkegaard's thought, not so much by virtue of the truth which he unearthed as by the general intention of his philosophy in its criticism of modern

thought. Realism has surely protested with a firm and reasoned voice against trends in the political and social order which have engulfed man, the individual. Realism has likewise defended man's present experience whose clamor for explanation here and now is completely ignored by systemism, empiriological or Hegelian. Systemism lures man either by reminiscences on the past, as in Platonism and in some forms of Romanticism, or by dreaming of the future where scientism promises its final arguments to explain away God, life, the soul, and man's ethical status.

But as with so many other reactions, Kierkegaard erred by excess. He swung to the pole exactly opposite Hegel, closing man off in his own individual limits even as Hegel sought to absorb him into the unlimited bosom of the Absolute. Truth, as usual, is found somewhere along the middle course.

What stops that reflective process which Kierkegaard said was essentially infinite and could be ended only by an act of will? Realism proves it to be the evidence of being. By such evidence, the mind stops and comes to a reasoned rest in an object. The mind sees that being is. For its natural operations, being is as inescapable as despair in a philosophy which denies being. Such a realism is the opposite to Kierkegaard's world of dynamic and subjective striving.

On the subjective side, Kierkegaard calls attention to an important problem but fails in solving it. Man always has a nature that does not awaken itself; it is already awakened at an individual's birth since he is not mere possibility but something actual in both a physical and spiritual way. He is innately endowed with powers of thought and will, and they are not merely possible but actual. In a sense, man's intellect from the moment that it comes into existence as a nature must always be in act. What is innate or natural man cannot make by striving. Man has only to recognize it.

In the philosophical order, the subjective and objective aspects of reality are explainable only by a realism that is neither Kierkegaardian nor aesthetic nor systematic but rises above all of them. There is a mode of appropriation as Kierkegaard argued but at the same time a something to be appropriated as Hegelianism would require. With neither the mode nor the thing, the subject or the object, can realism dispense.

It must certainly be agreed that the purely logical forms of the

Hegelian world, where content and essence are studied apart from existence, is a caricature that makes man a ghost and his universe a make-believe reality. But unlike Kierkegaard, a realist can defend the thesis that content, essence, and concepts do have meaning when related to existence, actual or possible. Indeed, they could never be thought unless related to some form of existence. By existence, all things are alike and therefore comparable. The fact that man can make comparisons and see the verifications of his reasoning indicates that his approach to the world has brought him into contact with those existential likenesses that all beings bear to each other and enable them to be united into a whole which, if not systematic, is at least scientific and universal.

But Kierkegaard's notion of existence does not accord ample place to man's rational self-direction which raises him above the mere brute world and makes him its student and its master. Man's loftiest goal is not, as Kierkegaard seemed to advocate, to exist blindly in pure inward and rather emotional striving. His real mission is to reach beyond himself rationally, discerning by thought where he is going and what he must do to reach his destiny. Having so blueprinted a pattern to be realized, man must turn inwardly to develop himself by means of will.

Kierkegaard's thought, like the theological tradition which he carried forward, does not do justice to man's intellect and to the objectivity of truth, philosophical and religious alike. Though of great worth in opposing the facts of concrete existence against the starry-eyed theorizing of the idealists, positivists, and historicists, Kierkegaard's is not a portrayal of the whole man, intelligent, free, and emotional—but above all, intelligent.

The existentialist philosophers are capable of being handled by the experience of men as well as by critical reason. Their counterparts have appeared before only to sink by their own inadequacies, as the rational animal works to conform to experience and to draw out of it a set of principles that have a real basis. Guido de Ruggiero pointed out historical parallels to existentialism, notably in Schelling and the German Romantics. Ideas similar to those of existentialism were also expressed in Eleatic ontology, Stoic moral law, the dynamism of Heraclitus, and in the *esse est percipi* of Bishop Berkeley. Such doctrines are already worn thin by past experience and have been copiously refuted by past thinkers.

Finally, as if sealed by the concepts of anguish and despair, Kierkegaard's over-all spirit is pessimistic, as all anti-intellectualisms must logically be. If man is *naturally* frustrated in his nature, then there is a contradiction in the world. Such a world, since it is outside the laws of being, is outside the laws of possibility and of existence. It would be the non-being, the vacuum, the absurdity of nihilistic universe. No system that ignores and even violates the principle of contradiction can lay claim to a correspondence with reality, and every philosophy ought to struggle to see reality as it is.

To be or not to be was Hamlet's question. *To be* was Kierkegaard's aim for man. *Not to be* is the only answer that his principles allow.

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CHAPTER 11 HEIDEGGER'S RETURN TO BEING

What is being?

Though Parmenides was the first philosopher to pose this problem in a formal way, the search for its answer forms the common ground on which all philosophies meet and mingle. Explicitly or implicitly, as Gilson has shown, all philosophies are engaged in a struggle for existence, the thrust and at times the torture toward its inner secrets and its deepest causes. They all seek the meaning of being. They all claim to report what really exists.

Infected by that love for analysis besetting modern thought, Martin Heidegger refused to give a simple answer to the questionnaire on being. He wanted first to unravel the meaning of a question and then the meaning of the questioner. In such an analytic, he was led beyond meaning and even beyond being, plunging at last into the darkness and the anguish that form his existentialism.

Born in 1889, Heidegger was a student of Edmund Husserl, the eminent phenomenologist, who made philosophy into a description of experience rather than a causal account of existences. In a bold aim to overcome the opposition between idealism and realism, Husserl had proposed that philosophy put the problem of existence in "parentheses" and direct its energies to a description of events as they appear to pure consciousness, without pre-judgment on whether they are real or mental. So aligned, phenomenology, as Husserl and also Max Scheler developed it, becomes a philosophy of essences. Its sole function is to classify things as they appear to an observer who is willing to withhold judgment about their existence. Phenomenology is a kind of neutral philosophy.

Heidegger was greatly impressed by his master's method, and it has stayed with him, in one form or another, throughout his

philosophical career. In a way he did to it what Marx claimed to do to Hegel's method; he stood it on its head, applying to the world of existence what Husserl had intended for the realm of essences. At any rate, phenomenology is a method that pretends only to describe and to start with none of the pre-suppositions which, when criticized, had been fatal to all philosophies since Descartes.

Heidegger wrote a dissertation at the University of Freiburg-im-Breisgau on the subject of meaning and its categories in Scotism, published in 1916. Eleven years later, while teaching at the University of Marburg, Heidegger published his master work, *Sein und Zeit* (*Being and Time*), intended as the first half of a treatise on metaphysics. However, this published portion of the work is so destructive that it apparently leaves no room for that positive ontology that Heidegger had announced for the second half, and so the original aims for the supplementary volume have not been fulfilled.

Heidegger returned to the faculty at Freiburg, publishing two major works in 1929, *On the Essence of Ground* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. In 1933, Freiburg made him its rector, but he resigned shortly thereafter.

He has written shorter works on the nature of truth, the nature of metaphysics, the essence of poetry, and in 1947 published a volume called *Plato's Doctrine of Truth, with a Letter on Humanism*. He is reported also to have prepared a treatise on the nature of the naught. The best English version of Heidegger is a volume *Existence and Being* (1949), containing four of Heidegger's short works and a substantial introduction to his thought by Werner Brock. Unable to move philosophically beyond the destructive premises of *Being and Time*, much of Heidegger's recent research has been focused on historical and aesthetic subjects rather than higher speculation. In this respect, he parallels George Santayana who realized that with the denial of the ultimates no meaning can be sought and found by man. Both of them advance the spirit of the Renaissance.

Heidegger, it is reported, required his students to read and understand his *Being and Time*, before admitting them to his classes. This in itself is a difficult task even for a native German since the thought of the book seems so much a prisoner of its language. Prepositions are strung together in strange ways, some-

times alone, sometimes with verbs and adverbs knitted in between. Oftentimes there is the impression that Heidegger is studying the origins of words rather than describing contemporary reality. Semanticists, like Carnap, have not hesitated to point up Heidegger as a prime example of allowing language to obscure thought. It is mainly because of the difficulties with Heidegger's idiom that *Being and Time* has not been translated into English. Not only because of his thought but also because of this language problem, Heidegger is not likely to join the immortals of philosophy whose wisdom is capable of dominating the times that produced it and even the native language in which it was written. Translated into English, Plato and Aristotle and even the great universal poets like Homer and Dante read like contemporaries.

Parmenides was deeply perplexed by his question on the nature of being. He was unable to deduce being or explain it in terms of any higher genus or more universal cause since beyond being is only the non-being or the naught. He concluded then that being can only be one because any differences of structure would be in the line of non-being or nothingness. So Parmenides enunciated the principle which he and his modern counterparts take to be a tautology: *being is being,* or *being is.*

Such a stroke in Greek thought turned the manifold of our sense world into the status of an illusion, and it does the same damage to learned thought today. Like Parmenides of old, who was really enunciating the principle of identity, Heidegger is fascinated by the relation between being and its opposite, and he is just as paralyzed when he states his conclusions.

In truth, Heidegger finally declares, the meaning of being is undiscovered and undiscoverable. For when the philosopher puts the question: *what is being?* he prejudges the answer by the very nature of his question. The question is a being; the questioner is a being; the object where the answer is sought is a being; the very copula itself backfires into the awareness that the question is answered before it is even posed. To ask: *what is being?* would seem to involve a vicious circle.

Like Hegel and later Jaspers, Heidegger admits the existence of the circle, but he denies that it is a vicious one. Circular argument can enter a demonstration only where a deduction is intended and where, say, a chicken is explained from an egg and the egg

in turn from a chicken. Such reasoning proves the origin of neither the egg nor the chicken and is logically absurd when it is passed off as a deduction. But Heidegger gets around the difficulty. He makes no pretense of deducing being or anything else. There is an exposition by pointing rather than by logic, the recognition of a fact rather than a search after causes and principles. Once being is admitted, then phenomenology can begin its task of describing it.

Making contact with being in advance of his descriptions, Heidegger does not follow a radical phenomenology. Phenomenology will make its appearance only after being has been first recognized, and when it does so, it will no longer be the philosophy of Husserl but his descriptive method transferred from the world of essence to the level of being and existence. Such a subject-matter makes Heidegger a metaphysician, and his system, in his own words, is a phenomenological ontology. To Kierkegaard he stands as deeply indebted as he does to Husserl.

Since the question about the nature of being involves its own answers according to this new view, the search of philosophy must range behind that question to the factors that provoke all thought and produce the philosopher's problems. This is not a Freudian search, psychological and biological in dimension. It is much more subtle and difficult. It is much too tenuous to illustrate by easy example. It probes into the metaphysical sub-forces of man and man's world, confident of capturing the secrets of being by finding out the metaphysical motives of questioning and, in the light of this, the metaphysical value of the answers.

The movement to exalt man as a concrete, historical being by contrast to dead objectivity Heidegger seems to have found suggested by Count Yorck von Wartenburg and especially developed in Wilhelm Dilthey. Such a quest for the ultimates spins inward to an analysis of the questioner who conditions his questions and therefore his answers. It moves from ontology toward criteriology, from experience to what Kant called the *a priori,* from universal history to the personal history of the examining subject. As in Dilthey so in Heidegger man not only has a history: he *is* a history. The mysteries of the real are thus locked up in the experiences of our pre-questioning, pre-propositional, pre-judicative existence. In

existentialism, science is taken as conditioned by the pre-scientific and ontology by the pre-ontological.

Yes, philosophy is a search after causes and reasons. But why does man seek or judge his search to be worth while? Man not only becomes a philosopher; the decision to become one already constitutes a philosophy. Leibniz made capital of the principle of sufficient reason. But what is the sufficient reason of sufficient reason? What is *a priori* to the Kantian *a priori*? The *sum* precedes the Cartesian *cogito* and determines it, according to existentialism.

But above all, Heidegger ought to be placed against a background of Kant. He is true to the Kantian preference for inspecting pure reason, attending to the limits of knowledge before allowing knowledge to be validated; it is as though a musical instrument were examined before first making it play. Such a dialectic of the purely finite and creaturely, led Kierkegaard to despair, and Heidegger will be found retracing Kierkegaard's footsteps. He is Kant carried to extreme.

In a broader sense, existentialism is simply closing a vast cycle in human thought that began with the Renaissance. Since this extremely skeptical period which started at the end of the fourteenth century, man has made what Kant called the Copernican Revolution. He has reversed his thought from an intellectual quest after eternal truth to a merely intuitive contemplation of the sense world and finally to the experience of himself. Marsilio Ficino, an influential Italian Humanist, held that God is known by withdrawing from the outer world and first scanning ourselves. The Renaissance spirit came to think not only, to use Pope's words, that "the proper study of mankind is man," but that man is also the proper study of being. When Descartes gave the ego-centric twist to modern philosophy, the world had already been prepared to receive his thought by more than a century of Renaissance directions toward subjectivism. Anticipating Dilthey, Pico della Mirandola wrote during the Renaissance that all things have given natures except man who is the father of himself by his own activity and is free to choose his history. Fichte held that thought is a deed and that depending on the personality of the philosopher is the philosophy that he will develop and adopt. The German Romantics were protrusions of the Renaissance into the nineteenth

century, and Schelling, in the midst of the Romantic movement which glorified the immediate and the aesthetic, tended like Heidegger to make finitude, liberty, and the naught into metaphysical synonyms.

The probing of the problem of being means then that the problem of man must be settled first. To Heidegger, phenomenology thus devolves into an analytic of the *Dasein,* the being who is "there." In ordinary German, this word *Dasein* does not mean "man" but rather has the sense of existence as opposed to essence. However, in view of the fact that the only existence in Heidegger's philosophy turns out to be man, *Dasein* can be retained in its original form as a synonym for man, the ego, the self. What is man, in all of his purity, without reference to his experience in an outer world, and what is this world apart from the human being who interprets it? The answer to these questions embraces the whole of Heidegger's existentialism.

Man is blocked in his quest for his preconscious status because he must always be conscious to initiate the quest or consider the status. Already under way even when looking backward to reflect on his origins, man can never be stationary to take a fix. As Dilthey had argued, man *is* his history, and he cannot see it from the outside. Transliterating Heidegger, it may be said that man is never pure being but being-in-the-world. He is "there" with it; it is "there" with him. He can never reach himself in his purity because in thinking of himself he must always think a world that is with him, and he can never get to the world in its objective nature because in considering it he must always take himself into account belonging to the very thing that he wants to study from the outside.

Brentano might be helpful here. He showed, in his reaction to Kantianism, that knowledge always pre-supposes an object and cannot even be conceived apart from this content which thought has. De Waelhens, the best expositor of what Heidegger has said, refers to the status of being-in-the-world in terms of preoccupation. Man is preoccupied. There is never a moment when he is himself, apart from an object and the experience of a world. From this fact there fans out the whole story of existentialism. If the meaning of being is conditioned by its interrogator, and if man can never know himself as he is, then obviously he can never get to the meaning

of being. The world is unknowable, in its purity and as it is, because our knowledge of it presupposes the conditioning influence of our presence in it.

Is this world external, or is it simply a thought in the mind of man? Heidegger answers like a naturalist. In fact he is even more emphatic than Dewey and, on his own grounds, more rigorous than Dewey is on naturalism's premises. He claims to have undercut the problem of idealism versus realism. To distinguish the two orders would presuppose a standard in terms of which the distinction could be made. But there is no such measure or standard since it would likewise need a yardstick to define it as a criterion. To broach the issue of idealism versus realism presumes an abstraction from man's character as a being-in-the-world. The world cannot be thought in itself and neither can man. They are inseparable, and so instead of asking about the existence of an external world, the philosopher should dive down in himself to analyze why such questions are asked. Once more, the inquiry moves inward to an analysis of man.

Heidegger proposes a revolutionary thesis to which modern thought has been headed but has always undershot because of a "failure of nerve." Man, he proclaims, exists for his own sake.

What is ultimate in man is irrelational since the most that can be said of him is that he is "there"; and this status of being "there" just cannot be broken down by logic or by anything else. Man is simply a being-in-the-world, unable to relate himself to anything further. He is able to relate himself only to himself, by the tautology *I am I* which is like the pleonasm in Parmenides: *being is being.* To say *I am I* is a translation of Heidegger's: *Das Dasein ist da.*

Now only what is related has responsibility. Religion, for instance, is the dutiful relation of man to God, and any other natural contract is likewise binding by its relations. In Heidegger's view, however, man is a gratuity, related to himself and himself alone. Apart from the world, there is only the pure experience of ourselves without content and without meaning. There is the sentiment of existence without essence, and in its ultimate reaches where the deepest part of us is to be probed by reflection, it is impossible for man to say *what* or *why* he is but only *that* he is.

In what is profoundest about the human personality, man dis-

covers no laws or sufficient reasons by Heidegger's logic, and nothing like a concept or moral urge. So Heidegger concludes that the substance of man is his existence. If what is ultimate in man is devoid of all meaning and content and relation and responsibility, his actions must all be spontaneous and hence radically contingent. There is no tie between man's absolute inwardness to self that radical analysis uncovers to him and anything or anyone beyond him. By the very structure of his being, he is alone with himself, and even the decision to seek help or counsel or law or meaning is a gratuitous whim of a being that is fundamentally a gratuity.

In this recursion toward existence, man really goes finally beyond being itself, according to Heidegger. The determinate ego fades far away and existence itself is even transcended, so that the "thinker" is left only as a possible being, faced with his own possibility. Thus, Heidegger feels free to define man as his own possibility and in a later context as a projection of himself, thrusting himself forward into a world by temporalizing his bare possibilities in the effort to untie their mystery and their meaning. Pure existence, a term of the analysis of self when all determination, content, and meaning are evacuated, turns out to be the same thing as possibility. Man is alone with himself at his origins. He is unrelated, in a state prior to responsibility. However, the majority of men become too engrossed in the effects of their projections to advert to this preconscious springboard of possibility from which the projection was initially made.

This aloneness to self is the meaning of anxiety. It is once anew a completion of Renaissance thought, which put God in His heaven and man on his own resources. Pico della Mirandola, a celebrated Humanist, held that man is eternally "anxious" and that he can never find peace with a formula. Such a view sounds like that of Kierkegaard or Heidegger and not like the sentiments of a pre-Cartesian. For Heidegger's man is ever anxious, ever deploying his possibilities with no previous pattern to assure him. No formula for being good or evil, right or wrong, for being human and truly social and confidently religious, can be found.

In the experience of our uniqueness, everything else must appear as absolutely strange, for there is no common bond between what is unique and anything else. In the absence of a relational

guide between this inner experience and the world that must be met the moment the self-experience ceases, the individual trembles in anguish over an attitude that he must take, a thought that he must have, or a response that he must show – all of which depend absolutely and irrevocably on him. In the pure experience of the self, the world does not take the form of definite objects. It is experienced as a totality of absolute and undifferentiated otherness, bound together only by the darkness which engulfs it all. The world is "there" without content and without meaning, and the self is "there" with the same dark and undiscoverable character. In this inner experience of self, it is the world, globally considered as absolutely other, that arouses the sentiment of anguish. We must act in this world and live in it, and there is no standard to go by in moving about through that completely alien environment. The lonely, spontaneous, and gratuitous character of the stand that we take must once more be ineffably ours since any help that we seek is already included in the anxiety-producing thing which prompts us to seek help in the first place. This is another way of saying that the human reality is and acts for its own sake.

But if all this is so, why is it that men have failed to realize their ultimate unmeaning and gratuity? To answer this, Heidegger distinguishes two levels of existence, authentic and inauthentic, and declares that the majority of men veer easily toward the second. In this area, they are impersonalized, reduced to a mass status, neutral, immersed in worldly affairs, unconscious of their own inner structures. The best way of depicting this modality of existence is in terms of the impersonal pronoun. "*They say* that there will be a war." . . . "People say . . . " and better still "it is said. . . . " In English, the pronoun "one" is often used, "one hopes for peace," etc. This expression is in fact the closest translation of what Heidegger means.

But the two worlds, the authentic and the inauthentic, are not practically divided from each other even by the sage. He too must live and act in the commonplace world of inauthenticity. He must think and will in terms of its objects and be inspired by its motives. He is a mixture in the end of inauthentic and of authentic existence, but he dominates his life by remaining aware that beneath the idle show of social and external relations on the inauthentic plane is the basic irrelational and meaningless structure that man is. It is this

remembrance of his true nature that makes the authentic man a philosophical realist conforming to things as they are and recognizing that any effort to reach meaning through action in the outer world is automatically fated to failure.

The human reality takes hold of itself by an act of transcendence. This simply means that the self moves beyond experience of external things and comes to a realization of its inner nature as a pure existent. Now the logical question is: what is transcended? What lies beyond the pure existent who transcends or, as it can also be put, what lies beyond pure existence as man reaches it by looking within himself?

Obviously what lies beyond existence is nothingness, and Heidegger is content to rest his laurels there. Alone with himself, man sees everything as absolutely other, as absolutely strange, and what is so depicted is not a being or a world or even a hostile force that challenges us. It is the naught of absolute darkness. It is a nihilistic universe.

As in the case of Parmenides, everything else is annihilated so that existence might exist and being might be. This nihilism is the ultimate reach of Heidegger's quest after meaning and being, and it is not surprising that on such a negativism he has been powerless to erect the second and positive portion of his metaphysic. Another way of putting the nihilism of Heidegger is simply to argue that if man is only pure possibility he is nothing.

So instead of concentrating on the philosophical, Heidegger has veered to the poetic. Through the momentary intuitions of the poet, he argues in his treatise on Hoelderlin, man goes as far as is humanly possible into the realness of the real. This is a view that the Renaissance emphasizes by its weight on the aesthetic, and it is a theme constantly recurring in Santayana. Santayana is a typical Renaissance mind. Moreover, he reached the existentialist conclusions of the Renaissance long before Heidegger, by viewing the world as a sheer dynamism and philosophy as an exercise in aesthetics.

THE MAN OF ANGUISH

Anguish is another way of saying that man is abandoned, and abandonment is one of Heidegger's favorite themes. Man is thrown-into-the-world, dejected as de Ruggiero translates it; he is absolutely

and irretrievably alone. He is, it was already seen, preoccupied, through no reward or failure since the ultimate force that propelled him into action is spontaneously his own. Preoccupation is thus the sign of our abandonment, the gratuitous thrust of we know not what, to a purpose that we know not why. By this preoccupied status, where the thinker in looking for himself discovers that he is already "there," man is ahead of himself as it were, and it is this situation of being ahead, or before, ourselves that opens up to Heidegger the study of time. As the title of his major work suggests, time is the secret of being.

Time, however, is to be taken more in the sense of temporalization. To begin with, the doctrine that man is preoccupied or under way or ahead of himself or before himself entitles Heidegger to view man as a pro-ject of himself. In the effort to decipher itself, the ego builds itself from its possibility or, as Sartre will later say, plunges into the world in the attempt to define its essence. Man's conscious journey of life begins in that experience of the naught which is anguish, and so it is first possible and then actual. The naught makes us aware of our own possibilities and moreover that their actualization depends on us and us alone. Heidegger writes: "The *Dasein* determines itself as being from its very possibilities. This is the formal sense of the existential grasping of the *Dasein.*" In the realization of possibility, which is the movement from naught to being, man's primary meaning is the future.

Man projects himself, throws himself forward, ahead of himself, and he endeavors thereby to inhabit a future while still a creature of the present instant. He not only throws himself, he is also thrown. Who or what is this thrower? In that project, man searches after meaning and value, and there on that borderland between being and the naught, he comes to the fullest consciousness of what he is—of his gratuity, of his anguish, of his abandonment, and of his existence for his own sake. In this fashion, man temporalizes himself and endows himself with a history.

As Pico della Mirandola said, man brings himself to be what he is by the instrument of his freedom. Santayana beats a similar tune. For him, man is essentially a hunter on the quest of his quarry. Giordano Bruno, in the later Renaissance period, used a similar figure, concluding like Kierkegaard in his search for God, that man "finally becomes changed from the huntsman into his

prey." Heidegger's philosophy is dynamic, and as in Lessing, the search for truth is more revealing than the possession of it.

Time always involves the *whither,* and it is this future reference of man that organizes his life and his learning, giving a sense and a purpose even to what is past by uniting its dead flesh into a new and living orientation. It is the future that is the most important of time's modalities, as though to reinforce the argument that the present is an affair of nihilism and that by temporalizing himself man brings his being into existence from the darkness of the naught. But the past also comes into the picture. If understanding is interwoven with the future, discovery has its rights in the past. It is the sense of abandonment, of having been thrown-into-the-world, that discloses the loneliness of man before the future attempts to unfold him. But abandonment is only intelligible in terms of this *pre*occupation, and the *pre* brings back the future to the foreground. Man has a past only because he has a future. He is ahead of himself only because he is abandoned and hence behind himself. He understands his abandonment because the future is the principle of understanding.

Between these two moments of abandonment and pro-ject is the meaningless and passing present, revealing man as simply "there," irreducible, irrelational, and solitary. Man is thus "beside" himself, abandoned, projecting, present as simply there, but never really in himself. He hovers between being and the naught, struggling to boost himself from nothingness to selfhood but failing at every turn because his raw materials are of the naught itself. Heidegger goes so far as to hold that man's exteriority to himself, his being beside himself, is "absolute ecstacy" in the ancient meaning of that word as a *standing out.* An absolute standing out from being is the opposite to being, and again the nihilistic destiny of Heidegger's thought can be discerned.

The sentiment of pure existence in those dark moments of anguish where the deepest roots of being lie entangled involves temporalization as the effort to grasp the mysteries that torture us. Heidegger is here pressing into extreme form the Kantian dogma that time is an *a priori* structure, projected into the sense data by the mind. Sharply critical of such a view are dialectical materialists who insist that man is the creature of time rather than its creator. Both extremes are agreed that man cannot surmount the

temporal and that he is essentially of the earth and earthy. As Marjorie Grene writes: "Existential philosophy . . . is an attempt to reinterpret human nature in terms of human subjectivity itself, not through superhuman religious or subhuman material categories." Existentialism, it may be said, is the final achievement of the Renaissance.

For Heidegger, time is more fundamental than space. It is only by moving and hence timing ourselves from point to point in extension, that space becomes real and definable. Understanding turned out to be a projective thrust toward the future, and consistently enough, space can only be grasped as a by-product of this dynamic surge. As Kant had said earlier, space shares an *a priori* status with time, but Heidegger makes time more fundamental. To show how the concept of space depends on that of time in his philosophy, a reference must be made to the beings that occupy space, to the beings that constitute our surrounding world.

Of supreme moment in such a description is the difference between a reality that is at hand as a tool and a reality that is simply present. The meaningful presence of things is established by our use of them as tools, a parallel, as Grene aptly says, of Dewey's instrumentalism. The awareness of what a thing is takes the form of what man can do with it.

The tool-like character of things represents the world as conquered and controlled, and as far as things are simply present, they lie outside the power that man exerts over his environment. To say that a hammer is heavy is to make an instrumental proposition; since the hammer has been lifted, it has made an impression on our muscles precisely at the moment of the lifting. As far as the presence of a thing is reduced to this servile status, it becomes being at hand, and the conquest of nature is reflected by the progress of science and of civilization as well.

However, man tries to generalize his experience of the hammer. For example, he declares that all corporeal being is heavy. But since he has made a leap, analogous to Kierkegaard's, from a particular personal experience to a general objective principle, his reasoning is punctured by the naught and becomes invalid. To make the leap is itself the fruit of anguish since the individual, hermetically sealed off unto himself, has no previous standards to go by and no

public approval to give him genuine support. How does one know that all bodies are heavy when he has lifted only a relatively few?

The tool-like character of things takes its measure from man and more precisely from his experience of his tools. But simple presence does not. It is the world that does not bow before man's power nor yield him knowledge in return. As Kant said, man understands what he makes. The presence of things is known only by their reduction to instruments, and until this harnessing of things is achieved, they lie in a dark, unfathomed externality. Attempting to universalize his experience of particulars, man meets with that lacuna or leap between individual and general, which has been a central problem in modern inductive reasoning. Even a tool is basically without meaning since the grasp of it comes only through its service to the human user who is in turn without meaning or aim, charged only with a pure and unrelated existence. The attempt to "deduce" the world in that search which drove man down to discover pure existence came to an impasse when the world appeared as absolute otherness or as the naught. Here the endeavor to "induce" meaning also runs aground. So man is hopelessly isolated at all ends. Of the human reality, Heidegger feels justified in writing: "The pure 'that it is' discloses itself, the whence and the whither remain in darkness."

But what is it that awakens man into conscious actuality and provokes him to take a stand in his situation, temporalizing himself and understanding reality by taming it? The voice that calls to man is man himself. There is nothing outside of him that can do it, and so he gives himself his own vocation in the world.

Plato and Aristotle asked this same question. Plato answered it by his doctrine of innate ideas which endowed the mind with a measure of act and made knowledge a business of remembering. Aristotle held that the agent intellect is born already actualized, so that it can respond to the phantasms produced from sense data without submitting passively like prime matter or pure inertia.

But Heidegger insists that man's inner structures can be completely analyzed first before an appeal can be made to Platonic prototypes or to a premoving God outside of man. It turns out that man is the voice which calls to his own self. His origins are spontaneous, his actions a gratuity, his being irrelational. Man brings himself to existence from his own possibility, and his whole

being turns out to be a spontaneous combustion of nothingness. He can only be himself if he is unrelated. Anything beyond the pure existence which his deepest experiences lay bare can only be outside existence itself and hence nothingness. The voice that calls to man is man speaking, man projecting a pattern to be realized and looking for a clue, only to discover his absolute abandonment.

From all this dialectic, it is easy to see that what Kant called the autonomy of will becomes in Heidegger the autonomy of man. Radical freedom is his birthmark. Such a view of man in terms of his will is but a paraphrase of the spontaneous, gratuitous, unique, and irrelational character that the previous analytic has pictured man to bear at the core of his being. Will is here not subservient to reason as its light in learning the law. Like the Renaissance Humanism which it furthers, existentialism is voluntaristic. Freedom is an absolute force that is equivalent to man himself. Man is freedom, freely moving itself as pure and unrelated existence. He is freely experienced as his own possibility and freely racing toward the future in quest of his meaning and his values.

Transcendence is also another way of defining freedom. Transcending the world which stands out in its black and absolutely ecstatic form and moving inward to his isolated atom of pure existence, man experiences his autonomy and knows that there is nothing beyond him on which to count either in enlightening his intellect or in attracting his will. Indeed, such distinctions between intellect and will, even those between a determinate ego and pure existence, cannot be detected in this ecstatic moment. Existence is globally experienced as sheer existence, and to say that it is mine is to make a later addition to it that itself is freely made and just as gratuitous in what it means. Freedom is thus called "the ground of ground."

Heidegger probes the principle of sufficient reason which Leibniz, an intellectualist, kept largely in the intellectual order. In the existentialist version of man and his world, the ground of sufficient reason is freedom since the very acceptance of the principle depends on the choice which the human reality makes when it moves from the experience of pure existence to the task of deciphering it. Man conditions the questions put to being, according to Heidegger, and in this respect, man must condition

all the laws of being including the principle of sufficient reason.

As Kierkegaard had argued, man in attempting to relate himself to being ends up by relating himself in an impure way. The scan of will which Plato held to be as wide as the universal good becomes a radically finite area in the existentialist landscape. Existence is free only to choose itself and to choose the world. Man is being-in-the-world, and he is hopelessly pinned to an earthy chaos. He is free only to temporalize himself, never to surmount time. He is free only to spatialize himself and his world and never to rise above it. His deepest insight into his nature shows that he has nothing but the finite and the limited in which to think and move and have being. Choice is forced on man in a way that Sartre describes more forcefully by showing that we are free in every way except to refuse freedom. The world imposes the necessity of choice but gives no pattern of what to choose. Freedom may be viewed either as an affair of pro-jecting or as the fact of abandonment; in either case, the necessity of choosing is itself imposed. Pico della Mirandola in describing man as the father of himself also emphasized freedom. Man cannot escape being in the world, according to Heidegger, but he is free and unguided when he is there. Nothing can withdraw him from the world save death.

Such a view of freedom may sound at first like the Epicurean version in which the world is chance and its supreme law is the personal pleasure of man. At bottom, existentialism does give licenses and would certainly give the Freudian man the environment he idealizes. But Heidegger and later Sartre try to show that they are not letting down the barriers to crude sensualism but calling men to a type of heroic life. Man is portrayed as essentially a harried creature whose essence is care, whose life is defeat, and whose end-all is death. Acknowledging only the finite and the temporal, Heidegger's philosophy is truly atheistic. But at the same time it claims for man a tortured freedom, having no assurances beyond his own ineffable nature and finding in a nihilistic universe that nothing can really satisfy his longings. Even suicide is denied as an escape, since the killing of self like anything else has no meaning in a meaningless universe.

One of the most original aspects of Heidegger's thought is his philosophy of death. Meaning has been defined in terms of

whither and was found to imply a future toward which man oriented himself as a possibility. For this reason, death becomes the arbiter of life's values as the terminal point toward which the future is perpetually angled. If there is any meaning that life may wear, an analysis of the event to which it tends should disclose it. This theme is again suggested by Dilthey, and it is in harmony with the Romantic view of life.

But death is unrepeatable. It is irrelational and unique. Knowledge, an affair of universal principles, cannot express the individual as such, and death is an individual thing. Man goes through it only once, and he is unavailable afterward to profit from his experience. It is no argument to say that from the deaths of others, even relatives and friends, a man may divine the nature of death and thus its meaning. Such deaths are objective. They are viewed by man the observer rather than acted out from within where their inner meaning lies encompassed. No matter how many tears are shed over the body of another or how much sympathy may be expressed to his bereft survivors, no one can really know the meaning of death until he trips across its threshold with his own feet; and in so doing, he passes beyond the point where he can even describe the meaning of his experiences.

The tendency to death is encrusted in the very nature of man, even more synonymously than the instinct to death mentioned by Freud. As our personal possibility, it is not an addition from outside our beings but must be structured into their very depths, sharing with all our other possibilities and forming in fact the chief and only possibility that makes us what we are as projects of ourselves. Pure existence can only project toward nothingness. It can only tend toward nothingness. It can only tend toward what is non-existence.

Socrates defined philosophy as a meditation on death, and it is true that the prospect of death heightens the consideration of life's ultimate meaning. But in Heidegger's view, the unicity, irrelationality, meaninglessness of death is the final seal on the meaninglessness of life itself.

At the very origins of his life, man experiences his own nothingness. In that sentiment of pure existence, his selfhood, hitherto preoccupied, disappears to arise from the naught as a spontaneous atom, called man. Nothingness turns up likewise

at the end of his life, hemming it in at its origin and term by zero points that deprive it of all meaning and reflect its radical finitude. Duration is thus absolutely finite. Temporalization is but the projection of man. In this way, modern philosophy, beginning with a Cartesian doubt about existence, ends with an existentialist denial of it. This is the Kantian preference for examining pure epistemological limits without first looking to the positive content that knowledge must always have, before even its limits either exist or become knowable. It is this Kantian dialectic in which limit alone is emphasized that leads in the end to the conception of man's powers as radically finite, limited, negated, and hence nothing. All of it is Renaissance subjectivism and the stress on the creaturely.

Man's proper attitude should be to keep himself free for death, says Heidegger. Any other attitude will end only in delusion. Death, after all, gives to man the fullness of his freedom, it is said, since that freedom is limited by nothing. Keeping himself free for death, man thus will not find it an accident or disaster but the gratuity that it actually is, as the destiny of a gratuitous being and as the source of his gratuitous freedom. Only by recognizing nothingness as his final end is man free, just as the naught experienced at the beginning of life was also but the fact and the evidence of his complete contingency.

There is a not-yet character to every man which makes him incomplete, according to Heidegger; what comes to an end has the character of no-longer; and coming to an end involves the unrepeatable. But meaning is accessible only in terms of the complete, to which nothing new can be added. Meaning must also be an affair of the present, since this is the locus where life must be led and thoughts analyzed. Meaning must finally be repeatable by its very universal character, where the same thing is present in many things and relations can be formed among them all. But death involves none of these—no completion, no presence, no repeatability. It is in fact the exact opposite. Death thus makes the life that precedes it a meaningless answer to a meaningless question.

Such is Heidegger's philosophy, as he has expressed it. It is nihilistic and atheistic as it stands. It is a neutral philosophy, shot through with subjectivism, and making everything dark and

unintelligible. It bores in toward the understructure of the thinking subject to find that the most one can say about him is that he is "there." It carries its analytic even beyond being to discover the so-called nothingness of men. Time is a projection of the possible subject endeavoring to decipher himself.

Heidegger would not agree with the nihilistic and atheistic interpretation which the foregoing pages have put upon his thought. A French review, *L'Ecole,* published an interview with Heidegger in 1948, and since the article has not been widely circulated, a key quotation from it is in place here. Asked whether his doctrine led to atheism, Heidegger replied: "By no means. Perhaps Sartre does profess atheism. For myself, I do not." But is not Heideggerian existentialism neutral to religious issues and even nihilistic?

> By no means. The affirming of the "Naught" does not necessarily imply nihilism. What I wish is to tear away all the veils which mask the true nature of being. My quarrel is with the subjectivization of the existent, with the reduction of being to an object. This tendency degrades the essence of God as well as that of man; indeed, to consider God as a value – undeniably the highest of all values – degrades Him and lowers Him to our scale. It is another error and degradation to see in Him the first cause of all existents.

Does Heidegger's work turn man away from the quest for God? "The contrary is true since my philosophy discloses being, clarifies it, and thereby permits what is sacred to reveal itself. My philosophy can serve as a preparation for the search after God. It is a threshold for theology and for the discovery of a transcendent God."

In the volume, *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* (1947), Heidegger rejects Sartre, refers to his own thought as a preamble to the discussion of God's existence, and speaks of the possibility of an existentialist ethics. As James Collins has remarked, Heidegger's interest in aesthetics is part of his search after God. Unable to go forward to find God through metaphysics, Heidegger is apparently exploring the affective approach to religion which appeared in a philosopher like Bergson. What Bergson found through the "dark-night" experiences of the mystics, Heidegger appears to be seeking on the avenues of aesthetics. Poets, Heidegger appears

to hold, penetrate behind those masks of being which often fool the philosophers.

Such a search after God coupled with Heidegger's testimony in the interview would seem at serious variance with the slant that this chapter has taken on his thought, and his own words ought certainly to be respected. Yet his explicit intentions cannot be preserved at the expense of deviating from his basic philosophy, and until Heidegger can provide more than promises to complete the logic of his *Being and Time,* the nihilism and atheism which flow from the actual status of his system must remain as his ultimate meaning in the history of thought. It is difficult to see how Heidegger can justify the statements in his interview, fulfill his promises to erect a positive ontology, or prevent Sartre from claiming him as his master. Even in the volume, *Plato's Doctrine of Truth,* Heidegger intimates that his philosophy is a neutral one, and if this is really true, it contradicts his hopes of reaching God through his premises. For the neutral is the inert, the passive, the chaotic, the potential. It is prime matter which is not actually anything and when deprived of form, leads very logically to nihilism. Heidegger has never reasoned himself away from the devastating conclusions of *Being and Time,* and until he does so, the fate of his philosophy must continue to rest on that book.

SOME CRITICAL REMARKS

Heidegger's thought is vulnerable on many points, but only a few broad lines of attack can be suggested in the space below. It is not in place to argue against any of the existentialists by an appeal to first principles since they question their validity, turning back the clock of philosophical adventure to the point where Aristotle found it in his disputes with the Greek sophists. A more promising approach is to show the inconsistencies in Heidegger and to point out that he fails to explain experience as it is—which is indeed the first and only office of philosophy.

If existentialism were true, there would be no existentialism. Its experience of pure existence and of the naught involve situations that would be impossible to remember for oneself or to describe for others, as existentialism does in its voluminous literature. Existentialism is a system of philosophy, written in a dis-

cursive language, making general statements, and using examples from ordinary lay experience. But if its doctrines are really true, they destroy all thinking, generality, communication, and the meaning of analogy. If existentialism is valid, no philosophy could ever be elaborated and no meaning could ever be expressed. The fact that existentialism is a system of thought, understood by many and apparently accepted by some, is the surest refutation of its principles.

Heidegger's method of phenomenology is likewise self-contradictory. If pure description prevailed in knowledge, nothing could ever be known. Knowledge is not possible as a mere description of fact. It is ultimately explanatory. It must basically be cast into terms of principles and causes. If descriptions occur in literature and in logic, if they even occur on the empiriological level where classification is made in terms of properties described, it is only because a causal explanation lurks in the background and because first principles are employed to discriminate and organize material.

The experience of the nothingness of man, when he drives inward to pure existence without reference to the determinate self that he is, could never be reported if it ever occurred. The naught is not a thing but a negation. In such a light, it can only be "experienced" and reported in terms of a positive something previously known and accepted as a standard. Pure existence, without knowing what it is that exists, could never make any impression on us, let alone subject itself to analysis and description in terms of thought and language. In the same way, pure possibility can never be known or even be suspected as a possibility, unless it is also known what it is that is possible.

Man's first experience is not of the naught nor even of pure existence. The first datum that occurs to the human mind is being, the most general "predicate" in the universe, and unless it were known first, no knowledge could ever occur. Knowledge is a discrimination or an organization of thought-objects into a judgment, but no such activity could occur unless the principle of non-contradiction is known and used at the very onset of knowledge, at least implicitly. This principle is a principle of being, not a determinate being but being that is initially so vague that it is simply referred to in terms of "is" as opposed to "is not."

Being in a vague and general way must be at least implicitly grasped before any knowledge is possible.

But being is not the same as existence. Being is that which is or that which exists. To know existence implies that we know what exists, even if only in the confused sense that it is something. The positive, as Lavelle has said, must always be known first, or else the negative could never be recognized. Rudolf Allers argues that the non-being is secondary to being in knowledge and indicates "unfulfillment."

Being, it was said is the most general of the predicates. Indeed, it is not really a predicate at all: it is not a genus but is above the generic and is for this reason called a transcendental. Everything that exists or can exist is a being in some way, and nothing can possibly be unless it be a being. From this analysis, it is obvious that being shares somehow in the infinite. It is not limited to one thing but appears as many things and many forms, all of which differ not because they are beings but are simply different kinds or limitations of it. It is the being that is known first and then the limits of being. Knowledge moves from the universal to the particular, from the positive to the negative, from the indeterminate to the determinate, from the infinite to the finite. God, the angels, man, the plants, the animals, all the atoms and even their component parts are called beings; and thus when man knows being he knows something of the infinite.

No creature is radically finite. No creature is pure limit. All of them are beings, imitations of God, participations in Him, reflections of His love and His laws, differing from God and from each other only by differences in their limits. Thus, when man knows being he sees a facet of infinity and even of God whom creatures reflect. He is not mere limit, merely temporal, unrelated, and wholly unique.

Heidegger's dialectic, on the other hand, examines in creatures only what is creaturely and contingent; it never breaks out of the finite and the temporal to see meaning and value and to come at last upon the existence of God as proved from the creatures who resemble Him. Heidegger starts with the finite, the negative, the subjective, the radically individual rather than the general and universal. His meaningless universe is consistent with his atheism. Communists, naturalists, positivists, and others who deny

or ignore the reality of God are not logical in their attempt to substitute another meaning for the universe after a theocentric organization of the world has been repudiated. In a general sense, Heidegger shows the basic unmeaning of everybody and everything if atheism is true.

Modern man is formed largely by the Reformation and the Renaissance. In a previous chapter, the nihilism that Kierkegaard's logic would urge was seen as a continuation of Lutheran theology, and in the present chapter, numerous allusions were made to the kinship between existentialism and the Renaissance which dropped men's eyes from their search after timeless truth and set them on the creaturely or merely naturalistic. An idea that Heidegger was to labor in the twentieth century was expressed in the sixteenth by the Humanist, Doni: "Time and death are almighty masters." Existentialism marks the end of an era in the thinking of western man. In many forms, it is the final phase of the Renaissance.

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CHAPTER 12 SARTRE'S REFUGE IN ATHEISM

The tides of present-day thought have been edging toward the conclusion that man is an absurd being in an absurd world. A blind and animal faith in a method is all that naturalism can give to men, and the study of logicalism with its semantic branches found the ordinary common sense world passed off as an illusion with meaning assigned to things only when they weather the so-called scientific test. Freud, it was shown, was obsessed by a symbolism which holds that things are not what they seem. Like Nietzsche, he considered life an affair of masks and camouflages. Marx, following Hegel, saw everything as a self-contradiction. Bergson, though roundly critical of scientism, joined it in the belief that the common sense world is an illusion, and Heidegger hammered at existentialist premises until they thinned out to nihilism.

Jean-Paul Sartre is even more audacious in outlining the absurdity of man. Man is what he is not and is not what he is, according to Sartre. Man is "his own nothing," "a useless passion," a victim of "bad faith," destined only for despair and disillusionment. Where man was once dignified by intelligence, Sartre has consigned him to the irrational. Where the real at one time was deemed knowable and valuable, Sartre has turned it into chaos. Truly modern philosophy has achieved a Copernican Revolution.

At first sight, it would not seem that Sartre subscribes to the view of man as an absurdity. He has produced voluminous literature, and his major work, *L'Etre et le Néant* (*Being and Time*), runs to more than 700 pages of rather small type in the French original. If reality is absurd, it ought not to hang together solidly enough and long enough and orderly enough to be pursued across such a lengthy study. If man is perforated by the naught, it should not take Sartre so long to characterize him.

Sartre's popularity is largely of post-war dimensions, and there is no doubt that the disillusionment which his work would spread to men could only gain audience in a world that was itself mired deeply in the chaos which he pictures life to be. Before the war, he was an obscure professor. Born in 1905, he studied in French schools until 1929 and then taught philosophy for several years. Afterward, he traveled widely on the continent and in England. He studied under Heidegger, whose philosophy he has largely carried over into his own.

As a member of the French Army, Sartre was captured by the Germans in World War II and was in a prison camp for nine months before making his escape. He returned to Paris where he was active in the Resistance movement. After the Liberation, he abandoned the teaching career which he had resumed in 1941 and began to give his time completely to writing and lecturing. He later assumed the editorship of a review called *Les Temps Modernes* and through it has engaged in controversies with the Marxians who, it has been charged, formerly counted him among their number.

Besides his book, *Being and Nothing,* he has written treatises on images and the imagination, the emotions, humanism, and the Jewish problem. He has been highly successful as a novelist, playwright, and essayist, in addition to the fame that has embellished his work in the technical field of philosophy. His plays and his novels translate his formal philosophy into action. He has a trilogy entitled *The Roads of Liberty,* the first of two volumes of which appeared in English under the titles, respectively, *The Age of Reason* and *The Reprieve.* The third volume has tentatively been titled *The Last Chance.* So closely does the trilogy, at least in its published portions, parallel his *Being and Nothing* that Gabriel Marcel, the Christian existentialist who is diametrically opposed to Sartre, said that those who read one need not trouble to read the other.

One of Sartre's chief disciples is the novelist, Simone de Beauvoir. Another French existentialist novelist is Albert Camus, who has certainly felt repercussions from Sartre's thought or at least has ridden on the wave of his popularity. Existentialism is a school, almost a sect, gathering its power mainly from among the French youth.

Sartre has been influenced mostly by Heidegger, under whom he studied; he has also been affected by Husserl, Hegel, Taine, Kierkegaard, to an extent Bergson, and certainly the philosopher-novelist, Marcel Proust. In a broad sense, Sartre is but Heidegger translated and carried to his logical destiny by pure Cartesian analysis. But in many respects Sartre has deviated from his master, and, in ethical and political doctrine, moves beyond him. He has promised a special treatise on morality but, just as it is difficult to envision how Heidegger could develop the negativism of *Being and Time* into his projected metaphysics, so it is a strain to picture an existentialist book on ethics which would not simply repeat the nihilism of existentialist ontology.

THE REALITY OF NON-BEING

Already in his study on the imagination, Sartre gave evidence of his sympathies with Heidegger, though he worked up to them, like Heidegger himself, from Husserl's phenomenology. His first published work, a novel called *Nausea,* came out in the early thirties to picture the type of lost and despairing soul, in search of meaning, which later came to populate his plays and trilogy. But the rigor which existentialism claims for its dialectic had to await the later study on the imagination. Here, Sartre concluded that man lacked a criterion to differentiate the image from the percept, the inner from the outer, the mental from the real. Like Heidegger and even Dewey, he sided with neither idealism nor realism but simply made the critical problem meaningless—even as Husserl tried to put existences in parentheses and to describe simply what appeared to consciousness.

Sartre moved from his psychology to epistemology in his doctrine of the image, and from there he went to metaphycics where he rejoined the ontology of Heidegger. In *Being and Nothing,* his clever maneuver of analysis reaches beyond Heidegger's verdict that man is his own possibility. Sartre concludes that man is *his own nothing.*

Since Kant's time, it has been customary to make the well-known distinction between appearances and reality, but Sartre finds this split unjustified. The appearances are themselves realities, he holds, so that they cannot lead the mind to the noumenon beyond them. They are themselves the same web of being whose

mysteries we seek to unravel by their mediation, and in probing them a little deeper, it is discovered that we cannot differentiate them from ourselves. How, Sartre pleads, can we distinguish pleasure from the consciousness of pleasure? How can we say we have a toothache, except in terms of the ache itself? Any other yardstick to recognize a toothache would perhaps not be a tooth or an ache. It would at least not be this toothache, here and now individualized and ineffable.

Granting that appearance is being, even as the reality supposedly "behind" it, Sartre now turns to the task of showing that judgments of negation involve not a negation in the mind but a negation in reality itself. For this purpose, he employs a technique from *Gestalt* or configuration psychology, as it is known from the works of Wolfgang Koehler and Kurt Koffka: Suppose that I have a rendezvous with Pierre in a cafe but that Pierre does not appear as scheduled. I search for him, looking at every table, every chair, every person. In such a perception there is, against the foreground, of what I see, the background of an *absence*. The cafe is organized against a backdrop of nothingness, the absence of Pierre. Against this negatively organized perspective, Pierre's absence becomes also a foreground in the experience. For such an absence is not only an organizing principle but the fact most emphasized in the experience of the cafe. There is thus a second nullity superimposed on the first.

It is these nothings which serve as grounds for the judgment: "Pierre is not here." Thus Sartre concludes, it is not the judgment of negation which inserts the non-being into things, but the non-being which serves as a basis for the judgment of negation. "The condition necessary that it be possible to say *no* is that the non-being be a personal presence, in us and outside of us; nothingness *haunts* being." Sartre's use of language here would seem to indicate that being is not intrinsically the same as nothing but is surrounded, so to speak, by the naught. But since being is viewed with the naught as its principle or organization, Sartre's doctrine is an endeavor to unite contradictories—a fact that will be clearer later on. Marcel calls Sartre's system "the philosophy of non-being."

If the carburetor of an automobile stops functioning, the driver thinks that there is something wrong—a negation—in the carburetor. According to Sartre, it can likewise be shown by examin-

ing distance, destruction, cyclones, pillagings, otherness, repulsion, regret, distraction, that at the very heart of reality, as a necessary condition for its appearance and being, the naught is revealed.

In like fashion, man emerges from the naught. When he poses being, he must transcend it, and the only thing capable of such transcendence is the non-being. When man thinks of being, he must be outside of it and therefore be nothing in order to think. Kant's idea of transcendence thus becomes the tool for negating. Since man experiences himself as not being pure and simple existence, since he is not the being of the world which he discovers around him, the *no* is spun through the very skein of what he is.

THE BIRTH OF MAN BY NEGATING

Sartre calls the human reality being-for-itself (*le pour soi*). Opposite to it is being-in-itself (*l'en soi*).

Being-for-itself is being-in-itself negated by the introduction of an alien element, that of consciousness. On the other hand, being-in-itself is a plenum, filled with itself. It is absolute spontaneity before any reflection whatsoever occurs. It is an undifferentiated mass, dense and meaningless, of which it can be said: (*a*) being is; (*b*) being is in-itself; and (*c*) being is what it is. (The semanticist Ayer has accused Sartre of punning on the verb "to be.") It is as though there were absolute equality between the subject and predicate in each of these three judgments, with no distinction of any kind between thing and meaning, being and truth, existence and content. This is the ghost of Parmenides or Plotinus haunting the twentieth century.

The distinction between in-itselfness and for-itselfness is a subtle one. In seeking to ground itself, being-in-itself gives place to being-for-itself. There is a reflection, where what is only being-in-itself attempts to take hold of itself, but since pure being is the starting point, the reflection which will add to it can only add the non-being. Reflection which is man's achievement thus involves the introduction of a nothingness into the plenum of the being-in-itself, so that it becomes for-itself. To the extent that he reflects or thinks, man removes himself from the status of that which is.

Therefore, thought is not an entry into the real but a flight

from it. Consciousness, reflection, self-perfection are defects in being rather than its fulfillments. They imply a certain distance from an object, and far from a presence to being, they entail an absence. Mathieu, the chief character in Sartre's trilogy, "always felt as though he were somewhere else, that he was not yet wholly born."

In Sartre's view of things, God is deemed an impossibility. In order that a self exist, the unity of in-itselfness must be ruptured, and the being-for-itself which results can exist only insofar as it does not coincide with itself. God, Sartre concludes, would involve the incongruity of a being that was for-itself and in-itself at the same time. If God were a self, to that extent He would be removed from being and perfection.

To be a self always introduces negation and to that extent removes its reality from the plenum of pure existence. Thus man, a being-for-itself, never coincides with himself, like A =A, a status that characterizes only being-in-itself. Sartre says of man that he is not what he is and is what he is not. He is an incongruity that is always seeking to coincide with himself but never succeeds. God, a perfect self and a perfect being at the same time, would, in Sartre's logic, also be a perfect contradiction.

Being-in-itself is opaque and unintelligible. It is what it is, and since intelligibility would be added to what it is, intelligibility would be nothing. What is in-itself is neither an appearance nor a reality in the post-Kantian meaning of these terms. It is simply massive, and its density is infinite. It has no laws, no secrets, no meaning, no reason for existence. What is for-itself is a "hole in being," a fall or a perpetual degradation. Only a being which is lacking in being by the addition of the naught can be intelligible; only a being which is made of the naught can be intelligent. Schelling had similar notions of man more than a century ago.

Consciousness is described as a decompression of that density which is being-in-itself. It is in taking consciousness of ourselves that we elongate ourselves from what we are and, by the introduction of the nothingness, become what we are not.

According to Sartre, consciousness is twofold, pre-reflexive and reflexive. The first is the identity of self and is not really a form of knowledge since it is immediate and unconceptualized. It is a simple awareness of existence. The pre-reflexive *cogito* is the

condition for reflection or what is called the true Cartesian *cogito*.

Sartre, following Husserl, would prefer to write not "consciousness of self," but "consciousness (of) self" or simply "consciousness-self." The "of" implies duality and is not present in the unity of the pre-reflexive *cogito* where consciousness cannot distinguish its object from itself. It cannot differentiate pleasure from the consciousness of pleasure nor pain from the awareness of what it is and where it is. Such a pre-reflexive status of man contains the secrets of his being, a status like that which Heidegger discovered when he sought the meaning of being in the questioner conditioning his answer. The two-world theory of Dilthey, with historical objects and beings with their own personal histories, once again appears. Bergson and Marcel Proust, in the French tradition, reinforce this existentialist dualism which Heidegger found in German sources.

But the pre-reflexive *cogito* cannot be understood without introducing a factor that destroys it, for only by reflection can it be studied; and reflection abrogates its own object so that it cannot be studied at all. To understand anything implies the wedge of nothingness that automatically distorts the object which it seeks. Reflection cannot enter the pristine unity of self with self without disrupting the unity. So Sartre can write, "I am forgotten; I see only the empty and the naught."

Kierkegaard attacked Hegel, but Sartre turns to him for inspiration. In Hegel, likewise, contradictories are united and intelligence is destroyed. Sartre writes, with an Hegelian flavor, that pre-reflexive consciousness is non-thetic, or what is the same, non-positional. Only what is posed and hence past, only a thesis, lends itself to understanding. "*Wesen ist was gewesen ist*," Hegel said. "Essence is what has been." Reflection can only grasp what has gone through the dynamic present and taken its dead and formal place within the past. Reflection is thetic and positional. Grasping what no longer is, it feeds on what is not.

Alain had insisted, "to know is to have consciousness of knowledge" or "to know is to know that one knows." But a foreign body has crept into the knowledge act. What is originally known, say an object, is withdrawn behind the curtain of the second act, the knowledge of our knowledge of the object, and this second act requires a third to be apprehended. Always the

prior and primitive act of man, the pre-conscious decision which thrust him into an actualization of his powers, conceals itself. Being is essentially volatile, and only man's nothingness abides. Thus a Sartre character muses that "it must seem strange to him to feel behind him an unknown act which he has already almost ceased to understand and which will turn his life upside down. All I do, I do for nothing." To live the absurd law of this absurd world means a perpetual nausea.

True knowledge is impossible because reflexive consciousness, which is a condition of knowledge, always warps the object that started knowledge on its way. In *knowing* being, reflexive consciousness must thus know only what lies outside of being and hence becomes a consciousness of nothing.

By such dialectical gymnastics, Sartre is led to his curious thesis that existence precedes essence. Man exists first and ineffably. It is only afterward by knowledge and action that he defines his essence, indeed that he acquires an essence. The object-world, known, when at all, as tools which man marshals for his ends, is made intelligible through these man-projected goals, just as Heidegger saw being at hand as being that is controlled through human use. Where the object of an action, the end of an agent, is in play, essence truly has priority. But man knows himself in terms of his own subjectivity. He begins with the *sum* ("I am") of Descartes' first principle, moving to an essence by the *cogito* ("I think"). Thus Sartre writes:

> This simply means that man *is* first and that only afterwards he is this or that. In short, man must create his own essence; it is by throwing himself into the world, by suffering and fighting in it that little by little he defines himself. And the definition always remains open; one cannot say what *this* man is before he has died, or what mankind is before it has disappeared.

These thoughts can be illumined by reference to Heidegger's analysis which led to the notion of man as first only existentially possible, without meaning or content.

Knowledge implies a presence, but it is nothingness that is present. What is present to me is not myself but what is other, and when I know myself as being, everything else must be annihilated, just as to know being as external means the annihilation of self. In reality, the two awarenesses are the same in the

existential depths, since there is no norm, at this point, for sorting things into a subjective and objective status. Things are what they are, if they are being, and any addition involves the naught.

Aristotle had argued that we become what we know, but this maxim is reversed in Sartre's thought where it is asserted that we are not what we know. Knowledge implies the nothingness, and complete knowledge would require a complete annihilation of the knower. "Knowledge is nothing but the presence of being to for-itselfness, and the for-itselfness is the nothingness which realizes this presence." Knowledge is always ecstatic in the original etymology of that word. It stands out from being. The knower, who is being-for-itself, is likewise ecstatic. He exists out of, by virtue of, the nothingness. Sartre speaks of the "inappreciable distance that reveals things to me and sets me apart from them forever. I am nothing. I possess nothing."

For Sartre, reflection is part of a game in which it is constantly checkmated. But in attempting to dominate itself by Cartesian analysis, it becomes more and more conscious of its character as for-itself and of its nothingness standing out from being. The being-for-itself wishes, while remaining being-for-itself, as conscious and self-possessed, to plunge into a status of in-itselfness. It wishes to do away with its nothingness and to become pure "presence," at the same time being aware of this plenitude. But the more it struggles to realize this impossibility, the more it deepens and widens the internal negation by which it is constituted. You cannot have being and the thought of being together. "The being which wishes to ground itself in being is nothing else but the very foundation of its own nothingness. The ensemble thus remains the being-in-itself annihilated."

It is the hopeless insularity of a being that is simply there, haunted and hounded by the non-being wherever it turns, which leads Sartre to his doctrine that man is the victim of bad faith. A conscious being, man is not what he is and he is what he is not. He can never be himself, let alone become other things as true knowledge does. A conscious being seeks facticity and transcendence. It would like to be itself, a fact alone, and it also yearns to transcend itself to see itself as it is apart from the conditioning which actual knowledge imparts to it when known. But the

juncture of these two poles is ruled out by the nature of things. Facticity cannot be and be known without being altered in the knowing. Transcendence cannot know facticity since it must transcend it. Everything in Sartre's world is turned into a hoax.

Sincerity itself is a case of bad faith. A sincere person would be what he is, but he wants to be thus with a conscious deliberation and the possession of himself. Sincerity is a moral virtue, it is willed. But when a sincere person, who would be what he is, adds consciousness and will to what he is, he loses his sincere character, and virtue, like knowledge, becomes impossible. With knowledge and will superadded to his being, he cannot coincide with his being. He can never really be himself. "Thus, the essential structure of sincerity does not differ from that of bad faith, since the sincere person sets himself up as that which he is in order *not to be it.*" *We know* that we believe, and hence believing is not believing and pure belief becomes impossible. We wish to reconstitute ourselves in our original indifferentiation, but doing this consciously, we only differentiate ourselves the more. There is no exit from our torture, and as Sartre writes, "The story of a life, whatever it be, is the story of a frustration." Man is conscious of his natural failure to attain his ends.

THE EXISTENCE OF OTHERS

Our attitude toward others likewise reveals the utter failure that is man. "We are lost." "We're in hell." Love is a contradiction, because it would set up two absolutes, as in mutual love where equals are in love by their likenesses; then it would require these absolutes to be related and hence relative. Hatred offers no hope either, because it can never destroy its object; the object *has* existed, even after its decimation. Sadism and masochism run headlong into an impasse because they would make objects and instruments out of liberties and subjects—out of being-for-itself whose real inner negation is untouchable from the outside and uncontrollable. Being-for-itself cannot be attained as it is by considering it as facticity and therefore as an object. For the same reason, the desire for another is impossible of fulfillment because another consciousness cannot be possessed.

> In fact, we could be able to take a consistent attitude toward others only if they were simultaneously revealed as subject and

object, as transcendence-transcending and as transcendence-transcended, what is in principle impossible.

An original notion in Sartre's existentialism is his doctrine on the existence and nature of other men. This is one of the aspects of his thought where he parts company with Heidegger. His theory has practical moment in view of the fact that he has attempted to cut humanism out of his existential cloth, to turn his thought into a philosophy for democracy because it renders men equal, undifferentiated, and secrets to themselves; and he has engaged in controversies with the Marxians, after once allegedly belonging to the Communist party.

In regard to knowledge of others, Sartre finds that the realistic position tends to be too subjective. Realism, it is said, holds that experience is a mediator between ourselves and other men. We note certain attributes in organized form and posit the organizing principle of another personality behind them. We thus think of a centricity radically different from our own, of an ego that is not the ego. But what entitles us to place that center of organization behind the appearances? There is no standard to go by.

Sartre repudiates Husserl's solution of this problem by reducing it to Kantianism. In Husserl, others are analyzed and described as they appear to pure consciousness. But how can the otherness of others be known in this way, Sartre asks. Pure consciousness is asked to see other men apart from itself; it must project itself beyond its own dimensions and in this way it loses both its purity and its conscious character.

Sartre also finds that Hegel gave a spurious answer to the question when he said that otherness is known prior to the self and that it is precisely the opposition produced by the external which awakens the *cogito* into a grasp of its own subjectivity. But this solution is idealistic, like the rest of Hegelianism, and in Sartre's view, it runs deeper aground by not departing from the subject that must do the recognizing of others and condition its answers to the problem of being.

Heidegger speaks of being-with (*Mitsein*), as though other men involved not an opposition but a team. This solution Sartre analyzes to be a gratuitous assumption, without having probed first the psychological roots of our relation to otherness.

In place of all these solutions, Sartre proposes that others are

recognized from our sentiment of *being seen*. It is the *look*, cast by others upon me, that awakens me to their reality.

> In a word, that to which my apprehension of another as *being probably* a man refers is my permanent possibility of being-seen-by-him, that is to the permanent possibility for a subject, who sees me, to be substituted for an object seen by me. "The being-seen-by-another" is the *truth* of *"seeing another."*

The *being-seen* which somehow turns from a passive state into an active awareness of other men is not really a mode of knowledge. It is a modality of being, with the man who is *seen* an actor rather than a spectator, and the *seer* but another actor whose role is ineffably blended with that of his object.

In Sartre's own example, let us suppose that a man peeping into a keyhole is caught in the act by someone else. He cannot define himself alone, as looking into the keyhole, because he escapes himself. He is the perpetual victim of bad faith. He is not what he is, and he is what he is not. But in the sentiment of being seen, he can identify the existence of others who detect him. A typical sentiment in the same context is shame, the most revelatory of experiences with respect to social values. It is shame that makes the keyhole-peeper not simply to know but to live the situation of being-seen. "I feel you there in every pore. Your silence clamors in my ears." Shame thus establishes my objectivity for others and their subjectivity for me. It is the mediator between one self and another and also the revelation to my own consciousness of my own real being which appears. The keyhole-peeper recognizes his own character of facticity, posture, and even as being-in-itself. By his shame, fear, rage, or pride, he assures himself of his own reality and of the reality of the other men who see him.

The look of another makes man spatializing-spatialized and temporalizing-temporalized. While reaching to the subjectivity of others, man sees himself as an object spread out in space and time; otherness is a mirror that brings man's own reality into a proper spatio-temporal focus.

In the phenomenon of *being-seen*, the seer does not wear the nature of an object. To objectify him, as is later done, is a kind of defense reaction which frees the peeper from his status of being

simply for someone else and turns the other into a quasi-object, a being-for-itself that exists. René Le Senne, writing a decade before Sartre's lines on the subject, held that the outer world was projected by the finite mind to compensate for its finite character, and Fichte wrote substantially the same thing when he pictured the ego as setting the non-ego against itself. But Sartre's solution differs from idealism. Of otherness he writes: "It *is*, and I cannot derive it from myself."

The discovery of otherness is the third in a series of "ecstasies." The first is the break in being where that which was only in-itself becomes for-itself. The second is the reflexive consciousness which is consciousness of the first consciousness and where the self seeks identity with itself. It is a futile effort to recover and reconquer being-in-itself with its finite and massive density. The third ecstasy is in being for others, a fissure in time and space. In this third internal negation, there is a recognition of an ego which is *not* myself and a further annihilation of being-for-itself.

Our first thought, Sartre claims, is to resorb this being who has discovered our secret and to regain our absolute status by a kind of Feuerbachian, "man, god to man." But bad faith nullifies such ambitions. Love and hate with all of their secondary manifestations only fail man when he seeks their aid.

Through his journal, *Les Temps Modernes,* Sartre has proposed a philosophy of social revolution, comparable to that of the Marxians but propelled by different forces and for different ends. The Marxians claim that man knows reality by altering it, and to such a principle, existentialism would likewise hold, insisting that a worker, a slave, even a pencil-pusher in an office realizes the meaning of causality not by looking at a causal stream but by swimming in it. Heidegger had argued that understanding is the work of projecting, and Sartre accords with his master. Things are understood by the ends to which we set them, and the ends, with the realities that they reveal and realize, do not come into existence until an ineffable and individual human tool-user conceives of them and brings them into play. To any lesser extent, things remain unknown and non-existent.

This differs from dialectical materialism which views man as determined and rejects the radical atomism of existential political philosophy in favor of dialectical synthesis that is primarily social;

especially after the rejection of the idealist heresy, dialectical materialism takes a much more objective and mechanistic view of things than Sartre's psychologism would authorize.

According to Sartre's outlook, man is free, and to keep himself in such a freedom is the highest ambition of his nature. In the dynamism of freedom which, as Bergson has argued, is more of an act than a state, man drinks deepest at the springs of his being by becoming a perpetual revolutionary. He is essentially a worker, organizing his life according to ends and acquiring an essence by his movement to realize them. Materialism presumably is unable to explain this process since it is mechanical and deterministic. Man frees himself, asserts himself, acquires his essence by free, constant, and complete intervention in the world. But where is man going in Sartre's world, asks Marjorie Grene in *Dreadful Freedom*. If man is a perpetual revolutionary, he must revolt against the states his rebellion gains for him. He must revolt against freedom and revolution. He must revolt against revolt and in the end destroy his own self in that nihilism which de Ruggiero, Alvarez, Delp, Marcel, and other critics of existentialism find in it.

"TIME AND FREE WILL"

Time is a modality of being-for-itself. As in Heidegger, the human reality is before itself in the world, helpless there in its abandonment, and temporality is a mode of this being who is outside of himself, as a creature that exists through his own nothingness. In a more precise sense, the negations which temporality stains into man are the following: First, the being of for-itselfness is discovered as being behind it. Its existence precedes its essence, and its being is discovered as abandoned. Secondly, it recognizes itself as a defect in being, as a lack that is the source of its own lack, and in that very concept of a lack there is a reference that makes the future necessary, where compensation is sought for the vacuum. Finally, being-for-itself is a perpetual escape from itself, moving in a perpetual flight from a present that is always vanishing. What had no duration would be a mere datum. What endures has an internal negation that gives it stages and a dynamic force. Such a series of negations charges history with its motions and its meanings, making it not the creator

of man but his creation from the three fore-mentioned aspects of nothingness in his being. In this deriving of time from man, existentialism again parts company with Marxism.

Heidegger emphasized the future. He insists that man is his own projection machine, moving from possibility toward temporalization in the attempt to see and understand himself. Sartre believes, however, that this stress is mistaken and that the secret to time lies in the ineffable *now* of the present. It is in the present that the nothings in the self are introduced; it is here where being-for-itself is constituted and here where the answer to the problem of time must be, if not found, at least sought. Being-for-itself is what it is not. It is not what it is. It finds itself in perpetual oscillation between the moments of time and between being and non-being. It is essentially a *between,* and this relation which unites contradictories holds the clue to the meaning of man.

The present is unintelligible, owning that ineffable secret which does not have anything outside of itself to translate it into language and intelligence. "There shall be no next time." The present is, and that is all.

The past is always with us, being the essence that our actions have wrung out for us in our struggle to reach the quiet status of having defined ourselves. The past gets its sense from the way in which it is oriented, and thus the future does seem, as Heidegger claimed, a promising locus for the solution of human mysteries.

But the future is not yet experienced. Only by thought, only by generality and abstraction, can the future be represented, and then it is only the future in general, not *my* future. Alone and unrelated, the general makes no sense.

Thus the three temporal modalities are involved in the structure of man, making in the end for a meaningless jumble of states and actions, where the present enjoys a priority only because existence is first and unceasing in our lives. The mystery of things is bound up in a living present: being *is.*

The place of liberty in Sartre's thought could already be foreseen from the preceding sketch. Man not only has freedom; he *is* it. Cut off from command and from counsel, man cannot help being completely autonomous. He does not exist first and afterward have freedom, since "first" and "after" are modalities produced by freedom itself. Man's first act is spontaneous and

gratuitous; ". . . it is absolute, as a result perfect gratuity." Existing without pattern or principle to form his guiding ideal, man is the freedom to make of himself what he will, and all of his posterior actions are efforts to unravel the mystery of his freedom, where indeed his very liberty must be used in the process and thus must make itself undefinable and unmeaning. "Outside the world, outside the past, outside myself: freedom is exile, and I am condemned to be free." Freedom, like thought, becomes a defect.

What liberty really is is the naught at the core of being which forces man to make himself what he is and which makes it legitimate to say: to be is to choose to be. Because of this spontaneous character of the free act which urges man's thought into action and thus conditions the answer that his thought will reach, liberty becomes the source of all values. A completely anthromorphic universe looms up, where man becomes a substitute for the God of orthodox thought, where man is a creator, the author of time, the source and the end of values, the mystery of mysteries, and the Protagorean measure of all things. One of Sartre's critics has said of him that, he has put the "absolute into his pocket."

Values like liberty are thus radically contingent and unjustifiable. Man is a "nobody from nowhere in particular." Existence must arise brusquely, *ex nihilo,* or it is nothing at all. Nietzsche was the prophet of existentialism and of our age. He insisted that man must be alone at his origins or else, depending on what is outside of him, he is not really free. Nietzsche also wrote those ominous words: "God is dead." In place of the God of traditional religion, existentialism substitutes the deity of man, and it is the positive achievement of Sartre's thought, by its emphasis on what is only finite and only creaturely, to have shown that the banishment of God, which Nietzsche describes, drives man himself into exile, an alien from his own personality and being.

The supreme value that man actually seeks, according to existentialism, is the status that Sartre claims would make the true God a self-contradiction and hence impossible. Man struggles to be a being-in-itself while remaining for-itself. To have everything and yet, while being conscious in addition to this universal possession, to have nothing—such is the self-contradictory ambition of man.

Value is beyond being. It is consubstantial with being-for-itself,

which exists by its own nothingness and makes its values as gratuitous as its own being. It is a source of no amazement to find Sartre saying that man is unjustifiable. He is superfluous, since he can only exist by attempting to add to the plenitude of being-in-itself and by adding as a result only nothings and negations. There is no basis for man in reality. Since he is outside of being, he is "too much." He is a "malady of being."

Yet strangely enough man is also held up as a responsible creature, responsible for himself and for the world that springs from his nothingness. With his own emergence into being-for-itself, the world and other men come into existence. All his experiences point to his responsibility by the reference they carry to this otherness which has come about because of his original, free, and spontaneous decision. Every thought, every deed, every word has the world as the condition for its existence and also for its meaning, and man has made the world. Even not to act is a form of acting. Man is condemned. It is as though he were forced inescapably into action from his abandonment, and yet he is free.

Even suicide is a mode of being in the world. Camus says that suicide is the most logical recourse of man, but Sartre refuses to recommend it as a panacea since it is itself an action and hence not the answer to what action means.

Death is the end of man. In Heidegger's thought, where death is a possibility structured into the being-for-itself, existence decides to die and projects itself deathward. The human reality in Heidegger's view is nothing but its own projection. Because death terminates, it assigns meaning to a person, and thus life becomes a serial story in which the full meaning remains unknown until the last chapter reveals the final turn of action.

But Sartre finds that Heidegger has used death to individuate the human reality and then used the human reality to individuate death. Both are unrepeatable, requiring the self to perform since no one else can die for us, no one else can live for us.

So Sartre does not believe that death is one of our anticipations. It is the result, rather, of any one of the infinite and hence unknowable factors and forces operating around us. The roof may crash this minute, killing a family in its home. The bridge of San Luis Rey collapsed and sent five persons to their death. No one knows what chance may thrust upon him the very next minute,

and for Sartre, it is this chance element which decides the character of our death.

Since death, as Dilthey argued, is the term of life and the seal of its meaning, chance must decide the meaning of the life which has preceded. For Hegel, meaning was always posthumous, and this is likewise the case in Sartre's vision of things. But the meaning of life, because of the death that terminates it, is a chance affair, and chance has no meaning at all.

Death is not *my* possibility. It is *a* possibility, having nothing to do with the projecting of self but emphasizing rather man's impotence to give his life a meaning since he does not invest it with its end. "That's what existence means: draining one's self dry without a sense of thirst." Death should neither be sought nor be taken lightly. In either case, it will come when it will. It is random like the existence, the liberty, the value, the being which it terminates.

Simone de Beauvoir, a disciple of Sartre, has written a book called *The Ethics of Ambiguity* which could intimate the directions that might be taken in the tract on morals which her master has promised. De Beauvoir acquiesces in the logic that man is a failure because he can never coincide with himself; he can never fulfill Pindar's maxim: "Become what you are."

But if realism is a statement of "what is the case," to use a Wittgenstein phrase, then man ought to recognize his ontological status as a failure and think and act in that awareness. Failure, as existentialism sees it, consists in being cut off from any ultimate meaning and value and thus being forced to make one's way freely and from within. This metaphysical analysis is transformed into a moral imperative by de Beauvoir's ethics. Freedom must keep itself free. As virtue in Kant's thought had no other end but itself, so stands freedom for de Beauvoir. Freedom must act to expand itself and should choose, as its contents, whatever can contribute toward that end; plunging toward the future, it organizes the whole past, we are told, like rays that fan out from a point of light.

It is not only our own freedom that existentialism would exhort us to further. The liberty of others must also be enhanced, and that brings Sartre and, to a certain extent, de Beauvoir to a theory of political revolution. *Les Temps Modernes* has been a mouthpiece for such doctrine. Marxism is repudiated for its economic

determinism, and man is said to determine himself in a radical way as he searches, through the causal ferment of things like work, to give sense to life and essence to his existence. De Beauvoir poses existentialism as the only philosophy that could have an ethics since there is a constant emphasis on man the agent and on the dangers and difficulties and failures that hover, without surcease, over his anguished solitude.

SOME CRITICAL REMARKS

Sartre's philosophy, much like that of Heidegger, is a nihilism when its final dimensions are measured. He views man as the source of his own nothingness and gives to nothingness an entitative force. For Sartre, life and reason and genuine free will (*liberum arbitrium*) are each an absurdity, a mixture of immiscible opposites which can only lead a genuine philosopher to despair.

In Sartre's world, nothing is ever truly known. Man seeks to know himself, only to find that his real self has vanished in the act of knowledge. He must be as nothing to know being, and he can only coincide with himself by negating everything else, including the conscious thought and will which make him a person. He creates himself and his world and, because of his original free decision, brings other men into his life whom he recognizes as spies and who make him even more conscious of himself in that flight from being which is his autobiography. The present might look promising as an answer to his problem of learning who, what, when, where, and why he is. But the present, as Heraclitus argued long ago, really does not exist: it only passes.

So is framed the picture of man the absurd. In many ways, Sartre has seen the leading directions of modern speculation and then has seen them through. He carries to their conclusions the deism, liberalism, subjectivism, analytic spirit, atomism, and secularism which various men before him had enunciated but failed to follow to their very ends. The history of modern thought has been the story of plugging the loopholes in Cartesian dualism and Cartesian doubt. But the end of the trail has apparently been reached. It is difficult to see how the modern secularistic tendencies can go any further than despair.

There is value to Sartre's thought in calling attention to the ultimate fate of some leading ideas which are still enshrined in

much of western thought, especially in the spirit of scientism. There is value, too, as there is among all the existentialists in the directing of the human mind toward the concrete and in pointing out the inadequacy of making the thinking mind a mere instrument, like a voltmeter, with no attention at all to its vital and active role in all science. In Sartre, there is a focus also on the privileged character of the human person which all the existentialists bring out, but subjectivity becomes so exaggerated for men like Sartre that not even a personal world remains.

Radical contingency, absolute check, complete anxiety and lack of assurance, despair, and the thoroughly finite character of the world which Sartre pictures seal man off forever from any positive contact with the real and deny to the real any positive character in itself. A radical limit is a negation. A limit is capable of being, of being understood, of being described, only when the positive exists and is grasped in the first place. Pure limit is pure vacuity or simple negation, and if thought worked entirely according to this vacuum, nothing could ever be known and even the so-called experience of the naught could never be described. F. H. Bradley showed that to know that transcendent reality exists, as Kant did, is to transcend toward it and thus to overcome its so-called unknowability. The same thought applies here when terms are properly changed.

Louis Lavelle, a contemporary of Sartre, seeks the same primitive fact of experience which Sartre aims to capture and present. But Lavelle emphasizes the positive character of this experience, whereas Sartre attends only to its limits. As a result of this positivity in Lavelle's thought, he mounts to the knowledge of a personal and premoving God. Sartre, on the contrary, seeing only the empty and the naught, denies not only the existence of God but the existence of everything. Aquinas, a thoroughgoing realist, held to the primacy of the principle of non-contradiction formulated, as it is, because the mind apprehends first the positive and then the negative which is a limit. Being cannot be non-being at the same time that it is being. The combination of the positive and the negative, with the former as prime in both being and knowledge, explains partly why the principle of non-contradiction is formulated in a negative way: being is not non-being.

Sartre adverts only to the finite aspects of man and of his world.

Lavelle, like Aquinas, views man as a participation in the infinite, limited indeed as every creature must be but still endowed with a minimum of likeness to Divinity itself by which creatures have the power to exist and the light to be understood. Sartre's whole dialectic reflects the direction in modern thought — beginning with the Renaissance and coming all the way through scientism which exalts man's power over nature — to make man not the image and likeness of God but the image and likeness of his own self. Sartre begins, like the typical modern thinker, with an individual datum as the first discovery of man's intellect. In reality, the first idea of man is that of being in its vague and general sense, and from it man can move not only through a universe that is intelligible but to existence of a provident God.

Sartre's description of our knowledge of others amounts to a verbalism. How can we know ourselves and know others, the one as an object seen and the second as the seer, unless we remain ourselves in knowledge while knowing something other as distinct from us? Knowledge involves becoming another thing, precisely as it is other. It is not possible in the universe which Sartre describes by his Cartesian analytic.

Knowledge, infinitely analytic, would destroy the human subject of knowledge by analyzing him away. It would also analyze away the object. If knowledge occurs at all, the subject must remain identical with himself and know what is other than he, without changing either his being or that of the object.

Existentialism, on its own principles, would make knowledge impossible, but as always happens with the denial of intellectualism, a philosopher makes use of his intelligence to accomplish the denial. Sartre's notion of the look in which both the subject and object of the action are united and yet differentiated and distinguished shows that he has, while denying the orthodox notion of knowledge, actually returned beneath his guise to an Aristotelian principle. He has not followed the Cartesian analytic which his principles compel. He has admitted an immediacy of relation which knowledge involves and knowledge meaningfully establishes, where the subject and object each preserve their being and through that very being enter into a relationship. Sartre's universe would require the denial of this immediacy and the substitution of an infinitely

long series of mediate relations, which are the fruits of analysis and the seeds of nihilism.

Gabriel Marcel has pointed out that Sartre has adumbrated the principle of identity in his notion of being-in-itself. But Sartre misses the real force of this principle, which has an existential and super-universal (transcendental) significance. To differentiate the existent from the non-existent implies the principle of non-contradiction which is a negative formulation of the principle of identity. Sartre obviously employs the principle of non-contradiction in marking off being-in-itself from being-for-itself. But he later denies this principle by holding that a thing can be what it is not and can not-be what it is. So existentialism itself becomes an absurdity, consistent with the universe it paints by its efforts.

Alphonse De Waelhens rejects the views of Bernard Delfgauuw who puts Sartre in the lineage of Descartes. De Waelhens' argument runs that Sartre makes capital of the intentional character of the mind and thus holds, against Kantianism and Cartesianism, that consciousness can only be defined when an object is compresent to it. Such, of course, is the view of Brentano and especially of Husserl, but Husserl's name really puts the whole problem, contrary to De Waelhens, back in the shadows of Descartes. For Husserl envisioned himself in one way as accepting the *cogito, ergo sum* and as attending to the *sum* more than the *cogito*. He reduced Cartesian analysis until it went beyond thought.

Be that as it may, Sartre inherited a corpus of thought from Husserl and Heidegger whom he studied, and he turned upon it the analytic spirit which has pervaded French philosophy since Descartes uncoiled it three centuries ago. When Descartes broke off the bonds between reality and the mind, it was Descartes and not Sartre who was un-Cartesian. For analysis, pure and simple, will not allow distinctions. It makes everything intermediate, indefinite, and indeterminate. Subject and object lose their identity like everything else in the world, and darkness prevails over the intellect. Descartes, in his analytic, differentiated his thought and his existence, and Sartre extended the Cartesian analytic to correct such a view.

Sartre, in fact, marks the final stage of Cartesianism and the numerous offshoots of Descartes which drew on one or another of

his principles and went their way. Mere analysis like that practiced by scientism leads man to discover, in the world and in his mind, only the empty and absurd universe of nihilism. Sartre is not a wholly new figure but an old one that has removed its mask.

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CHAPTER 13 TRANSCENDENCE IN KARL JASPERS

Karl Jaspers is one of the most searching, provocative, and original of Kierkegaard's intellectual descendants. He stands out by the order of his thought, his positive orientation, and the wide expanse of vision which he takes in. Compared to the ideas of Heidegger and of Sartre, the thought of Jaspers is much hardier and even healthier. It is more patiently worked out and somewhat more temperate in its final form.

Though inductive in presentation, the spirit of Jaspers is truly philosophical and synthetic, binding into a single expression ideas scattered through Kierkegaard, Hegel, Kant, Nietzsche, Schelling, Max Weber, and Plotinus. Whereas Heidegger is interested in the problem of being, Jaspers is focused more on human existence—its place, its power, and its purpose. By intention, Heidegger leans more toward the metaphysical and Sartre toward the psychological. The direction of Jaspers is to morals. Because of their differences in orientation, Heidegger and Jaspers reject each other's philosophies. But it will later be found that if they are not the same in method and in purpose, they do complement each other by arriving at the same broad conclusions concerning man and his universe.

Jaspers was born in 1883, and began his professional life as a psychiatrist. It is impossible to be a "scientist" without having some sort of philosophical perspective, and this is obviously true in psychology. The psychologist inevitably is charged with a philosophy of his subject-matter, who is man. So it was a logical march for Jaspers to move into the territory of philosophy by simply asking empiriological questions about man. In many ways, he carries over the analytic method of empiriological psychology into the philosophical domain.

As a philosopher, Jaspers taught at the University of Heidelberg, and with the reopening of this institution in the American zone of post-war Germany, he returned to his teaching post. Later, he was named to a professorship at the University of Basle, Switzerland.

Jaspers has written much more than any of the other twentieth-century existentialists, his masterpiece being the huge three-volume work called *Philosophy*. The year 1948 found him publishing the first of a new series of books on the problem of knowledge. This first volume *On Truth* is a massive 1103-page book and in many respects tones down his earlier and more extreme views in philosophy.

Jaspers has also written books on the psychology of world views, existence, Descartes, Nietzsche, the spiritual situation of the present, and existence compared to reason. He has published a post-war work on the question of guilt.

It is convenient to introduce Jaspers in the light of the divisions of his three-volume *Philosophy:* first, the problem of man's orientation in the world; second, the clarification of existence; and third, the study of transcendence.

ORIENTATION IN THE WORLD

That he has kneaded his philosophy of human orientation largely out of Kierkegaard's attack on Hegel, Karl Jaspers would be willing to acknowledge. Philosophy, he holds, is not a detached view of a passing parade. It is a risk. It is a daring. It is a thrust into the real. It is an awakening of one's self. Far from being the study of an object, it is best defined as the realization of an inner act. It grounds the authentic existence of the individual, clarifying while producing and realizing while being transcended. In point of fact, man is insulated from the ultimate around him and the intimate within him, and his vocation is to struggle against such limits that thwart his penetration into the truly real. He is reduced like Nietzsche's yea-sayer to pure striving rather than to purposeful existence in a value-laden world.

The necessity to orient himself in the cosmos shocks man toward limits that must be transcended if meaning and value are to be seized. The meditations on existence in the second part of Jaspers' earlier system show these limits to be irremovable and to be sur-

mountable only by an unconditional act which, as it were, goes outside existence in order to grasp it. In the third stage of this existentialism, where the transcendent is discussed in terms of the code in which it embodies itself, the riddle of deciphering the ambiguities and antinomies of the world is etched out as the highest hope of man.

Jaspers' attack on systemism is of shattering proportions. As Kierkegaard had argued, a system must be complete to be meaningful. It is utopian rather than historically tempered; it is abstract and arbitrary in its stand toward existence.

Existentialism, on the other hand, is much harder. "The existence philosophy cannot attain to a perfect figure in art nor to a decisive completion for the being of the individual thinker." Imperfect, the various historical world pictures like Hegelianism, Communism, and positivism are not cogent simply because their principles are relative to the system-maker; they are postulates. Only existence is compelling. It is hard, challenging, exact, inescapable. Systems, moreover, are in constant disagreement; there are different theories in science, different parties in politics, different guesses in the face of the unknown. How is a decision to be made among systems without creating another system that opposes all the rest and owns all of their chronic shortcomings like incompleteness and abstractness?

The placid, static character of systems is at variance with the dynamic welter of existence and of life. Life must plod its weary way not in a logical but in an ontological world. In such a life, individuals are far more striking than universals. Moreover, systems all end in symbols, in external substitutes for reality. They all involve the infinite regression, the relative, the indeterminate. Even Descartes found rational evidence inadequate in the end, and by virtue of the *sum* in his *cogito* principle, he seemed forced to the stubborn fact of existence. Yet the over-all tone of Cartesianism is typically modern in its play on logic; and pure method or logic or technique without content is as meaningless as the Kantian "pure reason." Method without metaphysics is blind and random.

Cosmic orientation, where man seeks to universalize his way through the valley of life, brings man to his right senses by its breakdown, and on the ruins of his system, he grasps the possibility of existence which transcends the world of objects. "The world

picture is incomplete; it ends with directions, ideas, intentions; it is not yet the whole but is becoming the whole." Yet in this very collapse of systems, there is revealed the reality of the existing subject whose continued questions have precipitated his failure and who becomes conscious of himself through obstacles in his path.

Unable to verify its own self, any world outlook is found to be completely unverified, and the discovery of this failure in systems is the beginning of wisdom. What remains from such a failure is no longer a world in which orientation can take place but a self that can orient and an immanence that can transcend. The Renaissance man, looking inward upon his finite self, again comes to maturity in existentialism. Reason is crowded out of this existential world, for there is no dipolar relation of subject and object, identical in themselves and distinct from each other. Rather, there is the confronting of self with self, and there is the realization, not through reason but through faith, that this positing of self by self can only be achieved through the transcendent.

The quest after life's meaning and nature's reasons thus looks first into the world to orient itself, and failing there, it discovers the call to possible existence. Thus, moving like Nietzsche from the negative to the positive, it opens up the way to transcendence. Transcendence, the ultimate super-existence toward which man plunges when he forsakes systemism, is called the One—very much as in the philosophy of Plotinus.

The world is thus a totality, existence is an origin, and the One is the transcendent. Giordano Bruno, a Renaissance pantheist, was greatly influenced in his Humanism by Plotinus. He sang of the conversion of *the many* to the *one* and the necessity of ecstatic intuition with this Unity that throbs transcendently at the root of all things. Jaspers carries on this tradition.

To give meaning to life, appeal is often made to religion, science, and art. But Jaspers finds that all of these are inadequate. Prayer and cult, according to him, bear upon another world, not the one where life is led and challenges are hurled. Revelation is pictured as objective, whereas man moves from within. Revelation speaks in terms of objects and universals, Jaspers asserts. Likewise, he finds that organization, a *corpus mysticum,* is sharply at variance with the existingly valuable individual.

Science, more properly scientism, Jaspers thoroughly discredits.

It glories in the merely mechanical, moves from the particular to the general, lacks a taste for the obvious unity in our world, soars away toward the theoretical, is unable to examine itself, is abstract by contrast with life's concreteness. With every step forward in science, completion does not close in on it but new problems and unsuspected tasks are opened up. Science is formal, ideal, logical, theoretical; existence is striving. When thought stands outside of being, it is not being but above being. On the other hand true philosophy must mediate between man and being. And as Bruno hinted, the climax of man's big questions on the cosmos must turn the huntsman into his prey.

At every moment when I make myself an object, I am indeed at the same time more than this object, namely, an essence that can objectify itself. I can never be unconditional and simultaneously know this fact, since knowledge itself would be a condition. Philosophy is not algebraic knowledge but passion. It is not on the reviewing stand; it is in the parade. It acts without ends, wills without knowing. It is a perpetual daring of man into the world that reason cannot probe.

Art, more than religion and science, offers a measure of hope. It is existential. Instead of transporting man to a different world, Jaspers holds, it deepens and discloses the world that is. It will be recalled here that Kierkegaard was greatly affected by German Romanticism, even though he stood against its final assessment of life. Jaspers follows a similar road. He pushes forward the spirit of the Renaissance with its aims of aesthetic experience that Santayana and even Whitehead have suggested on the American scene.

THE "INSCAPE" TO EXISTENCE

On the second tier of Jaspers' earlier thought, it is argued that philosophy thrusts toward existence by making the subject conscious of himself. Ontology, the categories, world pictures—all of these prepare the way. In their breakdowns, they confront the philosopher with a choice—a descent to that skepticism which Nietzsche termed a disease or the clarifying of existence through the reduction of all certainty to the present of self-certainty and through taking all knowledge, Socrates-like, to be self-knowledge. When such an identity occurs between knower and known, knowledge becomes

a deed rather than a formality. As Goethe said, in the beginning was the deed.

But Jaspers finds the deed not only at the beginning of true knowledge but everywhere in what is genuinely grasped. In the hopeless breakdown of world outlooks, whatever they may be, man is given a choice not between one world outlook and another but between being himself and not being it. "Become what you are!" This choice urges us to a decisive consciousness of ourselves. "For where man it totally himself in a matter, there is for him an either/or and then no compromise. He wills to drive things to the limit in order to come to a decision." Robert Frost says that he advocates a "demi-revolution." For Jaspers, in the revolt from system, the revolution must be soul-shakingly total.

Thus philosophy is a daily self-experience. It is the lifting of ourselves by the proverbial bootstraps to the summits of transcendence. The emphasis is not on thinking as content but on thinking as an act, a note that Fichte fully emphasized that, in a different context, appears in the philosophies of Lavelle and Le Senne in contemporary France. The decision, which is even more a doing than a deed, is not known as a universal. Rather it is historically experienced through a concrete participation in the historical process. Such a concretion has been depicted variously by others, Jaspers agrees, as libido, anxiety, preoccupation, will to power, and tendency to death.

What I really am, Jaspers says drawing up alongside of Heidegger, is possible experience that is determined through my own concrete act of liberty. Man must be alone at his origin in order to acquire power and originality and initiative. He must produce himself, as it were, if he is truly to enjoy freedom and independence. Man is neither a vacuum nor a part of God. As Pascal said, he hovers in between being and nothingness.

The so-called vicious circle in the grasping of self is avoided by Jaspers by the same reasoning that satisfied Heidegger. To know and to know that I know are identical. There is no question of a syllogism or disjunction of any sort. What is logically nonsensical is existentially real. Existence is not an object but an origin from which objects, thought, action, and even the self emerge for attention. Thought is thus posterior to existence. It is privative rather than enriching. Existence in turn gets its steam

from transcendence and is simply engaged by the individual. Gabriel Marcel makes capital of this point in his "Christian existentialism." Without existence, life becomes an empty formula, vacuous, abstract, a *tabula rasa.*

The awakening to existence cannot come about by pure thought. Rather there is a trembling in a situation where a decision must be made *ex nihilo,* without the help of counsel or even of forethought. Since there is no mediation between man and himself, he is truly immediate as he arises. He is forced to a Kierkegaardian leap, moving self through self in a relation that is absolute.

This makes it look as though Jaspers is placing existence entirely on the side of subjectivity. Actually such is not the case at all. Existence is found more in that relation between subjectivity and objectivity which is viewed as a dynamic reality and where the subject-object poles in knowledge and the subject-predicate duality in judgment have not yet acquired their disjunctions. Reflection and consciousness come later after the initial experience, and in their customary way, they are said to shatter the unity to which they advert, warping the experienced character of the experience in the endeavor to know it. In his book, *On Truth,* Jaspers says, "Truth is found in the cleavage between subjectivity and objectivity."

Existence can be clarified by the limits which hem it in. The notion of limit-situation plays a leading role in Jaspers' thought as it does in the philosophy of Marcel. Situations are not just conclusions. Somewhat as in Dewey's view, they are discovered in our first questions about reality since the questions themselves emerge not out of a vacuum but from a pre-existing set of circumstances.

But here comes the tragedy of existence. In thinking of a situation, as Kierkegaard said, man must prescind from it. What is thought, schematized, generalized is not this immediate black-bodied ontal frontier but something conceptual and universal and abstract. So the surges to transcend the limit-situations are checkmated, and the gap that stretches between them and our thoughts of them is as wide and as deep as the chasm between individual and universal.

What then is the significance of these situations? As facts they are realities for an interested human reality, circumscribing its

freedom and yet calling the attention of the individual to his concrete and irreducible character. Motion, with its resistances, gives ample evidence of constraining forces somewhere in our world. Constraint is the price of being finite. Situations are thrown on us, and we can also engender new ones. The only thing that we cannot do with situations is to escape them.

Limit-situations in the proper sense of the term are not simply blocks upon the abnormal ambitions of man. They force him normally into struggle and suffering. Fast, hard, unyielding, they find us ever unprotected from their challenges, and it is not out of whim that we react. They force us to take a stand against them.

Death is a prime example of such a situation. It is a barrier beyond which we cannot see and cannot will and cannot act at all. Unrepeatable and unique, it cannot be clarified from other grounds.

Another such situation is suffering. Not being an absolute, man attempts to understand suffering by representing it as an object, a number, or a formula. But suffering is not relieved by logic, any more than a doctor by studying a disease thereby immunizes himself against it. Suffering cannot be thought away. It is a price of limitation.

Guilt is a third important limit-situation. Produced from the depths of his own liberty, man is responsible for his finitude, and, through his decision, guilt is thus born into reality as unremitting as our shadow. It is a wound that cannot be healed. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard are united in affirming that man cannot return to a reflectionless immediacy. Even not acting, even returning to this innocent immediacy could not be achieved without destroying the very agent himself. Kierkegaard's acceptance of Luther's thesis on the depravity of man is definitely alive again in Jaspers.

In the face of all these limit-situations, the existing individual is called on for bravery. Such an attitude is the only one that is without disillusionment. It is the attitude of the yea-sayer, recognizing that his life depends on incompletion and that nothing which is achieved and finished can really live. By the very striving itself, man moves toward his own completion and death and in general his own self-realization. In an historical analogue, pain, the sense of work, and the feeling of guilt are asserted by Bruno to be man's hope of realizing what he is.

The limit-situations reveal existence as a constant swing between

order and disorder in history, subject and object in knowledge, individual and society, person and person. There is no egoless world or worldless ego. Neither of these opposite poles can give a complete description of human existence, which is caught up between them. The solution of life's antinomies will be offered in the third phase of Jaspers' thought.

Existence is a consciousness of existence. It is not a knowledge of it; for since existence is not thinkable, experimentable, transferrable, and universal, the clarification of existence is not an affair of the Cartesian clear and distinct idea. As Schelling said of finitude, existence is as nothing. And as Jaspers goes on, it is marked much more by frustration than by success. "I am in the world only as my situation which, in the ruins of the knowledge of the world as a knowledge of being itself, awakens me to myself as possible existence." It must be repeated that Jaspers disdains a philosophy of objects. His is an experience from within.

In searching out the backgrounds to illuminate this philosophy of existence, Kant naturally arises first. Being is its own oughtness, as it were, and there is what Kant called a moral autonomy or good will for the sake of itself alone. "Oughtness" is something unconditional for Jaspers, and it is thus an expression of self-consciousness and even self-possession. In this deed of the individual by which he becomes himself there is the final meaning of philosophy. Such a deed or, more forcefully, such a doing, is its own evidence, its own production, its own motion. It has no other law but itself. Self-becoming is also self-giving, the giving of self to self.

An expression of this unconditional character to which the individual is called is the phenomenon of anxiety or anguish. All anxiety comes from anxiety over death, where the human reality stands helplessly before the possibility of its own nothingness. At any moment, death may steal in upon man, death that not only means to be no longer "there" but to be no longer at all. Without such anxiety over death, there would really be no freedom since the nothingness of our future detaches freedom from the conditions that would limit it. Even knowledge and certitude must be posterior to freedom, since, as pre-existing, they would be constraints.

Only within an historical career can the human reality ground

itself. But only to know history as a string of facts or events is not what Jaspers means by genuinely historical consciousness. True historical-mindedness gets inside of history and can only be taken with a personal rather than objective flavor. Man, involuted by time, must make decisions for the timeless; the future means possibility for him, the past requires loyality of his contemporary efforts, and the present is decision. Neither timeless nor timely, eternity is the deepening of the one through the other. Detached by itself above history, existence can never make itself humanly felt; it only reveals itself by the resistance it throws up against man's deepest ventures, just as a bird can fly only in space where there is air. I am not empirically given in my being but historically possible and historically realizable.

Locked up in this dialectic of will, the view that takes will not in terms of free judgment but in terms of indivisible and immediate striving, is the very same problem that tormented the theologian, Kierkegaard, the problem of belief. Now belief is not here defined according to its dictionary sense, and like Kierkegaard, Jaspers would deny to it an intellectual content. Belief is here taken in the sense of Barth and Brunner, the leading Protestant theologians of our time. Belief, for Jaspers, is the outward expression of love. It is essentially an act and has no traffic in content.

As groundless, belief is the product of a leap and is the ground of all else in the life of man. It achieves a reunion with the *One* of Plotinus and of Bruno. It is not posited as an object but is much more to be treated in terms of consciousness. Belief, communication, love, and the inner deed that makes one be—all of these are not placidly possessed but are a matter of constant struggle with momentary success always being followed by failure. The human reality contends undyingly in the effort to clarify itself, reveal itself, and give itself, and in that very struggle lies its final meaning and its sole attainable goal.

Existence can be best set forth in terms of freedom. As de Tonquedec, the best expositor of the earlier Jaspers, puts it, liberty is the axis about which this new philosophy revolves. Only in freedom do we have that absolute where every man is an exception. Only thus can the autonomy of man be underwritten. In seeking to comprehend myself through freedom, I grasp my transcendence by its perpetual recession when I seek to conceptualize or objectify

it; in the motion of man, as motion, there is evidence for the highest accessible reality. Freedom is pure movement, but away from all content and conditions which impede its exercise. Freedom is immediacy. It is decision and activity. "I must will," Jaspers says, "for willing must be my last aim, if in the end I wish to be. In the fashion, however, in which I freely will transcendence can be revealed to me."

Freedom discloses itself not through insight but through action. Only a free man can understand what freedom is, and here even laws are free since he is free to follow them or not.

TRANSCENDENCE

Transcendence is the source of existence, and freedom is its language. Existence cannot overcome its situations. But in these situations, it gleans by a kind of "negative way" a dim suspicion of what lies beyond. Transcendence must be present wherever it is sought, for it is both the power to seek and the process of seeking. In the cosmic orientation, being is treated as an object; in existence, it is tenuously grasped from within; transcendence is achieved only in defeat, failure, and frustration.

Transcendence is real only in the present which passes by before man can catch it. It stands in that no man's land between being and nothingness and is reflected by the dynamism in between. Transcendence shows possibility as the identity of reality and necessity, since it is attained by an utterly indivisible act in which the "is" and the "ought" are unconditionally inseparable. Furthermore, transcending myself, I see freedom and nature as identified through the instant. Being, as Heidegger would say, is seen simply as "there." Once more existentialism proves itself to be a philosophy of Kierkegaardian paradoxes, if indeed it does not attempt to unite contradictory realities. The transcendent being toward which our freedom leaps is not only being but also something else, this other wearing the character of darkness, ground, matter, nothingness.

Jaspers' final position in theodicy would be, by intention, agnostic. God remains hidden since the transcendent is not grasped, not revealed and proved, not known to exist with a sure-sighted metaphysical certitude. The transcendent is visible only in its footprints, and here it is always ambiguous. Whether this transcendent principle is truly God we do not know. Man attains only to possible

"footprints not God Himself in his hiddenness." Even his latest expression on theodicy in his volume, *On Truth*, is a little more certain that the transcendent reality is truly God, but in another way Jaspers remains agnostic, saying like Barth and Brunner, that God is "distant, absolutely other, radically hidden."

The ambiguities alleged by Jaspers have been elaborated into a major platform of his philosophy. They are, of course, largely the fruit of his reflections on Kant, but Kant used them to discredit man's power to rise above his experienced world. Jaspers, on the contrary, views them as man's only hope for transcendence. In relation to transcendence, existence can be either defiant or obeisant, rebelling against the enigma that it is or yielding to it through quietism. A second antinomy is that of degeneration and resurrection on the part of the individual. A third is between day's law and order and the darkness and passions of the night.

Existence cannot deny these antinomies either logically or in actual conduct. They are evident realities that it must face existentially despite all the niceties of logic and system. Existence, in fact, lies precisely in the polarity between the branches of the dilemmas, between, as it were, the two Bergsonian sources of morality – school and naturalistic growth, morality and originality, form and inspiration, convention and self-assertion. The one class of pressures imposes law and precept; the other breaks open man's natural spontaneity. The oscillation between the poles, while not satisfying in the sense of providing an object to grasp, is the way in which the metaphysic of act can be realized.

A full integration of man is impossible in time since there is no concrete either/or on the one hand and on the other hand no possibility of an Hegelian overcoming of oppositions. So the human reality swings between opposites which, even when negative like defiance, degeneration, and suffering, presuppose the transcendent without which all would be indifferent. Caught thus by the tight dilemmas of existence, the "concrete situation requires action, it becomes deepened through the experience of the antinomic in the development of man." What is most required is a will to unity, a daring, a process without rules and without possessiveness, a refusal to vanish into either horn of the dilemmas, and the discovery of the transcendent by oscillating between both.

Thus it can be said that while the lights and shadows of the

world are turning on and off between the positive and negative terms of the polar relationships in life, God is manifest. The profoundest piercing of the mystery of being comes through the experience of what Kierkegaard called the *inter-esse*. But this dynamism, revealing transcendence, is not grasped by thought. It is not universal like a definition nor public like an experiment. It is a kind of ideal to which I am either moving or receding but am never able to grasp. The polarity which the antinomies involve is but another way of introducing the meaning of anxiety.

Transcendence is disclosed to man when he reads its ciphers. It is as though man were a Platonic prisoner perpetually emerging from his cave and unable to endure the brightness. Incapable of capture in the narrow-mindedness of a concept, transcendence requires openness, a straining toward the possible, and an admission that the ultimate cannot be measured by our possessiveness but is more to be signaled by despair, destruction, darkness, renunciation, and other such tortures of the soul. The shadow of Nietzsche stalks the earth in contemporary existentialism, and in no other author is this shadow any blacker than in Jaspers.

All beings are ciphers of transcendence. This is not a formal relation in which one being is found behind the other. Such a view is that of Kant, whose thought introduced the unfortunate distinction between appearance and reality, phenomena and noumena. As far back as Plato, philosophy was jolted by the problem of *the one* and *the other,* which is basically the mystery of being versus nothingness and accounts, by the answer of sound metaphysics, for the plurality of the universe.

Scotus Eriugena in the middle ages and Bergson on the modern scene are but two of the important thinkers who have been baffled by this time-mellowed problem and failed, in the end, to see how the concept of nothingness arrived in the mind without conceiving nothingness as a something. Jaspers would hold that it is a logical impossibility to think something as one without thinking of otherness, a proof that concepts fall far short of the absolute. When I think of *the one,* I cannot but think of *the other,* and there can be no thought of *the other,* without reference to *the one.* Transcendence is detected in the passage from *the one* to *the other.* Of all the existentialists, Jaspers displays most openly their allegiance to a dynamism like that of Heraclitus.

A cipher is a metaphysical object. It is not the transcendent but the language in which the transcendent conceals itself, and a cipher is more important not as an object but as a manner. This is again Kierkegaardian and Luther-like. In reality, there are three such languages, each of which is a cipher-bearer in its own right.

First there is the immediate character of all experience of transcendence. Immediacy is not expressible or provable, for if it were it would lose its features of immediacy and became a logical deduction or an ontological product of some previous grounds. The immediacy of experience is thus a language of transcendence.

Second, there is the universal language of communication. In images and thoughts designed to touch the interior of another man, I experience transcendence. In an even deeper sense than the fact of speech, communication is viewed by Jaspers as one of the profoundest and most revelatory of human experience. At its bottom, it becomes a type of communion rather than communication, losing its logical and discursive tones and blending into an existential harmony of self with self and of self with others. Communication is a direct witness to the *inter-esse* of which Kierkegaard speaks and the tension between opposites which Jaspers heralds as the lock to being, the combination of which only the antinomies can work.

Finally, there is speculative language, bearing on the past and the future and involving both memory and prediction. Bergson marshalled such activities in support of his theory of the vital élan, and Augustine was also impressed with them in his discussion of time. The present is on the threshold between the past and the future, and it is as though the two-headed Janus could experience in a single moment something of the realities and especially of the dynamisms on each side of the door. How can man experiment the past which is the *no-longer* and the future which is the *not-yet*? Certainly not by a Kantian formalism of thought or a Cartesian clear and distinct idea, says existentialism. Always in motion, the door is a revolving one, and it is the revolution rather than the door which reveals transcendence.

All three cipher languages bring transcendence into the world, without making it an object and without making existence a subject distinct from it. Existentialism is thus beyond Kant and even

beyond Hegel who saw the dynamism which Kant's discussions left unsaid. To read the ciphers cannot be planned, methodical, and principled. There is nothing more immediate than immediacy, more communicatory than communion, more dynamic than the flux of time which measures all dynamisms. Cipher-reading is unwilled and untrained. Kant used to tell his students that he could not teach them philosophy but only how to philosophize. It is that *how* as a mode and the Cartesian *sum* as a dynamic thing that receive all the inflections in existentialism.

But to speak of the enciphered language and its deciphering by man may be misleading. It is not a language in which symbol and symbolized can be segregated. No signs, metaphors, comparisons, maps, or models, distinct from the signified realities, are available. Military chiefs can communicate by means of a system that unscrambles their messages at the receiving end, but in existential living, the decoding system is itself scrambled and unbreakable. Because of the strange alphabet in which it is translated, transcendence is always a-conceptual. The ciphers are thus always ambiguous, because there is no standard by which to judge them.

But riddles though they be, they are the sole expressions of meaning, and the philosopher in quest of this meaning must ride the restless pendulum that arcs between opposites in being. Understanding everything, we understand nothing. Once more, Jaspers has descended below the water level of intelligence. The ciphers are grasped more by freedom than by thought, freedom that is a source of action more than meaning and, in its deepest reaches, defies all hopes of intellectualizing it.

I persuade myself that I am what I am because I so will it. Yet I receive everything that I choose. Thought is at the service of freedom rather than its guide. Maine de Biran said: "If I knew how I will, I would know everything." And Schopenhauer, obsessed likewise by the mystery of will, gave up on the attempt to rationalize reality and succumbed to a pessimism, much like that of existentialist despair.

There is nothing that cannot be a cipher. Everything has an indeterminacy and yet, somehow, an expressiveness. What is said is always said questionably and ambiguously, and, as in Plato's shadow world, what we grasp on earth is almost an occasion. Transcendence literally transcends man's ordinary instru-

ments of meeting reality, and so he is left with only elusive ciphers and the call to struggle onward in his mystery-ridden existence.

Concepts hold men aloof from reality. They are intervening experiences and fixed symbols that aim to reduce a dynamic universe.

Reality is not to be found by seeking what is distant but in the deepening of the here and now and in such things as a loyalty to one's self and to one's work. The American philosopher, Josiah Royce, constructed a transcendental philosophy that resembles Jaspers by its neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian architecture. Unable, like Jaspers, to ground his moral code in reason, he sank it into the virtue of loyalty—an idea that has had great appeal in contemporary French philosophy.

Man's fate in the universe of Jaspers may already be suspected. It is failure, defeat, check, or what de Ruggiero has translated as shipwreck. Jaspers' affinity to Nietzsche, already apparent on preceding issues, now becomes more complete. Striving against insuperable odds, man cannot avoid being completely checked. In Jasper's thought, as in Nietzsche's, the hero is the man who fails bravely and genuinely. In such a failure the individual does not vanish, absorbed into the folds of a logical system. Genuine failure is a plunge into darkness. The antinomies are not two ways between which I choose but occasions for a leap. Bruno too did not talk of saints so much as of heroes.

What is ultimate then is failure. Man meets it in world orientation where the attempt to build a systematic outlook on the real is brought to failure by the incompletion of the whole and by the unexamined premises on which the structure rests. In the clarification of existence, failure erupts out of the situational status of the individual who has for a guide only the universal and the abstract. Lastly, in transcendence, ciphers alone are available to pick our way ambiguously through an environment of antinomies..

Courage is demanded of man more than truth. Failure is not the excuse to cease failing, but it challenges man to charge into it with all that he has and is. It can be said that in itself nothing truly fails but that I simply let failure occur in me through the *manner* in which I recognize the failure and face it. Once more,

greatness is found to consist not in the possession of an object but in a mode of bearing.

Only in the inevitable check do we discover ourselves, the world, and reality. "He who really sees what is appears compelled to gaze into the stark darkness of the naught." For what is transcendent is closed off to a creature who is essentially limited and, at his highest, indivisibly himself through freedom.

On Truth (*Von der Wahrheit*) was the first significant book in philosophy to appear in post-war Germany. It concerns the methods of knowing and will be followed by studies on the categories and a final volume which will concern the philosophy of knowledge as concretely conditioned.

On Truth tones down considerably some of the former themes of Jaspers and in many respects he draws closer to the tradition of western philosophy whose rejection laid the groundwork for existentialism. At times, he is much more explicit that the transcendent reality which existence penetrates in its deeper moments is truly God, but at the same time he is more insistent than ever that this God is the Plotinian One. He is "distant, absolutely other, radically hidden." God is not known analogically but equivocally, since He is in no way immanent to the world but "absolutely transcendent." In his work, *The Philosophical Creed,* Jaspers also insists that the One is God, though still God, the unknown.

As in so many other men, the distinction must be made between the Jaspers of intention and the Jaspers of fact. He has developed a well-articulated system in which every experience, every situation, every breath and sunbeam is somehow an encoded expression of the transcendent. But when man reaches out to clasp the depths of anything, he fails. His finite character constrains him. His contact with the absolute is tragically indirect.

But though every genuine peripatetic, especially after the error of ontologism, would insist that God is known only indirectly in this life, there is yet a contact with the ultimates which is direct and immediate and certain. Such for example is the knowledge of being from which the proofs of natural theology begin.

Therefore, against Jaspers' notion, it is a mistake to say that man fails completely in his ambitions to know and to will. He is not totally indirect in his knowledge but by nature capable of

knowing eternal truth. Jaspers wishes to preserve God's existence as a personal and creative being. He wishes to make men moral and to guide them aright in an age that has lost its bearings and threatens the very existence of culture. But the difficulty is that the Plotinian and Bergsonian premises of Jaspers could never permit the elaboration of a theology. They would never authorize the philosophy of authority, work, language, history, which Jaspers would construct.

Jaspers calls his new doctrine a periechontology, with man, redolent of Sartre's views, gliding at the surface of being without the power to penetrate it at all. He knows something to be "there," but he does not know what it is. Jaspers therefore extols the mystic, as Plotinus and Bergson do, but he fails to solve the problem of pantheism which mysticism always raises.

This is a world, according to Jaspers, where being is torn by tensions. Truth is to be found in the tensions between subject and object, the general and the particular, the individual and authority. It is a world of movement, of constant mediations, of eternal flux and flow. It does not authorize the metaphysical ambitions of Jaspers regarding our knowledge of God, of morality, and of our own fate.

SOME CRITICAL REMARKS

Karl Jaspers, then, is a dynamist, and his philosophy must stand trial on the same charges that Aristotle leveled against Heraclitus. His universe of pure motion would abolish all the distinctions which experience reveals and without which language, truth, error, good, evil, and all of the other subjects that Jaspers would apply or discuss lose their meaning and their reality.

Certainly there is value in his criticism of mere abstract systems and of the indifferent spirit of modern methods which makes for a neutral rather than a moral world. But the likeness between what Jaspers opposes and what he accepts throws up a serious difficulty. He is an emphatic prototype of the vicious circle in existentialism as a whole. For existentialists too propose a system; indeed philosophy and any other kind of discursive thinking would not be possible without some type of organization. Existentialism thus falls under the same ax that its proponents swing so lustily at Hegelianism and scientism. It cannot examine its own

premises; it cannot present its own thought without appealing to common sense and to logical discursion; it is always incomplete since death, as it says, terminates life and invests it with significance.

For Jaspers, man is a complete failure because he is completely limited, and it can again be underscored that such a view conduces to a nihilistic world where being itself must eventually be driven out. As Bradley said against Kantianism, to know that the transcendent is or exists is already to know something about it and to admit the principle that the mind can range beyond its own limits.

In fact, to know anything means to know a thing in itself. If we understand realities only in terms of what they have in common with other things, we do not know *those* realities. For unless we know them as they are, in their own originalities, and in themselves, we know only what lies outside of them and is shared by all. To know what animal means is not to know man as man. There is no other being like man in the whole world, and to know man then means to know him in himself.

The first intellectual attainment in which there is knowledge of a thing-in-itself is the idea of being. There is nothing outside of being to make it intelligible. Non-being, if it could, *per impossible,* be studied for a whole lifetime and even a whole eternity, could never open up the idea of being. Being, when and where it is known, is known in itself, or it is not known at all.

If the thing-in-itself must be known for knowledge to occur, Jaspers, like Kant, has reversed the order of studying the human mind. He examines limits first and then inquires about transcendence. Knowledge, such as Jaspers uses in presenting his thought, does imply transcendence, and the critical problem becomes absurd if the philosopher, having already "transcended" by knowing something and hence knowing it in itself, starts asking whether transcendence is possible. Transcendence of sense data and transcendence of our own subjective limits to reach to the underlying substrates of our material world—both of these are facts, and their denial involves not a philosophy called existentialism but an impossibility called universal doubt. It is impossible to reach even a knowledge that there is something transcendent if limits alone are apprehended to begin with.

The natural order in knowledge and in the study of it is to move from the transcendent to its limits, from the positive to

the negative, from the known to the unknown, from the general which knowledge always implies to the particular which limits it. Being is indifferent to being limited or unlimited, and if knowledge occurs at all, this general reality of being must be apprehended first. There is something in common between God and a creature, namely their being, and that is why man can move from the world to a dim and but still significant knowledge of its Creator.

No existentialist could ever be an existentialist. If he knew nothing, he could never tell himself or anyone else about the fact of his ignorance.

Jaspers makes capital of the situational character of man. Genuine philosophy recognizes this fact by the emphasis it has laid on art and especially on prudence. Man can and does apply general principles to individual cases through these virtues, but he knows of his situational character only because he has apprehended the more general aspects of reality before adverting to individual things and his own individuality. To know that I am in a situation means that I compare my present status with a previous one or compare my own status with that of others who claim, like Jaspers, to be in a situation. I see the general characteristics of a situation. I know that a man-in-a-situation, to use the hyphens of Marcel, is a being and is finite. I know that I can mount from this general knowledge to the fact of God's existence and thus obtain a new meaning for my situational character as a value in God's economy with a destiny and a responsibility before Him.

Man must know other things before knowing himself, and it is only in the light of this previous and more general knowledge that he can recognize himself as existing. The Renaissance, which existentialism would seem to terminate—and Bruno, in particular, who is kindred to Jaspers—could not find God because the Humanists paid too great a heed to subjectivity, finiteness, the aesthetic, and the creaturely.

Something might be said also at this point regarding the view of will held generally by the existentialists. They take freedom to be radical spontaneity, an autonomy, existing by and for itself. It is not a property of man. It *is* man, random and gratuitous. Knowledge does not precede will; freedom, as the source of every-

thing, goes before knowledge. It is ultimate, ineffable, and indivisible.

An *ad hominem* argument could be drawn here from the appeal, made by existentialists, for man to invoke his freedom and to realize the experience they think so conclusive. They thus show respect for a common element in all men – an element which cannot be the ineffable and indivisible thing which their extreme principles require. If freedom builds our worlds, why is it that all our worlds are alike in general feature? Spontaneity cannot originate order, any more than nothingness can suddenly bloom into being. Finally, if will involves preceding knowledge as everyday experience indicates, then to allege an extraordinary act in the beginning of conscious life, where the tables would be turned, is a gratuitous assumption.

But a more direct engagement of the existentialists may be won by reflecting on the meaning of the unmatchable and indivisible act they ascribe to will. If this indivisible will of theirs willed anything, even itself, it would be destroyed in the willing because it would be divided. It would remain itself and will. If it were in immediate touch with nothing, man could not persist to report on that experience, to submit to its influences, and relate it to others. For on existentialist premises, there is no continuity between being and nothing. There is only a leap. Will, as conceived by existentialism, would be alternately as nothing and being, dying and rising from the dead, in a series of annihilations and self-creations. There could be no responsibility, no continuity in existence, no relation to the pristine experience which started man on his way. Freedom cannot be inertly indivisible. It takes the form of free choice (*liberum arbitrium*).

Finally, knowledge must always precede freedom, at least in a priority of nature if not of time. Otherwise, knowledge could never catch up with it to report on freedom's prior actions and to say, for instance, life begins in freedom and spontaneity. Existentialism lays claim to report on experience and the world. That it ventures such a report indicates that it admits the maxim "nothing is willed unless foreknown." Knowledge is at the origin of man's inner life, it is there with freedom analyzing freedom, and because it is knowledge, dominating freedom, one may say.

Man, the reflecting being, can always catch up with himself and start life all over again. For man, the master, "the cause of self" as freedom is sometimes described, there is always hope more than despair and always a way out of the failure and frustration that he may sometimes feel.

Genuine philosophy is dualistic, and the world that it realistically examines turns up as a dualism of potency and act, essence and existence, matter and form, substance and accident, thought and will. The antinomies which Jaspers finds may be dim suggestions of this dualism. They emphasize man's dualistic nature, with his constant struggle toward fulfillment.

Taken alone, the antinomies in Jaspers are meaningless and contradictory, like the rest of his nihilism. Only in a dualistic realism do they receive a satisfactory account. In such a universe, what Jaspers calls the ciphers of the transcendent are not wholly equivocal and unmeaning. For man and his world, though not the same as God's being and nature, are nevertheless His imitations and as Edward A. Pace has written

> . . . the setting of this copy is God's eternal self-thinking. The expression of this thought is the world, including ourselves; and if no single thing in the world is adequate utterance of God, the multitude of things is His magnificent diction, with a phrase of variety and lordly period of purpose, and the flowing grace of order – a metaphor of the infinite.

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CHAPTER 14 EXISTENTIALISM BECOMES SPIRITUAL

The existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre records a new low tide in the history of human speculation. To find a parallel, it is necessary to search all the way to the sophistry that Socrates opposed in ancient Athens, where morality was seeping away and philosophy was being dismissed as a meaningless adventure. In the method that made him immortal, Socrates urged men inward upon themselves toward a sense of their value and their destiny. But Socrates, later Plato, and finally Aristotle got little hearing from their own contemporaries, and Greek civilization went on to its death.

In the face of the pseudo-philosophies which are struggling to control the present-day mind, the Socratic spirit has remained alive, and even the Socratic method has, to a certain extent, been renewed. Evidence of this is more palpable on continental Europe than in America, where the introspective spirit in philosophy has, for several reasons, never taken hold. Bergson, obviously, was in the advance guard of present-day challenges to Kantian analysis, Hegelian universals, and scientific systemizing. The general spirit, but by no means the letter, of his thought is prolonged today by a loosely tied group in France promoting "the philosophy of spirit." In Italy too there is an awakening that might be called a Socratic and even a Christian existentialism with such philosophers in the forefront as Michele Federico Sciacca, Armando Carlini, and Luigi Stefanini.

The philosophy of spirit, continuing the French traditions of *spiritualism* that Bergson embraced, has been less expressive in the post-war era than during the thirties. But its three most influential figures continue to grow in stature and to a great

extent have now trained their energies not only against positivism but also against the atheistic existentialism of Sartre.

So it is valuable to pass in review the basic thoughts of Gabriel Marcel, Louis Lavelle, and René Le Senne. They take their stand in experience, and their starting point on several scores resembles Sartre's. But they reach conclusions wholly opposed to his. Moreover, besides their worth in challenging Sartre, these men have rich positive principles in their own philosophies that merit a profound respect and certainly form a water level in the tides of contemporary thought. Marcel and Lavelle and possibly even Le Senne could be called existentialists, but in the meaning attached to spiritualism by Ravaisson, their doctrine should be labeled a spiritual existentialism, reserving the term *existentialism,* unqualified for the vastly different themes in Jaspers, Heidegger, and Sartre.

A PHILOSOPHY OF INCARNATIONS

Gabriel Marcel would not like to be called a professional philosopher, especially if any attention were paid to the word "professional." He won his glory in the theater where, as a successful playwright, he brought philosophy into action, thought into concrete form, and truth into living and commonplace problems. He has, in fact, never written a systematic book in philosophy and once said that he was not likely to do so.

His philosophical works have taken the shape of essays, epilogues to his plays, or copies of his lectures which were later assembled into book form. In such pieces, he often takes a concrete situation, like family life, and analyzes the various principles involved as man in the concrete struggles to fulfill himself. He stays close to the boundaries of experience, "regarded not only in its content but in its quality, in its *being* of experience."

Marcel is strong where modern thought has been weak. He has remarkable introspective abilities, and the results of his analyses are intended to make other men conscious of their own spiritual vocations. In a way, Marcel belongs to the personalist group in France, represented by such men as Emmanuel Mounier and Maurice Nédoncelle. For him the only realities worth considering, if not the only realities that exist, are persons.

The important works of Marcel are: *Metaphysical Journal,*

Being and Having, Homo Viator, and *The Refusal of Invocation.* A book of his scattered essays has been translated into English under the title, *The Philosophy of Existence,* in which a fortunate selection of material has been made. The first chapter, "On Ontological Mystery," radiates the nucleus of Marcel's thought better than any other writing so far published. He has recanted his earlier belief that he would never express his whole philosophy in an organized and "systematic" way. His Gifford Lectures, yet unpublished, will possibly be something like a logical synthesis of his whole philosophy.

Marcel has affinities with Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Heidegger, and even Sartre, but he stands above all of them by his positive insights and is wholly independent of them in the genesis of his thought. His *Metaphysical Journal,* an intellectual diary from 1913 to 1923 and later resumed, shows him struggling away from idealism and assembling, on the ruins, his original philosophy of the concrete. This book showed the main arteries of Marcel's thought before he had read Kierkegaard and before the important works of Heidegger and Jaspers had appeared. When the *Journal* was begun, Sartre was a child of eight. Hence, though he used existentialism for occasional support in his later thinking, Marcel ground out his central themes with an original spirit that commends him to special consideration.

Philosophies can be grasped only by the problems they answer, and the problem that harassed Marcel was idealism's view that man is the act of thinking and the world is the product of his thought. He did not scruple with subtle counterarguments. He simply saw and stated that, in the concrete, idealism is impossible. If the world is the issue of man's *fiat,* there is no explaining of the resistance and torture and problems it thrusts upon its own maker. If everything is an idea, understood only by another idea, then an infinite and indeterminate fog should supplant this hard and unremitting world man faces in the concrete. Above all, a system of ideas or any system at all must bar from attention the individual who weaves it out. The more striking the system, the more and more the system-maker ought to be studied, and so the genuine philosopher, groping through the real until he comes upon its roots, must drive downward toward the individual. It is the concrete existent that counts most.

Generous with examples to underbrace his thought, Marcel finds that the principles of modern philosophy have wrecked man's practical life. Our mechanical age has lured man's energies to the world outside of him. It has drawn his ambitions into a material marathon. From this spiritual barrenness has emerged the functional man, whose values take the form of the work he can do or the slot he can fill in a socio-economic machine. The ticket taker on the subway, for instance, is viewed as a ticket taker and nothing more. When he is sick, he is overhauled in a hospital, and when he dies, he is automatically replaced as if another spare part were being inserted into an economic engine. Man's eminence as a person and his mastery over the matter that has weighted him down are ignored by our mechanical age and usually by the individual himself. It is this individual that forms mental systems and operates mechanical ones and that Marcel would examine and recall to his true dignity.

In the dimension that is most human in man, there is a need which is even more basic than hunger and thirst, and modern thought has wholly failed to quench it. It is the need, the hunger, the thirst, for ontology. When history returns its verdict on our age, Marcel opines, it will be proper to say that the reason for the abnormal and maladjusted mind of present-day man lodges very much deeper than sex or inferiority complexes or economic oppressions. Modern man is being suffocated because his thought and his culture are not breathing in the atmosphere of ontology and the universe of being.

Being is the central focus in Marcel's reconstructive enterprise. He takes stock not of thought, of universals, and of abstractions, but of existence, to remove the brackets which idealism, including Husserl, throws about the concrete priorities in experience. He enjoins man to a kind of self-experience like that forged by Sartre. Who am I?—such is the big question of metaphysics, and if it is forced to a deep enough level, the meaning of the answer will never be wholly obliterated. The person, turning inward upon himself, discerns something more than an empirical ego or a functional apparatus. He even finds himself beyond the factors that make him an individual subject. Who am I? In a real way, the answer takes the simple form: I am.

But the response is simple only because it is profound. It

does not show man as an object like a stone or as the atom of subjectivity he becomes in Sartre. Man is aware of his being in its concrete form, only because he finds himself engaged in a concrete world about him. He cannot think unless he "adheres" to being. He cannot will or love or hope or trust without reference to a reality surpassing his own. He finds that his own being, his *esse,* is always a *coesse,* and that presence is always co-presence.

It is not just logical arguments that make it unsound or incorrect or improbable to think and will, divorced from being. Without bearing upon being, thinking and willing become impossible. The mind is not a spectator, separated from a stage it is viewing. The cleavage of thought, thinker, and object is made within a global experience of existence that envelops all three of them in a concrete way. As the eye relates to color, so does the full man require being.

Marcel wants man to attend more to his own act of thinking or willing, to note its concrete dimensions and its references to what lies beyond it. He therefore calls this contact with being a reflection or reflective analysis or reflective intuition. In a more technical way, it might be called *synidesis,* "the act by which a whole is maintained under the mind's attention." By this act, man discovers that he is a concrete participation in being and that without such an entitative communion both philosophy and life become impossible. Philosophy's task is to draw out all the implications of this reflection of man on himself. Philosophy is a reflection on the reflection, in Marcel's own words, and its method of course is essentially introspective.

For being cannot be thought as an object. To make it so is to destroy its inner character as an act and to place man outside its pale. In abstract thought, man stands at a distance from the concrete. The unity of experience is shattered by the distinctions between thinker and object and between that part of the concrete which is universalized and the other part which is left behind, unabstracted.

Systems and universals and abstractions are not without their value. As in Jaspers, they collapse from the lack of a final test, and they fling man inward upon his own being. As Plato said, philosophy is always a conversion. Man must go through a purging, an ascesis, a negative stage that opens out upon a vast and

vibrant world which is all the more illumined because of the preceding darkness.

Defeated by the world of objects which ignores his ontological need, man "recollects," he gathers together again, and what he really gathers is his own inward self. He takes stock of his own resources. He girds himself with his real ontological armor. But recollection, at least in English as Marcel recognizes, has a second meaning, that of remembering, and typically enough, it is an act of recalling ourselves to our genuine eminence instead of squandering our lives like the functional man.

The various lines of Marcel's thought converge in his distinction between a mystery and a problem. A problem corresponds to a definite and fairly isolated task that man can perform in a rather routine fashion. It can be conceptualized, analyzed, and often reduced to formal data where man can equate and substitute terms. Examples would be the measurement of electronic charge, the repair of a damaged airplane, the choice of a new dress. A problem can be formulated in clear, definite, experimentable terms, and there is a final and satisfying character to the solution.

A mystery is wholly different. Though a Catholic, Marcel does not refer here to something supernatural, like the doctrine of the Trinity. Even in a natural way, man meets up with mystery and does so in a positive, though non-conceptual way. In Marcel's own words, "A mystery is a problem which encroaches upon its own data, invading them, as it were, and thereby transcending itself as a simple problem." For instance, to search for being with an instrument "encroaches" upon the data of the problem since the instrument is itself a case of what man is seeking. Another mystery is the question of evil. When evil is viewed in a purely systematic way, it ceases to be a question of evil and becomes a problem in mechanics. It is treated, for example, like a leak in the water mains or a mismanagement that intelligence in time can learn how to avoid and even to rectify.

Being itself is the deepest mystery of all. The perplexities it raises cannot be wrapped in nice, conceptual, univocal terms, and its mystery, unlike a problem, can never be exhausted into a final and fully satisfying answer. A mystery is meta-problematic. It is not something that I find in front of me like food to be

cooked by a certain recipe. It is in me, and I am engaged in it, and this engagement, contrary to Sartre, is an intensely positive experience.

The mystery of being can be illustrated by Marcel's theory of "my body." Descartes, of course, split the "my" and the "body" and set off the body as an extended machine, dissected like any other mechanical object. But in Marcel's view, I can never think of *my* body as an object, and to do so is to make a problem out of a mystery. To objectify "my body" is to study it in those things by which it is not mine but similar to everyone else's.

My body in a way is an instrument of mine, but in another way it is mysteriously more, for it is part of my inner self. One of its major offices is to mediate between man and the external world. A thing is recognized as truly other insofar as it is outside my body, and yet the body unites man to his environment, so that he is not a stranger in the world but at home. Such a duality, with the body uniting and distinguishing the outer world with respect to the thinker or agent, is inflected by the fact that it is *my* body. One with the outer world *qua* body, it is one with me *qua* mine.

Man then is neither pure matter nor pure spirit. He is spirit incarnated in matter, and this incarnate character extends not only to man's own being but to all the values in his world. Nowhere in his concrete situations does he meet a detached universal. Always where he finds truth or goodness or beauty he comes upon it in its concrete and incarnate form. Man is suspended, not like the atom he is in Heidegger and Sartre, hovering between being and the naught. He is an act that can think itself like a spirit, and yet in taking hold of his being, he quaffs of a world that surpasses him.

Body and soul reflect a modified dualism in Marcel, that is an innovation in post-Cartesian thought. Another dualism is being versus having. This distinction can trail rather smoothly from the theory of "my body" since it is natural to say "I *have* a body"; and yet, unlike any other possession, my body is part of me. A mediator between man and his world, the body is in a kind of twilight zone between being and having. I dispose of my body as I do any other piece of property, for example a fountain pen,

and yet in the unfathomed depths of my nature, my body is part of me. I do not manipulate it as I do a pawn, for it is performing the manipulation.

Such a concrete and personalistic universe could not help opening out upon a theism, but unfortunately, the strictures on metaphysical transcendence of direct experience lead Marcel to talk more about the nature of God than about the preliminary and more crucial question of His existence. Marcel is impressed by the natural theology of Thomism. But its five proofs, for a personalist, are not concrete enough, and though he welcomes them as secondary and only when rising from the concrete act of incarnate engagement, Marcel feels that Aquinas simply confirms for the existing person what he already knows from his own inner necessities.

Marcel's proof is technically termed an "act of faith," but it is not faith in its supernatural sense or with extrinsic evidence as a motive. Already in the *Metaphysical Journal,* he wrote:

> It is a question indeed of thinking of an affirmation (since we are discussing faith), indeed of an affirmation which cannot and ought not to be dissociated from that on which it bears.

What Marcel seems to mean is that, in the act of discovering myself as being through that non-conceptual experience which he later called synidesis, I recognize that I do not owe my existence to myself but to a giver that is infinitely and omnipresently beyond me. In his own words, "The best part of myself does not pertain to me, I am not the proprietor but only the depository." One cannot think of God without praying to Him at the same time.

In other words, in the *synidetic* attention to the mystery of being, there is included the awareness of dependence, and where dependence appears, the independent is but its correlative. For Marcel, the existence of God is thus known so obviously and immediately that he rarely dwells upon the subject in a formal way. He stresses so much the contingency of man that the necessary is seen through the very nature of what is not-necessary but dependent. If one side of a mirror is concave, the reverse surface is known at once to be convex.

Perhaps this whole argument is an abridged syllogism. But the references to Aquinas would prompt the suspicion that Marcel

has in mind an argument more immediate than reasoning could be. And such a suspicion is backed by the overall zeal in Marcel for the concrete and immediate dimensions of all evidence.

By his skill as a dramatist and by his greatness as a philosopher, Marcel sows all his works with examples of men in various situations and then reflects on the ways they confront their plight, to draw out his critical remarks. But there are two notions that etch out more than anything else the deeper lines of Marcel's thought and its points of divergence from other contemporary philosophies. They are fidelity and hope.

Marcel was showing his genius when he singled out these virtues for special reflection. They are issues in concrete life. They are wholly submerged by the typical systematic speculation of present-day thinkers, and yet they are indispensably vital in the concrete reconstructive ambition to recollect man and to salvage his imperiled civilization. Fidelity and hope show as well as any other examples how far modern scholarship has fled from the problems that really tug at human hearts.

As Nietzsche said, man is the only being who can make promises, and as Royce argued, the basis of moral law is loyalty. By fidelity, man rises beyond the individual limits of the here and now and commits himself to a future plan of action. This is the meaning of the statement that fidelity prolongs presence. In this way man is revealed as an identity who can dominate space and time. But the dominion is not as certain as a Stoic, for example, would declare, since fidelity is not an inert conformism in a world that works by mechanical law. In reality, it implies a certain ignorance about the future, where man will have to undergo a genuine struggle to keep his commitments in the face of obstacles. Man will be tempted to back down, but he is not passive, like an object. Personality means confronting, taking a stand, digging in against difficulties, and fidelity implies that willingness to struggle in order to keep one's previous obligations. Writing of fidelity, Marcel points out:

> It is indeed the recognition, not theoretical or verbal but in actual fact, of a certain ontological identity, of an identity which endures and with respect to which we endure, of an identity which implies or requires a history, by contrast to the inert or formal

identity of a treasure or a law. It is the perpetuation of a testimony which at every moment can be obliterated or denied.

Fidelity makes reference to the sacred, and it is wholly unmeaning in a purely secular atmosphere. Nor is it a matter of strict command, for then it becomes obedience rather than faithfulness, pure and simple. It is free and meritorious, and unlike obedience, it requires not justice alone but charity and generosity.

It takes only a glance at the foregoing remarks to size up the gap between genuine human experience, like fidelity, and the neutral world that scientism, positivism, and even naturalism offer men. Identity, struggle, uncertainty, generosity, and the whole spectrum of human willing escape the equalitarian formulas of empiriological methods. They are not at the problem level at all.

Marcel goes even further when he holds that the object of fidelity is always a person and never a principle. For in his world principles are abstract, and they depend for recognition on the act which proclaims them. From another angle, it could be said that they are always incarnate and must ever be kept in the concrete setting where they are personified. One does not love a principle, though one does love a person who incarnates them. So persons are the true objects of fidelity. It is persons, not principles, that one fails by being unfaithful, and it is also persons alone that receive one's loyalty.

The prototype of fidelity is that which I bear to myself. It is a will to struggle through thick and thin to the fulfillment of being as it is met in the *synidesis*. The act of taking hold of ourselves is not a product of intellect but of the whole man and hence of his will. As the issue of recollection, man wills himself. He takes on commitments in the mere discovery that he is a being and is subject to being's hegemony. He is committed to remain himself and renew himself.

Fidelity, obviously, is a virtue associated with faith, and it is more than coincidental for it to be placed within the proportions of that soul-filling act of faith which reveals man as existing before God. Such an act, such a faith—and it is merely a natural one in Marcel's philosophy—is the only faith that is unconditional, and once more the object is not the formality or abstractness of a mere law but God, personal and provident.

Where there is hope, man is also engaging himself in the

mystery of being. It is significant that modern psychologies, when they deal at all with will, do so only in terms of desire. Hope is an untilled field in modern thought, and yet it is singularly important as an eternal spring in man. It is not desire, not wishful thinking, not a mechanism of escape. In its proper sense, it is not angled toward a definite object as the solution of a problem. It engages the whole man, struggling in the world and admitting that his deliverance does not depend on his own resources.

Hope is stronger than desire in the sense that it is not only a wish but also the belief that what is wanted will actually be given. Marcel again resembles Plato when he views man as a being in a sort of perennial captivity, confronted always by mystery and surrounded by problems that disappear only when others take their places. In such a setting, there is an obvious avenue open to despair, and Sartre in fact has taken it. Rationalism would reduce man's plight to a set of problems and hold that given enough time it will lead each one of them to a happy ending. But the man of hope, contrary to Sartre, has drunk deeply of being; and contrary to the rationalist, he knows that the mystery of being is only ignored when it is degraded to the problem level. Man hopes. He wishes a release from his present distress, with the confidence that his hopes will not fail him.

Hope is possible only on the premise that reality is outside the mind of man and beyond his power to dictate its terms. Yet this outer order must not be one of mechanical determinism. Hope would never spring up in a world that ruled out the possibility of variations and even of miracles in nature's course of events.

A common example of hope is the case of an illness which doctors assert to be incurable. The sick person, his family, and his friends often hold out to the very end in the hope of a cure, struggling, as in the case of fidelity, against odds and tempted, as in all hope, to despair. The sick person wishes to be restored to normal health, and Marcel finds a common note of all hope to be this wish for reinstatement into an integrity of being. The highest hope is oriented to salvation, to an unbinding of present woes, and to a fullness and integrity which is no longer challenged by the vagaries of present life.

But Marcel has to brave a capital difficulty in his view: How can hope be efficacious? How can hoping warrant the confidence

that what is wanted will be given? Marcel's answer can be clothed in his own words:

> Hope consists in asserting that there is at the heart of being, beyond all data, beyond all inventories and all calculations, a mysterious principle which is in connivance with me, which cannot but will that which I will, if what I will deserves to be willed and is, in fact, willed by the whole of my being.

The word "principle" is to be taken only in a general sense as something ultimate or initial. Marcel actually holds, as he did in the case of fidelity, that the only genuine hope is the hope in persons. One does not hope that . . . he says; one hopes in. . . . And such a view is the fulcrum for his later arguments that hope is truly efficacious.

By his act of faith, the human person discerns himself as part of community with a personal God at its center. With this as a background and God as the Ultimate Provider in the world, there is none of the mechanical determinism that would render hope unmeaning. On the contrary, there is a communion of love between a personal God and the person of the man of good will, so that even if a miracle be required, the good of man will be accomplished. God guarantees the unity of the self that lacks and the self that is fulfilled. Hence, hope, no matter what the odds, is never vain, and hoping a thing with a total hope will make it actual.

In the light of the foregoing development, Marcel's formal definition of hope can now be understood, reserved for the end of the present discussion just as it climaxes his own treatment of the subject:

> Hope is essentially . . . the availability of a soul, very intimately engaged in the experience of communion, to accomplish a transcendent act, in opposition to willing and thinking, whereby it affirms a vital permanence of which this experience is at once the measure and the premises.

From the little that has been said here it is obvious that Gabriel Marcel is an important, original, positive, and salutary thinker rising up like Socrates to defend moral values and the high vocation of philosophy. Gilson, who calls Marcel a "speculative mystic," has ranked his essay, "On the Ontological Mystery," along with the Bergsonian "Introduction to Metaphysics" as one of the truly

inspirational works in the philosophy of our time. Marcel de Corte finds Marcel another Christian Aristotle, and Marcel himself envisions his work as uniting the Forms of Plato with Aristotle's taste for the concrete, enabling truths and values to be seen as incarnations.

Marcel is a moralist, defending human values and human dignity and appealing to man to alert himself to his true super-eminence as the image and likeness of God. Lavelle and Le Senne have similar intentions, but they differ much from Marcel and each other.

A PHILOSOPHY OF BEING

Louis Lavelle has well earned a highly prized professorship at the Collège de France. One of the greatest metaphysicians of our day, he has driven deeply enough into the real to find a point of intersection for whatever is positive and salutary in modern philosophy. He has felt the influence of Kant, German existentialism, French spiritualism, Descartes, Husserl, and Spinoza, and there is a definite likeness in his mature views to Platonism. More than a dozen books have flowed from his facile pen on such subjects as act, being, the total presence, time and eternity, evil and suffering, and the powers of the ego.

The Cartesian and Kantian currents in modern thought require that method be examined prior to content as though ideas could be treated as vacuous forms without reference to an object. But method, for Lavelle, is not a form of thought, a "third thing" wedged in between the mind and the world to make knowledge relative to the logic of man alone and not to being outside of him. Method invites us to perform an operation, and in the exercise of our faculties, to discover reality in the experience of it. Take the act of thinking as an act rather than a reference to a thing thought about, and there is a first approximation to what Lavelle means. There is emphasis on the act as a personal accomplishment and on the real, lived, experienced, and not merely logical character of being.

Lavelle's method consists in a return to a primitive fact from which all other experience can be derived. Such a fact is not given like a datum in a laboratory. In a more Kierkegaardian framework, it is an act; it is an experience. "Internal knowledge

of self," Lavelle says, "being the only concrete knowledge, presents the character of an immediate possession and of that infinity full of echoes to which we give the name of sentiment." This is the opposite to the "algebraic," spectator's approach to the real. The primitive fact — analogated by the act of thought — may be variously described as act accomplishing itself, being realizing itself, self-consciousness, decision, consent. In this crucial moment of existence there is a oneness of initiative with the consciousness that illuminates it. For consciousness is always consciousness of consciousness.

In a profound way, Lavelle's primitive problem is the same as that proposed by Heidegger and Sartre, and his philosophy has with good reason been called a spiritual existentialism. Such a label, however, does not range Lavelle with the Heidegger-Sartre school except by a general focus upon the problem of existence. What he has done indeed has been, like Marcel, to challenge existentialism at its own level. The pristine experience which Lavelle would emphasize is something very positive. Heidegger and Sartre envision men as surrounded by nothingness, standing in anguish against pure otherness, and, since there is but nothingness to clarify life, despairing of all meaning and value. For them as for scientism, being is not its own evidence but looks outside itself to be clarified and evaluated.

But what lies outside of being? It is nothingness. Heidegger and Sartre begin their picture of man with denial and negation, looking across the full diameter of Kant's Copernican Revolution when they see man as creating his own self out of nothingness. For Lavelle, on the other hand, being does not get its meaning, evidence, illumination, and value from nothingness but from itself. It is its own evidence in the spirit of that co-terminal unity between truth and being (*ens et verum convertuntur*), which was the Aristotelian answer to Platonism and must be the modern answer to the empiriological method.

This view of evidence Lavelle sketches when he affirms that being is, in a sense, self-justifying. His employment of the strong terms "liberty" and "auto-determination" to describe being at its heart only serves to emphasize his close alliance with traditional thought in rejecting the scientistic view that being is inert and in affirming its spontaneous, original, and undivided character. The

immediacy of union between being and evidence, in other words the self-evidence of being, is expressed in the principle that being has no other end but itself. With its own internal structure, its own light, and its own laws, being is self-contained, according to Lavelle. Far from illuminated by denials, being is self-asserting through the act of affirmation where a juncture is effected between epistemology and ontology. Psychology joins this company too on the ground that ontology is always psychometaphysics, the probing of man's own inward acts.

Bergson's greatness was his critique of empiricism, but he bequeathed no metaphysics that could capture the enthusiasm of history. With the exception of Edward Le Roy, there is no prominent thinker who adheres today to Bergsonism. But on the ground that Bergson had cleared in the wilderness of scientism, Lavelle has blueprinted a metaphysical mansion. The salutary aspect of his thought, by contrast with the narrowness of modern philosophy as a whole, is its strongly positive character. It is a critique of existentialism to say that we cannot discuss what we were before we are, without using what we are as the sole legitimate frame of reference. Lavelle escapes this charge, because he does not begin with the naught. He insists that the primitive fact, though irreducible, is positive and self-evident. It is not a fact so much as an act, not the measuring of an object but, as Kierkegaard said, the experience of our own subjectivity.

Repeatedly in a manner reminiscent of Fichte and Maine de Biran, this primitive experience is described as an act accomplishing itself, and it is an object of awareness in its very exercise. It could also be called the consciousness of consciousness. As Husserl had shown, the Cartesian *cogito* inspired modern man to polarize thought and reality. Whereas Husserl has been accused of a philosophy of essence that leads to idealism, Lavelle has been charged with extreme dynamism for refusing to divorce thought from existence. Whatever the verdict on his notion of act rather than fact as the metaphysical point of departure, he claims for his doctrine the following considerable consequences:

1. It enables us to bridge over the valley of tears where modern philosophy has lived and died, the valley between experience and philosophy. Lavelle refuses to sunder philosophy from life, thought from the experience of the thought.

2. This initial experience, which is the discovery of being, as the act of subjectivity, reaffirms the principle that being is intrinsically intelligible. Indeed, the identity of being and act is perhaps the central and most original feature of Lavelle's thought, the key to his whole metaphysics of participation. Through the experience of our act, where ontology and epistemology are conjoined, man the observer becomes man the actor.

3. As a corollary of the preceding points, act is seen to have its own sufficient reason. "The property of act," Lavelle says, "is to produce its own light, it is incessantly to bear witness of itself, it is to make itself rationally explicit. . . ." We do not make truth. It *is*.

4. Act is internally efficacious. Opposed to the positivistic view of man which sees him wholly determined from without, Lavelle constantly italicizes the interiority which Kierkegaard preached and which, in Lavelle's transcendence of Kierkegaard, makes each individual valuable and truly operative as a secondary cause.

A critique upon the existentialism of Heidegger and Sartre is its solipsism. Lavelle views man as not only aware of exterior being but as capable of ascending to a personal and premoving God.

As a backdrop to this theology, the critical problem is realistically solved by the discovery of a threefold aspect within that initial presence of being whose evidence is act. There is first the presence of being, and we are aware of it before adverting to ourselves; it is a consciousness of the general and undifferentiated being, prior to the cleavage of subjectivity and objectivity, essence and existence. Second, there is the discovery of our presence to being which was implied but not actually distinguished in the first awareness. In this step, the thinker is a kind of frame of reference for the recognition of being. Last, there is awareness of our interiority to being, a recognition that we participate in the presence of being.

The existentialism of Lavelle is thus wholly different from that of his nihilistic contemporaries. He criticizes Sartre for refusing to admit man's first experience as evidence of his union with the absolute. For Lavelle, man is not a nothingness seeking being but a being discovering himself. Here, the absolute is the *source* of man's being; for Sartre it is the object of the vain chase which twists the whole of man's life into the closed career of a failure. Anguish is the sentiment of our original experience when con-

sidered in its deficiency. But there is a positive side to this initial act, in that awareness of man's participation in being. Man is neither nothingness nor the All. His anguish arises from his participated character; but his joy, his security, and his dignity come from the being which is participated.

The meaningfulness and intrinsicness of each being, considered as act, provide Lavelle with an original approach to the problem of theodicy. At first sight, a Thomist would incline to use against Lavelle's argument the same logic which Aquinas invoked to refute Anselm. But the Lavellian argument, a rethinking of Cartesian theodicy, would deny the purely idealistic character of the ontological argument. Here indeed, act and being, consciousness and object, thought and thing are united in an "act accomplishing itself." The logical and ontological orders are at one. The idea of being is itself a being, the only concept that is adequate to its object. As Lavelle puts it, "it is impossible to pose the idea of being without perceiving at once that the being of the idea is the same as the being of which it is the idea." Because of the ontal status of the act of knowledge, as Lavelle explains it, there is no passage from the logical to the ontological order. The idea of God thus implies the existence of the being which it represents. Indeed, says Lavelle,

> the idea of infinite perfection appears to us not as including being after the fashion of one of the elements which forms its comprehension, but as confounded with the being itself, as having the same essence and the same extension.

Descartes himself suggests this view of an idea in its existential character. He differentiated between the idea as materially and as representatively considered. The idea of a substance is, he said, something greater than the idea of an accident. Greatest of all substances and greatest of all ideas go hand in hand on such a platform. Lavelle does not move from the idea as a representation to the reality represented. He departs from being as act, from the idea materially considered.

Whence came the power to make this positive, efficacious, self-justifying, and intrinsic act which puts me on the level of being? The power comes, it is evident, from the infinite, for only infinity can originate being from the non-being. The act of being, accomplished by man, reveals itself as a participation rather than

an absolute act, and participation, as in Thomism, explains how there can be a likeness between God and man and between man and man without descending into monism. The doctrine of participation is a constant chord in Lavelle's thought, but it is really founded on the more primary principle of the identity between act and being. It is a property of being that it never begins and a property of act that it is always beginning. Combining these concepts gives rise to the notion of being that is, in Descartes's and Spinoza's language, *causa sui,* a cause of self. Act and being are one in that there is nothing created in God which differs from the act of creation. Participated act, also identifying act and being, is likewise self-creative. It contains, it was said, an intrinsic efficacy and sufficient reason. Analogically, it is also *causi sui*—a phrase that Aquinas used to describe freedom. Man is an imitation of God.

To the world of objects outside the thinker, Lavelle's thought also turns. Being seems to lie completely on the side of subjectivity, and in a manner reminiscent of Fichte, the world of objects would appear to correspond to the limit of the individual thinker. Beyond that limit lies the area of the Absolute which the finite thinker has not been able to appropriate. Thus, what finite act cannot realize by its self-accomplishment is given as a datum. Act is thus matched by fact, and yet Lavelle cautions against regarding reality as a simple sum in which act plus fact would equal Absolute.

But how can such a view escape the Platonic and Humean fate of phenomenism? Lavelle would certainly be a phenomenist if he did not insist that the objects of the world are "exterior and manifest aspects" of an Absolute that is undivided and indivisible. The data from the exterior world are not a blank tablet on which the thinker can write his will at random. The world is, so to speak, the Absolute transfigured, the Absolute appearing in the form of exteriority as it appears in man in the form of interiority. Lavelle's language is strong with a strength no doubt measured against positivism, and if we take him at his word, he does appear to defend himself against phenomenism.

In Lavelle's *Introduction to Ontology,* there appears a refinement of terminology and a categorizing of concept which enable a summary view of what has been said so far and a general estimate of the direction which his mind has taken. Understanding the expression in a personal way and not in the fashion of

Kant or even Aristotle, Lavelle declares that there are three *categories* of ontology: being, existence, and reality. Corresponding to these are the three categories of axiology: good, value, and ideality.

Being, in this later terminology of Lavelle, is defined as the Infinite Being. As if to repeat his opposition to the disease of nihilistic existentialism, Lavelle constantly refers to the knowledge of this being as originating from an act of affirmation. "Being," he declares, "is inseparable from affirmation, but it is less the effect of it than its principle." Here is simply a restatement, primed against the skeptical spirit of modern man, scientistic and existential alike, that being is self-justifying, having its own intrinsic intelligibility and efficacity.

Existence, the second category, is "the constitutive discovery of the subject itself." It is also described as the consciousness of our liberty which is our initiative engaged. In existence, the individual, anguished and alone, freely decides in favor of itself, accepting its responsibilities, discovering its companionships, experiencing the joy of participation. Time and space are the conditions given to existence. They are at once the cause and effect of its limitations, creating an interval between pure act and participated act which is filled by the third category, reality. But once more, in this second category, there is the priority of the positive, since "the affirmer needs the affirmed in order to affirm himself as affirming."

Reality, the third category, may be properly called the non-ego. It does more than simply limit. It stretches out an area for the communication of persons who are united with that privileged reality of their bodies and who, without such a reality, would remain in utter solitude and separation. Reality, as it is, is not evil. It is simply a natural limit. However, when inflated beyond its place it becomes materialism, just as being, when extended without qualification, becomes pantheism; and existence, when exaggerated, leads to idealism.

Lavelle, it was stated earlier, is a moralist. This character of his work naturally appears most forcefully in his axiology. Though clinging to a kind of holism as against the analytic danger of dissecting man's actions, assigning part to intellect and part to will, there is an emphatic way in which Lavelle holds to the primacy of the good, the superiority of will over intelligence, and

a rigorous Kantian brand of moral code with traces of the Stoics and of Spinoza. Thus, he declares that "it is the will which permits us to seize being in the act which makes it ours." Here the identity of act and being once again comes front and center.

Being, disclosed as act, is not deduced. It is an accomplishment and bears at its heart a genuine self-sufficiency. The result of priority of act is a kind of self-finality which further expatiates upon the phrase *causa sui.* As Lavelle declares,

> . . . the good is precisely the name which we give to that reason for being which justifies not a being already given but that being which confers being on itself, which wills itself to be, or which makes its own end the act of being which is its own being.

Goodness thus becomes not the end of will but the will itself in exercise.

Both Plato and Descartes are suggested by this doctrine, and the autonomy of will preached by Kant likewise finds a place within Lavelle's original synthesis. Kant denied that pure reason could attain to the "thing-in-itself." But as Lavelle sees him, in the doctrine of practical reason, he redeemed the metaphysics that he had previously condemned. In this view, Kant would propose a way of reaching metaphysical realities in a more personal form and more evident manner than the intellectualism which he attacked. What is truly puzzling about Lavelle's approach is this Platonic, Cartesian, and Kantian pavement superimposed upon his insistence that act is undifferentiated and is engaged by man holistically before distinctions between intellect and will are made.

In elaboration of the first axiological category, God is good, but there is no necessary creation. For God is also liberty. He is perfect spontaneity and generosity, and He freely invokes into being other beings like Himself. Eternally willing Himself, God eternally creates Himself. Participated being receives from God the liberty which it both exercises and discovers in the primitive act,

> the supreme gift which He makes to us from His very essence, a gift such that we can reject it only by the usage which we make of it and which is such that if it is missing all the goods of the world would be tasteless for us. . . .

As the good is associated with Being, value, the second category of axiology, is a mark of existence. Value is therefore the good as available for participation; it is involved in our discovery of being.

We apprehend being in wishing it, and combining the notions of act and of the autonomy of will, we may view will as *being* as far as it is assumed by us. Between the good and being there is an identity. But there is no corresponding symmetry between existence and value, and in that disproportion between them, free will holds its dominion. Such a dissymmetry leads to the relation between reality and ideality, where in a sense compensation is achieved since one of these supplies what is lacking in the other.

Value is a denial of reality because the former lies on the side of interiority, whereas the latter bespeaks what is exterior. Value is always realizing itself but it is never real and realized. By virtue of this negation, the ideal may be defined, and Lavelle writes, "it is value itself as far as it is non-real and non-realized, indeed as far as it is incapable of being and yet ought always to be." The ideal wears the character of being realizable, pointing out moreover not so much what is capable of participation as what is worthy of it. The worth of an ideal is imparted by the act which it invites man to accomplish, just as any great task exacts great effort. Because the ideal always beckons us by its infinite expanses, the real is never capable of satisfying. Value is the consent to the being which is offered us for participation. Freedom thus can thrive, and that disproportion between God and man (which is the negative aspect of metaphysical analogy) can be explained.

An intellectual descendant of Descartes, with his clear and distinct ideas, Lavelle has constructed a completely articulated system of philosophy, dominated by a Leibnizian optimism and holding out hope to men who are tempted by Nietzsche, Sartre, Marx, and Freud. What makes Lavelle's thought so wholesome on the modern scene is that by its emphasis on voluntarism his system, at least from one viewpoint, takes the form of an appeal or even an urge, showing to men of bad will the redeeming and undying beauty of the good life. If, as Aquinas affirmed, being and its first principles are so natural as to be seen by an innate habitus, then the skepticism of our day can only be explained as the issue of bad wills rather than erroneous minds. A man of bad will cannot be met on a syllogistic plane. He can be coerced by the state or ignored by the pride of his adversary. But dialectical commerce with him can occur, for example, only in the form of presenting the beauty of a life or of a thought in the hope that

truth might issue from his fascination. Eric Gill indicates how in one phase of his conversion he moved from goodness to truth and, in another, from truth to goodness.

But to let this apparent voluntarism animate the whole corpus of a philosophical system is another matter, and here, it would seem, is the big question in Lavellianism. The identity of act and being is empirical, but by that very fact, it cannot be conceptualized. It is acknowledged by an act of faith, and as in every act of faith, its acceptance is rooted in will and decision — two terms that Lavelle often employs. Empiricism and voluntarism usually form a team, but hard as they tug at intelligence, they cannot satisfy where truth and truth alone can suffice.

The gap between the empirical and the speculative yawns in Lavelle's system, and the problem arises whether Lavelle and Sartre do not differ less by speculative conviction than by the choice between the positive and negative aspects of man's initial experience. Husserl never reached the "viewpoint-less" philosophy he wanted. Because Lavelle, a modified phenomenologist, wishes to do no more than describe, he can choose any facet of man's initial experience as a point of departure — now intelligence, now will, now their holism — and because description admits of no hierarchy, he can always equate his results with man. This arbitrary maneuver to which phenomenology lends itself could likewise explain how Lavelle and Sartre, beginning at the same point on the circumference of man's initial experience, eventually move a hundred and eighty degrees apart. Each has chosen a different aspect of the point of departure — the one positive, the other negative — and Sartre simply moves around the circumference counterclockwise.

Lavelle's universe is so deftly organized that it recalls the world of Spinoza. Disorder and defeat can find in it no real abode and this is one of Lavelle's differences from Le Senne.

As in scholastic thought, evil is viewed in terms of privation. The only real evil is the moral evil, breaking upon the world from the secrets of human freedom. The fact of pain, however, does present a difficulty. If suffering were meted out to an individual in return for the evil he has done, there would, of course, be no problem but simply the balance of justice swinging into place. Why, to labor a familiar challenge, must the innocent suffer?

To phrase the problem properly, Lavelle insists that it is fallacious to hold that pain is the greatest evil which besets man. Much more than being evil itself, pain is the instrument to render man sensitive to evil. As the most acute and self-awakening of all feelings, pain arouses man's consciousness, as nothing else can, to the fact of his loneliness. In its character not as a logical deduction but as a cosmic fact which Jaspers so forcefully pictured, pain has for its office to incite the suffering individual to a way of overcoming his greatest suffering. Salvation is always a kind of rebirth. Nostalgia is as prominent an ethnic fact as the dreaming of a future Utopia. Plato spoke of a conversion, Kierkegaard of the movement from guilt to innocence, romanticism sighed for a return more than a forward march, Marcel heralds "recollection." Lavelle writes:

> The cure is an interior conversion of the soul; and this conversion cannot be produced without the remembrance of the fault the simple thought of which suffices to make me suffer. But the suffering is at one with purification.

Lavelle avoids the annihilation of creaturehood which the Kierkegaardian *ek-stasis* requires. In the conversion which Lavelle depicts, there is a consciousness of both the finite and the infinite. For existence, contrary to Jaspers, is not a fault. Sin is not freedom but originates from its abuse.

But if repentance alone resolved the problem of evil, the solution would not be positive enough. Lavelle offers a second and more aggressive principle. In a manner redolent of Kant, the Stoics, and Spinoza, he writes that the primary aim of man must be to do good to others rather than to himself. The good of others is our true happiness. Reversing the order that one would expect, Lavelle writes that obstacles exist in the world only for the egoist, who, in a sense, creates them. With selflessness, suffering, and sacrifice at the core of his moral code, Lavelle — if he does not make irrelevant the question of why the individual must suffer — at least subsumes it into the good *ad extra* which man must accomplish. Thus the disorder of pain is only apparent. For the genuine lover, an obstacle is only an occasion. It is our attitude to pain that determines it to be evil or not. Pain is a kind of prolegomenon to the good life and even to philosophy; it is secularism that makes it a surd, and it is the conversion to our real good that surmounts it.

Pain is a physical counterpart of our original anguish which, when its negative side alone is stressed, leads to the nihilism of a Sartre and, when its positive character is accepted, reflects our participation – with a part to play in the whole. The annihilating fuse in this ever menacing anguish always is ready to be touched off at the moment when our moral vocation toward others and toward God is relented. Human life, in a fashion reminiscent of Jaspers but with much more positive assurance of itself, oscillates between positive and negative poles. Pain is a problem only when we fail to solve the larger problem of meaning, value, and morality. Thus, as if to crown his achievement, Lavelle is able to return from the summits of his philosophy to the original sentiment of anguish with which he began, illuminating the problem of pain and suffering, by that white light which Being itself has provided. Anguish, like pain, is an occasion, and in the end Lavelle is able to make the entire orbit of man's world transparent to him.

A PHILOSOPHY OF THE OBSTACLE

René Le Senne is akin to Lavelle, but the general strain of his thought reveals differences of a profound nature between the two. Le Senne, who is an expression of the Sorbonne in our times, is co-editor with Lavelle of the series, "The Philosophy of Spirit," of which more than thirty volumes have appeared. This editorial accent definitely places him in the tradition of what the French call spiritualism, but if, as a later context will show, he is an idealist in his technical system, how can he enter into a chapter on spiritual existentialism?

In a strict literal exegesis of his thought, Le Senne does not belong with Lavelle and especially Marcel in their existential metaphysics. But in a broader fashion, all three of these modern spiritualists are kindred in their philosophical sympathies. Le Senne would fix his gaze upon the hard, inexorable mysteries of the concrete and take experience as his method. He feels the anguish, disorder, and struggle in finite man, which secular optimisms cover up by promises of what the future will bring if something like the empiriological method or Communistic principles be only obeyed. Finally, existentialism is not as opposed to idealism as Kierkegaard's attack on Hegel would make it seem. Its traditional

adversary is systemism, and even Sartre, the arch-existentialist of our time, has been charged with being an idealist. Existentialism pretends to avoid the critical problem, and its atheistic variety cannot be classed as a realism. Therefore, Le Senne's decision that mind is everything does not isolate him from all contact with the existentialists, especially with Lavelle and Marcel, and the ensuing development will show, disregarding the technical meaning of labels, that these three spiritualists belong together.

Like Lavelle, Le Senne seems to have reached philosophical maturity by way of idealism, and as one of the last survivors of idealism, he stands today. In the lineage of F. H. Bradley, whom he often suggests, Le Senne would easily subscribe to the Hegelian note on which the great British idealist closed his *Appearance and Reality:* "Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality, and, the more that anything is spiritual, so much more is it veritably real."

In evolving his idealism, Bradley often moved with the machinery of the pragmatic method, and it will not be surprising to note in Le Senne an affinity to William James. All of his works except two are on the concrete practical subjects of ethics and characterology, which he has modeled into laboratories for testing his metaphysical principles. These practical works together with his two speculative books, *Obstacle and Value* and *Introduction to Philosophy,* permit the general direction of Le Senne's metaphysics to be plotted out. Unfortunately none of the works of Lavelle and Le Senne have been translated into English, although our contemporary tastes have provided a good commercial market for a number of translations of Sartre.

With Lavelle, Royce, Fichte, and Nietzsche, Le Senne promises a philosophy primed with emotion, content, and quality. In both of these men, the spirit of Bergson has been reborn; it is a spirit that would erect a positive natural metaphysic on the ground that Bergson vainly tried to break with his doctrine of mysticism. But the philosopher, when he builds, is not removed on a distant balcony directing the operations. He is part of the metaphysical structure that he would depict. Bradley writes that, "There is but one view of Reality, and its being consists in experience." This ubiquity of experience, bulging far beyond the Kantian cate

gories and empiriological methods, Le Senne takes constructively into account; philosophy is the passage from "a sensible experience to an intellectual one."

The idealistic texture of Le Senne's thought begins weaving itself when he insists that the only subject and the only organon of philosophy is "conscious actuality." The existentialists pride themselves on transcending the critical problem, and even in the case of Jaspers, they never break out of the "brackets" which Husserl built around existence. The analytic bias which led Berkeley to hold that *esse est percipi* (to be is to be perceived) existentialism embraces and then applies to the percipient. Le Senne's escape from solipsism is the story of his philosophy.

Anguish is not a point of departure but a later arrival in man's attitude toward existence. Our first business with the real is transacted through what Le Senne terms astonishment, a surprisingly close analogue to Plato's original notion that philosophy begins in wonder. There follows an awareness not of being but of multiplicity, which Le Senne finds to be something intimate and ultimate in our world. Art, for instance, makes sense only because there is a previous disorder that must be organized; morality presupposes an incoherence that must be resolved; religion works for the union of man with God.

The ego is sparked into a consciousness of itself from a prior state of naïve and affective spontaneity. Its identity is discovered, as Marcel also claims, by a kind of second thought. But there is a subtlety about the nature of an idea in Le Senne's writings that does not let it rest into the usual historical categories. As in the descriptions by Lavelle, the first act is presented as neutral to the distinction between ego and non-ego. As in Lavelle also, the matter and form of the idea seem united. "That which is an idea in a philosophy," Le Senne says, "is an operation in the mind of the philosopher. . . ." There is an uneasiness in this naïve spontaneity, and it yields to astonishment, which Le Senne rather picturesquely and yet profoundly calls a knowledge of the unknown. This then is the beginning of wisdom. The astonishment is a matrix for the multiplicities which the ego forthwith discriminates in the universe about it.

Lest the full force of this important description go unnoted, its meaning may be probed from another vantage point. Anticipating

an expression of Sartre, Le Senne writes that when I see the Eiffel Tower, the "I" and the Tower "coincide." But there is a second phase to this experience, a projection of the object, as it were, "to relate it to the self, to appropriate it by a precautionary protest against the eventual claim of others on the property of that object." More than ten years after these lines appeared, Sartre spoke of the objectifying of others as a defense reaction.

This birth of exteriority issues from the weakness of the finite individual mind, and in a manner that parallels contemporary existentialism, exteriority is "our vain protest against nothingness." In the second of Fichte's first principles, "the ego posits the non-ego directly opposite itself." And in Bradley, the cleavage between appearance and the real is but the hard fact of finitude, too feeble to live in a pure unity of being and therefore relegated to a split world. Exteriority is thus the birthmark of our inability to inhabit the world of the Idea in all of its purity and self-sufficiency. Le Senne definitely meets existentialism on capital points.

Given this broken world, Le Senne will not assault it with either of the two dominant philosophies of the recent past, intuitionism and empiricism. The one tends to deny relations and exalt content; the other enshrines relation and attends too much to forms of thought, neglecting its matter. A genuine philosophy must somehow wed these two methods, Le Senne holds.

Such an alloy he proposes to achieve in the flame of his modified Hegelianism. The unifying element between empiricism and intuitionism, between, as it were, the material and formal approaches to reality, is spirit, consciousness, the *cogito,* in a word *l'esprit,* which may be clumsily translated as mind. Spirit, according to Le Senne is "a dynamic unity of liason . . . according to which to deny and to exclude is to unite."

Such a view might be underwritten by Hegel's identification of logical and real being and the denial of the principle of contradiction. Le Senne would not tolerate a further probing of his definition. He would say, it would seem, that spirit is, as he portrays it, that its nature is multiple as well as one, and that this nature is something ultimate. He would insist that no such reduction of the manifold as Lavelle attempts can account for the unyielding facts of difference which experience imposes. Consciousness, for instance, entails relation, and hence a kind of

duality-in-one, in its very structure; for it is a being but it makes essential reference to something else. This is what phenomenology holds, and in the spirit of such a philosophy, the following of Le Senne's references is to be understood:

> That medium [*milieu*] where the conditions which are imposed on our action and the values which it involves meet with our emotional and intellectual dialectics is consciousness.

The empirical and intuitional, the relational and the contentual, the formal and the material, have been cemented together in this passage, and when the word "medium" is taken to signify mediation, the relational structure of consciousness is seen to be its native character. The world is one and multiple, it is one-multiple, at once.

It is of interest here that Le Senne makes no effort to derive multiplicity from being after the fashion of Lavelle. What is the ultimate substructure of the finite whose impotence, protesting against the naught, ended its struggle with the truce of positing an exterior world? Le Senne argues back from human operations to the presence of their principle and in almost a reworking of Bradley and especially of Hamelin, a French idealist of the last generation, the unity of the principle is largely one of relation. It is said that opposites are united in a "unity of laison," but it is not explained how or why the various opposites can have a common meeting ground. Lavelle, beginning with consciousness and being, takes up the problem at this point and proposes that the multiple is an imitation of the one at a finite level. Le Senne does not elaborate on the basic principle of his system as one-multiple. This is the way everything is supposedly constituted, and there is nothing more fundamental.

Continuing this dualism, Le Senne defines the ego in terms neither of thought nor of things. It is both. It is ideo-existential and can be considered in both a subjective and objective character. The third of Fichte's first principles claimed that, "In the ego, the ego posits a partial ego against a partial non-ego." Neither one nor multiple, the ego may be defined, in Le Senne's rendition, as "one-of," once more in the genealogy of Brentano and Husserl. It is essentially something but essentially relation to what is not itself. It thus conjoins personality, defined in terms of unity and impersonality, considered as indetermination. Another approach

to the ego is through the pair: sublimity and universality. It is limited and unlimited, open and closed, like the two moral universes of Bergson. It has width and depth, comprehension and intension, atmosphere and detail.

Le Senne's idea of man may likewise be presented in terms of a relation, this time as a relation-soul, *une relation-âme*. Such a reality is synthetic not only of knowledge-states but of emotions and sentiments which all blend into the relating unity of a single resonating being. "What is more important than relation is the life of the relation." A relation is relational and is a living concretion.

Such a description lines up squarely with the reference to the ego as ideo-existential. As a relational unity, it is a synthesis of existence and determination. There is an internal opposition between the terms of the relation and hence within the relation itself. Personality involves a suspended animation between the infrapersonal unity of a mathematical point and pure existence which would be a continuous unity between thought and being in the superpersonality of God. Such a synthesis of the rational and empirical is the sense of the *cogito*. On more than one point, this whole development on the nature of relation, with its two terms knotted into it, appears as an original and provocative reworking of the Hegelian dialectical triad.

It was said above that astonishment breaks open the original spontaneity of the ego and evolves into the discovery of determinations. These take the form of obstacles which Le Senne discusses in one of the most original and most stimulating phases of his philosophy. As existence in Thomistic thought is regarded to be limited by essence, so here the emergence of the obstacle reflects the imprisonment of existence into determination. Determination, in contrast to man's naïve and pristine spontaneity, has the property of being localized. It is a negating in Spinoza's sense, a limit of existence to a man and a limit of man to a subject-predicate dialectic. It provides man with a panorama but also with a prison. Our life is constituted by the relation of existence to determination.

Existence is viewed as "the support of determination." Through the language of determination, it speaks its nature and presence. Another way of depicting obstacle is in terms of the localized

unity of a *fact* which is always enveloped by an existence that surpasses it. The more a fact stands out by itself, the less intelligible it is, Le Senne would say, and the greater is the character of the obstacle which it takes on.

As a moralist like Lavelle, Le Senne is closely concerned with the value-problem. Whereas determination is always localized, value is more of an atmosphere than a detail. In Marcel's language, is it not a problem but a mystery. Where, Le Senne inquires, could we localize love, goodness, nobility? All of these sanities of life would be prostituted and destroyed by being localized. In a language like that of Plato or Hegel, Le Senne writes, "Existence presents itself then in the interval between value and nothing, having in common with each of them the nature of denying determination." In like allegiance to the Platonic tradition, Le Senne finds that being and value both seem to involve a polarity; value—for example, truth, love, beauty—exists only by opposition to its contrary.

Value and obstacle are really opposites, but there nevertheless exists something of a union between them. By virtue of the obstacle, there is something more to life and to philosophy than the arid formalism of modern methods. By means of the obstacle, what would otherwise be a purely intellectual dialectic becomes a living process. Man cannot fly into the ease of inert living, the ambition of those who judge progress by bathtubs, airplanes, and atom-smashing. Without the obstacle, life could well deteriorate into a logical game. The obstacle must be overcome for the sake of value.

A number of original notions have been introduced so far, and they ought to be summarized and compared. What are the relations among existence, determination, obstacle, and value?

Determination, it was seen, is contrasted with existence. With the breakup of the original spontaneity of man, determination emerges out of existence, and is closely leagued to value, acting at once to degrade value into existence and canalize value to man. Determinations really limit existence, impeding man's unconditional possession of spirit (*l'esprit*). They enter into relation with other determinations, forming a system in the ideal order; determinations in the practical order, when mediated, enable communication with another self.

Yet this ideal system and practical communication remain incomplete and it is because of the obstacle that the union of existences through determinations come to failure. The obstacle thus effectively disjoins value and determination.

Le Senne's descriptions are not always easy to follow, and the absence of concrete example in his speculative works makes his meaning even more difficult. The final meaning of the obstacle appears to be that it is simply a condition of finitude. It is the bond, between the ego, on the one hand, and on the other hand, value, which really stands opposite to the obstacle and yet through determination triumphs over its opposition.

Defeat and negation await man everywhere. American readers will recognize a parallel to John Dewey when Le Senne describes the first fact as a felt contradiction. More interesting still is the doctrine that "the non-being is experienced as being." In all of his life, man meets and mixes with emptiness, loneliness, error, regret, illusion, loss, destruction, forgetfulness. How are these "negative" realities to be explained? For Sartre, of course, who used similar terms, they show the identity between being and the naught, but Le Senne's solution is more dualistic. Life originates in suffering and conflict and runs its course with art harmonizing things, metaphysics organizing ideas, and religion uniting persons. Evil and suffering herald the fact that there are "two tendencies" in life, obstacle and value.

Contradictions, suffering, obstacles—all of these can bring out the best in us or the worst in us. They can provoke despair or duty, strength or weakness, defeat, or in Marcel's language, confrontation. Even when the setting is theoretical, contradiction is associated with man's progress. An historian, for example, studies a document more carefully when another contradicts him. A physicist neglects facts which confirm his theory, to go after the irregularities. A thesis gets its value from the objections which it answers. Several philosophers have written that they learned most from philosophers with whom they differed. Every affirmation must be preceded by the need of affirmation.

In establishing the existence of God, Le Senne seems to favor the moral argument, and such a procedure falls naturally under his moralism and under the dominant place which will and value own in his philosophy. Along this moral way, Le Senne would

hold as a premise that certitude is not simply a state but is widened and deepened by action. He writes:

> When moral action takes place, to that extent doubt about the validity of reason has ceased. For in the moral act, there are identified the value which makes it be and the liberty of the agent.

In other words, the agent discovers in moral action that he partakes of a value transcendent to himself.

In viewing God as value, Le Senne follows the Kantian argument, whereas God, as Being, is established in Lavelle's thought from the Cartesian argument rising from consciousness. Le Senne views his argument as a kind of existential proof of God's existence. The traditional ways, he holds, degrade a spiritual being into an object. God is known through man's liberty, associating itself in the expansion of a truly valuable universe.

Elsewhere, God's existence is argued as it is in Bradley's philosophy, where the Absolute becomes the conciliator of opposites. The contradictions of finite existence introduce us to a Being that has no contradictions and thus no finitude. This, Le Senne says, is a kind of ontological argument in reverse. Contradiction cannot exist objectively, but it requires the supreme, synthesizing reality of Spirit.

Developing this argument, it may be said that an absolute contradiction between finite consciences is inadmissible. There is a deep juncture uniting them, not only in the abstract—for the abstract has no force of being—but in a fashion which is thoroughly concrete.

Le Senne at least intimates the notion of analogy in holding that the obstacle and value, the finite and the infinite, are both distinct and consolidated. He takes a stand against pantheism, which would leave unexplained the inwardness of consciousness as multiplied in the world and which, in the unity of a single Subject, would lead to a world where communication would be smothered by a kind of transcendental solipsism. Yet Le Senne is also the author of this statement: "In the measure in which value dominates, the ego is God." The anomaly in this idea might be resolved by observing the mention of *measure* which means degree, participation, analogy, and plurality.

In the high tide of scholasticism, God was considered as Being.

Ego sum qui sum: I am Who am. In Le Senne's theology, this becomes: *Ego sum qui valeo:* I am Who am valuable. "What we call by the word *'God'* is an indeterminate source but a source whose existence makes us partakers in the value which animates Him." This might appear as a renewal of Spinoza's pantheism, but in reality, God's indetermination is considered to be a kind of superdetermination from which all determinations originate. That Le Senne does not intend pantheism can be seen in his reference to God as superior to the opposition between determination and indetermination, the ideal and the existent. It is God that delivers man from defeat before the obstacle. As Lavelle says, obstacles exist only for an egoist, and in a way, Le Senne would second this notion. With God before us, the obstacle becomes a medium rather than a check, a factor of propulsion rather than of defeat.

Le Senne speaks of a double *cogito.* This concept is explained as involving God and man, both of whom "cannot be considered nor exist except by their relationship." There is no God-without-man. "God is God-with-us or He is not God." God as value must necessarily be creative and here there is an aspect of Le Senne's thought which seems very much open to challenge. Is this not but a revival of neo-platonic emanationism of Meister Eckhart, and a renewal of Abelard?

In defense of Le Senne, the following points should be observed: (*a*) there is no means of knowing God by reason except by reference to man as the prover of His existence, and there would be no proof of God's existence if there were no creature who needed and performed the proving; (*b*) Le Senne's method is purely descriptive, and in such a view, the procession of creatures could only be approached as in continuity with God; description admits of no hiatus like that between being and nothing; (*c*) Le Senne admits that God is not exhausted by creation, he accepts the analogy of being, and he rejects pantheism; (*d*) Le Senne insists that God is an existential unity. This defense might temper criticism of Le Senne, but the point certainly remains to be clarified. Perhaps the moral of the problem is the danger of phenomenology when it becomes man's only approach to the ultimates.

The relation between the two *cogitos* is labeled theandric. Its nature does not seem to reside in the intellectual order as the term *cogito* would at first sight suggest:

> At every instant, in the measure in which the double *cogito* is union, *it is the convergence of a double act,* that of God emanating value and of ourselves making it emanate from Him, that of the ego verifying the existence of God in associating itself in its own creation.

By virtue of this theandric relation, man experiences the will of God in the obstacle and the grace of God in value. God is the union of the two, the sustainer of determination, the principle of existence, the source of value, the conciliator of opposites.

The service of God in moral conduct is neither through blind spontaneity nor through the abstract universals of science. Morality provides a pattern involving both. It is ideo-existential, uniting atmosphere and detail, value and determination; and religion is the propulsive force, the vital élan for realizing this pattern. God, in a fashion which is reminiscent of Pascal, must be made to touch the heart.

It is the obstacle that provokes reflection. From an original quasi-indifferent state of mind, there is realized a gradual but analogical divinization of man and of the content of his experience. Man, as Plato said, should aim to become more and more like God.

Bergson's famous distinction is recovered in Le Senne's differentiation of morality into urgency and inspiration. Determination is oppressive until inspiration is caught.

> At that moment, ostensive determination becomes propulsive. It contributes to propel the mind. The more it changes from an intellectual dialectic to an emotional process, the more it becomes indistinguishable from the total élan of the ego as it participates in value.

Salvation is the spiritualizing of the obstacle.

Le Senne's greatness consists in his efforts to transcend the narrow party-lines of modern philosophies and to reach a promontory where the fragments of truth which even false philosophies have gleaned from man's problems take their proper and respectable places. Like Lavelle, he presents an alternative to the shallow phenomenism of the modern mind which fails to agree with man's intimate penetration of himself and of nature. If everything is spirit, there is at least hope of meaning and value; neither can be found in brute matter, as the empiriological method depicts it.

SOME CRITICAL REMARKS

From the little that a chapter will allow to be said, it is evident that Marcel, Lavelle, and Le Senne are strong contenders against atheistic existentialism and that their rich, positive principles should give serious pause to the secularized mind of modern man. Existentialism and scientism, in both its naturalistic and logicalistic forms, must dispose of all of them in order to defend the writs of their own secular philosophies. It is easy enough to call names and to brand the real philosophers of our times as the victims of illusion. It is simple to label all speculation as meaningless, supernatural, or reactionary. But ease and simplicity are not synonymous with reason, and no philosopher is loyal to his title unless he is willing to answer objections.

The starting point of all three of these philosophers is surprisingly like that of John Dewey, to take an example close to home. The comparison is especially apt in the case of Marcel who even uses a language like Dewey's in referring to "situations" and "problems." But Marcel eventually develops a philosophy quite different from that of naturalism, and Dewey and his school must confront Marcel in a frank and considered way before their philosophy can go unchallenged.

In a more general way, Marcel is especially valuable when the mind must descend from a scientific level, with its traffic in universal principles, and consider concretions at their own level by dialectical techniques. It is at this point, where man must forsake science or causal knowledge and content himself with descriptions of cases, that phenomenology can supplement philosophy in a highly desirable and very ingenious fashion. Marcel has found a way to deal with individual concretions as such and has used the method better perhaps than any philosopher now writing in the western world. He is especially suggestive for practical sciences like ethics and applied psychologies where dialectics, descriptions, and case histories are of great moment.

In the light of the foregoing analysis, it can be admitted with Maritain that Marcel has provided "concrete analogies" to the truths of a more speculative nature, as studied in metaphysics. Maritain also finds that Marcel can pave the way to the genuine notion of being by his descriptive analyses of man. It might be said in fact that though phenomenology, not being causal, cannot

claim to be a truly scientific approach to reality, it may function as a prologue to the abstraction of philosophical principles, as the present context suggests, or as an epilogue to philosophy as the preceding paragraph has argued.

The difficulty with Marcel's thought is its refusal to speculate or, at any rate, its tendency to give speculation a secondary place in the questioning career of the human mind. Unless the act of faith in our own being and in God reposes on realities which are not simply experienced but truly known by intelligence, it cannot claim the conviction that alone can make man meaningful in a meaningful universe. Besides all this, our knowledge cannot begin with the individual object, even if it be ourselves; it starts off with being in its general sense and proceeds by obeying being's first principles. Marcel's intentions must be respected when he belittles principles in favor of persons in an age when persons have become little more than names on a payroll or on identification cards. But it is principles, it is thought, it is intelligence that are primary in the guiding of man when we take him as he is; universal knowledge must be valid knowledge if skepticism is to be averted. It is only in a later stage of knowledge that individual concretions refuse to be exhausted by abstract science; the form no longer capable of being abstracted from matter, must then be left incarnately in its concrete setting.

Lavelle's great merit is to have reaffirmed the ubiquitous (transcendental) character of being as the primary object of human wisdom. By identifying act and being, he essays a method uniting metaphysics with experience. Credit must go to him likewise for restoring the analogy of being as a problem in philosophy and for defending the dignity of man in a climate that sometimes dignifies only dollars. He does not begin with a preconceived method in philosophy, and synthetic as he is, he is ever willing to search through the past and the present to assimilate truth wherever he comes upon it. He restores truth and value to their real ontological status as synonyms for being at a time when truth has been defined as relative to a method and value as relative to individual wills.

Lavelle is also a challenge to Sartre, since both seek out the "primitive fact" in the life of man's mind and yet come up with answers diametrically opposed. As Dewey must defend himself

against Marcel, so Sartre would have to fight off the philosophy of Lavelle to keep his own atheistic existentialism as more than a prejudice.

But there are grave problems in Lavelle too. Is description adequate as a philosophical method? Can a philosophy carry certitude at its heart when its feet are resting on a non-knowledge type of awareness? Is the Lavellian moral code too difficult to apply to the generality of men as opposed to the elite few who could act upon his "metaphysic of pain"? Finally, there is the problem of the primacy of the good, mentioned earlier, according to which, act even in God appears to depend for its reason on something beyond being.

Le Senne is more difficult to understand, to present, and to evaluate. He has certainly caught glimpses of the tormented character of human life which cannot be reasoned away through scientific formulae. In this respect his thought diverges widely from the somewhat placid and definitely Platonic solutions of Lavelle. In Le Senne's view, there are powerful strokes in behalf of dualism where existence and determination, on the one hand, and obstacle and value, on the other, suggest a return to the great secrets in Platonic and Aristotelian cosmologies. For Le Senne, everything is meaningful and indeed gets its meaning from its relation to the absolute. His idea of relation is intended to explain reality as unified and organized and theocentric.

But in the philosophy of relation which he executes there are grave difficulties. His descriptions of relation are not altogether clear, and what is clear does not always have a conviction to match its clarity. The soul is a relation-soul; the ego is ideo-existential; the double *cogito* involves a theandric relation. But what is relation?

> It is dialectically evident, Le Senne writes, that mediation and immediation are only possible by their relation (*leur liason*). A pure immediation would be lost in the indiscernibility of the dual in the one; a mediation which would be nothing else would make of means and extremes just so many things which would be mutually exclusive.

The reduction of the manifold to unity is therefore not proposed by Le Senne. There is no one-in-many; yet there is just one-many. He holds that things have a mediate and immediate character

apparently side by side, with no internal hierarchical unity of structure; experience is just given that way. This is the final stop of metaphysics in its pursuit of internal causes and reasons; and what lies beyond it can only be answered in theodicy where once anew a relational pattern is introduced.

In this fashion, beginning with contradictions and doubts, the philosopher only mediates between incoherences, ending with a relation between opposites that is but the initial cleavage restated on a higher level. The result seems a type of Plotinian dualism in a universe marked by "the omnipresence of conflict."

Le Senne's rejection of immediation would force him logically to deny that a thing can be related to itself, in the sense, say, of self-evidence. This is a somewhat critical issue and suggests the problem of how far Le Senne, beginning with the plural and the relational, can speak of the one and the infinite. Only when we begin with the immediate can we arrive at the ultimate. Any other course would be an endless search after premises, not to mention the infinite series of putting premises together.

Any idealism, of course, is open to attack, and the arguments against it are well known. In Le Senne's case, it must be remembered that he employs a phenomenological method. And description, followed with utter rigor, is bound to lead to idealism or something even beyond it. Since he apparently does not admit the self-evident, Le Senne has to use a method which is not dictated by his subject-matter and is not, like truth, coterminous with being. Had he used a causal rather than descriptive technique would his mind have moved to idealism?

Whatever difficulties may lurk in their formal statements, the spirits of Marcel, Lavelle, and Le Senne echo sympathetically in the hearts of genuine philosophers. Sartre has hit the headlines, but spiritual existentialism has come inspiringly closer to hitting the truth.

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PART IV

CHAPTER 15 MIND AND MATTER

Like the moon swinging the tides of the sea, the dead planet of Cartesian doubt has been a giant factor in the present-day tides of philosophy. The history of modern thought has largely been a record of its enthusiasm to deliver itself from doubt and to reach security. For doubt can never be more than a transition stage between certitudes. It is a disturbance that does not make man happy, a disorder that leaves him insecure, a block to the truth that would make him free.

In the effort to escape from doubt, method has taken a priority over the study of matter in philosophy, but since method is needed to explore method in the spirit of rigid Cartesianism, philosophy has been whirled up in either a vicious circle or an infinite regression. There is hence a return to the skepticism for which method was initially set up as a release.

In radical existentialism, man has not compromised. Pursuing a pure analysis to its limits, philosophers like Heidegger and Sartre have moved beyond skepticism and into a nihilistic abyss. Other minds, like those studied in Part II, have had a "failure of nerve." In general, they take refuge in the empiriological method because it provides so-called public criteria of truth or makes for mechanical progress or enables us to "point" to objects in experience to verify statements.

The universe, observed through the colored glasses of so-called scientific methods when they are applied purely, is an indifferent

and indeterminate reality, and the general direction of most of the philosophies on the preceding pages would tend to the opinion that the world is an equalitarian one, neutral, controllable, homogeneous at its roots and accounting for its own differences and developments by evolution. Though admitting of reservations and even exceptions, two large problems can be disengaged from an over-all glance at the preceding pages: the problem of knowledge and the problem of whether this is a hierarchical world or one of mere equality and blind evolution. The first question forms the subject of the present chapter while the second will be treated in the chapter following.

THE PRAGMATIC TEST OF SKEPTICISM

Universal skepticism cannot possibly be accredited in theory or carried out in practice. As Nietzsche said, it is a disease, and as Santayana says, it is "an exercise, not a life." In practice, it leads to an infinite questioning of everything, including of course, in Heidegger's language, the question and the questioner. As such an infinite series of mere questions, it would paralyze all life. Nothing positive could ever be uttered and no action could ever be performed. The doubter would still be doubting whether he should go to sleep when the alarm clock is already sounding to get him up. In doubting whether to eat his food, he would hardly be embarked on his infinite series when the waiter would arrive to clear the table.

Complete doubt leads to death, not to life; and that it is wholly alien to the hardware of everyday affairs is at least a strong bias against its recommendations as the right and realistic attitude. Doubt is negative. It is nihilistic because it dissolves the subject into an infinite flux of mental states where being could never be and come to rest; it is also nihilistic because, without the principle of non-contradiction, it unites opposites that cancel each other out to an ontological zero.

Radical doubt leads to suicide because the doubter would be frozen in his refusal to think, speak, and act until he has crossed the infinite series of settling his own mind. As shown by the cycle from Descartes to Sartre, doubt is despair, and the desperate are anti-social. As a perpetual regression toward its own interior, doubt is self-explosive and in that same regression cuts the ties

uniting man to family, friends, and society. Doubt is isolationist and therefore disorganizing and cannot be the grounds for the organization required by a scientific system and of course by the social planning of our time. Universal doubt is a morbid fear, opposed to love and life. By its insulating bias, complete doubt leads to pride and paganism, bitterness and ill-temper, neuroses and suicide. That no doubter can remain on his treadmill and roll along through an infinite time before making up his mind, is a sure sign that doubt cannot possibly be lived, and if it were, the doubter should never emerge from his shell of silence to inform the world of his physical existence and the "truth" of his skepticism. Before saying anything like this, he must complete his infinite series.

Phenomenology would provide a real service to philosophy if it would analyze the anatomy of a doubt along the lines, say, of Marcel's analyses of fidelity and hope. Doubt of course is very often legitimate, realistic, and commendable, and obviously, it is only universal doubt that is of interest here. In fact doubt has an immense application within the empiriological disciplines adapted by men like Dewey precisely to conquer doubt.

The word "doubt" is an etymological relative of the term "double," and a chronic and universal doubter, must always have a double or split personality. As phenomenology would be prompted to say, doubt only has meaning as a secondary attitude which presupposes prior certitudes. Doubt presupposes always a vague, general, but a very certain knowledge of the solution which a given intellectual problem will and must have: but there is a conflict, a doubt, between at least two present alternatives, and neither has enough light to make the prior certainty clearer than it actually is or to supplement the vagueness by a more definite knowledge. Doubt is not ultimate, universal, and complete. It has meaning only when directed to something outside of itself like an answer to questions. It is darkness, ignorance, and indirection, and all of these presuppose a positive correlative to make them meaningful as logical facts and psychological possibilities.

Unable to decide among alternatives, the doubter suspends his judgment, and the suspension is caused by that prior certainty which present alternatives do not fulfill. In suspense, man relates the alternatives to each other, if only in terms of their common relation to his anterior and certain knowledge, to the problem

whose answer he already knows in a vague and dim fashion and applies to restrain any of his present alternatives from becoming his final solution.

Let us say that a mechanic sees a nut on an engine and decides to loosen it. He has a rough idea of the size of a nut, a general though certain knowledge, as he sorts through his toolbox for a suitable wrench. At last he finds one that comes close to the size that he remembers from having looked at the nut, but he is not sure that it is close enough. He doubts. Perhaps he finds two wrenches and is undecided which one to try. In any event, his doubt bears on prior knowledge: the certainty that there is a nut on the engine and that it must be loosened and the relevance of his alternatives arises from this certainty.

Or let us take a more speculative question: which is the better empiriological approach to matter, the quantum theory or relativity? The one says that space and time cannot be measured at the same time in exact fashion; the other says they can. We know from prior certitudes that both theories cannot be right as they now stand, and so we may hesitate to accept the one or the other or both. Our doubt again is secondary and relative, and rooted in antecedent knowledge. And it will always be found to do so.

So doubt is relative, never absolute and self-prompted, and it presupposes a more general common knowledge, or there could be no doubt and obviously no such monstrosity as universal skepticism. Doubt implies a plurality of alternatives united by the relation to a common antecedent problem, and this primarily known unity to which such a relation bears witness confirms the Thomistic view that unity, or being, in a confused, implied, but highly certain way is known first to intelligence, and only afterward is there reference to the plurality to which doubt attests. The logical structure of doubt as dependent upon prior certitude stands in contrast to Russell's opinion that skepticism is "logically impeccable but psychologically impossible." Universal doubt is not even logically in order.

Phenomenology could say much more about doubt, and it could supplement the dialectical tools of the philosopher of knowledge if it would turn its power on skepticism which is central issue in modern and contemporary epistemology.

Theoretically, no one can doubt that he is doubting and really

take himself seriously. At least he admits his doubt as a reality and using like Hume the principle that he doubts or denies, he employs the principle of causality in pointing to the premises that made him doubt. He recognizes doubt from non-doubt and the unsatisfactory character of all of his alternatives in the light of the solution which he seeks to clarify. Then too, the skeptic could hardly doubt his existence if he were operating, even if his action is only one of doubt. He distinguishes between himself and his doubt, and when he decides that everything is a matter of opinion, he makes special references to his own identity by saying, "It seems to me. . . ." "I think. . . ." "In my opinion. . . ." It is not only that universal skepticism is theoretically false but it is empirically impossible by the very same arguments. It is not only theoretically absurd to doubt that one is doubting, to doubt that he is a doubter, and to doubt the differences between doubt and non-doubt. But it is also brutally and empirically impossible to do so.

Such a convergence of theory and practice is highly significant. Here there looms up the concrete character of truth which is at one with existing being and not merely an abstract concept that is applied to reality from outside its boundaries. This is another way of saying that fact and evidence are identified, with evidence being intrinsic rather than a man-made fancy. It is also another way of saying that discursive and empiriological methods are not the only highways to reality. At this point of the analysis, theory and praxis, theoretical absurdity and empirical impossibility are seen cemented together, and something ultimate has been reached that can radiate out over the whole of life, integrating experience and philosophy, thought and will, speculation and action.

There is a touch of this truth, but on a different plane, in the existentialists, attempting to corner their own subjectivity and claiming in the end that an impasse is reached because thought, the purported interpreter of experience, turns out to be an experience itself. Apart from existentialist extremisms, the empirical and theoretical levels of man's life do meet to make a common cause against skepticism. The error of existentialism is not its emphasis on concretions but the denial that intelligence can penetrate them at all.

As a corollary of the foregoing arguments, it can be said that

whatever leads to skepticism is impossible and absurd and merits the same condemnation as skepticism itself. It is often said, for instance, that scientism is virtually certain of its conclusions but declines to press them into the status of unshakable truths. According to this rather common contemporary view, we live in a perpetually evolving universe and any of our principles are only tentative. They are practical certitudes but when their understructure is pursued, all knowledge turns out to be provisional, statistically true perhaps but capable tomorrow of producing the statistical exception.

Such a view is really fatal also. Even the possibility of skepticism is a form of skepticism. Man may not pick and choose among degrees of doubt when he is talking about the ultimate structures of his ontology or logic. Possible skepticism is actual skepticism, and there can be no differences and degrees in doubt unless an ultimate norm is reached for differentiating or for drawing up a scale. There are no degrees in skepticism as such. If there are no hard and fast truths that are beyond doubt, any equation or entity which empiriological method employs and scientism elevates into philosophy, is an arbitrary opinion of an interrupted doubt. To have a possible doubt is to doubt really.

But my ideas work, the modern physicist will say, for I can see my instruments, and obeying my equations, I could blow up a city with an atom bomb. But this statement like the reality to which it refers is meaningless unless it is safely moored on some ultimate bedrock. Where is the authority for saying that a thing is true if it works, meaningful if it gets results, good if it makes for human comfort and convenience like an automobile: without references to an objective standard which is ultimate and unchanging, all these defenses of empiriological disciplines must dangle in mid-air, questionable tomorrow perhaps, even if accepted today. Skepticism is the outcome.

Philosophers like Dewey, Russell, Lenin, and even Whitehead who exalt the method of empiriological research into a philosophical ultimate must use that method to examine the method or take it, as Randall and even Russell, on faith alone. In either case, skepticism triumphs and man is urged upon a course of action that is not only logically wrong but will lead him to practical impossibilities. Can we postulate like semantics or Marxism or Whitehead

and make our escape? No, for the "undecidable" postulates are in the last analysis arbitrary and dogmatic; and the whole structure of the resulting system stands on a skeptical quagmire. Can we abandon the quest for meaning like Santayana or Heidegger or Sartre? By no means, for to say that all is meaningless is itself a meaningful statement, and an impossible universe again results. Can we belittle intelligence like Bergson and proclaim a mystical intuition as the approach to the real? But the discussion of the whole subject and the recognition of differences—in experience, in thought, and in reality—can only take place by using the principles which anti-intellectualism denies. Typically modern thought has not kept faith with itself. It has not thought through the scientifically absurd, practically impossible, and socially dangerous premises on which it now placidly reposes. If it did, the modern mind would find that the genuine "bad faith" is skepticism, and in the reaction there would not be the skeptical indifference that has dominated contemporary thinking. If the premises of a system are arbitrary, to paraphrase Kierkegaard, so is the whole system. The only way to avoid a science that is not completely arbitrary in a world which becomes an absolute chaos is to reject skepticism both in practice and in the theory that guides it, coming to rest in the obvious conclusion that something, at least, can be known for certain.

"BEING IS NOT NON-BEING"

The truly prime principle of thought and being is the law of non-contradiction: "It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time and in the same way." The principle pulls its support, if it needs any, from the absolute skepticism which its denial entails, and without it, the world descends into a wild anarchy while thought and speech become absurd. In its logical and ontological status, in knowledge and also in being, this principle pays respect to both identity and difference. It says that things are what they are and do not have the same identity as their neighbors. They do not shade into one another in a manner that would make them not only continuous but the same thing. The stenographer is not her typewriter, and the hunter, when he shoots his game, is not really shooting himself.

The denial of the principle of non-contradiction, as Aristotle

said, churns reality into a universe of flux where no differences can be seen and hence no identities can be discerned either. Everything is everything else. The simile of a river, often used to picture the flux in a Heraclitean world, is not really accurate, since river water has an identity, even if it is moving from place to place. In fact, no good analogy can be found in experience since the obedience of things to first principles prevents them from dissolving into a pure flow that a lawless world would be; and hence any good analogy would be unreal. In a world where the principle of non-contradiction did not hold complete dominion, the flux would have to be, not partial like the river, but absolute, with no differences between the drops, no bank for an observer to stand on, and no distinction between the observer and the stream. There would be no identities at all. Nothing would be what it is.

It is, after all, the fact of non-contradiction in things that assures their differences and, if one may use Plato's word metaphorically, that makes for the inequalities that allow real motion and forbid the nameless flux. Contrary to Marx, only where this principle is held could there be two different things, two opposites. Only such a world could truly move. If the principle were not valid always and everywhere, all differences would perish along with it. The fact of self-identity, in nature and in man, is a prominent one, and yet when the prime principle is denied, things must taper into one another and nothing retains a self-identity, nothing is itself, nothing is. Right and wrong, truth and error, the baby and the bath, war and peace, all lose their differences absolutely, and if a new day should dawn, a rank impossibility where all is flux, all persons and all things are absolutely new since they have no stability in the stream. Despite Dewey, a denial of the principle of non-contradiction obliterates both identity and difference.

Where nothing but invertebrate flux prevails, thought and speech, like being, also become impossible. Thought involves the discernment of both identity and difference and the assurance that by the time a judgment is completed its matter will not be completely about-faced from what it was in the beginning. Without detecting identities, abstractively isolating them and then comparing them with other objects, self-identical but different from the first, thought could not possibly function even in stating physico-mathematical equations or discussing words or describing the

naturalistic universe. Speech would have no meaning since it could identify and differentiate neither things nor words, to communicate ideas. It may certainly be conceded to the semanticists that misunderstandings exist among men and that they may sometimes be partially caused by the meanings of words. But the differences are not absolute. If they were, semantics could never hope to communicate its message to others. There is some stable area of agreement among men.

No reality could exist if it were not what it is, and in a nihilistic universe where nothing exists, nothing surely could be thought and spoken. Skepticism usurps thought unless the principle of non-contradiction is accepted not only provisionally and for the here and now but as a timeless and unchangeable truth. For if it could ever be broken, the infraction might occur at any moment and in any place and might have already completely revolutionized the object of an idea by the time the mind has gotten around to formulate its conclusions about it. It will be seen anew that the practical, provisional, and apparently more modest type of certitude, where scientism likes to stop, simply will not do as an approach to the real. It is impossible and absurd and leads to skepticism. Unless the principle of non-contradiction, at both logical and ontological levels, is taken as absolute, the philosopher could not know that he was certain, practical, or provisional. He could not identify or differentiate anything.

The denial of the principle of non-contradiction and the courting of skepticism have been common challenges through most of the foregoing chapters. Some philosophers, denying the ontological value of the principle, took refuge in the logical order, like Russell and Carnap, and they used the principle as a rule of method, a species of Kantian "regulative" idea. But if the principle is repealed in ontology, the explosion also ravages our logic. Common sense, reinforced virtually down to the Cartesian revolution by the science of philosophy, has always accorded ontological rigor to the principle of non-contradiction. But if common sense were deceived, as Kant said, and as his progeny continue to declare today, and if scholastic philosophy, in its ontology of being versus non-being were dominated by this so-called common sense illusion, where does the illusion end? Perhaps with further advance of thought the principle of non-contradiction, by the same historical argu-

ment, will be ejected from logic as well as from ontology. In that case, its present-day value in logic, where it is called the principle of tautology, might be suspected. The skeptical epidemic of modern thought must thus spread to logic as well, and nothing could be taken as certain anywhere. There is, be it repeated, not even a practical certainty resting on how an idea works, since the possibility of ultimate skepticism is itself actual skepticism. If skepticism is refuted as both a possibility and actuality in the same argument, the case against it must be ultimate.

ULTIMATE CERTITUDES

The principle of non-contradiction has both logical and ontological rigor and applies to both possibility and actuality. It is the first law of thought and of being alike. This is but another sign of the realism that brings thought into contact with being and shows them as ultimately conjoined under a law common to both. In the absolute sense, differences do not form a continuous spectrum since they are based on the radical rupture that sets "is" forever apart from "is not." Being is something ultimate since outside of it there is nothing, and though a color might fade or the volume on a radio might grow a little fainter as the tubes age, being can undergo no such graduations in the absolute sense since it has nothing to change to. Even a faded dress is still separated from nothing. It is still a dress. It is still something, and it can become a number of things, like a dustcloth or cellulose in a paper factory. But being cannot become anything else in a positive way. It is an ultimate and to go beyond it is to go to non-being.

Empiriological method studies things in terms of forces outside of them. It sets up a standard and measures things by their relationship to it. The sun is so many miles distant from the earth taken as a standard, and the charge on an electron amounts to this or that fraction of a standard electrostatic unit. Now when the philosopher would clarify being by external evidence, he would find that there is only non-being outside of it. He attains then to what is ultimate, beyond which there is nothing; the laws of being are necessary since there is nothing that could interfere with them; as an ultimate, being considered with respect to nothing, is really known with respect to itself. Our knowledge is intimate and internal to being. Being is known in an ultimate, necessary, and intimate way.

The discursion in thought and the division in things which empiriological methods exploit at their own levels must somehow come to an end on a level deeper down in being and higher up in thought. Being cannot be divided since its parts would be non-being or nothingness. The mind, when it says that being is, cannot go further in its general knowledge since other than saying *it is* one could only say that *it is not.*

Such ultimate considerations the logical positivists call meaningless, the naturalists call supernaturalisms, and the Communists call reactionary. The symbolic logicians, for example, deny the ontological value of the law of identity and make it meaningful only in logic where it is called the principle of tautology. But this principle, meaningless as it may be to the empiriological pursuit of it in objective reality, is constantly invoked in its real applications. No organized knowledge could proceed without reference to distinctions among its objects of study and eventually among objects in the external world. If the principle of non-contradiction is admitted in its ontological value—and the price of denying it is skepticism—then the distinction which it implies between "is" and "is-not" shows being to be something ultimate and something meaningful. And unless being is meaningful, nothing is meaningful.

The spirit of scientism reasons like this: Philosophers of the past, from the Greeks to the moderns, have failed to agree on ultimate issues and have proposed as solid and eternal truth what have really turned out to be the private systems spun from their own minds. They have in short enjoyed no such public tests of truth as the empiriological method has afforded men. In reality, the story goes, the ultimate is beyond experience, and there can be as many ideas on it as there are philosophers to devise them. Let us then, says scientism, be more modest and democratic; let us restrict the region of certitude, meaning, and science to the public world of experience where the so-called scientific method of experiment can be the judge of truth and mathematical equations can formulate the results into a universal and public language. In this fashion, scientism concludes, the ultimates cannot be scientifically formulated, but by empiriological tests there is at least an experimentable area of meaning and truth where all men can agree.

But meaning must always presuppose an ultimate meaning and

truth an ultimate truth. If anything is certain, the ultimate must be certain. For without the principle of non-contradiction which bears upon being as known in an intimate way and is so ultimate in itself that there is nothing beyond it, not even the empiriological disciplines would be possible.

Dewey calls it "childish" to say that meaning must always involve an ultimate meaning, and his remark should be examined a little closer. It is obvious at first sight that the identity and difference which Dewey detects in experience and in the thoughts and words by which he purveys his philosophy rest upon that ultimate principle of identity and difference which is the law of non-contradiction as rooted in the real. He wants to reinstate the so-called scientific method to the common sense world that gave it birth, and hence he obviously recognizes that the two worlds are not now the synonyms which his continuum of flux would require. He thus employs in practice the ultimate standards that he denies in theory.

His instrumentalism is a ready instrument to show how unmeaning is his naturalism and how premature and arbitrary is his worship of the empiriological method. Instrumentalism claims that a thing is known by its fruits and stresses an object in terms of what can be done with it. A thing takes on meaning only in so much as it is *for* something else, and this second thing is in turn made meaningful only as far as it works *for* a third thing. Thus is begun the infinite series so basic in the structure of scientism.

Now if a thing has no intrinsic reality or value, if it is only *for* . . . , its being and its meaning lie completely outside of it, and in itself it becomes nothing and utterly meaningless. Such a thought, at first sight, may seem surprising since we often alter a thing from the outside and since we can likewise confer outside meaning on it, as a tool is for work or a figure of speech is for an idea. But this "outsideness" of things is not purely local or occasional in Dewey. Carried in its rigorous form to the limits of the universe, it must hold that everything *that is* is really outside itself and that no meaning can ever make contact with a thing. If everything is *for* something else, there is an infinite series of *"for-ness."* Nothing exists *in* itself. The world is pure *for-ness.* It is radical *for-ness* since the underlying being must

disappear into pure flux. If the world were an infinite series of *for's,* no thought or action could occur in it since an agent would have to cross infinity to reach the effect that it is presumed to influence. All meaning would be mediate, one meaning determining another, and the logical world would be as indifferent as the world of ontology. There is no meaning unless there is an ultimate one, unless there is an end to the series which Dewey's principles must open to infinity. Where ultimates are "undecidable," so is everything else.

Scientism ought to be the last to object to a spatial metaphor to express this idea. If all things are *pure for-ness,* there are no differences among them since plurality would imply something else besides the pure, undifferentiated, and mono-structured *for.* Now if *A* tried to move to *B,* it must be already there since there could be no discriminations in the real, no mediums, terms, ends in view; or put in another way, the moving thing would have to travel across a distance that was the same as itself, the pure and absolute *for.* Pure, radical, incommunicable *for's* would be lined up solidly between things, and *A* could not move one half, one third, one *n*th of the stretch toward *B* because the infinite series would have to be spanned between any two points. If Dewey gave to instrumentalism the full hegemony that his principles require, he could not retain his dynamism. The world would be static, not dynamic, and the whole of it, dissolved (in the limit) into a pure and radical *for,* would be an indeterminate mass that included man himself in its monistic darkness. If "childish" is another way of saying arbitrary, Dewey has provided a label for his own system. Without an ultimate view, he could not even assign meaning arbitrarily, for skepticism would conquer his own mind; and when he dogmatizes as he does to an arbitrary standard for judging meaning, the arbitrariness of the whole understructure would open his system to skepticism too. It is not genuine philosophy but rather scientism which makes truth ultimately an arbitrary and opinionated personalism.

There is something ultimate known to man, at least being and its ontological principle of non-contradiction; when these sanities are abandoned, there is only skepticism as an alternative. Unless there is an ultimate meaning, nonsense rather than meaning everywhere prevails.

Genuine philosophy insists that being exists in itself and that its meaning does not derive entirely from outside of it. Kierkegaard made much of the "inwardness" and Lavelle of the "interiority" of being. These ideas are extremely suggestive and aid in conveying the deep truth that there is no infinite series between *being* and its *is;* it is intrinsic in being to be. We cannot go on indefinitely saying that a thing *has* being. The mediation is ultimately halted and *immediation,* to use Le Senne's language, replaces it. Being, immediately, is. It is not the simple sum of outer inertial forces that act on it. It *is* from within. It has intrinsicness and immediacy. It is ultimate, and when the metaphysical realist accounts for finite being, he shows that it is not inertially produced but created out of nothing.

That *being is,* if a subject-predicate analogy may be used, enables us to say that the subject is the same as the attribute, or in an even weaker analogy from Sartre, that being is the same as its "appearances." Fact and evidence converge at this point, giving the mind an initial contact with reality and with a real principle that, in subsequent operations, it can use as a test or a regulator. The semanticists err in seeing this regulative force as the only value and meaning of first principles. They set out to write a set of rules. Genuine philosophy, while agreeing that first principles become regulative in order to test proofs and weigh evidence, insists that they are first derived from the objective order of being and make man competent within this order. With this initial confluence of fact and evidence, the regulative and what is regulated are inseparably united also, thus avoiding the infinite regression that would otherwise obtain between them. Being is intrinsic to itself, and meaning is intrinsic to being. This is the ultimate force of self-evidence and a guarantee of metaphysical certitude.

The existentialists seek to go beyond being. Analytic like the naturalists and positivists, they seek to deduce being from its grounds, and this leads them into darkness which they call the naught. Their chief failure is in the order of non-being with respect to being. They claim that the naught is prior in knowledge, where traditional philosophy insists on the initial idea of being known with respect to its opposite and hence grasped in itself. All of this positive knowledge of being must be presupposed by existen-

tialism in order to "describe" and "identify" the naught. The naught, in practice, thus becomes secondary in their system also, and they are inconsistent when, by their theory, they attempt to elevate it into the first rank. They drive toward nihilism in their final direction, but their insights do serve to reaffirm the rights of the non-discursive elements in thought which, in genuine realism, makes a valid and vital contact with reality.

TOWARD THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY

The preceding paragraphs, angled to show that man is an intelligent being in a meaningful and intelligible universe, may be supplemented now by a brief exploration of the principles of the excluded middle, of sufficient reason, and of causality.

The principle of the excluded middle yields a new insight into the identity of being: "Between being and non-being there is no third state."

If being were anything but being, it would have to be non-being. Bread may be sliced and eaten, leaving some of the original loaf for another meal. But once being, as such, is changed or divided, it can only go over into the non-being. Being *is*, and outside of it, there is nothing. There is no stairway from non-being to being. If a thing is not non-being, it is something, it is being. The principle of non-contradiction reinforces this argument: "It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time and in the same way." If being is, then it cannot possibly be anything else because this other "thing" would be the naught itself, and in reverse, so long as a thing is not a positive actuality, it can be said that in the actual order it does not exist at all. A thing either is or is not. "Is" and "is not" are infinitely separated, and there is no third something that could bridge the gap between them.

The principle of sufficient reason is an immediate corollary of the preceding principles and, like the rest, is still worthy of the name "first principle" since it is derived from the law of non-contradiction without the use of a middle term or syllogism. "Everything that exists has a sufficient reason for existing."

The difficulty in understanding this principle is that *reason* is often understood in a purely logical sense, making it seem that the genuine philosopher is stacking the deck in his own favor by

insisting, before exploring reality, that he is bound to find it intelligible. But reason here is taken in the sense of ground or basis, and the principle means that there is a ground, a fact or combination of facts, for being's being on this side of nothingness. If being has no such principle, everything is indifferent in the universe. In such a case, being might just as well be non-being since it does not have a sufficiency to save it from this fate. In reflecting on this principle, the accent should fall not on reason (for which it is difficult to find another word), but on sufficiency. If being did not have a sufficiency, a repugnance to nothingness, a positive character or ground, it would be nothing at the same time. The sufficiency or ground forever forbids being from becoming nothing, while remaining being.

That the principle of sufficient reason, attesting to being's positivity, is a real one is not a new and *a priori* postulate, introduced to make philosophy work. If being can never become nothing while remaining being, it has a sufficiency or positivity about it that is real. A positive universe is differential. An indifferent universe would confound being and nothing. Only the principle of sufficient reason can preserve their differences, insisting that being is not only a fact but also a ground, not only a subject but its own regulator, in the immediacy of itself.

The principle of sufficient reason is almost like repeating: being is. Being is something, is positive, stands out from nothingness, for if being did not have the sufficiency to be what it is, then it could also have the ground not to be and would not be eternally conformable to the principle of non-contradiction. In such a case, one may just as well say: being is not.

God has a sufficient reason but it is internal. A sufficient reason may also be extrinsic and in that case is called a cause. The principle of causality is thus the principle of extrinsic sufficient reason and may be formulated: "Whatever does not have a sufficient reason for itself in itself must have that sufficient reason in something outside of it." By the principle of non-contradiction, the sufficient ground for a being is either *in it* or *not in it*, and if the latter alternative prevails, then since the ground, again by the principle of non-contradiction, cannot be in non-being, it must necessarily be in some other being which is called a cause.

The principle of causality thus rests upon metaphysical concrete

and it cannot be denied without repudiating the principle of non-contradiction. Causality is not a synonym for sequence, as Hume implied. Causality entails a relation of sequence, but sequence does not entail the relation of cause. The succession may only be temporal, where there is no causal interplay between the members. Hume took sequence, which is a property of causal activity, to be its essence.

But he did more. He claimed that a recognition of causality was a matter of expectation. After seeing *A* recurrently followed by *B*, we expect *B* to follow *A* whenever *A* occurs. The note of expectation is significant. It shows Hume endeavoring to work from cause to effect when the logical approach to causality is reasoning from the effect back to the cause. It is conceivable that *A* could appear and not be followed by *B* since the existence of a thing does not necessarily mean its activity. For instance, a farmer can exist without necessarily working in his fields; he may go into the city for a movie.

Modern man has been looking for causality in the wrong ways and in the wrong places. To establish the principle of causality is not a matter of counting or measuring or expecting. It is much simpler and more certain than that. A thing can either explain itself or not — by the principle of non-contradiction. If it cannot, the being on which it depends for explanation or existence is called its cause, and no "science," until it gets to its cause, has really explained it.

Now once all these principles are admitted, in fact once we advert to the real force of the principle of non-contradiction, it is possible to work out a real, genuine, certain metaphysics. Once they are denied, skepticism must ensue. Deny the principle of non-contradiction, and there is nothing in the way of identity left to study. Deny the principle of the excluded middle, and what you study now may be completely reversed in nature the next moment: there is no necessity or stability. Deny the principle of sufficient reason, and the world becomes a negative rather than positive thing. Deny the principle of causality, and there is a disordered universe since a member of a sequence, not dependent on its predecessor but only succeeding it, is therefore causally independent and can arise anywhere, anytime. Modern men, especially leaders in education and culture who spurn metaphysics, have not been logical

because their premises have not been pressed into the absurd fate to which they lead. There has been a "failure of nerve." As a result, the deep errors in post-Cartesian thought have not been theoretically detected and have been forced to work their way to the surface the hard way, by international and national crises and by the general and highly incendiary spirit of selfishness that is so widespread. And the end is not yet.

Idealism is no longer the vogue that it used to be, and nearly all the thinkers surveyed in these chapters have had a preference for realism. We do not propose here to beat upon buried corpses, but for the sake of record, it ought to be pointed out that philosophers like Dewey, Heidegger, Russell, and Sartre cannot logically maintain their neutral status in regard to epistemology. They all say, as it was shown, that their systems do not require a decision on the externality of the world and that they have truly undercut the critical problem. But to avoid skepticism, a philosophy cannot hedge. It must declare itself unequivocally, for a realism which makes being exterior to the creation and complete control of man's mind. The unanimity among men in the acceptance of an exterior world cannot be contradicted with impunity. To go against it is to hold that the mind tends naturally to illusion, and skepticism must result. If the natural judgment of mankind has been duped into believing that the world is external, then perhaps that illusion extends to our present so-called scientific knowledge, philosophical and empiriological, and we have not yet found it out. But if there is even any possibility of such an illusion, skepticism results. For possible skepticism is an actual skepticism, and if idealism leads to a skeptical philosophy it is as wrong and as absurd as skepticism itself. The escape from skepticism requires a respect for common sense ontology.

Realistic philosophy, like that of Aristotle, examines common sense to purify and rigidify its knowledge and obviously to deepen and extend it. In addition to being true, this philosophy has the now unusual merit of agreeing, on basic issues, with common sense ontology. It is a philosophy for the truly profound mind but also a philosophy for the ordinary man. It can fulfill Russell's ambition for correctness, Dewey's aims for cultural life, Marx's goals for a better society, Santayana's love for the beautiful, Whitehead's thirst for organization, Bergson's dualisms, and the

existentialists' taste for the concrete; it can synthesize truth wherever it is. For Aristotle's principles imply the communion of mind with matter, of science with common sense, of principles with life, of meaning with being.

It would of course be naïve to take common sense ontology as a presupposition or postulate or hypothesis. It would be naïve to say that common sense is always right. In such an event, philosophy would not only be easy, it would be superfluous. In some cases, as in the acceptance of geocentric astronomy, common sense, or a good portion of it, might be wrong. When it defends the reliability of sensation and especially of intellection, realistic epistemology does not assure the reliability of this individual's powers, on this particular object or at this particular time; for there is no science of the individual. It only insists that, in general human knowledge does not tend to deceive itself and that it is not possible for nature to be naturally disposed to what is contrary to nature. This means then that if we abandon those spontaneous convictions, of nearly all men of nearly all times, that the world is exterior to them, then how can we trust human intelligence under any circumstances? The convictions of modern empiriological disciplines go no deeper and perhaps not even as deep as the convictions of pedestrian thought that the world lies beyond it, and even if they did, the attack by modern scholarship on common sense is an attack on human intelligence in the laboratory. Maybe tomorrow today's learned thought will be exploded as violently as modern philosophers often claim to have demolished the common sense world of the past and present. No statement could then be trusted.

Pierre Duhem has pointed out that there is more profundity in common sense than in empiriological methods. At least pedestrian thought works in terms of the idea of being which strict empiriology must ignore. In a like vein, Christopher Dawson has pointed out that even culturally primitive man gets closer to the big realities of life and nature than typically modern man in "hygienically conditioned and artificially lit" environments. In short, modern man has failed to combine the virtues of the past with the progress of the present. In his present civilization, he often ignores nature. His successful conquest of the material and sense world has led him to belittle intelligence.

THE REALISM OF THE KNOWLEDGE-ACT

Nearly all of the array of thinkers which the foregoing chapters passed in review were anti-intellectualist, either as sensists following Hume or as existentialists who even shrug off the validity of the senses, plunging into a dark world of negation. Thus, for Dewey, the ontology of common sense ranks with supernaturalism; for Santayana, it is an object of animal inference; for Russell a matter of belief; for the Marxists reactionary; for the existentialists inauthentic; for Freud a projection of the unconscious; for Bergson the product of the fabricating mind; for Carnap a "meaningless question." In almost all cases, the sole reason for survival of such critics as thinkers and for the fact that their works are readable at all is their constant use of the intellectualism which they cannot escape as men but persistently deny in their theories.

The very discovery of being, which everyone makes and which pseudo-philosophies encode by their use of language and of the first principles outlined above, is the surest sign that man rises above the animal level and owns a spiritual mind. *Being is,* it was said in both the foregoing arguments and by all of the thinkers in the earlier chapters who used first principles in the face of their own denials. But only a spiritual, simple intellect can discover being and discern its laws. Since Kant's time, learned man has become habituated to the role of an observer, outside the events he is exploring and knowing them by transeunt rather than immanent action. The knower withdraws to a world of types or to instrument panel. He is like a cook, stirring the soup with a long-handled spoon that keeps her away from the heat. A brief glance at this method will not only show its inner deficiencies but renew the argument in favor of intellectualism.

Dewey's biological theory of cognition for example makes knowledge transeunt. In transeunt action, a cause is always altered by producing an effect since the two are outside one another; in this respect, an object, known transeuntly, is known by being altered. If an object is changed by being the agent of the knower's mental states, then in so far as it is known to one subject it remains unknown to another. This has crucial significance for Randall's rather typical opinion that the so-called scientific method affords a "public" test of truth or meaning or value. On the

contrary, it should be stated that when a fact or meaning is public, it has not been known by pure and rigorous empiriological methods since a fact, or aspect of it, known to one person would automatically be made unavailable to another. The private character of empiriological knowledge, taken in all its purity, should rather be stressed.

This may seem a minor point, perhaps even a quibble until its full and final scope unfolds. When the principle of knowing-by-altering, to use Marx's term, is enlarged through the whole empire of knowledge, to which scientism must extend it, a critical issue must be faced. How could being be known by such techniques? If it is altered by prehension or construction, or anything else, there is only one possibility: being must be changed to non-being, being must be annihilated, as existentialism argues. Scientism, which shows its contact with being by the use of being's principles, could never examine the presuppositions that it makes since, in the endeavor to study being, it would only study a void that it created by knowing. The widespread denial that being is real and meaningful is owed largely to the lack of empiriological resources to study it. To know it by the change produced through experimental control is to annihilate it; to go outside of it for external evidence is to go only to non-being.

In point of fact, being is not changed by our knowing it, or we would never know it all. As the argument against skepticism proved, as the principle of non-contradiction requires, and as experience attests, being is known, but it must somehow be acted upon by mind without being physically changed. In the second place, though something like a diffraction grid may alter the path of an electron, there is nothing outside of being by which to control and change it. It is simple and unmediated, unable to emanate particles of itself or emit waves like a tuning fork in acoustics; it must be known immediately and in its undivided self. Radiations, for instance, involve plurality both in their trajectory and in the distinction between rays and source. But being is one and immediate; it is intrinsic. It cannot be known by transeunt means. It must be known as the intrinsic, immediate undivided, and hence simple, reality which it is, or it is just not known at all. It must be known in itself since it does not have divisions—the divided parts would

be non-being—and so contact with any "part" of it is the knowledge of the whole.

If all this is true, the mind does not reach its object by remaining outside of it like the cook with her spoon. It gets into immediate, intrinsic contact with the thing known. It becomes the being which it knows as the nature of immediacy authorizes one to say. There is no physical wedge, no method, frame of reference, or experimental apparatus between mind and matter in the knowledge of being. There is a vital communion between them; the technical world is *intentional* action since the mind *tends into* its object rather than assaults it from the outside, like a physicist with a particle gun smashing atoms at a distance from his "trigger."

Though intentional action is characteristic of all knowledge, both animal and human, there is something about the contact with being which stamps the intellect as a spiritual, simple thing working far above the highest altitude which the senses attain. Being, it was seen, is a simple thing in the sense of standing undivided; once divided, the so-called parts would be nothing since there is only the non-being beyond being. So when being, a simplicity, is known, the tool that has delivered it to man must also be a simple thing. For it becomes the object and there, identified with it, it becomes its simplicity. Subject and object become as synonyms, and if one is simple, so likewise is the other. The senses know only the divided and the material; their objects must always be clothed in movement and its corresponding extensions; they form pictures rather than simple ideas.

Being is even higher than a universal and is called a transcendental, and the soul is even more than simple since it is spiritual. To know being means to know something about everything and even about the subject which is doing the knowing. From this viewpoint, it is obvious that the knower rises above space and time, beyond the dimensional and bounded character of all matter and the sense world. From this aspect too, since knowledge of self is included in knowledge of being—the self is a case of what is known—the subject can be said to reflect on his own reality; he turns back the clock in time and moves beyond the laws of space where one area never acts on itself but only in another which is outside of it. Bergson saw but exaggerated the vital character of

the mind and the necessity of an inward penetration of its object.

Being is. It is understandably and meaningfully so, and the knowing subject is a spiritual reality. Scientism, of course, would reject the foregoing analysis as mystical, supernatural, or untested "mentalism." Existentialism would make the intentional action into a physical one. But even the thinkers who deny all these facts and all these principles do the next best thing. They use them anyway.

TOWARD A TRULY ORGANIC PHILOSOPHY

Traditional philosophy would agree with existentialism in the general emphasis on directness in knowledge and would accord with scientism that knowledge also has a discursive aspect. Once first facts and first principles are apprehended, the mind can proceed by reasoning. When it uses the laws of being to test a reasoning process, the conclusion shares in their firmness and eternal truth. In fact, no argument is really convincing and metaphysically certain unless it can be directly reduced to the principle of non-contradiction.

But knowledge is not discursive only. If it knows anything, it must know its object as it is, in its own originality; it must know the thing in itself. As far as a thing is original, it has nothing in common with other things that could be used to clarify it; it is fatal, for example, to study what is originally and distinctively human by relating it only to what man has in common with the animals and is not original to him alone.

Knowledge knows intrinsically and immediately. The difficulty with scientism in its emphasis on discursive knowledge and with existentialism in its stress of the direct alone is what someone aptly has called a "nothing but" attitude. A thinker may see a little shaft of truth and then proclaim that the whole truth is "nothing but" this.

Man has only a dim and vague grasp of being, and that is why he must get to the deeper truths of ontology by reasoning his way. But that faint whisper which he catches is the voice of reality itself, and when he follows its ontological commands, he moves feebly onward to a knowledge of the "realest of beings," as Kant says, which is the Pure Being of God.

What we know by reasoning is always indirect, but if our contact with reality is radically and wholly indirect, we have no contact

with reality at all. Human knowledge is neither completely direct nor completely indirect. Under different aspects and hence not exclusively committed to either of these extreme modes, man partakes of both. The indirect knowledge of scientism could never gain a foothold in the real; and the radically direct knowledge which is sought in existentialism would sink its feet so deeply and physically into the world that they descend all the way to a bottomless abyss of nihilism.

But this respect for truth on both sides in the battle between the discursive and the direct must not be allowed to become eclectic. The two giant tides of modern thought cannot be assimilated by taking the water level which is their average. The organic synthesis of scientism and existentialism must really go higher than either of them and change their present originalities like food that has been digested. A living whole does not result by simply uniting its aspects into a mechanical heap. Being is one, and the approaches to it must be guarded by a constant emphasis on this unity. Where discursion occurs in knowledge, it does not get its meaning by taking an arbitrary and undecidable starting point but only by reference to that initial unity which the mind detects when it knows being and works by discursion to deepen and develop.

Existentialism on the other hand wants the beatific vision in this life, and when it cannot have it, it gives up in despair and disillusionment. "We're in hell." But genuine philosophy, while insisting on the unity between mind and matter and between the immediate and the mediate knowledge of reality does not take over bodily the broad truth in existentialism, setting it side by side with discursion. It redefines, as reality requires, the unity of knower and known which existentialism preaches; it shows the unity to be not physical but intentional, allowing the mind direct contact with the object without disturbing it and thus destroying its objectivity.

The unity of being, real in itself and realistically apprehended, can give rise to discursive reasoning and eventually to the reasoned conclusion that God exists. Man directly knows being but he knows *the* Being only indirectly. The highest of man's gifts, direct vision of this Being, is reserved for another life, but when man contemplates the things that God has made, knowing that they are His

thought and His will projected into time, he has an indirect knowledge of Him even now, as Le Senne glimpses.

Such a view gives life a significance; it respects the discursive and direct methods of the two main currents in contemporary thought, but, in uniting them, it goes to a different level of objects and of knowledge acts. Being leads to discursion and discursion leads to the cause of being, and moving back to the original finite being from knowing God gives the universe a new significance. The course of contemporary thought makes it an historical as well as philosophical truth that only a theocentric universe can be meaningful. Just as meaning was shown to require an ultimate meaning, so another direction of thought can show that if this Supreme Being does not exist, there is no being at all. The nihilism that results from atheistic premises is shown by the inner logic of existentialism. If there is any meaning, there is an ultimate one; if there is any being, there is a God.

Modern thought has been concerned almost exclusively with the problem of knowledge. It started with a doubt, it reaches maturity in the tremendous mechanical successes of scientism, and it moves toward its own suicide in the radical subjectivity of the existentialists. This chapter has discussed the problem of knowledge first in the plan of these two final chapters of constructive criticism. In this plan, the proper order of philosophy is being disobeyed. The critical questions of modern thought should be discussed in epistemology, which follows all the other branches including ontology and belongs in the science of metaphysics. It is the tendency of modern thought to discuss knowledge first, and that fact indeed has brought it crashing down in chaos.

Apart from more technical considerations, the reason for adjourning epistemology until other fields have been tilled is the simple fact that knowledge must have an object to think about, and in these other fields of philosophy, the study of this object is cultivated. If, as did Descartes and even more emphatically Kant, one inaugurates his philosophy by studying pure knowledge ("pure reason"), he arrives at a knowledge that is without content and hence not knowledge at all. If the possibilities and the limits of knowledge are explored before things are known, the philosopher ends by studying pure possibility without respect to the actual, and

pure limit without account of what is limited. What is actual and factual, what knowledge knows as its object, must be studied first, and epistemology becomes the science of reflecting upon knowledge's own relation to objects; in this way, the preceding departments of philosophy are verified by genuine reflective analysis.

Even psychologically considered, man knows an object before he knows knowledge and himself, and the postponement of epistemology until the object has been explored is but an adherence to this natural direction in the knowledge process itself. The order proposed by modern philosophy has made that philosophy an ever more apparent disorder. The decision so common to present-day philosophers to study knowledge before anything else never enables them to go logically beyond their own mental states, and any reference to a world becomes an artificial hypothesis. Man has lost confidence in his intelligence. He no longer even raises the big issues in philosophy. Existentialists, semanticists, Russell, Dewey, Whitehead, and anyone else who starts thinking with a preconceived method follow the Cartesian-Kantian order, and they wind up at an impasse. They tend to subjectivity and skepticism. They construct a morally neutral world. The eventual failure that stares at all such thinkers through the critical skepticism and the ontological nihilism that their doctrines suggest should, with no further argument, be a strong bias that they are taking the wrong road to reality. Why not accept the elements of common sense ontology which cannot be abandoned without skepticism, purify such truths, deepen them, extend them, and not only attain in this fashion to necessary truth but satisfy the ontological need of man which is stronger than Freudian drives and capable of standing Marx on his head by making man the determiner of the economic?

Genuine philosophy is not a static thing. It grows wherever and whenever truth is discovered, and in that ultimate that it reaches when it explores being, there is room for all other fact and all other correlations that man may empirically verify. It certainly recognizes that the so-called empiriological method has definite rights in the study of matter: to make life easier by engineering achievements and to discover new facts for interpretation by the philosopher of nature and eventually by the metaphysician. It only insists that this modern method remain in its own limits.

True philosophy welcomes "science" but protests when "science" becomes scientism.

Perennial philosophy grows not only by positive truth but by virtue of the error which it answers. Defending its own principles and developing their meaning to meet new challenges, it becomes ever more conscious of itself, living by the problems that it answers and by the questions that form its organic hunger and thirst. It profits by every new discovery which provides it with new analogies to express itself and to deepen its knowledge of the principles that no discovery could possibly change. It is unafraid of fact and fearful only where special methods conceived in advance, like those of scientism or existentialism, prevent the facts from speaking their full message. To let nature speak is one of its oldest policies. But contrary to the empiriological methods so popular in American philosophy, nature is at least bilingual. And her mother tongue is that of being.

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CHAPTER 16 THE UNIVERSE OF HIERARCHY

Modern man has come to believe that there is peculiar magic in equality. Descartes, a mathematician, set the realm of bodies off to itself by his dualism and defined matter by quantity alone, thus turning physics into a mathematical enterprise. Rousseau's *Social Contract* tended to view the authority of the state as equal to the sum of human wills that inhabit it. At the time of the French Revolution, the equality of all men became a political slogan. In the empiriological disciplines, perhaps the basic temper of so-called scientific method is the equivalence of action and reaction which Galileo and Newton proclaimed. In Communism, of course, equality reaches the economic level in the doctrine of equalitarianism.

As usual, there is a flavor of truth in all these doctrines. They are for the most part merely extreme versions of older ideas in western thought that have broken free of the setting where they were only parts and today run wildly through the whole of learning or life. But there is something much higher than equality, if only to serve as a standard by which things are rated equal. There is an inequality of level. There is an ascending scale of powers and purposes, of values and dignity, of actions and effects. There is in short a hierarchy of being.

The denial of this hierarchy has been a more or less common proposal in all of the philosophies which these pages have discussed. Communism obviously denies it in its concept of equalitarianism. The naturalists and logicalists, Whitehead by his ontological principle and Freud by his competing drives—all belong to scientism with its obedience to mathematics. The evolutionism in Bergson and in Santayana puts both of them into important agreement with their adversaries who exaggerate empiriological theories. The more

common variety of existentialist is too shackled into his subjectivity to reach the structure of the world outside. Who is to say, Sartre asks, whether a cat is nobler than a man? There is no standard scale outside of both to decide the issue.

There are several ways of verifying this hierarchy toward which modern man has become so prejudiced. When the metaphysician completes his story, he sees the world in the broad spectrum of potency and act, where one level is raised above the other by owning less of the first and more of the second. In another approach, metaphysics can scale the world according to the real distinction between essence and existence in which, as the stairway is mounted, existence is less and less limited by the essence that receives it. But without ascending all the way to the metaphysical order of abstraction, there is ample evidence that this is a hierarchical universe.

FROM TRANSEUNT TO IMMANENT ACTION

In the philosophy of nature, the distinction is drawn between immanent and transeunt action. Matter acts transeuntly since the effects on this mineral level always terminate outside the causes. For example, a billiard ball collides with another, causing it to move, and if the second one strikes a third, it again leaves its effect outside of it. Throw an electric switch on the wall of a room and the effect travels so far from the push button that it lights the bulb in the ceiling. The whole circuit in turn is powered by turbine generators miles away from the room.

But matter is not completely determined from outside itself, and though inertia is a very striking thing on the level of minerals, it is not quite the whole story. Since a material thing, taken globally is a being, then, to that extent, it has a minimum of the immediacy and intrinsicness which characterize all beings and set them positively apart from nothing. It has a measure of unity and originality, of stability and sufficiency; it is not divided; it *is*, from within. But despite the presence of being, the most salient feature of the mineral world remains transeunt action to which empiriological methods bear such illuminating witness. For instance, the most common type of movement at this level is local motion which is the change from one place to another outside of it. The general principle can be developed in this way that in the material world the subject and object of a given action are external to each other.

Searching upward through the plant world reveals the first dim reality of a remarkable new realm, that of immanence. This is a living world, and though there may be a technical question as to whether, in the formal sense of the word, it is strictly immanent in its action, it is certainly immanent in the wide sense; vegetable life has a capacity to act on itself (*sese movere*) and to rise above the transeunt extroversions beneath it. From the point of view of structure, this change from transeunce to immanence is, truly enough, hardly discernible, and structurally it looks as though minerals become plants by simply becoming more complicated.

But it is a capital mistake to look at this problem from the anatomical point of view. It is in physiology rather than anatomy, in motion rather than quantity, in function rather than structure, that the difference between the living and the lifeless becomes unmistakably clear. Plants, the biologists confirm, have three functions: nutrition, growth, and reproduction. None of these is a mechanical and transeunt activity, and each should be briefly discussed to show why.

Nutrition involves the ingestion, digestion, and assimilation of foods and the elimination of waste materials. Plants, for instance, feed on the salts and water of the soil and on the carbon dioxide which the animal world exhales. Nutrition involves the process of absorbing all such raw materials and transforming them within the organism until they become part of it.

Now during these digestive and assimilative phases, the plant's own powers are put to work, but by a somewhat astonishing contrast to the transeuncy of minerals, the worker and the product in vegetative action turn out to be the same thing. The subject and object of the action are the same. The effect terminates inside the very agent that is producing it. There is immanent action, the action of a thing on itself.

The animal world and man are vegetative, in addition to being higher than plants. They share in this power of nutrition which appears in the plant world, and their more apparent digestive systems bring out the meaning of immanence into even sharper focus. Man, for instance, has an alimentary canal, numerous internal organs that have access to it, and a blood stream to distribute the digested food to the various needy tissues throughout the body. In the alimentary canal, the food is broken down, but

since the organic agencies which pour out the dissolvents are all part of man who will assimilate the results of their remarkable biochemistry, producer and consumer are here the same thing. The agent that is man acts upon himself. If the liver is a storehouse of certain sugars, for example, this repository is the same human agent as its beneficiary.

Another index of immanence in man is his circulatory system. In the mineral world, coal is loaded on a train in Pennsylvania and hauled perhaps to a consumer in New York. But since the circulatory system is part of men, the distributor and the user are the same thing.

Even the homely example of locomotion is revealing. When man and animal move from place to place, they really move themselves, so that what is transported and what is doing the transporting become identified. A pilot flies an airplane different from himself. But when a bird flies, the pilot is the same as the plane.

Growth is also an immanent activity. It is promoted by forces within the agent, even though the raw materials must come from the outside. It is known, for example, that the presence of certain hormones in the body (the endocrine system), has a tremendous effect on growth; there are even so-called "skin hormones" which are especially notable when cells are injured and the "secretions" appear to grow new tissue. A living thing thus cultivates itself, as though by analogy the farmer were actually part of the corn he is hoeing.

The living thing has its own police force to guard it, rather than like minerals, looking transeuntly outside of it for any protection. The white corpuscles of the blood stream hasten to the wounded area to destroy the pathogenic organisms seeking admittance. Life medicates itself. It protects itself. It cultivates itself. When the non-directive approach to psychopathology discerns a principle of therapy (Chapter 7) within the patient, it accords with this reality of immanence as the definition of all life.

Finally, reproduction is an immanent activity at the vegetative level and inches up to suggest the higher realm which will appear as sensation of an external object in the animals. In reproduction, the agent acts upon itself to the extent of releasing part of its being. The resulting offspring is something new in the world and is distinct from the subject, making it seem at first sight as though

transeunt action alone were involved. But on closer inspection, the separated effect makes its appearance only because the cause has first acted immanently upon itself, even to the extent of giving a part of itself to something else, making the giver and the gift, in the original action, the same thing.

In general then, plants can boast of immanence, that action of a thing upon itself which is not transeunt and mineral but what Aquinas described as self-motion. Yet the plants in the universe attain to the matter of other beings without assimilating their forms. Vegetation is immanent only in efficient and not in formal causality. The food that is eaten loses its identity as food, while the matter remains under a new form, that of the living and digesting organism. The salt outside the body gives up its saltness when it enters the living composite, but the matter that had hitherto been existing under the form of salt now exists under the form of the organism that ingested it.

FROM PLANT TO ANIMAL

Animals have a higher degree of immanence than vegetables, so much so that they are not only capable of plant functions but also of sense knowledge and sense appetition.

Knowledge was depicted in the preceding chapter as the becoming of an object while the subject remains what it is. Both subject and object retain their identities and yet enter into a most intimate communion. In Aristotelian language, knowledge is the becoming of other as other. Plants, for instance, do become the food they eat, but they do not become it as other. It must yield its own form, its otherness, its individual identity, and so by digestion the plant becomes the object not as other but as itself.

In knowledge, however, this mutilation of the object is not possible. To the extent that a thing is known, it must be left undisturbed. Hence, the animals in their sensations, stretch above the lower life, which constantly destroys its object to take it unto itself. To the extent that a thing is altered, the thing remains unknown, and if knowledge always involved altering whatever it knows, nothing obviously could be known at all. This is another way of saying that there must be identity between subject and object without a change in either.

What is knowable in a thing is its form, not its matter. For

matter is essentially plural and may be looked upon as an infinity of potentiality or plurality. Knowledge is only possible where there is not plurality but unity, organization, form. Matter has nothing definite and determinate and unified and organized that knowledge can lay hold of. There is nothing in it that can be the direct object which knowledge must actually not disturb but become. It is form that is knowable, and if the animal knows, as it obviously does, it must somehow get a grasp of the world of form.

But the animal cannot disengage the form from the matter to which it is wedded. It does not have an immaterial soul that bears upon the unities and simplicities of our universe. The form known by animals is always immersed in matter. It is always known in matter and hence never known in itself. As plants cannot rise fully above the transeunt and own only a low grade of immanence, which still requires a gross contact with an object before the immanent principle can be sent in motion, so animals, though above the vegetative, do not attain to the peak of immanent action. They know a thing by relating it to themselves. They know a thing as food, drink, shelter, as the object of their reproductive instincts. They seek their object for its relation to themselves like a hungry dog in search of his bone. Form is thus related to matter in the object known or sought. It is related to the subject of knowledge. It is not related to itself, grasped in itself, sought for itself. This point will be clarified by contrast with intellectual action in the next section.

Sensation is a form of immanence, higher and more intense and more worthy to be called immanent than mere vegetative activity; but the point is that sensation rises above vegetation on a graduated scale that ensuing discussions will extend still higher. The analogy which puts plant and animal into a hierarchy can be brought home by reference to the intenser communion of cause and effect which sensation reveals. Thus, subject and object are united, they are within the same being at the vegetative level; in sensation they are identified. In the analogy of being cause and effect of its own actions, the animal reaches out to the world about it and, coming full circle, brings it back to itself. For the immanence of the animal is strong enough to allow it, at least in a material way, to be its own guide on the course of life by contrast to the blind and much more passive status of the plant. In addition to

being a producer and consumer all in one as the plant is, the animal is its own purchasing agent, surveying the markets for acceptable goods. A dog moves under its own power to seize an object or to flee it by contrast to the sessile fortunes of the rosebush. A brute feels pain which alerts it to danger, and pleasure that urges it on to fulfillment. It thus is equipped, at a layer deeper than the vegetable, to act on itself and to realize its goals. All such remarkable facilities trace back to the animal's ability to know. Knowing, it does not destroy its object. Did it do so, knowledge would be nothing but vegetative action where the plant must alter its object to take it in. Knowledge would be like digestion, and a toothache, for example, could be destroyed by thinking about it. Knowledge involves having the cake and eating it, letting things remain what they are and yet knowing them.

What does not pertain to the animal's destiny makes no impression on it. Its endowment of knowledge is spent only on objects affecting its life, showing that closed and somewhat self-sustaining system that is another way of regarding immanence.

FROM SENSATION TO INTELLECTION

At the summit of the material world stands man. Here knowledge enters into a new dimension which is the lack of all dimensionality. As the appetite of an intelligent being, will is no longer animal passion but human freedom.

Remembering that form is the knowable principle in material things, intelligence is the knowledge of form abstracted entirely from matter. Animals, it was seen, cannot disengage the form but know it only when matted in its material home. It is in man that abstraction becomes possible and real.

Like the animals, man does not find the form apart from matter, but unlike the animals, he has endowments to disengage it. By his agent intellect, he performs an abstraction to put his object into an intelligible status, and as one would suspect from the character of immanence, this tool for making matter intelligible is in the very same subject who will use the product.

In the preceding chapter, it was seen that man knows that is simple. He knows things in themselves. The animal can know objects only in relation to itself, as the subject, and sensation even in man makes such a reference to his own being. But by intel-

ligence, man knows things not in relation to him but in relation to themselves. This is another way of saying that man knows things as they are. He knows them in themselves. He knows the simple. For being has an intrinsic and immediate character and is opposed to non-being. Hence, if it is known at all, it must be known in relation to itself, known in itself, known intrinsically, known as the ultimate and immediate thing which it is. Being is known not related to a viewpoint outside of it but to its own. Being is known viewpointlessly. It is not approached through something outside of it since there is nothing outside of being. This inner penetration of being, studying it with respect to its opposite which is to say relating it to itself, is the true philosophy of objectivity. The public character of knowledge which is claimed by scientism can only be safeguarded through immanent, truly intelligent activity.

The knowledge of simplicities like being reveals the immanent character of intelligence. The intellectual principle is immaterial, so immanent that it has no parts, so drawn in upon itself that it can know without reference to other things that lie outside its object and reveal the object only in its external relations. An immaterial and hence spiritual thing is the highest type of immanence since there are no parts in it, and any action performed by it shows in a striking way an identity of subject and object.

Besides knowing being intrinsically and thus displaying an immanent immateriality, the intellect can bend back upon its own actions to know itself by reflection. The cause and effect are in the same being.

Unusual evidence for the spirituality of man's soul can be found paradoxically enough in the very modern attitude that has led to its denial, the philosophy of doubt. The last chapter mentioned the logical structure of doubt as a tempting subject for phenomenology to examine. Here the psychological aspect of doubt deserves mention. For man is the only animal who can doubt, and doubt certainly involves the weighing of alternatives and thus the piercing (abstraction) to their common element which makes both refer to the same problem, the same object, the same system. In doubt, man shows that he is not restricted to his own form, nor does he change the forms of what he knows and considers. He has two alternatives before him at the same time, as if he were bilocating them. He does not lose sight of one alternative when he is consider-

ing the other. He makes a doubling as the word doubt might suggest; he makes a reflection. He goes above the individual dimensions of each alternative to common issues and moves back and forth between them as though he had stopped the clock which would tick these alternatives past him instead of allowing them, as it does, to remain stably above time and space until examined and compared and decided.

Doubt is a telltale example of Aristotle's statement that the knower has his own form and the forms of other things. In doubt, the knower has not only one other form but at least two since there are alternatives, and he has the two other forms at the same time. He has gone above the alternatives toward their common reference to the solution of his problem. He has gone eventually to being and its prime principle of identity and difference.

The reflective power of intelligence is a sign of man's self-possession. He not only nourishes himself, sensibly guides himself; he possesses himself as well. Doubt again reinforces this analysis. In doubt, there is a holding back, a hesitation as Whitehead and Bergson say, a certain introversion, in brief a self-possession which is not propelled outward like matter but reserved in the man himself. The doubting attitude of modern man is unquestionably more a matter of will than of reason.

Self-possession opens up the question of will, and here a whole storehouse of evidence supports the claims for immanence and for the intense degree of it that appears in man. Freedom is not only self-motion, like vegetative life. It is self-determination. Man is not only his own sensible guide. He is his own master. Aquinas frequently spoke of freedom as a "cause of self"—*causa sui*. The will not only wills objects. In the so-called freedom of exercise, it wills itself. It can will to act or not to act, to will or not to will.

From the viewpoint of the object, human will ranks almost with intelligence in its natural achievements. It gets to what is intrinsic in things, able to will not only what relates to man and is good for him but what relates to itself and is intrinsically good. It can command actions because they are essentially good, and it can love another person not for selfish reasons but because this person is good in himself. It can will God's will and move toward Him by its actions. It works in a world where things are related to themselves.

From here on, the hierarchy can ascend still further, through the angels and to God Himself, who is the apex of all immanence and simplicity. Aristotle described God as "the thought of a thought." St. Thomas concludes of Him that He is Subsistent Being, so immanent that He is perfectly self-sufficient and needs no extrinsic agent to sustain Him. As man knows without altering himself, so God can create without changing His nature. This immutability of divine immanence is a point missed by Whitehead in his organic philosophy. God is Intelligence, He is Love, He is Life, in a word, He is Immanence.

HIERARCHY VERSUS EQUALITY

All of the foregoing remarks on the material universe show it up in a quite different way from the picture which is made of it by philosophies of equality. On the lowest rung is mineral being which, as a being, has a minimum of intrinsicness but, as a mineral, is dominated by transeunce. In plants, this intrinsicness is intensified, becoming immanent, and, in animals, sensation reveals even a higher-grade organism, to use Whitehead's term: the animal is so immanent that in the material sense it can guide itself to its goals. Finally, the highest level of intrinsicness is the life that is called intelligence; here the immanence reaches to self-knowledge and self-determination. All of these four grades of being are intrinsic, and the more and more intrinsic the higher the grade and the more the being. The plant, animal, and man are all living. They differ in degree of life, in the modality or intensity by which being is realized in each of them.

If all this is true, it is a most serious error to presume that the knowable universe can be exhausted by empiriological method with its mathematical equations and its equality of action and reaction. Plants, animals, and man cannot be fully understood by dissecting them chemophysically, and even in the mineral world, the intrinsicness of being which is a kind of shadow of the immanence on higher levels, cannot be grasped by attending only to its transeunt activities.

Even within beings, there is not an equalitarianism but a hierarchical structure between say, form and matter, substance and accident, cause and effect, nutrition which is the lowest form of plant action, and reproduction which is the highest. There is

a hierarchy among the mineral, vegetative, sensory, and the rational aspects of man.

In the preceding ladder of being, one rung always subsumed its predecessor. For instance, the inorganic appeared in the vegetative and both are included in sense life. Finally, man embodies the mineral, vegetative, and sensory levels of the lower world and crowns them with rationality. The levels, however, are not mechanically united like the blocks in inlaid linoleum. Each being at any step in the hierarchy has a unity of its own, and its lower aspects are identified only in the service of its higher ones.

There is thus a scaffold of true hierarchy, with an element of sameness running all through it and an element of difference on every step. It is only to be a realist to note this hierarchy and to study it as such. Scientism can never get at the intrinsicness in things, and existentialism can never see their transeunce. A hierarchy cannot be studied by being leveled into a mathematics of equality-signs nor, like the existentialists, by viewing all reality from the singleness of subjectivity. Realism includes the truths in extremes without taking the extremisms. There is something in reality corresponding to the ambitions of both scientism and existentialism when they are set in their proper context.

But taken alone, scientism and existentialism are each inadequate to account for the real. Scientism has only width, and existentialism would have only depth. It takes a third dimension in thought to do justice to experience, and at this higher level of genuine philosophy, each being is said to be intrinsic, while yet permitting graduations throughout the cosmos. Defending the intellect as immanent, vital, and spiritual, a realistic philosophy detects that hierarchy.

There is unity in the universe since all of the beings in it are alike in their possession of an intrinsic character. There is variety in the world, different grades or intensities of this intrinsicness. Such a world is organized in itself, and by following the outlines of the hierarchy, a realistic philosophy detects that organization by what is science in the best sense of that word. The universe is intelligible, meaningful, full of purpose and of principle, stable but progressive, inspiring of confidence, responsive to man, indicative of God.

The big thing that it is not is equalitarian. To reduce life to the status of mathematics is to kill it. To equate the intrinsicness

of a being to something else is to hold that this being is not really intrinsic and original but externalizes its whole reality in the factors on the other side of the equation. The physicomathematical approach of modern scholarship makes exteriority out of the intrinsic and a cadaver from what is alive.

THE STRICTURES ON EVOLUTIONISM

In the light of the foregoing analysis, evolution may now be discussed. It was a frequent intruder, especially in Part II of this study and is widely accepted as a settled fact in modern scholarship.

Evolutionism stands in the lineage of equalitarianism. It endeavors to show that high-grade entities are not really loftier in rank but simply lower-grade realities in more complicated form. It thus equates the higher to the lower.

It is a frequent and airtight argument that even if evolution has occurred, it required God to originate it, to direct it along its trajectory and to create the human soul which, as a spiritual thing, could not emerge from the potentialities of matter. This is all true and incontrovertible.

But one may go much further. It can be shown that naturally plants could not originate from the mineral nor could animals take their rise from plants. Before such a project is undertaken, however, it is important to mention the empiriological approach to the problem of biological evolution.

Paleontology has unearthed the fragmentary remains of extinct forms of life which it more than often builds into the status of historical links between the various species of life now extant. Though the evidence here is often paltry, and though the number of extinct forms thus excavated is often short of the statistical average one would expect if evolution were very widespread and really true, the conclusion is drawn that the differences from mineral, to plant, to animal, and to man have not been abrupt but gradual ascents that took millennia to complete themselves. Various skulls of early man have slightly different contours from that of contemporary man, and this too has often been marshaled as evidence that man reached his present form only gradually and after a slow rise upward from the animal world.

Another source of evidence is homology, the similarity of structure in living things. Man's body has organs like those of lower life.

Animals have cells very much like those of plants, and both types have a protoplasmic constitution that can be chemically analyzed. Wings are supposed to be appendages that later became hands, and mouths presumably are foreshadowed by the structure (pseudopodium) which certain one-celled organisms extrude to ingest their food. It is still an argument in many quarters that the way in which the human embryo develops from an original one-celled state into distinctively human form is a miniature reproduction of the larger lines of evolution which preceded the appearance of man.

Such in a general but significant fashion is the story told by the empiriological method about the descent of man.

As an initial evaluation of its worth, it may simply be remarked that evolution is and must always be a misty theory. No one now living saw this evolutionary process going on, if indeed it ever occurred, and, looking backward, logic forbids the conclusion that because *A* follows *B* in time *B* therefore is the cause of *A*. The case for evolution rests on the principle of causality as Hume and not realism defines it. It is rather obvious that night follows day, but no one puts a causal connection between them. Irish grandmothers used to have a belief that if a bird alighted on the window sill, a death would shortly follow in the household, and perhaps this sequence was observed in a number of cases where a bird appeared and a death ensued. Hume's doctrine could not protect itself against admitting this bird-death sequence to be a causal one. Hume should be an encouragement to superstition.

To say that when *A* follows *B* recurrently, *B* is, therefore, the cause of *A* is called the fallacy of false cause (*post hoc ergo propter hoc*).

Besides this difficulty in the logic of evolutionism, Weismann showed that the body (somatic) cells of higher-grade organisms are virtually isolated from the germ cells and that therefore acquired characteristics cannot be hereditary. Further, natural mutations observed in experience are of a recessive character and tend to die out. At any rate, the ardent proponents of evolution have not shown sufficient respect for the arguments drawn from Weismann against Darwin.

All of this reasoning would leave evolution at most in the realm of possibility and never in the area of settled fact. But philosophy has something very positive to say about this question, and in

the light of the hierarchy of the universe the shadow of a wholesale biological evolution has no place.

The mineral, it was seen acts transeuntly. Though having an intrinsic character as a being, a purely material thing is directed outside of itself in its activity, as if its physical destinies lie wholly beyond its own boundaries. These transeunt tendencies of matter are sharply reversed at the level of life. Here there is a complete difference of direction, the tendency of matter being toward the outside and the tendency of life toward the inside of the given agent. To ask the mineral to become a plant is like expecting to make food hotter through increasing its refrigeration or to travel on the left lane of a highway by merely driving straight on the right one.

The difference between the inorganic and the organic is a basic opposition of direction, and one cannot arrive at the second by continuing the line of movement in the first. There is a difference of principle. Matter spends and life conserves, and one does not become a miser by continuing to be a spendthrift.

Lower entities cannot account for the higher which they do not have sufficient reason to produce. Man, because of his high tier in the hierarchy, can reverse himself. As the broader meaning of Freud would indicate, man can go back and start over. He is so immanent that he sees all being and can act at his will within that empire because there is being everywhere and whatever he does will not violate being's laws. But the mineral has no such infinity of vision and no such self-determination of its energies. It is limited, unidirectional, irrevocable in what it does and hence unable to reverse itself. It is transeunt, and transeunt action, no matter how much it is multiplied, can no more yield immanence than climbing to the top of the Empire State Building can eventually put one in the basement. The repair bill will be great for a driver who thinks that he can throw his car into even higher gear on the highway by shifting it into reverse.

The reversal of movement that makes the transition from minerals to plants an abrupt rather than a gradual one turns up again in crossing the frontier between the plant and the animal. Vegetables destroy their objects when they act on them, but an animal, when it knows and seeks on the sensitive level, must leave its object whole. Knowledge would change its object if it

were only a vegetative activity, and hence the dog when it desires the bone being brought to it would no longer be seeking what it saw; seeking the bone the dog would destroy it so that it would no longer be available to eat.

Between plant and animal, there is a reversal of direction, as though with each grade of being one turned a hundred and eighty degrees on a landing in the hierarchical stairway. By simply complicating the process of destroying the object, as plants do, it is impossible to be working toward the preservation of the object, undestroyed and intact. In that case, the best way to keep a balloon from deflating would be by puncturing it.

The animal preserves its object of knowledge and of desire, and in this respect, as plants are more conservative than minerals, animals are even more conservative than plants. Animals can conserve their object and themselves despite a relation between them. They guide themselves to their destinies in a material way. If, however, they are only high-grade plants, their sight is a summation of blindnesses.

Knowledge becomes its object as other. A plant does not. If the principle of the excluded middle holds, then there is no missing link between becoming something as other and not becoming it as other. The difference is absolute. An animal, compared to a plant, embodies a new and differently directed principle, and if it is new and opposite to the plant's tendencies, it is not just a protraction of the old and of the same. Such an erroneous view would violate the principles of sufficient reason, of causality, of non-contradiction. It would make opposites the same thing.

Animals could not have evolved from plants obeying their own natures, and if that is so, they could not have come naturally from plants. When they appeared in the world, then, there was a special extra-mundane intervention.

Last of all comes man. His departure from even the highest reaches of the world below him has been previously underscored, and there is no need to develop the point much further. His soul, being spiritual, acts independently of matter, and thus could not have evolved from the potencies of matter. His immanence extends to the point of knowing being as being, to self-knowledge which is called reflection, and to freedom which is defined as self-determination.

Another and new reversal or movement appears when objects, known by animals only in relation to the knower, are now known in themselves. The lines joining the object to the subject have been cut in the sense that the object is now joined, when known, to itself. But lines are not cut by being prolonged, they are not lengthened by being shortened.

The autodetermination of will is likewise far above the animal appetite and operating on a wholly different principle. The animals are compelled by their environment, but man determines his own self. There is another cut, an opposition of direction whence determination arises; there is not just a continuation of old tendencies but a new principle. Evolution can account for neither intelligence nor will. A special creative act of God is necessary to produce them.

The differences between the empiriological and philosophical approaches to the problem of evolution must be carefully noted. The empiriological picture is based almost solely on anatomical structure, whereas the philosopher is interested in life as a form of motion. With all deference to the importance of structure and to the mechanical advances which have been made by exploiting it in engineering and in medicine, the evidence of motion is of higher rank in revealing what things are.

Material being exists for its motion. It is by its motions that we know it, and it is its motions that the philosopher of nature is pressed to explain. His philosophy is inadequate if it ends its account in a recourse to structure which is static, so much so that static mathematical forms become his only language. Motion is higher than structure and more versatile. The same motion can appear in different sets of structures. Using the eye in one case, nature can give to men the impression of motion that, if he is blind, he can still get by by the sense of touch. It is the same motion achieved by two different structures. When fats are lacking in the body, nature will synthesize them from her stored sugars, using different structures—fats or sugars—for the same motion and end.

Structure is thus coerced into realizing that higher motion of a living body that was defined as immanent activity. In itself, it is much less versatile, and when the basic structures of the body, say the elements and compounds, appear outside of it,

they do not respond as pliably to stimulation as when, being "parts" of an organism, they are forced to defer to its immanence. Comparative anatomy is emphasized in medical schools and in biology books, to the frequent neglect of the much more philosophically revealing study of physiology. One cannot add static structures and get an idea of motion, but from motion it is certainly possible to understand the static. In the very definition of motion is the hierarchical pair of potency and act, with act as the stable unity in the process and, in the last analysis, a synonym for being.

Motion enjoys a priority both in nature and in knowledge over structure, and the account of things that derives from considering it can decide the issue between the empiriological and philosophical approaches to evolution and to many other topics. Such a decision would and should refrain from disputing the data of empiriological disciplines; the sole challenge must be directed to the philosophical interpretation of the empiriological researcher who often neglects the larger principles that give meaning to his discoveries. Genuine philosophy does not deny, for example, the findings of comparative anatomy; it only insists that such facts when judged philosophically be viewed in the light of that higher standard for judging which is based on motion.

When the structures of man are described simply as continuances of what exists below him in the world and when life is regarded as simply a more complicated form of minerals, it must be stoutly argued that reversals of movement are not obtained by simply complicating and continuing movements in the same direction. How a thing looks under a microscope does not determine its status in being. All that glitters is not gold. Looks and measurement are the only tools of the strict empiriological method to carve out its version of the universe. Such a method, however, cannot tell what material things are, for this story is told by motion, that forgotten aspect of our universe that was cast out of philosophy the day that Descartes decided to study matter not as mobile but as mathematical and quantitative alone.

The scale of being in the world is not an affair of complicating the same unidirectional forces. There are ruptures and reversals in the scale. What structural homologies there may be are nature

working out variety of purpose by instruments that look alike. The differences in modes of motion among things that in many respects are similar in structure only proves that chemistry and physics do not account for the variety that differentiates all things, for the intrinsicness that makes them original, and for the immanence that makes the living alive.

Without unity, there would be no being and without variety no universe. The lower could not serve the higher if it could not be subsumed, like the chemicals in the grass of the grazing cattle. If man, in addition to being rational, did not have structures similar to those of lower life, he would not have the vegetative and sensory aspects that genuine philosophy has found in him. A philosophy of hierarchy would expect the homologies that empiriological methods describe. But structure is not the story of the universe. Motions are more striking, more perfecting, and more revealing.

EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT

Evolution is taken for granted by the majority of the thinkers which the preceding chapters portrayed, and there is no doubt that the philosophical assessing of its value is of extremely urgent importance. This brief outline of counterargument does not require a stand on whether evolution has occurred or not but only that if it did it was not blind or complete. It only holds that acting according to their own natures, minerals could not produce plants, nor plants animals, nor animals man, and that if the natures of the lower levels preclude their production of the higher ones, there were at least four major extra-mundane interventions: one at the mineral beginning and one for each of the grades of life culminating with the creation of man's soul. Between these nodal points and within the various realms of material being, evolution might have occurred; there is certainly no ontological necessity which would prevent, for example, the crossover from aquatic to amphibious life among the animals. Philosophically speaking, such transitions do seem possible, but there is not enough data for a sure decision in any way. So long as evolution must be explored post-factum, it is difficult to see how certain

data could be assembled ages and ages after the process went on and now studied no longer as a process but as a series of static fossils.

Within the plant and animal kingdoms, or species, as the philosopher says, evolution can never be more than a theory, more or less probable in degree but never capable of being a certain premise to which a whole philosophy—like naturalism, behaviorism, Freudianism, or Marxism—ought safely to entrust its foundations. Limited evolution there certainly can be. But it is not blind; it is not absolute; it is not radical. It cannot naturally bridge the gap from mineral to plant or from plant to animal.

There are, however, two objections, not of course posed by naturalistic evolutionism but certainly a challenge to an Aristotelian studying motion's causes:

1) Could evolution from mineral to plant to animal be explained by an appeal not to individual causes but to the causality in the universe as a whole, where material things are not merely particular but parts of the cosmos, working toward its universal ends and charged with a universal causality to carry on this work?

2) Since prime matter is potential to all forms—including plant and animal souls—it would not seem unnatural for evolution in the material world on a very much wider scale than the foregoing argument allowed.

Regarding the first difficulty, the point being made in these pages is that material beings acting according to their own natures could not engender a realm of being higher than themselves. Before animals appeared, our world was inhabited, on evolutionary premises, by nothing higher than plants. Neither individually nor in the universe as a whole was there anywhere even a speck of being loftier than vegetation; all the causes then in the universe, individually or collectively, could not conspire of their own natures to produce a single animal, greater than a plant and greater even than all plants put together. An extra-mundane agency, either God or what Aristotle called a separated mover, was necessary if plants could not vegetate their way into a synonym for sensation. The same logic applies in going from mineral to plant (and of course in the case of man's spiritual soul, creation was absolutely necessary). The higher cannot be generated naturally from the lower, acting naturally and under its own steam.

Regarding the second objection, it is true that all the forms of visible creatures below man can be educed from the pure potency of prime matter, but whether this or that eduction is possible in the course of nature, whether in technical language such and such an eduction is naturally possible (as opposed to being essentially or metaphysically so) — this is another question.

The argument of the present is that the evolution from mineral to plant to animal is naturally impossible and that the lower, acting of its native power and within the order of nature, cannot naturally produce the higher. For though all material forms are in the potency of matter, the one actually educed by an efficient cause depends upon the proportion of such a cause to its effects. The form actually educed depends proximately on the efficient cause and ultimately on the final one. Before plants appeared, evolutionism would posit only mineral matter, and to allow that vegetation arose naturally from it would be tantamount to saying that plant forms were educed or evolved spontaneously since there were no movers or raw materials to be moved save mineral matter behaving in mineral ways.

In other words, natures tend to produce what is like themselves. Though they may be instruments of a higher causality, they are naturally determined to effects within their own proportions, and acting naturally, they cannot transcend their own limits or determinations, reversing their course of motion by simply prolonging it. They do not generate higher species by a type of movement which is naturally lower. To bring forth a plant form from prime matter requires more causality than can be marshalled by all the minerals in the world, and the same is true in going from plant to animal. Higher effects are not the sums of lower causalities.

To summarize, a cause not proportioned to the effects to be explained could not explain them and thus would not be their cause. Some other causality is necessary. By multiplying plant activity, we get only plant activity in the end, and the same is true for the action of minerals. Addition is necessary to explain the differences of grade in our universe, and that makes blind or radical or complete or unqualified evolution impossible. Evolutionism is no excuse to dispense with God or to make man naturally a fellow mineral that time has complicated but not essentially changed.

Evolutionism errs as much by seeking man's story in the past

as Heidegger does by looking only to the future for his meaning. Once again there are extremes, and if Kierkegaard were alive, he would be caustically challenging both of them for neglecting the present and the individual. Genuine philosophy unites all three ambitions by reaching principles that are necessary and timeless, applicable to the past and to the future while charging our present life with meaning and value.

Heidegger's emphasis on the future was anticipated by Bergson who, however, used man's power of prospection as evidence of the vital character of mind and its break with the narrowness of mere matter. Le Senne and Lavelle are also impressed with the arguments for man's spiritual nature that can be drawn from his power to look ahead toward a world that is not yet real.

There is something very striking about all these views, and one wonders whether our knowledge of the future, if it is not as full, is at least on a higher plane than speculation built up from the past. For science must be causal knowledge, and the fallacy of false causes forbids the conclusion that a temporal sequence in the past has been a causal one. But looking out toward the future, man sees the unrealized world through the principle of the order in nature. He knows, for instance, that so many atoms of uranium will decay in a certain time to so many atoms of lead. Now is the principle of order retroactive, so that finding so much lead beside so much uranium man can hold that all of the lead came from uranium and estimate the age of the world? Production in time implies order and yields a basis for predicting the future, but does order always imply production in time and represent the causalities of the past? The point bears further study and is mentioned here if not to give us principle at least to give us pause in reflecting on evolution. As a matter of pertinent fact, the larger views inspired by the empiriological method do pretend to know more about the world's future than about its past, and thus the law of entropy, that the universe is running down, does not agree with the evolutionary faith that it is winding up.

Even ordinary men sometimes go to extremes regarding the timetable of their lives. As Bernanos brings out, some are always looking backward to "the good old days," while others look only toward a "brave new world." One class looks to paradise and the

other to utopia, and neither makes capital of the present. For the present must be lived, and to assign it meaning by the past or future alone is to rob it of intrinsic meaning and strip man of his inner dignity and personal value. Kierkegaard was right in calling Hegel back to the present, and a similar challenge should be issued to all those thinkers, from Marx to Dewey, who account for the world and man by a blind and naturalistic evolutionism.

In view of what has been said, wisdom should reserve a truly scientific judgment on whether there was an evolution within the two lower realms of life, while insisting that in any case the frontier between mineral and plant, plant and animal, and animal and man cannot be crossed by lower natures acting in their natural ways. If evolution occurred, it was sharply limited in scope.

But such a healthy reservation of opinion has not been practiced in contemporary thought. Instead of adhering to known principles and present evidence, a vast number of our present-day thinkers prefer to retreat into the misty atmosphere of the past, where they are fairly free to construct their principles and no witnesses of the period survive to question them. Faced with the difficulties that the present should produce its own statistical samples of evolution if their doctrines are as certain as they claim, evolutionists often take refuge in the age of the world, which a study of radioactive deposits puts at between 1500 and 1800 million years. Granted that evolution has not been observed in present-day nature, the philosopher is told, but given enough time, anything can happen and the world is old enough to make out a case for evolution on statistics alone. But time cannot solve this problem. Time does not have a gambling instinct. For it is not a genuine cause, the thrower of dice that evolutionism often would make of it. What is impossible by nature is impossible in time, however long. It is easier to use time as a refuge than to grapple with present evidence that it would be embarrassing perhaps to explain.

Remove the theory that nature is in wholesale evolution, and a great deal of contemporary thought is left unsupported and demolished. Without its evolutionism, Hegelian and Darwinian alike, Marxism would perish. Naturalism also requires evolutionism as its floor. Without evolution, there would be no philosophies

like those of Whitehead, Bergson, and Freud. Reflexology, like that proposed by Morris, would be in the same graveyard with Democritus. Learned minds could no longer take comfort in the theory that chance has accounted for the origins of man and does not hold him responsible.

Kurt Goldstein, whose work was cited in evaluating semantical behaviorism, has proposed that modern psychobiology—and the real undercover agent is evolutionism—has transformed the order in which we study living things and has thus perverted the natural direction of knowledge. Behaviorism, for instance, studies sensation and emotion in rats and then attempts to transfer its conclusions to the human plane, claiming thus to gain an understanding of man.

But the deeper insights into things are obtained differently. If man did not know sensation and emotion from within himself, he could not understand the observed behavior in animals. Their sight of food, their writhing in pain, their sleeping, and their scratching would be nothing but geometry if known only through measure and observation, Goldstein intimates. It is because of pain felt within ourselves that we really know pain's reality, and this we project into the animal when we see it writhing and groaning in the same fashion that we use to indicate the presence of pain. The dog's use of his eyes would be utterly unknown as a sense of sight unless we first knew sensations from within ourselves and projected such knowledge into the animal when we note it acting in a way similar to our own experience of seeing. The contortions of a dog in pain would be so much geometry, like the crinkling of paper, unless man first knows what pain means from his personal experience.

Goldstein's ideas reverse the order embedded in evolutionary biology, and rather than work upward from the lower to the higher, we are urged to study the higher first and enrich our knowledge of the lower by working downward. There is danger always in emphasizing subjectivity as the starting point in knowledge, and existentialism should never allow future philosophy to forget that lesson. Besides, the preceding discussions, in the last chapter and in this, reveal man as unconstrained to study the higher by relating it to the lower or vice versa. He knows things as they are. He relates things to themselves. He knows,

at least generally, what an animal and plant are (metaphysical universal) before he starts comparing them and uses this knowledge to initiate the comparison (logical universal). But it would certainly be agreed with Goldstein that knowledge of ourselves reinforces and enlarges the knowledge of objectivities. At any rate, it is certain that we do not learn about man by simply studying rats in mazes; we do not study animals by concentrating only on plants; and we do not learn about life by confining ourselves entirely inside the boundaries of physics and chemistry with the static and structural formalism that mathematics decrees. Existentialism has carried this view to its limit by attempting to study being in terms of non-being.

It is the great merit of Marcel and of Lavelle to have found man at home in the universe. Scientism, from Dewey to Marx, sees him battling against a hostile environment. In general, modern thought that set out in the Renaissance to exalt man's stature has ended its efforts by dwarfing him. He is often portrayed as a tiny speck in a universe billions of miles in diameter and tossing him up from a cosmic sea after billions of years of evolution. This sort of logic is sometimes supposed to say that the human race is, after all, an insignificant thing and that the individual is even tinier; thus man is enjoined to be humble and to recognize his own unimportance.

If time and space are the judges, all of this logic is correct, and if the empiriological method is the tool for examining all things meaningfully, the meaning of man is surely destroyed. But all the cosmic epochs that allegedly preceded man's arrival and all of the astronomical abysses that stretch out beyond him, could never produce in combination even the simplest of thoughts or a spark of freedom. Even society does not think or will. If individual men are not at the cosmographical midpoint of the universe, they remain at its center in regard to meaning; so centralized are they that they can take all of it in and bend back upon their own thoughts and wills besides.

Moreover, an argument exactly opposite to secularism's could be drawn from the size and age of the universe. If a colossal system is supporting the earth and, in the Providence of God, the arrival of man was preceded by a tremendous past, man should be made aware not of his littleness but of his size, stature, and

importance. If so much time and space have gone into the preparation for human life, there is all the more reason to exalt it. This is exactly opposite to the secular argument and is even sounder. Humility is not a matter of geometry but of seeing things as they are, and man is as great in himself as he depends on the world in their joint contingency on divine wisdom and divine will.

This is not an equalitarian universe. It is a universe of hierarchy, where every being has an intrinsic character that cannot be equated to things outside of it and cannot be regarded as the mere sum of extrinsic forces. With life, this interiority becomes immanence, rising to a still further peak in sensation and finally attaining to intelligence which is the highest type of vital activity. Because material being is not completely immanent to itself, like God, there is room for empiriological methods in this hierarchy, and because human intelligence has a spiritual degree of immanence, there is copious space for all of the truths that inspire existentialism in its broad urge to reflection and self-possession. Man is not the sum of outside and past evolutionary forces, but neither is he so unique that he makes no references to the outside and finds himself a complete stranger in his universe.

Genuine philosophy gives a meaningful picture of the universe by pointing to its hierarchical frame. Everything that exists is in some way ultimate since it is itself and since there is nothing exactly like it anywhere else. But everything in the universe points beyond itself. Our world is always progressing, always open, always, in Whitehead's word, suggesting an organism by its inner movement yet directive balance. And it leads at last to the summit of the hierarchy who is God.

Philosophy would surrender its birthrights if it did not come upon the ultimates, while explaining in the same breath how anything less than the Divine Ultimate can possibly be. No being could exist unless in some way it reflected God's own Being, and it is the great merit of Lavelle to have underscored this principle. Whatever perfections are imperfectly realized in the finite are perfectly realized in God. The beings of the world are a divine alphabet, and the growth in our knowledge of beings brings us so much closer to knowing God.

Such is the high vocation of philosophy. Dewey would condemn

it as a spectator theory of truth. He proposes, as a substitute, a philosophy that does work by fostering the socio-cultural adjustments of man to this world. But however appealing such a proposal might seem, taken in itself it could never satisfy a spiritual soul, gifted to know being and seek its causes, and equipped by nature to relate things to themselves, hence to contemplate them. Truly man has that ontological need of which Marcel speaks, and it cannot go unsatisfied with impunity. However attractive it may be at times to live for material ease and by an emphasis on sense knowledge and animal delight, such a pattern runs counter to human nature, and that nature somehow and somewhere will gain its Dionysan revenge.

Genuine philosophy is the only account mentioned in these pages that can justify the ultimates on rational grounds. It both defends man's ontological need and takes measures to fulfill it. In its profound message, there is the perennial optimism that the tides of contemporary secularism are just a passing flood and will not touch the mountains in the hierarchy of knowledge. Such peaks will be forever available to the rational animal when he looks for them.

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