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MODERN EUROPE

1789-1914



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TORONTO

MODERN EUROPE

1789[•]—1914

BY

SYDNEY HERBERT

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1916

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TO
MY WIFE

PREFACE

THE object of this book is to describe the main lines of development pursued in European politics since the beginning of the French Revolution in 1789. To do this on a really adequate scale would require a work of immensely greater dimensions, and I have attempted no more than an introductory sketch. One result of the Great War has been that a very large number of people is seeking, for the first time, seriously to understand what are called "foreign affairs," the relations in which England stands to other States, and the causes which have helped to produce the present world-convulsion. It is a commonplace that the causes which bring states to hostility or friendship can only be understood when something is known of their respective histories, of the manner of their growth, and of the forces which have conditioned that growth. I have tried, therefore, to produce a book which will assist such students as I have described to gain a foundation of knowledge upon which they can build by further studies.

The modesty of my purpose has conditioned the method pursued in writing the book. I have consistently endeavoured to show how the internal histories of the European States have affected their external relations, and how these in turn have influenced domestic development. The method of dealing with the history of each nation separately and continuously has many advantages, but these were

outweighed in my mind by the desire to describe the forces moulding Europe as a whole. Desire, I fear, has certainly outrun performance; I can only say that I have spared no pains to make my narrative intelligible and accurate.

The last two chapters, dealing, as they do, with diplomatic history since the Treaty of Berlin, are outlines only. So many of the events which have occurred since that date are still shrouded in mystery that it would have been dangerous for me to have attempted more. There is so much that we do not know—the inner history of the Franco-Russian Alliance, the degree and extent to which German diplomacy was responsible for the Greco-Turkish War, the real origins of the Balkan League. Much secret history has been revealed since August 1914, but the whole truth about these, and many other matters, is hardly likely to be known to our generation.

I desire to acknowledge my indebtedness to my friend, Mr. A. E. Zimmern, who has read the whole work in manuscript, and to Lieut. Cyril Burton, who gave me many valuable suggestions for the first book. Their kindness has been of the greatest possible assistance to me. I cannot forbear also to express my gratitude for the sympathetic encouragement I have received from my publishers.

S. H.

September 1915.

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BOOK I

CHAPTER I

EUROPE AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

A GREAT French historian has said : “ In the history of ancient societies, epochs are more conveniently marked by the succession of ideas and of institutions than by that of years.”¹ This holds good not merely of ancient, but of all history. There are epochs, that, for example, which we call the Reformation, which cut across reigns and centuries, but are dominated by certain religious or political conceptions, and particular events have meaning and importance in the degree to which they bear witness to the essential unity of the epoch.

Such an epoch opened in Europe with the French Revolution. That event set in motion forces which, in less than a century, remodelled Europe, and are potent for good and evil to this day. The reasons why a movement which began as an attempt to reform the domestic institutions of France had such widespread influence must be sought, first, in the nature of the social philosophy which inspired the revolutionists, and second, in the internal condition and mutual relations of the contemporary European states.

¹ Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité antique*, p. 134, ed. 1876.

In 1789 the National Assembly of the French people, called into being by the monarchy to save the realm from bankruptcy and dissolution, resolved, to use its own words, "to set forth in a solemn Declaration the natural, the inalienable, the sacred rights of mankind." The Declaration contained seventeen clauses, of which the following are the most important :

1. All men are born and exist both free and equal as regards their rights. Social distinctions admit of no basis save that of common utility.

3. The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No corporate body, and no individual can exercise authority which does not emanate expressly from the same.

4. Liberty consists of being able to do whatsoever does not harm another man. Thus the exercise of the natural rights of the individual knows no limits save those which assure to his fellow-members of society the enjoyment of the same rights as his own. Those limits can be determined only by law.

6. Law is the expression of the general will. All citizens have the right to assent personally, or through their representatives, to its formation. It must be the same for all, whether it protects, or whether it punishes. All citizens, being equal in its eyes, are equally admissible to all honours, functions, and posts in the public employ, according to their capacity, and without other distinction than that of their virtues or of their talents.

10. No person ought to be molested for his opinions, even with regard to religion, provided that their manifestation does not disturb the public order as established by law.

11. Free communication of thought and opinions is one of the most precious rights of man. Every citizen, therefore, may speak, write, and print freely, save in connection with abuses of that liberty, and in cases determined by the law.

What are the underlying principles of this Declaration ? They may be expressed in three words : liberty, democracy, nationality. All men ought to be free in act, speech, and thought. The only justification for the restriction of such

freedom is the assurance of equal liberty to other men, and the only valid method of restriction is by law. But laws are not mere arbitrary rules, dictated by a ruler's caprice. They must express the conscious purpose, the "general will" of the Nation, and those who make and execute laws derive their powers from the same source. They are responsible to it for all their acts. In short, to secure liberty, there must be democracy, the participation of all men in political power, those men, in their corporate capacity as a Nation, being the only just source of public authority. It follows as a necessary corollary that, to exercise its rightful powers, the Nation itself must be free from external oppression and interference.

These theories were not new. They had been expressed before in other lands, notably by the English Levellers in the Great Rebellion; similar doctrines had been urged in the American Declaration of Independence. What was new was the fact that the representatives of the most powerful state in Europe had adopted these theories as the foundations of their political structure. Such an act was, in effect, a challenge to the rest of Europe. For the doctrines were expressed in abstract terms, limited by no considerations of time, place, or occasion. Freedom and equality were claimed as the sacred rights of mankind, not merely of the French people. Moreover, the legislation of the National Assembly put into practice what the Declaration of Rights had asserted in theory. The limitation of the royal veto, the abolition of nobility and of hereditary offices, the partial destruction of feudalism,¹ the establishment of religious and civil equality, the replacing by departments of the old provinces, with their ancient traditions and vested rights,—all these acts were so many

¹ Feudalism was not completely abolished till 1793.

examples or menaces to the established order in Europe. To the consideration of that order we must turn.

Certain leading facts emerge from a survey of the European states as they existed in 1789. To begin with, the prevailing form of government (certain notable exceptions apart) was absolute monarchy. In Austria, Russia, Spain, Prussia, Sweden, and most of the Italian states, the prince was absolute. Where, as in Spain, for example, representative institutions had existed in former times, they had long since fallen into political nullity. Towards this state of things Europe had been evolving for centuries, and so deeply had the monarchical tradition penetrated into men's minds that in the eighteenth century some of the acutest intellects looked to enlightened despots as the only possible source of progress and reform.

Certain exceptions to this general rule have been mentioned. England was, of course, the most notable. There the Revolution of 1688 had established the principle that sovereignty lay with the king in Parliament, and even George III., though as absolutist in temper as James II., could only achieve his ends by the systematic corruption of the House of Commons. Holland was in form a federal republic, with a strong monarchical element in its constitution. This was supplied by the Stadtholderate, hereditary in the house of Orange. The office carried with it control over the armed forces of the Republic. Political power resided with the States-General, an assembly of delegates from the seven constituent provinces. Switzerland was also a federal republic; Poland an elective monarchy, where all effective power rested in the hands of the nobility. Genoa and Venice retained their ancient republican institutions.

The social organisation of practically all the European states was aristocratic, or rather, oligarchic. In most parts of the Continent feudalism predominated. The landowners of central and eastern Europe generally ruled as petty sovereigns over those who tilled their lands. The Russian noble measured his wealth by the number of "souls" he owned; in Prussia many a peasant was bound to labour six days in a week for his lord, and toiled by moonlight in his own poor fields. The republics were in but little better case than the monarchies. Venice had always been governed by a noble caste; in Holland, political power was monopolised by the wealthy merchant class. As for Switzerland, "within each canton the most violent contrast existed between the rulers and the subjects. In those which took their names from their capitals the town was really the sovereign, and looked upon the rural districts simply as subjects held by right of conquest or of purchase. Out of the citizens admitted to the franchise, especially in Bern, Luzern, Fribourg, and Solothurn, a small number of families had gradually come to monopolise all the offices of State, so that the 'Patricians' excluded the 'ordinary citizens' from any share in the government."¹ In constitutional England the great majority of the inhabitants did not possess the franchise, and some members of Parliament represented nothing but a decaying wall or a grassy mound.

The spirit of nationality found but small expression in the Europe of 1789. What is now Belgium was an Austrian province; the present Balkan States were subject lands of the Turk. Italy was still "a geographical expression," with several of its states in the hands of foreign rulers. Switzerland, its cantons deeply divided by religion and language, was an alliance rather than a true federation.

¹ *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. x. p. 235.

The map of Germany appeared "a veritable mosaic."¹ Three hundred and sixty separate sovereignties existed. Imperial knights and kings, city-republics and prince-bishops, every grade in the feudal hierarchy was represented. The bond which held this motley assemblage of states together was their inclusion in the Holy Roman Empire. That supreme political creation of the Middle Ages had fallen into sad decay. Voltaire had declared it "neither holy, Roman, nor an Empire." The imperial Diet, which should have regulated its internal affairs, was powerless, and religious strife aggravated political division. Two great states strove for the mastery of Germany—Prussia and Austria. The former was formidable by reason of its powerful bureaucracy and great military traditions; the latter derived prestige from the fact that its ruler was also Emperor. Both suffered from the dispersion of their component dominions.

The international morality of the time was purely egotistic. That the end justifies the means was a maxim accepted by every chancellory. Frederick the Great, the typical eighteenth-century monarch, had begun his career by wresting Silesia from Austria. At a later date he had combined with that Power, and another old antagonist, Russia, to dismember Poland. France had not hesitated to hurl itself upon England when the latter was struggling with the revolted American colonies. "Reasons of State" were held to justify every aggression; prudence and fear were the sole restraint upon ambition.

Surveying the situation with a knowledge of after events, the student cannot fail to realise that between

¹ The phrase is Albert Sorel's. An excellent description of pre-revolutionary Germany will be found in the opening chapters of H. A. L. Fisher's *Napoleonic Statesmanship—Germany*.

revolutionary France and feudal Europe a conflict was inevitable. To the men of the time, absorbed in passing events, without precedents to guide them, matters appeared quite otherwise. Some few thinkers in England and Germany regarded events in France with hopeful complacency; others, like Burke, with a suspicion that deepened into inveterate hatred; but to the mass of politicians the Revolution in its earlier stages appeared merely "as one of those periodical maladies to which the constitution of all peoples is subject, and which have no other effect than to open new fields to policy."¹ In the diplomatic correspondence of the time the idea appears continually that France has ceased to be a great Power; that its internal discords have deprived it of all influence.

Gradually, however, causes of conflict accumulated. First, came the emigration to Germany of the brothers of Louis XVI., who, supported by increasing numbers of the nobility, speedily became a source of irritation and alarm to those who held by the Revolution. Not content with filling Europe with their complaints, the *émigrés* openly begged for foreign aid in restoring the old order. The decrees which abolished feudalism raised up other enemies. By reason of them, certain German princes who had held fiefs in Alsace found themselves despoiled of their prerogatives and implored the aid of Austria and Prussia. But an infinitely more serious cause of conflict was the breach between Louis XVI. and his subjects. His natural inertia had allowed him, though disapproving, to be borne along by the current of events. But the unfortunate decrees by which ecclesiastical property was nationalised and the Church and its internal organisation brought under the control of the State, wounded his deepest feelings. After

¹ De Tocqueville, *L'Ancien Régime*, liv. i. c. 1.

signing the decree which exacted an oath of fidelity to the constitution of the clergy, Louis declared that he would rather "be King of Metz than remain King of France in such a position." Thenceforward, his dominant thought was of how to escape from an intolerable situation.

To fly from Paris, rally such military forces as were available, and suppress the Revolution, was the expedient which appeared to promise best, and which was adopted. On June 20, 1791, the royal family fled from Paris by night, but was arrested at Varennes and brought back to the capital. At first it appeared that this event might provoke foreign intervention. The King was now obviously under duress, and the Emperor, Leopold of Austria, a brother of Marie Antoinette, Queen of France, suggested a congress of the Powers to deal with this situation. But England was hostile, and Spain without resources. Catherine II. of Russia was all for energetic intervention, but by some other Power. The proposed congress resolved itself into a meeting of the Emperor and the King of Prussia at Pillnitz,¹ when a declaration was issued, proclaiming that in certain eventualities those sovereigns would act on behalf of the King of France.

For a moment the danger was averted, but forces, the most diverse in character, were thrusting France towards a breach with Europe. The royal family saw in foreign intervention its one hope of safety, and that could best be brought about by war. On the other hand, the dominant party in the new Legislative Assembly,² known to history as the Girondins, desired war in order to consolidate the work of the Revolution by uniting the nation for a common

¹ August 27, 1791.

² The first to be elected under the new Constitution. It met on October 1, 1791.

end. The question of the *émigrés* and of the dispossessed princes remained unsettled; the attitude of Prussia and Austria grew more and more menacing as the contagious character of the revolutionary doctrines was more clearly recognised; and a despatch of the Austrian minister, Kaunitz, dated February 17, 1792, in which he animadverted severely upon the advanced parties in France, drove indignation to fever heat. To the peremptory demands of the French Government, that its menacing attitude should be abandoned, Austria returned stubborn refusals, and on April 20, 1792, war upon that Power was declared, which, in turn, involved war with Prussia.

The war was the outcome of the fundamental contradiction between the ideas of the Revolution and those of monarchical Europe. For twenty-three years it raged with scarcely an interval of peace, and its conclusion saw both sides profoundly affected. The Revolution had been widely deflected from its natural course; European society had been shaken to its foundations.

CHAPTER II

EUROPE AND THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

THE conflict on the frontier had its effects upon the internal political strife. The Austro-Prussian invasion, bringing the hated *émigrés* in its train, and threatening the restoration of the old order, made the King's position impossible. It was universally suspected that he sympathised with the enemies of France, and an ill-timed manifesto, issued by the Duke of Brunswick, commander of the invading forces, which threatened to avenge an attack upon the royal family by the destruction of Paris, sealed the fate of the monarchy. An organised insurrection overturned the Government on August 10, 1792, and a newly elected Convention proclaimed the abolition of royalty on September 21. From that to the trial and execution of the King, in January 1793, was but a step. The rising tide of revolutionary enthusiasm was partly the cause, partly the consequence, of a change of attitude towards the war.

The campaign had opened badly for the French. The frontier fortresses speedily fell, but a cannonade at Valmy checked the invasion, and the enemy was glad to recross the frontier. And now a great counter-movement began. Savoy and Nice were annexed to France, after a plebiscite of the inhabitants. A French army crossed the Rhine,

another invaded Belgium. The Revolution had taken the offensive, and a war of propaganda had begun. The new spirit was manifested in a decree of December 15, 1792, which ordered the French generals to abolish all existing authorities in the territories they occupied, to sweep away feudalism and nobility, and to proclaim the sovereignty of the people. Finally, "the French nation will treat as enemies any people which, refusing liberty and equality, desires to preserve its prince and privileged castes, or to make any accommodation with them."

This was a threat to every government, a threat to which the execution of Louis XVI. gave terrible meaning. England had witnessed the French occupation of Belgium with alarm; the opening of the Scheldt which followed was a violent breach of treaty rights; then Holland also was threatened. The French ambassador was expelled on January 24, 1793, and, in reply, France declared war on February 1. To the list of enemies were soon added Spain, Naples, Piedmont, the Papal States, and the Holy Empire. Speedily the tide of conflict turned against France; Holland and Belgium were lost (in part, by treachery), and the German conquests followed. By the middle of 1793 five hostile armies were on French soil, while civil war raged furiously in the land. But as the danger grew more desperate, the temper of the people rose to meet it. The Executive Government was handed over to a Committee of Public Safety which wielded prodigious powers, and a drastic species of martial law (the "Terror") was applied to the whole country. An immense levy of men and material filled the depleted ranks. Yet these were but measures of government that could not have succeeded had they not been sustained by the popular will. Everything conspired to raise patriotic emotion to

fever heat. In the minds of great masses of men love of country had become identical with approval of the Revolution; the success of the foreigner meant that the tithes and feudal dues would once more be imposed upon the peasant, and that the middle classes would be condemned again to civic inequality. Not all the crimes of the terrorists, the furious faction-fighting in the Convention, could shake the devotion of the man who identified "la patrie" with his newly won freedom. The secular task of the monarchy had been to create the French state; the Revolution had created the French nation. Vast new energies had been liberated, against which monarchical Europe, uninspired by an idea, and divided by conflicting interests, struggled in vain. By the beginning of 1794, 850,000 Frenchmen were under arms; the country was a vast camp. This prodigious effort had its reward. At the end of 1793 the foreigner had been driven from French soil.

Then the tide of war turned again and flowed into hostile territory. Once more Germany and the Netherlands were invaded, as were Piedmont and Spain. Under this tremendous pressure the great coalition collapsed. Prussia withdrew from the war, and by the Treaty of Bâle¹ recognised the Republic and the carrying of the French frontier to the Rhine. Belgium became definitively French; Holland, degraded to the position of a vassal republic, was forced to consent to a large cession of territory and to abandon its monopoly over the Scheldt. Spain and the minor states, Naples, the Papacy, Saxony, and the rest, hastened to make their peace. Only England and Austria remained hostile.

To England, as to France, the issue seemed one of life and death. French domination in the Netherlands menaced

¹ Signed April 5, 1795.

her security and her commerce, and to resist such domination to the last was her traditional policy. Of all the European Powers, England alone could meet France on equal terms. Her fleets swept the seas, her subsidies had made the coalition possible. The devotion of her people to their country and its institutions was as deep as that of the French. Burke's panegyrics on the Constitution expressed the feelings of the vast mass of Englishmen. It is the great tragedy of history that these two peoples, so noble in war and in peace, should, in this supreme crisis, have faced each other in mortal combat. Coincident with military success, France seemed to have achieved internal peace by the adoption of a new constitution, which confided executive power to a Directory of five members and the legislative to a bicameral Parliament. A royalist insurrection in Paris was suppressed, thanks, in large part, to the energy of a Corsican officer of artillery named Napoleon Bonaparte. But internal order could not be maintained without peace. The terrible feuds of the Revolution had decimated the country, leaving behind them hatreds not easy to appease, while the concentration of the national energies upon the prosecution of the war left politics to men of inferior intelligence and morality. The mass of the population desired only to be left in peace to enjoy the gains of the Revolution, but had not sufficient energy and political instruction to impose such a policy upon its governors. Moreover, national sentiment demanded the maintenance of the conquests made with such vast sacrifices; no Government would dare to abandon them, and without such concessions a lasting peace was impossible. Thus a vicious circle was created. To maintain the gains of war fresh wars were necessary, and the continuance of war meant the subordination of political liberty to military necessities. Thus

began a new era of conquest, with the overthrow of Austria as its immediate object, and having as its inevitable result the prostration of France at the feet of a successful general.

The new spirit was exemplified in the invasion of Italy by Bonaparte in 1796. His achievements in crushing the royalist insurrection, and the friendship of the most corrupt member of the Directory—Barras—had obtained him the command. From the military point of view, the campaign was one of his finest achievements ; from the moral, it was a career of unscrupulous pillage. Not only were huge financial exactions levied upon the conquered Italian states, but hundreds of art treasures were seized and sent into France. The climax of the campaign was reached when Bonaparte deliberately manufactured an excuse to seize upon Venice, not to hold it for France, but to use his prey for the purpose of bargaining with Austria. That Power was now at the end of its resources. On April 7, 1797, the Austrian commander appealed for an armistice, for Bonaparte was within eighty miles of Vienna. On October 17 was signed the Treaty of Campo Formio, which gave to France the Rhenish provinces of Germany, and the Austrian possessions in the Netherlands. Lombardy, Modena, portions of the Papal States and of Venetian territory, were to be formed into a Cisalpine Republic, obviously destined to be a vassal state of France ;¹ Austria took Venice itself with the remainder of its territory, and was to receive further compensation in Germany. The situation in the latter country was to be regulated by a congress at Rastadt.

The settlement with England still remained to make.

¹ Genoa had already been re-organised as the Ligurian Republic and Piedmont had been compelled to make large cessions of territory to France.

Attempts to use the navies of Holland and Spain against her had been complete failures. She was still mistress of the seas. The fertile mind of Bonaparte, longing for fresh opportunities of conquest, conceived the plan of seizing Egypt as a preliminary to an assault upon the British possessions in India. This, at any rate, was the ostensible object of the scheme, but who can say how many gigantic projects were germinating in the General's mind? The Directory had no objections to raise. Apart from the possibilities of fresh glory and plunder, the incompetent faction then governing France was not unwilling to see the terrible General depart from Europe. In Italy he had acted more like an independent potentate than a servant of the Republic; unoccupied, he would be a continual menace to the faction's hold on power. Accordingly, on May 19, 1798, Bonaparte sailed from Toulon, seized Malta, by treachery, on June 16, and evading the English fleet, soon landed in Egypt. Alexandria was captured, and, after the battle of the Pyramids, Cairo was occupied. Egypt seemed won, but disaster was now at hand. Nelson, after a vain search for the enemy's fleet, found it in Aboukir Bay, and utterly destroyed it on August 1. At a time when grave dangers threatened France, Bonaparte's retreat was cut off. To make the situation clear we must retrace our steps a little.

Towards the end of 1796 Catherine II. of Russia had died. The last years of her reign had been occupied with the final destruction of Polish nationality. Warned by the disasters of the first partition, many patriotic Poles had been striving for the regeneration of their country, above all, for the reform of its anarchical political institutions. In 1791 a new Constitution was promulgated which made Poland a constitutional monarchy. The

crown became hereditary ; the monstrous privileges of the nobles were reduced, and the condition of the serfs somewhat ameliorated. Given time, the work of national regeneration might have been achieved, but this Catherine II. was determined to prevent. In May 1792 a great Russian army entered Poland, to be followed later by a Prussian force. The new Constitution was overthrown, and the two aggressive Powers seized more Polish territory. But Poland was not to lose her liberty without a struggle. Under the leadership of Kosciuszko, a patriot who had fought for the Americans in their War of Independence, a great insurrection broke out in 1794 which was at first successful. Assailed, however, by Russian and Prussian forces, the new national Government was overwhelmed, and the two Powers, together with Austria, made a third partition, which wiped Poland from the map of Europe.¹

The new Tsar, Paul I., pursued at the beginning of his reign a peaceful policy, though he declared himself willing to oppose with other Powers "the frantic French Republic." The unfortunate policy of the Directory gave him an opportunity of translating this threat into action. At the invitation of certain discontented democrats, and with an eye to the possibilities of financial plunder, Switzerland was subjugated by France, and a new centralised constitution, alien to the traditions of the people, imposed upon it. An occasion was also found to overturn the Papal Government, establish a Roman Republic, and carry the Pope into captivity. Finally, the King of Piedmont was dethroned and his country annexed to France. The Republic appeared insatiable, and, under the leadership of England, a new coalition was organised against it, in which England,

¹ The Treaty consummating the partition was signed on October 24, 1795.

Russia (threatened in its Oriental schemes by Bonaparte's Eastern policy), Turkey (aggrieved by the invasion of Egypt), Naples, and Austria joined. This last Power had found at the Congress of Rastadt that the French demands were increased, and that the promised compensation in Bavaria was unattainable. Her troops dissolved the Congress, and foully murdered the French plenipotentiaries. Russian forces invaded Italy, and, with English co-operation, Holland; Austria advanced in Germany; the Neapolitan army invaded Roman territory. At first events were adverse to the French; they were driven from Italy, and the Russian armies invaded Switzerland. Then the old powers of resistance came into play once more; Souvoroff, the Russian general, was crushingly defeated and driven from Switzerland; the allied forces in Holland also met with disaster. With defeat came dissension in the ranks of the coalition, and the Tsar withdrew from the war.

On the morrow of these events Bonaparte landed in France. The Egyptian expedition had been little short of a disaster, the army was cut off from reinforcements, and a return to France was impossible. An invasion of Syria failed before the stubborn defence of Acre, so, wearied by the failure of his Oriental schemes, and realising that the disasters in Europe opened fresh scope for his ambitions, Bonaparte abandoned his army, evaded the English cruisers, and landed in France on October 8, 1799.

The internal affairs of the country were in an alarming condition. The ruling faction, thoroughly discredited, were only able to maintain themselves in power by repeated *coups d'état*. Corruption was rampant in the administration, and members of the Directory were notoriously involved in these scandals. Brigandage, largely political in origin, raged in the rural districts. Everywhere was

disorder and misgovernment. The enthusiasm for political liberty and equality which had dominated the early years of the Revolution had passed away, leaving behind it a sense of disillusionment and weariness. On the other hand, there was no general desire for the restoration of the monarchy. That had come to be identified with foreign domination. Men wished above all things to enjoy the material gains of the Revolution in peace. The Government could neither secure peace nor govern tolerably,

Some acute intellects had been preparing for an attempt to overthrow the Constitution, and establish a more settled form of government. Foremost among these were the Director, Siéyès, and the diplomatist, Talleyrand. They felt the co-operation of a soldier to be necessary, and the arrival upon the scene of Bonaparte provided the man they needed. His return had been the signal for an immense outburst of popular enthusiasm. The truth about the Egyptian failure was not realised; only his victories were remembered, and he seemed to be the one man capable of imposing a peace upon hostile Europe. Between those members of the Government who sought its overthrow, and Bonaparte, ambitious, and conscious of his power, there was little room for misunderstanding. A plot was carefully elaborated, support—financial and military—was obtained. The Parliament was summoned to meet outside Paris, at St. Cloud, and after much confusion and a theatrical scene, the dissenting legislators were dispersed by military force.¹ Finally, a rump of the Parliament placed the government in the hands of three Consuls, Bonaparte, Siéyès, and Roger Ducos. The military dictator, whose coming had so often been prophesied during the Revolution, had at last arrived.

¹ November 10, 1799.

CHAPTER III

EUROPE AND NAPOLEON

It will be convenient to discuss the work of internal re-organisation undertaken by Bonaparte, as a whole, without strict attention to chronological order. The first task was to formulate a new Constitution. This was submitted to, and ratified by a popular vote. It confided executive power for ten years to three Consuls, Bonaparte, Cambacérès (a regicide), and Lebrun. To the First Consul, Bonaparte, were attributed very extensive powers. He nominated ministers, ambassadors, the higher judicial officers, members of local administrative bodies, and officers of the army and navy. Laws were prepared by a Council of State (also appointed by the First Consul), submitted to a Tribunal, which could discuss them and recommend their acceptance or rejection to a Legislature, which voted upon them in silence and without discussion. These two bodies were not freely elected, but nominated by a Senate, which could in theory annul unconstitutional legislation. For all practical purposes Bonaparte was the depositary of governmental power. A strict censorship made effective criticism by the press impossible. But even these extensive powers failed to satisfy the ambitions of Bonaparte. In 1802 a fresh plebiscite elected him First Consul for life, and an

alteration of the Constitution permitted him to nominate a successor. In 1804 the last step was taken, and Napoleon Bonaparte became Emperor of the French.

Perhaps the most important act of the Consulate was the establishment of an efficient administrative system in the form of a highly centralised bureaucracy. Every unit of local administration was controlled by a government official. The prefect ruled the department; the sub-prefect, the *arrondissement*; the mayor, the commune. This was a return to the methods of the monarchy, but the new system was infinitely more powerful. The local and personal privileges which had hampered the officers of the old régime had been swept away by the Revolution, and this levelling process made possible a uniformity and efficiency such as Europe had not known since the fall of the Roman Empire. To the direction of this administrative machine, as, indeed, to the whole work of government, Napoleon brought enormous powers of labour, an iron will, and an unrivalled judgment of men. No detail was small enough to escape his attention. From his servants he demanded two qualities—obedience and efficiency, and if these were forthcoming antecedents counted for nothing. Men of the old order served side by side with constitutionalists of 1789, and regicides of 1793.

In legislation, the work of the new Government was essentially one of consolidation. The Civil Code, issued in 1804, really established the social principles of the Revolution, though it often modified their application in a conservative sense. It admitted no legal privileges; all citizens were to be equal before the law. The principle of equality in regard to inheritance was maintained, though the portion of his property of which the testator could freely dispose was increased. Divorce was retained but

restricted, and the equality of the sexes in regard thereto, established by the Convention, was now abolished. The jury system was maintained.

The Civil Code is one of Napoleon's best titles to the gratitude of posterity. It has exercised a profound effect upon the legislation of later times, and has been copied by many states. It should be remembered, however, that its compilers had, as the basis of their work, the great mass of revolutionary legislation, and much of their task consisted in systematising the achievements of others. As has been well remarked, the Code "embodies the permanent conquests, while rejecting the temporary extravagance, of the French Revolution."¹

The most difficult problem of all which confronted Napoleon upon his accession to power was that of religious and social pacification, the restoration of internal order and security. This was solved, in part, by the tolerant methods previously described. The laws against the *émigrés* were gradually relaxed, and many who had been driven from France by revolutionary excesses were glad to return and swear allegiance to a settled Government. On the other hand, those who had purchased the confiscated property of the Church and of the aristocrats were secured in their titles, and, by reason of self-interest, became supporters of the new régime. Religious discords were more difficult to appease. The conflict between the Revolution and the Church had been the cause of civil war, bringing misery and persecution in its train. The clergy, finding a determined enemy in the Republic, had not un-naturally given great support to the royalist cause. This state of things Napoleon determined to alter radically. The savage persecution of refractory priests by the Con-

¹ H. A. L. Fisher, *Napoleon*, p. 95.

vention, and the complete separation of Church and State brought about under the Directory, seemed to him great errors, and he desired for reasons both personal and public to gain the support of the Church for the new Government. Without any real religious feeling himself, he took the view that religion was necessary for the uninstructed mass of men. "The people must have a religion, and that religion must be in the hands of the Government." A transaction with the Papacy was undertaken, which resulted in the signing of a Concordat in 1801.¹ This recognised that the Catholic religion was that of the majority of French citizens, and permitted its free exercise; the State further undertook to assure adequate salaries to all the clergy. On the other hand, it was agreed that the bishops should swear fidelity to the Government, which also acquired the right, enjoyed by the old monarchy, of nominating bishops who were to be instituted by the Pope. The Papacy also agreed to recognise the legitimacy of the titles of those who had acquired Church property during the Revolution. The Concordat contributed greatly to the restoration of order and the consolidation of the Napoleonic Government.

In spite of these imposing reforms, it must be remembered that the new Government was essentially despotic and tended to become more so. Its acts were often arbitrary and violent. Napoleon's tolerance had very definite limits. Thus, a royalist assassination plot in 1800 was made the excuse for the deportation of one hundred and thirty well-known Jacobins, though there was no real evidence to connect them with it. In 1804, in consequence of a fresh conspiracy, a member of the Bourbon family, the Duc d'Enghien, was kidnapped from Baden, brought across the frontier, tried, and shot.

¹ It was promulgated and became law, April 8, 1802.

The dangers which threatened France from the second coalition had been partially dispelled before Napoleon's return. The self-seeking policy of Austria, evidently desirous of replacing France as mistress of Italy, had disgusted the Tsar, who withdrew from active participation in the campaign. But though weakened, the coalition was not entirely dissolved, and the menace to France continued. Napoleon knew that the country desired peace, and though war had opened the road to power and was to maintain him in possession, he felt the necessity of conciliating opinion. He addressed letters to George III. and Francis II., suggesting peace, but neither Government was prepared to come to terms. Napoleon promptly published the correspondence, and, with the moral advantage of appearing as the defender of his country against foreign aggression, prepared for a fresh struggle. A renewed conscription brought him 200,000 recruits; 30,000 veterans were recalled to the colours. A fresh onslaught upon the Austrians in Germany was begun, and in May 1800 the First Consul himself led an army across the St. Bernard Pass to drive them from Italy. By the end of the year the peninsula was clear of the enemy, and Naples had been compelled to close its ports to the English fleet. Finally, on December 3, Moreau utterly crushed the Austrians at Hohenlinden. Once more the house of Hapsburg was obliged to admit defeat, and by the Peace of Lunéville¹ withdrew from the struggle and recognised the vassal republics, Batavian, Helvetic, and Cisalpine, as well as the French acquisitions on the Rhine.

But England remained hostile. Entrenched in her island as in a fortress, her fleets mastered the seas, and had already been the means of capturing Malta. For a moment

¹ February 9, 1801.

it seemed that even this last enemy could be overthrown. The Tsar had organised a League of Neutrals, joined by Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark, to oppose what was considered as England's maritime despotism. Skilfully led on by Napoleon, Paul I. began to consider a French alliance and a joint attack upon India, but these schemes were wrecked by his assassination in March 1801. His son and successor, Alexander I., speedily reconciled himself with England, and Nelson destroyed the Danish fleet off Copenhagen, thus breaking the League of Neutrals and asserting the supremacy of English sea-power. The French army in Egypt was compelled to capitulate after a defeat by Abercromby. On the other hand, Portugal was coerced into closing its ports to English vessels, and the Tsar, abandoning his earlier impulse, entered into friendly negotiations with France. Napoleon massed a large force at Boulogne and threatened a direct invasion. Most important factor of all, perhaps, in the situation, Pitt was out of office, and English affairs were in the hands of the feebler Addington. Matters were at a deadlock, and accordingly on October 1, 1801, preliminaries of peace were signed at London. These developed, in March 1802, into the Treaty of Amiens. England surrendered all her colonial conquests, save Ceylon and Trinidad, and agreed to deliver Malta to its ancient possessors, the Knights of St. John. The new order in Holland and the other vassal states was recognised. As against this, France abandoned Egypt, and interference with Naples and Portugal.

It may well be doubted whether a peace of so one-sided a character could, in any event, have been lasting. Everything, however, points to the fact that Napoleon did not intend it to last. He did not abandon his Oriental schemes;¹ a

¹ In January 1803 he wrote: "I keep my eyes always fixed on Egypt."

prohibitive tariff excluded English commerce from France. Fresh constitutions were imposed upon Holland and Switzerland, while Piedmont was definitively annexed to France. Under his auspices a great process of "secularisation" was carried out in Germany, by which the territories of all the ecclesiastical rulers save one were annexed by secular princes. Increasingly alarmed by these proceedings, and by an expedition to the West Indies, England refused to surrender Malta. The inevitable conflict broke out in May 1803, and once more the great rivals faced each other in arms.

England could only be struck down by two methods: direct invasion, or exclusion from the Continent, with economic ruin as a result. Napoleon prepared to try both. A great force was concentrated at Boulogne, and a flotilla of transports was prepared, which, with favouring winds and tides, and in the absence of the English fleet, could hurl the "Army of England" upon the Kentish coast. Holland was compelled to furnish ships and men, and Spain large subsidies. But while all these preparations proceeded, the other method of attack was not neglected. Hanover, the patrimony of George III., had been occupied immediately after the declaration of war, with the result that the North German ports were closed to English shipping. But this was insufficient, and in order to extend his control over Europe, Napoleon carefully sought for an occasion of fresh war with Austria. The assumption of the imperial title, the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien, the occupation of Hanover, were so many affronts that the exhausted state did not venture to resent. Increasingly uneasy, however, Austria, in November 1804, contracted a defensive alliance with Russia to resist any fresh encroachments. The latter Power, indeed, was anxious for a rupture. The Tsar

desired to pursue the traditional policy of his state and encroach upon the dominions of Turkey. Here, of necessity, his desires conflicted with Napoleon's; for behind all schemes of European dominion, there lurked in the Emperor's mind the wish "to hold the gorgeous East in fee." The act which precipitated the war was the transformation of the Italian Republic into an Italian Kingdom. It was at first announced that Joseph Bonaparte would receive the new crown, but this plan was speedily abandoned, and in May 1805 the Emperor journeyed to Milan, there to assume himself the Iron Crown of the ancient Lombard kings. The Ligurian Republic was at the same time annexed to France, and in reply, Austria began to arm. Since the beginning of 1805 Pitt, once more in office, had been organising a third coalition. In April, England and Russia entered into an alliance, and in August, Austria also joined, to be followed by Sweden. Every effort was made to persuade Prussia to throw in its lot with the Allies, but the King, Frederick William III., suffered, as throughout his life, from an infirmity of the will which kept him balancing between possible courses of action.

To the last, the preparations for a descent upon England were maintained, but by the end of August Napoleon was convinced of their futility, and with wonderful skill the great army was thrown into Germany. The South German states—Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt—rallied to his support. Suspicious of Prussia and Austria alike, anxious to increase the territorial gains already made under French auspices, no thoughts of national dignity or independence entered into their calculations. On October 17 the first great success was won at Ulm, where the Austrian general, Mack, was compelled to surrender with a large force, and on November 13 Napoleon entered Vienna.

On December 2 he crushingly defeated an Austro-Russian army at Austerlitz, and under this blow the third coalition dissolved. Austria was glad to conclude a fresh peace at Pressburg, by which she recognised the new kingdom of Italy, and ceded Venetia to it. She was compelled also to cede territory to Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden, and to recognise the Electors of the two former as kings. On January 23, 1806, William Pitt died—killed, so men thought, by Austerlitz; and the event in itself was worth a victory to Napoleon.

The reorganisation of the French conquests went on rapidly. As the result of a successful invasion Joseph Bonaparte became King of Naples; his brother Louis received the throne of Holland. In Germany, Prussia had been placated with the gift of Hanover, and now Napoleon sought to organise a federation of the smaller states, to be known as the Confederation of the Rhine, which should be subservient to France and serve as a check to both Prussia and Austria. The project was successfully achieved, and on August 1, 1806, the states of the new Power declared their secession from the German Empire. The Emperor Francis bowed to the inevitable and took the title of Emperor of Austria. The Holy Roman Empire, after a thousand years of life, thus came to a dishonoured end, symbolising in its collapse the conquest of old Europe by the Revolution.

The coalition was broken but not destroyed, for England and Russia were unconquered, and though negotiations with both were opened, no satisfactory result could be obtained. Meanwhile, Prussia was growing increasingly restive. An attempt to found a North German Confederation as an off-set to that of the Rhine was defeated by French pressure, and it was known that the Emperor, as a

bribe to England, had offered to dispossess Prussia of Hanover. The overthrow of Prussia can hardly have failed to be in Napoleon's mind. To bring that state into a condition of vassalage would be a tremendous step towards the long-desired exclusion of English commerce from the Continent. No conciliatory steps were taken, and when the Government began to arm a peremptory demand for discontinuation was issued. Frederick William III. answered with an ultimatum demanding that the French troops should be withdrawn from Germany, and war ensued. It was of short duration. On October 14 Napoleon crushed one Prussian army at Jena, Davoût a second at Auerstadt. The collapse was complete, and the Emperor determined to follow up his advantage.

On November 21 from the enemy's capital was issued the famous Berlin Decree, forbidding all commerce with England—a prohibition which included the vassal and allied states. It remained to deal with Russia. Poland was invaded and Warsaw occupied, but the battle of Eylau, though nominally a victory, was more costly than a defeat. In spite of this check Napoleon held firm, for a retreat would have destroyed his whole prestige and power. A success at Friedland saved the situation, and the Tsar determined to make peace. The Treaty of Tilsit was signed on July 8, 1807, after personal negotiations between the two sovereigns. The French conquests were recognised; Prussia was despoiled of further territory, part of which went to form a kingdom of Westphalia under Jerome Bonaparte, and the Polish provinces were formed into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and placed under the King of Saxony. A French army of occupation was to remain in Prussia till an enormous indemnity had been paid. The Tsar, moreover, agreed to enforce the blockade against England.

CHAPTER IV

THE LIBERATION OF EUROPE

THE Peace of Tilsit marks the greatest degree of effective power attained by the Napoleonic Empire ; its frontiers were to be extended, but at the price of security. The struggle which was about to begin was fought upon fresh lines, with new forces in the field. We have followed the collapse of monarchical Europe before the onslaught of revolutionary France, inspired by an enthusiasm for nationality and liberty which made its armies invincible. Henceforward, we shall find that enthusiasm invoked against it. France had succumbed to a conqueror devoured by limitless ambition, under whose leadership she had trampled upon the liberties of every European people. She had shown, too, what unity and equality could achieve, and men began at last to seek how to apply that lesson for her overthrow. England alone, before the Peace of Tilsit, had been able to bring into the conflict a spirit similar to that which inspired the French, and the example thus provided was beginning to take effect. To crush England—a necessary part of the Napoleonic policy—the domination of the Continent was necessary, and that attempt at domination collapsed, as will be seen, before a new spirit of resistance.

The first evidence of this new spirit appeared in Prussia. There a group of able and patriotic men began to devote themselves to the restoration of the fallen state. The two whose labours may be regarded as typical of this renaissance were Stein and Scharnhorst. Neither of them was Prussian by birth, but both had served their adopted country faithfully and long, and now, as reorganisers respectively of its social and military systems, contributed to its reconstitution and the liberation of Germany. This last ideal was present in the minds of both, and the method of carrying it into effect was indicated by one of their collaborators. "The Revolution has brought into play the whole national force of the French people, and if the European states wish to re-establish the old relations between nations and the equilibrium which resulted from them, they must draw upon the same sources. If they appropriate to themselves the results of the Revolution they will have the double advantage of opposing their national strength, in all its powers, to the foreign forces, and of avoiding the perils of an internal revolution which still menaces them, because they have not known how to escape by a voluntary transformation the dangers of a violent one."¹ Such a transformation had been advocated by Stein and others before the overthrow, but the weakness of the King and the intrigues of Court favourites had postponed all serious attempts at reconstruction. Jena and Auerstadt convinced even Frederick William that the work of reform must be undertaken if the national existence of Prussia were to be preserved.

As has been pointed out, the social constitution of Prussia was still feudal and aristocratic. The organisation

¹ Gneisenau, quoted by Cavaignac, *La Formation de la Prusse Contemporaine*, vol. i. p. 407.

of the absolute monarchy undertaken in the seventeenth century by the Great Elector, and completed in the eighteenth by Frederick II., had only been made possible by a compromise which concentrated political power in the hands of the monarch, but left the nobility in full possession of their social privileges. They controlled the land, officered the army, monopolised the local administration. So long as a man of intellect and character was at the head of the state the faults of the system were not apparent, but the successors of the great Frederick were incapable of carrying on his work, and the collapse after Jena proved, what careful observers had long suspected, that the edifice of the Prussian state was built upon sand. Fortunately for Prussia and for Europe, men who could begin the task of rebuilding with courage and intelligence were forthcoming.

Stein was called to office in October 1807, and the work of reform immediately began. The first blow was struck at the monstrous feudalism which still dominated the national life. Hereditary serfdom was abolished—henceforward the peasant was to be personally free,¹—and the laws which had prevented the alienation of “noble lands,” as the estates of the feudal hierarchy were called, were abolished, and free-trade in land thus established. The rigid class divisions, which had made the development of a truly national life impossible, were broken down in some degree by the abolition of the laws which had made it impossible for the noble or the peasant to follow the occupations of the burgher, and *vice versa*. The towns were endowed with a system of self-government remarkably liberal for the age, and the civil service was partially reorganised.

¹ In 1811, after Stein's fall from power, his successor, Hardenberg, carried through a further reform which made the peasants proprietors of part of the land they tilled.

A reform of the army was also undertaken. It had suffered from the same radical vice as the other departments of the social system—the subordination of national well-being to aristocratic privilege. In 1806 the officers of the army numbered between seven and eight thousand, and of these only 695 were without titles of nobility. The evils of such a system had been demonstrated on the battlefield, and this class-barrier was now, under Scharnhorst's inspiration, broken down. Another problem even more urgently demanded solution. Napoleon had imposed a strict limitation upon the numbers of the Prussian army as an effective means of preventing that state from becoming dangerous again, and to evade this limitation (as was obviously necessary) Scharnhorst devised a short service system by which men were passed quickly through the ranks, and then drafted to a reserve which could be brought into the field when required.

These reforms were but limited in their scope, yet they aroused violent resistance from the aristocratic class, which, with an astounding lack of patriotism, protested against every limitation of its prerogatives, however urgently demanded by the public good. The reformers were denounced as Jacobins, and the wavering will of the King deprived them of necessary support. Fortunately, the nobles were representative neither of Prussia nor of Germany. Everywhere there appeared a national spirit which, though feeble at first, was destined to accomplish great things. Men of letters like Fichte, in his *Addresses to the German Nation*, gave it literary expression, and the educated classes rallied to the new standard. The Moral and Scientific Union, or Tugenbund, was founded by professors, and had as its aim the moral regeneration of Germany. Suppressed in 1809, it con-

tinued its efforts in secret and contributed to the work of national liberation.

In the middle of 1808 it appeared that the reformers would have an opportunity of putting their work to the test. The Napoleonic Empire had received its first serious shock. The Emperor had long been manœuvring towards the acquisition of complete control over the Iberian states, and in 1807 a joint attack with Spain upon Portugal was successful. The Portuguese royal family fled to Brazil, and abandoned the country to the enemy. Then, by skilfully applied terrorism Charles IV. of Spain was persuaded to fly from his capital, but a popular insurrection first arrested the fugitive, and then compelled his abdication in favour of his son Ferdinand. The latter, however, was unworthy of the trust imposed upon him. He was lured by specious promises to meet the Emperor at Bayonne, and there, terrified by the menaces heaped upon him, basely abandoned his throne and people.

Already the Spaniards, foreseeing the fate prepared for them, had risen in rebellion. On May 2, 1808, a furious insurrection began in Madrid, and when the news became public that Ferdinand had been replaced by Joseph Bonaparte, the whole country rose. The strong provincial attachments of the Spaniards, in normal times a source of weakness, now stood them in good stead; without waiting for guidance from a central authority, towns and districts rose in swift succession against the invader. Religious fanaticism strengthened national feeling, for, cut off by their geographical situation from the main currents of European thought, the Spaniards had remained the most intensely Catholic people in Europe, and to them Napoleon was an infidel, Anti-Christ in the flesh.

The situation grew increasingly serious; Joseph Bona-

parte was proclaimed King in Madrid, but soon after, a French army was compelled to surrender at Baylen, and an English expeditionary force under Sir Arthur Wellesley drove the invaders out of Portugal. The Prussian patriots began to prepare plans for a German revolt and implored their King to throw himself into the struggle. Austria, too, began to arm. Never were Napoleon's characteristic qualities of lucidity and determination better displayed than in this crisis. A fresh meeting with the Tsar assured him that the Russian alliance held firm; then, at the head of his armies, he invaded Spain anew, and the English army of Sir John Moore was compelled to make its historic retreat to Corunna, and to abandon Spain. Nor did Prussia fail to receive attention. Intercepted letters of Stein's revealed the plans of the patriotic party for a national uprising similar to that of Spain, and by imperial threats the great minister was forced to fly from Prussia for safety.

The menace from Austria remained, and rallying all his forces the Emperor prepared for the struggle. In April 1809 the armies of that state invaded Bavaria, preceded by an appeal "to the German nation" to rise against the foreigner. This appeal (in itself a remarkable sign of changing times) had but a limited result. The Tyrolese peasantry rose against the Bavarian masters imposed upon them by France, and some Westphalian and Prussian regiments revolted, but the Prussian Government itself did not stir, and when the Austrian armies had been defeated and Vienna occupied, it was clear that the great opportunity had passed. A defeat of the French at Asperne only checked the tide of disaster for a moment, though it led to some popular movements in Würtemberg and Westphalia, and when the Austrians were overwhelmed at Wagram¹ all was

¹ July 5 and 6, 1809.

over. A fresh attempt to invade Spain by an English army was unsuccessful, and another force which should have attacked Holland was allowed to rot in the pestilential marshes of Walcheren. Austria had no choice but to surrender and make fresh concessions of territory, by which four million inhabitants were lost to her. The peace was sealed by the marriage of Napoleon to the Archduchess Marie Louise. The policy of championing the rights of nations was abandoned, and in place of the patriotic Stadion who had initiated that policy, the opportunist, Metternich, became Austrian chief minister, thus opening a career destined to be so fraught with evil for the cause of European progress.

But the stubborn resistance of Spain, strengthened by English aid, had still to be overcome, and, what was more serious, the Russian alliance was weakening. The policy of excluding English commerce was now being applied over, practically, the whole Continent, but the results were not those anticipated. Since the battle of Trafalgar English sea-power had not been seriously disputed, and this gave powerful aid to the island-state in the economic struggle. Russian trade suffered severely from the embargo, and the Tsar, offended by the French *rapprochement* with Austria, prepared to abandon the alliance. Napoleon took his precautions; a treaty was forced upon Prussia, by which that state was compelled to furnish armed support, while Austria promised what was, in fact, neutrality, though nominally she, too, was to render military assistance.

In 1812 the Grand Army, 600,000 strong, was launched at Russia. From the opening of the campaign disaster dogged its footsteps. The Russians steadily retreated, and when brought to action fought with a stubborn courage which made victory as costly as defeat. Moscow was

reached, but was fired by its inhabitants, who fled before the invader. In the middle of October, the Tsar having still refused to capitulate, the long agony of retreat began. When, in December, the French recrossed the Niemen, more than half a million men had been lost against the vast dumb loyalty to the sovereign who, as head both of Church and State, symbolised Holy Russia to his people; the military power of France had shattered itself in vain, and now all Europe began to stir.

Prussia was the first to move, though not officially, for Frederick William could not yet act with courage and determination. On his own responsibility, General von York concluded a convention with the Russian commander which placed Königsberg in Russian hands, and thus practically declared war upon Napoleon. Soon after, Stein returned from his exile with a mandate from the Tsar to summon an Assembly in East Prussia, and appeal to the inhabitants to arm against the French. This was successfully done, and driven on thus by his subjects, Frederick William took courage, fled from Berlin (where there was a French garrison) to Breslau, there to issue an edict calling to the colours all Prussians between the ages of seventeen and twenty-four. Men rushed with enthusiasm into the ranks and, a treaty of alliance having been signed with the Tsar, Frederick William formally declared war on March 17, 1813.

The Liberation War was fairly on foot, but much hard fighting remained to be done. Napoleon was in the field again with fresh levies; the minor German states were apathetic. At Lützen and Bautzen¹ the allies were beaten, though the Prussian troops fought heroically. Then Austria intervened, and promised to join the alliance

¹ Fought on May 2 and 21 respectively.

if Napoleon would not concede satisfactory terms of peace. Those proposed would have left him master of Italy and half Germany, but the nature of his system, built and dependent upon victory, made such a peace impossible. He refused, and Austria entered the war. A furious campaign followed in which victory rested first with the French, then with the Allies, but in the three days' battle of Leipzig¹ Napoleon was decisively and overwhelmingly defeated. A fortnight later the French had crossed the Rhine and the struggle entered upon a new stage.

The Allies had the weight of numbers on their side; moreover, the English army under Wellington had crossed the Pyrenees and could co-operate in an invasion of French territory. But serious divisions of opinion existed in their ranks. The Tsar and the patriot party of Prussia desired the complete overthrow of Napoleon, and were prepared to fight their way to Paris; Metternich, on Austria's behalf, desired to temporise. He was suspicious of both his allies, of Alexander in particular. The Tsar, always unstable and easily susceptible to new influences, had abandoned the dreams of military domination which had seized upon his imagination after Tilsit. The burning of Moscow had caused a revulsion of his feelings, and the liberal opinions imbibed in youth from his French tutor, La Harpe, had recovered their ascendancy. He was also experiencing a great access of mystical piety, and devoted much time to the study and interpretation of Scripture. He desired to be the liberator of Europe and the defender of national rights, an attitude which rendered him all the more suspect to the cynical Austrian minister.

Opinions being thus divided, it was determined to offer Napoleon terms of peace, and negotiations were accordingly

¹ October 16-18, 1813.

begun. France was to withdraw within her "natural limits," that is, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. This would still have left Nice, Savoy, Belgium, and the left bank of the Rhine in French hands, the principal gains of the Republic, and the only territories capable of being easily assimilated to France. But Napoleon would not abandon the conquests essentially his own; the negotiations, not very sincerely undertaken, collapsed, and the plans for invasion went on. Blücher, with the Germans and Russians, pressed across the Rhine, while the Austrians advanced by way of Switzerland. This separation of forces nearly proved fatal, for Napoleon's defensive campaign was of great brilliance, and by striking first at one, then at the other of his opponents, he gained several successes. Emboldened by these, he once more rejected the terms of peace, now less favourable, proposed by the Allies, but the latter, warned by misfortune, temporarily settled their differences, and by the Treaty of Chaumont pledged themselves to continue the war till France should have been reduced to its pre-revolutionary limits. Their troops now marched straight upon Paris, and struggle though he might, Napoleon could not break them. On March 30 Blücher was outside Paris and occupied the capital next day. The Emperor, at Fontainebleau, was still prepared to continue the struggle, but his marshals would no longer fight. They, at any rate, could see that the cause was lost, and did not desire to perish with it. In the capital the Senate had decreed Napoleon's deposition, and acting upon this inspiration, the officers demanded his abdication. After much dispute he bowed to the inevitable, and, appointing his young son, the King of Rome, as regent, laid down his office. But this compromise was not accepted by the conquerors, and so, on April 13, he signed the Treaty

of Fontainebleau, which banished him to the island of Elbą with a liberal revenue and full sovereignty over his place of exile. The most wonderful career known to men since Caesar fell under the assassin's knife, seemed to have come to an inglorious end.

CHAPTER V

THE EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT

Two problems demanded solution from the Allies on the morrow of their victory : first, the nature of the government to be conferred upon France ; second, the redrafting of the map of Europe, which was made necessary by the collapse of the Napoleonic empire. The obvious way out of the first difficulty was to recall the old royal family, and to place the brother of Louis XVI.¹ upon the vacant throne. This was the solution desired by England and Austria, who believed that only under Bourbon rule would France cease to be a disturber of European peace. The Tsar, however, had doubts. Inspired by a considerable contempt for the old royal family, he questioned whether the rule of one of its members could possibly be stable. Thanks very largely to the efforts of Talleyrand, these doubts were dissipated, and on April 6 the Senate adopted a Constitutional Charter, which called "freely to the throne Louis - Stanislas - Xavier of France," but at the same time laid down certain conditions which he must accept. The King was to enjoy full executive power, but was to share the legislative with a Senate and an elected Chamber ; ministers were to be responsible, the jury system was to

¹ Louis's son had died in the Temple prison during the Revolution.

be retained, the titles of those who had acquired the lands of the Church and the *émigrés* were to be respected, legislative sanction was to be necessary for taxation, and the titles of nobility conferred by Napoleon were to be recognised. In short, the restored monarchy was to be a constitutional one, similar, in many respects, to that of England. So much homage, at any rate, was to be paid to the principles of 1789.

Accordingly, on May 3, Louis XVIII. entered his capital, whither he had been preceded by his brother and heir, Charles, Comte d'Artois. Obese, gouty, and disillusioned, the new King was yet in many ways the ablest man of his family. He, at any rate, did not deserve the reproach of having "learnt nothing and forgotten nothing." His first task was to arrange a constitutional settlement. The prescribed principles were accepted in their main outlines; France was to be endowed with a House of Peers, nominated by the King, and a Chamber of Deputies elected on a very high property-franchise. Its members were to be renewed by one-fifth every year. Freedom of worship was accorded to all religious denominations, and Catholicism was declared the religion of the State. The revolutionary land-settlement was guaranteed, the jury was preserved, the press was to be free within limits subsequently to be fixed. The Charter closed with the words "Given at Paris in the year of grace 1814 and in the nineteenth year of our reign," and this attempt to ignore the Revolution aroused angry criticism and suspicion as foreshadowing a reaction.

France was now endowed with a constitutional sovereign; it remained to settle its relations with the other European states, and the relations of those states with one another. The first half of this task was accomplished by the Treaty of Paris published on May 30, 1814. By this treaty, the

frontiers of France were reconstituted as they had been on November 1, 1792, with certain slight modifications, thus destroying the whole work of conquest achieved by the Republic. Belgium, Savoy, Nice, and the left bank of the Rhine, were lost to France. Of the French colonies, Tobago, Île de France, and Santa Lucia went to England, and the Spanish half of San Domingo was restored to Spain. Other provisions, both public and secret, were agreed upon at the same time, but the general European settlement was referred to a Congress to be held at Vienna.

The opening of the Congress had been fixed for August, but it was not until the end of September that the various sovereigns and plenipotentiaries had assembled and were prepared to begin their task. That task was surrounded with enormous difficulties, for the divergent interests and aims of the Powers which, more than once, had hampered the work of overthrowing Napoleon, had free play now that the necessity of presenting a united front to the common enemy no longer existed. Castlereagh lamented, and with reason, "the astonishing tenacity with which all the Powers cling to the smallest point of separate interests." The Tsar, still under the sway of liberal ideas, desired to reconstitute Poland as a separate state, under his sovereignty; Prussia wished to seize upon the territories of the King of Saxony, whose loyalty to Napoleon, too long maintained, had brought the wrath of the Allies upon him; Austria, while seeking to possess itself of as much Italian territory as possible, regarded the projects of its neighbours with considerable hostility, an attitude shared by the other German states.

Of these divisions between the Powers, Talleyrand, the representative of France, skilfully took advantage. He had set himself the task of retrieving by diplomacy the position

of influence lost to France upon the battlefield. He protested to all that France desired nothing for itself; that the sole principle for which he was concerned was legitimacy and the supremacy of public law. To conclude the era of violent conquest, and establish that of justice and legality, was his mission at the Congress. Such language in the mouth of one who had served the old monarchy, the Republic, the Consulate, and the Empire, and was now in the service of Louis XVIII., can have deceived no one; but his principles were impeccable, and the division of interests between the parties concerned gave him his opportunity. The proposal to dispossess the King of Saxony alarmed all the minor German states, and Talleyrand's opposition to the expropriation gained him their sympathy and support. To pit these states against the two great German Powers was a traditional move of French diplomacy that so acute an intellect as Talleyrand's was certain not to neglect. Divisions between the Powers grew so violent that on January 3, 1815, England, France, and Austria entered into a secret alliance which pledged them to resist the aggressive schemes of Russia and Prussia, even at the cost of war. The new coalition could count upon the support of Bavaria and the smaller German states, and in face of the opposition thus organised the Tsar gave way. A transaction was arranged, and the Congress was proceeding with its work, when, on the night of March 6, Metternich received the news that Napoleon had quitted Elba.

From his tiny kingdom the fallen conqueror had been carefully watching the course of events in France and at Vienna. He was well served with information, and had come at last to the conclusion that the propitious hour for a new "flight of the eagle" had struck. With 1100

men of his guard, he sailed from Elba on February 26, and landed in France, near Antibes, on March 1.

The errors of the Bourbons had made his path smooth. Starting with the initial disadvantage that it appeared to be imposed upon France by foreign armies, the restored dynasty had contrived, in its short tenure of power, to offend powerful interests and shock cherished sentiments. Nowhere was affection for Napoleon and devotion to his cause more widespread than in the army, yet its numbers were drastically reduced, and over 10,000 officers were placed on half-pay. The Household Corps of the old monarchy was revived, and staffed with young nobles and old *émigrés*. Inevitably, the veteran who had followed the eagles from the Pyrenees to Moscow, who bore honourable scars acquired at Wagram, Austerlitz, or Jena, contrasted his lot with theirs, and yearned for the return of his old master. Another act of the Government alarmed that other powerful section of French society—the peasantry. The free peasant proprietor was, in a sense, the creation of the Revolution, which had abolished the feudal dues and tithes, and distributed the estates of the Church and the *émigrés*. A law was now passed through the Chambers to sanction the return to the latter class of such of their lands as remained unsold. To the many uninstructed and illiterate proprietors who had acquired such property the measure, not unjust in itself, appeared as the first step towards an attack upon their lands in the interests of the still-hated aristocrats. The monarchy suffered, too, from the indiscretions of its supporters. The Government of Louis XVIII., like that of Charles II. in similar circumstances, was accused of neglecting its friends and gratifying its enemies. Napoleon returned, therefore, to a France where large sections of the population were restive and suspicious.

Leaving the coast, and avoiding large towns, he plunged into the mountainous regions of Dauphiné, to be everywhere received with rapturous delight by the peasantry. A force of soldiers sent to arrest his progress first faltered, then went over to their old commander *en masse*. As he pushed rapidly towards the capital, his advance became a triumphal progress. Marshal Ney, who had left Paris boasting that he would return with the imperial disturber of the peace in an iron cage, deserted to him on March 14. On the evening of the 19th, Louis XVIII. fled secretly from Paris; the next night Napoleon was borne triumphantly into the deserted Tuileries.

His first task was to organise an administration and an army. Already the coalition had re-formed and declared him an outlaw "as the enemy and disturber of the peace of the world." The four great Powers had pledged themselves to maintain each an army of 150,000 men to prosecute his overthrow. Veterans, both officers and men, rallied willingly to the imperial standard, but the conscription was not put into force till it was too late to be of much effect. One unwilling tribute the returned despot was obliged to pay to the principles of the Revolution; by a constitutional Act he gave France a Parliament consisting of a nominated Senate and an elected Chamber, for in the changed circumstances, a Napoleon could not afford to be less liberal than a Louis XVIII. On June 1 Napoleon swore to observe the Constitution (an oath which he intended to break in the event of victory), eleven days later he started for the Belgian front where Wellington and Blücher were organising their forces for a fresh invasion. On the 18th was fought the battle of Waterloo, and on the 21st Napoleon—a beaten man—was again in Paris. Next day the Chamber extorted an abdication, and the way was clear for Louis XVIII. and the Allies.

The old monarchy returned, but chastened by its violent experience. The Charter was to be maintained. Yet France had to suffer severely in territory and national pride for its last desperate effort to reverse the decision of the Liberation War. The Second Peace of Paris¹ reduced France to the frontiers of 1790, and exacted a huge financial indemnity. An army of occupation was to be left to secure the execution of the treaty, and to watch over the internal peace of the state. The art treasures, which many campaigns had accumulated at Paris, were restored to their rightful possessors.

Some days before Waterloo, on June 9, was signed the final Act of the Congress of Vienna, ratifying the various treaties and territorial readjustments there executed. As this Act formed the basis of international European politics for nearly two generations, its main provisions must be set out in some detail.

Poland was partitioned among Austria, Prussia, and Russia, with the exception of Cracow, which was declared a free town under the guarantee of the partitioning Powers. A vague clause was inserted which stated that the Polish subjects of the three states "shall obtain a representation and national institutions, regulated according to the mode of political existence that each of the Governments to which they belong shall judge useful and convenient to accord to them." The designs of Prussia upon Saxony were only partially realised. A portion of its territory became Prussian, as also certain other territories upon both banks of the Rhine. In all, Prussia gained about half a million inhabitants, though the dispersion of its component territories remained a source of weakness. Of more importance for the future than any immediate gain

¹ Signed November 20, 1815.

was the fact that the new acquisitions on the Rhine made the Prussian state, in the event of any new conflict arising, the obvious defender of Germany against France. The other territorial readjustments in Germany need not detain us.

Belgium was joined to Holland, and was to form henceforth the kingdom of the Netherlands, under the rule of the old Stadtholder, the Prince of Orange. This sovereign also received the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg as compensation for territory lost in Germany. The integrity of Switzerland was guaranteed, and three new cantons, the Valais, Geneva, and Neuchâtel, were added to it, making twenty-one cantons in all. A later treaty, signed ¹ by the four Allied Powers and by France, guaranteed the perpetual neutrality of the Swiss Confederation, and the inviolability of its territory.

Austria received abundant compensation for the loss of the Belgian provinces, in Italy and on the Adriatic. Lombardy, Venetia, the Trentino, Dalmatia, Istria, Ragusa, and Cattaro became definitively Austrian. For the rest of Italy, there was a return to something like the *status quo*. Modena went to the Archduke Francis d'Este, the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand was re-established in Tuscany, and King Ferdinand IV. in Naples. The Duchy of Parma was made over to Napoleon's wife, the Empress Marie Louise, and that of Lucca to the Infanta Marie Louise. Victor Emanuel I. entered once more into possession of Piedmont and Sardinia, and received in addition the territories of what had been the Genoese Republic, in spite, it may be noted, of the lively protests of the inhabitants. Finally, almost the whole of the Papal States were returned to the Holy See.

One other point of great importance remains to be noticed, namely, the new form of government given to

¹ November 20, 1815.

Germany by the Congress. Stein had desired that it might be united under the leadership of one of the two great Powers; as to which he was indifferent, but the mutual jealousies of those Powers and the egotism of the smaller states were insuperable barriers to the accomplishment of such an ideal. Instead, a weak form of federal government was established, having as its objects "the maintenance of the external and internal security of Germany, the independence and inviolability of the confederated states," of which there were thirty-eight. A Federal Diet was established for the transaction of common affairs, over which Austria was to preside; to enact fundamental laws or alter them, however, a General Assembly was required, in which the voting power of the states was proportioned to their size. No attempt was made to secure a national representation of the German *people* apart from their rulers.

Other changes effected at the general settlement, which were not included in the Act of the Congress, may be noted in conclusion. King Ferdinand returned as a matter of course to Spain. England secured in Europe (besides colonial territory elsewhere), Malta,¹ and the Ionian Islands. As a reward for assistance given by Sweden to the Allies, and thanks to the diplomatic ability of ex-Marshal Bernadotte, who had been adopted heir to the Swedish throne in 1810, Norway was detached from Denmark and handed over to Sweden. The union was not accomplished without great difficulty; the Norwegians offered a determined opposition, and exacted as the price of surrender the recognition of their highly democratic constitution,² as well as the maintenance of their administrative and legislative independence.








¹ This was especially important as strengthening English sea-power in the Mediterranean.


² Adopted in 1814.

EUROPE in 1815

1 50 100 English Miles
100 200 300 400 500

Boundary of German Confederation

-  Hanover
-  Prussia
-  Austrian Empire
-  Old-Oldenburg HES Hesse-Cassel
-  HN Hesse-Nassau HC. Hessel-Cassel
-  THUR Thuringian States L.D. Lippe-Deimold
-  MECK Mecklenburg



BOOK II

CHAPTER I

THE RESTORATION

THE Grand Alliance was brought into existence to overthrow Napoleon, and bring to a close the revolutionary era of which he was at once the product and the representative. That task was finally achieved at Vienna and Waterloo, but although the immediate object of its existence was attained, the Alliance did not dissolve. On the contrary, it proceeded to inaugurate a political system which in spirit, though not in form, was to control European politics for a generation. That system received from contemporaries the name of the "Holy Alliance," and in spite of its inaccuracy, presently to be demonstrated, the use of the title has persisted to our times. The true "Holy Alliance" was, in fact, of a very different nature. On September 26, 1815, the Emperors of Austria and Russia, and the King of Prussia, affixed their signatures to a document which declared their intention "both in the administration of their respective States, and in their political relations with every other Government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of that Holy Religion, namely, the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity and Peace." The three sovereigns agreed further that they would "on all occasions and in all places lend each other aid and assistance," and finally recom-

mended their peoples "to strengthen themselves every day more and more in the principles and exercise of the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind." This document, probably unique in the annals of diplomacy, was the product of the varying emotions of Alexander I., still under strongly pietistic influences. Some contemporaries saw in it, as has been said, a profound political design, thinly cloaked in the language of religious hypocrisy. Those best capable of judging did not take this view; they ascribed the declaration to unsoundness of intellect. Castlereagh called it a "piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense"; Metternich thought "it was quite clear that the Tsar's mind was affected." To pronounce a definite opinion upon the strange psychology of Alexander would be extremely rash, but this view probably contains more truth than the other. In any case, to seek for the origin of the new political system inaugurated by the Alliance in this strange document is quite unnecessary; it can be found in the treaty signed by the four Powers on November 20, 1815. This renewed the pact of Chaumont¹ for the purpose of preserving the peace of Europe from revolutionary troubles in France, and bound the Powers to renew, at intervals, meetings which should discuss measures necessary to be taken for that end and for the general security. In other words, the Powers pledged themselves to the preservation of the European settlement secured by the Act of the Vienna Congress and the Second Peace of Paris.

The importance of this treaty will be seen when the nature of that settlement is recollected. In it the principles of the Revolution were utterly ignored; the idea of nationality was set at naught by the partitioning of Poland

¹ See Chap. IV. Bk. I.

and Italy; the political rights of the people were not secured in any way, unless the vague clause which laid down that there were to be assemblies of Estates in all the constituent states of the German Confederation be regarded as an exception. The work accomplished by the Powers in 1815, therefore, was essentially reactionary, inasmuch as it attempted to reinstate a political condition of things which the Revolution had striven to destroy. So far, then, from ending the conflict with revolutionary ideas, the settlement of 1815 marked, as will be seen in the sequel, the beginning of that struggle in a new form.

For the moment the forces of reaction were almost everywhere in the ascendant. An act recorded of Victor Emanuel of Piedmont symbolises the new spirit very fittingly. On his return to Turin his first action was to call for the Court Almanack of 1798, and reappoint all the surviving officials to their old positions. This might have passed for mere peevish antiquarianism, but the King followed it up by an edict which abolished all laws of a later date than 1800. Piedmont, in short, reverted to its old paternal despotism. The aristocracy once more dominated the army and the administration; the clergy regained all its old privileges and authority. "Every Piedmontese was driven to communicate at Easter; shops were compulsorily closed on religious festivals; cabinet-ministers observed fast-days on pain of losing office; twice a year classes were suspended at the University for a week of religious observances."¹ The old disabilities were reimposed upon Jews and Protestants. The inhabitants of some other of the Italian states suffered more than the

¹ Bolton King, *History of Italian Unity*, vol. i. p. 44. Chapter III. of this work contains an admirable description of social and political conditions in Italy after 1815.

Piedmontese. Francis IV. of Modena outdid the King of Piedmont by repealing all laws enacted later than 1791. His press-censors banned the works of Dante. The methods of government in the Papal States shocked even the fervent Catholic, Chateaubriand. Ecclesiastics monopolised most public offices ; the Inquisition, and the use of torture, were reintroduced ; three separate forces of police tyrannised over and spied upon the inhabitants. In spite of their efforts, brigandage was endemic, and smuggling a well-organised industry. Evil though these conditions were, those which obtained in the reconstituted Kingdom of Naples were even worse. King Ferdinand had promised his subjects a Constitution, but promptly broke his promise. He had also sworn to respect the autonomy of Sicily, but in 1816 he united the government of the island to that of the mainland. Corruption was rampant in the public services ; crime went unpunished ; political liberty there was none. The unhappy peasants, grievously oppressed by the great landowners who maintained feudal conditions on their estates, were still further impoverished by the exactions of the tax-gatherer.

From the grosser evils of Neapolitan rule the Austrian provinces, Lombardy and Venetia, remained free. There the administration was honest, though hampered by being directed from Vienna ; justice was fairly done in non-political cases. But where political discontent was concerned Austrian rule was nakedly brutal and oppressive. The press-censor and the political police-agent were powers in the land ; private correspondence was systematically tampered with. Flogging, starvation, drugging, were used to extort confessions from those suspected of sedition. The population, the most industrious in Italy, was penalised for its activity by being compelled to contribute one-fourth

of the revenue of the whole Austrian Empire. Above all, the Government was essentially foreign and unsympathetic ; its continuance meant that all hope of independence and self-development must be abandoned.

Italy was not the only country thus violently thrust back under pre-revolutionary conditions. In 1812, some of the most active leaders of the Spaniards in their struggle against Napoleon had contrived to endow Spain with constitutional government. This Constitution was closely modelled upon that given to France in 1791 ; the Cortes, or Parliament, possessed full legislative power and could control the executive Government ; the municipalities became elective and the privileges of the nobility were abolished. The Cortes elected under this Constitution had attempted some serious reforms. The Inquisition was abolished, together with feudal rights and jurisdictions, and the number of monastic communities was legally limited. At the same time the constitutional party, or Liberals, as they were called, had been obliged to pay tribute to the religious fervour of the people by declaring that the Catholic religion alone should be recognised in Spain. There can be no doubt that the authors of these reforms were but a small fraction of the Spanish people ; the great mass, deprived of all instruction, neither understood nor desired such institutions as those erected in 1812, while the strong provincial attachments, still so characteristic of popular feeling in Spain, made the spread of liberal ideas extremely slow. Of this situation King Ferdinand on his return was not slow to take advantage. Ignoring the decree of the Cortes that he should not be recognised as sovereign till he had agreed to observe the Constitution, he pressed on to the capital and there issued a decree declaring null the Constitution and all the decrees of the

Cortes. All the old abuses which had strangled the intellectual and material development of Spain were restored in the mass, while the Liberals and leaders of the Cortes were subjected to severe persecution. Many of them were thrown into prison or confined in monasteries ; others were deported to African fortresses. The more fortunate were sent into exile or placed under police supervision at a distance from the capital.

In France also, the second Restoration was followed by a wave of reaction. In the south serious disorders occurred, known as the "White Terror," in which a number of Protestants, Bonapartists, and suspected Republicans were brutally murdered. A number of persons who had taken an active part in the return from Elba were tried, and some, including Marshal Ney, suffered death. There were many preventive imprisonments, the ordinary operations of the laws being temporarily suspended. In October the Chambers met and the Government, which desired to act with moderation, found itself in a situation similar to that of Charles II. in 1661. The elected House was almost filled with extreme monarchists, "more royalist than the King," who clamoured for proscriptions and confiscations in language which recalled the worst times of the Terror. This party received strong support from the King's brother, the Comte d'Artois, a man of narrow intelligence and great obstinacy, who made blind opposition to the ideas of the Revolution his leading political principle. He desired the restoration of the old order in its integrity, the mere suspicion of which design had already once sufficed to overturn the restored dynasty. Fortunately, Louis XVIII. refused to adopt such a policy, and his chief minister, the Duc de Richelieu, strove zealously for conciliation and moderate measures. So violent, however, was the royalist

majority that the representatives of the Powers began to urge the necessity for dissolving the Chambers upon the King, lest some fresh revolutionary outburst should be provoked, and when several governmental measures had been rejected, this course was adopted in September 1816. The liberal elements in the country had recovered from the depression into which the second Restoration had plunged them, and now supported the Government against the "Ultras," as the fanatical royalists were called; the administration was used to influence the elections, and these combined forces returned a moderate majority, willing to support the royal policy of conciliation and reconstruction.

No attempt was made to interfere with the administrative machinery set up under the Empire or with the Napoleonic codes; they were already too firmly rooted in the national life, but the electoral law was put upon a definite basis. Henceforward, one-fifth of the Chamber was to be renewed annually; the qualifications for electors were the attainment of thirty years of age and the payment of 300 francs in direct taxation; for deputies, forty years and 1000 francs. This system deprived the large body of small property-owners of political influence; the franchise became the monopoly of about 100,000 persons. Even so, the professors of liberal opinions, drawing their strength from the wealthy middle class, which feared the aristocratic and clerical "Ultras," speedily increased their numbers in the Chamber; they had 25 deputies in 1817, 45 in 1818, 90 in 1819. In this latter year a press law was passed, which abolished the censorship and instituted trial by jury for press offences; these were liberal gains, but they were modified by further provisions which subjected newspapers to a stamp-tax and required the deposit by the proprietors of a large sum (200,000 francs) as security for

good behaviour. This made the establishment of a cheap and popular press practically impossible. In spite of this, however, France, in the first years of the Restoration, appeared to be moving along the lines of moderate reform towards a constitutional government of the contemporary English type.

In Germany the political situation was much more complex. The form of government established in 1815 was that of a loose confederation. Now it may be asserted as axiomatic, that a federal Government will not work successfully if, first, one or more of the constituent states greatly outstrip the rest in size, power, or resources, and second, if no machinery is provided whereby the general will of the whole nation can make itself supreme over the separate state governments. In Germany, both these obstacles to good government existed. Two great states, Austria and Prussia, confronted a large number of small and middle-sized states, all divided from one another by mutual jealousies, religious differences, historical tradition. Worse still, the German *people* had no organ of expression, no political existence, in fact. In the Federal Diet, to which affairs common to the confederacy were entrusted, only the sovereigns of the States were represented, full play being given, therefore, to the distrust and egotism which led each dynasty to seek its own interests exclusively, however much these might conflict with the general good.

These difficulties might have been surmounted had either Austria or Prussia been able and willing to adopt a truly national policy, and thus rally to a common standard all those elements in German life which stood for unity and progress. But such a policy—the policy of Stein—was acceptable to neither of these Governments. Metternich had secured for Austria a predominant place in the con-

federation, and was determined to retain it. The establishment of a genuine federal Government would have meant that Austrian policy must be subordinated to German interests. Now Austria was not a wholly German state; the great majority of its population was made up of subject races—Poles, Roumanians, Magyars, Czechs, Croats, Italians—bound together by no common tie save that of allegiance to the Hapsburg monarchy, and the maintenance of these diverse elements in subjection to the ruling house was the first principle of Austrian policy. To submit that policy to external control would have destroyed its very basis, and Metternich, therefore, was utterly opposed to German nationalism. “The union of all Germans in one Germany,” he described as an “infamous object.”

The position of Prussia was different, though in her case also there were serious obstacles to the adoption of a national policy. The state had suffered terribly from the French occupation and the ensuing wars; the territories gained on the Rhine were inhabited by a Catholic population, long used to French laws and methods of administration, and consequently difficult of assimilation by Protestant and semi-feudal Prussia. But the chief obstacle lay in the character and ideas of the King. Frederick William III. had no sympathy with liberal or nationalist schemes. Prussian power had been built up by a policy of calculated selfishness, and he had no desire to sacrifice his own position for the general good, or merge his kingdom in a united Germany. So hostile was he to the patriots who had inspired the national movement that he never recalled Stein to power, and General von York suffered severely for the courageous act which had inaugurated the liberation of Prussia. Hardenberg, the chief minister, though a man of just ideas and great capacity, was too much lacking

in character to supply the deficiencies of the King. The old reactionary group regained its influence, and the golden opportunity for Prussia passed.

The Austrian and Prussian Governments were as hostile to constitutional rule as to nationalism. Democracy would have been as certain a dissolvent of the Austrian Empire as the recognition of the rights of nationalities, and the correspondence of Metternich is the record of a life spent in maintaining a system of government which, in clear-sighted moments, he recognised as a "mouldering edifice." With extraordinary tenacity and subtlety he strove against the apostles of Revolution, a category in which he included republicans, the founders of Bible societies, and advocates of parliamentary government. Of this attitude some of the smaller German states were not slow to take advantage. Hostile to Prussia and Austria alike, they sought to pursue an independent policy which should hold the great states in check, and for this purpose were willing to make political concessions to their subjects. The Duke of Saxe-Weimar granted a Constitution in 1816, Bavaria and Baden followed suit in 1818. Thus, to the great misfortune of Germany, liberalism in state politics became associated with "particularism" (the pursuit of state, as opposed to national, interests) in federal politics. It must be admitted that liberalism was a plant of very tender growth in the Germany of that day; peasants only just released from serfdom, shopkeepers and artisans of sleepy provincial towns, their horizons limited to their own small states, were not easily accessible to abstract ideals. These found a more congenial home at the universities. As in 1813 professors and literary men had rallied with enthusiasm to the standard of German liberation, so now they were the leading spirits in the struggle for political liberty. Associations of students

(*Burschenschaften*) were organised for the purpose of spreading liberal opinions, and Jena University became the centre of the movement. In October 1817 a number of its students and professors assembled on the Wartburg to celebrate the anniversary of Leipzig, sang hymns, made patriotic speeches, and finally burned some reactionary books, together with a soldier's belt and a corporal's baton, the symbols of Austrian and Prussian militarism. This mild manifestation of liberal zeal created a profound sensation throughout Germany.

CHAPTER II

EUROPE UNDER METTERNICH

UP till 1818 the Vienna settlement was not seriously challenged in Europe. The conference of the Powers held at Aix-la-Chapelle in September of that year was principally concerned with the withdrawal of the army of occupation from France. But in 1819 various manifestations of discontent occurred which created great alarm. The Liberals had steadily been gaining strength in the French Chamber; the refusal of the King to permit a reactionary manipulation of the franchise led to the resignation of the Duc de Richelieu. His successor, Descazes, continued a moderate policy, but the election in 1819 of Grégoire, who had sat in the Convention and proposed the abolition of royalty, appeared so menacing a symptom that measures of repression were once more discussed. Before these could be carried out the King's nephew, the Duc de Berry, was murdered by an isolated fanatic, and France was once more plunged into reaction. The franchise was altered so as to give a double vote to the largest property-owners; the censorship was re-established. Aided by these conditions, and by the prevailing alarm, the "Ultras" recovered complete control of the Chamber and the Government.

Germany experienced a somewhat similar crisis. Kotze-

bue, a reactionary journalist, was assassinated in March 1819 by a student named Sand. The murderer's sanity was doubtful, his act the outcome of individual impulse, but Metternich regarded it as evidence of a widespread conspiracy. A whole class of men, he declared, were being "ripened for revolution" in the Universities. He immediately appealed to the Prussian Government for assistance, which was immediately accorded (to the eternal disgrace of those responsible, Stein was placed under police surveillance), and a plan for suppressing freedom of speech and propaganda was prepared. A conference of ministers from the German states held at Carlsbad agreed that the Diet should call upon all sovereigns to control the Universities, censor publications, and dismiss suspected professors. A commission of enquiry into secret associations was set up, with full powers over the local law-courts. The Diet accepted these proposals without delay, and a further conference, held at Vienna, endowed the Federation with power to enforce order in any state whose sovereign was unequal to the task, and to prevent any state legislature asserting sovereign powers. Metternich was triumphant; "a grand example of vigour has just been given in Germany," he wrote, "which must resound in every corner of Europe," and again, "one word spoken by Austria will now be inviolable law throughout Germany."

The triumph was somewhat premature, Metternich and the Powers were soon confronted with a more serious situation. The persecuting policy of King Ferdinand did not destroy Liberalism in Spain; it was merely driven underground. Secret societies were organised, and the Freemasons' lodges became centres of conspiracy. Several attempts at insurrection failed, but in January 1820 a military revolt broke out, led by Riego and Quiroga, which

was followed by successful risings at Corunna, Barcelona, and elsewhere. The Government was terrified into surrender, summoned the Cortes, and promised to accept the Constitution of 1812. On March 9 Ferdinand took the oath of allegiance to it.

The example of Spain was speedily followed in Italy. There secret societies, the most important of which was called the Carbonari, had long been at work propagating vaguely defined ideas of political freedom. They found a particularly fruitful soil in Naples, where, indeed, the Carbonarists had their headquarters. The army in particular had been infected with revolutionary ideas, and the news of a successful military revolt in Spain encouraged a similar movement in Naples. On July 2, 1820, some officers headed a mutiny and marched upon the capital, being speedily joined by a prominent Carbonarist, General Pepe. King Ferdinand, who had been thrown into frantic terror by the revolt, made no serious attempt at resistance; like his namesake of Spain he gave way, and promised his subjects the Spanish Constitution of 1812.

The Neapolitan revolt was a direct challenge to Metternich. A successful democratic revolution in the south threatened Austrian rule in the north. Moreover, it could be regarded as a breach of treaty obligations, since Ferdinand, in 1815, had pledged himself to introduce no constitutional changes in his domains other than those which Austria might confer upon her Italian subjects. Metternich at once determined upon armed intervention, but found himself embarrassed by the attitude of Alexander I. Ever since 1815 the Tsar had appeared to Metternich as no better than a Jacobin, but Alexander's zeal for liberty had waned, and the events of 1820 entirely destroyed it. In 1815 he had endowed Poland with a constitution perhaps the most

liberal in continental Europe. Liberty of the person, of religious belief, and of the press was guaranteed, and an elective Chamber of Deputies established. A separate Polish army was to be maintained and the national language was to be exclusively used in the administration and the law-courts. For a few years the new régime worked well, but it was inevitably regarded by many Poles as merely the first step towards larger freedom, while on the other hand Russian agents in the Government used every effort to discontent Alexander with the results of his experiment. The events of 1819 had a powerful effect upon his imagination, as was shown by the introduction into Poland of a strict press-censorship, and other violations of the Constitution. The murder of the Duc de Berry and the Spanish Revolution affected him even more profoundly; he demanded a fresh conference of the Powers, and offered to send a Russian army into Spain. However delighted Metternich might be with the Tsar's conversion, this latter measure was not at all to his taste; fear of Russian aggrandisement balanced hatred of revolution in his mind. His counter-proposal was that the Powers should collectively ban the new Neapolitan Government and support Austria in its forcible suppression. But this project was wrecked by the opposition of England. Castlereagh, the Foreign Secretary, had no sympathy whatever with the revolutionists of Naples—he regarded their movement as “wanton and unprovoked”—but he was the minister of a constitutional government whose policy needed the support of a Parliament little inclined for fresh Continental enterprises. England had borne the heaviest share of the financial burden imposed by the successive coalitions against France; the National Debt had reached enormous proportions, and the social discontent caused by economic stress had taken

a menacing form. Castlereagh would not, therefore, accept a proposal which committed England to a fresh anti-revolutionary crusade.

Metternich was consequently obliged to fall back upon the idea of a conference, which accordingly was opened at Troppau on October 20, 1820. Austria and Russia were represented by their respective sovereigns; Prussia by its Crown Prince. England and France were also represented, but their agents did not receive plenary powers. In conversation with Metternich, Alexander explained his change of heart, deplored his past actions, and placed his influence unreservedly at the Austrian's disposal. His reactionary mood, indeed, was deepened during the conference by the news that a regiment of his guard had mutinied. The movement was entirely non-political, but the Tsar persisted in regarding it as one more manifestation of the revolutionary spirit.¹ In this state of mind he readily agreed to the issue of a protocol which laid down the principle that "States which have undergone a change of Government due to revolution, the results of which threaten other States, *ipso facto* cease to be members of the European Alliance, and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guarantee for legal order and stability. If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger threatens other States, the Powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, or if need be by arms, to bring back the guilty State into the bosom of the Great Alliance." This was a step forward from the position taken up in 1815, and, as such, was opposed by England, which refused to take part in such measures, but the development was natural and inevitable. The settlement imposed upon Europe in that year conflicted every-

¹ The soldiers had risen against a brutal German colonel. Six of them were sentenced to receive a thousand strokes apiece!

where with the passions and ideals provoked by the Revolution and the wars of liberation. Just as birds in their migrations are said to carry seeds to distant lands, so the French eagles in their great flight from the Pyrenees to Moscow scattered everywhere seeds of change and transformation. The Revolution was no longer concentrated in one state, but dispersed across the Continent, taking fresh forms in new environments, but still everywhere fundamentally the same. This fact was recognised clearly enough by Metternich, and he imposed upon himself the task of holding back the avalanche which threatened once more to overwhelm monarchical Europe.

The immediate outcome of the Troppau conference was a summons to the King of Naples to attend a fresh meeting to be held in January 1821 at Laibach. Ferdinand desired nothing better; assuring the newly elected Parliament of his faithfulness to the Constitution, he hurried to Laibach to denounce that Constitution to the sympathetic Powers. An Austrian army marched south and easily defeated the undisciplined troops of Naples. At this one blow the constitutional edifice collapsed. Liberal opinions had not taken—indeed, could not take—deep root in the minds of the most degraded and ignorant population in Italy. Some fortunate leaders fled, others suffered in the ferocious persecution which followed Ferdinand's return.

Before the embers of revolt had been trodden out in the south, Piedmont had burst into flame. As at Naples, the movement began in the army; on March 10 the garrison of Alessandria revolted, demanding the Spanish Constitution and war with Austria, the enemy of national liberty, and was speedily followed by that of Turin. The timid Victor Emanuel, unable to face the crisis and unwilling to concede anything to rebellion, abdicated in favour of his brother

Charles Felix, then absent from the kingdom. As a temporary measure the heir-apparent, Charles Albert, Prince of Carignano, assumed the Regency. The Prince had the reputation of a Liberal; under strong pressure he granted the desired Constitution, but a few days after received orders from the new King to abandon his post. Torn between a certain sympathy for the rebellion and his strong feelings of personal loyalty, Charles Albert at last obeyed the order and fled from Turin. Deprived in this manner of one whom they regarded as a leader, and assailed by a combination of loyal troops and Austrians, the rebels were defeated at Novara, and in Piedmont also the brief dream of liberty was rudely broken. For nine years Italy lay helpless under the rule of her despots, with Austria always in the background ready to hurl its armies against any revolutionary attempt.

But even while Metternich was rejoicing over the collapse of the revolution in Italy, the Christian subjects of the Turk were rising upon their master. The war for the independence of Greece had begun. A few words of explanation are needed to make the situation in the Near East comprehensible.

In the early years of the nineteenth century competent observers regarded the Ottoman Empire as in full decay. Outwardly it was still imposing enough, for the Sultan ruled over the whole Balkan Peninsula, Egypt, Asia Minor, the Levant, and Arabia. But over important parts of these dominions his rule was little more than nominal. Egypt was practically independent under its viceroys, while many of the local governors in European Turkey ruled with but scant respect for the Government at Constantinople. The political status of the subject populations varied. The fierce tribesmen of Montenegro still enjoyed

independence under their Vladikas, or Prince-Bishops, though this independence was never recognised by the Porte. The Serbians had won partial autonomy under the rule of an elected prince, Milosh Obrenovich; tribute was still paid and Turkish garrisons remained in the land, otherwise there was little interference from without. National ideas or aspirations towards liberty had not yet penetrated into Bulgaria; there the peasants laboured as of old, despoiled by tax-gatherers and landowners, preserving their Slavonic tongue, but forgotten by the outside world. The territory now known as Roumania was, in 1821, still divided into two distinct provinces, Wallachia and Moldavia. Over these provinces the Russian Government since 1774 had exercised a species of protectorate. The Porte contented itself with appointing the Hospodars, or Princes, and receiving the annual tribute. Social organisation was still quite feudal, the peasants being bound to the glebes of the nobles.

The conditions of the Greeks varied in different parts of the Empire. Some of the islands enjoyed practical autonomy; their inhabitants were courageous seamen and skilful traders. The peasants of the mainland were not so fortunate; they paid the tithe and the capitation-tax, and often suffered from the exactions of Turkish landowners and governors. But, like the rest of their fellow-Christians, they enjoyed a large measure of religious liberty; for the Turk, save in moments of fanatical rage, was tolerant. It was largely by means of Greeks, indeed, that the other subject races were governed. The Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia were Greeks; the administration was in Greek hands. The great mass of the Christian population was of the Orthodox faith, and this fact gave the Greeks another advantage. By means of the Patriarch at Con-

stantinople—always a Greek—the Sultan was able to maintain his rule over the subject peoples. There was another and worthier reason for the superior position enjoyed by the Greeks, namely, their better education. Alone of the peoples of the Empire they possessed a great literature, and the patriotic labours of men like Adamantios Korais in reforming the language helped to make this literature accessible to a largely literate population. “Degraded as the condition of the Greeks was politically,” wrote Finlay, with the authority of personal knowledge, “it is probable that a larger proportion could read and write than among any other Christian race in Europe.”¹ In spite of these advantages, however, the Greeks suffered like their fellow-subjects from the eternal evils of Turkish rule—a corrupt and oppressive administration, and the absence of any secure and adequate system of justice.

The French Revolution had not been without influence upon the Greeks. Many of them received its political doctrines with avidity; some, like Rhigas (executed in 1794), endeavoured to rouse the patriotism of their countrymen by literary means. As a result of this propaganda a secret society, the Hetairia Philike, was founded in 1814 by some Greek merchants at Odessa. This organisation spread throughout the land, carrying on a propaganda for the overthrow of the Turk and the re-establishment of the Greek Empire. Its members looked to Russia for support, and found a friend in Capodistrias, the Tsar’s Foreign Minister. In 1821 the moment seemed favourable for armed revolt, since the Sultan’s forces were fully occupied in suppressing his revolted vassal, the infamous Ali Pacha of Joannina. Capodistrias was offered the leadership of the revolt, but refused, and the office fell to Prince Alexander

¹ *History of Greece*, vol. vi. p. 16.

Ypsilanti, son of a former Hospodar of Wallachia, who had served with the Russian army.

With singular lack of judgment, the first blow was struck in Moldavia. Ypsilanti crossed the Pruth on March 6, 1821, calling on the people to revolt, and proclaiming (quite falsely) that he was supported by "a Great Power," in other words, by Russia. The movement was foredoomed to failure. The native population detested the Greeks who had been the active agents of Turkish rule, and Ypsilanti was quite incompetent for the task to which he had set his hand. The Turks soon rallied from their first surprise, and defeated a band of Greeks in Ypsilanti's service. Repudiated by Russia and threatened by the Roumanians, the leader abandoned the remainder of his followers and fled to Austrian territory, only to be kept a prisoner till his death in 1828. The remnants of the revolt were soon crushed, and the movement ended without profit to the Hellenic cause. The Roumanians, however, were the gainers, in that the Sultan, naturally embittered against the Greeks, consented in 1822 to choose the Hospodars henceforward from among the native nobility.

The movement in Greece itself was more fortunate. Towards the end of March a number of isolated attacks upon Turks took place, followed in the succeeding months by a general rising in the Morea. The war was one of extermination on the part of the Greeks; centuries of oppression were avenged by massacres which the Government at Constantinople was not slow to imitate. Its crowning act of vengeance, which filled the whole Orthodox world with horror, was to put the Patriarch of Constantinople, the head of the Greek Church in the Ottoman dominions, to death upon Easter Sunday. His body was barbarously insulted and then flung into the sea.

Undeterred by this and similar atrocities, the insurrection spread throughout continental Greece and gained the islands, whence the hardy Hydriote and Psariote sailors put forth to harry Turkish commerce. Invasions of the revolted provinces were defeated in 1822 by the heroic defence of Missolonghi, and the complete overthrow of Dramali, near Corinth, in the August of that year. In spite of the internal quarrels, leading to actual civil war upon more than one occasion, which disgraced the Greek cause, it became increasingly clear that this new revolutionary movement was not a mere passing outbreak but a serious bid for national independence.

As such it attracted the anxious attention of the Powers. The traditional policy of Russia was to champion the interests of the Ottoman Christians against the Porte and to use this motive as the excuse for expansion at Turkish expense. Both England and Austria now brought all their influence to bear to restrain Alexander from assisting the revolted Greeks, and were successful. Whatever his sympathies with his fellow-Christians may have been, the Tsar had pledged himself too deeply to uphold the cause of established governments now to return upon that policy. He abandoned the Greeks to their fate.

But this agreement of the Powers was not maintained in the case of Spain, whose internal troubles had long since excited the jealous attention of the French Government, now in the hands of the followers of the Comte d'Artois. The promulgation of the Spanish Constitution had been the signal for fierce strife between moderates and extremists, aggravated, on the one hand, by the overbearing demeanour of Riego and the military leaders of the revolt, and on the other, by the underhand intrigues of Ferdinand, who had been imploring foreign aid ever since 1820. Anti-clerical

laws passed by the Cortes brought the Church into opposition to the Constitution, and absolutist bands, largely organised by priests, began to ravage the provinces, receiving secret support from the King. The French royalists felt a natural sympathy for a Bourbon monarch beset by rebels, and at a Conference of the Powers which met at Verona in October 1822, France proposed that she should intervene to restore order in Spain with their collective support. To this proposal, England, whose foreign policy was now directed by the great statesman, Canning, refused assent; in his view, Spain ought to be left to manage its own affairs. In spite of this, however, a French army invaded Spain in April 1823, and, after a brief campaign, overthrew the Government and rescued Ferdinand from its hands. A horrible reaction followed. The excesses committed by the restored monarchy were such that even the French were driven to protest, though unavailingly.

The events in Spain typified the political condition of continental Europe. Reaction was everywhere the order of the day, in Germany, Italy, and France, where the death of Louis XVIII., in September 1824, brought the bigoted Comte d'Artois to the throne as Charles X. Save in Greece, where the rebellion still maintained itself, the policy of Metternich, solidly supported by Prussia and the Tsar, threatened the destruction of all freedom. The practical secession of England from the Great Alliance, emphasised by its recognition of the independence of the revolted Spanish colonies in South America, certainly weakened, but was not sufficient to destroy, the system.

CHAPTER III

THE MOVEMENTS OF 1830

THE death of Alexander I., in 1825, dealt a serious blow to the "Holy Alliance" and its policy. His successor, Nicholas I., hated Liberalism even more fiercely than his brother, but he never adopted Alexander's policy of subordination to Austria. His accession was marked by an outbreak which bore curious witness to the widespread influence of revolutionary ideas. A plot had been hatched by some military officers, who took advantage of the vacancy of the throne to organise a mutiny which was suppressed without serious difficulty. One of the leaders of the conspiracy,¹ Pestel, who had served in France with the army of occupation in 1815, thus described the evolution of his opinions: "I saw then (at the Restoration) that the greater part of the essential institutions of the Revolution were conserved, since the Restoration of the monarchy, as beneficial things. . . . I concluded from this that apparently it was not so bad as it had been represented to us, and even that there was much good in it. I was confirmed in my ideas by considering that the States where it had not taken place continued to be deprived of many rights

¹ Known as that of the "Decembrists," from the month in which the outbreak occurred.

and liberties." Confronted, on his return to Russia, by a despotic government and the enslavement of the peasantry, there "commenced to germinate in me ideas of constitutional monarchy and of revolution; these last were still feeble and obscure, but little by little they became stronger and more distinct. . . . From ideas of constitutional monarchy I passed to republican ideas."¹ This movement, which received no popular support, merely served as the pretext for fresh despotic measures on the part of the Tsar.

The situation in the Near East continued to receive serious attention from the Powers. Until 1824 the Greeks were generally successful in their operations against the Turks, but in that year the Sultan, despairing of victory if left to his own resources, called to his aid the Viceroy of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, who despatched powerful naval and military forces, commanded by his son Ibrahim, to the help of his nominal sovereign. Against this fresh attack the Greeks, deeply divided by political feuds, were unable to make headway; serious defeats were inflicted upon them, Missolonghi was captured after an heroic resistance, and in August 1826 Athens also fell. It became increasingly apparent that only foreign intervention could save Greece, even though its disastrous internal divisions had been temporarily healed by the election of Capodistrias² as President.

As has been pointed out, the accession of Nicholas I. emancipated Russia from Austrian influence, and this made intervention possible. On July 6, 1827, England, France, and Russia concluded a treaty which pledged them to mediate between the belligerents, and, meanwhile, to enforce an armistice upon them. The refusal of the Porte

¹ Quoted in Lavisso et Rambaud, *Histoire Générale*, vol. ix.

² See p. 74.

and of Ibrahim to accept the armistice led to the destruction of their fleets by the allies at Navarino.¹ This blow was followed up in the spring of 1828 by a declaration of war on the part of Russia, and the invasion of the Danubian Principalities. Shortly after, with the assent of England, a French expedition drove Ibrahim's troops out of the Morea. The Turks offered an unexpectedly powerful resistance to the Russians, but were finally overcome, and in 1829 concluded the Treaty of Adrianople, which accepted the proposal of the three Powers, namely, that Greece should become a self-governing though tributary state, under the rule of a foreign Prince. This solution was rejected by Capodistrias, as was a further proposal which would have made Greece independent, but within very restricted frontiers. The President, however, was assassinated in 1831, and the advent of a Whig Government in England, and of Louis Philippe in France,² led to the offer of more generous terms. On May 7, 1832, was signed a treaty which made Greece an independent state under the guarantee of England, France, and Russia, with a frontier running from the Gulf of Arta to that of Volo, and placed on its throne Prince Otto of Bavaria.

While the negotiations which led to the establishment of Greek independence were proceeding, Europe was shaken by a revolutionary outburst infinitely more serious than that of 1820. The storm first broke in France. The accession of Charles X. had led to steadily increasing political tension, which finally resulted in revolution. The first act of the new reign was to carry a measure which endowed the *émigrés* who had suffered expropriation during the Revolution with a compensation of a thousand million francs. This imposed upon the revenue an annual charge

¹ October 20, 1827.

² See below, p. 82.

of thirty million francs, but as a set-off the existing 5 per cent stock was converted to 3 per cent. Such a measure naturally appeared to the moneyed classes as spoliation for the benefit of the landed aristocracy, and the Government was henceforth faced by the hostility of capitalists and bankers. Other measures deeply offended that large body of educated Frenchmen who had inherited the anti-clerical opinions of the Republicans. Conventual establishments for women were once more permitted, sacrilege was made punishable by death, and the Jesuits were allowed to return to France by ministerial order. Finally, an unsuccessful attempt was made to reintroduce entails and the privileges of primogeniture into French law. Opposition to this legislation was met by a renewed censorship of the press, and when the National Guard¹ demonstrated against it, it was disbanded. In spite of this, however, the Opposition gained a victory at the elections in December 1827, and a new Ministry had to be formed with the Vicomte de Martignac at its head. His policy was in some sort a reversion to that of the early years of the Restoration; without surrender to the Liberals, he abandoned the extreme Royalists, and, in consequence, incurred the hostility of both. The King viewed this lukewarm policy with disfavour, and in August 1829 placed the Prince de Polignac in office.

Polignac was an *émigré*, notorious for his conspiracies with foreign Powers during the Revolution, and his appointment was a direct challenge to the nation. As such, it was criticised in a memorial sent to the King by 221 Opposition deputies in March 1830, but Charles's only reply was to dissolve the Chamber. At the elections in July a

¹ A civic force, recruited at this time from the propertied classes.

largely increased number of Liberals were returned, and in reply the King issued three ordinances, dissolving the new Chamber before it had met, altering the electoral law, and enacting fresh measures for the suppression of press criticism.

The Opposition was faced with a crisis, but the Liberal deputies were not prepared for revolt. The initiative passed to a small band of Republicans, mostly students and workmen, who began to build barricades on July 27. The Government was unprepared and insufficiently provided with troops; attempts to disperse the insurrectionists failed, and on the 29th such of the military as remained loyal retreated from Paris. From a revolt the movement had grown to a revolution. At this moment a group of Liberal deputies came forward with a proposal that the crown should pass from the elder to the younger branch of the Bourbons, and that the Duke of Orleans should be made King. "A republic," they urged, "would embroil us with all Europe. The Duke of Orleans is a prince devoted to the cause of the Revolution. He has borne the tricolour standard in the midst of battle, he alone can bear it again." Two deputies, Thiers and Lafitte (the former well known as a literary man, the latter a great banker), brought the Duke to Paris, where he was installed by the Chamber as Lieutenant-General of the realm. The Republicans offered no serious opposition, Charles X. speedily fled to England, and on August 7 Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, was proclaimed King of the French.

Certain constitutional changes followed; the initiative in legislation passed to the Chambers; press-censorships were forbidden. The amount of direct taxes which qualified for the franchise was lowered to 200 francs, and peerages ceased to be hereditary. The Government, in short,

rested upon the middle class; the mass of wage-earners and peasants were still excluded from any control over its proceedings. At the same time the position of the Crown was radically altered, since Louis Philippe had accepted his office at the hands of Parliament, and thus recognised its political superiority.

The first echo of the July revolution was heard in the Netherlands. The union of Belgium with Holland had never been really popular in the former country; the Belgians were overwhelmingly Catholic, and Holland was a Protestant state. The Dutch Public Debt, moreover, was enormous, and the Belgians found themselves saddled with heavy and irritating taxes to meet liabilities they had not themselves contracted. Language, again, was a bar to effective union; though Flemish is closely akin to Dutch, most educated Belgians spoke French. The policy of King William I. was not calculated to allay these discords. The Constitution gave him large powers, which he used with more vigour than discretion. Belgian representation in the States-General, or Parliament, was equal to that of Holland, and as many members were susceptible to official influence, the deputies who desired to uphold national rights found themselves in a permanent minority. These rights were soon seriously attacked. In 1819 a knowledge of Dutch was demanded from all candidates for public employment, and in 1822 Dutch was made the official language. One result of this policy was that by 1830 Dutchmen had acquired an almost complete monopoly of public offices. Opposition to these measures was treated with great rigour, the press in particular being subjected to severe persecution.

Resistance to Dutch rule came from two quarters: from the Catholics, who were concerned primarily with religious matters, and from the Liberals, much influenced by French

thought, who took their stand upon constitutional and national rights. In 1828 these parties coalesced to organise a national agitation, and were able to reject governmental measures in the States-General. The King, however, refused all concessions; it rained press-prosecutions. By 1830 Belgian national feeling had been wrought up to a revolutionary pitch.

The necessary stimulus came from the events in Paris. On August 25 an insurrection began in Brussels, and being successful there, spread rapidly throughout the land. A Dutch attempt to retake the capital was defeated, and a National Congress, which met in November, declared Belgium an independent state, and drew up a Constitution. But the fate of the country could not be decided by itself alone, for, as the creation of the Powers, the Kingdom of the Netherlands was the object of international concern. But Europe had already moved far from the Congress of Vienna; neither France nor England would permit the Belgians to be overthrown by foreign intervention. At a Congress in London it was agreed that Belgium should become independent, and Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg became King of the new state. Holland, however, refused to accept this decision and invaded Belgian territory, only to be repulsed by a French army, acting with the consent of the Powers. In the negotiations which followed Belgium suffered some losses of territory, but its status as an independent and neutral state, under international guarantee, was fixed in 1832, though the Dutch did not finally accept the new position till 1839.

The effects of the revolution at Paris were not confined to Belgium. In December there were risings in Modena, Parma, and the Papal States, French assistance being expected, but this was not forthcoming, and Austrian

troops speedily restored order. The rulers of Brunswick, Hesse-Cassel, and Saxony were obliged to grant Constitutions to their subjects. But the revolt which in November broke out in Poland was of a more serious character than either the Italian or German movements.

The abandonment of Liberal ideas by Alexander I. had led to the practical suspension of the Constitution with which he had endowed Poland. Between 1820 and 1825 the Diet was not summoned to meet. The inevitable result was the formation of secret societies which spread patriotic ideas throughout the land and entered into relations with the Russians, who organised the plot of December 1825. The "Decembrist" conspiracy caused the new Tsar to regard all constitutional experiments with suspicion, but the Polish Diet was not dissolved; indeed, Nicholas opened it in person in 1830. Discontent, however, continued to grow; the Polish army was deeply affected, and when, as a result of the events in France and Belgium, the Tsar began to contemplate a war with the former state, the storm broke.

On November 29 a military insurrection in Warsaw made the Poles masters of the city, and speedily of the whole kingdom. A national Government was organised, and as the Tsar obdurately refused all concessions, he was declared dethroned. Unfortunately for themselves there were divisions in the Polish ranks; moderates and extremists, factions which inevitably appear in revolutionary movements, were not agreed as to policy, and the excellent Polish army was not very efficiently led. Even under these circumstances the Russians suffered several checks, and it was not until September 1831 that Warsaw surrendered to their forces.

A system of stern repression was applied to the

unfortunate country. The Constitution was immediately suppressed and the government entrusted to Russian officials. Many of those who had taken part in the insurrection were dragged to miserable exile in Siberia ; others, more fortunate, dispersed themselves throughout Europe, to play, in every revolutionary movement during the next generation, the parts of "agents and vectors of revolution."¹

¹ H. A. L. Fisher, *The Republican Tradition in Europe*, p. 213.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEW NATIONALISM

THE revolutionary movements of 1830 left the political fabric erected in 1815 shaken, but not overthrown. Legitimism had been swept away in France, the independence of Greece and Belgium was assured, but the last remnants of liberty had been destroyed in Poland and the condition of Italy remained as hopeless as before. As if in answer to the challenge flung down by the revolutionists, the absolutist states of Central and Eastern Europe consolidated their forces once more. Under the inspiration of Metternich, Russia, Austria, and Prussia renewed their coalition against liberty. The secret clauses of the Treaty of Berlin, 1833, explicitly recognised the right of sovereigns to call foreign aid to assist them in domestic difficulties. This was not the Austrian Chancellor's only triumph. In Germany the Liberal movement had revived; secret societies and clubs were organised and a press campaign begun in which Heinrich Heine was conspicuous. The movement, strongly affected by French and Polish influences, tended towards republicanism, and a demonstration at Hambach in May 1832 gave Metternich his opportunity. The machinery of the Federal Diet was set in motion and a series of articles promulgated, which, to describe the

matter briefly, established a Federal right of veto over State legislation which conflicted with the privileges of sovereigns or threatened the security of the Federation—as conceived by Metternich.¹ Once more the Universities were subjected to surveillance, books and newspapers were rigidly censored, and public meetings were prohibited. The natural exasperation aroused by such legislation led to an insurrection at Frankfort in 1833, but this was easily suppressed, and the hand of Metternich continued to weigh heavily upon Germany. When the King of Hanover in 1837 abolished the Constitution set up by his predecessor, and drove a number of distinguished professors¹ who protested from the University of Göttingen, Metternich defended him and prevented the interference of the Diet, invoked by Bavaria and other minor states. Heine commented in characteristic fashion upon the events of this period: “The wind of the Paris Revolution blew about the candles in the dark night of Germany, so that the red curtains of a German throne or two caught fire; but the old watchmen, who do the police of the German kingdoms, are already bringing out the fire engines, and will keep the candles closer snuffed for the future.”

The gloom, however, of the “dark night of Germany” was relieved by one faint ray of hope, feeble as yet, but promising greater things. While political unity seemed as far off as ever, the ability of some enlightened Prussian administrators was uniting the economic activities of the country. The existence of so many frontiers was inevitably a barrier to the development of commerce, thus hampered in its natural course. The difficulty could only be surmounted by a Zollverein or Customs Union, and the foundations of such a work were laid in 1819, when the

¹ Among them was the great philologist, Grimm.

Prussian Motz negotiated a Customs Treaty with the little state of Schwarzburg-Sonderhausen. Later, as Minister of Finance, he successfully developed his policy, in spite of opposition in the Diet, and of the establishment in 1828 of rival Unions in the south and middle states. After a brief conflict even this obstacle was surmounted, and the northern and southern leagues entered into a treaty. The third Union was undermined by desertions, and by 1844 something approaching internal free-trade had been established throughout the greater part of Germany. Under this system there was a considerable commercial and industrial expansion, and the modern economic power of Germany may fairly be ascribed to the labours of Motz and his collaborators.

While German political life was thus, almost imperceptibly, in process of revolution (for industrial development led necessarily to the emergence of new social groups whose interests differed from or were hostile to those of the old directing classes), Italy also was experiencing change, both moral and intellectual. The failures of the movements of 1830 had convinced all capable of understanding that emancipation, whether national or political, could not be achieved by the outworn methods of the Carbonari. A larger, more generous, creed was necessary, and in the years succeeding 1830 this was supplied by a man whose name is inseparably linked with that of liberated Italy.—Joseph Mazzini.

Born in 1805, he became engaged in political conspiracy at an early age, and in 1830 suffered imprisonment at the hands of the Piedmontese Government. Driven into exile in the following year, he founded at Marseilles an organisation called “Young Italy” for the propagation of Republican and Nationalist ideas. Of profoundly religious tempera-

ment, he took "God and the People" for his watchword, and all his teaching was fired by a powerful moral fervour which appealed especially to the native generosity of youth. To Mazzini, a nation was not a political unit to which men attached themselves from motives of self-interest, but a moral personality, charged with a divine mission. Disregard of nationality, therefore, was not merely oppressive but blasphemous. Only in an atmosphere of freedom—national, social, personal—could men rightly perform those duties of which the fulfilment was their reason of being. Nor did the prophet's personal life (for Mazzini was essentially a prophet) conflict with this high teaching. His biography is one long record of self-sacrifice and abnegation. Like Browning's "Italian in England," he might truthfully have said at any moment of his life :

How very long since I have thought
Concerning—much less wished for—ought
Beside the good of Italy,
For which I live and mean to die !

Led by so powerful a personality, the new movement carried its secret propaganda throughout Italy, and soon numbered its adherents by thousands. But Mazzini was not content with propaganda—he believed in action. His thoughts turned to Piedmont where Charles Albert, who had played so dubious a part in the movement of 1820, was now reigning. A military plot was organised which was to compel the King to concede Liberal institutions and hurl himself against the Austrians in Lombardy. The conspiracy was discovered, and a terrible repression followed. Torture was used to extract confessions; courts-martial condemned twelve conspirators to death and many others to imprisonment. But Mazzini was not disheartened. In February 1834 he broke into Savoy with a small band of

volunteers, hoping to organise a revolt, to assist which a young sailor called Garibaldi was to stir up the fleet. But the plan failed, and the volunteers disbanded; Mazzini was obliged to fly first to Switzerland and then to England, while Garibaldi departed to South America. The movement seemed crushed, but the propaganda of "Young Italy" had left its mark. Deprived of political activities men turned to literature, and such authors as Niccolini and Guérazzi braved the censorship in order to keep the flame of patriotism alive.

If despotism remained unshaken in Italy, Spain was racked by spasms of revolt alternating with savage repression. From his restoration to his death King Ferdinand pursued a policy of implacable persecution against every one suspected of Liberal sympathies. To be a Freemason, for example, was to incur the punishment of death. Insurrections in 1831 and 1832 were put down with the utmost violence. The King's death in 1833 merely brought a fresh evil upon the unhappy country in the shape of a disputed succession. In 1830 Ferdinand had issued an Act which made his infant daughter, Isabel, heir to the throne in place of his brother, Don Carlos. To the latter rallied all those elements in the country which hated the very name of Liberalism, and the Queen Regent, Cristina, was obliged to rely upon the more progressive parties for support. The civil war which began in 1833 raged for seven years, the situation being complicated by frequent insurrections of the extreme democrats. This disastrous epoch in Spanish history was brought to an end in 1840 by Cristina's abdication and abandonment of the government to the Radicals, with a successful general—Espantero—at their head.

The reign of Louis Philippe in France falls into two

almost equal periods. From 1830 to 1840 the new dynasty was constantly engaged in a struggle to maintain itself against divers enemies; from 1840 onwards its position seemed assured till, in 1848, it was overwhelmed by the revolutionary tide which then swept over Europe. The opponents of the Orleans monarchy fell into two groups: the Legitimists, who desired the restoration of the elder Bourbons, and the Republicans. The former drew their strength from the old aristocracy, the clergy, and the more backward among the rural populations. Their programme, in so far as it was defined, was a return to the methods of the old monarchy. The Republicans on principle were few in number, but they had the support of those who desired the democratisation of French government and a spirited foreign policy. This last point was of considerable importance. The restored monarchy had never been able to shake off the reputation of having been forced upon France by foreign bayonets; as time went on the miseries entailed by the wars of the Republic and the Empire were forgotten, and men remembered only that France had once been the master of Europe. Hostility to the settlement of 1815 and to the European system which grew out of it, became a cardinal point of the Republican creed.

This desire for a foreign policy directed against the Vienna Treaty, shared, it may be remarked, by many who were not Republicans, conflicted with the policy dictated to Louis Philippe, alike by his personal opinions and the interests of his most powerful supporters. As has been pointed out, the new dynasty rested for support upon the moneyed classes, whose political creation it was (the first two Ministries of the reign both had financiers at their head), and this section of society naturally had little sympathy with the policy of the "party of movement," as

it was called. The Government refused to intervene on behalf of the Italian and Polish revolutions, and thus drew upon itself increased hostility.

The Republicans, organised in secret societies, of which one called "The Rights of Man" was the most powerful, prepared to repeat for their own advantage the *coup* which had overthrown Charles X. There were outbreaks in Paris in 1830 and 1831, and at Grenoble in March 1832. These were not serious, but a fresh attempt at Paris in June 1832 was of a more dangerous character. The moment was well chosen, for the Government was embarrassed by a Legitimist movement in La Vendée, inspired by the Duchesse de Berry. Advantage was taken of the funeral of General Lamarque, an old soldier of the Empire who had played an active part in the Parliamentary struggle against Charles X., to organise an imposing demonstration which speedily became an insurrection. The fighting lasted for two days, and 25,000 troops, in addition to the National Guard, were needed to crush the revolt. In 1834 the Republicans struck again, this time at Lyons, where economic strengthened political discontent. The silk-weavers had revolted against their employers in 1831, and when, in February 1834, a strike broke out the authorities prosecuted certain of those concerned. The weavers had been organised by the Republicans, and an insurrection followed which took five days to subdue. There were sympathetic movements in many places, including Paris, and this last was only suppressed at the cost of considerable bloodshed. The Government had endeavoured to combat these movements by press-prosecutions (one Republican newspaper, the *Tribune*, was prosecuted 111 times in four years) and a law against the secret societies, but the rising of 1834, and an attempt to assassinate the King in

1835, led to the passing of severe measures which sent persons accused of political crimes before special courts, and subjected the press to rigid restrictions. These drastic measures sufficed to check Republicanism; an isolated manifestation in 1839 had no serious consequences.

Louis Philippe had triumphed over the open enemies of his throne; he was also successful in a conflict with a different type of opponent. The role which the Crown should play in politics was the question on which parties now divided. One, led by Thiers, demanded that the principle, "The King reigns but does not govern," should be acted upon; the other desired that the personal will of the sovereign should be an active factor in the work of government. This last party had the support of Louis Philippe, whose constitutionalism was not very profound. The struggles of the parties lasted till 1840, when the King's policy was finally victorious. In 1839 a Ministry was forced upon him by the Chamber of which Thiers was the leading spirit. It nearly led France into a war against the rest of Europe. The Sultan of Turkey was in conflict with his vassal, Mehemet Ali, Viceroy of Egypt, and received the support of the Powers, notably of England and Russia. Thiers, suspicious of Russian designs, threw the weight of France upon the side of Mehemet, and in 1840 began serious military preparations. An invasion of Germany was expected,¹ alarm was widespread in Europe, but the King suddenly dismissed Thiers and called Guizot, well known as historian and politician, to office. This ended the crisis, and for the next seven years the King's policy, expressed through his subservient Minister, was victorious.

Though the movement of 1830 had produced such com-

¹ The German national song, "Die Wacht am Rhein," dates from this crisis.

paratively small results, the spirit of change had not failed to penetrate even that fortress of reaction, the Austrian Empire. Metternich found himself confronted with a national self-consciousness which boded ill for the maintenance of his conservative system.

In Bohemia the movement was cultural rather than political. After the destruction of Bohemian independence in the Thirty Years' War, the Czech language was abandoned to the uneducated classes and ceased to be used for literary purposes. The wholesale destruction of works in the vernacular—in which destruction the Jesuits took a prominent part—was one of the main factors in producing this decadence. The first third of the nineteenth century witnessed a remarkable revival, due to the devoted labours of a band of scholars who studied with a passionate enthusiasm the language, literature, and history of their nation. Old texts were edited, dictionaries prepared, and, most important of all, in 1836 Francis Palacký published his *History of Bohemia*, the first adequate and scientific work devoted to the subject in modern times. The movement had to be carried on in the teeth of a vexatious censorship—Palacký was subjected to odious annoyance in the preparation of this great history—but it had as its result the awakening of the Czechs to a sense of nationality and a feeling of solidarity with the other Slavonic peoples.

In Hungary political and literary revival went hand in hand. The old feudal Diet had survived, though it was seldom called together by the Government. When this occurred in 1825 and 1830, a certain amount of opposition was offered to the Government's proposals, an opposition which increased in the Diet of 1833, when for the first time Kossuth, soon to be a figure of European importance, took his seat. From this year dates the formation in Hungary

of a party which advocated Liberalism in the Western sense of the word—use of the national language, abolition of feudalism, and so forth. The Government did not fail to attack the new movement, Kossuth and others were imprisoned, but it continued to grow and attract to itself the best elements of the Magyar people.

CHAPTER V

THE EVE OF REVOLUTION

THE history of Europe from 1840 to 1848 is a record of steadily accumulating discontents pressing upon established institutions as floods beat upon a dyke. If one weak place gave way the whole barrier would be overwhelmed. The time was one of changing standards, alike in social and intellectual life. The Romantic movement transformed French literature; in Germany the philosophy of Hegel was developed by his disciples into a weapon of aggression against the established order. Everywhere, too, the utilisation of machinery in industry and the introduction of railways served to revolutionise economic activities. A new Europe was manifestly in process of birth; the question for the future to solve was whether Metternich and the men of the "system" could strangle it in its cradle.

In Germany, the rapid development of almost universal discontent was particularly marked. The death of Frederick William III. of Prussia in 1840 brought about the familiar situation of a new monarch being endowed by the popular mind with views and intentions which he was far from possessing. Frederick William IV. was quite incapable of satisfying the demands of Liberal Germany. "He had made himself acquainted," wrote a contemporary, "in an

amateur sort of way, with the rudiments of most sciences, and thought himself, therefore, learned enough to consider final his judgment upon every subject. He made sure he was a first-rate orator, and there was certainly no commercial traveller in Berlin who could beat him either in prolixity of pretended wit or in fluency of elocution. And, above all, he had his opinions. He hated and despised the bureaucratic element of the Prussian Monarchy, but only because all his sympathies were with the feudal element. . . . He aimed at a restoration, as complete as possible, of the predominant social position of the nobility. The King, first nobleman of his realm, surrounded in the first instance by a splendid court of mighty vassals, princes, dukes and counts ; in the second instance, by a numerous and wealthy lower nobility ; ruling according to his discretion over his loyal burgesses and peasants, and thus being himself the chief of a complete hierarchy of social ranks or castes, each of which was to enjoy its particular privileges, and to be separated from the others by the almost insurmountable barrier of birth, or of a fixed, unalterable social position ; the whole of these castes, or ' estates of the realm ' balancing each other at the same time so nicely in power and influence that a complete independence should remain to the King—such was the *beau ideal* which Frederick William IV. undertook to realise." The portrait is by a hostile hand, but its general truth is unquestionable.

The reign began well. An amnesty was granted to political offenders ; three of the professors expelled from Hanover received Prussian appointments, and Boyen, a Liberal minister, driven from office in 1819, was restored in 1841. A vigorous Liberal movement speedily appeared in Prussia, particularly in Silesia, where the rapid growth of industrialism produced deep social and political dis-

content; in East Prussia, a stronghold of the liberation movement of 1813, and the Rhinelands, then very susceptible to French intellectual influences. In this last district the most outspoken organ of democratic opinion was the *Rheinische Zeitung*, then edited by a young man of Jewish descent—Karl Marx, who thus served his apprenticeship to revolutionary politics. So vigorous, indeed, was his criticism, that the journal was suppressed in 1843.

This new outburst of Liberalism, and particularly the demand for constitutional government which was the first item on the reformers' programme, greatly angered the King. His failure to satisfy this aspiration merely drove larger numbers of the people into the opposition camp. But now arose a problem of increasing urgency, which affords an interesting example of the influence of economic forces upon political situations. In Prussia, as throughout Europe at this period, the question of railway construction was of pressing importance. Private enterprise was unequal to the task, and the State could not undertake it without resort to a loan. But a Royal Order of 1820 had pledged the monarchy not to borrow without reference to the representatives of the population. The King, therefore, was faced by a serious dilemma and was driven more and more to contemplate constitutional change, though this course was opposed by his brother (afterwards William I.), and by the inevitable Metternich. Everything turned upon the character of the contemplated reform. To a genuinely representative Government, exercising control over state policy, Frederick William was unalterably opposed, but his mediaeval tastes led him to sympathise with the idea of an assembly of estates on the old feudal plan. The method finally adopted was to bring together in a combined Diet at Berlin representatives of the various provincial

Assemblies of Estates. These, it must be remembered, were all organised upon a system of class-representation of nobles, burghers, and peasants. To these were added in the new Diet a special representation of the higher nobility, intended to act as a sort of House of Lords. The whole scheme has been adequately described by a recent German historian as a "mongrel creation."

This body met on April 11, 1847, and the King gratified his oratorical tastes by an harangue in which he declared, "Never will I allow a written document (*i.e.* a Constitution) to come between God in Heaven and this land in the character of a second Providence, to govern us with its formalities and take the place of ancient loyalty." The Diet was to be confined, save in matters of taxation, to petition and discussion. Such a programme no longer satisfied current aspirations. The majority in the Diet demanded more extended functions, and finally rejected the royal proposals for a state loan. The Diet was dissolved on June 20.

These events caused a great sensation throughout Germany, where, indeed, the tide of discontent was steadily rising. In Baden, in 1846, a Liberal ministry had been imposed upon the Grand-Duke. At Leipzig, in 1847, there were labour conflicts, while in Bavaria the King's notorious connection with a Spanish dancer, Lola Montez, caused enormous scandal which found expression in serious riots. "The world is very sick, the condition of Europe is dangerous," wrote Metternich, and the condition of the Austrian Empire gave point to his lamentations.

Even among the German-speaking subjects of the Hapsburg Monarchy—usually the most docile—discontent was gaining ground, but the most serious menace came from the subject nationalities. The attempt to suppress

the nationalist movement in Hungary failed. The Government was obliged to summon the Diet again in 1840, and to release Kossuth and his fellow-prisoners. The radical section increased in strength, and its *intransigéant* attitude led to a fresh attempt at repression after 1843. The local assemblies of the comitats, or counties, were placed under official control, and where resistance was offered it was suppressed by military force. When the Diet at last met again in November 1847, its members, now dominated by Kossuth, were ripe for revolution.

Passionate nationalism, unfortunately, does not always go hand in hand with wise toleration. With singular lack of wisdom, Kossuth and his Magyar supporters raised up enemies among the Slav populations of Hungary. The use of Latin in the Diet was abolished in 1843, and Magyar substituted for it, with the result that the Croatian deputies, whose native tongue was Serb, and who claimed that they represented an associate, and not a subject, kingdom, were driven into opposition. This division was not healed when Magyar was made obligatory in Croatian schools, and the Croat poet Gaj spoke for the whole Slavonic population when he reminded the Magyars that they were "an island in the Slav ocean."

"For a people which has no political liberty," wrote a great Russian author,¹ "literature is the only tribune from which it can cause the cry of its indignation and of its conscience to be heard." We have already noted the importance of literary movements in Greece and in the Austrian Empire; and in Italy, between 1840 and 1846, the most important symptoms of the slowly forming desire for national liberty and unity were books. The underground revolutionary propaganda continued, the ideas of

¹ Alexander Herzen.

“ Young Italy ” influenced many, but the repeated failure of isolated insurrectionary attempts deterred even good patriots from whole-heartedly embracing Mazzini’s cause. In 1844, two brothers, Attilio and Emilio Bandiera, Venetians serving in the Austrian navy, made a descent into Calabria, hoping to organise a revolt. They received no popular support and were speedily overwhelmed. Twelve members of the expedition were shot. The heroism of the Bandieras evoked general sympathy, but their action was not unnaturally regarded as a reckless waste of valuable life. The republican movement received a severe check. Men turned to economic reform, to the improvement of agriculture and the organisation of railways, which might some day “ stitch the boot ” and unite Italy, or to literature.

In 1843 two books were published which created a deep impression. They were *The Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians*, by Gioberti, and *The Hopes of Italy*, by Cesare Balbo. The former appealed to the Pope to put himself at the head of an Italian federation; the latter looked rather to Piedmont and Charles Albert for Italy’s deliverance. The ideas of Balbo were of more immediate practical importance. Piedmontese agents were at work in Central Italy, and one of them, Massimo D’Azeglio, published in 1845 a scathing denunciation of Papal misrule. Charles Albert was not averse to this movement. In 1843, angered by a dispute with Austria over railway questions, he threatened “ to ring every bell from the Ticino to Savoy, and raise the cry of Lombard independence.” He bade D’Azeglio tell his Romagnuol friends that “ when the opportunity came his arms and his treasures would be spent for Italy.” Two personalities seemed to inhabit the body of the King. One was a genuine patriot, desiring the

liberation of Italy; the other, a bigoted pupil of the Jesuits. Between the two policies he balanced perpetually, waiting, as it seemed, for events to determine his actions for him. But in 1846 it appeared that the revolutionary initiative was to pass to the Papacy after all. In that year Cardinal Mastai-Ferretti was elected Pope, as Pius IX.

The new pontiff was one of that long line of rulers in whom mediocre intellect and feeble will betray the desire for good. Pius undoubtedly and sincerely wished Italy well, but his position—at once head of an international Church and temporal sovereign of an Italian state—was one of enormous difficulty. The first act of his reign was to proclaim an amnesty for political offences which released seven hundred persons from exile and prison. This, and his reputation as a reforming Pope, caused him to be received everywhere with enthusiasm, which steadily increased and became an insistent clamour for reform. The censorship was modified, and in 1847 a citizen guard established in Rome.

The spectacle of a reformer enthroned in the Vatican dismayed the despotic sovereigns of Catholic states. The Neapolitan royal family caused prayers to be said for Pius' enlightenment; Metternich prepared for sterner measures. Austria, by treaty right, maintained a garrison in Ferrara; in August 1847 the city was seized, an act which provoked furious indignation. The Pope appealed to Charles Albert, who promised protection and declared publicly that "if God permitted a war for the freedom of Italy, he would place himself at the head of his army." The reform movement soon spread beyond the Papal States. The citizens of Lucca forced their Duke to concede a citizen guard, and so frightened him that he finally sold his life-interest in the state to Tuscany, and incontinently fled. In the

latter state, also, the Duke was obliged to concede reforms and place Liberals in high office. Piedmont concluded a commercial treaty and alliance with Rome and Tuscany; and Charles Albert, mastering his native irresolution, promised a long list of reforms, including relaxation of the censorship, municipal and educational reform, and civil emancipation of the Protestants. In every part of Italy, from Venice to Palermo, there was agitation and unrest.

France could not fail to be stirred by the new wind of liberty blowing across Europe. The policy of stolid conservatism, imposed by Louis Philippe and executed by Guizot—a policy maintained, moreover, by serious political corruption, entirely failed to satisfy two classes which have always played a great part in French politics—the workers of the large towns and the middle-class “intellectuals.” Two movements sprang up, the one seeking political, the other social, change. From 1841 onwards there was an insistent demand for franchise reform which grew stronger from year to year. Various schemes were put forward, ranging from universal suffrage to a lowering of the amount of direct taxation which qualified for a vote. Guizot rejected them all, and the obedient majority in the Chamber, largely made up of Government functionaries, supported him. In 1847 all sections of the opposition, liberal monarchists, radicals, and republicans, united in a great campaign for electoral reform. Public banquets were held all over the country and served as occasions for propaganda. At one of these banquets the poet Lamartine threatened the monarchy with overthrow. “After having had the revolutions of liberty and the counter-revolutions of glory, you will have the revolution of the public conscience and the revolution of disdain.”

The other opposition movement was even more menacing

since it looked beyond political changes to social reconstruction. Ever since the days of the Directory there had been a Socialist movement in France. Under the restored monarchy it was practically confined to secret societies, but after the revolution of 1830 it became openly militant. Many republicans were led to think that economic questions were more important than political. The earlier Socialist writers, Saint-Simon and Fourier, had little influence upon the masses, but in 1839 a small book called *The Organisation of Labour* appeared—its author was a republican journalist, named Louis Blanc—which put a simple and coherent doctrine before the people. Its main practical proposal was that the Government should subsidise co-operative productive associations, “national workshops,” which would be governed by the members. The essential superiority of these, so Blanc held, would lead in time to the complete elimination of the private capitalist, competition would be abolished, and a reign of social justice established. This brief summary does rather less than justice to a book the lucidity and brevity of which contrasted favourably with the complex Utopias set forth in its predecessors. Any question of its merits apart, it undoubtedly produced a deep impression upon working-class opinion, and “the organisation of labour” became the battle-cry of an increasing body of wage-earners.

The economic condition of France was favourable to the spread of such doctrines, for commerce and manufactures were growing apace. At the end of the Empire the total value of French industrial products was calculated as less than 2 milliards of francs ; in 1847 it had risen to 4 milliards. In 1812 the value of chemical products was 5 million francs ; in 1847, 55 millions. Between the same years the amount of raw cotton imported rose from 10 to 55 million

kilogrammes. The rubber industry dated practically from 1831. In 1830 only 16,000 kilogrammes of raw material were imported, but by 1845 the imports had risen to 181,000. The application of steam to manufactures and shipping, and the introduction of railways, swelled the rising tide of industrialism. The inevitable result was a rapid increase of the urban population. Between 1836 and 1846 the number of inhabitants of communes containing more than three thousand persons was increased by nearly 2 millions, almost exactly equal to the total increase of population between those dates. Both real and money wages appear to have risen under the July monarchy, but the hours of labour were often excessive. In the textile industries, working days of fourteen and fifteen hours were frequent, and in mines, of twelve and fourteen hours. Moreover, as nearly always happens in times of rapid industrial development, the standard of conditions under which work was carried on was lamentably low. Such an environment was an excellent forcing-bed for social discontent.

The foreign policy of the Government was not calculated to commend it to public opinion. Rightly or wrongly, it was regarded as willing to sacrifice the national honour to party ends, and as unduly subservient to England. A diplomatic conflict with the latter country over the marriage of the King's son, the Duc de Montpensier, to the sister and heiress of the Queen of Spain, failed to rehabilitate the monarchy in the eyes of France, and by arousing English antagonism weakened its position in the eyes of Europe.

Spain itself continued to be torn by desperate feuds, in which first one faction, then another, possessed itself of the government, and employed corruption or military violence

to maintain its hold. In singular contrast to this anarchy, and to the condition of most Continental states, then obviously drifting towards revolution, were the rapidity and decision with which one of the smallest European countries settled for itself those problems of political liberty and national unity which were convulsing the greater part of Europe.

Switzerland had suffered in 1815 from the conservative reaction then almost universal. The government of the cantons once more became largely oligarchical, and the authority of the Federation over the constituent states was reduced to a minimum. The country vegetated peaceably until 1829, when a movement for cantonal reform began, which, stimulated by the events of 1830, was victorious in several cantons. From then onwards till 1845 there was a general democratic advance throughout the country, the radical reformers, sometimes by force of arms, ousting the old governments and establishing full political liberty. About this latter date, however, religious strife became acute, and the country was divided by confessional rather than political lines. Seven Catholic cantons formed a league known as the "Sonderbund," which looked for assistance to the conservative Powers, and practically set up a new Government inside the Federation. The Radical party answered this menace by a demand for the dissolution of the league and the expulsion of the Jesuits. To obtain a majority in the Federal Diet the governments in certain cantons were overthrown, being replaced by democrats, and in 1847, this process having been completed, the Diet declared the Sonderbund dissolved and the Jesuits expelled. Civil war followed, but the Government was well prepared, and in a three weeks' campaign the forces of secession were completely overthrown. In 1848, while the rest of Europe

was in political convulsions, the Swiss peaceably reformed their institutions. In both the cantons and the Federation universal suffrage was established, together with full civic liberty and equality, and the central Government was endowed with adequate powers of general control. The new Constitution, which closely resembled that of the United States, was accepted by a popular vote or referendum.

BOOK III

CHAPTER I

THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTION (1)

THE year 1848, so fateful in the history of Modern Europe, had scarcely begun when the first revolutionary blow was struck. In the opening days of January there were anti-Austrian riots in Lombardy; on the 13th an insurrection began at Palermo, which soon swept over the whole of Sicily and compelled Ferdinand II. of Naples to concede a Constitution. But the train which was to produce a universal explosion was fired at Paris. Alarmed by the growing clamour for political reform, the Government prohibited a public banquet which the leaders of the movement had arranged to hold in the capital. Street disturbances followed, and it soon became obvious that the middle-class National Guard could not be trusted to act against the working men of the *faubourgs*. Guizot resigned, and it seemed that all might end peaceably, but on the evening of February 23 a conflict with the troops (whether accidental or provoked by design remains doubtful) led to some eighty persons being killed or wounded. There was an immediate rush to arms, and on the 24th Louis Philippe was compelled to abdicate and fly. The democratic deputies elected a Provisional Government, which speedily coalesced with another, nominated by popular

acclaim at the Hôtel de Ville; it included two Socialists—Louis Blanc, and Albert, a workman. On the 25th the Republic was proclaimed.

Two currents of opinion had helped to bring about the Revolution: both desired a democratic republic, but the one desired it as an end in itself, the other as a means by which social reconstruction could be achieved. Thus, from the beginning, the new Government was troubled by a fatal division of purpose which could not fail to produce a conflict for supremacy. For the moment, the Socialist wing, of which Louis Blanc was the recognised leader, was in the ascendant, and was able to adopt a distinctly revolutionary policy in economic affairs. Employment was guaranteed to all who desired it, and the Government decreed “the immediate establishment of national workshops.” Further, a special Commission was instituted, presided over by Blanc and Albert, to discuss measures by which the condition of the workers might be improved.

The use of the phrase “national workshops” in the above-mentioned decree has led to much misunderstanding. As employed by Blanc it meant the establishment of co-operative productive associations, subsidised by the State. The majority in the Government was not prepared to embark on any such policy. What would have been the result of its adoption is matter for interesting speculation; as a matter of fact, the workmen who demanded the redemption of the Government’s pledge were put to excavation and levelling work in the Champ de Mars and elsewhere. The organisation of these relief-works—for they were nothing more—was entrusted to one Émile Thomas, who later wrote an important account of his administration. The inevitable suspension of business caused by the Revolution led to a large increase in the number of unemployed

persons : in the middle of March 25,000 were employed by the Government, in May the number had risen to 100,000. At first, each man received two francs per day, but later, only this sum for each day of work actually done (of which there were only two per week), and one franc for each other day. The scheme, in short, was a very vicious combination of relief-works with outdoor relief ; it was not even a caricature of Blanc's original proposals.

The prominence of the Socialist working men in the Revolution, and their obvious intention to control the new Government, by force if necessary, speedily alarmed the propertied classes, who began to organise resistance and received secret support from the majority in the Provisional Government. For the moment, however, both parties combined to carry out a series of measures accepted by all republicans. The death penalty for political offences was abolished, along with negro slavery in the colonies ; the press was liberated,¹ the salt-tax and the Parisian *octroi* on wine and butcher's meat were repealed. These latter measures necessitated an increase in direct taxation which was much disliked by the large body of small rural proprietors. But beneath the apparent unity of all republican sections the struggle over the labour question continued. When Émile Thomas suggested that the Government should subsidise employers to enable them to keep their works open, Marie, the Minister of Commerce, refused, and declared (according to Thomas) " that the fixed intention of the Government was to let this experiment (of the so-called National Workshops) work itself out, that in itself it could only have good results, because it would demonstrate to the workers themselves the emptiness and falsity

¹ This measure produced an immense crop of popular journals which afford valuable material to the student of the period.

of these impracticable theories ; . . . that, then, disabused for the future, their idolatry for M. Louis Blanc would collapse, and that, henceforward, he would lose all his prestige and strength." This disingenuous method of dealing with a dangerous situation could not fail to have disastrous consequences.

A National Assembly to draw up a new Constitution and regularise the situation was elected on April 23, on a basis of universal suffrage. Most of the deputies returned were moderate republicans, definitely hostile to Socialism, and it speedily became evident that a new crisis was approaching. Louis Blanc was excluded from the executive commission elected by the Assembly, which also refused to create a Ministry of Labour. Provoked by this direct challenge, some leaders of the revolutionary clubs organised an attack on the Chamber and proclaimed a new revolutionary Government, to which, in spite of their protests, Blanc and Albert were nominated. The insurrection, however, was suppressed by the National Guard ; Albert was arrested, and Blanc compelled to fly from the country. Emboldened by this success the Assembly next determined to suppress the "workshops." On June 21 they were declared dissolved, and the workers told that if they did not disperse quietly force would be employed. The answer was a fresh revolt of the most determined character. The Government, however, had troops in reserve, and after four days' desperate barricade fighting, the insurrection was suppressed. It is impossible to state the full number of the casualties ; one estimate places them at 16,000. Of the insurgents 11,000 were made prisoners and deported *en masse*. So ended the first phase of the Revolution in France.

The February revolution in Paris was a tocsin which

called every reformer in Europe to arms. In the weeks that followed no sound was heard on the Continent but the crash of falling Governments, and the fierce rejoicings of liberated peoples. The Hapsburg monarchy, which, for a generation, had been the main prop and bulwark of absolutism and privilege, was among the first to be overwhelmed. On March 13 the people of Vienna rose and compelled the resignation of Metternich. His secret flight seemed fittingly to symbolise the old order creeping shamefacedly into the night before the anger of awakened justice. This triumph was speedily followed by the grant of a Constitution. The Magyars were already moving; since November 1847 the Hungarian Liberals, who now, under Kossuth's leadership, dominated the Diet, had been preparing for battle with the Viennese Government and their own reactionary magnates. The events at Vienna merely hastened their action; on the morrow of Metternich's fall a deputation presented their demands to the Emperor, who hastened to concede them. They included responsible government, annual meetings of the Diet, triennial elections, a wide franchise, equal taxation of noble and commoner, full civil and religious liberty, control over the national army—in short, the erection of Hungary into an independent democratic state, attached by a purely personal bond to the Hapsburg Empire. Up to this point Kossuth was generally supported by the non-Magyar sections of the population. In the North, by a bloodless revolution, the Czechs of Bohemia had conquered similar liberties.

The Viennese Government was unable to offer any effective resistance to the revolutionary outburst by reason of its universality; for Milan and Venice were following the example set by Vienna, Prague, and Budapesth. The

revolution in the Neapolitan kingdom had given the signal for a general movement throughout Italy, even before the events at Paris set Europe in a flame. Piedmont first felt the new influence; Moderates and Democrats joined in petitioning for a Constitution. On February 8 Charles Albert granted it, an example followed three days later by the Grand-Duke of Tuscany. The constitutional question now arose at Rome; Pius' liberalism was fast ebbing away before the spectacle of a continent plunged into revolution, but all over the Papal States the clamour for a Constitution arose, and the Pope gave way on March 15. Events now moved rapidly. The news of the crisis in Vienna had reached Italy, and on the 18th Milan rose. The struggle between an ill-armed population and the veteran troops of Austria (their commander, Radetzky, had some time previously declared that "three days of blood will give us thirty years of peace") was desperately unequal, but the soldiers were demoralised by the collapse of their Government, and the Milanese had a generation of cruel oppression to avenge. Armed bands poured in to their assistance from Como, Brescia, and Bergamo, whose citizens had defeated the local garrisons, and after five days' fighting the Austrians sullenly retreated from the city. Venice had risen in their rear; there the people, led by Daniele Manin, who bore the name of the last Doge, had driven out the enemy and proclaimed on March 22 the reconstitution of their ancient Republic.

Matters could not rest in this position. A universal impulse stirred all Italy; volunteers poured into Lombardy to strike a blow against the hated white-coats. Parma and Modena drove out their sovereigns; Charles Albert of Piedmont, urged on by his subjects and the Lombards alike, declared war upon the Austrians on March 22, and

Leopold of Tuscany was constrained to follow his example. The hour of Italy's resurrection seemed to have struck at last.

In Germany, as in Italy and in Austria, the smouldering embers of discontent needed only the wind from Paris to blow them into flame. Beginning in Baden (then the most liberal of the German states) on the first day of March, the revolutionary movement swept rapidly across the country. Government after Government was compelled to concede political reforms or place known Liberals in office. Concessions, indeed, failed to satisfy the Bavarians; in face of the popular wrath excited by his open profligacy, the King was obliged to abdicate in favour of his son. But the key of the political position in Germany, now that Austria was immobilised by its own revolution, was Prussia. The most powerful of the truly German states, everything depended upon its attitude. The situation was exactly calculated to unbalance Frederick William. He "let 'I dare not' wait upon 'I would,'" till, on March 18, a scuffle between the populace and the soldiery outside his palace set the Berliners to pillaging armourers' shops and building barricades. Even in this crisis the King's irresolution persisted; the Government was in confusion. The troops had the advantage in the street-fighting, but moved, it may be hoped, by considerations of humanity, the King first engaged to withdraw the military if the barricades were dismantled, then ordered them to abandon their advanced positions. In the resulting confusion General von Prittwitz led his forces back to their barracks and finally out of the city. The revolt was triumphant; the palace fore-court was piled with the bodies of dead insurgents, and the King and Queen were compelled to salute them. As a sign of final surrender, Frederick

William rode through his capital carrying the tricolour cockade which was the symbol of German nationalism, and publicly proclaimed that "I assume the leadership to-day in the hour of danger! My people will not abandon me, and Germany will unite itself to me with confidence; Prussia henceforth merges itself in Germany." The optimism of this statement was excessive; the King's conversion was of the twelfth hour, and this alone, and leaving aside Prussia's past record, was sufficient to arouse suspicions in many minds. Yet the important fact remained: Prussia, through its King, had adhered to the cause of national unity.

This ideal had even more influence in the German revolution than the desire for social and political reforms. One who played an active part in these events wrote in after years: "I was dominated by the feeling that at last the great opportunity had arrived for giving to the German people the liberty which was their birthright, and to the German Fatherland its unity and greatness."¹ Every patriotic citizen who knew the history of his country knew that for centuries its lack of unity had made it at once the tool and victim of foreign Governments. Now the moment had arrived to sweep away the fatal heritage of the past. Every Government had been compelled to give its assent to a policy of union; the Federal Diet had already summoned representatives from the different states to decide upon the form which an Assembly to draft a Constitution for United Germany should take. The "preparatory Parliament" (*Vorparlament*) met on March 31 and decided that in all the states represented in the ancient Confederation, delegates to the new National Parliament should be elected by universal suffrage. Accordingly, on May 18,

¹ *Reminiscences of Carl Schurz*, vol. i. p. 113.

this Assembly, to whose hands the fate of Germany was confided, met in Frankfort for its first sitting. Unfortunate events had occurred in the interval ; in Baden and Bavaria groups of extremists had broken out into an insurrection which had to be put down by military force ; in Posen, conflicts between Polish bands and Prussian troops took place. These disorders only served to alarm the timid and the politically lukewarm, and thus strengthened the reactionary parties, slowly rallying from their first surprise.

The ultimate success of the German and Italian revolutions depended upon the attitude of Austria. As has been made sufficiently clear in previous chapters, that Power, since 1815, had been the chief upholder of the political structure erected by the Congress of Vienna. Only the fact that Austria was itself convulsed by revolution had made the national movements of 1848 possible. Had the Viennese and the subject-nationalities remained quiescent, there can be no doubt that Austrian armies would speedily have marched into Italy and Germany to stamp out the first stirrings of revolt. The success of the new movements depended, then, upon the continuance of the paralysis of the Hapsburg monarchy, and that, in turn, depended upon the degree of unity to which the revolutionary forces within the monarchy could attain.

The position was one of enormous difficulty. Could Germans and Magyars unite with Czechs, Croats, Ruthenes, Poles and Vlachs, could Catholics unite with Protestants, Uniates and Orthodox, to force the monarchy along the path of freedom ? Upon the answer to these questions depended the fate of central and southern Europe. The Swiss Republic has demonstrated that communities divided by language, religion, and social conditions can be bound together in one state, but, apart from the difference in mere

size, the problem in the Austrian Empire was made infinitely more difficult by the absence of widely diffused political instruction and intellectual culture. Only statesmanship of the highest order could have found a way out of the impasse, and that, unfortunately, was not forthcoming. Kossuth and his Magyars passionately asserted their own national rights, but just as passionately refused to recognise those of the Croats and Serbs. "I know no Croatian nationality," cried Kossuth, and when approached by a Serb deputation he categorically refused to recognise any nationality in the state but the Magyar. "Then," replied the Serbian leader, Stratimirovic, "we must look for recognition elsewhere than at Pressburg."¹ "In that case," came the fierce answer, "the sword must decide." Violent deeds followed hard upon violent words, and by May, Magyar and Serb were locked in civil war. In Transylvania, also, there was conflict, for the Vlach² peasants hated the Magyars not only as political oppressors but as feudal lords, and a ferocious social war was soon in progress. Meanwhile, the Croatian Diet, under the leadership of the newly appointed Ban, or Governor, Jellacić, set the Magyar Government at defiance.

If Hungary and the South were relapsing into anarchy, the North was in little better case. In Vienna, an attempt by the Government to suppress the Students' Battalion, which had played an active part in the March revolution, led to an insurrection of the working men. This was temporarily successful and the Government gave way, but it alarmed the propertied classes by opening up vistas of social upheaval. In Bohemia, racial strife paved the

¹ The meeting-place of the Hungarian Diet.

² The Vlachs are identical in race and language with the Roumanians.

way for disaster. The minority of German inhabitants wished to send representatives to the National Parliament at Fränkfort; the Czech majority refused, on the grounds that, historically and racially, Bohemia was a separate nation, owing no allegiance to Germany, and having no desire to be involved in its internal affairs. To manifest this independence, and to give expression to the ideal of the solidarity of all Slav peoples, a Pan-Slavonic Congress was opened at Prague; it was attended by representatives of all the Slav peoples of the Empire, by a few Russians, and by Poles from Posen and Warsaw. On the heels of this demonstration, itself more imposing than useful, came disaster. On June 12 a conflict, provoked, it is supposed, by Magyar emissaries, broke out in Prague. The imperial forces under Windischgraetz took four days to subdue the town, but when the task was accomplished the work of the March revolution was swept away. There was to be no autonomy for Bohemia. This was the first great victory for the reaction in Austria.

Its prospects, too, were improving in Italy. Charles Albert, on whose shoulders rested responsibility for the conduct of the war, was personally courageous, but suffered from the most fatal of defects in a general—irresolution. He had been slow in resolving upon war; he was slow in waging it. Radetzky, though defeated in some minor engagements, was able to fall back upon his fortresses, which the Piedmontese could not reduce. Then the internal position in Italy worsened; a portion of the Papal army, disobeying orders, had marched into Lombardy to fight the Austrians, but, on April 29, Pius IX., in an Encyclical, solemnly declared against war with Austria. The lamentable situation of the Pope, torn between his duties as Head of the Catholic Church (of which the Hapsburgs were faithful

adherents) and the national claims of his Italian subjects, could not have been more clearly illustrated. The effect of this pronouncement upon the fortunes of the national cause could not but be disastrous. Another serious misfortune speedily followed; the Liberals of Naples became engaged in a conflict with the King, and on May 15 betook themselves to the barricades. They were put down by the troops, and Ferdinand II. hastened to recall a considerable force that he had sent to assist in the northern war. While these events were proceeding, a fresh Austrian force had broken into Venetia, crushed the revolt everywhere save in Venice itself, and effected a junction with Radetzky.

As a set-off against these untoward happenings, Charles Albert was able to congratulate himself upon the fact that Parma, Modena, Lombardy, and Venice had agreed to accept fusion with Piedmont. But only military success could make these resolutions good, and the King, unfortunately, was not equal to his task. He first wasted time and men in useless manœuvres, then allowed the spirits of his troops to be depressed by a month's inaction. Radetzky, meanwhile, had been receiving reinforcements, and taking the offensive in July he severely defeated Charles Albert at Custozza. On August 6 the Austrians re-entered Milan, and three days after the King was glad to sign an armistice and withdraw across the Piedmontese frontier, while Radetzky speedily overran the Duchies. The Italian revolution had received a decisive check.

CHAPTER II

THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTION (II)

THE reactionaries in the Austrian Government were not slow to profit from the situation created by the victories in Italy and the civil war in Hungary. The Magyars pressed for an imperial declaration against Jellacić and the Croats, and the Ban was, indeed, suspended from his functions for a time, but on September 9 he was restored to office. This was a direct challenge to the Magyars and was accepted as such. Two days later Kossuth, having been recognised as Dictator, promulgated by his own authority laws which the Emperor had previously refused to sanction. On the same day Jellacić led an army of Croats across the Drave and invaded Hungarian territory. Fortified by this, the Emperor, in a manifesto issued on October 3, declared Hungary in a state of siege and its Diet dissolved.

The Viennese democrats clearly understood the trend of events: on September 13 they endeavoured to organise a fresh insurrection, but failed. Negotiations for common action were then opened up with the Magyars, and when a portion of the garrison was ordered to Hungary the people forcibly prevented its departure and hanged the Minister of War. The next day, October 7, the Emperor fled to Olmütz, being followed by the majority of members of the

Austrian Parliament.¹ Windischgraetz, the conqueror of Prague, was ordered to reduce the rebellious capital, a task which he successfully accomplished on October 31. A significant event which followed was the execution of Blum and Fröbel, two members of the German National Parliament, who had been sent to encourage the democrats of Vienna. For this act Prince Schwarzenberg, into whose hands the supreme direction of affairs had been committed, was responsible, and he soon followed it up by another of greater importance. The Emperor Ferdinand was a man of feeble intellect, quite unfitted for a serious crisis; Schwarzenberg procured his abdication, and his nephew, Francis Joseph, ascended the throne which he still occupies. Only one step more remained to be taken; on March 7, 1849, the Parliament was dissolved. The revolution, so far as Austria proper was concerned, was at an end.

The immediate result of the defeat at Custozza and the withdrawal of Charles Albert from the national war was to give an immense impetus to the republican movement in Italy. Mazzini declared that whosoever still cherished "dynastic illusions" had "neither intelligence nor heart, nor true love of Italy, nor any hope of the future." "The war of the princes is finished," said D'Azeglio, "that of the people begins." Venice, still unconquered, once more proclaimed itself a republic; the Piedmontese Parliament and people, though faithful to the monarchy, clamoured for a renewal of the war. In Rome the Pope was besieged with appeals and denunciations; he still refused to declare war (although the Austrians had violated Papal territory), but consented to entrust the Government to Pellegrino

¹ This body, which had met on July 22, had only been able to enact one measure of importance—the abolition of feudalism in Austria.

Rossi, an experienced and able administrator, who, on the one hand, pursued an active policy of internal reform, and on the other, negotiated for an Italian federation. But such measures could not content the republicans, infuriated by a fresh manifestation of royal perfidy. Ferdinand of Naples, true to the traditions of his House, had re-established absolute government in his states on the mainland, and pursuing the same end in Sicily, had caused Messina to be subjected to a bombardment which earned him the nickname of "King Bomba." Passions mounted continually in Rome, and at last found vent in a deplorable crime: on November 15 Rossi was murdered outside the Chamber of Deputies. Wild scenes followed; there were combats between the people and the Papal guards; and Pius, believing himself in danger, fled disguised to Gaëta, in Neapolitan territory, on November 24. This abandonment of his temporal power by the Pope left the way clear for the democrats. A Constituent Assembly was elected by universal suffrage, and on February 9, 1849, Rome was declared a republic. Garibaldi, who had returned from exile to fight for Italy, was already in the city with a band of volunteers; Mazzini arrived soon after, to be made one of the three triumvirs to whom the executive government of the new Republic was entrusted. Tuscany was not slow to follow the example of Rome. The Grand-Duke, feeling his position increasingly insecure, fled, and the Republic was proclaimed in Florence on February 18.

These events had their influence in Piedmont. There democratic feeling was directed against the Austrians rather than the monarchy, but speedily became so powerful that Charles Albert was compelled to brace himself for one more effort. On March 12 he denounced the truce with Austria and crossed the frontier for a fresh dash at Milan.

But Radetzky was now too strong for such an attempt to be successful; on the 23rd, after a bitter struggle, the Piedmontese were heavily defeated at Novara. The cause was evidently lost, and Charles Albert, overcome by failure, abdicated on the evening of the battle, resigning the crown to his son, Victor Emanuel II. The new King signed a fresh armistice and withdrew his army.

The second war for independence was over, but Venice, Tuscany, and Rome remained unsubdued. Mazzini had little hope that the Republic could maintain itself, but he believed a great example of fortitude to be necessary for the moral regeneration of Italy. "Here in Rome," he told the Assembly, "we may not be moral mediocrities," and again, "We must act like men who have the enemy at their gates, and at the same time like men working for eternity." The triumvir did his best to fulfil both ideals. There is ample testimony to show that, considering the abnormal circumstances, the city was well governed under the Republic; Mazzini himself lived with the utmost simplicity and probity, though this did not prevent the most extraordinary libels upon the man and his cause being scattered throughout Europe. But the enemies of whom he had spoken were at the gates. In February Cardinal Antonelli, acting for the Pope, had appealed to France, Austria, Spain, and Naples for armed assistance, "as in this way alone can order be restored in the States of the Church and the Holy Father re-established in the exercise of his supreme authority, in compliance with the imperious exigencies of his august and sacred character, the interests of the universal Church, and the peace of nations." On April 25 the French General Oudinot landed at Civita Vecchia with a strong force, prepared for an attack on Rome, whither had by this time resorted the bravest and the best of the Italian

patriots. The circumstances under which the forces of one republic came to be used for an unprovoked attack upon another require explanation.

The suppression of the insurrection of June 1848 in Paris had restored order in the Second Republic. The capital remained for some months in a state of siege, and the National Assembly was able to proceed with its task of framing a fresh Constitution. This was based upon two principles: first, "all public powers emanate from the people, they cannot be delegated hereditarily"; second, "the separation of powers is the first condition of a free government." In accordance with these principles, legislative power was entrusted to an Assembly of one chamber, elected by universal suffrage; a President, also elected by universal suffrage, was charged with executive functions. A Council of State, chosen by the Assembly, was to prepare the laws. The fatal defect in the Constitution was the provision for the choice of a President. It was borrowed from the United States, but there the social and political circumstances were utterly different from those of France, with its deeply rooted military traditions and powerfully organised bureaucracy. The head of the executive government, directly chosen by the nation, controlling the armed and civil forces of the state, could hardly fail to outweigh, in public estimation, an Assembly divided by party strife and possessed of only legislative powers. This result, foreseen by a few, speedily came to pass.

The presidential election took place on December 10, and to the surprise of France and of Europe, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, nephew of the great Emperor, was elected by 5,434,226 votes. A variety of circumstances had conspired to bring about this remarkable result. The Prince himself was an old pretender to the throne of France. In 1836

and in 1840 he had attempted to excite military insurrections ; on the first occasion he had merely been deported, on the second, he was imprisoned in the castle of Ham, whence he had escaped in 1847. In 1848 he was elected to the National Assembly by five departments, and a renewed Bonapartist movement speedily sprang up. Louis Napoleon could appeal to many passions. First and foremost he posed as the man of order. Just as his uncle had preserved France from anarchy in 1799, so he would conjure away the "red spectre" of Socialism which had alarmed every shopkeeper and peasant-proprietor in France. He appealed to the Catholics, distrustful of the Republic with its anti-clerical traditions inherited from the great Revolution. Above all, he appealed to the desire for glory and revenge, to hatred of the settlement of 1815, to those vague feelings that France had been dragged from its rightful position as the mistress of Europe which had helped to undermine the throne of Louis Philippe. His very name was one to conjure with in France. The despotism of the Empire and its deadly wars were forgotten ; the Emperor had become the legendary hero of a national epic. "How should I not vote for this gentleman, I whose nose was frozen at Moscow ?" said a survivor of the Grand Army.

There were strong reasons, personal and political, why the President should intervene in Italy. Already aiming at supreme power, he desired the support of the powerful Catholic party which viewed the overthrow of the Papal Government with horror ; he must conciliate public opinion which would have rebelled against leaving Austria to control the situation unchecked ; he needed the army, so it must be given an opportunity to acquire glory. So, in spite of the protests of the National Assembly, Oudinot's expedition was launched against Rome.

It had expected an easy victory ; it met instead with an heroic resistance. Thanks largely to Garibaldi's leadership, a first attack was severely repulsed, and the great guerilla followed up his success by completely defeating a Neapolitan force which was moving against the Republic. " Our soldiers have been received as enemies, your military honour is engaged," wrote Louis Napoleon to his general ; in the meantime, to give an opportunity for reinforcements to be sent, Ferdinand de Lesseps was despatched to negotiate with the triumvirs. Directly fresh troops arrived Oudinot broke off the armistice, and made a treacherous attack upon the outer works. The heroic story of the defence cannot here be told in detail. On June 30 the Roman Assembly decided upon surrender, and three days after the French occupied the city. For a week Mazzini braved the invaders and the Papalists alike, then quietly returned to exile. On the day before Oudinot's entry, Garibaldi and his wife, accompanied by a considerable following, had ridden out of Rome to begin a retreat across Italy which ranks among the most wonderful of modern feats of arms. On September 2 he made his escape from Cala Martina, having crossed and recrossed the peninsula. His wife had died from exhaustion, his comrades were scattered, dead, or imprisoned. The Tuscan Republic had been overthrown in May. " Bomba " had completed the subjugation of Sicily in the same month, Venice had surrendered on July 24. Italy was abandoned once more to its despots, native and foreign. Piedmont alone, though defeated and discredited, retained its constitutional institutions.

The National Parliament of Frankfort, to the lasting misfortune of Germany and of Europe, proved itself unequal to the mission of providing the German people with a form of government at once liberal and national. Certainly, the

difficulties of the task were enormous; apart from the thorny question of the position of Prussia and Austria in the new state-organisation, the Parliament had to reckon with the political inexperience of the population and the active hostility of the princes and privileged classes. The majority of its members had no definite plan of campaign, and the presence of large numbers of professors and literary men was a disadvantage, inasmuch as they tended to turn the attention of the Assembly towards academic issues when the situation demanded decisive action. The first act of the Parliament was ill-advised in the extreme; it appointed as Vicar-General of the Empire, charged with administering its affairs, the Austrian Archduke John, a step which excited Prussian hostility and gave an unhopèd-for advantage to the ancient enemy of German unity—the House of Hapsburg. Then, turning from the question of the composition of the national state, the Parliament abandoned itself with enthusiasm to the barren task of discussing for months on end the “fundamental rights” upon which the new Constitution was to be based. The enthusiasm which had heralded the assembling of the Parliament began to ebb; the reactionary forces in the country had a free field to prepare for a reconquest of the ground lost in March.

A question was pending which served to show the real powerlessness of the Frankfort Assembly. The Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, whose populations were largely German, had long been united to Denmark, though Holstein, in 1815, had been declared a component part of the Germanic Confederation. The national movement found an echo there, only to be met by a Danish nationalist desire to bind the Duchies more closely to the Crown. This, in turn, provoked an insurrection, and German public opinion immediately proclaimed itself passionately on the side of the

insurgents. Frederick William of Prussia, on the advice of his ministry, sent an army to their support which defeated the Danes, but was robbed of the fruits of victory by the intervention of England and Russia, who demanded that the conditions established in 1815 should be maintained. Frederick William was only lukewarm in the cause, he could not afford to break with Russia; and accordingly, an armistice was signed without consulting the politicians at Frankfort.¹ This neglect, and the abandonment of the Duchies, excited great indignation in the Parliament. A vote was carried refusing to ratify the armistice, but the majority was small and timid, and after a few days the vote was reversed. This exhibition of feebleness produced a fresh republican insurrection which, however, was suppressed without much difficulty.

In Prussia, also, matters went badly for the reformers. The King was as hostile as ever to genuinely constitutional government, and was worked upon by the aristocratic party. The court was not long in finding the opportunity it desired to disembarass itself of the Prussian Parliament. When, in October, the news became public of the siege of Vienna, the liberal leaders demanded that the Government should support the cause of liberty in Austria, and their demand was enforced by street demonstrations. Then came the news of the Viennese capitulation, and the Parliament was promptly adjourned and summoned to meet elsewhere than in Berlin. The majority refused, but was ejected from its meeting-place; the capital was filled with troops and placed in a state of siege. Finally the Parliament was dissolved. Manteuffel, in whose hands the direction of the court policy lay, was an astute politician; he carefully divided the opposition by publishing a new

¹ August 26, 1848.

constitution of a not illiberal character, while he promulgated a series of laws which abolished the surviving vestiges of feudalism together with the exceptional tribunals, and established the jury system. These measures were certainly unfavourable to the aristocracy, but they satisfied the mass of the people, and when a new Parliament made some tentatives of resistance it, also, was dissolved. A fresh franchise law was promulgated, which divided the citizens into three classes, according to wealth; the richest, and, of course, the smallest, group had as much weight in the elections (which, moreover, were indirect) as either of the other two classes. Under these conditions the Government could rely upon docile assemblies.

While these transactions were in progress the Frankfort Assembly had completed its labours upon the national Constitution, and was at last obliged to consider its relations with Austria and Prussia. Foreshadowing the events of 1866 and 1870, it proposed to exclude Austria from the new State and to establish the office of Emperor of Germany. By a narrow majority the imperial crown was offered to Frederick William. The King had promised to "merge Prussia in Germany"; he was no longer willing to carry out his promise. "I have not to say 'yes' or 'no,'" he wrote to the Assembly, "for you have nothing to offer me; this is a thing to settle with my equals; against the democrats there is no recourse but to the soldiers." In short, the King would not accept the leadership of united Germany at the hands of the German people. The Prussian aristocracy took the same side. Otto von Bismarck, a young member of the class, expressed its genuine opinions when he said, "We all wish that the Prussian eagle should spread out his wings as guardian and ruler from the Memel to the Donnersberg, but free will we have him, not bound by

a new Regensburg Diet. Prussians we are and Prussians we will remain ; I know that in these words I speak the confession of the Prussian army and the majority of my fellow-countrymen, and I hope to God that we will still long remain Prussian when this sheet of paper [the Frankfort Constitution] is forgotten like a withered autumn leaf." In this view Prussian domination was to be the price of German unity.

The National Parliament had received its death-blow. Frederick William's refusal deprived it of all reason of being ; the mass of moderate members abandoned it to the democrats. But these, for the most part, were unfitted to lead a revolution—now the only possible way out of the situation, short of complete surrender. Republican insurrections broke out in many parts of the country in May, but were serious only in Saxony and Baden. A large Prussian army was hurled against the rebels ; the barricades of Dresden took two days to storm, and the last embers of the revolt were not drowned in blood till the end of July. The remnants of the National Parliament had been dispersed in June. The Governments were pitiless in their hour of triumph ; a terrible repression followed. The dream of a free and united Germany was shattered. The reformers, by their divisions and their incapacity, had perhaps deserved defeat, but the death-blow was struck by Prussia and its King. Disloyal to the common Fatherland, they preferred to see it drenched with the blood of its sons rather than allow it to escape from Prussian domination.

CHAPTER III

THE REVOLUTIONARY COLLAPSE

THE abdication of the Emperor Ferdinand was a signal for open war between the Magyars and the Hapsburg monarchy. The former refused to recognise Francis Joseph, and a desperate struggle was soon in progress. At first the Austrian forces were victorious, but the Magyars speedily rallied, and in April 1849 inflicted severe defeats upon their adversaries. Kossuth was emboldened to take a decisive step. On April 14 the Diet declared the Hapsburg dynasty deprived of the throne and banished for ever from Hungarian territory. "God may overwhelm me with evils," cried Kossuth, "but there is one He cannot inflict upon me: that of ever again becoming a subject of the House of Austria." The situation, however, changed rapidly for the worse; the victory of Novara set free large Austrian forces, and more important aid was forthcoming. On May 1 the Viennese Government announced that the Tsar of Russia had placed his forces at its disposal to crush the Revolution.

Nicholas had witnessed the upheavals in Europe with indignation. He had nothing to fear from his own subjects, whether Polish or Russian, but he was determined not to permit a democratic revolution near his frontiers. He had offered his assistance to Vienna in 1848, but the Austrian

Government had avoided calling upon so dangerous an ally as long as possible. Now a large Russian army poured into Hungary. The Magyars offered a determined resistance, but were overwhelmed by numbers; there were disputes, moreover, between their leaders, and Kossuth, abandoned by his ministers, laid down his dictatorship and went into exile. Two days after, the main Hungarian force laid down its arms at Villágos, and though the fortress of Komorn resisted until the end of September, the Magyar revolt was ended.

Hungary was not the only sufferer from Russian intervention. In the Roumanian Principalities there were revolutionary movements early in 1848. That in Moldavia was easily suppressed by the Hospodar, but in Wallachia the revolutionaries compelled their Prince first to sign a constitution, then to abdicate. Both Russia and Turkey speedily intervened and put down the revolt. The leaders were imprisoned or sent into exile without trial, and the two Powers entered into a Convention at Balta-Liman on May 1, 1849, by which the Hospodars were to be jointly appointed by the Tsar and the Sultan, and not by a general assembly, as had been the practice since the last Russo-Turkish war. The Assemblies themselves were abolished, and a Russian army of occupation remained in the country for a considerable period.

Freed from its preoccupations in Italy and Hungary, the Austrian Government was able to turn its attention to the affairs of Germany. It had looked with equal hostility upon the movement for national unity and Frederick William's attempts to secure for Prussia a predominant place in German affairs. That monarch, even before the final collapse of the Frankfort Parliament, had been endeavouring to arrange for a new scheme of federation in

which he was to play the leading part. The States which accepted the Prussian hegemony sent representatives to a Federal Parliament which met at Erfurt in March 1850. This produced no decisive result, and a Congress of sovereigns held at Berlin in May was equally fruitless. Already Austria had sprung its counter-mine: at the end of April Schwarzenberg invited the German Courts to co-operate in the re-establishment of the old Federal Diet. Frederick William protested, but was speedily abandoned by the Governments which had formerly accepted his leadership. Still the King, with the obstinacy which often characterises men essentially weak, refused to accept the new position, and Austria began to prepare for war. Schwarzenberg had secured the moral support of the Tsar; Prussia, finding itself isolated in Germany and in Europe, was obliged to yield. At a humiliating interview at Olmütz,¹ Manteuffel accepted the Austrian terms, and by the middle of 1851 the old Federal Diet was duly reconstituted.

A paralysing reaction spread throughout Germany and the Hapsburg Empire, and continued till 1859. Thousands of men of liberal opinions emigrated, particularly to the United States; those who remained were subjected to a *régime* of espionage and persecution. The old devices of Metternich were revived and enthusiastically applied; once more Germany was subjected to an intolerable press-censorship; domiciliary visits and arbitrary arrests filled the prisons. The steadily increasing tide of emigration, which carried the best brains and hearts of the country across the Atlantic, was regarded with complacency, since it removed possible authors of discontent and disturbance. No private correspondence was safe; even so earnest a supporter of monarchy and privilege as Bismarck was obliged to warn

¹ November 28, 1850.

his wife not to speak of politics in her letters, since they would infallibly be read by spies. The Constitutions extorted in 1848 were either swept away or reduced to practical nullity. In Austria, the Government treated the Magyars who had attacked it, and the Slavs who had saved it, with equal rigour. All political freedom was swept away and the Empire delivered over to a *régime* of centralised bureaucracy which strove to stifle every national sentiment, every breath of independent thought.

In Italy, outside Piedmont, conditions were even worse. Austria set the example, and the restored despots hastened to better it. For an innocuous demonstration in the streets of Milan, seventeen persons were brutally flogged in 1849. Two of them were women, one twenty, the other eighteen years of age. Tuscany, which had been honourably distinguished by the mildness of its laws, now imitated the despotic methods of the other Italian states. As for the Papal States, Farini, who had been a vigorous opponent of Mazzini and the Republic, thus described their condition in 1852. "The Government is, as formerly, purely clerical. . . . The finances are ruined ; commerce and traffic at the very lowest ebb ; smuggling has sprung to life again ; all the immunities, all the jurisdiction of the clergy are restored. Taxes and rates are imposed in abundance without rule or measure. There is neither public nor private safety ; no moral authority, no real army, no railroads, no telegraphs. Studies are neglected ; there is not a breath of liberty, not a hope of tranquil life ; two foreign armies ; a permanent state of siege, atrocious acts of revenge, factions raging, universal discontent ; such is the Papal Government at the present day." ¹ But to Naples was reserved the "bad eminence" of being the worst despotism in the peninsula.

¹ L. C. Farini, *The Roman State from 1815 to 1850*, vol. iv. p. 328.

In 1851 Mr. Gladstone, after personal investigation, estimated that there were 20,000 persons in prison for political offences. His description of the Government has become classic. "It is not mere imperfection, not corruption in low quarters, not occasional severity that I am about to describe; it is incessant systematic violation of the law by the Power appointed to watch over and maintain it. . . . It is the wholesale persecution of virtue when united with intelligence, operating upon such a scale that entire classes may with truth be said to be its object, so that the Government is in bitter and cruel, as well as utterly illegal hostility to whatever in the nation really lives and moves and forms the mainspring of practical progress and improvement. . . . I have seen and heard strong and too true expressions used, 'This is the negation of God erected into a system of Government.'" Behind all this, and making every attempt at resistance futile, lay the foreign armies; the French in Rome, the Austrians in Lombardy, stood ready to crush the slightest movement of rebellion.

France, which had given the first signal of revolt to Europe, was still nominally a democratic Republic. But already the far-sighted could predict that in calling upon a Bonaparte to save them from social revolution the French had delivered themselves over to a despot. In May 1849 the elections to the Legislative Assembly were held, with the result that a strong majority of anti-republicans was returned. The democrats, however, were still strong in the east and in Paris, and on June 13 they made the Italian policy of the Government an excuse for a fresh attempt at insurrection. It was easily defeated, and the monarchists in the Assembly seized the opportunity to crush their enemies. Once more Paris was subjected to a state of siege, press-laws were re-introduced, public meetings were for-

bidden for a year. Political offences were to be tried by courts-martial.

For the next two years a curious three-cornered duel raged in France. All the democratic groups fought against the President, whom they justly suspected of aiming at a dictatorship, on the one hand, and against the monarchists on the other. These last wished to use Louis Napoleon as their tool for the destruction of the Republic. The President was willing to accept their aid against the common enemy, but still intrigued for his own hand against both groups. His Italian policy had been designed to obtain Catholic support, but while restoring Papal Government he demanded that the Pope should institute reforms. Pius, cured once for all of his liberal tendencies, refused, and the Assembly voted a Declaration which amounted to a censure on the President's action. This gave him an opportunity to appeal from the parties to the nation. On October 31 he dismissed the existing ministry, and replaced it by one made up of his own adherents. At the same time he issued a manifesto to the people. "No sooner," he wrote, "were the dangers of the mob safely past than the parties were seen to raise their standards afresh, renew their rivalry, and alarm the country by sowing seeds of unrest broadcast. In the midst of this confusion France looks to the guiding hand, the will and the standard of him whom she elected on December 10. That victory of December 10 involved a whole system, for the name of Napoleon is a programme in itself, alone. Let us, then, exalt authority without detriment to true liberty." The new ministry took vigorous administrative action against the republicans, and desired, amongst other measures, to bring all schoolmasters under control of the prefects. This step formed the subject of a significant transaction.

The royalists in the Assembly agreed to vote a law for this purpose if the Government would accept another education law devised by them. The bargain was struck, and a notorious measure, known as the Falloux Law, was passed in March 1850. Among other things it placed State education under the control of the clergy and exempted clerical teachers from efficiency tests. This *entente* between the monarchists and the President was strengthened by fresh republican successes at by-elections both in the provinces and Paris, where Eugène Sue, the novelist, was elected as a Socialist. To check this movement the Government and the majority united to pass a law¹ which confined the suffrage to those persons who had resided continuously for three years in one place. This measure was directed at the working men of the towns and was successful in its object, since nearly three million citizens were thus deprived of votes. A further measure forbade political clubs and even election meetings. These triumphs were followed up by a fresh persecution of the republicans. All officials suspected of democratic opinions were dismissed, and it became actionable to cry "Long live the Republic!"

But the agreement between Louis Napoleon and the Assembly could not be permanent, since they desired different ends. The question, so far as the President was concerned, was not whether he should achieve the dictatorship—for on that he was determined—but how. Only two courses were open: legal constitutional change, or a violent *coup d'état*. The President, not more scrupulous but less passionate than his uncle, preferred the former method. France must be accustomed to his personal rule by degrees, and to accomplish this he needed the prolongation of his term of office. But for this an amendment of the Constitu-

¹ May 31, 1850.

tion was necessary, a process which could only be effected by three votes of three-quarters of the deputies, which must, in turn, be ratified by a specially elected assembly. Some royalists were won over to this scheme, but still a sufficient majority could not be obtained. Immediately afterwards the Assembly was adjourned, thus leaving the President with free hands.

The opportunity was utilised to make preparation for a sudden stroke, but Louis Napoleon still hesitated. Throughout his life he was dominated by a puerile fatalism, itself a pale caricature of the great Emperor's belief in his star. This betrayed itself perpetually in mental irresolution, hidden, indeed, from the multitude by a well-assumed mask of inscrutability. At this moment he could not brace himself to the effort needed for a *coup d'état*, and matters were allowed to drift till the Assembly met again in October 1851. Then a fresh attempt was made to come to an understanding with the majority, but this also failed. It was clear that there was no remedy save naked force, and the most elaborate preparations were accordingly made.

On December 2 Paris was placarded with proclamations dissolving the Assembly and calling upon the citizens to vote at a plebiscite as to the revision of the Constitution. The prominent party leaders were arrested, and when two different bodies of deputies met they also were arrested *en masse*. Some republicans (among them the great poet, Victor Hugo) endeavoured to organise armed resistance, but received small support. The past actions of the Assembly now recoiled upon it. The militant leaders of the working class were dead or in exile; the men of the faubourgs had small reason to respect the politicians who had robbed them of their political rights. Yet the erection of barricades was made the excuse for a massacre in which several hundreds

perished. Meanwhile, a new Government was in process of organisation. The prefects were ordered to remove suspected officials, arrest all opponents of the new *régime*, and to forbid the publication of any newspaper till its proofs had been inspected.

Paris was crushed, but there were serious risings in the south-east, where the peasants, unexpectedly, took a prominent part. These, however, were suppressed by the troops and used by the Government to frighten property-owners. Thirty-two departments were put in a state of siege; there were thousands of arrests, both in the capital and the provinces. The plebiscite was proceeding at the same time, with the result that by over seven million votes Louis Napoleon received power to revise the Constitution. This triumph was the signal for fresh outrages. Eighty-four deputies were exiled or transported, and during January 1852 nearly 100,000 arrests were made.

The new Constitution was promulgated on January 14, 1852. Executive power was handed over to the President, elected for ten years; he alone could make treaties, declare war, nominate to public employments, proclaim a state of siege, initiate legislation. A Legislature, elected by universal suffrage, was to vote on the laws presented to it; since the ministers were chosen by the President and were responsible to him alone, and since it had no control over finance, this body was without effective powers. A nominated Senate was charged with the rejection of unconstitutional laws and could modify the Constitution in accord with the President. By reason of its very nature, this body also was deprived of any real influence. The Constitution, in brief, established a personal despotism, the nakedness of which was partially hidden by democratic forms. It was, for all practical purposes, a revival of the system of

Napoleon I. Only one thing was lacking—the hereditary Emperor—and in less than a year he, too, was forthcoming. A Presidential tour in the provinces prepared the way for a fresh plebiscite, and on November 20, 1852, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was elected Emperor of the French, with the title of Napoleon III.

The establishment of the Second Empire in France marked the definitive close of the revolutionary epoch which began in February 1848. The thrones and territorial boundaries that, for a moment, had been submerged by the flood, reappeared once more. Outwardly, at any rate, they seemed the more firmly established for their temporary overthrow. What were the causes of the revolutionary failure? Leaving on one side the strength of ancient loyalties and the stubborn hostility of vested political interests, two facts establish themselves as of primary importance. There was first of all the divergence of aims between the groups that accomplished the revolutions. Was Germany to be a republic or an empire; was Italy to be united under the monarchy of Savoy or under Mazzini and the democrats; was the revolution in France to be social or simply political? Pressure from above threw the partisans of these discordant views into temporary alliance; immediately the pressure was removed they drew apart and the irreconcilability of their ideals became apparent. Of even more importance in its influence upon the situation was the clash of national aspirations and racial aims. “The sentiment of nationalism,” says the most brilliant of our modern historians, “that simplest of all ideals which appeals to the largest quantity of brute force, has in its nature no political affinities either with liberty on the one hand or with tyranny on the other; it can be turned by some chance current of events, or by the cunning or clumsiness of states-

men, to run in any channel and to work any wheel.”¹ How profoundly true this is the foregoing chapters have shown. Germans, struggling desperately for national unity, had nothing but contempt for Bohemian nationalism; Magyars, scarcely emancipated from the Hapsburg yoke, hastened to impose their own upon Roumanians and Slavs; Croats, whose countrymen were fighting for national existence against the Magyars, marched willingly against Italians whose aspirations were identical with theirs. The European Revolution was destroyed, not so much by kings and aristocracies, as by the mutual hatreds of its partisans.

Yet to assert that the movement was an utter failure would be an error. Piedmont, thanks to the courage of its citizens and the good faith of its King, preserved its newly won liberal institutions. The Swiss were able to establish the most democratic Government in Europe. In both Belgium and Holland, the sovereigns, warned by the fate of other dynasties, peacefully conceded reforms which enabled those countries to embark upon careers of moderate constitutional progress. But of more importance than these minor victories were the unrest and the aspirations bequeathed by the revolutionists of 1848 to those who came after them. In the generation which followed the establishment of the Second Empire the whole state-system set up by the Treaty of Vienna was ruined and overthrown.

¹ G. M. Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts*, p. 117.

BOOK IV

CHAPTER II

ITALIAN UNITY

IN describing the Crimean War reference was made to the fact that in 1855 the Allies were joined by Piedmont. The causes and consequences of that event must now be described.

After the defeat of Novara and the consequent reaction, Piedmont remained the one hopeful feature of the Italian situation. Victor Emanuel, in spite of Austrian temptations and the factious opposition of certain democrats, bluntly refused to abolish the Constitution established by his father. By this fact alone Piedmont was differentiated from the surrounding states, and became a liberal oasis in the desert of despotism. Most fortunately for the state and for Italy, the courage of the King was soon fortified by the wisdom of a great statesman. Italy had had innumerable martyrs and at least one prophet, for Mazzini was no less ; now, for the first time for centuries, a master of policy who was also a patriot took her destiny in hand. In 1850 Camillo Cavour joined the Government, and two years later became Prime Minister. Born in 1810, the son of an aristocrat of the old régime, Cavour had suffered for his liberalism early in life. Cut off from all prospects of professional advancement,¹ and disliking the usual idle life of a younger

¹ He had been a military engineer.

son, he applied himself to the development of the family estates and speedily proved a very capable agriculturist. He visited England in 1835, and on that occasion conceived an admiration for English institutions and ideas which amounted, in the view of his enemies, to "Anglomania." When the crisis of 1847 was reaching its height, he took a leading part in his journal, the *Risorgimento*, and elsewhere, in urging the necessity for a Constitution. Elected to the Chamber, he speedily overcame the prejudices excited by his aristocratic birth; and his manifest capacity for office overcame the dislike of the King and opened his way to power. He possessed tremendous tenacity and powers of work, combined with a subtlety, or, as some would say, a lack of scruple, more characteristic of the countryman of Machiavelli. Certainly he once said, "If we had done for ourselves what we have done for Italy, we should have been great rascals"; but, whilst allowing for a tinge of humorous cynicism in this utterance, we have also to remember that what may be called political morality was not then, and is not now, at as high a level as personal morality. His attitude towards Italian unity at this time cannot be very clearly defined, for Cavour was no dealer in verbal Utopias, but his actions make it clear that he was determined to win for Piedmont a commanding place in the peninsula by organising its military and economic resources so that, when a convenient moment arrived, it might be able to strike effectively at the national enemy—Austria.

Cavour's success as a diplomatist has overshadowed his eminence as an administrator. Yet, under his guidance, Piedmont became a pioneer of Free Trade in Europe; large public works were undertaken and railways extended, with the result that in five years the imports were nearly trebled, and the exports increased by one-half. Although a Catholic,

he did not hesitate to enter into conflict with the Holy See when the interests of the State seemed to demand it. The ecclesiastical courts and immunities had been abolished in 1850, and in 1854 a large number of monasteries were suppressed. At this time Piedmont had more than twice as many ecclesiastics in proportion to its population as Belgium, and nearly three times as many as Austria. Alongside these social reforms the reorganisation of the army proceeded under General La Marmora.

But over and above all questions of internal improvement, necessary and useful as these might be, loomed the national question. It is Cavour's great merit to have seen this problem in its real bearings and to have devised means for its solution. The vital fact for all Italian patriots was the presence of the Austrians in Lombardy and Venetia. Whilst the "white-coats" were intrenched there, ready to march south at the first sign of revolt, national life could not develop, and every reform was merely tentative. To drive the foreigner from Italian soil was therefore the indispensable preliminary to the attainment of freedom. Cavour believed that Italians could only achieve this with foreign assistance, and while he developed Piedmontese resources to the utmost in preparation for the inevitable struggle, he cast about for allies. That his judgment was correct, in spite of the enormous risks involved, the repeated failures of the Republicans proved. Mazzini was still active, but a widespread conspiracy in Lombardy was discovered in 1851, and an insurrection at Milan failed in 1853. The atrocious repressions which followed in both instances made the name of Austria hateful to every Liberal in Europe, yet they served also to discredit Mazzini and prepare men's minds for the subtler policy of Cavour.

To the Piedmontese statesman the Crimean War came as

a Heaven-sent opportunity. An alliance with the Western Powers would improve Piedmont's international standing and place those Powers under an obligation to be useful at some later time. If Austria also intervened, as seemed quite possible in the earlier months of the crisis, she might obtain more territory and be willing to surrender Lombardy as compensation to Piedmont. With great difficulty, for the Allies were exacting and public opinion inclined to hostility, Cavour secured a treaty of alliance, and 15,000 troops were despatched to the Crimea. They fought brilliantly at the battle of the Tchernaja, and returned home with much glory. But the question now to be answered was what gain their courage and discipline were to bring to Piedmont and Italy? After the fall of Sevastopol, Victor Emanuel and his minister visited England and France, winning golden opinions in both countries. Napoleon III. even said, "Write confidentially what you think I might do for Piedmont and for Italy." The immediate gain secured was the admission of Cavour—in spite of Austrian opposition—to the Congress of Paris and the discussion there of the condition of Italy. The victory was purely moral; Austria flatly refused all territorial concessions; neither the Pope nor Ferdinand of Naples took any notice of the protests of England and France against the misgovernment of their states. Yet the Italian question was converted into a matter of European concern, and Piedmont placed at the head of the regeneration movement. Moral the gain might be, yet—and the best minds of Italy recognised this—it was enormous.

The first result of the Congress was a working alliance between Cavour and a large section of the old Republican party. Whilst paying just homage to Mazzini's sincerity, and admitting his real services to the national cause, an

increasing number of democrats realised that his policy of conspiracy and insurrection was suicidal, and turned instead to the idea of unity under Piedmontese leadership. Daniele Manin, the heroic defender of Venice in 1849, adopted this position ; he recognised in Italy " two living forces, Italian public opinion and the Piedmontese army." " Make Italy," he wrote to Victor Emanuel, " and we are with you, if not, not." In August 1856 Cavour had an interview with Garibaldi, as the result of which the great guerilla gave in his adhesion to the new departure. This was sufficient in itself to rally most Republicans to its support. In 1857 Manin and Pallavicino founded the " Italian National Society " to urge on the new policy, and their propaganda spread rapidly throughout Italy, everywhere gaining recruits to the cause. Cavour's relations with the movement were necessarily secret. " Come to see me whenever you like," he said to La Farina, the secretary of the Society, " but come at day-break and let no one else see or know. If I am questioned in Parliament or by diplomats, I shall deny you, like Peter, and say, ' I know him not.' " This secrecy was a necessity of his position. " I have faith," he said, " that Italy will become one State, and will have Rome for its capital." But, " I am minister of the King of Piedmont, and I cannot . . . say or do anything prematurely to compromise his dynasty."

While thus raising up friends for his policy in Italy, Cavour did not neglect the search for allies abroad. Napoleon III., he believed, was the man for the task, and he did his best to cultivate the Emperor's goodwill. At the same time, without provoking an open conflict, he contrived to irritate Austria into withdrawing its diplomatic representative from Turin, an act which placed that State in the wrong before all Europe. But the French Alliance

was finally the product of an unexpected incident which, handled by a lesser man than Cavour, might have provoked disaster. On January 14, 1858, Felice Orsini, who had fought for the Roman Republic in 1849, hurled a bomb at Napoleon III., when on his way to the opera. The Emperor escaped, and the assassin was brought to trial and the scaffold. But from his prison he addressed letters to Napoleon, reminding him of the services rendered by Italians to Napoleon I. and imploring his aid for Italy. "Remember that the tranquillity of Europe, and that of your Majesty will be a chimera until Italy shall be independent. . . . Free my country, and the benedictions of twenty-five millions of citizens will follow you through posterity." The effect of the attempt and of this eloquent pleading was reinforced by Cavour, who, in reply to angry French remonstrances, urged that Austria and the Italian despots were really responsible for Orsini's crime and the persistence of revolutionary efforts in the peninsula. Together the statesman and the murderer clinched the Emperor's resolution. He had dallied with the idea of intervention in Italy; now (whether through fear, disinterested sympathy, or vague idealism remains questionable) he determined upon definite action. On July 21, at Napoleon's invitation, Cavour journeyed to meet the Emperor at Plombières, where, in a secret interview, the fate of Italy was decided. It was agreed that a pretext for a joint war with Austria should be found; that Lombardy and Venetia should be handed over to Piedmont, and Tuscany enlarged at the expense of the Papal States and the Duchies; that the Pope should continue to rule in Rome, but should become the President of an Italian Federation. As reward for services rendered, Savoy, and possibly Nice, were to be ceded to France.

The dangers of this policy, so far as Italy was concerned,

were enormous. The Austrians might be ejected, but a French protectorate might replace them, for Napoleon III. made no secret of his desire that a French prince should oust the Neapolitan Bourbons. The difficulties which Cavour had personally to confront were also very great. He had to prepare for war, to compel Austria to act the aggressor's part, and to hold the Emperor to his bargain. As to the war he had no doubts—in December he declared that he would “force Austria to declare war about the first week in May”—but the last portion of his task was more difficult. Napoleon's public statement that the relations of France with Austria were not so good as he could wish, and a speech by Victor Emanuel to his Parliament, in which the King declared himself “not insensible to the cry of suffering which is raised towards us from so many parts of Italy,”¹ were warnings to Europe of what was to come. Immediately a powerful opposition, both clerical and financial, arose in France, and England, alarmed by visions of a new Napoleonic career of conquest, flung itself valiantly into the breach. The Court and the existing Conservative Government were Austrian rather than Italian in sympathy; consequently, strong pressure was brought upon the Allies to avert war. Napoleon wavered, and in the middle of April 1859 agreed to the English suggestion for a general disarmament by the three states involved. Cavour—who in a moment of despair at this wreckage of his hopes contemplated suicide—perforce agreed also, but then Austria stepped in to save the situation. Cavour's open preparations for a struggle, the recruiting of bands of volunteers who fled from Lombardy to Piedmont, and the immense cost of maintaining the Austrian army on a war footing, proved too much for the stiff-necked officials at Vienna. Austria refused to disarm,

¹ These words were suggested to the King by Napoleon III.

and on April 23 Cavour received an ultimatum calling upon Piedmont to abandon all warlike preparations; he, of course, refused, and four days after war began.

The conflict that followed was more notable for the stubbornness of the fighting than for brilliance of generalship. Its most striking episode was a minor campaign in which Garibaldi, at the head of a small band of irregulars, inflicted severe defeats upon superior forces of the enemy. On June 4 the Austrian General Gyulai, whose dilatory methods compromised his whole campaign, was badly beaten at Magenta and fell back through Lombardy to the fortresses of Venetia. On the 24th the Allies were again victorious at the sanguinary battle of Solferino. Then, with dramatic suddenness, the scene changed. On July 8 an armistice was concluded, and three days afterwards the Emperors of France and Austria, in a personal interview at Villafranca, settled preliminaries of peace. Victor Emanuel was not consulted.

The reasons for this sudden *volte-face* were not without weight. The French losses had been heavy, and the fortresses were still to be reduced. Moreover, the war had been the signal for an explosion in Central Italy. Tuscany, Modena, and Parma had expelled their sovereigns, and the withdrawal of the Austrian garrisons had been followed by the revolt of the Pope's Romagna subjects. The liberated populations demanded nothing short of union with Piedmont. Instead of a divided Italy under French hegemony, a powerful Italian State was in process of formation. Prussia and the South German States were contemplating intervention. The situation in France was serious; the Catholic party, always hostile to the war, took on a menacing attitude when it appeared that the Papacy was to suffer for the benefit of Piedmont. Trembling for his dynasty, Napoleon III.

agreed at Villafranca that Lombardy alone should be surrendered by Austria, and that the expelled despots should be restored.

Cavour's anger at this dashing of his highest hopes was terrible. Losing for a moment his grip on realities, he demanded that Victor Emanuel should continue the war alone, and when met by a blunt refusal he resigned. The King saw more clearly; he accepted the treaty "so far as it concerns myself," thus leaving France and Austria to grapple with the problem of Central Italy as best they could. Meanwhile, Cavour in his retirement was meditating how to bring the treaty to nought. "This treaty shall not be executed," he declared. "I will become a conspirator, I will become a revolutionary. But the treaty shall not be executed. No! A thousand times no! Never, never!"

The treaty, in fact, could not be executed. Secretly encouraged by Cavour, the Central Italians held fast, refusing submission to their ancient Governments and demanding union with Piedmont. Coercion became increasingly impossible, for English policy was now directed by Lords Palmerston and Russell, whose proposal was "to let the Italian people settle their own affairs." The Pope, pressed by Napoleon to promise reforms and accept the presidency of a confederation, refused all compromise. The Emperor was between the horns of a dilemma, from which he finally strove to extricate himself by a disastrous bargain. Union between Piedmont and Central Italy might be permitted, but as the price of French complaisance the former must cede Savoy and Nice. Cavour, restored to office in January 1860, assumed the heavy burden of persuading the Piedmontese Parliament to accept the sacrifice. He was successful, and an Italian kingdom at last issued

from the turmoil. Cavour has been severely criticised for assenting to the bargain, but an impartial consideration of the facts acquits him from blame. Savoy, by language and economic interest, was French rather than Italian, and its cession was probably a gain to the new State. The loss of Nice was a serious blow, but without it Central Italy could hardly have been gained. Had Piedmont refused the concession, Franco-Austrian intervention was possible, and Lombards, Tuscans, and Romagnuols might have been thrust once more under their ancient yokes. England might have protested, but it is most unlikely that she would have fought.

The new kingdom was soon to receive magnificent compensation for its loss. The novel situation in the peninsula inevitably brought forward the question of the future of Naples. Cavour urged an alliance on Bomba's successor, Francis, but his proposal was rejected. Instead, an alliance with Austria and the Pope was sought by Naples. The consummation of this policy, obviously menacing to the new kingdom, would almost certainly have produced a conflict, but the independent intervention of Garibaldi precipitated matters. The Republicans had for some time been hoping to retrieve their prestige by an attempt on Sicily, and Garibaldi had given a conditional promise of assistance. On April 4, 1860, an insurrection in the island began, headed by one Riso, a plumber. To the assistance of the rebels came Rosilino Pilo, a republican, who, without authority, spread the news that Garibaldi was about to appear. On the 7th two of Garibaldi's lieutenants brought the news to their chief, and next day he determined to sail for Sicily. A month of alternate hopes and fears, mixed with active preparations for the expedition, followed. Cavour's attitude towards the movement has been the theme of much

discussion. Certain facts are unquestionable. During his retirement he had declared that he would "busy himself with Naples," and on April 23 he discussed Garibaldi's plans with the latter's agent, Sirtori. The minister definitely forbade any attempt on Papal territory, but as for Sicily he said, "Well and good. Begin at the south, to come up again by the north. When it is a question of undertakings of that kind, however bold they may be, Count Cavour will be second to none." On May 2 Cavour saw the King at Bologna, and they agreed to let Garibaldi go.

The expedition, known to history as that of "The Thousand," sailed on May 6.¹ Five days after Garibaldi landed at Marsala, and the most extraordinary feat of arms of modern times began. The "red-shirts" were confronted by largely superior forces, but in a few weeks they had captured Palermo and compelled the main enemy force to withdraw. At the end of July the Neapolitan Government was glad to evacuate the island and sign a convention which delivered it over to Garibaldi. But the great chief was not content with Sicily. On August 8 the first Garibaldians reached the mainland, and in less than a month the King of Naples was a fugitive from his capital. History has no other record of a campaign begun with such inadequate resources being crowned with so overwhelming a success.

These fateful months had been a time of anxious stress for Cavour. He had been content to face the diplomatic storm which the news of the expedition brought upon him, and to render Garibaldi such secret aid as he could. He had striven to foment a rebellion in Naples to provide an excuse for intervention. Garibaldi's success compelled him to take open and decisive action. The situation was

¹ The actual number of volunteers was apparently 1089.

full of danger. Garibaldi was being wrought upon by the Republicans and cherished plans for an attack upon Rome. This, Cavour knew, would certainly provoke foreign intervention, with its attendant evils. Moreover, there was always the possibility that Garibaldi—whose heart was much superior to his head¹—would allow himself to be persuaded into giving the movement a republican character, the only result of which would have been civil war and national disaster. It was necessary, therefore, to confront both Europe and Garibaldi with an accomplished fact. Assuring himself that Napoleon III. would not interfere so long as Rome was respected, Cavour despatched Victor Emanuel and an army into Papal territory to make their way south and meet the “red-shirts” at Naples. The Pope’s troops were defeated at Castelfiardo, and on October 26 occurred the historic meeting between the King and Garibaldi at Teano, when in fact, though not in words, the soldier presented the monarch with a United Italy. Garibaldi had had the good sense and honesty to repudiate any separatist movement and bow to the inevitable. Five days before the meeting, the Neapolitans, by an overwhelming majority, had voted for union with the Italian kingdom. With rare disinterestedness Garibaldi refused all honours or rewards, and departed for his island home, Caprera, with no more than a bag of seeds. From the Alps to the Mediterranean Italy was free; only Rome and Venetia were wanting to complete the perfect unity.

Cavour now turned to the organisation of the new kingdom and to the question which continued to trouble its peace—that of the future of Rome. He endeavoured to persuade the Papacy to accept a scheme by which the

¹ “The heart of a lion and the brains of an ox,” was Mazzini’s verdict.

State would guarantee complete freedom to the head of the Church in all his ecclesiastical functions ; he was further to retain the Vatican and receive a large annual subsidy. The clergy, moreover, were to receive adequate revenues. These proposals, placed before Pius IX. by certain friendly priests, were not accepted. Cavour's policy of a " free Church in a free State " was before its time. But he persuaded the first national Parliament to resolve that Rome should be the capital of United Italy. To the lasting misfortune of his country he did not live to see this resolution translated into fact. Cavour died on June 6, 1861, saying, " Italy is made—all is safe."

The Unification of ITALY in 1859.

The figures show the dates of union

Lombardy ··· Austrian before 1859.

Venetia ··· Austrian before 1866.

English Miles

0 10 20 40 60 80 100



The Modern Kingdom of Italy was formed by the union of the various states with the Kingdom of Sardinia (House of Savoy).

CHAPTER III

PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA

As has been said,¹ the years which immediately followed the defeat of the German revolution witnessed an orgy of reaction. The very ideals of liberty and national unity seemed banished for ever. Signs were not wanting of a moral decadence. Corruption invaded the Governments and raised its head in high places. Austrian influence was once more supreme, and the necessary effect of that influence upon Germany has already been made sufficiently clear in previous chapters. One far-sighted observer at least realised that the situation could not be permanent. Bismarck's services to the Prussian throne had been rewarded by his appointment as representative of that State in the Federal Diet, where his experiences modified his views very considerably. In 1856, after the Crimean War, he wrote : " Germany is too narrow for Austria and Prussia. We shall have, then, in the near future to defend our existence against Austria, and it does not depend upon us to avoid a collision ; the march of things in Germany comports with no other issue." But Bismarck recognised that at the moment his was a voice crying in the wilderness. The first hope of release from this political Slough of Despond

¹ See p. 136 above.

came in the autumn of 1857, when Frederick William IV. became insane and necessarily abandoned the task of government. It passed for a time to the Queen and the old reactionary camarilla, though the King's brother, William, Prince of Prussia, was named Lieutenant-General of the realm. This condition of things lasted for nearly a year, but speedily became intolerable. In a largely autocratic state like Prussia the absence of a responsible head threw the administration out of gear; the political horizon was becoming increasingly stormy, and in October 1859 Prince William became Regent, an office which he continued to fill till his accession to the throne after the King's death in 1861. Some ministerial changes, of no particular importance, followed his assumption of power.

William was in most respects a typical Prussian squire. Personally honest, his intellect was but mediocre. He lacked his brother's high-flown romanticism and also his moral instability. He believed vaguely in Germany's destiny, but this was subordinated in his mind to the greatness of Prussia and of the Prussian ruling house. In the God-appointed mission of the Hohenzollerns he believed implicitly. While far from accepting Bismarck's clear-cut views as to the necessity of war for the hegemony of Germany, he spoke to his ministers "of the moral conquests that Prussia ought to make in Germany by wise legislation, the development of moral elements and the use of such means of union as the Zollverein." The Liberalism with which popular opinion credited him did not exist. "I make a great distinction," he wrote at the moment of his accession, "between parliamentary legislation and parliamentary government; I admit the first, not the second." Frederick William IV. would have said the same. His advent to power was soon followed by a renaissance of

Liberal and Unionist opinion. For this the Italian policy of Napoleon III. was primarily responsible. A policy ultimately more injurious to France could scarcely have been conceived. After having promised the liberation of Italy "from the Alps to the Adriatic," the liberator first opposed the emancipation of the Central States, then exacted the cession of Nice and Savoy as the price of his complaisance! Apart from the effects of this usurious policy upon Italian opinion, it alarmed all Europe, which envisaged a new epoch of Napoleonic conquests. An attack on the Rhine provinces was confidently expected; it is probable that only the lack of accord between Prussia and Austria prevented German intervention in the war. But the Viennese Government preferred to lose Lombardy rather than allow its rival to take the lead in the Confederation. Fear is a great stimulator of patriotic emotion; the Germans were afraid, and the anarchic condition of their Government attracted proportionate hostility. Economic development pointed the same way; commerce and industry were increasing, and swelled the urban population; the restrictions imposed upon this development by the multitude of frontier-lines aggravated political discontent. One product of these diverse forces was the formation of the "National Association," which revived and propagated the programme of the old Liberal majority in the Frankfurt Parliament: Unity under the leadership of Prussia. Another was the election of a Liberal majority in the Prussian Diet.

Two policies thus found themselves confronted. Was Prussia to advance along the lines of normal constitutional progress, establish Parliamentary government, and thus win a moral hegemony over Germany which must sooner or later find political expression? This had been the policy

of Piedmont in Italy, just carried to a successful conclusion. Or was the old order to be maintained, and Prussian ascendancy established by force? Certainly, the Regent had not yet accepted this second alternative, but the rejection of the Liberal policy would make any other outcome impossible. His hostility to political reform was only emphasised when he found himself in conflict with the Prussian Diet upon the subject which held first place in his mind—military reform.

Always preoccupied with army affairs, William had been seriously alarmed by the condition of the Prussian forces during the crisis of 1859. The military system set up in 1814 still remained unaltered in its essential features. Universal service with the colours for two years was obligatory; ¹ this was succeeded by two years in the reserve and fourteen in the *Landwehr*. But in spite of the fact that the population had risen from ten to eighteen millions, the number of recruits called annually to the first line remained at the figure fixed in 1815—40,000. This led to an uneven distribution of the burdens of military service and lowered the efficiency of the *Landwehr*. The Regent determined upon reform, and in 1860 called to his councils General von Roon, a soldier of great organising ability. A scheme was elaborated, the essentials of which were to increase the term of service with the colours to three years; to bring the number of line regiments up to the level justified by the population; to release members of the *Landwehr* over twenty-seven years of age from the obligation of active service at the front. When submitted to the Diet, these proposals met with active opposition, particularly the lengthened period of line-service. As a result of this opposition the Government decided to ask simply for a pro-

¹ The law of 1814 required three years' service, but the long peace had led to reduction in the term.

visional grant of money to put the army on a proper footing. It was expressly declared that the general principle of reorganisation was not prejudiced by the grant, and the opposition, placated by the declaration, voted the necessary funds for one year only. The Regent and Roon, however, without concerning themselves about the Government's pledge, proceeded to remodel the army according to their own plans. When the death of Frederick William IV. in January 1861 placed William on the throne, the reorganisation was an accomplished fact.¹

When the Diet reassembled and discovered the deception practised upon it, a fresh storm of opposition broke forth, a storm which was not appeased by Roon's declaration that the Crown's prerogative was sufficient to cover the new army scheme, that the consent of the Diet was therefore unnecessary, and that all it had to do was to vote the money required. Once more the struggle ended in a compromise, the House again voted the necessary funds for one year. At the elections to the Diet in 1861 the opposition was completely successful and showed itself uncompromising on the army question. It is important to note that its strength lay chiefly in the manufacturing districts—Silesia and the Rhineland. William, however, would make no concessions. In March 1862 he dissolved the Diet and appointed a frankly Conservative ministry, but at the new elections the Opposition, or Progressist party, as it was called, was once more successful, and after long negotiations, the deputies, by an overwhelming majority, refused the indispensable supplies for the reorganised army. The issue had ceased to be one of army reform, and had become a question as to whether

¹ At his coronation William placed the crown upon his own head, thus proclaiming that "the Kings of Prussia receive their crown from God."

ultimate sovereignty was to reside in the Diet or the King. Behind this, again, lay a deeper social conflict. If the Progressists won, not only the King, but the old aristocracy, still semi-feudal in its habits and ideas, would be vanquished, and the rule of the industrial middle class established in Prussia. The deadlock was complete; William meditated abdication, but at last, on Roon's advice, placed Bismarck at the head of the ministry, pledged to carry on the royal programme in the teeth of the Diet.

Prussian state-policy was now in the hands of a man who knew what he desired, and was quite unhampered by scruples as to the means of attaining it. When on a visit to England in 1862, he explained his views to Disraeli in the following words: "I shall soon be compelled to undertake the leadership of the Prussian Government. My first care will be, with or without the help of Parliament, to reorganise the army. The King has rightly set himself this task; he cannot, however, carry it through with his present councillors. When the army has been brought to such a state as to command respect, then I will take the first opportunity to declare war with Austria, burst asunder the German Confederation, bring the middle and smaller states into subjection, and give Germany a national union under the leadership of Prussia." Once established in office, he set his hand to the execution of this plan. The Progressists knew him only as the fierce reactionary of 1849; to them he was a typical squire, appointed merely to coerce the Diet. The frank brutality with which he expressed his views shocked them even more than the views themselves. "It is not Prussia's liberalism," he said, "that Germany looks to, but her military power." And again: "Not by speeches and resolutions of majorities are the mighty problems of the age to be solved, but by blood and iron." It is not surprising

that after these deliverances his tentatives of conciliation failed. The struggle continued; a dispute between the Lower and Upper Houses led to the Budget not being passed before the prorogation of the Diet. Bismarck continued to collect the taxes and to maintain the army on its new footing -- acts quite clearly illegal. A fresh dissolution in 1863 produced no improvement, since the Progressists again obtained a majority, although the Government had dragooned the Press and instructed officials "to follow as voters the course indicated by the King." The unconstitutional acts continued, while every protest was stifled.

Meanwhile, Bismarck was pursuing his great diplomatic scheme for the crushing of Austria. A favourable opportunity occurred in 1863 for isolating that state by winning the friendship of Russia. In January of that year a revolt broke out in Russian Poland, and the gallant struggle of the Polish bands against great odds aroused general enthusiasm. So strong was this feeling in France that Napoleon III., seeking as ever for popularity, urged the Tsar to re-establish the Polish kingdom, and, when his advice was haughtily refused, persuaded England and Austria to join him in sending first separate, then joint notes of protest to the Russian Government against its treatment of the Poles. These manœuvres did not benefit Poland; they merely aroused the Tsar's hostility to France and Austria. Bismarck steadily refused to take any part in the proceedings; in February 1863 he had come to an agreement with Russia to take joint action, if necessary, against the revolt. This step was in direct contradiction with German feeling, then strongly on the Polish side, but its diplomatic value was immense. Austria had lost, while Prussia had gained, the goodwill of the Tsar.

Towards Austria, indeed, Bismarck pursued his policy of

hostility. When that state in 1863 proposed a Congress of German princes to consider federal reform, he refused to accept its proposals, demanding instead a German union with Prussia at its head. But the time for a definite breach had not yet come ; Bismarck was willing to act with Austria so long as she was useful to his ultimate ends. The opportunity for joint action occurred in 1863, when the revival of the Schleswig-Holstein question¹ convulsed Germany. In that year a new Danish Constitution was promulgated, which infringed the ancient rights of Holstein and was followed by the complete absorption of Schleswig into the Danish state—a palpable breach of treaty rights. The situation was further complicated by the death of Frederick III. of Denmark, when the son of the German Duke of Augustenberg laid claim to the Duchies. National feeling there and in Germany generally ran high ; it was proposed in the Federal Diet that Augustenberg's claims should be supported by the Federal army. This Bismarck resolutely opposed. He objected to the new Danish Constitution as illegal, but did not desire to add a fresh member to the ranks of petty German princes. Prussia, moreover, would gain nothing by such a course, and Bismarck was eminently a realist in politics. Austria, for motives of her own, was likewise opposed to Augustenberg's claim, and, a concert being temporarily established, the two rivals agreed that Danish aggression in Holstein should be repulsed by Federal execution. In December 1863, therefore, Hanoverian and Saxon troops, acting on behalf of the Confederation, occupied that Duchy. The problem of Schleswig, however, still demanded solution. Prussia and Austria now agreed to request the Danish Government to withdraw the Constitution which had absorbed the Duchy, and if it refused, as was

¹ See p. 130 above.

certain, to take armed action. As Bismarck had anticipated, the Danes did refuse, and in January 1864 the Austro-Prussian armies entered Holstein, and then in February occupied Schleswig. In the fighting which ensued the Danes were completely defeated. Long and tedious negotiations, and a Conference of the Powers in London followed, but in the upshot, by a treaty signed on October 30, 1864, Denmark was compelled to surrender Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenberg (a purely Danish district) to Austria and Prussia jointly. These states were to decide the ultimate fate of the ceded territory.

The question of the Duchies now entered upon a new phase. It is abundantly clear that Bismarck intended their annexation from the first, but various difficulties had to be surmounted. King William was troubled with moral scruples which greatly irritated his minister; the Federal Diet was strong in its support of Augustenberg; the inhabitants of the Duchies were hostile to annexation, and Austria would certainly rather fight than permit it. The first step was to remove the Federal troops from Holstein; with Austria's support this was accomplished, with the result that Austria, having no prospect of obtaining the Duchies for herself, began to support Augustenberg. Since fresh territory could not be obtained, the Viennese Government was willing to accept a new client as some compensation. Bismarck countered by himself professing willingness to admit the pretender's claims, but was careful to lay down conditions which made acceptance impossible. Negotiations continued, while Bismarck, seeking an ally in the war he knew to be inevitable, began to make approaches to Italy. A temporary arrangement—the Convention of Gastein, signed in August 1865, by which Prussia agreed to administer Schleswig, and Austria Holstein—merely

postponed the conflict. Bismarck continued to harass the Austrian Government, and in 1866 both sides began to prepare for war. Bismarck secured his treaty with Italy; in the event of a struggle, both states were to attack Austria, and if successful, Italy was to receive Venetia as a reward. Here, again, Bismarck profited by the errors of Napoleon III. The French occupation of Rome—the goal of Italy's hopes—made good relations between the states impossible. Rome, Napoleon dared not surrender, and the way was left clear for Bismarck. Fortified by the alliance, he continued his preparations; Austria, at the end of her patience, menaced on two sides, suddenly precipitated the conflict by remitting the question of the Duchies to the Federal Diet. The Prussian representative protested and withdrew; six days after—on June 7—Prussian troops invaded Holstein.

In the war which followed, Austria received the support of almost all the minor German states, whose rulers were irrevocably hostile to Prussian ambitions. But their military resources were small; Austria, weakened by internal racial strife, was unprepared, while under the care of Roon and Moltke the Prussian army had become the most formidable fighting machine in Europe. The actual struggle was brief, an affair of weeks. In ten days Hesse-Cassel, Hanover, and Saxony were overrun by the Prussians; on June 22 Bohemia was invaded, on July 3 the Austrians were overwhelmingly defeated at Königgrätz. In less than a fortnight after, the armies of the Confederation were crushed, and Frankfort, the meeting-place of the Diet, was in Prussian hands. The Italians, it is true, had suffered defeat, on land at Custozza, on sea at Lissa, but Austria was at the end of its resources. Francis Joseph appealed to Napoleon III. to act as mediator, an appeal to

which the Emperor assented. Bismarck had no objection ; he was anxious to obtain peace at the earliest possible moment before any power had time to intervene. Moreover, though in this he was opposed by the military chiefs, he did not wish to crush Austria completely ; the enemy of the present might be the ally of the future. He made it clear, however, that Napoleon would not be allowed to dictate terms. Negotiations were opened at Nikolsburg on July 22, and on August 23 the conditions there decided upon were embodied in the Treaty of Prague, the main provisions of which were as follows. Austria was henceforth excluded from Germany, and ceded Venetia to Italy ; Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfort were annexed to Prussia, which became the dominant power in a new federal state, the North German Confederation ; Schleswig and Holstein also passed to Prussia, though a provision was inserted which declared that Schleswig might be reunited to Denmark if the inhabitants so desired.¹

Prussia thus emerged from the war with her position immensely fortified, and her territory greatly enlarged. The new Confederation was put upon a very different basis from the old. It was a genuine federal organisation, with a common military force and foreign policy ; its political constitution included two bodies—a Federal Council, in which the states had proportionate voting powers, and a Reichstag elected by universal suffrage, in which the people as a whole was represented. The King of Prussia was proclaimed President of the new state ; he named its Chancellor, and had supreme direction over military and diplomatic affairs. Over the greater part of Germany the old régime of division and “ particularism ” was at an end. The success of the war, moreover, closed the constitutional

¹ This provision was never put into force.

struggle in Prussia. Elections to the Diet had been held immediately after Königgrätz, with the natural result that a majority favourable to the Government was returned. When all was safely concluded, Bismarck (much against the King's will) obtained a vote of indemnity from the Diet for any illegal acts done in the course of the struggle. The Prussian people abandoned its claim for self-government in return for the hegemony of Germany.

The influence of its defeat upon the Austrian Empire was far-reaching. After the disasters of 1859, Francis Joseph had endeavoured to reform the political condition of his distracted state, but had failed, largely owing to the hostility of the Magyars. Now it became necessary for Austria to agree quickly with her adversary, and in 1867 was framed the remarkable Constitution which set up the Dual Monarchy. This established two states, Austria and Hungary, which, so far as their internal affairs were concerned, were independent, the sole bond of union being the Hapsburg Crown. Three ministers were to be appointed by the monarch to deal with affairs common to both states, that is, war, diplomacy, and finance. Control over these was to be maintained by "Delegations" from the Parliaments of both states, which were to meet alternately in Vienna and Pesth; the two "Delegations" were not to meet together, but would communicate in writing; each was to employ its national language. The Dual Monarchy is still governed on this system, the real meaning of which was that Germans and Magyars united to maintain their hold over the other nationalities. The Magyars, in particular, have distinguished themselves by their oppressive treatment of the subject races, Serbs, Slovaks, and Roumanians, who have been persistently denied the very elements of justice and liberty.

CHAPTER IV

BISMARCK AND NAPOLEON III.

THE blow struck at Königgrätz reverberated throughout Europe. The sudden re-emergence of Prussia as a first-class military power; the welding of the larger part of Germany into an organised state, with its resources at the disposal of one who had proved himself a master of statecraft: these things marked a new era in Continental politics as clearly as the proclamation of the first French Republic. Little now was left of the imposing political fabric erected with so much labour in 1815, and sustained for nearly half a century with such lavish expenditure of human life. For more than two hundred years a divided Germany had been the first principle of French and Austrian statesmen; now, unity was partially achieved, and no one could suppose that the man responsible for that first step would rest content till the next and last was taken. No country could be more seriously affected than France, for ever since the close of the religious wars of the seventeenth century, its diplomacy had persistently striven for the maintenance of German disunion. The Republic and the Empire had played this game as skilfully as the servants of Louis XIV. The disappearance of the old state of things must, therefore, in any event, have profoundly influenced the policy

of France, but at the moment, owing to the internal condition of that state, its effect was the more far-reaching.

Ever since 1859 the star of Napoleon III. had been steadily waning. Up to that date his conduct of affairs had been successful, at any rate on the side of national prestige. His part in the Crimean War had covered France with glory; at the Congress of Paris he appeared as the dictator of Europe. In 1859 he had humbled the ancient enemy—Austria, and by aiding the liberation of Italy seemed to give a death-blow to the hated system of 1815. But the fortunes of uncle and nephew were alike in this: their tenure of power rested upon success. Directly that escaped them their end was in sight. But the situation of Napoleon III. was more difficult than that of his predecessor. Apart from the enormous difference in personal capacity, there was the fact that the footsteps of the later Emperor were dogged by two inexpiable crimes. To gain support for his cause he had permitted the fratricidal attack upon the Roman Republic, thereby committing himself, in the teeth of his own principles and of the ardent desires of the Italian people, to the maintenance of the discredited Temporal Power. Not all his services to Italy could minimise that fact, any more than the glories of his policy could wash away the stains of innocent blood shed upon December 2. The ancients loved to represent the criminal hunted by the avenging Furies; the consequences of the shameful victories by which he had attained to the Imperial throne pursued Napoleon III. till his fall.

The results of French intervention in Italy have already been partially indicated. The peace of Villafranca seemed to the Italians a betrayal, and the enforced cession of Savoy and Nice the act of a mercenary. But the war had unloosed forces that the Emperor could not control.

Garibaldi and the Thousand overturned the Neapolitan Bourbons; Cavour annexed the papal territories. For this the Catholic party in France held Napoleon responsible, and its attacks upon him were speedily reinforced from a different quarter. In a desperate attempt to regain English goodwill, much impaired by his grasping Italian policy, Napoleon arranged a commercial treaty with England. This breach with the protectionist system drew down upon him the wrath of the industrial and commercial classes. Alarmed at this alienation of the two most powerful classes of his supporters, he attempted to conciliate liberal opinion and shelter himself behind the forms of constitutional government. Already, in 1859, a complete amnesty for political offenders had permitted the return of many exiles to France; now, a further step was taken. By an Imperial decree¹ both the Senate and the Legislative body were empowered to move and freely discuss an address in reply to the speech from the throne. The concession was really illusory, and its true motive was revealed by a member of the Government, De Gramont, who said, "The moment has come to lighten the Emperor's burden, and to relieve him of the full weight of the discontent which his policy must inevitably produce. . . . The Emperor can satisfy neither reactionaries nor revolutionaries. The rôle of mediator which he has elected to play single-handed makes it impossible." However, the aim of this strategy was by no means achieved; the few Republicans in the Legislature demanded further concessions, and the clericals denounced the foreign policy of the Government.

At the same time the financial situation was worsening. The wars, and the lavish expenditure which was a necessary part of the Imperial programme, had raised the public

¹ November 24, 1860.

debt to an unprecedented figure. This led the Emperor in 1861 to renounce the Government's right to borrow money when the Chambers were not sitting, and to permit them slightly increased control over the Budget. But the conflict with the Catholic party continued; the quarrel was even exacerbated by the recognition of the new Italian kingdom. A bishop referred to Napoleon as "Judas." When measures of repression were applied the opposition became stronger than ever, and the Emperor was so far overborne that he made it clear to the Italian Government that it would not be allowed to take Rome. In 1863 came the serious error of policy in regard to Poland described in the previous chapter. The sole result of French interference was the alienation of Russia, while domestic feeling, strongly sympathetic with Poland, became increasingly discontented. This discontent manifested itself in the elections which took place the same year. The opposition parties, coalescing at the polls, cast nearly two million votes, and elected thirty-five deputies, of whom seventeen were Republicans. From this time onwards there was a marked growth of revolutionary feeling; the exiles had returned in no conciliatory mood; as the economic situation worsened, and the popularity of the Empire waned, their propaganda reached an ever-widening circle of the discontented.

In the years that followed, the diplomatic activities of the Government were calculated neither to appease public opinion nor improve the international status of France. In 1864 a convention with Italy procured an adjournment, rather than a solution, of the Roman question. The Italians agreed to make no attempt upon the city, to defend it from all attacks, and permit the Pope to enrol a defensive force. France, in return, promised to withdraw its troops from Rome within two years, and they were, in fact, removed in

1866. But this arrangement neither pleased the Pope nor conciliated Italy, thus compelled to abandon the goal of her ambitions. Prussia was at hand to promise Venetia, and thus arose the alliance which ultimately defeated Austria. That defeat burst like a thunder-clap upon Napoleon III. He had anticipated a long-drawn struggle which would permit his intervention at the right moment, and enable him to extract some territorial gain from the exhaustion of the combatants. Königgrätz dissipated these hopes. For a moment it seemed that the Emperor would accept the situation, but the pressure upon him was strong, there were clamours in the Chamber, and he permitted his ambassador, Benedetti, secretly to ask for the cession to France of territory on the Rhine. This was peremptorily refused, with the result that the minister primarily responsible—Drouyn de Lhuys—was dismissed. Yet even then Napoleon could not rest. A great political event had taken place in Europe, far-reaching territorial changes had been accomplished, in all of which France had had no share. He had educated public opinion into a thoroughly unhealthy frame of mind, into an avid expectation of gains, material and in prestige. This appetite he must satisfy, or fall like Louis Philippe and the elder Bourbons. Driven on by this necessity, he permitted a fresh demand for the cession of Landau and Saarlouis; for a free hand in the annexation of Luxemburg and for Prussian aid in the acquisition of Belgium. Bismarck perceived his advantage in these proposals. He roundly refused an inch of German territory, but temporised as to Belgium and Luxemburg. At his instigation, it would appear, Benedetti drafted a treaty embodying these demands, a document which he, very inadvisedly, left in Bismarck's hands. The latter affected to hesitate, but in the meantime the Treaty of Prague was

signed. Secure in his gains, and confident that Napoleon would not risk a war, he quietly dropped the matter, returning no answer to Benedetti. The Emperor retired from the contest empty-handed, to face an increasingly exasperated public opinion.

An even more serious defeat speedily followed, the cause of which requires some explanation. The Mexican Government had suspended payments to its foreign creditors, with the result that, in 1861, France, Spain, and England agreed to enforce payment, but renounced any idea of conquest. After a naval demonstration off the Mexican coast, the three Powers entered into negotiations with the President, Benito Juarez, but these were interrupted by France, which cherished other designs than mere debt-collecting. The Emperor, in fact, had determined upon a fresh adventure by which France might secure a footing in the New World. The moment seemed propitious; the United States were torn by the great Secession War, and a party in Mexico was willing to support his schemes. England and Spain, disgusted by this clear breach of agreement, withdrew their forces, but a French expedition was landed, and achieved sufficient success to justify the production of a claimant to the empire of Mexico. The pretender in question was Prince Maximilian of Austria; urged on by his wife and Napoleon, he accepted the invitation extended by French partisans in Mexico, and arrived in that country in 1864, there to be proclaimed Emperor. But he came as the ruler of a clique, supported by foreign bayonets. From the beginning his position was utterly false. Juarez organised a stubborn resistance; the drain of French men and money speedily became enormous. In 1865 the Civil War in North America ended, and the United States Government was free to turn its attention to Mexico. To repulse

any attempt of a European state to obtain a footing on the American continent was, and remains, a first principle in the foreign policy of the United States ; the Government had at its command a vast army hardened in the fires of a gigantic war. Peremptory demands for the withdrawal of the French could not long be refused, and the troops departed in March 1867. Maximilian could not maintain the struggle single-handed. He was made prisoner and shot in June. His wife, overborne by grief, had previously become insane. The moral effects of this disaster were enormous. The expedition was alleged to have had its origin in corrupt finance ; a vast expenditure had been incurred with no result but serious humiliation ; an innocent man had been enticed to his death.

Pressed upon all sides, Napoleon had already resumed his policy of political concessions. In January 1867 the right of deputies to interpellate ministers had been established. In 1868 the Press was partially freed, and public meetings permitted under police supervision. These crumbs of liberty satisfied no one ; the Republicans merely seized the opportunity to extend their propaganda. A fresh complication arose in Italy. In 1862 Garibaldi had issued from retirement to attack Rome, and had then been prevented by the Italian Government ; at the end of 1867 he made a fresh attempt, but French troops were hurried to Italy and defeated him at Mentana. In Paris, Rouher, the chief minister, declared in the Chamber, "Italy will not enter Rome. No, never !" Once more a French garrison protected the Pope, but Italian sympathies were finally alienated from France.

The widespread discontent manifested itself at the elections of 1869. The opposition parties polled nearly three and a half million votes. Paris went over to their

candidates, and the solid majority which had hitherto supported the Government was irretrievably broken up. A fresh compromise was evidently necessary; Ollivier, the leader of the Liberal, as opposed to the Republican Opposition, demanded the creation of a responsible Ministry, and the recognition of the right of the Legislative body "to regulate the essential conditions of its own activity." The Emperor was wretchedly ill from an internal disease, and in no condition to embark upon a fresh political struggle; the powers demanded were conceded. To inaugurate the "Liberal Empire" new men were needed, and Ollivier took office as chief minister. But once in place he speedily surrendered to the reactionary influences that still dominated the Court. A new attempt to combat the revolutionary movement began. A Republican deputy, Henri de Rochefort, and the International Working Men's Association,¹ which was spreading Socialist doctrines among the masses, were prosecuted. The characteristic Napoleonic device of an appeal to the nation for moral support was once more tried and succeeded. At a plebiscite taken in May 1870, over seven million citizens approved the reforms by their votes. It was the last triumph of the Second Empire, for the Franco-German War was at hand.

It is difficult to say when the idea of a conflict with France first entered Bismarck's mind, but probably the demands put forward in 1866 convinced him that it was inevitable. In any case, he had good reason to believe that the union of the German states which retained an independent existence with the Northern Confederation would be resisted by France, and as that union was the natural goal of his ambitions, he prepared for a struggle with his accustomed thoroughness. Bismarck never

¹ See below, p. 231.

fought save upon ground favourable to himself, and a breach with the ancient enemy upon a well-chosen pretext would drive southern Germany into his arms. Prussia was not popular in Bavaria and Würtemberg, but France was less so. The French diplomats made the fatal error of exaggerating the jealous mutterings of princes and officials into a deep-rooted hostility to Prussia and a friendship for their own country. Bismarck, on the other hand, knew that if he could make France appear the aggressive enemy of German independence, the whole nation would forget its minor grievances and rally to the common cause. The occasion he sought for was at hand; the statesmen formed in the corruption of the Second Empire, rendered blind by self-confidence, too much absorbed by dynastic considerations to comprehend true national interests, were about to deliver France over to an unsleeping enemy.

The chronic state of despotism tempered by revolt in which Spain had long existed, culminated in 1868 in a general uprising against Queen Isabella and the Church. The movement had at its head General Prim, a Catalan soldier of great ability, who also possessed statesmanlike qualities much above those of the average Spanish military politician. Isabella was driven into exile, but a dispute as to the nature of the government to be set up immediately broke out. Prim was determined upon the retention of monarchy, and was supported by a Cortes elected by universal suffrage. A search for a suitable monarch amongst the minor royal houses of Europe accordingly began. The first choice fell upon Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, whose family had already given a prince to Roumania,¹ and who was, moreover, at once a relative of William of Prussia and Napoleon III. Leopold at first refused, but finally, in

¹ See below, p. 212.

June 1870, accepted at Bismarck's instigation. King William, in his capacity as head of the Hohenzollern house, approved the acceptance. Now, this candidature could not be agreeable to France, since Spain under a German king might be drawn into an attitude hostile to its northern neighbour, which would thus find itself menaced upon two frontiers. Napoleon III. had opposed it in 1869, and there is little doubt that Bismarck revived the proposal after its rejection in order to find a favourable pretext for a dispute. Great efforts were made by European diplomacy to persuade Leopold after all to withdraw, and he finally did so on July 12. Unfortunately, the matter had become public; a bellicose party in France had begun to talk of war. The French Government, striving to satisfy public opinion by a diplomatic victory, ordered its ambassador, Benedetti, to press King William to forbid the candidature. This the King refused to do, preferring to leave the decision to the Prince. The latter's abandonment of the project on the 12th should have settled the whole question, but the Government at Paris, overborne by press clamours, instructed Benedetti to press the King for a promise that the candidature should not be resumed. William refused his assent in an interview on the 13th, but parted from the ambassador in a friendly manner. The same day he received a telegram from Paris stating that Napoleon was about to ask for a personal letter conveying a declaration that he had no intentions injurious to France. Irritated by this untimely pressure, William refused to see Benedetti again, and telegraphed the facts of the matter to Bismarck. The Chancellor immediately published this telegram in an altered form,¹ which made the King's action appear as

¹ The word "forgery" has been used in this connection; it is excessive.

an affront to Benedetti. The telegram, as Moltke said, now sounded "like a flourish in answer to a challenge." Bismarck had been much disgusted with Leopold's withdrawal, he had even contemplated resignation; the maladroitness of the French Government gave him the desired opportunity. When the altered telegram appeared in the German press on July 14 it was received with violent manifestations of nationalist feeling. The King, it appeared, had inflicted a well-deserved rebuke upon the ancient enemy. The Government at Paris saw the matter in a similar light, and next day informed the Chambers that mobilisation was on foot. France declared war on July 19.

In spite of the boastful declarations of ministers, the French army was unprepared for the conflict that ensued. The diplomatic position was wholly bad. The Government had counted on aid from Italy and Austria, but the sympathies of the former had been alienated by the occupation of Rome, and the latter was immobilised by Russia, hostile to the Empire since 1863. Both states preserved their neutrality. Bismarck took care still further to damage France by revealing to Europe the aggressive proposals of 1866. Opinion was almost universally anti-French. Military disaster followed hard upon diplomatic. The Prussian armies, reinforced by those of the southern states, swept into French territory, gaining a series of important victories, and succeeded in shutting up the principal French force in Metz. An attempt to relieve the city led to the decisive battle of Sedan,¹ where the Emperor and his whole army were made prisoners. Directly the news became known in Paris, a Republic was proclaimed, and a Government of National Defence set up. All hope seemed lost, but France is never more dangerous than in the hour of disaster. Léon

¹ September 2, 1870.

Gambetta, a member of the new Government, laboured desperately to organise new forces, whilst Paris heroically withstood a long siege and bombardment. But the capital was compelled to capitulatè on January 24, 1871; preliminaries of peace were settled on February 26, and ratified by a National Assembly on March 1. France ceded Alsace and Lorraine, and agreed to pay an indemnity of 5,000,000,000 francs.

Civil war followed hard upon defeat. The National Assembly was full of crypto-royalists notoriously hostile to the Republic; the population of Paris, which had retained its arms, believed that it had been betrayed into surrender, and was correspondingly discontented; a strong Socialist element in the capital was ripe for insurrection. An attempt to disarm the National Guard gave the signal for revolt. The Government fled to Versailles, and in Paris a "Commune" was proclaimed. So far as there was a conscious political theory behind the revolt, its idea was to resolve France into a federation of practically autonomous Communes, a proposal which—apart from any considerations of practical difficulties—conflicted with the great age-long tradition of national unity. A second siege and bombardment were necessary before the revolution was finally suppressed. The rebels fought from street to street and house to house; many public buildings were burned down. Both sides committed grave excesses; the Communards murdered a number of hostages, while the Government troops slaughtered the conquered after the merest pretence of trial before courts-martial, or without any trial at all. It was officially admitted that the slain numbered 17,000, but the true figure was almost certainly much larger. Thousands of persons, including women and children, were arrested, of whom many perished from

the effects of ill-treatment. Courts-martial continued to function till 1876, in which time they sentenced over 13,000 people—270 of them to death, and 7500 to transportation.

Both Italy and Russia hastened to use the situation created by the war for their own advantage. Military exigencies had compelled the withdrawal of the French garrison from Rome, and its departure was followed by an Italian occupation, achieved after a trifling resistance. The Temporal Power of the Pope was thus finally abolished, and Mazzini's dream was realised when the city became the capital of United Italy. Russia denounced the clause of the Treaty of 1856 which excluded her fleets from the Black Sea. England protested, but a conference of the Powers held in London agreed to the abolition of the articles in question, and the Sultan accepted its decision without protest. Thus ended a very ill-judged attempt artificially to fetter the normal and inevitable development of the Russian state.

The crowning act of the struggle was the formation of a united German Empire. By separate treaties between the Northern Confederation and the independent states the latter were admitted into the Union, and on January 18, 1871, William of Prussia was proclaimed Emperor of the new state at Versailles by his fellow-sovereigns. The constitution was practically that of 1866, adjusted to meet the new circumstances; a Reichstag, with carefully limited powers, but elected by manhood suffrage, continued to represent the German people, but effective sovereignty remained with the Emperor and the Federal Council.

CHAPTER V

NATIONAL REORGANISATIONS

THE years immediately following the Franco-German War were chiefly notable in the domestic histories of most European states for labours of reorganisation and adaptation to new circumstances. This chapter will accordingly be devoted to a brief indication of the more important facts of this process.

The condition of France in 1871 was truly deplorable. The country had been ravaged by invasion and torn by civil war; its prestige in Europe had been diminished, to all appearances, irretrievably; two provinces had been wrenched from its territory, and the new frontier thus constituted placed it in an inferior military position; its armed forces and its economic life were thoroughly disorganised, while a huge new financial liability had been incurred in the shape of the indemnity; finally, the political future was dark, since the fall of the Empire had revived the hopes of the older dynasties, thus threatening the nation with fresh internal conflicts as to forms of government. Fortunately, a statesman had been placed at the head of affairs whose character and abilities were peculiarly useful at this hour of supreme crisis. The National Assembly had nominated Thiers to the headship of the executive

Government in the early days of its existence ; he had concluded the peace and crushed the Commune. Now he was confronted with the tremendous task of pacification and reorganisation. Though not a great political genius, he possessed qualities admirably fitted for the work. His experience was great ; his intellect acute and nourished by wide information. During the Empire he had criticised the Imperial policy with admirable force, and could claim to have predicted the disasters it would bring upon the country. His political antecedents stood him in good stead. He was known to have a personal preference for monarchy, whilst his belief in representative government and liberal institutions was unquestioned. Royalists and Republicans alike hoped to enlist him upon their side, and were therefore content to adjourn the question of the political organisation of the state to a more favourable moment. Thiers himself accepted the Republic as "the form of government which divides us least." Monarchy was impossible since there were three claimants for one throne. In any case, the Republic had been legally established ; to overturn it would delay the work of reorganisation. In these views he was supported by a large body of moderate opinion.

Under his skilful guidance France revived with astonishing rapidity. Huge loans were raised without difficulty to pay the indemnity, "the liberation of the territory" from the German army of occupation being finally secured in 1873. Local government was reformed ; by a reaction from the excessive centralisation of the Empire, the powers of the communal and departmental councils were enlarged, and these bodies partially freed from official tutelage. Most important of all, the army was remodelled and re-armed. The long-service system of the Empire was abolished ; for a professional, was substituted a national

army, organised on the Prussian model, and having universal liability to serve as its basis. Throughout the country there was a revival of economic and intellectual life which surprised Europe, while it deeply mortified Bismarck and the German military party.

The political truce which had contributed to this renaissance could not last for ever. Thiers made it increasingly evident that he regarded the Republic as definitely established; those who, like Gambetta, supported this form of government on principle, gained strength in the country, which returned Republicans at most by-elections. The Monarchists felt power slipping from their hands. All attempts at compromise between the supporters of the two Bourbon branches had hitherto broken down, but none the less a final effort to destroy the Government was made. Thiers' proposals for organising the public powers on a Republican, though Conservative, basis were rejected, and he resigned in consequence. His successor was Marshal MacMahon, under whose auspices the royalist groups made a last effort to restore the monarchy. It failed through the obstinacy of the Comte de Chambord, the representative of the elder Bourbon branch, who refused all compromise on the question of the national flag—the fleurs-de-lys must replace the tricolour. Such an attitude made an immediate restoration impossible in view of the strength of public sentiment. Thus disappointed, the Coalition first passed a law which confided executive power to the Marshal for seven years, then worked to destroy Republicanism by repressive acts. A state of siege was maintained in thirty-nine departments; bureaucratic interference in elections was revived; suspected officials were dismissed. The symbols of the Republic were ostentatiously removed from public buildings, while the communes

were once more subjected to Government control. Democratic resistance to these proceedings, which recalled only too clearly the worst manœuvres of the Empire, was supported by public opinion at the polls. Between May 1873 and January 1875 Republican candidates were successful at twenty-six out of twenty-nine by-elections. This state of affairs, in which all was provisional at a time when the country had so urgent a need of repose, could not be permanent. Against its will, the majority was compelled to organise the Republic. In the constitutional debates which began in 1875, a vote was carried which gave to the executive chief the title of "President of the Republic." The vital step had been taken, and the Constitution soon assumed the form which it has ever since—some unimportant modifications apart—retained. Its character is briefly as follows: There are two Houses—a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate. The former is elected by universal suffrage for four years, the latter by a special electorate drawn from the local governing bodies.¹ The Chambers unite to elect a President, who retains office for seven years. His powers are considerable, but must all be exercised by a responsible ministry. He can, with the assent of the Senate, dissolve the Chamber of Deputies. In practice, effective sovereignty lies with the popularly elected House. This régime has maintained itself longer than any form of government in France since 1789; though more than once menaced by royalist conspiracies it has always emerged triumphant; and public opinion, moulded by universal secular education, has become increasingly democratic. None but fanatics and visionaries desire or expect the overthrow of the Third Republic.

¹ A proportion of its members was originally elected for life by the National Assembly.

But the new order was not established without a final struggle. The Republicans were very successful at the general elections of 1876 ; the Senate, however, was almost equally divided between the parties. Ministries more or less in accord with the sentiments of the Chamber were formed, but the President was covertly hostile. Open conflict broke out in 1877. Petitions had been presented in favour of the Pope's Temporal Power ; these the Chamber denounced as " ultramontane manifestations," and Gambetta described " clericalism " as the enemy of France. On May 16 Marshal MacMahon in a public letter reproached the chief minister, Jules Simon, for his inability to control the Chamber ; Simon, though supported by the Republican majority, promptly resigned. A coalition ministry of Royalists and Bonapartists was formed, which, in conjunction with the Senate, procured the dissolution of the Chamber. Every device was used to coerce the electorate ; MacMahon made a personal appeal ; Government candidates were openly supported by the bureaucracy. The Republicans, however, were victorious, and the ministers were compelled to resign. The President, undaunted, procured a fresh Conservative ministry ; he even contemplated another dissolution. But the Chamber, supported by the people, held the key to the situation ; it refused to vote the Budget. The attempt to renew the system of personal government by a soldier had dismally failed ; MacMahon surrendered at discretion, and accepted a Republican ministry. A final dispute over the dismissal of openly disloyal officials led to his resignation in January 1879, when he was succeeded by Jules Grévy. At last the Republic had a Republican at its head.

In Germany, as in France, the new order was not established without serious conflicts, though these were

sectarian and economic rather than political in their origin. Bismarck had to defend himself against personal intrigues, but, supported by the Emperor, retained his hold upon office without serious difficulty. Separatist tendencies among the minor states were confined to small coteries of no real importance. Nor was there any serious revival of the constitutional struggle. The middle classes, who had been the great upholders of parliamentary government, abandoned themselves, for the most part, to feverish industrial and commercial activity. Content with the vast successes of the "blood and iron policy," they abandoned their dreams of political domination, accepting material gratifications as a more than adequate recompense. A new factor in the political situation strengthened this tendency. The appearance of a powerful Socialist party drove the aristocratic and moneyed classes, old antagonists though they were, into an uneasy alliance against the "red peril." This alliance has in fact, if not always in form, persisted, and furnishes the key to comprehension of German political evolution in recent years. Liberalism has long ceased to be a vital force, and has merely become the expression of economic interests. Another factor which has weakened it has been the growth of a new generation, ignorant of the struggles and oppressions of the past, and filled with enthusiasm for the Empire and its dominant position in Europe. Monarchical sentiment has notably revived; in the middle decades of the nineteenth century it had largely disappeared amongst educated Germans, but a positive monarchist cult has now been established. That very feeble personality, Frederick William III., has been elevated into something like a national hero, while William I. has been the subject, both in professorial chairs and the market-place, of eulogies which would seem

excessive if applied to a Caesar or a Charlemagne. The old gentle, dreaming Germany, so much beloved of sentimental foreigners in the early years of last century, steeped in transcendental philosophy and politically insignificant, has vanished for ever.

The most serious opposition to Bismarck's policy came from the Catholics rather than the Liberals. The former organised themselves as a political party to support the Holy See; they particularly desired that the Temporal Power might be restored. The proclamation of Papal Infallibility in 1870 appears to have convinced Bismarck that the Church meditated aggression upon the State. "The resolutions of the Vatican Council," he declared in 1872, "have made the bishops instruments of the Pope, the irresponsible organs of a sovereign who, in virtue of his infallibility, disposes of a power more completely absolute than any monarch in the world." He professed also to trace Polish nationalist machinations in the activity of the Catholic or "Centre" party, as it was called. Thus began the *Kulturkampf* or "struggle for civilisation." The State strove to subordinate the Church completely to itself; the clergy resisted. The latter were deprived of control over the schools; the Jesuits and their affiliated orders were expelled; the bishops were ordered to notify their nominations to the civil authority, which might oppose its veto; State payments to the Church were abandoned; civil marriage became obligatory. The Catholics presented an obstinate resistance to this "Diocletian persecution"; bishops and clergy submitted to imprisonment rather than obey the laws. Most of the Episcopal sees became empty. Bismarck saw that the task of crushing Catholicism was above his forces: "the picture of dexterous, light-footed priests pursued through back doors and bedrooms by

honest but awkward Prussian gendarmes, with spurs and trailing sabres,"¹ convinced him that the policy of repression was a failure. Moreover, he needed an ally in the conflict with Socialism. After 1879 the struggle began to relax, and the objectionable laws were gradually modified or withdrawn. The Centre, though not the most numerous, has remained the most influential party in the Empire.

The establishment of the new Empire necessitated new diplomatic arrangements. Bismarck was penetrated with the belief that France would one day seek revenge for its defeat. His suspicions of the injured were proportionate to the injury inflicted. The inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine, in spite of severe oppression, obstinately preserved their French sympathies. The rapid revival of France increased his fears; in the Chancellor's own words, the idea of a coalition against Germany gave him "nightmares." Accordingly, he strove for a *rapprochement* with Austria and Russia, and a series of meetings of the three sovereigns inaugurated what was known as the "League of the Three Emperors." Bismarck professed also to see in this coalition a defence of the monarchical principle; it is permissible to believe that this was no more than a theory of parade. The great political realist was hardly the man to drug himself with the senilities of Metternich. But the triple agreement or understanding lacked the elements of permanence. By the very fact that Austria had been finally excluded from Germany and Italy, her attention was increasingly drawn to the Balkans, a sphere in which Russian influence had hitherto dominated. It was improbable, therefore, that these two states could march permanently side by side. Another factor in the situation was the suspicion felt in Russia in regard to Germany. The military

¹ Bismarck's *Reflections and Reminiscences*, vol. ii. p. 141.

predominance of the latter could not fail to alarm the Tsar's advisers. This was well seen in 1875, when a fresh war with France seemed imminent. The military party in Germany had seen the re-creation of French military and economic power with increasing irritation. It regretted that more territory, particularly Belfort, had not been acquired in 1871. The degree to which Bismarck shared these views is open to discussion, but, in any case, the German ambassador at Paris permitted himself to make menacing statements to the French minister. The open clamours of the official press in Germany, notoriously sub-vented by the Government, increased the general alarm. France appealed to Russia, and the Tsar made personal representations at Berlin. England took a similar course. Bismarck sturdily denied any hostile intentions, with what degree of truth it would be futile to discuss. The incident finally closed, but not before it had shaken the triple league.

Since the establishment of the dualist system in Austria-Hungary, that Empire had rallied somewhat from its condition of decadence. But its financial position remained unfavourable, and racial conflicts did not abate. A fact of greater importance was the increasing influence of Hungary in the common councils of the Empire, which had a marked effect in directing its external policy towards the south. Russia, on the other hand, began to be shaken by internal disorders more serious than it had felt for centuries. The Polish revolt of 1863 had checked the reform movement; after that date the policy of Alexander II. took on an increasingly reactionary character. At the same time, the greater freedom allowed for a short period, the increased facilities for higher education, both in Russia and abroad, had bred up a generation of young men and women which ardently desired further progress, and embraced the

democratic social and political doctrines of Western Europe with passionate enthusiasm. This movement, frankly accepted and tactfully guided, might have worked infinite good for Russia. Unhappily, it aroused the suspicions of the Tsar and the active hostility of the bureaucracy which really controlled his policy. Large numbers of men and women had striven to devote themselves to the improvement of the people, to educate them, to elevate their economic position, and so forth. The Government began a fierce persecution of these reformers, with the not unnatural consequence that this "to the people" movement speedily took on a revolutionary character. Circles for the propagation of Socialist opinions were formed, and as the persecution continued, violent methods of resistance were employed. As early as 1866 Karakazoff had made an attempt on the Tsar's life; in 1878 began a whole series of assassinations of high officials. The conflict developed into a regular civil war. All the resources of the State were employed to hunt down the small band of revolutionaries, who replied by striking at Alexander II. himself. Two plots failed, but on March 1, 1881, the Tsar was killed by the explosion of a bomb on the very day when he had signed a decree which would have given Russia a Constitution. This Constitution, it must be admitted, would merely have established a Council composed of officials and representatives of the zemstvos, or provincial assemblies, with very limited powers. Whether this new assembly would have become a genuine organ of national opinion, or have sunk to the level of a mere piece of bureaucratic machinery, can only be conjectured, since under the reign of the new Tsar, Alexander III., the project was suppressed, and the revolutionary movement forcibly stamped out. The autocracy remained unshaken.

The failure of the Hohenzollern candidature for the throne of Spain¹ compelled Prim to recommence his search for a king. He finally persuaded Victor Emanuel of Italy to permit his son, Amadeo, Duke of Aosta, to accept the vacant place. Unfortunately, the arrival of the new King in Spain coincided with the assassination of Prim. The origin and motives of the crime remain obscure. This was a serious blow to Amadeo, who, deprived of Prim's powerful support, soon found his throne a place of torment. He was disliked by the people as a foreigner who spoke Spanish with an Italian accent; by the clergy as a member of the royal house which had ousted the Pope; by the Republicans because of his office. He strove to govern constitutionally, but received little support from the warring parties. Finally, a Carlist insurrection broke out in 1872. Thoroughly wearied of his hopeless task, Amadeo abdicated in February 1873, and a Republic was immediately proclaimed. The Republicans, however, could not agree as to the form of government, whether federal or centralised, which was to be instituted. Something like anarchy ensued. Carthagená and other towns proclaimed Communes, and hoisted the black flag of social revolt. Some degree of order was restored by the familiar device of a military dictatorship, but a permanent solution was not found till the end of 1874, when the military leaders combined to recall the Bourbon line in the person of Alphonso XII., son of the deposed Queen Isabella. The restored dynasty has maintained itself to the present day in spite of severe adversities; the social and political life of Spain has, however, remained at a low level. The finances are desperately embarrassed, and the mass of the people is illiterate.

The entry of the Italian Government into Rome in 1870

¹ See above, p. 194.

opened a new chapter in the country's history. "Italy," said Victor Emanuel to his Parliament, "is free and united; henceforward it depends upon ourselves to render it great and happy." The chief obstacles to the successful accomplishment of this patriotic task were the evil inheritances from the past. Despotism had done its inevitable work upon large masses of the population; ignorance, crime, and corruption flourished freely, particularly in the south. Nor was it easy for men who had grown up in an atmosphere of conspiracy and rebellion to adapt themselves successfully to the normal procedures of constitutional politics. These difficulties have not been entirely surmounted; the burden of armaments imposed by the state of Europe has been a serious trial to what is still, economically speaking, a poor country. Various adventures in colonial enterprise have not lessened these burdens.

With regard to the religious question, the source of so much calamity to Italy, an attempt was made to provide a solution in May 1871 by the Law of Guarantees. This declared the Pope's person and his residence, the Vatican, inviolable; his freedom of communication with foreign States and his right of receiving their diplomatic representatives were formally guaranteed. The State further abandoned its control over the clergy, including the nomination of bishops, and placed a large annual sum at the Pope's disposal. This compromise was rejected by Pius IX., who declared himself a prisoner in the Vatican, and refused all communication with the civil authorities. He further forbade Italian Catholics to take part in national politics. This conflict was not decided by the deaths in 1878 of Pius and of Victor Emanuel; the breach still remains open between the Church and the Italian State, and this fact has not been without influence upon international politics.

CHAPTER VI

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION (II)

A PERIOD of widespread political disturbance in Europe has nearly always been followed by a revival, in a form more or less acute, of the Near Eastern question. The crisis of 1854 followed hard upon the revolutionary movements of 1818; soon after the cessation of the series of vast political changes which took place between 1860 and 1870, the relations of the Ottoman Government with its subjects and tributaries once more occupied the stage of European politics. Not that the years after 1856 had been empty of incident. The establishment of Roumania as a united State under Prince Couza has already been described. Unfortunately, the election of a native prince did not bring the country's troubles to an end. Partisan quarrels harassed Couza, who finally, in 1864, used military force to dissolve the Parliament and set up a constitution of his own framing. He had previously secured the suppression of the numerous monasteries, which owned one-fifth of the national soil; he now proceeded to abolish feudalism and establish a free peasant class. He also attempted to secure universal compulsory education. These measures, naturally popular with the people, merely increased the hostility of the politicians. A military plot procured his overthrow in 1866, when a

German prince, Charles of Hohenzollern, was called to the vacant throne. The new ruler encountered many difficulties—indeed, he at one time contemplated abdication, but the events presently to be described enabled him to consolidate his position and improve the status of his adopted country.

The history of Serbia since the Crimean War had been one of internal disturbance. Alexander Karageorgevich was regarded by his subjects as unduly subservient to Austria; a National Assembly held in 1858 deposed him, and replaced Milosh Obrenovich on the throne. He was succeeded in 1860 by Michael Obrenovich III., a man of wide experience and cultivation, who appreciated the merits of constitutional government. He curtailed the powers of the Senate, previously almost omnipotent, called the Skupstschina, or National Assembly, regularly, introduced a distinctive Serbian coinage, and reorganised the army. In 1867, aided by England and Austria, he procured the evacuation of the fortresses by the Turkish garrisons. Unhappily for Serbia, he was murdered in the following year by a supporter of the opposing dynasty, but the country rallied to his heir and cousin, Milan, who, though a minor, was placed on the throne.

The revolution of 1843 failed to bring internal peace and order to Greece. During the Crimean War popular feeling was on the side of Russia, but France and England imposed restraint upon King Otho. This submission merely increased his unpopularity, and he was at last dethroned by a military insurrection in 1862. After much negotiation Prince George of Denmark was elected king, and England seized the opportunity to rid itself of a troublesome possession by handing over the Ionian Islands to Greece. A Cretan insurrection nearly involved the country in a war with Turkey in 1866, but the Powers once more

intervened, compelled the Greeks to keep the peace, and secured the introduction of some reforms in Crete. The internal confusion of the kingdom continued.

Such, then, was the condition of affairs in the Balkan States when, in 1875, a revolt broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The reforms promised to his Christian subjects by the Sultan in 1856 had never been executed, and the lot of the populations in these territories was aggravated by the spectacle of the autonomy enjoyed by their fellow-Serbs in Montenegro and Serbia. The exactions of some tax-collectors gave the signal for revolt; "the peasant," declared the insurgents, is a "dumb creature, inferior to the animals, a species of man born for slavery. . . . To-day, he has resolved to fight for liberty, or die to the last man." They demanded union with Serbia, whose people, like their kinsmen of Montenegro, openly expressed sympathy with the rebellion. The three Imperial Powers, at Austria's suggestion, offered their mediation, and transmitted the demands of the rebels to the Porte. But the latter, instead of granting the concessions required, suddenly announced its intention of establishing large reforms throughout the Empire. These promises, however, were not to the point; all the Powers¹ signed a Note demanding specific ameliorative measures for the revolted provinces, and the Porte acceded in February 1876. The insurgents were now called upon to lay down their arms, but they displayed a not unnatural reluctance, preferring to see the reforms in operation before abandoning their defences. A division of opinion now began between Austria on the one hand, and Russia and Germany on the other. Unity, however, was restored by startling events which occurred shortly after.

¹ England signed with reservations.

For many years national sentiment had been slowly growing among the Bulgars. In 1870, thanks to Russian support, they had secured the autonomy of their Church; schools and books in the national language had developed patriotic ideas. The material condition of the people, however, had remained miserable, had even worsened since 1865, when the country had been colonised by Circassians who had emigrated to the Turkish dominions rather than submit to Russian rule. The movement in Bosnia had a feeble echo in Bulgaria in April 1876. To suppress this movement the Turks let loose a horde of irregular troops to work their will upon the wretched population. In a short time some 15,000 persons were massacred; enormous numbers were despoiled of all possessions. These abominations were not known in Europe at the time, but an event which brought about fresh intervention by the Powers was the murder at Salonika in May of the French and German Consuls. A fresh Memorandum was immediately drawn up by the three Imperial Governments, demanding the urgent execution of reforms, and threatening drastic action if delay occurred. France and Italy supported the Memorandum, but the English Government refused to do so. The maintenance of Ottoman integrity had long been a dogma of English foreign policy, whilst the aims of Russia were regarded with intense suspicion. It was inevitable that the Turks should strive to profit by these divisions.

At the end of May a palace revolution deposed the Sultan Abdul-Aziz and enthroned Murad V. The new Government immediately demanded explanations from Serbia and Montenegro on the subject of the armaments both countries had been preparing. No satisfaction was given, and on July 1 Serbs and Montenegrins invaded

Turkish territory. Russian volunteers hastened to their assistance, but the results of the campaign were unfavourable to Serbia, which was speedily forced to appeal to the Powers for assistance. Even England remonstrated with the Porte, but a fresh revolution had placed Abdul-Hamid in power, and the war continued. Belgrade was nearly in Turkish hands when the Tsar, suddenly intervening, compelled a cessation of hostilities. Alexander II. was determined that an end should be put to Turkish evasions. In spite of England's threatening attitude, he mobilised six army corps, secured the neutrality of Austria by a secret convention, and prepared for war. He made, however, one last effort for peace. Following up an earlier suggestion, a conference of the Powers met at Constantinople in December 1876, to draw up propositions which might solve the whole problem. This assembly was broken in upon by the news that the Sultan had granted a Constitution, with all the apparatus of representative government. The envoys, not greatly moved, bargained, discussed, and finally separated. The Porte was convinced that the European States would exercise no pressure upon it, and with reason. England's attitude towards Russia remained hostile; France declared herself unable to take part in armed constraint. Bismarck, also, was unwilling to intervene, but he incited Russia to war, thus repaying the check of 1875. Turkey refused to permit the Powers to survey the execution of the reforms, and continued hostilities against Montenegro. The Tsar, at the end of his patience, declared war on April 24, 1877.

He had assured himself of the support of Roumania, which now proclaimed its independence. A joint army invaded Turkish territory, gaining large initial successes. The Turks, however, rallied in the fortress of Plevna, and a

long and costly siege began, which did not terminate with the fall of the fortress till December. Then, crossing the Balkans in mid-winter, the Russian armies swept on, defeated the Turks afresh at Adrianople, and arrived within striking distance of the capital. Serbia had declared war afresh; the Montenegrins occupied Antivari and Dulcigno. Turkey could do no more. Preliminaries of peace were signed; then, on March 3, 1878, a definitive treaty, known as that of San Stefano. Montenegro, Serbia, and Roumania were declared independent, the two first receiving accessions of territory. Roumania handed over Bessarabia to Russia and received the Dobrudja in exchange. A new Christian State—Bulgaria—was created, which included Bulgaria proper, Eastern Roumelia, and a large part of Macedonia. It was to be an autonomous Principality, tributary to the Sultan. A large indemnity was to be paid by Turkey, and extensive territories in Armenia surrendered to Russia.

The Treaty of San Stefano raised a diplomatic storm. Too many interests were involved to permit this ruthless dissection of the "sick man." England and Austria demanded a general congress and commenced warlike preparations; Roumania protested against the enforced cession of Bessarabia. Russia might have resisted, but her internal condition was dangerous, for the struggle with the revolutionary groups was nearing its climax. Bismarck decided the question when he, too, declared for a congress at which he offered to play the part of "honest broker," thus emphasising his detachment from Russia. The Tsar gave way; in a Memorandum signed in London on May 30, the idea of a Great Bulgaria, elaborated at San Stefano, was abandoned. England was thus mollified. At the same time, by a secret treaty with Turkey she agreed to

defend the latter's Asiatic possessions, for which service she was to receive the right of occupying Cyprus.

The Congress opened at Berlin on June 13, its final act being signed exactly one month later. Its principal decisions were as follows. The Great Bulgarian State established at San Stefano was split into three portions. Macedonia was returned unconditionally to Turkey; Eastern Roumelia became an autonomous province under Turkish rule, but with a Christian governor; Bulgaria proper was established as a tributary Principality whose ruler the inhabitants were to elect. Bosnia and Herzegovina were retained by the Porte, but were to be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary, which further received the right of garrisoning the sandjak of Novi-Bazar. These last provisions put an effective barrier to union between the two Serb States. Serbia became independent, with considerably increased territory; Montenegro, along with the final recognition of complete freedom from Turkey, received a port—Antivari, but the policing of this, and of the coastal territory, was confided to Austria. Roumania lost Bessarabia, but received her independence, along with the Dobrudja and the islands of the Danube delta. An article of the treaty compelled her to emancipate her Jewish inhabitants, a clause which has since been the source of serious disorders. Russia abandoned most of her Asiatic gains, while Greece was gratified by a rectification of her frontiers in Thessaly and Epirus. The Sultan once more engaged himself to grant religious liberty, with social and political equality, to his Christian subjects, an engagement honoured in the breach rather than the observance.

The treaty as a whole bore evident marks of the mutual jealousies and suspicions in which it originated. By checking the legitimate aspirations of Serbs and Bulgars it sowed

the seeds of future conflicts, by abandoning Macedonia to the Turks it deprived a whole population of the prospect of liberty and progress. By profiting Austria at the expense of Russia it made a new diplomatic grouping of the Powers inevitable.



BOOK V

CHAPTER I

EXTRA-NATIONAL FORCES

THE Treaty of Berlin may be said to mark the close of an epoch in European history, the epoch that opened with the French Revolution in 1789. In 1878 the principles asserted in the Declaration of the Rights of Man—personal liberty, nationality, self-government—were triumphant throughout the greater part of Europe. Increasingly since that date politics, both domestic and foreign, have been dominated by new issues, parties and nations have struggled for different ideals. But this statement, though true in general, is not, of course, universal in its application. Historical epochs are not rigidly divided from those which precede and follow them. There were democratic thinkers in Europe before 1789, and insurgent nationalists did not disappear from the Continent in 1878. English readers need scarcely be reminded that nationalism, in the form of a demand for Irish self-government, has continued since that date to be a disturbing factor in our domestic politics, and in Austria-Hungary racial conflict has continued without abatement. In Germany, Danes, Poles, and Alsations have continued to uphold their national rights, while in Russia the resistance of Finns and Poles to absorption has gone hand-in-hand with revolutionary attempts to substitute

democracy for autocracy in the national government. The nationalist aspirations of the various Balkan States, left unsatisfied by the Berlin Treaty, have seriously, and on more than one occasion, influenced the course of European politics.

But when all these exceptions have been taken into account, the proposition that the course of European development during the last generation has been markedly different from that pursued in the preceding period still holds good. The causes of this new orientation are many and varied, but one stands out as of supreme importance and calls for special remark. The economic life of Europe—indeed, of the world—has been revolutionised. In 1789 agriculture was the chief resource of all nations; the majority of men lived, directly or indirectly, by the cultivation of the soil. Half-way through the nineteenth century this was still the case, but since then industry and commerce have developed with a rapidity to which there is no parallel in human history. England led the way in this development; even while the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars were in progress its social life was being profoundly modified by that industrial revolution of which the steam-engine was at once the cause and symbol. From England the new development won its way across the world, gaining ever greater momentum in its march. No human community has escaped its influence, the world to-day is one vast market, in which men of every colour, race, and creed struggle fiercely for livelihood. Mechanical transit, the elaboration of a vast and complex credit system, these and a hundred other products of the industrial system have served to modify human society in its every aspect. The failure of a New York bank may now ruin a craftsman in Tokio; a drought in Russia will alter an English artisan's

standard of living. The manifold changes thus introduced into social life cannot here be described ; perhaps the most striking is the growth of urban, at the expense of rural, populations. With this change of environment have come innumerable others, in customs, morals, desires.

In this work we are only concerned with the industrial revolution and the establishment of a world market in so far as they have influenced the policy of States, whether in their domestic concerns or in their foreign relations. Two great movements have arisen, the origin of which can be discovered in this economic revolution, and should find notice, necessarily inadequate notice, in this book. They are Imperialism and International Socialism.

Since 1870, a prominent feature of international politics has been the extension of European control outside the Continent. This " expansion of Europe " is certainly not a novelty. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Spain, Portugal, England, and France laid the foundations of colonial empires. But since the entry on to the European stage of two new Great Powers, the process has gone forward with enhanced rapidity. Increasingly, areas not controlled by civilised Governments have passed into the hands of one or other great State, and ancient civilisations, either decadent or incapable of self-defence, have seen their territories encroached upon, or completely occupied, by the vigorous nations of Europe. The process, indeed, has not been confined to those nations ; the United States and Japan have both entered into the race for overseas empires. To describe the progress of this movement in detail would require a separate work. Only the main facts can be rapidly indicated here.

Africa and the Far East have been the principal scenes of European expansion in the last generation. All the

Great Powers, with the exception of Russia and Austria, now hold territories in the former continent. France, by her conquest of Algiers in the early part of the nineteenth century, had commenced the task of regaining Northern Africa for Latin civilisation. Its sphere of influence in the period under discussion was immensely extended. In 1881 a protectorate over Tunis was established; in 1882 the district known as the Mزاب, to the south of Algiers, was annexed, and in 1899-1900 an expedition into the Sahara not only inflicted summary justice upon the robber Tuaregs, but also occupied a number of oases. In 1907 certain portions of Morocco adjacent to the Algerian frontier were occupied, and in 1911, as a consequence of the anarchy prevailing in the Shereefian empire, a French force entered the country, which is now definitely within the Republic's sphere of influence. Farther south, a move from Senegal (penetrated during the Second Empire) was made in 1880 towards the Niger. This culminated in the taking of Timbuctoo in 1903. On the Guinea Coast the district known as the Ivory Coast was annexed in 1891, while in 1892 Dahomey was conquered. French influence is now supreme as far east as Lake Tchad.

The explorations of Stanley in the Congo Basin during the 'seventies drew universal attention to that area, with the result that a conference at Berlin in 1885 recognised an independent State—the Congo Free State—of which Leopold II. of Belgium became the ruler.¹ This gave rise to a general race for territory in the district. France acquired large possessions in the north, thus opening a direct route to the Mediterranean. The whole of North-West Africa, with the exception of Liberia and of certain Euro-

¹ As the result of various deplorable occurrences in the administration of the state, its territory passed to Belgium in 1907.

pean Colonies on the coast, is now under French control. In 1884 the foundations of a German colonial empire were laid in Africa, when Bismarck established a protectorate over the coast from Angola to Cape Colony, and shortly after annexed Togoland and the Cameroons. Thus the whole of Western Africa passed under European control.

A similar result was achieved on the other side of the continent. In 1882 English armed intervention in Egypt took place to suppress a military revolt directed against foreign financial influence. The occupation thus begun has been maintained and led to the re-conquest of the Sudan from the Khalifa, a religious fanatic who had succeeded to a despotic empire established there in 1883 by a predecessor of like character, the Mahdi. This vast area has entered, under British control, into a course of economic revival and civil order. The proclamation of a protectorate over Uganda in 1894 carried English rule still farther south, though a rival influence made itself felt in the German East African Colony established in 1886. At the same time the British Empire was expanding from the south. Zululand, Bechuanaland, Rhodesia were successively annexed or occupied by a Chartered Company, while the subjugation of the independent Boer Republics in 1902 completed the work. Two campaigns, in 1895 and 1896, brought Madagascar under the dominion of France; the annexation had as its consequences the liberation of a vast number of slaves and the abolition of the feudal rule of the Hovas, previously the dominant race. Since 1882 Italy has established herself in Ethiopia, though she suffered serious disasters at the hands of the Abyssinians in 1896. The conquest of Tripoli, however, in 1911-12 placed Italy in possession of more important territory, and consolidated her position as a Mediterranean power. Thus the partition of Africa is, at

the present time, practically complete. Little room for further acquisitions remains, unless they are achieved by one Power at the expense of another.

In Asia, the greatest measure of conquest and colonisation has been accomplished by Russia. The advance into Siberia began in the sixteenth century in the reign of Ivan the Terrible, but reached its maximum degree of rapidity in the last portion of the nineteenth. Perhaps the greatest factor in the work has been the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway, the commencement of which was decreed in 1889. The full political and economic effects of this triumph of engineering science have not yet developed, but the successful future of this vast colonial domain is assured. Farther south, Russia has acquired successively Khiva, Khokand, and Merv. In 1907 a treaty defined the spheres of influence in Persia of England and Russia respectively. France has also acquired a footing in Asia by the annexation of Cochin-China and of Tonkin, though these involved the Republic in a war with China. It is indeed at the expense of the Chinese Empire that much European expansion in the Far East has been achieved. In the earlier part of the nineteenth century commercial intercourse between China and the Western nations had been established and forcibly maintained. Something like a process of partition began, however, after the Chino-Japanese War in 1894, when Japan asserted her claim to rank as a Great Power by decisively defeating the Chinese. The latter were compelled to cede Formosa and the Liao-Tung peninsula, but this provoked the intervention of certain Western Powers, who compelled Japan to abandon the Liao-Tung and themselves began to claim territory. Germany acquired Kiao-Chow in 1897; Russia, Port Arthur in the following year. England and France also

obtained concessions at Wei-hai-Wei, and near Tonkin respectively. The manner in which Russian ambitions were checked in 1904 by the disastrous war with Japan is described in a subsequent chapter.

To describe in further detail the various steps taken by the European states towards the expansion of their colonial possessions is unnecessary. A word, however, must be devoted to the causes of this remarkable overseas activity. That economic motives have played an important, if not a preponderant, part has already been suggested, and is, moreover, sufficiently obvious. The desire for fresh markets, for undeveloped supplies of raw material, leads to the demand for colonies, or, in the case of backward civilisations such as Egypt, Persia and Morocco, financial indebtedness ends finally in political absorption or control. Thus the rise of the great industry, the increasing intensity of commercial competition, have affected the destinies of states. Some critics have seen in the economic motive the sole cause of modern Imperialism. But this view suffers from over-simplicity. No great historical process can be explained by a single formula. It has been suggested, with much reason, that this competition for overseas possessions is really an extension of the struggle for territory within Europe itself. Within the limits of the Continent, territorial changes now affect so many interests, the armaments of modern states are so formidable, that the old ambitions which led, in the eighteenth century, to the seizure of Silesia by Frederick the Great, and to the repeated partitions of Poland, have been compelled to find satisfaction in the neglected places of the outer world. A contributory cause may also be found for Imperialism by regarding it as an extension of the nationalist idea. "History tells us that nations which acquire overseas possessions acquire them

when, and not until, they have taken final shape at home, not until they have really become nations and have entered upon national life.”¹ These words of an able writer express a profound truth; the race for empire has been redoubled in intensity since the epoch when national aspirations attained a large degree of satisfaction in Europe. All these causes, political, economic, psychological, have contributed to produce the phenomenon of European expansion; to assign to each its exact measure of influence would be a task, fascinating indeed, but hopeless.

If the Industrial Revolution has profoundly affected the foreign policies of states, its influence upon their internal development has been even more decisive. Increasingly, during the last forty years, the conflicts of parties and social groups have turned around the economic problems produced by industrial change. The most striking result of this situation has been the emergence of Socialism as an international force.

A brief account of the early manifestations of the Socialist idea has been given in previous chapters. The year 1848, so fruitful in change and dissolution, marks the beginning of a new development in Socialist thought, for then was published a brief work called the *Communist Manifesto*, having as its authors two Germans, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Something has already been said of Marx and his career as a revolutionary journalist.² In 1847 he was an exile in London, and there, together with his collaborator, was requested by a body called the Communist League to frame a statement of its principles. The result was the pamphlet above mentioned. Few political works, it may safely be asserted, have been so widely scattered

¹ Sir C. P. Lucas, *The British Empire*, p. 5.

² See above, p. 99.

across the world, or translated into so many different languages.

The leading doctrines of the *Manifesto* may be briefly described as follows. Its fundamental idea is that "in every historical epoch the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organisation necessarily following it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch." Put less technically, Marx asserted that the economic factor is predominant in historical development; human society marches, as an army is said to do, upon its stomach. The methods by which wealth, *i.e.* material objects of human desire, is produced determine the social and political ideals of men, and give rise in turn to moral and religious systems which reflect, alike in what they command and prohibit, the economic circumstances which brought them to birth. Starting from this standpoint, it will be seen that "all history is a record of class struggles," since always, as far back as historical knowledge reaches, there have been two main classes of men, those who produce wealth and those who appropriate the product to their own use. This sets up a fundamental conflict in society which finds expression in political and social struggles. In the ancient civilisations the slave was set over against the slave-holder; in the middle ages the serf struggled with the feudal lord; in modern times the wage-earner combats the capitalist receiver of interest and profit. But these are not the only conflicts in society, since "exploiting" classes may co-exist and have opposing interests, which lead them to struggle for political supremacy. To Marx, the revolutionary movements of his own day represented the efforts of the rising class of industrial capitalists to wrest power from

the old aristocracies, representative of the feudal tradition. He thus explained the Reform and Free Trade movements in England, the Liberal attacks upon the Restoration monarchy in France, and the similar movements in his own country. But when this capitalist class had conquered power it would find another competitor arising—the wage-earning class, or proletariat. The new struggle, in fact, had already begun.¹ Competition between capitalists would lead inevitably to the crushing out of the weaker; “monopoly is the fatal term of competition.” Capital would be concentrated in vast masses, socialised, as it were, by a necessary law of its own development. Nothing would be left in society but a handful of owners and a vast army of the disinherited, constantly growing more miserable and impoverished. “Capitalism digs its own grave”; it will be able to expand no more. The proletariat will rise and, in one vast social overthrow, establish the communism for which industrial development has paved the way. “The death-knell of capitalist society sounds; the expropriators are expropriated.” Socialism will be established, not because it is just and good, but because social evolution leads inevitably in that direction. The message for the proletariat is, therefore: “Workers of the world, unite! You have nothing to lose but your chains, and you have a world to win.”

Detailed criticism of these doctrines would be out of place in a work like the present. The curious enquirer may be referred to the vast literature of exposition and refutation which has been devoted to them. Here it will suffice to say that the fundamental generalisation upon which they rest has been accepted by many who totally disagree with Marx's ultimate conclusions, and its applica-

¹ Marx placed great hopes on the Chartist movement in England.

tion to historical studies has been fruitful of valuable results. The *Manifesto* was written with much power. Both its matter and manner separated it from its predecessors in Socialist literature. It had none of their vague humanitarianism, or their appeals to sentiments of goodwill. It looked for the establishment of a new order, not to the spread of reason or the growth of human fraternity, but to the ruthless march of a vast industrial system. The older manufacturers of Utopias loved to produce detailed specifications of the "new moral world"; Marx rejected such puerilities with scorn. Future social arrangements would be dictated by economic circumstances, not by theorists poring over books.

The doctrines of the *Manifesto*, expanded and developed in later works, at first made comparatively few converts. A dead calm settled upon Europe after the collapse of the movements of 1848. Revolutionary ideas were driven underground. Their renaissance, which began everywhere after 1860, soon produced a Socialist revival, which found its most interesting expression in the International Working Men's Association, founded in 1864. This organisation originated in the visits of French working men to England in 1862. Marx became its General Secretary, and drew up its declaration of principles: "The emancipation of the working class must be accomplished by the working class itself. . . . The economic emancipation of the working class is the final end to which every political movement must be subordinated as a means. This emancipation is neither a local nor national, but a social problem, which includes every country where modern society exists." The Association found adherents in most West European countries. It propagated its doctrines by holding congresses, and endeavoured to provide international support

for labour movements in various countries. The precise degree of influence exerted by it cannot be exactly estimated in the absence of full information. It was troubled by dissensions caused by Anarchists, revolutionaries who sought the perfection of society in the abolition of all governmental action. Voluntary association, they held, was sufficient to provide for all genuine social requirements. The "International" was much injured by the communalist insurrection at Paris in 1871, that movement being unjustly ascribed to its machinations. Its influence declined, and it ceased to exist a few years after.

The Association was no more than a short-lived experiment, but it paved the way for movements of a more permanent character. In Germany, Ferdinand Lassalle, a friend and, to some extent, a disciple of Marx, had attempted to found an independent working-class party. His premature death (he was killed in a duel) deprived his movement of most of its vitality, but another association had already come into existence, led by William Liebknecht and August Bebel, adherents of Marx. After the founding of the German Empire these two movements coalesced, and soon attained such strength that Bismarck procured the enactment of penal laws against Socialist propaganda. In spite of these the party continued to gain ground, and shortly after the accession of Emperor William II. the anti-Socialist laws were abandoned. The German Socialist party has continued to increase in strength, millions of voters supporting its candidates at elections to the Reichstag. Its phenomenal success prompted imitation in other countries, and now, all over the world, Socialist parties, more or less modelled on the German, exist. Since 1889 they have held International Conferences at frequent intervals. Speculation as to the future of this movement is of little

value, particularly at the present time. The emergence of Socialism is undoubtedly due to modern industrial conditions, and while these persist, some such expression of discontent is likely to continue. Two tendencies may, however, be noted. In so far as Socialism has entered into politics, its adherents have increasingly abandoned the old revolutionary attitude, and have become supporters of piece-meal reform rather than workers for a complete social transformation. As a consequence, other sections of the movement have tended to abandon politics altogether, and to look rather to working-class organisations like trade unions for the means of building up a new economic order. Whether one of these tendencies will conquer the other, or whether two separate and possibly hostile movements will finally emerge, only the future can show.

CHAPTER II

DIPLOMATIC HISTORY (1879-1900)

THE great diplomatic achievement of Bismarck--the League of the Three Emperors--did not long survive the Berlin Congress. "All contracts between great states cease to be unconditionally binding as soon as they are tested by the 'struggle for existence,'" the great Chancellor once wrote, and, so far as Russia was concerned, the League had not stood the test in the crisis of 1878. "Your friendship is too platonic," said the Empress Marie of Russia to a German diplomat. "Your Majesty's chancellor has forgotten the promises of 1870," wrote the Tsar to the Emperor William. Signs, indeed, had not been lacking before the Near Eastern crisis that Russian statesmen were inclined to regret the complaisance which had permitted the overthrow of France in 1870; one of these had been the rather ostentatious intervention of the Tsar in the "incident" of 1875. As Bismarck himself said, "That for the Russian policy there is a limit beyond which the importance of France in Europe must not be decreased is explicable." In any case, Russian irritation with Bismarck's policy of "honest broker" in 1878 brought matters to a turning-point. The interests of Austria and Russia clashed too decisively to permit of any final agree-

ment between them, a situation aggravated since 1866 when Austria, finally excluded from Germany and Italy, was driven to turn its attention to the Balkans, a sphere where Russia's influence, founded upon racial and religious ties, had previously predominated.

Compelled, therefore, though against his will, to choose between his two imperial neighbours, Bismarck did not hesitate long. He now reaped fresh benefit from the forbearance which he had persuaded his master to show in 1866 (against the will of the military leaders), when Austria had been stricken helpless at the feet of Prussia. Always keeping a wary eye upon future contingencies, he had insisted that no excessive humiliation should be inflicted upon the vanquished. The first fruits of his foresight had been Austria's neutrality in 1870; the second reward was an alliance signed in October 1879. The treaty provided that should either Power be attacked by Russia, mutual military assistance was to be rendered; should one of the contracting parties be attacked by another Power, the other would preserve a benevolent neutrality, but should Russia come to the aid of the aggressor, then the previous provision of the treaty would come into force. This last clause was clearly aimed at France and a Franco-Russian alliance. Thus both Russia (to whom the treaty was communicated) and France found themselves menaced by a powerful combination, a combination which had greater elements of permanence than is usual with diplomatic arrangements. Of the two governing nationalities in the Dual Monarchy, the German was drawn towards the neighbouring empire by ties of language and racial sentiment, the Magyar by its position as "an island in the Slav ocean," a position which naturally threw it into hostility towards the great Slavonic champion—Russia. Buda-Pesth had celebrated Turkish

successes in the war of 1877-78 by illuminations ; a Magyar, Count Andrassy, actually negotiated the treaty of 1879 with Bismarck.

But the Austrian alliance did not satisfy the Chancellor. The diplomatic combination which he had been meditating since 1870 would have included Russia and Italy as well. The bond with the former was now reduced to the personal friendliness which united the two Emperors (William I. had ratified the 1879 treaty with great reluctance) ; but a renewal of the Italian alliance of 1866 was perfectly feasible. Certainly, to persuade Austria the oppressor, and Italy the oppressed, of yesterday to march amicably together was not easy, but circumstances favoured Bismarck's plan. The return of France from the semi-Free Trade policy of the Empire to one of Protection led to a tariff war with Italy ; the luckless policy of Napoleon III. had left a heritage of hostility to France behind it that only time could destroy. To strengthen this last factor came the fear that the Third Republic might give way to another restoration monarchy which would, it was believed, endeavour forcibly to restore the Temporal Power of the Pope. Finally, a colonial conflict came to clinch matters. Since 1878 Italy had considered Tunis as " the last door open to its expansion " ; France, by virtue of its situation in Algeria, had ambitions in the same direction. Assured of England's complaisance, it took the decisive step in 1881 and established a Tunisian protectorate. Italian sentiment was deeply wounded ; its accession to the alliance of the Central Powers was thenceforward certain. Visits of King Humbert to Vienna and Berlin paved the way ; the Dual finally became the Triple Alliance in 1883. Regarding the matter retrospectively, Italy can hardly be regarded as having drawn great profit from the Alliance. It necessarily com-

pelled the abandonment of any hopes of "redeeming" the Trentino and Trieste, overwhelmingly Italian though they were and are; moreover, Italy was compelled by it to witness without resistance the growth of Austrian influence and naval power in the Adriatic. On the other hand, the Alliance protected Italy from any foreign attempt to restore the Temporal Power. Bismarck, we may be sure, would not have scrupled to use this weapon had Italy been recalcitrant.

France thus found itself to an increasing degree isolated in Europe. In face of the Triple Alliance two courses were possible, a coalition with Russia, or with England. With the former Power, indeed, French relations were, and remained, excellent. But the ties which bound Russia to Germany were old and strong. Neither the Austrian alliance nor the death of Alexander II. sufficed to break them while William I. lived, and Bismarck remained in power. The latter spared no efforts to conciliate the old ally; a defensive alliance was even concluded in 1884. As for England, her occupation of Egypt in 1882 led to a distinct modification of feeling between the two countries. French aspirations towards predominance in that portion of Africa were of old standing; Napoleon's invasion had been the realisation of a dream of the old régime. Bismarck, whose suspicions of France did not decrease with age, saw with satisfaction this breach between the nations he most disliked. He had placed no barrier in the way of the French occupation of Tunis; he placed none before England in Egypt. Years were to pass before the breach between the two Powers was closed, and in the meantime both remained isolated in the face of the Triple Alliance. England, indeed, stood more completely alone than France, since her relations with Russia were very unfriendly. The

steady advance of the latter Power in Central Asia, with the apparent menace to India which it involved, nearly led, indeed, to an open rupture in 1885.

But this situation, in which Germany stood at the head of a group of states, solidly confronting the rest of Europe, could not remain permanent. The renewed ties with Russia slowly gave way before the pressure of circumstances. As a consequence of its actions in 1878, that Power had distinctly lost ground in the Balkans. Serbia drew closer to Austria; Roumania was aggrieved by the loss of Bessarabia; the new Bulgarian state, Russian creation though it was, began to emancipate itself. Tacitly, if not openly, the two Central Powers encouraged this tendency, which Russia countered by violent methods unworthy of a state which had often played the part of liberator in the Balkans. In 1885 Prince Alexander of Battenberg, who, on the Tsar's nomination, had been elected ruler of Bulgaria in 1879, achieved the reunion of Eastern Roumelia with his own state. His independence had previously excited Russian hostility, and he was abandoned to an unprovoked attack by Serbia. The Bulgars, however, repulsed the invasion, and taking the offensive, were only prevented from decisively defeating their enemy by the intervention of Austria. But on the morrow of these triumphs Russia's attitude procured Alexander's downfall. A military conspiracy, countenanced, if not contrived, by that Power, expelled him from the Principality in 1886, and though recalled by the popular voice, the Tsar's refusal of support compelled him to abdicate. His successor, Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, under the inspiration of Stambuloff, the greatest of modern Balkan statesmen, pursued a similar policy of independence for a time. Russia refused to recognise him, and the inconveniences arising from this

position produced at last a change in tactics. Stambuloff was compelled to resign in 1894; in 1896 the heir to the throne entered the Orthodox Church, the Tsar having consented to be his godfather; Ferdinand was, in consequence, recognised by Petrograd, and the friendly relations between the two countries were renewed. A somewhat similar result was brought about in Serbia by the abdication in 1889 of Milan Obrenovich, who had imposed his own Austrian leanings on the policy of his country. His departure led to a fresh orientation towards Russia, a tendency which was strengthened when his son Alexander seized power from the Regency in 1893.

Russia had thus regained some of the influence of which its moral isolation since 1879 had deprived it. This revival was accentuated and typified by a French alliance. The bond, very largely personal, with Germany had been steadily weakening. The Emperor William I. died in 1888; his grandson, William II., dismissed Bismarck in 1890. The stage was cleared of those who had sincerely courted Russian friendship. Meanwhile the connection with France was being strengthened. When, in 1887, a frontier incident nearly provoked a fresh Franco-German war, the personal intervention of Alexander III. ensured peace. The same year was notable for the fact that a great Russian loan was, for the first time, floated on the Paris market. Others followed in 1889, 1890, and 1891. Civilities were multiplied between the two Governments; a treaty of commerce was signed in 1893. The assassination of President Carnot, and the death of the Tsar, in 1894, produced no change in these relations. The latter's successor, Nicholas II., was enthusiastically received in France in 1896, and when, in the following year, President Faure visited Petrograd, both host and guest spoke of "the friendly and allied

nations." This was merely to give official expression to a fact which had been obvious for some time. The predominance of Germany and the Triple Alliance was now challenged; France was no longer isolated, the coalition which Bismarck had dreaded was in being. With the exception of England, all the great European states were now divided into two groups whose relations, if not actually hostile, were watchfully suspicious. England at this juncture, though she remained formally isolated, was on better terms with the Triple, than with the Dual, Alliance. The Asiatic policy of Russia was regarded with great jealousy by English statesmen; the attempt of the French Captain Marchand in 1898 to establish himself upon the Upper Nile at Fashoda, thus menacing England's position in the Egyptian Sudan, nearly led to a war, a disaster which was only averted by his unconditional withdrawal.

The absence of moral unity in the conduct of European affairs which was responsible for the diplomatic groupings above described, was further displayed by the repeated inability of the Great Powers to co-operate for matters of common concern. In 1894 the internal disorders of the Turkish Empire once more began to attract universal attention. In that year occurred the first of a whole series of massacres of Christian Armenians by Mohammedans. In the autumn of 1895 some 30,000 persons were murdered in Asia Minor, and in August 1896, after an attack by Armenian revolutionaries on the Ottoman Bank, Constantinople was for two days the scene of a hideous slaughter. Many suggestions for collective action were put forward, but neither Germany, Austria, nor Russia were prepared to intervene, and these tragedies were speedily put into the shade by other events. In May 1896 civil war between Christians and Moslems broke out in Crete, followed in April 1897 by

a war between Greece and Turkey. The Greeks were severely defeated, being compelled to pay a heavy indemnity. Meanwhile Germany and Austria had withdrawn from the attempt to settle the Cretan question, for which, indeed, a solution was not found till 1898, when the island received autonomous government under the rule of Prince George of Greece. Foreign troops continued to occupy the island till internal order was re-established.

Since 1870 the commercial competition between the European states had been supplemented by competition in armaments. With the exception of England, all the Great Powers remodelled their armies upon the Prussian system of universal liability for service; Europe, in a well-worn phrase, tended to become "one vast camp." Projects for the improvement of this situation, obviously burdensome and distressing, had frequently been mooted, but the discussion was put upon a different footing when, in 1898, Nicholas II. of Russia issued a circular to the Powers declaring that "the maintenance of peace and a possible reduction of excessive armaments" was an ideal to which "the efforts of all Governments" should be directed. A conference to discuss these grave problems was suggested. In 1899 such a conference was, in fact, held at the Hague, twenty-six states being represented. It was speedily evident that on the main question—the limitation or reduction of armaments—no general accord was possible. The German military delegate declared that "the German people is not crushed under the weight of charges and taxation," and the conference was obliged to content itself with the statement that it regarded "the limitation of military charges" as "greatly desirable." Greater success was obtained in the increased precision with which certain laws of war were formulated, and a permanent Court of

Arbitration was set up. Further conferences have been held since 1899, at which various humane regulations for the conduct of war have been laid down, but no reduction of armaments has been achieved, and recent events have shown only too clearly that humanitarian attempts to regulate military operations are of small avail when an unscrupulous Government sees advantage in disregarding them.

The close of the nineteenth century, indeed, brought small comfort to the apostles of peace. Great Britain was engaged in war with the Boer republics in South Africa, while an international expeditionary force invaded China to protect the European inhabitants of Peking, threatened with destruction by an anti-foreign rebellion.

CHAPTER III

DIPLOMATIC HISTORY (1901-1914)

AT the end of the nineteenth century, in spite of the Franco-Russian Alliance, the balance of strength lay rather with the combination of which Germany was the acknowledged head. England stood outside both groups, occupying a position of isolation which had become traditional. This isolation, during the period 1899-1901, whilst the war with the Boer republics in South Africa was being waged, was even exaggerated by the ostentatious sympathy for those states displayed by most Continental populations. The most remarkable event of the twentieth century has been the gradual abandonment by England of that aloofness, and her adoption of a policy of agreements and understandings which tended to throw her weight upon the side of the Dual Alliance. This new orientation was due, not to any sudden change of heart, or to the acceptance of a novel theory of European relations, but to the steadily accumulating pressure of forces which earlier generations of our statesmen were not called upon to face.

England, the little island in the West European seas, is the centre of the greatest political organisation of which the world has record. Without always fully realising the nature of the work upon which it was engaged, her people has

established English rule and English civilisation in every quarter of the globe. Gradually, almost, it would be fair to say, imperceptibly, the colonial populations have grown to nationhood, and England has discovered herself to be the connecting link which binds a group of states in an informal federation. The increasing realisation of this fact, and of the new responsibilities it has brought in its train, has been reflected in our foreign policy. The attitude of England towards her Continental neighbours has become less and less a question of her approval of their internal arrangements and of their relations with other European states, and more and more a question of their attitude towards the Empire in which she is less a ruler than a first among equals. Hence the danger of a breach with France over African affairs, and the hostility, certainly of longer standing, towards the Russian advance in Asia. The reason of the change from the old policy of isolation has undoubtedly been the realisation that the most urgent menace came, not from these two Powers, but from the determination of the German Empire to add naval to military predominance, and to challenge England's imperial position. For England, supremacy at sea is not a luxury ; it is a burden imposed by her geographical situation, by her economic position as a great industrial community, relying upon imports for the necessaries of life, and by her federal responsibilities. In 1889 the maintenance of a naval force equal in strength to that of the two Powers—France and Russia—with which there then seemed most possibility of conflict, was laid down as England's necessary naval policy. But from 1900 onwards Germany began rapidly to increase her maritime strength, an effort which was paralleled by successive increases of military force, and accompanied by a growing disposition to seek colonial adventures. Faced by this

new situation, and relieved, in a manner presently to be described, of certain pre-occupations of older standing, England gradually abandoned her cherished policy of "splendid isolation," with the result that the balance of power in Europe began to swing in a fresh direction.

The first departure from the traditional policy was dictated, indeed, by considerations of a different kind. The steady advance of Russia in the Far East affected both England and Japan very nearly. Its dangerous possibilities were recognised in an alliance between those states, signed in 1902, by which the former promised assistance to her ally if attacked by more than one Power. The importance of this diplomatic combination (apart from the fact that it officially recognised, so to say, the emergence of Japan as a Great Power) was soon to be manifested. Russian influence in Korea was increasing; valuable concessions had been granted to her subjects in the timber region of the Yalu River, concessions in which high personages were interested. She showed, moreover, distinct indications of wishing to increase her grip upon Manchuria. Fortified by the English Alliance, Japan in 1903 proposed a treaty which should secure the interests of both states, but this was refused, and in February 1904 the Japanese Government issued an ultimatum to Russia. In the conflict that followed, Japan had the advantage of a base comparatively close to the scene of operations and united national support for the war. Russia was obliged to draw troops and supplies from a great distance, whilst her population neither understood nor desired the war. After inflicting severe defeats on land and sea, the Japanese struck the final blow when they destroyed the Russian fleet in the Straits of Tsushima on May 27, 1905. The good offices of the United States were available to institute negotiations, which were

begun in August, and three weeks later the Treaty of Portsmouth (U.S.A.) brought the war to a close. Russia evacuated Manchuria, and ceded the Liao-Tung peninsula, together with the southern half of Sakhalin, to Japan.

The Russian defeat seriously influenced the international situation. It decisively checked expansion in the Far East, and to that extent reduced the possibilities of friction with England. On the other hand Russia's power and prestige were seriously diminished, to the obvious profit of the Triple Alliance, the more so that the country was shaken by a violent internal crisis. Political discontent, crushed out under Alexander III., had been slowly growing again, strengthened, moreover, by social grievances arising from the land hunger of the peasants, and the miserable condition of the growing class of industrial workers. The ill-success and unpopularity of the war brought matters to a head; a series of political assassinations took place; and in the early part of 1905 a general strike, accompanied by agrarian risings in many parts,¹ broke out. The autocracy was coerced into a temporary surrender. A limited form of representative government was established, and various social reforms granted; but the agitation of the revolutionary parties, countered, as it was, by violent repression, exhausted the country, and temporarily depressed it in the scale of international politics.

The results of this weakening soon became apparent. Slowly pursuing her new evolution, England had already settled her differences with France. A visit of Edward VII. to Paris in 1903 opened up an era of "cordial understanding" between the two nations which, in the following year, found expression in a treaty designed to remove outstand-

¹ Notably in the Baltic provinces, where the Lettish peasantry rose upon the German landowners.

ing causes of difference. The principal questions for settlement were colonial in character. They were dealt with on the basis of mutual concessions and delimitation of spheres of influence. Thus France withdrew all claims to Egypt and agreed not to press for the abandonment of the British occupation, in return for which England promised France a free hand in Morocco, to which her position in Algiers and Tunis naturally drew her attention. Other minor matters relating to Siam, West Africa, Madagascar, the New Hebrides, and to the Newfoundland fisheries, were disposed of amicably. The two states drew closer together in feeling and sympathy, nor was the connection disturbed by the conflict in the Far East.

The effects of that conflict, however, and of the temporary immobilisation of Russia resulting from it, speedily made themselves felt in European politics. Germany had been duly notified of the 1904 treaty before its signature and had raised no objection; indeed, Count Bülow informed the Reichstag that it contained nothing inimical to the solely commercial interests of Germany in Morocco. France, thus relieved of pre-occupations, proceeded on her way, came to an agreement with Spain, and proposed to the Sultan of Morocco a broad scheme of reform—which the anarchical condition of that country showed to be sorely needed—to be achieved by French financial aid. But the Russian military eclipse was by this time notorious, and early in 1905 the German tone changed. The Emperor William visited Tangier, and there took occasion to make a remarkable public oration. German interests would be safeguarded, declared the imperial traveller, the Sultan was an independent sovereign, no Power should be allowed to step between himself and such a ruler. This pronouncement was followed up by a German demand for a general

conference on Moroccan affairs. Delcassé, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, advocated resistance, but the general situation was too threatening and France gave way. At the Conference, however, which assembled at Algeciras in January 1906, the issue went against Germany. Her opponent received the support of England and Russia; Italy, whose relations with France had been steadily improving for some years, adopted a friendly attitude, thus dividing the ranks of the Triple Alliance. Austria was lukewarm over a question which interested her only indirectly. As a result the integrity of Morocco was certainly proclaimed, but the policing of the coast towns was confided to France and Spain, while the former was to have a predominant interest in the state bank which was to be established. The whole episode can scarcely be regarded as anything less than a deliberate attempt on the part of Germany to test the strength of the Franco-British *entente* at a time when the weakness of Russia made such a policy exceptionally safe.

Its most obvious result was to fortify the understanding, and to pave the way for a new agreement between England and Russia. This was assisted by the decisive check given to the latter's Asiatic aspirations. In August 1907 a treaty was signed by the two states which defined their respective spheres of action in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, territories where the clashing of economic and political interests had long made serious disagreements possible. An interchange of visits by the sovereigns of the two nations, and the successful floating of a Russian loan in London, served to seal the diplomatic arrangements. Thus, over against the Triple Alliance arose a new grouping of states, popularly called the Triple Entente. The bonds of connection in this last, however, were obviously of a less formal nature than those

which held the older combination together. Its aim may fairly be said to have been primarily defensive. Consultations between French and English military experts did indeed take place, but, as Sir Edward Grey wrote to the French ambassador in November 1912, "it has always been understood that such consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either to action in an emergency that has not arisen and may never arise."

The condition of the Turkish Empire and its relations with its subject lands have figured largely in this work, and necessarily so. As Alexander I. of Russia wrote to William Pitt in 1804, "its weakness, the anarchy of its régime, and the growing discontent of its Christian subjects, are so many elements tending to encourage speculative ambitions"; and the truth of this doctrine was once more exemplified in 1908, when the internal affairs of the Ottoman state precipitated a European crisis. In July of that year a military revolution, inspired by the party of reformers known as the "Young Turks," compelled the Sultan to grant a Constitution and summon a Parliament. The event roused many hopes of Turkish regeneration, but its immediate effect was to inspire an attack upon the integrity of the state. Acting, it seems probable, in collaboration, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Prince of Bulgaria proclaimed himself an independent monarch.¹ Turkey was in no condition to resist; fresh internal commotions, which speedily arose and ended in the Sultan's deposition, led to a compromise by which money payments were accepted as compensation for injuries received. But other interests had been affected: Serbia and Montenegro also demanded compensation for the destruction, by reason

¹ October 5, 1908.

of the annexation, of their national aspirations. Russia supported their claims ; a Conference was demanded ; war, indeed, seemed imminent. Had Austria stood alone this would doubtless have occurred, but Germany at once made it clear that she supported her ally. Faced by this combination Russia drew back, and Serbia was compelled to abandon her aggressive attitude. The two Germanic Powers had won a striking victory. The Tsar journeyed to Potsdam, and the two states even entered upon agreements relating to Persia and to the Bagdad railway, in which Germany was deeply interested.

Crisis, however, rapidly succeeded crisis ; the danger in the Near East had scarcely passed away when a fresh difficulty arose in Morocco in 1911. French troops occupied Fez, on the ground that European residents were in danger. Germany immediately countered by despatching a cruiser to Agadir. The threat to France was obvious. War, indeed, would very probably have ensued had not English ministers made it abundantly clear in public speeches that an attack on France would be resisted by England. The danger passed ; Germany accepted compensation for her claims in Morocco in the shape of territorial concessions in the French Congo.

The year 1911 was, indeed, particularly troubled, since it witnessed the beginning of a fresh struggle in the Near East. In September the Italian Government declared war on Turkey for the purpose of obtaining Tripoli, which, on November 11, was " placed under the full and entire sovereignty of the kingdom of Italy." Peace was not concluded till nearly a year after, when, by the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne on October 18, 1912, the Turks abandoned their last direct possession in Africa to Italy. Peace was hastened by the fact that an even more serious menace to Turkey

had arisen in Europe. On October 8 Montenegro had declared war, and five days later Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia had presented ultimatums identical in their terms.

The origins of this Balkan League date some years back. Since 1899 Macedonia (abandoned to Turkey, it will be remembered, by the Treaty of Berlin) had been the scene of constant disturbances, arising, on the one hand, from attempts of the inhabitants to shake off Ottoman rule, and on the other, from the efforts of all the Balkan states to gain a footing in that area. Revolutionary bands of different nationalities had ravaged the country, while Turkish attempts at repression had been characterised by their usual savagery. Various attempts to put an end to this miserable condition of things had for principal result fresh displays of the lack of harmony prevailing in "the Concert of Europe." The sudden cessation of competition among the Balkan states, and the organisation of a formidable coalition against Turkey, were due to various causes. The internal anarchy in that state, together with the drain of the Italian war, left it peculiarly defenceless; the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which put an end to the hopes of expansion in that direction cherished by the Serb states, predisposed them towards adventures to the south; Bulgarian sympathy with the Macedonians was of old standing—indeed, the revolutionary movement in that province had largely been directed from Sofia; finally, a really able statesman—Venizelos—had appeared in Greece, where he had put an end to domestic factions and reorganised the kingdom. To M. Venizelos, indeed, the formation of the League is usually ascribed. However that may be, the sudden onset of the Allies rapidly overwhelmed the exhausted Turks. By the end of 1912 the latter were glad to sign an armistice, but in February of the next year the

war broke out again. Matters were speedily complicated by a quarrel among the Allies over the division of the spoils, a quarrel which is generally regarded as having been fomented by the Austrian Government. Bulgaria attacked Greece and Serbia, and was in turn attacked by Roumania. The Treaty of Bucharest, which put an end to this fratricidal strife, left Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, and Roumania with extended territories, but Bulgaria, in spite of her considerable sacrifices, gained very little. The old condition of mutual suspicion reigned once more in the Balkans.

These dramatic events reacted upon the general European situation. The two Central Powers, in particular, suffered by them. Germany had long courted the Turks, from motives both economic and political; and now Turkey had suffered an overwhelming defeat. To Austria the victories of the Serbs were peculiarly obnoxious. Perpetually involved in difficulties with its own subjects of that race, the Dual Monarchy could not see without uneasiness the renaissance of its southern neighbour, which had taken so remarkable a stride towards the re-establishment of the empire of Stephen Dušan. The menace of Serb expansion to the Adriatic was particularly acute, since Russia was known to be favourable to this advance. Moreover, a fresh barrier was put in the way of that Austrian march to Salonika, long desired by her statesmen. It is now known that in 1913 the two Germanic Powers sounded Italy as to the possibility of a war with Serbia, but were restrained by the latter's refusal to countenance such an aggression. The new cause of tension in European affairs thus fortified tendencies which had been apparent for some years. All the Powers were redoubling their efforts to gain military predominance; the events of 1911 served Germany as a pretext for increases of her army as well as for a Navy Law

which raised the expenditure on the fleet by £1,000,000 per annum for six years. England met these ominous preparations by naval increases; France and Russia lengthened the term of service with the colours demanded from their conscripts. This tremendous strain, with the growing atmosphere of hostility and suspicion which it engendered, reduced the Continent to the condition of a vast magazine which the merest spark might explode.

The spark fell on June 28, 1914. On that day the heir-apparent to the Austrian throne, together with his wife, was murdered in the streets of Serajevo, apparently by revolutionaries who desired that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be united to Serbia. The Austrian Government, after an investigation, declared that the crime had been planned in Belgrade and carried out with the help of Serbian officials. In consequence, on July 23 it forwarded a series of demands to Serbia with which compliance was demanded in forty-eight hours. Of these demands it is sufficient to say that their concession would have grievously impaired the position of Serbia as an independent state. The more offensive of them were rejected by the Belgrade Government, though it expressed its willingness to submit them to the Hague Tribunal, and on the 25th the Austro-Hungarian representative left that capital. On these events one brief comment may be made. It appears incredible, first, that the Austrian Government should have failed to realise that Russia would not—could not, indeed—permit the crushing of a Slav state in the interests of the Central Powers; second, that the Austrian Government should have taken a step of so serious a nature without previous consultation with Germany. The sole alternative is to credit the Viennese statesmen with needless and extravagant levity. If the former supposition be correct—which the

future alone can absolutely prove—the only theory which can be entertained is that Germany and Austria had determined to assert their strength in a decisive fashion before the military preparations of France and Russia could take effect, or a fresh turn of the Balkan kaleidoscope show the League renewed, perhaps consolidated into a permanent political arrangement.

The events that followed are but too well known to require fresh description in these pages. Of the determined stand taken by Russia ; of the efforts of the English Government to arrange some form of discussion between the Powers which should prevent a resort to arms ; of the military preparations of the Continental states ; of the presentation by Germany of ultimatums to France and Russia on July 31,—of these things the tale has been repeatedly told. On August 2, German troops invaded Luxemburg (in defiance of treaty obligations) and entered French territory. Their Government had already given an unsatisfactory reply to an English demand that Belgian neutrality should be respected ; on August 4 it was violated, and England entered the Great War.

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FRANCE

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