UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY
OU_170971
UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

SOCIETY

ITS STRUCTURE AND CHANGES

SOCIETY

ITS STRUCTURE AND CHANGES

BY

R. M. MacIVER

LIEBER PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIOLOGY,
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY



TORONTO: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF
CANADA LIMITED, AT ST. MARTIN'S HOUSE

1931

Copyright, 1931, by
R. M. MacIVER

All rights reserved, including that of translation—no part of this book may be produced in any form without permission in writing from the publishers.

PRINTED IN CANADA

TO
MY FRIEND
J. STANLEY McLEAN

PREFACE

This book presents a system of sociology. If it has any claim to be new it is as a work of interpretation of things already known. As this interpretation expresses a point of view, it may be well to state at the outset the position of the author, whether by way of warning or of preparation.

I hold that any science which makes the life of man its province must use the tools of the artist as well as those generally regarded as proper to the scientist. For it deals with the inner phenomena of experience and not the outer phenomena of 'nature'. If we concern ourselves solely with the external aspects of this world of experience, with its material signs and symbols, with its quantitative relations of unit to unit, with the mere mechanisms which it employs, with the environmental factors in and through which it strives for being and fulfilment, we are rejecting the main content of our study and denuding these external aspects themselves of their significance. To understand society we must appreciate the processes of group life, the conscious attitudes of relationship which in their constancy and their changefulness, their variety and their subtlety, sustain and modify every social system. Apart from these attitudes and conscious strivings the system would instantly dissolve into nothingness, and apart from the comprehension of them it becomes an empty shell, no matter how marvellous its convolutions or how intricate its design. The understanding of society begins from our personal experience as members of society, and the fuller and richer our experience the better sociologists we are likely to be. Beyond that we must turn the key of personal experience so as to enter imaginatively into the lives of others, seeking to interpret the abounding materials in which *their* experience is recorded. The mass of materials—biographies, newspaper records, reports of all sorts, historical explorations, statistical

researches—is perplexingly rich in many respects though in others it is still very defective.

Sociology seeks to discover the principles of cohesion and of order within the social structure, the ways in which it roots and grows within an environment, the moving equilibrium of changing structure and changing environment, the main trends of this incessant change and the forces which determine its direction at any time, the harmonies and conflicts, the adjustments and maladjustments within the structure as they are revealed in the light of human desires, and thus the practical application of means to ends in the creative activities of social man. In doing so it demands the insight of the interpreter. He must endeavor to express what seems to him most significant and illuminating in the vast complex of social relationships. He must continually adjudge and select the more relevant from the less relevant aspects, and thus he is brought face to face with a problem of valuation which is vastly different from any presented by the physical sciences, as we shall show in due course. He must treat of relationships which both in themselves and in their conditions cannot be reduced to formulae but which are infinitely variable and subtle. He must deal with statistics the interpretation of which involves a fine perception of the complex pattern of human behavior.

Why, to take an example, is the divorce-rate higher in the United States than in European countries? It is easy, and quite unsatisfactory, to point out that divorce is more prevalent where certain other factors are present, such as prosperity, the economic and social independence of women, the lack of family traditions, the weakening of certain religious attitudes, the mobility of the population, the swift transition from one mode of life to another, and the tolerance of law. But we have not thereby explained the presence of the phenomenon in question; we have merely shown that it is enmeshed in a complex of phenomena. We have not explained it until we can express the manner in which a whole situation reacts upon the minds of men, modifying their social responses in the specified direction while at the same time

these responses are active in modifying the whole situation. The nearer we push to the essential social phenomena, the intimate interaction of men within their social environment, the less do quantitative formulae suffice. The latter are guide-posts, not goals. Those sociologists who are content to point to the guide-posts, who never feel happy when they pass beyond their figures to the social truths they can yield, who delight in the "natural science approach", who think their work is done when they have counted something and measured something else, are ignorant of the art of interpretation which is the soul of the sciences of man. The aim of sociology is the understanding of society. Why should the misunderstood name of science limit the sociologist to the arid schematism of figures and tables and classifications, so that the student often finds a clearer illumination of the working of society in the fragmentary revelations of the social novelist, dramatist, and the essayist? Cannot the sociologist combine the art of revelation with the presentation of order? If not, he is unequal to his final task, to his most exacting and most interesting theme.

The most important thing the student of society can learn is—how to study it. Sometimes one feels that sociology would prosper more, especially in America, if its practitioners forgot to think of it as a science. The physical sciences deal with quantities, numbers, ratios, or at least with phenomena which it expresses in these terms. Sociology, in the minds of many of its students, achieves its end in so far as it does likewise. They want to act like scientists, forgetting that their business is not to put the veil of imitation between them and their object of study, but to understand that object in any way in which it admits of understanding. They think, for example, of social statistics as belonging to the same order of reality as the quantitative expressions of physico-mechanical law, whereas they have a wholly different import. The essential difference between the social and the physical sciences—at once the stumbling-block and the glory of the former—is that social phenomena are facts of conscious experience, consciously created or sustained. Not a single *social* phenomenon would

exist were it not for the creative experience of social beings such as we are ourselves. Here we have a principle at once of causation and of explanation which is unknown to the 'natural sciences'.

Society is a system of social relationships, and we know these relations in the same manner that we enter into them, directly, qualitatively. To endeavor to understand them *merely* by counting, measuring, and manipulating them is as vain as to apply the same principles to the understanding of a picture or a poem. Measurement applies to units and to parts. Where a whole or unity is, as it were, assembled out of units and parts—whether by nature or by man—then measurement may perhaps be adequate for the comprehension of the system and of the relationships between the parts. But experience reveals other types of unity, where we must speak of aspects and not of parts, non-mechanistic unities such as the integrating mind itself, and other types of relationship, such as the conscious relationships of social beings. If this is true, then the mechanistic or behavioristic attempt to explain a mind-reft organism in terms of unit relationships, of built-up patterns, and of stimulus-response reactions, will prove to be nothing more than the bad dream of an engineer. A bad dream surely, when the exponents of it taboo the reality which is both the instrument and the object of their study, when they present themselves as psychologists who scorn the mention of the psyche. It has had, in the writer's judgment, a deplorable influence on all the social sciences in America, and perhaps most of all on educational principles. But already there are signs of an awakening from this dream. And the naïve simplicism of behaviorist theory may prove to be but a passing episode, no doubt having served some cathartic function in the history of American social science.

To understand is harder than to memorize, to see the relationship of things than to count their parts. Sociology is not an easy study. It is full of embarrassing but fascinating difficulties. I hope this work will serve as a text for students, but I have not attempted to write down for them. Genuine students resent this too familiar process. In any event a

text-book should not be a substitute for a teacher but rather should provide him with a better opportunity for his art.

To understand things is to perceive their connectedness and thus their relation within some whole to which they all belong. In the last resort it is the discovery of causal interdependence. Our main object in this volume is to lead the student on to this most significant quest. Part One, entitled Initiation, prepares the way by offering definitions of the primary social concepts and a preliminary analysis of the social relationship. Part Two deals with the social structure, describing the outer and the inner aspects of the main types of social grouping and their relation to one another in the articulated system of a modern society. From a consideration of the inner aspect, that is, the attitudes and interests expressed or reflected in these various types, we then pass to the social codes which maintain the structure as a whole. Part Three introduces us to a new set of considerations. We now see the social order as it is related to and dependent upon the external world, the environment, and here the problem of causation becomes more urgent. Part Four, dealing with the processes of social change, seeks to interpret trends and to reveal the reality and the significance of social evolution. Here, as we face the various factors that somehow converge in the changed and changing situation, we are driven to seek a way of assessing their respective rôles or contributions. In the judgment of the author the future of sociology depends on the degree of success with which it can answer this question. Without an answer, it must move forever, as it has tended to move, between hazardous generalization and superficial description.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE vii

PART ONE * INITIATION

PREFATORY NOTE 3

CHAPTER

I. KEY-WORDS 5
Society—Community—Association—Institutions—Mores

II. THE NATURE OF THE SOCIAL BOND . . . 19
In what sense we belong to society—The fundamental harmony of individuality and society—Coercion and the social bond

III. PSYCHOLOGICAL FOREWORD: ATTITUDES AND INTERESTS 43

PART TWO * THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

(A) ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS

PREFATORY NOTE 55

IV. THE COMMUNITY 57
The territorial basis of the community—The psychical basis of the community—Nationality as a type of community sentiment—Transition to inter-communal groups

V. CLASS AND CASTE 78
The class principle—C'ass attitudes and class-consciousness—Class and the social structure

VI. THE HERD AND THE CROWD 97
The crowd phenomenon—The spirit of the crowd

CHAPTER PAGE

VII. THE FAMILY 109

The nature and psychological significance of the family—Early forms of the family—The evolution of the modern family—The family of to-day—The family and the state

VIII. THE ORGANIZED GROUP OR ASSOCIATION . . 152

Interests and associations—Associations classified in terms of interests—Conflicts of interests within associations

IX. THE PRIMARY GROUP AND THE GREAT ASSOCIATION 172

The face-to-face group—From the face-to-face group to the great associations

X. THE GREAT ASSOCIATIONS: I. POLITICAL . . 191

The nature of the state—The functions of the state in a complex society—The state and the greater society

XI. THE GREAT ASSOCIATIONS: II ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL 208

Distinction of the economic from the political method—The nature of economic association—Occupational associations

XII. THE GREAT ASSOCIATIONS: III. CULTURAL . . 225

The distinction of civilization and culture—The church as a type of cultural association

(B) REGULATIVE PRINCIPLES

PREFATORY NOTE 247

XIII. SOCIAL CODES AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE . . 248

Codes and sanctions—Sustaining forces—Social cohesion in utopian communities

XIV. RELIGION, CUSTOM, FASHION, MORALITY, AND LAW 266

Religion and morals—Custom and law—Fashion and custom

XV. SOCIAL CODES AND THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE . . 284

Social and individual norms—Custom and habit—The concrete situation and the individual life

PART THREE * SOCIETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

PAGE

PREFATORY NOTE 305

CHAPTER

XVI. ENVIRONMENT AND LIFE 306
The significance of environment—Heredity and environment—Crucial instances and some conclusions

XVII. THE GEOGRAPHICAL ENVIRONMENT . . . 331
Geography as a social determinant—Land and population

XVIII. THE TOTAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE SOCIAL BEING 344
The intervention of the social heritage—The process of adjustment to a total environment

XIX. CITY AND COUNTRY 358
The terms of the comparison—Urban and rural contrasts—Interaction and dominance

PART FOUR * SOCIAL CHANGE

PREFATORY NOTE 389

XX. SOCIETY AS PROCESS 390
The significance of social change—The permanent conditions of social change

XXI. THE WAYS OF SOCIAL CHANGE 399
Preliminary distinctions—The concept of evolution applied to society—Evolution and progress—The place of the concept of progress in sociology

XXII. THE REALITY OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION . . . 423
The false quest of origins—General view of social evolution—An illustration: the evolution of the church as a social form

XXIII. EVOLUTIONARY FORCES: I. NATURAL AND SOCIAL SELECTION 450
Natural selection within society—Social selection—Fertility and mode of living

CHAPTER PAGE

XXIV. EVOLUTIONARY FORCES: II. THE PROCESSES OF CIVILIZATION 480

Civilization as determinant of society—Social evolution and the economic process—Changing techniques and changing society—From deterministic to anti-deterministic interpretations

XXV. EVOLUTIONARY FORCES: III. THE PROCESSES OF CULTURE 503

Immanent and emergent potentialities—Social evolution as the realization of a universal principle—Social evolution as the fulfilment of a cultural cycle

XXVI. SOCIAL CAUSATION 519

The nature of the problem—The unifying principle in social causation—The inner and the outer—The mode in which causal factors combine

APPENDIX

NOTES ON FURTHER READING 547

INDEX 561

PART ONE
INITIATION

PREFATORY NOTE

Abundant controversy has arisen over the question whether there is at all a subject deserving to be named sociology, whether if there is it is a science, whether in that event it is a generic or a specific science, and so forth. We do not feel it necessary here to deal with such questions. In a sense the whole of this book offers an answer to them. It may suffice to state at the outset that for us the subject-matter of sociology is social relationships as such. This is not the essential, certainly not the exclusive concern of the other sciences included under the rubric of 'social'. Anthropology studies man (especially primitive man) in terms of his culture and his civilization; it is as much interested in his arts and techniques, his myths and his superstitions, as in his social institutions. Economics studies *inter alia* the distribution of the earth's resources, the operation of the gold standard, the relation between trade and credit facilities. History sets forth the time-order of significant events. And so forth. In a word, the focus of these studies is not identical with that of sociology. It is the focus or the interest which determines the field of a social science. We should not think of the social sciences as dividing between them physically separate areas of reality. What distinguishes each from each is the selective interest.

Our interest then is in social relationships, as social, not merely as economic or political or religious. These are aspects, not compartments, of society. If two people meet in the market-place, they are not just two 'economic men', but two human beings, and they enter into relationships which are not simply economic. Our life as social beings is not 'made up' of our economic life and our political life and our family life and our aesthetic life and our religious life and our club life. We select these aspects for study according to our interest, and this is very necessary alike for the progress of our knowledge and for practical applications. But in thus selecting

we are also abstracting from the actual social relationships into which social beings enter and neglecting for the time being the greater coherence of society which consists in the marvellously intricate and ever-changing pattern of the totality of these relationships. We are breaking up in thought, for the convenience of study or for the sake of practical control, that which is indissoluble in reality, and we cannot or should not be satisfied until our thought has restored the unity which it has taken away.

To find the focus of our subject is therefore of first importance. In particular, we should recognize that in studying society we are not attempting to study everything that happens 'in society' or under social conditions, for that includes all human activity and all human learning. We shall be concerned with culture, but only for the light it throws on social relationships. We shall not, for example, study religion as religion or art as art or invention as invention. Unless we find and keep some focus we lose our way in the welter of phenomena, and this danger is always besetting the student of sociology. The only way to avoid this danger is to keep our interest fixed upon social relationships themselves. The object of Part One is to establish and to clarify this point of view, to discover the nature of the social bond or relationship and to define the primary modes in which it reveals itself and out of which the whole social structure is built.

CHAPTER ONE

KEY-WORDS

1. *Society*

We think in words. They are both the instruments and the symbols of our thoughts. To think clearly about anything we must use words in such a way that they have at all times a clear single reference, so that there is no confusion as to what they denote or signify. The fulness of meaning, the emphasis, the emotional response, will and must vary with the training and experience of each of us, but if we are to study anything together we must, when we use a word or phrase, be denoting, mentally pointing out as it were, the same object. This necessity is most imperative for the primary terms, the key-words, of our study. To understand them fully would be to know all that is to be known, more than anyone does know, about their objects. Their meaning grows and grows as we advance in knowledge, but the beginning of knowledge is that fixed reference or denotation which enables us to distinguish one object of thought from another.

Unfortunately in the social sciences there seem to be greater difficulties in the way of a common agreement on the reference of our key-words than in the physical sciences. One difficulty is that our terms belong for the most part to everyday speech so that they carry with them into the scientific sphere the varieties and ambiguities of popular usage. Another difficulty is that our primary terms do not refer to external tangible objects, or classes of object, which can be identified by aid of the senses. We cannot see or touch these objects, whether directly through the senses or indirectly by means of microscope or spectroscope or any other scientific instrument. The primary objects of our study are social relationships, and in naming them social we take them out of the world of sheerly physical objects altogether.

Our first task then is to present a definition of our key-words, in a brief preliminary account of the objects which these terms will signify throughout this work. In doing so we must remember that in the young science of modern sociology there is no accepted authority, whether created by scientific tradition or otherwise, to impose a common terminology. Other writers will be found to use some of these terms in a different way. But if we form the habit of meaning always the same object when we use any of these terms the present variety of usage will not seriously trouble us. Our first, the most general of our terms, is *society* itself. It signifies the whole complex system of social relationships. Social beings express their nature by creating and recreating an organization which guides and controls their behavior in a myriad ways, which liberates and limits their activities, which sets up standards for them to follow and maintain, which in fact, in spite of all the imperfections and tyrannies it has exhibited in human history, is a necessary condition of every fulfilment of life. That organization is society.

Society is the web of social relationships, but what do we mean by social relationship? We may approach the answer by contrasting the social with the physical. There is a relationship between a typewriter and a desk, between the earth and the sun, between fire and smoke, between two chemical constituents. Each is affected by the existence of the other, but the relationship is not a social one. The psychical condition is lacking. The typewriter and the desk are in no intelligible sense aware of the presence of one another. Their relationship is not in any way determined by mutual awareness. Without this recognition there is no society. It exists only where social beings conduct themselves, or 'behave' towards one another in ways determined by their recognition of one another.

But we have not yet attained our definition. To be mutually aware and to act in that awareness is hardly enough to create a social situation. The hunter and the wolf are aware of the presence of each other and act accordingly, but it would be an undue stretching of language to speak of society as exist-

ing between the hunter and the wolf. Society implies some sort of 'belonging together', some sense of what we shall presently describe as community. It involves the recognition of something that is common to its members. Any relationship that is based on the recognition, in any degree, of a common life may properly be termed a social relationship.

It is clear that by this definition society is not limited to human beings. There are animal societies of all degrees. Even—or especially—among the insects, such as the ant, the bee, the hornet, there are remarkable social organizations. It might perhaps be contended that wherever there is life there is society, because life means heredity and, so far as we know, can arise only out of and in the presence of other life. But in the lowest stages the social awareness, if it exists, is extremely dim and the social contact often extremely fleeting. Among all higher animals at least there is a very definite society, arising out of the necessities of their nature and particularly out of the conditions involved in the perpetuation of their species. In passing one may point out that there may be society, as above defined, between animals of different species, as between a man and a horse or a man and a dog.

It is often said that the family, in some form, was the first society, and it is certainly true that sex relationship is a primary and essential type of social relationship. Observe that it involves both likeness and difference in the beings whom it relates. Without likeness and the sense of likeness there could be no mutual recognition of 'belonging together' and therefore no society. This is what Giddings meant when he said that society rested on "consciousness of kind," though we must be careful not to interpret the word *kind* too narrowly. Society exists among those who resemble one another in some degree, in body and in mind, and who are near enough or intelligent enough to appreciate the fact. In early society the sense of likeness was focussed on kin-membership, closely uniting the ideas of likeness of body and of mind. The conditions of social likeness have broadened out in modern societies, but even so extensive a principle of union as nationality con-

tains the basic conception of likeness which primitive man identified with the kin.

At this point it is necessary to make a simple but fundamental distinction, that between the *like* and the *common*. Our language tends to confuse this distinction. We say, for example, that people have common capacities, common habits, when we really mean that they have like (or perhaps identical) capacities and so forth. The like is what we have distributively, privately, each to himself; the common is what we have collectively, what we share. The credits we receive at college belong to the first order, the college life in which we participate belongs to the second. Observe that while the like is not the common it is often the source of the common. A sense of likeness nearly always creates common ground, common possession both material and spiritual. One of the great processes of society, as we shall see later, is that whereby the common is built out of the like, common interests growing out of what were at first merely like interests.

But society depends on difference as well as likeness. If people were all exactly alike, merely alike, their social relationships would be very limited. There would be little give-and-take, little reciprocity. What is true of the family is true, in its degree, of all social systems. They involve relationships in which each complements the other, in which a true exchange takes place. In society each seeks something and gives something. It is the creation of interdependent complementary beings. There are natural differences such as those on which the family rests; differences also of aptitude, of capacity, and of interest. This is the condition of that primary division of labor which, as Adam Smith showed so well, is the foundation of social economy. On the basis of these natural differences (but sometimes, unfortunately, in repression of them, owing to the compulsion of economic and other forces) further differences are developed in the process of specialization. But always, in the making of society, the difference is subordinate to the likeness. Thus the division of labor is co-operation before it is division. It is because they have like wants that people associate in the performance of unlike functions. Their

like wants bring them together in a common organization, and the economics of organization requires the differentiation of functions for the fuller satisfaction of these wants. The part played by difference as well as likeness—primary likeness and secondary difference—in the social structure will appear more clearly when we come to consider how society grows. We shall see that as society increases in range and in complexity the secondary differences are multiplied at the same time that the sense of likeness is broadened.

We have still to mention the fundamental attribute, fundamental beyond even the sense of likeness, on which society depends. It was expressed by Aristotle when he said that man was a social animal. It is evidenced in man's reflection on society ever since the beginnings of recorded thought, the reflection that it was not good for man to be alone. Man is dependent on society for something more than protection, comfort, nurture, education, equipment, opportunity, and the myriad definite services which it conveys. He has in him the yearning for society. He is born in society and the need of society is born in him. If all his organic needs could be perfectly satisfied without society he would still need it as intensely as ever. Solitary confinement is the most fearful of all punishments because it prevents the satisfaction of this fundamental need. The hermit leaves the society of men only because he imagines he can find another kind of society in communion with God, and if he is not mad at the outset he becomes so in the end. Normal humanity must have social relationships to make life livable. The need of society is inwrought in our essential nature.

In sum, then, society is the system of social relationships in and through which we live.

2. *Community*

The second of our key-words is *community*. We pass now from the structure of relationships to the people who are thus related. Any circle of people who live together, who belong together, so that they share, not this or that particular interest, but a whole set of interests wide enough and com-

plete enough to include their lives, is a community. Thus we may designate as a community a tribe, a village, a pioneer settlement, a city, or a nation. The mark of a community is that one's life *may* be lived wholly within it, that all one's social relationships *may* be found within it. This does not mean that to be a community the circle must be all-inclusive. Among primitive peoples we find communities, sometimes communities of no more than a hundred persons, as for example among the Yurok tribes of California, which are almost or altogether isolated. But civilized communities, even very large ones, are much less self-contained. We may live in a metropolis and yet be members of a very small community because our interests are circumscribed within a narrow area. We may live in a village and yet belong to a community as wide as the whole area of our civilization or even wider. No civilized community has walls around it to cut it off from a larger one. Communities exist within greater communities, as the town within the area of the country.

A community, according to our definition, is always a group occupying a territorial area. One basis of its coherence is locality. Even a nomad community, a band of gypsies, for example, has a local, though changing, habitation. At every moment they occupy together a definite place on the earth's surface. But most communities are settled and derive from the conditions of their abode a strong bond of solidarity. To some extent the local bond has been weakened in the modern world by the extending facilities of communication, itself the condition of the larger but still territorial community. The importance of the conception of community is in large measure that it reveals the relation between social coherence and the geographical area. Although this relation has been modified by civilization, yet "the basic character of locality as a social classifier has never been transcended." [1]

To-day we find, what never existed in primitive societies, local areas which seem to lack the other conditions of social coherence necessary to give them a community character. The residents of a ward or district of a large city may lack

[1] A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization* (New York, 1929), ch. XII.

sufficient contacts or common interests to constitute a community, to possess a community spirit. Here the physical neighborhood has lost much of its significance. Its social value, if not lost, as some think, is transferred to the larger community and to the various associations which have come to supplement the social bonds of the community proper. Such cases illustrate the fact that locality, though a necessary condition, is not enough to create a community. A community, to repeat, is an area of common living. There must be the common living as well as the common earth.

Since a modern community represents a degree of common living and not a complete boundary of it, the question of where to draw the line in particular cases becomes a difficult though not very important one. Shall we call a monastery or convent a community in our sense? Shall we call an immigrant group, which in the midst of a large American city cherishes its own customs and speaks its own language, a community? Shall we call a social caste, the members of which exclude their fellow citizens from the more intimate social relationships, a community? It is quite reasonable to answer the first two questions in the affirmative, but the third is better answered in the negative. The reason is that, in order to satisfy our definition, the community group must by itself occupy a particular location. The external aspect of a community is an area within which its members live together by themselves, though not necessarily, as we have seen, without contacts over a wider area.

In the process of civilization the walls of the small exclusive communities have been broken down. This vast process of permeation still advances and is gradually making of the whole earth one area, the only integral area, of community. The only potential limit of community is the limit of effective communication and that already includes the earth itself in its range. But the smaller communities, although they cease to be integral, do not disappear through absorption in the larger. As civilized beings, we need the smaller as well as the larger circles of community. Living in the smaller we find the nearer, more intimate satisfactions; but the larger bring to us

opportunity, stability, economy, the constant stimulus of a richer, more varied culture.

The significance of the term *community* is most clearly brought out when we contrast it with our next key-word, *association*.

3. *Associations*

There are three ways in which men may seek the fulfilment of their ends. They may act independently, each following his own way without thought of his fellows or their actions, but this unsocial way has narrow limitations wherever men live together. They may seek them through conflict with one another, each striving to wrest from the others the object that he prizes, but this method, when unalloyed, is unproductive and wasteful and is opposed to the very existence of society. The conflicts that society permits, such as the competitive struggle, are limited and regulated. Lastly, they may pursue their ends in company, on some co-operative basis, so that each is in some degree and manner contributing to the ends of his fellows. This socialized method gives rise to associations. The co-operative pursuit may be spontaneous, it may be casual, it may be determined simply by use and wont, by the customs of a community. On the other hand a group may organize itself expressly for the purpose of pursuing certain of its interests together. When that happens, an association is born.

An association then is a group specifically organized for the pursuit of an interest or group of interests in common. It is not a community but an organization within a community. A community is more than any organization, it is the matrix of organization. The difference is obvious. We contrast the business or the church or the club with the village or city or nation. We can ask, for example, what churches stand for, why they exist, and answer in terms of the particular interests around which they are organized. But we cannot ask why communities exist, any more than we can ask why life itself exists, expecting a definite answer. (We can ask why a community, say a city, exists where *it is situated*, but this is a different question.) Here another contrast between the com-

munity and the association reveals itself. Because the association is organized for particular purposes, we belong to it only by virtue of these purposes. Membership of an association has a limited significance. An association may engage our whole devotion, our whole personality, but we belong to it only by virtue of specific interests which we possess; we have, in the economic phrase, a limited liability in respect of it. Consequently, there can be a multitude of associations within the same community. The object of an association can be important or trivial, wide or narrow, but it is never all-comprehensive. Some part of our life always escapes organization. A community on the other hand can be, and often is for many of its members, an area within which the whole of life is lived. It contains all sorts and conditions, men, women, and children; the wise man and the fool, the well-to-do and the destitute, equally belong to it. We are born into communities, but we create or are elected into associations.

There are two organizations which may seem to lie on the border line between associations and communities. One is the family. In some of its older forms it had many of the attributes of a community, circumscribing largely or even wholly the life of its members. In modern society, as in all complex civilizations, it becomes definitely an association, so far as its adult members are concerned. For the original contracting parties it is an association specifically established with certain ends in view, and vastly important as these ends are they are nevertheless limited. The functions of the family are more and more limited and defined as social differentiation proceeds. On the other hand the family, for the new lives which arise within it, is more than an association. For them it is a preliminary community, preparing them for the greater community. By imperceptible degrees it is transformed for them also, as they grow up, into a kind of association.

The other association is the state. We are still apt to confuse the state with the community. But in reality the state is one form of social organization, not the whole community in all its aspects. We distinguish, for example, the state from the church, the political from the religious organization. It is

highly important, for the understanding of the social structure and particularly of the evolution of that structure, that we should realize the associative character of the state. The state is an agency of peculiarly wide range, but nevertheless an agency. At a certain stage in the evolution of western society it took an absolutist form claiming to control every aspect of human life. Even if it had achieved its full pretensions in this respect—which it never could,—it would still have been, not the community, but an organization controlling the community. The state is different in important respects from all other associations. It is limited more by the way in which it pursues interests than by the kinds of interests which it pursues. It has certain powers over all other associations. It is a territorial organization, and therefore may be described as an agency of the community rather than an agency within it. Its jurisdiction extends over all within the territory it organizes, whether they are in a strict sense members (citizens) of the state or not. All other associations, in a modern society at least, are voluntary. We belong only if we want to; we can leave them if we want to, except in the case of the family, where the state, recognizing the peculiar obligations of the marriage contract, sets limits to this privilege. The state alone has the last resort of compulsion.

We have defined an association as a group expressly organized around a particular interest. By a group itself we mean any collection of social beings who enter into distinctive social relationships with one another. Sometimes the term is used more broadly. Oppenheimer, for example, though he denies the term to a number of people who simultaneously put up their umbrellas when it begins to rain, yet would designate as a group a number of people who read in their separate rooms the same newspaper.[2] Since these people do not on that account enter into social relationships with one another, they would not form a group on our definition. A group, as we understand it, involves reciprocity between its members. The qualification, *expressly organized*, enables us to distinguish between associations and other social groups. A social class, for ex-

[2] F. Oppenheimer, *Allgemeine Soziologie* (Jena, 1923), II, p. 463.

ample, is not—any more than a community itself—an association. It is a group exhibiting common interests, like attitudes, reciprocal relationships of its members, but it is not itself created expressly to pursue certain ends or to fulfil certain functions.

Associations in their pure forms are simply means or agencies through which their members realize their interests, like or common. It belongs to the essence of social organization that they act, not merely through leaders, but through officials or representatives, as agencies. The officials may control the organization so that the interests of the majority are subordinated to their own—wherever there is organization the problem of liberty arises—or they may be controlled by the members to the service of the inclusive interest. But in its executive operations as distinct from its mere deliberations, the association normally acts through agents who are responsible for and to the association. This fact gives the association its distinctive character and its peculiar legal status. For though an association has in truth no purposes that are not the purposes of some or all of its members, it has methods of operation peculiar to it as an association. It owns property which is not simply an aggregation of individual properties; it owns funds which the members cannot at pleasure distribute among themselves, since they are assigned to the express purposes of the association; it possesses rights and obligations, powers, and liabilities, which the members cannot distributively exercise. A public utility, a bank, a trade-union, a club, a church, has in virtue of its organization and function certain duties and certain privileges as such, as a unity. When this condition is legally established and the limits of these duties and privileges are legally assigned, the association becomes a corporation.

4. *Institutions*

Anything socially established we are apt to call an institution, and according to this wide usage the family and the state, no less than marriage and government, would be so described. But we shall gain a clearer view of the social structure if we make a distinction between institutions and associations. In

this book we shall always mean by institutions the established forms or conditions of procedure characteristic of group activity. When men create associations they must also create rules and procedures for the despatch of the common business and for the regulation of the members to one another within the ambit of the organization. Such forms are distinctively institutions. Every association has, in respect of its particular interest, its characteristic institutions. The church, for example, has its sacraments, its modes of worship, its rituals. The family has marriage and inheritance—these may perhaps be reckoned as institutions of the state, being under its guardianship, but the family has besides its own institutions, such as the home, the family meal, and so forth. The state has its own peculiar institutions, such as representative government and legislative procedures. It should be observed that there are institutions which are established by communities as well as those which associations set up. Such are, for example, festivals, ceremonies expressive of important occasions, modes of recreation and amusement. Communal institutions, unlike many associational institutions, do not result from a deliberate act of establishment. They gradually attain social recognition, they grow into establishment. The difference between a social usage or custom on the one hand and an institution on the other may therefore be one of degree. Institution implies a more definite recognition. We would call the marriage feast an institution, but courtship a custom, and certainly we should call marriage itself an institution and not a custom. Institutions have external insignia, marks of public recognition, which customs as such do not require. Again, a custom is always a social mode of conduct, whereas an institution is often a social condition of conduct. Thus no one would call property a custom though it is certainly an institution.

Sometimes a confusion arises between institution and association because the same term, *in a different reference*, may mean either one or the other. There is no difficulty in deciding, according to our definition, that the church is an association and communion an institution, that the trade-union is an association and the union label an institution, that the family

is an association and primogeniture an institution. But which term shall we apply to a hospital, a parliament, a cabinet, a college? When we speak of a hospital we may be thinking of a building for the cure of the sick, a system of medical service, a provision publicly or privately established to meet certain social needs—in other words we may be thinking of it as an institution. But we may also think of it, from the inside as it were, as a body of physicians, nurses, attendants—in other words as an association. This suggests the simple clue by which we can find an answer to our question. If we are considering something as an organized group, it is an association; if as a mode or means of service, it is an institution. Do we think of it in terms of membership, as something which people belong to, then it is in our reference an association. When we regard a college as a body of teachers and students, we are selecting its associational aspect, but when we regard it as an educational system, we are selecting its institutional features. We cannot *belong to* an institution. We do not belong to marriage or primogeniture or property-systems, but we do belong to families and to states.

5. *Mores*

Customs and institutions are in one aspect agencies of social control. As such they are incorporated in the mores of the group. If we name the whole system of behavior patterns characteristic of a group its folkways, then this system, *regarded as a regulator of conduct*, may be termed the mores. Sumner, whose main contribution to sociology has been his comprehensive study of folkways, defines the mores as follows: "they are the ways of doing things which are current in a society to satisfy human needs and desires, together with the faiths, notions, codes, and standards of well living which inhere in those ways." [3] The mores represent the living character of a group or community, operative in conscious or unconscious control over its members. They are at once the expression and the limitation of the group life, an omnipresent influence towards conformity, forever moulding and forever

[3] W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston, 1906), p. 59.

restraining the tendencies of every individual. From infancy to old age they mete out to each member the strong medicine of praise and blame, approval to those who follow them and, still more, disapproval to those who seek to defy them, with all the penalties which attach to the displeasure of the group. The mores are authorities with which one cannot argue, for they are guarded most tenaciously by those who reason least. Often they scorn utility. They arise out of the interpretation and misinterpretation of experience, detoured by the happy and unhappy conjunctures which impress the memory of the group, formalized by tradition, distorted by dominant interests, and reinforced by fear or dislike of the untried. Agents of conservatism as they normally are, they nevertheless have only the appearance of fixity, changing subtly from age to age.

The mores are in the last resort the guardians of solidarity. Every social unity has its own mores. There are mores for each sex, for all ages, for all classes, for all groups from the family to the nation or the civilization. These specializations of the mores tend to check the rigor of the conformity they enforce, so that they are less tyrannical in the large-scale society. Moreover, with the evolution of society the mores differentiate within themselves, appearing as a series of special codes, custom and fashion and law and the codes of variant religious and other cultural groups. Thus their control is rendered more flexible and the varieties of social experience are allowed a freer and fuller expression.

CHAPTER TWO

THE NATURE OF THE SOCIAL BOND

1. *In What Sense We Belong to Society*

Following our definition of sociology and of society we might proceed at once to the study of the social structure. But our understanding of the particular forms and types, situations and problems, which that structure reveals, will be more secure if first we endeavor to think through a preliminary problem, which in its full comprehension is actually the biggest and hardest problem that sociology offers. It is one, the significance of which grows greater the further we advance in our study, and at this stage all we can expect to attain is a proper orientation to it. What does it really mean to be a member of a community? In what sense do we belong to society? In what sense does society belong to us? What is the nature of our dependence upon it? How shall we interpret the unity of the whole to which our individual lives are bound? These questions are aspects of one fundamental question, the relation of the unit, the individual, to the group and to the social system. We may find it easiest to approach this question by an examination of two misleading and opposing answers to it.

It has often been held that society is merely a system of cooperation or a protective agency, perhaps a contrivance to ensure individuals against the hazards created by their own uncontrolled liberties; at best an artificial device of mutual economy, at worst a scheme by which the strong exploit the weak. In some such manner did the Greek sophists think, when they said of society that it existed "by convention (or ordinance) and not by nature". In such a manner did the philosopher Hobbes picture it when he said that "men have no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of grief) in keeping company, where there is no power able to overawe them all"; and so did all those thinkers who, like Hobbes, thought

of men as entering a compact to form society, because without it they made life uncomfortable or intolerably unpleasant for one another. In such a manner did the eighteenth century prophets of individualism speak, when they declared that men were "born free and equal", as though they entered society at will, already armed with a panoply of rights and powers. And the same conception, though with diminished influence, echoed through certain schools of the nineteenth century, and is still sometimes expressed in our own days.

A false assumption underlies this whole mode of thought. It is that men can exist as men apart from society. In fact many thinkers of these schools imagined that society really limited or repressed the individuality which men would have possessed and developed in its absence. They failed to appreciate the truth of Aristotle's famous phrase, that man is a "social animal." Men did not become individuals first and then members of society. It is only in society they become individuals. Men are not "born free". It is only in society that they can attain freedom. We can fulfil our nature only in and through society; moreover the nature that is thus fulfilled is itself a social nature. Not only is every individual the offspring of a social relationship, but he becomes *himself*, an individual, in the unfolding of his social relationships. In his adult selfhood he is more self-determining but scarcely more self-sufficient, self-complete, than in his infancy. Moreover, every person, as man or woman, is essentially a term in a relationship. The individual is neither beginning nor end, but a link in the succession of life. This is a sociological as well as a biological truth.[1]

In saying so we have still not expressed the depth of our dependence as individuals on society. It is more than a necessary environment, more than the soil in which we are nurtured. Our relation to it is even more intimate than that of the seed to the earth in which it grows. It is the selective processes of

[1] There are some common misunderstandings of this truth. It does not mean that man is a sociable animal. Men vary greatly in this respect. It does not mean that man is altruistic or other-regarding in his need for society. Nor does it mean that he is social by virtue of some original constitution of human nature.

society which have determined our heredity, our being. We are born to a social heritage which becomes in time our mental equipment, not merely an external possession. That heritage, reinforced by our continuous social experience, evokes and directs our personality. Society liberates selectively and also limits our potentialities, not only by affording definite opportunities and stimulations, not only by placing upon us definite restraints and interferences, but also subtly and imperceptibly, its omnipresent influences moulding our attitudes, our beliefs, our morals, and our ideals. If in infancy any of us had been transported to a very different kind of society, we would have become profoundly different from what we now are. Or, to take the extreme case which we shall illustrate presently, if in infancy any of us had through some tragic accident been abandoned by society altogether and had been still enabled to survive, our very being would have ceased to be, or would never have become, in any intelligible sense, human. In isolation we could be nothing: only in society do we become individuals.

Thus we can scarcely exaggerate our dependence, as individuals, on society. But in making full acknowledgment of it we must avoid an opposite error to that of the individualists. Individuality is no less real because it is socially determined. Autonomy, the self-determination of the individual, is no less, but rather the more, possible because our life is fulfilled in social relationships. It is misleading to say, as some (such as the French sociologist Fouillée) have said, that it is only society that lives and breathes in its individuals, that our consciousness is only an expression of the social consciousness—we can at least reply that it is only in us, its individuals, that society lives. It is misleading to say that we belong to society as the leaves belong to the tree or the cells to the body. It is misleading to say, as various thinkers have said from the time of Plato to the present, that our individual minds are constituents of a greater mind that animates a society as a unity.[2] If the individualist view failed to appreciate the meaning of society,

[2] Plato, *Republic*, Bk. II. Cf. Wm. McDougall, *The Group Mind* (Cambridge, 1920), esp. ch. I.

this view equally fails to appreciate the meaning of individuality. It is essential for us to realize our vital dependence, as individuals, on society; but it is no less essential that we should understand the reality, the significance, that we as individuals possess. Society can have no meaning unless individuals are real. As one writer well puts it, "if, when I think, it is society that thinks in me, there is no thought, and no society."[3]

We can state quite briefly the reasons why the characterization of society as an organism or a greater mind fails to do justice to the fact of individuality and thus tends to give us a wrong view of the unity of society and of the relation of the members to one another and to the whole. There are significant resemblances between a social and an organic structure, but there are also very significant differences. Herbert Spencer, though he was fond of considering society as an organism, pointed out one great difference when he said that society has no "common sensorium," no central organ of perception or of thought. We speak of sharing our feelings and our thoughts, but it is only individuals who think and feel. We can communicate our feelings so that others may sympathize with us and, if they too have had similar experiences, can appreciate what our feelings are. But there is a sense in which they cannot share our feelings. In this sense every self is as it were insulated. Feelings are *like*, not *common*. No one *feels* another's happiness or sorrow, another's pleasure or pain, however understanding or sympathetic he may be. At most he may induce in himself a sorrow for the sorrow of another. In this sense "the heart knoweth his own bitterness; and a stranger doth not intermeddle with his joy." Mind communicates with mind, but they do not form a single mind. The same influences may stir a people or a crowd, but only as they pulsate in its several members. If we speak of the mind of a group we have no evidence and therefore no right to conceive of it as anything but the minds of its members thinking or feeling in like ways, making like responses and being moved thereby to like or to common action.

There are other important differences, both structural and

[3] Hocking, *Man and the State* (New Haven, 1926), ch. XV, § 157.

functional, between the relation of the cells to the organism and that of the individuals to a society, but the difference we have just mentioned is sufficient for our purpose. It shows that we do not belong to society as the cells 'belong' to the organism. The only centers of activity, of feeling, of function, of purpose which we know are individual selves. The only society which we know is a society in which those selves are bound together, through time and space, by the relations of each to each which they themselves create or inherit. The only experience we know is the experience of individuals, and it is only in the light of their struggles, their interests, their aspirations, their hopes and their fears, that we can assign any function and any goal to society. When we speak of the 'group interest' we mean only the interest in the group which its members, or any of them, feel. The group has no fulfilment except that of its members, present or future. It has no thoughts, no desires, save those that animate the hearts of its members. Underlying all our conscious striving there is a sense of values, desirable states of being, which we seek to attain. We seek them for others as well as for ourselves. We seek, in the degree of our socialmindedness, to establish such social relationships that these values shall be attained as widely as possible. We seek to maintain them for the future as well as in the present. But where and how are these values realized? Only in the lives that individual persons live. Perhaps it is the gravest danger of the false view we have been criticizing that it implies that in some mysterious way society exists in its own right and that its welfare can be realized apart from or even at the cost of the welfare of its individuals. It is sometimes assumed that it is possible, and even desirable, to sacrifice the welfare of 'the individual' (not, observe, of some individuals) to that of society. The best corrective of this error is to remember that the only values we know, the only ends we humanly strive for, are those which in the last resort are realized by and in individuals. The only thing to which we are able to attach value, when we think of it as end and not as means, is personal quality.

Society, therefore, the system or structure of social relation-

ships with all the traditions, the institutions, the equipments which it provides, is for us only a great means whereby social beings live their lives and transmit to coming generations the facilities of living. We cannot agree with those thinkers who, like Hobbes or even John Stuart Mill, wrote as though society were in its very nature inimical to the expression and development of individuality. Still less can we accept the views of those thinkers who, like Benjamin Kidd, declare that the individual *should* be subordinated to society; or who, like certain followers of the philosopher Hegel, suggest that society itself has a value beyond the service which it renders to its members; or who, like certain religious writers, assign to society some other function than the realization of the interests which its members pursue.[4] The reason for the rejection of these views will be brought out more fully as we turn to the positive aspect of the argument, showing how individuality and society are in fundamental harmony.

2. *The Fundamental Harmony of Individuality and Society*

There are some types of unity in our conception of which the units or constituents derive their significance from their respective contributions to the functioning of the whole. Of such is the organism, for we interpret its cells and organs solely as contributory to the life of the whole. Of such also is every mechanism. There are other types of unity in our conception of which the whole system derives its significance from its support of and contribution to the functioning of the units or constituents. Of such is every social organization, and of such is society itself. It is this principle which makes possible the reconciliation of individuality and society. To bring out the harmony between them we must first make clear the meaning we attach to the term *individuality.*

We speak of individuality in various references. We sometimes use the term in a physical reference, as involving the

[4] For the views of the writers mentioned above, see Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. XXI; Mill, *On Liberty, passim;* Kidd, *Social Evolution* (new ed., New York, 1920), and *Principles of Western Civilization* (London, 1902); and, as an example of the Hegelian doctrine, B. Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State* (London, 1923), chh. V and VII.

physical detachment of one unit from another. Here there are border-line instances which may puzzle us. Is the plant that sends a new rooting shoot from underground or the tree, like the banyan tree, which sends down new roots from its branches, to be regarded as one or more individuals? There are simple forms of life which reproduce by fissure so that what was one individual becomes two. Such examples suggest that even physical individuality is a matter of degree. It is less evident in the simplest than in the more complex forms of life. If we care to extend the term to include inanimate objects, another aspect of this truth is seen. Two drops of water or two clouds fuse together so that they become one without distinction of the constituents. Individuality has obviously little meaning as applied to objects so inchoate or formless in themselves that this is possible.

When we turn to the higher forms of life, and especially to human beings, individuality takes on a fuller meaning, but it still consists in those attributes which give a distinctive quality or character to each unit and it is still a matter of degree. In a broad biological sense a being is more individualized the more it is self-determining, the more selectively it responds to stimuli from without, the more it adapts its environment to its particular needs. In a sociological reference a being has more individuality when his conduct is not simply imitative or the result of suggestion, when he is less the slave of custom or even of habit, when his responses to the social environment are not quasi-automatic and subservient, devoid of understanding or of personal purpose. Individuality is that attribute in virtue of which the member of a group is yet more than merely a member, is a self, a center of activity and response expressive of a nature that is his own. It need not mean just originality, it certainly does not mean eccentricity. A strong individuality may express more fully the spirit or quality of his age, but he does so, not because he is quickly imitative or easily suggestible, but because it is deeply rooted in his own nature. It is true that when the members of a group are more individualized they will reveal greater differences, they will express themselves in a greater variety of

ways. But the criterion of individuality is not how far each is divergent from the rest but how far each, in his relations to others, acts autonomously, acts in his own consciousness, and with his own interpretation, of the claims of others on himself. When the possessor of individuality does as others do, at least in matters which he deems important, he does it not simply because others do it, but because his own nature responds in the same way. When he follows authority, except in so far as he is compelled to, he follows it because of conviction, not because it is authority. He does not superficially accept or echo the opinions of others—he has some independence of judgment, some initiative, some discrimination, some strength of character. The degree in which he exhibits these qualities is the degree in which he possesses individuality.[5]

We are not here, be it noted, describing an ideal, but an actual attribute which, in greater or less degree, people reveal in their social relationships. We are not pronouncing upon its ethical value. We are simply concerned to show that this factor of individuality, so far from being inconsistent with social living, is fundamentally in harmony with it, so that, for example, in the highly organized societies more and not less individuality is necessary to maintain the system; so that, on the other hand, the more highly organized societies evoke and provide opportunities for more and not less of it.

It is easy to show, in the first place, that individuality develops in and through social contacts and the provision made for it by a social heritage. If we take the extreme case, where social contacts are entirely lacking, we find that practically no development of human individuality is possible. We are not referring to Robinson Crusoes who have been wrecked on desert islands or hermits who have forsaken the world, not to those who have been brought up in society and later been

[5] In order not to complicate the argument, I have not attempted here to distinguish between individuality and personality. Personality, as I understand the term, is the integral character of a being, all that he is and has experienced so far as it can be comprehended as a unity. Individuality, as above defined, is an aspect of personality. Hence in my *Community* I state the principle that "sociality and individuality"—as the two aspects of personality—"develop pari passu" (Bk. III. ch. III).

withdrawn from it, though the authentic history of such persons, apart from the romance of fiction, corroborates our principle. We are thinking of the well-established instances of children who have grown up 'wild', outside of social relationships. Of course it is not possible to make experiments in this direction, though certain absolute monarchs, from King Psammetichus of Egypt to King James IV of Scotland, are reported to have done so. But chance or accident and in one instance at least an evil design, have furnished sufficient evidence.[6] It shows that, apart from the social environment, human beings may grow up physiologically but cannot realize their distinctive qualities as human beings, cannot develop their intellectual and emotional capacities, are cut off from the world of speech and the other modes of expression, from that interplay of mind with mind in which alone individuality can arise and reveal itself. In most instances these socially disinherited children are described by observers as having the aptitudes and habits of the lower animals and in many instances they are reported as having the appearance of idiots or imbeciles. A peculiarly significant case is the famous one of Caspar Hauser, because this ill-starred youth was in all probability bereft of human contacts through political machinations and therefore his condition when found could not be attributed to a defect of innate mentality. Hauser, when he wandered into the city of Nuremberg in 1828, could hardly walk and had the mind of an infant, and like an infant could only mutter a meaningless phrase or two. By this time he was seventeen years of age but his mind in consequence of his enforced isolation was utterly undeveloped. In the five years before another political intrigue ended his life he made distinct progress, but in some respects his native potentialities were permanently checked, and it is particularly noteworthy that a post-mortem revealed the brain development to be subnormal.[7] As the criminologist von Feuerbach phrased it,

[6] For a collection of such instances see Briffault, *The Mothers* (New York, 1927), ch. I.

[7] This historical case is the subject of Wassermann's novel so entitled. For the facts of the case see *Meyers Konversationslexicon*, *s. v.*

the denial of society to Caspar Hauser was "a crime against the soul of a human being."

If individuality is dependent on society, so the degree and form of its development is dependent on the kind of sustenance and opportunity which the particular society provides. Consider only how far its evocation depends on the flexibility and richness of language, on the fineness of this primary instrument of education and of communication. Add to this the numerous other tools of expression which a complex society affords. Remember also that the more civilized societies supply the greater variety and range of contacts, of callings, of interests and of opportunities, in short of the general and the specific stimulations to which the differences involved in individuality can appropriately respond. As Durkheim brought out so well in his *Division du Travail Social*, the more advanced society is built on difference as well as likeness and thus admits of a greater degree of individuality in its members.

Moreover, the greater society not only admits, it demands more individuality of its members. Here is the other side of the story. If all men thought alike, felt alike, and acted alike; if they all had the same standards and the same interests; if they all accepted the same customs and echoed the same opinions without questioning and without variation, civilization could never have advanced and culture would have remained rudimentary. There would be little specialization, little exchange, little interdependence, and what did exist would be of a superficial and rather artificial character. The profounder aspects of social co-operation would be lost, the fruitful stimulation of social contacts would be lacking. There would be no initiative, enterprise, and experiment. There would be no resistance to regimentation and thus no hope of progress. It is characteristic of the greater society, as it has grown both extensively and intensively, that it does not merely tolerate but accepts and incorporates differences. Its complex structure is built on reciprocity of function. Its manifold activities are maintained only by the individual initiative and the individual responsibility of its members in their various capacities. The greater society harmonizes differences to an extent un-

dreamed of in primitive societies. A primitive society may be repressive of individuality or it may be indifferent to it, but it cannot use it. One of the best criteria of the development of a society is the degree in which it can enlist in reciprocal or in common service the variant individualities within it.

We shall see another aspect of this truth later, when we come to consider the relation of liberty and law. As we shall then show, liberty cannot be realized except with the aid of law, though the degree to which it is realized depends on the character of the code. So here we may say of individuality, that it cannot be realized except within social relationships, though the degree of its realization depends on the quality of society. Individuality must meet individuality within the social system, or else it remains unfulfilled. To achieve his distinctive interests the individual must be able to co-operate with others, giving and taking, taking the myriad things he needs in exchange for his individual gift. Sustaining that give-and-take, sustaining his individuality itself, is his participation in the common life and common interests in the whole. Thus he is able, according to the strength of his individuality, to say 'we' instead of merely 'I', and thereby to liberate profound elements in his nature. For he finds himself also in that which he shares with others, in identifying himself with the common cause, in the exercise of his individuality through devotion to the group, the community, the nation, the party, the business, the trade-union, the cultural association. In this devotion he loses his isolation and finds his individuality. Were it otherwise the group could not evoke as it does the greater loyalties and enthusiasms and aspirations.

We conclude therefore that there is essential harmony between the claims of individuality and the conditions of social organization. Yet there are at points serious conflicts, disharmonies, resistances. There are frictions, maladjustments, competitive jealousies and hindrances, sometimes sheer repressions, which interfere with the sense of harmony and limit the integration of individuals and groups within the social order. What individual has not at some time or other resented the regulation of society? Who has not at some time

resisted and perhaps been defeated by the mores of his community? We are not referring merely to the suppression of anti-social impulses, for that can be more easily reconciled with our general principle but to the suppression of impulses, of needs, even of ideals, which the mere rigor, uniformity, intolerance, or else the inequity and ruthlessness, of the social system impose. Who has not at times yearned for a cloak of invisibility so that he might be liberated from the inquisitiveness or the tyranny of society as from an argus-eyed and intolerable censorship? It has been maintained that many of the mental strains and grave neuroses of modern life are due to the sense of an insistent social pressure.[8] It has been claimed by champions of liberty that "society has now fairly got the better of individuality."[9] What do these protestations mean? If they do not destroy, do they not at least seriously impair our principle of a fundamental harmony?

We must admit that the harmony between individuality and society is far from being perfect. What we have shown so far is that each of these factors depends for its existence and its growth upon the existence and the growth of the other. Defects on the side of either factor may still prevent the realization of the full potential harmony between them. The conditions obtaining within a society no less than the codes which it sets up are inevitably at some points in conflict with the impulses of our nature, and especially with our strongest impulses, like that of sex. Even for those most amenable to social discipline there are involved maladjustments, perhaps no less serious if unrecognized, while those who are resistant suffer more obviously. It is the sensitive, the imaginative, the original minds on whom the pressure bears most heavily. It is these too who feel most bitterly the tyrannies which are often imposed by officials and bureaucrats, "clothed in a little brief authority". But we cannot accept the implication of writers like Mill that society 'gets the better of' its members, one and all. There may well be, in important respects, repression of the few by the many, or of the many by the few. But society is no authority

[8] Cf. T. Burrow, *The Social Basis of Consciousness* (New York, 1927).
[9] J. S. Mill, *On Liberty*, ch. III.

standing outside of all its members. It is in the last resort their creation, maintained by them and responsive to their wills. Let us examine more particularly in what sense society may be in partial conflict with individuality.

Within every community there is an incessant struggle of diverse and opposing interests. This struggle in itself is not antagonistic to individuality but on the contrary is an ever-present spur to it. But under the unequal conditions of privilege and power and wealth it leads to forms of dominance which are harmful to the individuality of those subject to it. Dominant groups, whether of the few or the many, impose their selfish or thoughtless control over the rest. They bring to bear strong social pressures under which the less dominant suffer. In one sphere the pressure takes the form of social ostracism, in another of economic exploitation, in another of arbitrary or tyrannical laws. In the second place, within every group, no matter how small, no matter how united by common purpose, there is the tendency of authority and prestige to seek its own ends and to express its power at the cost of the variant individualities subject to it. To secure any common end there must be common rules, but the drive of authority, fostered by lack of understanding as well as by pride of position, goes beyond the degree of regulation which the common end requires. Even in the circle of the family this tendency is displayed. The divergent view-points of the older and the younger lead often to bitter compulsions and revolts and sometimes to tragic sacrifices. The harm to individuality occurs when the accepted common good remains unrealized because the demands of authority exceed its limits. A sense of frustration ensues which may be expressed in a bitterness against the particular organization or even against society itself. There are, of course, beneficent restrictions, needful restrictions. All organization involves some restriction, some rules, if the object of the organization is to be obtained. There must be common policy for common ends, for common discipline. That, if wisely devised and maintained, is a means of strength. Without order there is no direction and no achievement in a common cause. And on the other hand individuality cannot be achieved

without self-control. But there are restrictions which are due to the failure to understand differences, to the ambition or narrow-mindedness of power, to the willingness of men to exploit others without consideration of the cost.

A third source of social restriction arises from the almost impersonal control exercised through institutions. The social structure rests on a social heritage. It has been built through many generations. Its institutions express the prejudice and superstition as well as the intelligence of their countless builders. Although it is constantly being re-built according to the standards of each age, the process is never complete. Some of its institutions may be harmful survivals, repressive of the individuality of its present members. Conventions and mores, especially of the prohibitive type, may derive authority from the mere fact of long establishment. They are apt to grow sacrosanct and thus resistant of change, all the more because they fail to justify themselves by the only legitimate test, the service they render to the members of the society. The demand for conformity is often unreasoning, and history is strewn with instances of the suppression of those less gregarious and more original minds whose insight proved in the retrospect to be greater than that of the mass of their fellows.

Beyond these difficulties there lies another, involved in the very nature of society. Every social situation or environment, even the most intimate, is one which each individual shares with others. Each must adjust himself not only to these others but also to the *common* situation. Hence certain uniformities of conduct are demanded of him. As we shall see more fully at a later stage, every social situation creates norms to regulate behavior and sanctions to support these norms. The common code and the variant individual, the code demanding conformity and the individual seeking to be himself—these are the terms of a myriad conflicts. Their more extreme manifestations are on the one hand the ruthlessness of power crushing individuality in the name of social authority, and on the other hand the fear, distraction, revolt, and mental instability of those who from the standpoint of the prevailing code are 'abnormal' and in the eyes of authority are 'anti-social'. It

is part of our more modern social enlightenment that we are no longer content to accept such oppositions as inevitable. Codes can be made more accommodating, individuals can be trained to a better adjustment. Particular individual responses are relative to particular social environments, and both are susceptible of change. In any given case of maladjustment the practical question at once arises: Is it the environment or the maladjusted individuals that we should seek to change? Is the code too rigid or the behavior too lax? Perhaps both are in need of reform. Obviously our answers will depend on our ideas of social welfare, but however we answer we admit the possibility of a greater harmony. It may be observed that sociology and its applied sciences attack any such problem from the side of the code, the institution, the social environment, while psychology in its practical aspects has its attention centered on the variant individuals. Each must contribute its share if a solution is to be achieved.

These obstacles to the perfect harmony of individuality and society can perhaps never be wholly removed, but they can be greatly mitigated, perhaps to the point where they provoke for the most part no more than character-making struggle. The necessary conditions of a complex society give hope of this outcome, for the diversity of interests and cultural attitudes which accompany it make the imposition of uniform controls over the more intimate aspects of conduct less feasible and more precarious. On the whole, as we shall show more fully at a later stage, the more civilized we are the more are we individualized, and therefore the more do we require of society—not freedom from it but freedom within it, freedom for the creative or constructive powers, for the sheer activities of life. This freedom society alone can give, in the presence of its order, but in the absence of those coercions which repress the fulness and variety of living.

Let us sum up the argument to this point. We have shown (1) that society is a fundamental condition for the development of individuality—in fact society is a condition of every satisfaction we find or seek or even dream: (2) that the more there is of individuality the more it depends on and the more it can

give to society, so that the two grow normally together: (3) that nevertheless every social system is imperfectly adapted to the needs of at least some of the individualities within it and that under certain conditions a society may seriously restrict the expression and development of that variety of life which might, if freely admitted, give it strength and richness: (4) that the most serious cause of the difference between the potential and the actual harmony of society and individuality lies in the abuse of power, while conversely the condition that most advances this harmony involves the substitution of co-operation for exploitation and of tolerance for intolerance.

In the light of these formulations we shall now discuss briefly the doctrine that the solidarity or cohesion of society *demands* the sacrifice of individuality. In its ethical form the principle is that social conduct requires self-sacrifice. We are not concerned here with moral ultimates, with what in any final sense *ought* to be or to be done. The sociological question is simply whether such and such conduct is necessary *if* such and such a result is to be attained. It is quite clear that society sometimes imposes obligations which are adverse to the fulfilment of the life of the individuals on whom they are imposed or who voluntarily accept them. It may establish a censorship over his opinions or his beliefs. It may compel him, in time of war, to sacrifice his career, his morals, and his life itself. It may offer him material or social success at the price of his own convictions and ideals. Responsibilities of a family may devote a man to uncongenial toil while defeating the claims of his intellectual or artistic life. A woman may have to choose between her lover and social esteem, between a home of her own and the care of an invalid mother. These are but a few examples of the numerous cases in which social obligation or responsibility demands some genuine sacrifice of individuality. They reveal one and all the imperfections of the harmony of which we have spoken.

A little analysis suffices to show that such examples really confirm our general principle. If we take first the extreme instance of sacrifice, that demanded by warfare, it is surely imposed by the breakdown of society, by the very denial of a

common society wide enough to include the warring peoples. If society makes the demand it is because society itself is defective. And so with the other instances. The sacrifice occurs at the point where social relationships reach their limit, where the co-operative maintenance of need is inadequate, where society is too narrow to admit the varieties of personality within it. Struggle of many kinds is implicit in the very nature of society, with its incessant changefulness and the endless surge of the expansive interests of individuals and groups. But it is hard to conceive of instances in which society itself is in conflict with individuality except as arising from defects of individuality, where it narrowly seeks self-advantage in disregard of society and in the long-run in disregard of its own fulfilment, and from defects of society, where its limitations and its maladjustments entail the repression of some of its members. It is the common experience that to fulfil ourselves we must devote ourselves to common or social purposes. The more we have—the more in other words we *are*—the more we can give. The greater society is, the more it can receive from us. Thus the potential harmony is more fully realized.

This principle is so important for the understanding of society that, in order to establish it more completely, we shall turn next to examine the nature of the great obstacle to the potential harmony, the abuse of power. Let us consider the function and place of coercion in the social system.

3. *Coercion and the Social Bond*

In every society there exist many degrees and forms of coercion. Whenever men act, or refrain from acting, in a manner different from that which they themselves have chosen or would choose in a given situation, because others deliberately limit the range of their choice either directly, through present control over it, or indirectly, through the threat of consequences, they may be said to be under coercion. There are therefore as many forms of coercion as there are forms of power. Whoever makes conditions the failure to fulfil which is visited by a penalty is exercising coercion, whether it be an employer with the power to dismiss or a group of workmen

with the power to strike, whether it be a church with the power to excommunicate or a club with the power to deny its privileges, whether it be even a husband or a wife with the power to make things unpleasant for his or her partner. But beyond all these there is an absolute form of coercion, the exercise of physical force to control or prevent action. This is compulsion in its purest unconditional form, and in civilized communities it is vested, as a *right*, solely in the state. It is force so understood which alone we shall examine here, seeking to point out the nature and the limits of its social effectiveness and function, but what is said of it will hold true of the other forms of coercion, in the degree in which, under whatever disguise, they constrain the will and the act of those subject to them.

The function of force in the social order exhibits curious variations. It is prominent in some primitive communities, among war-like tribes, but practically non-existent in others, such as the Trobriand islanders described by Dr. Malinowski.[10] In the primitive world it seems to increase as we pass from the simple to the more complex and highly organized groups, if we may judge from the presence among these peoples of social ranks or castes.[11] Yet we would be wrong to infer that its rôle necessarily increases with the degree of social organization, for the vast complex democracies of the modern world are less force-controlled than the simpler feudal economies out of which they arose. It is obvious that the governmental force is more in evidence in times and under conditions of social crisis, and sometimes it retains a tyrannical form as an aftermath of such crises, as in the dictatorships of Soviet Russia and of Fascist Italy. It is obvious also that it is a more effective instrument of social control over uneducated and acquiescent populations than over those which have been brought up in an atmosphere of liberty and of criticism.

Physical force cannot, as the anarchists claim, be abolished altogether from the social system, if for no other reason than

[10] *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* (New York, 1926).

[11] Cf. Hobhouse, Wheeler and Ginsberg, *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples* (London, 1915), ch. IV, § 2.

that there must always exist some socialized force to restrain the anti-social manifestations of force itself, whether exerted by individuals or by organized groups. It is also necessary, in the last resort, to curb the encroachments of the other forms of power we have just mentioned, such as economic exploitation. There are certain fundamental forms of order and of security which can be maintained only under laws which all must obey. The real service of force is as a safeguard of this order. Force alone cannot protect this order but without this force as an ally of its other safeguards it could never be secure. Without force universal law is in danger of being dethroned, though force alone can never keep law in its throne. The limits to the social efficiency of force are very decided, and within these limits it is normally effective because it is conjoined with profounder expressions of the human will.

The nature of these limitations appears when we examine the peculiar character of physical enforcement. In the first place, the intervention of force substitutes a mechanical for a social relationship. In so far as force is employed it is the denial of the possibility of co-operation. It treats the human being as though he were merely a physical object. So far as it reaches it admits no expression of human impulses on the part of those against whom it is wielded. It is the end of mutuality and consequently it narrows also to a minimum the expression of the nature of those who wield it. In the second place, its exercise, wherever there is an alternative open, is a wasteful operation, for it checks all the ordinary processes of life, all the give-and-take of common living: and the more it is used the more does it breed resistance, thus necessitating still more enforcement. Consequently any system that depends mainly on force is in a precarious position, for in the tides of chance and change this resistance is apt to find some opportunity to overthrow it. It is an historical commonplace that empires based on force do not endure, that whatever lives by the sword also falls by the sword. In his later days Napoleon, the greatest wielder of force in the modern world, declared: "Do you know what amazes me more than all else? The impotence of force to organize anything."

The limits of the efficacy of force are best revealed if we consider its operation in those regions where men have placed most reliance upon it. "If you wish peace prepare for war," is an old aphorism which states have faithfully followed to the present day, in spite of the countless historical evidences that in international relations preparation for war has begotten war. In the light of this experience it would seem expedient to abandon the paradox and accept the more logical alternative, "If you wish peace prepare for peace". One essential difference between the two methods is that war is 'prepared for' nationally while peace requires an international preparation. The reason for the failure of the older method, in so far as peace and security have been its object, is very obvious, depending as it does on another of the peculiar characteristics of force. Force is effective in so far as there is no opposing force, in other words in so far as it is centralized and monopolized. If the United States were forty-eight independent states there would be a vastly greater display of force within its area than there is to-day, and the greater force would be vastly less effective. Where force is least obtrusive, least in evidence, it is always most successful. It may be said that there is force behind the police who regulate traffic, but they scarcely need to use it. If it were necessary to have machine-guns at the intersections it would show that traffic control was highly precarious. The greater the show of force the greater the instability. So long as the nations 'prepare for' peace by the display of force, international peace must remain insecure.

Let us turn to another region where reliance on force alone is shown by experience to have been unjustified. It is a well-worn doctrine that the laws of the state are obeyed mainly because of the force behind them, that they would be vain formulae, in the language of Hobbes, "without the terror of some Power, to cause them to be observed." We have already pointed out that the backing of enforcement is necessary to political law, but it by no means follows that the mainspring of obedience is submission to force or fear of punishment. There are other sources of law-abidingness than such motives. There is the conviction, which many must share, that the law is right or

just. There is the still more important conviction that, even where the particular law is not approved, it is right to obey the law. There are social sanctions which are often more imperative than the sanction of punishment, the fear of public opinion or the desire to stand well with it. There is the sheer habit of obedience. There may be a feeling that law has a certain majesty and authority which impresses the mind apart altogether from the fear of individual consequences. It was such motives which largely inspired the obedience to customary law, the predecessor of the modern code. It is on such motives that one form of the law of the state, its constitutional code, mainly depends to-day. These considerations lead back to the essential fact which controverts the argument of those whose chief appeal is to force. It is that in the last resort the force behind the law—and this holds not only of democracies but even of despotisms provided that they are not imposed by a foreign power—is that of the population who are subject to it. If the will to obey is undermined in the people as a whole, no enforcement, as many a revolution has shown, can prevail. The remedy of more enforcement, of Draconian penalties, has not stood the test under such circumstances. We cannot pause here to give the lengthy evidence on this subject, but one modern illustration of it may be offered. There is conclusive proof that no law can be enforced if a very large *minority* is permanently or bitterly opposed to it. This has been the situation in modern states in respect of anti-strike legislation, and there is practically no instance in which a state, whether it be New Zealand, Australia, Kansas, or Canada, has been able, where this attitude has developed, to enforce the penalties attached to such a law.

Lastly, let us examine the rôle of force not as a deterrent of law-breaking but as a punishment of the law-breaker. If, as criminologists everywhere agree, the fear of punishment is a very inadequate preventive of crime, what of the fact of punishment as a method of treatment of the criminal? Until very recent times it was generally taken for granted that the sheer discipline of enforcement, often taking the form of harsh or cruel treatment, was sufficient. The principle of punishment

was confused by atavistic ideas of retribution, revenge, and expiation, whereas it would surely seem that the only proper consideration of the state in inflicting punishment is the well-being of society, as that well-being is affected by the manner in which the criminal, himself a member of the community, is treated by it. Certainly, as this principle has grown more clear, the reliance on force alone has been rendered more and more dubious. Mere force, being the mechanical treatment of human beings, seems very ill-adapted to be a means of reform and thus, in the long run, of the prevention of crime. Many instances could be cited where it proved to have the opposite effect. Moreover it is a peculiarly inflexible mode of treatment. As one keen student of the subject has aptly observed, the judge has been with respect to the offender in a somewhat analogous position to that of a physician who could dispense to his patients, no matter what their trouble, only one or other of three drugs, say quinine, nux vomica, and strychnine.[12] So the court, in dealing with the endlessly variant cases which came before it, could mete out only fine, imprisonment, or death. Whether the offender were juvenile or adult, man or woman, weak-minded or strong-minded, passionate or calculating, sensitive or insensitive; whether the offense were motivated by despair or repression or poverty or by sheer ill-will or greed; whatever its antecedents, whatever the context of the crime or the environment of the criminal; the court could do nothing but prescribe some measure of its violent 'drugs'. The growing movement for a more scientific administration of justice and a more understanding treatment of the various types of offender—of which the introduction of reformatories, institutions for first offenders, psychopathic hospitals, industrial schools and farm-colonies, parole systems, juvenile courts, is just a beginning—witnesses to the breaking down of one of the last and most terrible strongholds of the faith in sheer unadulterated force.

We have touched thus briefly on three very great social problems simply in order to suggest that social experience, as

[12] This statement is paraphrased from an address delivered to the Social Science Research Council, at Hanover, N.H., August 26th, 1927, by Dr. William A. White of the Government Hospital, Washington, D.C.

it grows, heavily discounts the service, in any sphere, of enforcement. We have shown that mere force is necessary as the guarantee of political law, but that, even where this necessity exists, its service is best rendered under conditions which admit the minimum of its exercise and display. We have seen that a relationship determined by force is the very antithesis of a social relationship, and that therefore its function can go no further than to preserve social relationships against anti-social tendencies. Where a common rule is deemed necessary or advantageous for the common good, some degree of compulsion is involved, but the compulsion is always a cost which must be reckoned in deciding whether the common rule is necessary or advantageous. Society does not need common rules for everything. Fortunately, for the more intimate or personal aspects of conduct it scarcely needs common rules at all. People cannot run factories or banks as they please, because if they did so, they would place other people directly at their mercy; but they can hold different religions, express different opinions, cherish different tastes without preventing others from exercising the same prerogatives. In the light of what has already been said regarding the interaction of individuality and society we can now add that compulsion is dangerous and usually harmful when applied to matters in respect of which the pursuit by each of his own way does not directly interfere with the equal opportunity of the rest to pursue *their* own ways. This broad conclusion does not solve many of the practical problems regarding the intervention of society but it is useful as a limiting principle. It offers a justification of the more fundamental liberties, above all the liberty of thought and of its expression. This is a liberty which all can equally possess within a social order. If society were to restrict it only in the border-line case where it demanded the suppression of the like liberty in others, the seeming exception would be merely the establishment of the rule. Since this liberty is vastly more important for the fulfilment of individuality, as Mill and many others have shown, than those external liberties which some cannot exercise except at the expense of others, we see here once again the fundamental harmony of individual-

ity and society. The presence of compulsion, if limited to the service we have already described, is quite compatible with this principle, since force, so limited, assures more numerous or more fundamental liberties than it restricts.

When pushed beyond these limits force strikes at the social bond itself. For it then divides man from man, turning co-operation into slavery and making it harder for the group to feel its community, to share a common loyalty so that each, in thinking of the rest, can say 'we' instead of 'I'. When governments, inspired by one of the greatest dividing influences in human history, dogmatic religion, excluded 'heretics' from social or political rights, they did not heal the 'heresy' but they cleft society asunder. When they ceased to take cognizance of religious differences, they made possible a degree of national solidarity unrealized before. "The historical experience of the nineteenth century," says one of the finest exponents of the subject, "shows that freedom has the force of a bond, capable of holding men together in associations the more lasting and fertile according as they are more spontaneous in their origin and autonomous in their choice of ends." [13]

Finally, when pushed beyond these limits force strikes at the creative principle which gives vitality and renewal to society. Different types of personality have different points of resistance to social pressure and the demand for conformity. There is much biographical evidence to show that such pressure is felt most keenly and most quickly resisted by the creative spirits among a people, its artists and its prophets. There is much historical evidence to show, from the days of Socrates or of Christ to the time of the Great War and its subsequent dictatorships, that it is on such creative spirits that force, when given free rein, most heavily descends. Unfortunately, it is hard for the common man, but impossible for the tyrant, to distinguish between the creative and the criminal mind. Only when force is limited so that it becomes the servant of fundamental liberties can those who bear the greatest gifts for society be free to offer them. Only then can the *potential* harmony of individuality and society be most fully achieved.

[13] De Ruggiero, *History of European Liberalism* (Eng. tr., London, 1927), p. 353.

CHAPTER THREE

PSYCHOLOGICAL FOREWORD: ATTITUDES AND INTERESTS

It is sometimes claimed for psychology that it is the study or science of behavior. By this definition all the social sciences would be branches of psychology. We cannot study the behavior of men except by studying the myriad situations in which their behavior is manifested. The difference between psychology and sociology is therefore not the possession by either of a separate field for investigation. They are severally interested in different aspects of an indivisible reality. Each selects for study an aspect of the totality of life; each, in other words, abstracts, as all sciences must do. Psychology is interested in the nature of the behaving unit, in the structure of the individual mind which makes behavior possible. Sociology is interested in the relations into which the individual enters, into which it is in fact his nature to enter. Since neither aspect is separable in reality, neither can be understood apart from the other. We are *also* students of psychology when we study society; we are no less students of sociology when we study the mentality of the human being. In the last resort the difference depends on the focus of our interest.

Social relations we have distinguished from all others in as much as they involve and arise out of mutual awareness. They are expressions of psychical activity, and their peculiar quality derives from the character of consciousness. What the sociologist is interested in is pre-eminently the way in which beings endowed with consciousness act in relation to one another. Beyond or beneath that consciousness there lie realms of being which other scientists seek to explore, but it is on the level of that consciousness that the sociologist pursues his quest. He is not directly concerned with the psycho-neural conditions of behavior, with the physiology of sensation or perception, with the biological processes of inheritance, with

the functioning of the glands, and so forth, except in so far as they may throw light on his own distinctive problems. He is not directly concerned with those organic activities and responses, such as reflexes and tropisms, which are not directed or conditioned by the conscious mind. Although neuromuscular activity is always a concomitant of conscious behavior, although in fact the latter is for us inconceivable apart from the former, it remains gravely doubtful whether a study of physiological structures and processes can help us to interpret or understand the processes of consciousness. A musician does not understand music the better by studying the physiology of the ear and brain, and it is difficult to see how a sociologist can understand society the better by studying neurons and synapses. In this psychological foreword, writing from the standpoint of the sociologist, we shall content ourselves with defining and describing some of the more important aspects of consciousness which manifest themselves directly in social behavior. For our purposes it may suffice—and it is certainly necessary—to distinguish between attitudes, interests, and motivations.

By an attitude we mean a definite state or quality of consciousness, involving a tendency to act in a characteristic way whenever an object or occasion which stimulates it is presented. The attitude is built by experience on the basis of the hereditary constitution of the conscious being. Attitudes are not to be identified with the fundamental drives or propensities of our nature. These original factors are of course revealed in our attitudes, but the attitudes are modes of our consciousness, the range and character of which are constantly being modified by our training, our experience, our health, our circumstances of every sort. They consequently assume variant, complex, individualized forms. When we attribute an attitude to a person, such as love or fear or pity, we do not completely express the state of consciousness so described—the integral attitude is too complex for such summary description. All that we mean is that the attitude-factor so named is dominant or at least recognizable in the subject. Our pity, for example, may contain love and fear as well. The term we apply to a

state of consciousness carries an element of selection and of judgment. The terms themselves shade into one another—consider, for example, the difference between 'respect', 'esteem', and 'admiration'. And the mental realities they denote shade still more subtly into one another, since our names for psychological facts are utterly inadequate, as every novelist knows and every sociologist ought to realize. It is important to insist upon this point, since a contemporary school of psychologists maintain that attitudes can be "measured".[1] They seek to apply mechanical methods of measurement to things whose very nature they fail to understand.

Every social relationship involves an adjustment of attitudes. The respective attitudes may be like or unlike or complementary. Friendliness, for example, may be met by friendliness or by indifference or by enmity. Domination and submissiveness form a pair of complementary attitudes which often appear in social situations. Even when we employ the same term for the attitudes exhibited by each of the related persons, these may have a complementary rather than a like quality. The love of a parent for a child is very different from and is complementary to the love of the child for the parent. It is obvious that while all attitudes possess a social significance some make for solidarity and others are socially disruptive. There are attitudes of attraction and of repulsion, of nearness and of distance, of competition and of co-operation. All such may be regarded as pre-eminently social attitudes, not only because they directly arise out of social situations but also because they are so responsive to suggestion and to education. We find, for example, that certain attitudes characterize whole groups, tribal, local, racial, national, and so forth, towards other groups. These attitudes are sustained and perpetuated within the mores of the groups, being in large part confirmed in each member by the social influences which bear upon him.[2]

For reasons already implied a classification of attitudes is difficult. They are so complex, so blended, so variant, so in-

[1] Cf. Thurstone and Chave, *The Measurement of Attitude* (Chicago, 1929).

[2] Cf., for example, Bruno Lasker, *Race Attitudes in Children* (New York, 1930).

dividualized, that any classification must be, as the logicians say, 'artificial', and no classification can be complete. In other words, our classification must depend on our purpose in making it. In the following classification we are looking at attitudes from a sociological viewpoint, distinguishing them according as they make for or against social solidarity and also according as the relationships they foster imply subordination and superordination, or have no such implication, in the persons respectively maintaining the attitudes. The classification is merely illustrative and is in no sense exhaustive. It will be seen that in each class there belong attitudes which are clearly dissociative, others which are without restriction associative, and others which at once sustain and limit social relationships. Thus in Class I the attitude of veneration is placed, because it implies a sense of inferiority in the subject towards the person venerated, and it is included in the last-mentioned group under that class, because while it sustains one type of social relationship it has a restrictive quality, checking in other directions the expression of the personality of the subject towards the person who evokes the attitude. It should be noted that in this classification we are concerned only with attitudes as directed towards other social beings, not with attitudes as displayed towards external things, towards nature, for example, or towards our possessions, or towards events or actions. We do not include, therefore, such attitudes as courage, hopefulness, remorse, despair, avariciousness, and so forth, though of course such attitudes often arise out of and often affect our attitudes towards persons. Nor do we include what may be called self-directed attitudes, such as complacency.

A CLASSIFICATION OF ATTITUDES

(Attitudes of persons exhibited in relations with other persons)

I. *Attitudes implying some present sense of inferiority in the subject in respect of the object of the attitude*

Dissociative	*Restrictive*	*Associative*
Dread	Awe	Gratitude
Fear	Veneration	Emulation

Dissociative	*Restrictive*	*Associative*
Terror	Worship	Imitativeness [3]
Envy	Devotion	Hero-worship
Bashfulness	Humility	
	Submissiveness [3]	
	Subservience	
	Modesty	
	Snobbishness [4]	

II. *Attitudes implying some present sense of superiority in the subject*

Disgust	Pride	Pity [6]
Abhorrence	Patronage	Protectiveness
Repugnance	Tolerance [5]	
Scorn	Forbearance	
Contempt		
Disdain		
Superciliousness		
Intolerance		
Arrogance		

III. *Attitudes not necessarily implying a difference of plane or status*

Hate	Rivalry	Sympathy
Dislike	Competitiveness	Affection
Aversion	Jealousy [7]	Trust
Distrust		Tenderness
Suspicion		Love
Spitefulness		Friendliness
Malice		Kindliness
Cruelty		Courtesy
		Helpfulness

[3] Imitativeness and submissiveness rather than imitation and submission, since the former are attitudes and the latter processes. But often there is only one term to describe both the attitude and the process.

[4] Snobbishness, looking downward, discourages social relationship; looking upward, seeks to extend it. This attitude is placed in Class I on the assumption that while it involves a sense both of inferiority and of superiority, the former is the stronger element in the complex.

[5] Tolerance not in the sense of open-mindedness, but as the attitude corresponding to the process of toleration.

[6] Pity might seem to fall more appropriately in the restrictive class, but that is because it is so frequently associated with such attitudes as patronage. Pity as such, as for a friend fallen in misfortune, has no such implication.

[7] Jealousy might seem to fall in Class I, since it is so closely associated with a sense of inferiority. But though a sense of inferiority may underlie jealousy it is not necessarily present in the attitude of the jealous person towards the person for whom he has a jealous regard.

A survey of the preceding lists readily suggests how subtly attitudes blend with and shade into one another. Some attitudes seem poles apart, like love and hate, and yet even in respect of these it is a commonplace that they may be combined in one complex attitude towards the same person.

> Odi et amo; quare id faciam fortasse requiris.
> Nescio, sed fieri sentio et excrucior.[8]

Other attitudes are near akin, like awe and veneration or scorn and repugnance, so that the selection of a particular term to express one's own state of mind, and still more to interpret that of others, is at best an approximation, an estimate, a matter of emphasis. We must remember also that the attitude which we seek to fix down by a name is itself variable, like a color seen in a changeful light. This characteristic of the attitude is related to the fact that it always involves a valuation on the part of the subject. It is a way of regarding persons or things, with its own emotional coloring, a way of assessing them in relation to ourselves and ourselves in relation to them. This valuation represents also a tendency to act, a direction of desire with respect to the person or thing or occasion which sustains the attitude.

From attitudes we must now distinguish interests. We spoke of attitudes as states or qualities of consciousness; in other words we defined them wholly in subjective terms. An attitude of course implies objects towards which it is directed, but it is the state of mind, not the object, which is denoted by the term. Take, for example, the attitude of timidity. When we impute timidity to a person we do not thereby convey any reference to the situations in which the attitude is revealed. The timidity may be 'constitutional', a tendency characteristic of the subject in all sorts of situations, or it may be more specific, apt to show itself on particular occasions. In attributing an attitude to a person we are abstracting from the object in the subject-object relationship and focussing attention on the subject. *When on the other hand we abstract*

[8] Catullus, Odes, LXXXV. "I love and hate; if you perchance ask me why, I do not know, but I feel it within me and am in torment."

from the subject and focus attention on the object we should, for the sake of clarity, speak of interests instead of attitudes. A politician, for example, is a focus of interest to many persons whose attitudes towards him are very diverse. We speak, again, of an economic interest, an educational interest, a religious interest, and thereby characterize, not the attitude, but the direction or object of the attitude. Bulls and bears are both interested in the stock-market, but their attitudes are different, and the attitude of the economist or of the banker who is also interested in the market may be quite different again. The same interest may inspire fear or hope or any one of a number of conflicting attitudes in different persons. We define an interest therefore as any object or kind of object which seriously enlists our attention.[9] By object we do not of course mean merely a material or external fact; it is anything, material or immaterial, factual or conceptual, to which we devote our attention. It is the correlative of attitude, in the sense that any actual behavior situation is revealed when we know both the attitude, the subjective aspect, and the interest, the objective aspect. Since in the reality of experience subject and object are never separate we cannot speak of an interest without implying some sort of attitude, and often the very mention of the interest sufficiently indicates the nature of the attitude. An interest in health or recreation, for instance, obviously implies an attitude of attraction towards these objects. But we should not on that account think of an interest as itself an attitude. The burglar, the policeman, the jurist, the respectable citizen, and the reformer, all find an interest in the law, but it is needless to point out that their attitudes are diverse.

Much confusion arises in the treatment of various sociological subjects because of the failure to discriminate by the employment of distinctive terms between the mode of consciousness and the object of consciousness. When, for example, we are dealing with social structures, as in Part Two, we shall find it necessary to lay stress on interests, as above defined.

[9] "Seriously", because some degree of permanence is associated with the term *interest*, just as it is with the term *attitude*.

Attitudes alone, no matter how harmonious, do not create social organizations; they are always built around like or common interests, and so long as a common interest endures they persist in spite of grave conflicts of attitudes. We shall see that the various forms of association correspond to various types of interest.[10] When, on the other hand, we are studying social processes, such as assimilation or accommodation, we shall be more concerned with attitudes and the changes that occur in them.

There remains another psychological term which becomes especially significant when, as in our final Book, we turn to questions of social causation. This is the term *motive* or *motivation.* When we seek to *explain* any social phenomenon whatever, when we ask what moves us to act as we do in any social situation, we must delve beneath the total conscious fact, the attitude or complex of attitudes as related to the interest or complex of interests, in an endeavor to find the effective valuations which inspire our conduct, which subtly change our attitudes and our interests. These operative valuations are our motivations. The quest for motivations is difficult and precarious. What moves one man leaves another unmoved. The motives of conduct are as complex as the personality itself. We tend in retrospect, even in action, to see in them a simplicity which they do not possess. We tend to single out one motive as *the* motive. Moreover, as social beings, we are disposed to select socially esteemed reasons for our conduct and present them to others, and also to ourselves, as the grounds of our action. We form habits of concealing petty and self-seeking motives under high names, like duty and honor and patriotism. We want to appear rational in the sight of others, we want to justify ourselves. Thus we 'rationalize' our conduct, and such rationalization is the more easy and the more convincing—to ourselves at least—because it is always hard to disentangle the valuations which are deeply embedded in our nature. Certain modern historians, such as Beard and Robinson, and certain sociologists, such

[10] A classification of interests and of the correspondent associations will be found in chapter VIII.

as Pareto, have done signal service in seeking to penetrate the façade of rationalization which often hides the moving forces of history and the inner springs of conduct.[11] And the same mission is zestfully popularized by the biographers who in our days rewrite the lives of the great figures of history. Yet such interpretations may be liable to an opposite simplification to that which they attribute, somewhat too sweepingly, to the writers of the past. Men are not single-motived beings, whether the motives we attribute be lofty or petty. "A history of philosophy and theology," says Robinson, "could be written in terms of grouches, wounded pride, and aversions, and it would be far more instructive than the usual treatments of these themes." [12] Perhaps more instructive, but perhaps not more one-sided or misleading. Of all quests none seems more difficult than the adequate understanding of motivation, which is nothing less than the understanding of human nature itself, in its baffling variations and complex reactions—human nature conditioned in each variant human being by the unique series of experiences which are the history of the individual life and yet exhibiting in us all the same common traits of humanity. In this respect however the task of the sociologist is less overwhelming than that of the historian, for his interest is primarily in group phenomena rather than in particular events, and where numbers act in like ways or maintain common institutions the hazard of interpretation is somewhat reduced. But this is a theme which we must postpone till a much later stage of the argument.

[11] Charles A. Beard, *The Economic Basis of Politics* and other works, J. H. Robinson, *The Mind in the Making* (New York, 1921), Vilfredo Pareto, *Traité de Sociologie Générale* (Paris, 1919).

[12] Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

PART TWO
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

(A) ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS

PREFATORY NOTE

In the part that follows we shall be occupied with the description of the structure of society. This structure is for ever changing, and we must therefore limit our attention for the most part to the types of organization which characterize the society of our present western civilization.

The complex pattern of the social structure comprises three broadly distinctive modes of grouping. In the first place there are communities, those areas of social living within which the threads of specific relationships are incessantly spun. In the second place there are the more or less spontaneous configurations responsive to the like and the common interests that develop within the community. These may be enduring—the social classes—or they may be quite transient, such as crowds and other gatherings. They differ from the third type in that they are not formally set up. In the third place there are associations, specific forms of organization deliberately established for more or less specific ends. They are, in short, ways in which like and common interests are expressly formulated and pursued. They constitute the most definite part of the social structure, and they gain in coherence, definition, number, and efficacy as the conditions of society grow more complex. Groupings which, like the neighborhood or the family, had a communal quality in primitive society, tend either to break up into associational units or to assume a distinctly associational character. And there seems to be no limit to the variety of associational forms which can arise out of the matrix of a large community.

If communities and classes reveal more directly social attitudes, associations, being definitely organized, stand in closer relation to social interests. In other words, associations are essentially functional. The different sociological types which they present are thus best understood in the light of their

different functions. A classification of interests therefore provides a basis for the study of associations.

From another aspect associations fall into two great classes, those which are primary, uni-cellular, or 'face-to-face' on the one hand, and those which are complex, multi-cellular, and relatively impersonal on the other. The former re-appear in modified forms as nuclei within the latter, but the great associations, particularly the political and the economic, creating as they do an ever more extensive framework of the whole social structure, tend to become administrative agencies rather than foci for the direct satisfaction of the social nature of man.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE COMMUNITY

1. *The Territorial Basis of the Community*

If we study a population map, whether of a country-side, of a whole country, or of the world itself, we observe that it presents curious configurations, the seemingly irregular massing and thinning of habitation, the nuclei of greatest density shading off into the more sparsely settled areas. We observe that the areas of higher congestion in some degree but by no means wholly correspond with physiographically determined areas. In some regions, such as the prairie plains, it seems geographically accidental that here should be stray farmhouses, here a village, and here a town; and even when we examine the variations in soil conditions or other natural resources and the natural facilities for communication and for the amenities of living some degree of physiographical indifference may remain. In other regions the location of the nuclei is clearly responsive to naturally-determined advantages, apparent in the site of most great cities, for example; though here too the natural advantage has to be understood in the light of the existent state of civilization, and the density of the nucleus as of the surrounding areas may require further explanation in terms of historical process and mere conjuncture. The interpretation of relative densities is an interesting demographical study which does not here concern us. What we see before us in our density map are ranges and types of community.

There are, as Gras points out, areas of scattered homesteads which possess no visible focus, amorphous communities with no communal division of labor and therefore with no centers in which economic and administrative functions inhere.[1] But most communities possess some center of their social activities. In particular, wherever human habitation is congested

[1] N. S. B. Gras, *Introduction to Economic History* (New York, 1922), pp. 50 ff.

in an area too small to contain within itself enough land for its primal needs, there a community center exists, in rudimentary or developed form, since this condition implies exchange and specialization. The center provides some common meeting-place, such as the market square of the small town or the general store of the village. If the community is small the center is undifferentiated: if large, it is of course more elaborate and specialized. In the large city there may be one dominant focus of its pulsing life, but it has also distinctive foci of business, of finance, of retail trade, of recreation, and so forth. The center is itself relative to the community, a market-place may be the center of the town-community, but the town itself is a center for a region and the metropolis for a country. What distinguishes externally the center from the periphery is the fact that there the lines of communication meet. Without communication there can be no community, and the life of the community revolves around the points where communication is most intense.

The relation of a community to communications is manifest in various ways. A community frequently arises at a terminal of transportation, where topographical conditions conspire with economic advantage of other kinds to create a settlement, where a ford, a port, a cross-roads, a railroad junction, a river-mouth, a strategic island, or similar feature presents itself. Its size varies from a village to a metropolis, according to the trading facilities, the economic resources of the region it serves, and the general level of civilization. The large community is both a terminal and a starting-point, but it has in a peculiar degree the aspect of a destination, both in a psychological and in a geographical sense. It is the end of the road more than the beginning, and this fact is often emphasized by its position beside some natural barrier, the sea or a lake or a mountain range, a forest or even a desert. Hence many large communities have hinterlands, regions which, as it were, lie behind them and on which they depend for their economic necessities and the resources of wealth and population which they attract not only by their facilities for trade and finance but also by their opportunities for cultural stim-

ulation and for the more elaborate and exciting forms of living and spending.

In our definition of a community we insisted on its distinctively territorial character. It implies a common soil as well as common living. The relation of communities to the regions in which they appear has in recent sociology been a subject of much interest and of intensive study. The local area is not only the condition of those continuous personal relationships which weld a group together and give it distinctive social form as well as biological unity, it is also a specific common environment with whose peculiar characteristics men in their group life must come to terms and to which they make appropriate responses. Particularly since the time of Le Play with his insistence on the dependence of the family on its work and of its work on the locality, sociologists have sought to relate social differences to regional differences. They have pointed out the significance of such factors as the natural vegetation, the types of soil cultivation and of animal domestication favored by the region, the climatic conditions. They have shown how in primitive life and to some extent in our own the areas of particular culture correspond with geographical areas.[2] They have, especially in America, sought to find a parallel between the relation of variant plants and animals to their respective habitats and that of human groups to their local or regional conditions—terming this procedure the *ecological* approach.[3]

[2] Cf., for example, Clark Wissler, *The Culture-Area Concept in Social Anthropology*, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, May, 1927, and *The Culture-Area Concept as a Research Lead*, *ibid.*, May, 1928. Interesting examples of the 'regional approach' are offered in the publications of the Institute for Research in Social Science of the University of North Carolina and in the issues of SOCIAL FORCES, edited by Professor Howard W. Odum.

[3] For a statement of this approach see R. D. McKenzie, *The Study of Human Ecology*, PROCEEDINGS of the American Sociological Society, Vol. XX pp. 141 ff., and the chapter by the same author, entitled *The Ecological Approach to the Study of the Human Community*, in Park and Burgess, *The City* ch. III. Statements of the 'ecological approach' sometimes fail to bring out the point that the process by which a group, as each younger generation grows up, accommodates itself to itself, in the continuity of present and past, is different from the process by which it adjusts itself, at any given time, to the external environment.

But we must be careful to avoid the assumption that there is any full correspondence between the process of physical adaptation in vegetative life and the vastly more complex process of social differentiation in terms of locality. The group adapts itself, as we shall see later, to a manifold environment of which the physical locality is but one element. The group creates, for all its members, an environment of its own. There are very significant differences, both obvious and subtle ones, between the groups living in different territories, but we must never assume that the differences can be explained solely in terms of the physical environment. Many factors combine to bring a group together and to hold it together in a given area, and it is exceedingly difficult to isolate the influence of any one of these, since they are all interactive in determining its social character. If we take the simplest community, the neighborhood, understanding by that term the "first grouping beyond the family which has social significance and which is conscious of some local unity", we find that already a variety of factors are interwoven conditions of its solidarity, "such as topography and original vegetation, nationality bonds, religious purpose, the migration from a common place of residence and economic and social purposes."[4] The relative importance of these factors, once the group is formed, is always changing. Some factors grow more prominent, such as, in certain groups studied by Kolb, the educational and the religious, others dwindle, such as the kinship consciousness. Shifting of population, changes in communication and transportation, changes in leadership, rising or declining economic opportunities, the impact of new influences from without—these and other forces are always at work. We should therefore, while insisting on the importance of locality as a basis of study, be careful to avoid the assumption that the basis of study is also the basis of interpretation. The need for this caution will be more fully revealed when we come to the chapters on environment.

[4] J. H. Kolb, *Rural Primary Groups*, in Research Bulletin 51, Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Wisconsin.

2. *The Psychical Basis of the Community*

Wherever human beings are thrown together, separated in whole or in part from the world outside so that for the time they must live their lives in one another's company, as on a long voyage or in a camp, we can observe the stirring of those primal social impulses which bring men all over the earth into communities. A present-day novelist thus describes the process which occurs among the passengers on ship-board. "Every slightest action betrayed their inordinate consciousness of one another. Those who walked, walked either more emphatically than was their wont, or more sheepishly, aware of the scrutiny, more or less veiled, of the row of sitters. Those who sat in deck-chairs were conscious of their extended feet, their plaid rugs and shawls, and the slight physical and moral discomfort of having to look 'up' at the walkers. The extraordinary feeling of kinship, of unity, of a solidarity far closer and more binding than that of nations or cities or villages, was swiftly uniting them; the ship was making them a community." [5] In this nascent but short-lived community smaller groups quickly form, the like draws to the like, degrees of nearness and of distance are established, but over all there is this sense of participation in a common life.

In the more permanent communities of everyday life the same influences work more profoundly, rooted in the historical conditions which have created the spiritual or cultural possessions of every territorial group. The land they occupy together is for them much more than a portion of the earth's surface—it is their greater home, enriched by past association and present experience. The sense of what they have in common—memories and traditions, customs and institutions—informs and defines the general impulse of men to live together, establishing the community sentiment. The community becomes the permanent background of their lives, the projection of their individualities. Other attachments may be more intense, but no other is so broad-based as that which binds men to their community. It is developed by education, working through

[5] Conrad Aiken, *Blue Voyage*, ch. II. The author may have exaggerated the intensity of community sentiment created in these circumstances.

prescription and authority, social esteem or disfavor, until habits and conformities become the ground of loyalties and convictions. No living being can grow up within a community —except congenital idiots incapable of experience—without having this sense of community impressed in the depths of his nature, until it is no longer an outer compulsion but an inner necessity, within which he must find the liberty of his being. Even if he revolts against some of its codes, he still belongs in his heart to some community. For on a social heredity has been impressed a socializing experience which from its ceaseless impact has determined that profound and ineluctable set of the individual heart and will which we call the sense of community.

It must not be assumed that in so characterizing the community sentiment we are implying that it is altruistic or other-regarding. Such terms, like their contraries, *egoistic* or *self-regarding*, are misleading as applied to any kind of group-attachment. Self-interest and unselfishness are motivations, group-attachments are attitudes, and we have already pointed out the danger of confusing the two.[6] We may seek to analyze the community sentiment and discover within it various elements subtly compounded. We may distinguish, for example, the following. (1) There is the sense of communion itself, of collective participation in an indivisible unity, the feeling that makes men identify themselves with others so that when they say 'we' there is no thought of distinction and when they say 'ours' there is no thought of division. This "we-sentiment," to use Oppenheimer's expression, is found wherever men have a common interest, but it takes profounder character where the interest is the commonweal itself.[7] It is the sentiment which swells most strongly when the commonweal is threatened, so that men are ready to sacrifice all their private interests in order to save it. Yet even here, even in the white heat of such devotion, we should be cautious in using

[6] See ch. III.

[7] Oppenheimer, *Allgemeine Soziologie*, Vol. I, p. 295. Oppenheimer uses the term *we-interest* (*Wir-interesse*) but in accordance with our usage we are here dealing with the attitude rather than the interest aspect.

the ethical judgment which distinguishes between self-interest and altruism. It is rather that the interest of the individual is identified with or merged in the larger interest of the group, so that he feels indissolubly bound up with it, so that in his thought the community is "bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh." (2) Another ingredient in the community sentiment is the sense of place and station, so that each feels he has a rôle to play, his own part and duty to fulfil in the reciprocal exchanges of the social scene. This feeling, involving subordination to the whole on the part of the individual, is obviously fostered by training and habituation in the daily discipline of life, and thus wrought into character it expands until in some degree it expresses the mode in which the individual normally realizes his membership within the whole community. There are, it is true, other and narrower attachments, such as those of class or economic interest, which are apt to conflict with it. (3) Closely associated with this feeling there is the individual's sense of dependence, which makes him cling to the community as a necessary condition of his own life, a physical dependence, since all his material wants are satisfied within it, and a spiritual dependence, since it is his greater home, the nearer world which sustains his spirit, which embodies all that is familiar at least, if not all that is congenial to his life, his refuge from all the phantasms of solitude and from the spiritual fears that in his individual insulation lie all around the adventure of living.

These and other strands of feeling are woven into the community sentiment, but to analyze it further would carry us into social-psychological discussions that lie beyond the range of this volume. We can only point out its generic quality. In all its variations it has this in common, that it is an attachment directed towards the inextricable unity, for the minds of those who feel it, of the place and the group. It is no simple bond. We should not think, for example, of mere kinship as the condition of coherence in a primitive group. It is the kin as occupying a terrain, and without this qualification we can understand neither the nature nor the limits of the attachment. This point is well brought out in Lowie's little book,

The Origin of the State.[8] He points out that among various primitive peoples in the administration of justice and the prevention of internecine strife the principle of the territorial unity of the group is at work. "Not only do local ties coexist with those of blood kinship, but it may be contended that the bond of relationship when defined in sociological rather than biological terms is itself in no small part a derivative of local contiguity."

Common living on a common soil engenders distinctive likenesses in the members of a group, and the recognition of these in turn reinforces the community sentiment. They are revealed in the peculiarities of speech which characterize different regions—for the genius of the spoken tongue is perhaps the most subtle index of the character of a group. They are revealed in their peculiar beliefs and superstitions, their folk-tales and myths, their local habits and customs. The members feel their nearness, psychical as well as physical, to one another, and this is witnessed to by their love of gossip concerning their neighbors, which in our days often supports and is supported by a local press, by their belief in the excellence of local products, and by their pride in the success or prestige, particularly outside the community, of a community member. These attitudes do not necessarily imply that the members of a community feel a strong devotion to one another —gossip, for example, has often a spice of maliciousness, and men often condemn conduct in their neighbors which they would condone in strangers. Rather they reveal that the members of a community feel a peculiar interest in one another, that they contrast themselves with the members of other communities, and that they appreciate more vividly and with a warmer imagination what anyone in their own group does or suffers.

We have seen that there are many ranges and degrees of community in the modern world. For the civilized man there is thus not one but various communal attachments, and each tends to limit the other and to modify its nature, perhaps also to reduce its intensity. Moreover, the development of special-

[8] Cf. Lowie, *op. cit.*, ch. IV.

ization has transferred to associational groups some part of the alliance that formerly was bestowed on the local community. Under these conditions civilized man, seeking for unity in his social life, has tended to find it in the sentiment of nationality. This relatively modern form of community sentiment is of such importance for the understanding of the social structure and raises such problems concerning its future development that we must examine it more closely.

3. *Nationality as a Type of Community Sentiment*

In the world of our present-day civilization the nation is the largest effective community. By this we mean that the nation is the largest group which is permeated by the consciousness of comprehensive solidarity. There are interests which extend far beyond national frontiers, there are international associations of many kinds. But there is as yet no international community in any effective degree. The expansion of community has so far not prevailed against the barriers of the state. But the nation itself has all the earmarks of a community. This becomes clear if we examine the nature of the sentiment which animates it. For nationality implies that those who share a common territory share also the other attributes of people who live together.[9] Hence it does not depend on any specific common possession, whether speech or race or religion or physical type or even history. The Swiss are a nation but they have no common speech. Race, for groups on the scale of a nation, is never an exclusive common possession, and even the sense of common race, delusive as it is, is a bond of union which many strong nations do not need. The Americans are a nation, though they are so obviously composed of the children of many races. What conditions then does the sentiment of nationality demand? What differentiates it from the felt unity of the tribe or of the village? We find the answer in the relation of the nation to the state, which has developed in the history of nation-making. There are nations

[9] We are not of course using the term *nationality* in its juristic sense, as the status of citizenship. Nor are we using it substantively, as is sometimes done, to mean a group with national aspirations which has not attained statehood.

which do not rule themselves politically, but we call them nations only if they seek for political autonomy. This is the only criterion which enables us to distinguish the nation from other groups. The Jews, for instance, are a race-conscious people, but we would not apply to them the term *nation*. So we define nationality as a type of community sentiment, a sense of belonging together, created by historical circumstances and supported by common spiritual possessions, *of such an extent and so strong that those who feel it desire to have a common government peculiarly or exclusively their own*. It will be seen that we are defining the nation in terms of the sentiment which the members share. In this too it resembles other types of community. For while common territory and common living are the conditions of any community, they do not of themselves demarcate it—how much common territory, we might ask, how much common living? Just so much, our answer must be, as actually inspires the sentiment. As Oppenheimer says, "the consciousness of nationality makes the nation and not the nation the consciousness of nationality."[10] Communities, for all their external marks, are not objective things, they are spiritual realities. The limits of community are psychological limits and its expansion, in a world provided with the physical means of communication, is an expansion of attitudes.

A nation, so defined, is obviously distinct from a race. A race is often thought of as a group biologically different because representing a common and distinctive heredity. But strictly there are no pure races in this sense. What we can discover are characteristic physical types prevailing in some region of considerable size. We may call these types races, but we cannot regard them as the product of an exclusive heredity, since some inmixture of outside stocks is found in every large group and since the physical type itself has environmental determinants and is certainly subject to environ-

[10] *Allgemeine Soziologie*, Vol. II, p. 644. Cf. Ramsay Muir, *Nationalism and Internationalism* (London, 1916), ch. II: "In the last resort, we can only say that a nation is a nation because its members passionately and unanimously believe it to be so."

mental selection. Much nonsense, inspired by group egoisms, has been written on races and race qualities, as though races were pure biological categories uninfluenced by environment and underived from the intermixture of diverse elements.[11] Even the classification of races, alpine, nordic, and so forth, involves serious difficulties, and the races so distinguished are not found as integral social groups. It is only when we find marked social barriers between human types exhibiting physical differences, in other words where on a basis of physical differences reinforced by social-historical discrimination race-consciousness develops, that the tendency to intermixture is checked, and the discriminated groups stand out as races. This has determined the distinctiveness of the Jewish race, and is obviously at work in maintaining the broad color-divisions of humanity.

Having defined the nation and the corporate sentiment of nationality we can now proceed to note the peculiarities of that sentiment. Like all communal sentiments—as contrasted, for example, with class-consciousness—it is essentially democratic. In other words, it admits no grades, no hierarchy of membership. It does not exclude the poor or uncultured, it does not distinguish between the high-born and the low-born, the intelligent and the stupid. But on the scale of the nation community sentiment must be reconciled with the fact that millions of people of every estate are equally entitled to share it and together constitute the object to which it is devoted. On such a scale it is hard to find like qualities characteristic of the group as a whole, such as might form a definite ground for the sentiment. There are indeed typical expressions of the character of a nation, revealed in art, literature, and historical event. But they are elusive, subtle, and variable, and most attempts to state them exhibit the uncritical egoism of the

[11] As a corrective to those popular and quasi-scientific representations see, for example, F. H. Hankins, *The Racial Basis of Civilization* (New York, 1926); F. Hertz, *Race and Civilization* (New York, 1928). F. Boas, in his study, *Changes in Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants* (Washington, 1911), presented evidence that even in a single generation environmental conditions may modify the physical type, and though these findings have been questioned, his evidences have not been disproved.

devotee who in exalting his own nation disparages the rest. On the other hand, most concrete representations of the national type are exaggerations or caricatures, such as the figures of John Bull or Uncle Sam. The Latin is thought of as logical and volatile, the Englishman as stolid and unemotional and a lover of sport, the Teuton as heavy and disciplined and thorough, the American as standardized, mechanistic, and engrossed in the pursuit of the dollar—though closer acquaintance in every case reveals the countless exceptions to the popular rule. The sentiment seeks higher ground in admiration of the cultural, economic, and political achievements of the group taken as a whole, but these achievements are the creation of the few, and the glory they reflect on the many who make the nation is of dubious validity. For lack of a specific object the sentiment is apt to take a traditional or mystical form, as seen in the adoration of the flag or other national symbol. It is difficult for the average man to grasp the content of the nation-idea, and therefore men are readily susceptible, especially in a crisis, to propagandist teaching. This is very obvious in time of war, when even the most cultured and the most scientifically trained are swayed by utterly misleading ideas about their own and other nations. The nation-sentiment has thus distinct affinities with the crowd spirit later to be described. It exhibits, in time of crisis, a characteristic emotional tone, the enlarged egoism, the irrational love and hate, the de-individualizing sense of absorption, and the thrill of a vaguely conceived common purpose which are the universally recognized attributes of the crowd.

The sentiment of nationality consequently expresses itself in very diverse ways. In one form it coheres about the idea of the fatherland or the homeland, and when this thought inspires altruistic devotion it is properly named patriotism. The profession of patriotism may indeed be and often is a cloak for selfish interest or narrow conservatism or class pride or the hatred of other nations, but in itself patriotism is a deep communal emotion, capable of inspiring the most devoted and disinterested service, in peace no less than in war. In another form the sentiment of nationality turns into nationalism, an

attitude of profound import for good and for evil in the modern world. Nationalism is the spirit which seeks to make the nation an effective unity. At one level it demands the unity and integrity of the nation, its political autonomy, its liberation from the dominion of alien powers. At this level it has been a powerful influence in the break-up of feudalism and in the making of modern territorial states. It has prepared the way for our modern democracies, since the demand for self-government expands into the demand that the nation really govern itself. Having assaulted the feudal dynastic order it assaults in turn the state which stands for a ruling class instead of for the nation itself. The spirit of nationalism has broadened the basis of the state. But nationalism, having achieved this goal, tends, like every other sentiment of solidarity, to become exclusive, and here its great danger lies, since the agency of exclusiveness is the armed might of the state. It serves well as a source of unity and harmony within the state, but it is dangerous when it denies the common interest that binds nation to nation, thereby defeating the true national interest itself. In this form it becomes chauvinism, which is intolerant and boastful, or imperialism, which seeks economic or political domination over others. The true service of nationality is as a basis for the pursuit of common interests, not as a line of demarcation cutting off the interests of one nation from those of another.

The spirit of nationality may therefore express a splendid ideal of unity or else be a curse and a sword of division. For this reason it has been as much denounced by some as it has been extolled by others. The prophets of nationality, like Mazzini, have regarded it as the very breath of life stirring in a people, while Lord Acton, representing the opposite view, declared it an evil thing whose course "will be marked by material and moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over . . . the interests of mankind." [12] It is easy to find justification for either view, as we look either on the constructive or the destructive work of nationalism. Nationality has a high principle so long as the nation is itself in the making,

[12] *History of Freedom and Other Essays* (London, 1907).

and so far as, once the nation is born, it makes for harmony within it. But it is too easily turned into the fear and hate and contempt of other nations, too often made the specious cloak of selfish economic exploitation and political aggrandisement, too readily inflated with the pride and vainglory of the mob. In the modern world, as a limit to the range of community, nationalism is disastrous. It was in Europe that nationalism first became a potent force, but in Europe to-day we best see its evil aspects, not only in the smaller nations of the east but also in the great nations of the west. For its dividing walls disrupt the economic interest which they might share, and foster the deadly mutual distrust which leads to war. Western Europe exhibits the menace of opposing nationalisms to the unity or even the maintenance of civilization, while Eastern Europe presents the pathetic spectacle of small self-defeating nationalisms with their dreams of enclosed greatness, prevented from any hope of realization just because they are enclosed. Nationalism in these forms prevents the understanding of one nation by another and in its separatism it distorts all social values, creating false views of the condition on which alike economic wealth and social welfare depend.

Yet on the other hand nationality itself is the condition of that further advance to internationalism which its extremist forms prevent. The extension of effective community beyond the limits of the state has for its prerequisite a system of nation-states. Imperialism that denies the rights of nations to autonomy can never establish an enduring order. World order can exist only as inclusive empire, like that of Rome, a system always precarious and incomplete and now wholly ruled out by the growth of nationality, or as an equilibrium of powers, a system essentially unstable, or as the corporate union of nations, true communities organized as states, owning their own autonomy while nevertheless they constitute together a greater system. Sheer detachment is alien to the realities of interdependence. In nature every system is part of a larger system, and so must it finally be in the affairs of men. But the unity cannot be secure unless the units, the component parts, are themselves real units. The growth of nationality has

prepared the units. They rest on the conviction of each nation that each is a true community. It is this conviction which has brought Norway and Sweden, Belgium and Holland, Greece and Italy, and more recently the nations of Eastern Europe, into autonomous being as national entities. The process has meant and still means a serious disturbance of the former equilibrium; it is beset with grave practical difficulties. But the spirit of nationality which destroyed the old system can, if its limits are realized, and can alone, create an order in which the various nations are incorporated. What needs to be stressed, once the demand of nationality is approximately satisfied, is the further demand of civilization. The practical necessities are more urgent than the practical difficulties. Civilization makes the world one, and our sentiments must ultimately adjust themselves to the facts. Traditional loyalties and traditional hates are resistant, but the lessons of experience may here as elsewhere be learned in time. The process which has extended the community from the village to the nation cannot stop at that limit, for both the material and the spiritual well-being of men are irrevocably bound up with its further extension.

There are indeed serious obstacles to the establishment of an international order in which national communities will be effectively united, but the most serious is the atmosphere of emotional prejudice, the product of excessive nationalism abetted by the narrower interests of various economic groups, which beclouds the problems of international organization and prevents the application to them of scientific statesmanship. The nations are slow to realize the necessities imposed upon them by the growth of a world civilization. The expansion of civilization seems an irresistible process, an inevitable consequence of physical science. Social science, which, unlike physical science, must be the possession of the many if its fruits are to be attained, lags behind. The East, once thought so impermeable to such influences, is taking over the civilization of the West. Japan has done so already. China, which at first had merely suffered from its alien impacts is beginning to do so in the very attempt to rescue herself from internal

nisery and external exploitation. India is learning from the Vest more lessons than the West wanted to teach. Turkey liscards the insignia of her aloofness, the fez and the veil, and ollows the economic and political pathways of the West. Russia, converted to an anti-capitalist faith, only the more agerly develops a program of western industrialization. Industry and capital, whether under the banner of socialism or of individualism, are making the world one civilization.[13] The ime is at hand when we shall learn whether, as many suspect, ulture is in the long run more responsive to civilization than o race or to geography. In so far as it is true—and that it is rue in part the Industrial Revolution has made obvious—he world is being prepared, at whatever cost, to become one ommunity—one vast community but with myriad differences f smaller communities revealing more subtly and more richly he liberated expressions of the infinite variety of mankind.

4. *Transition to Inter-communal Groups*

Every community is founded on the consciousness of solidarity which pervades its members, but that solidarity always dmits, even in the smallest groups and most obviously in the arger ones, the presence of differences. There are differences which do not disrupt the sense of community; there are others which even support it; there are again others which weaken, hreaten, and may at length destroy it. In the former categories belong functional differences which assign to members recognized and accepted place in the social economy, and ll such class differences as are rooted in a system of authority which holds the minds alike of the subordinated and of the uperior groups. Caste itself, though it prevents the free articipation in the affairs of the community of large sections within it, may, provided it conforms to the beliefs and indoctrinations of the great majority, be a strong social bond. For example, the reverence in which the Brahmin is held by he lower caste orders in India is of vast significance in explaining the cohesion of Indian society. On the other hand, in mobile modern society the differences between political

[13] For the meaning of civilization, as employed here, see ch. XII.

parties, in so far as they are issues determined freely and fully by resort to the vote, are quite compatible with communal solidarity. For the implied agreement that all will accept the majority verdict involves that deeper sense of unity, that loyalty to the whole, which Rousseau named the "general will." This system, unlike the caste-system, allows differences freely to express themselves, but it is practicable only in so far as the differences themselves are held subordinate to a fundamental unity, in so far as they are differences of policy in respect of commonly accepted ends. Given some basic agreement there is room for the play of a thousand minor differences, competitive and other conflicts, which need not and normally do not impair the sentiment of community.

There are other differences which are prejudicial and may even prove fatal to the sentiment of community. In the days of classical Greece it was said that every city was two cities at war with each other, a city of the rich and a city of the poor.[14] Economic disparity may prove a dividing sword, especially when associated with class distinctions which are no longer tolerable to the subject classes. These dissensions are aggravated by conditions involving rapid change when a feeling of the instability of things is combined with a sense of social injustice. And it has often been remarked, since the observation was first made by Thucydides, that the crisis of war precipitates such economic cleavage.[15] Another type of difference which always threatens solidarity is that which is expressed in race-consciousness. For racial antagonisms are bitterly subjective. They are easily inflamed and most apt to blind men to a reasoning consideration of their common interest. Even in long-established communities they not infrequently remain half-submerged, ready to intensify other disturbances, as in the situation of the Swedes and the Finns in Finland or of the Flemish and the Walloons in Belgium. Dif-

[14] Plato, *Republic*, IV, 422.

[15] "In peace and prosperity communities and individuals alike are better disposed, but war is a violent master and assimilates the temper of most men to the existing state of things." Thucydides, III, 82.

ferences of speech, as in the instances just mentioned, tend to perpetuate racial distinctions. So do marked external signs of race—what Park calls "racial visibility." The most conspicuous of these signs is color, and the 'color line' is thus the most formidable barrier to solidarity where groups of different color meet. Another important though diminishing danger to solidarity arises from the contact within a community of different strongly dogmatic religions. "How can we live at peace," said Rousseau, "with those whom we believe to be damned?" In many civilized communities a partial answer has been found to this question, but in others—in India, for example, where Mussulmans and Hindus meet—religious difference is still a grave cause of division.

The three types of difference we have mentioned—economic, racial, and religious—sometimes separately but often combined in various degrees, have been throughout history the great precipitants of civil war and revolution. Such convulsions are relatively rare, but the differences themselves are generally operative to limit or thwart the sentiment of community. Of the three the economic is the most universal breeder of dissension. The conflict of the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' is everywhere latent or active, even under communism. There is no prospect that it will wholly disappear, but its revolutionary forms are the product of sheer destitution or ruthless exploitation, and these conditions at least it is within the power of social intelligence to abolish.

The American continent offers peculiar opportunities for the study of the manner in which the growth of communal solidarity embracing groups of diverse origins and national characteristics is advanced or retarded. Immigrant groups, entering a social environment which at first is alien to them, tend to cherish their old customs and seek, through the establishment of clubs, institutions, newspaper and other agencies of intercommunication, to guard their group traditions and group individuality. By such means they mitigate the abruptness of the transition to the new life, provide themselves with a temporary status and often support a self-respect which the sudden impact of an alien environment might otherwise en-

danger.[16] But gradually, unless strong social discriminations are roused by racial or religious prejudice, these groups become integrated within the larger community. This process will be examined at a later stage. It will suffice here to point out that the principle of communal solidarity does not demand uniformity, the elimination of differences, and least of all is achieved by coercive suppression, as a myriad historical instances, from the fate of the Israelites in Egypt to the subjection of the German-speaking groups in the Austri-Italian Tyrol, sufficiently reveal. What instead is requisite are conditions under which the diverse groups can learn to feel 'at home' in the community, thus spontaneously establishing habituations which assure a sufficient *sense* of familiarity to permit them freely to participate in its life.

A very different and far less soluble problem is presented by the situation arising when groups representing peoples of markedly different cultural levels live together in the same area. One of the broad social tragedies of world history is the destruction of the communal spirit of primitive peoples under the impact of alien civilizations. The civilized people impose upon the primitive their laws and their morals, their industrial methods and their mechanisms, bringing also their unwanted services, their vices, and their diseases, destroying the old habituations and the ancestral customs, sometimes through the misguided zeal of ignorant missionary enterprise but often through the greed of economic exploitation. Thus have the Maoris perished and the Andamanese, thus have the ancient peoples of South America been wiped out, thus have the Fijis and the Hawaiians and many Indian tribes dwindled to insignificance. A few examples of fine restraint relieve the dark picture of communal disintegration presented so frequently in Asia and Africa and Polynesia, but the economic and military

[16] Interesting examples are given in Park and Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted* (New York, 1921) and K. Bercovici, *Around the World in New York* (New York, 1924). The nature of the problem is well revealed in E. S. Bogardus, *Immigration and Race Attitudes* (Boston, 1928). A comprehensive review of the whole subject is offered in Dawson and Gettys, *Introduction to Sociology* (New York, 1929), chs. VIII–XIII, following mainly the treatment of Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago, 1924).

power and the scornful superiority of the civilized peoples have made mutual accommodation difficult and often impossible.[17] In the relationships of civilized and primitive peoples solidarity, in the strict sense, is ruled out, not merely because of differences in power but also because the civilized people have the ever-present and not unreasonable fear that the admission of the native to equal participation in communal rights would lower or imperil their own cultural standards.

Another scarcely less difficult, if less tragic, situation is that of the meeting of alien cultures each of which asserts its own superiority while one is politically dominant over the other. A case in point is that of the British and Indians in India. Certainly Britain could not have maintained so long its now precarious Indian suzerainty if it had not been respectful of the custom, the rule of life, of the politically subject culture. In fact, as Maine pointed out, "a nervous fear of altering native custom has, ever since the terrible event of 1857, taken possession of Indian administrators." [18] But while respect for native usage is the basis of comparative harmony when the subject people is on a distinctly lower cultural level it proves quite inadequate when that people has reached the stage in which nationalism awakens, as the Indian situation has more recently illustrated.

The fuller consideration of these problems is beyond our present scope. What we have sought in general to show is that the solidarity of a community depends not on the absence of differences within it but rather on the absence of certain barriers to the liberation and the consequent modification or adjustment of these differences. In this respect the chief barriers to solidarity would seem to be: (1) the coercion of group by group within the community—this need not be physical coercion but may be social and economic pressure or discrimination directed against politically disfranchized groups, economic

[17] On the problem of accommodation see Bryce, *The Relations of the Advanced and the Backward Races of Mankind* (Oxford, 1902). An example of comparatively successful accommodation is suggested in M. Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa* (New York, 1928).

[18] Sir H. Maine, *Village Communities*. The "terrible event" is of course the Indian Mutiny, which developed out of the infringement of native custom.

classes, racial or religious minorities—and (2) the lack of those free contacts which mitigate both cultural and physical aloofness—cultural aloofness as expressed in the contempt of group for group, a feeling which often means the failure of one to comprehend the life of another, and physical aloofness which prevents the expansion of any community sentiment, as exemplified in certain ethnic blocks of the western prairies and particularly in extreme separatist groups such as the Mennonites, Doukhobors, Hutterites, and similar bodies. Often these settlements have an intensely communal life of their own, but under conditions which prohibit their participation in the wider community.

CHAPTER FIVE

CLASS AND CASTE

1. *The Class Principle*

We pass from the community, viewed as a whole, to the divisions within it. These divisions are primarily social classes, the stratifications of society. They are different from mere associations, in that they are, like the community itself, more or less spontaneous formations expressive of fundamental social attitudes, not simply instrumentalities for the furtherance of particular interests. The class-system, as we shall see, emanates from and profoundly influences the whole mode of life and thought within the community.

But first we must explain the sense in which the term *social class* is here employed. A 'class' may mean any category or type within which individuals or units fall. We may speak, for instance, of bachelors or novel-readers or theater-goers or social reformers as constituting a 'class'. Here we are not dealing with a group, in our sense, at all. We may speak of artists and doctors and engineers as classes. Here we are thinking of occupational categories, but not of coherent groups definitely related to one another in a social structure. These are, to use a common expression, at most 'vertical' divisions of the community, whereas the divisions which are of real moment for the understanding of the class principle are the 'horizontal' divisions, those which involve comparative status, a graded order. Wherever social intercourse is limited by considerations of status, by distinctions between 'higher' and 'lower', there the class principle is at work. We shall then mean by a social class any portion of a community which is marked off from the rest, not by limitations arising out of language, locality, function, or specialization, but primarily by a sense of social distance. Such a subjective character involves also as a rule objective differences, income levels, occupational distinctions

and so forth, within the society. But these differences, apart from a recognized order of superiority and of inferiority, would not establish cohesive groups. It is the sense of status, sustained by economic, political, or ecclesiastical power and by the distinctive modes of life and cultural expressions corresponding to them, which draws class apart from class, gives cohesion to each, and stratifies a whole society.

We have here used the term *status*. It is sometimes applied in a more rigid sense, as involving a predetermined, hereditary, unchangeable rank or station—that which, as we shall presently see, characterizes caste. But it is here used in a broader significance, to connote any social position the mere possession of which assures to the possessor, apart from his personal attributes, a degree of respect, prestige, and influence. Status is seen at its maximum in a caste-system, but it is an ingredient in every social order. A contrast is sometimes drawn between a class order and a functional order. The distinction is seen when we consider the economic or occupational categories of a present-day society. If we take only the broad divisions, such as that between the wage-earning and the professional classes, between the salaried and the *rentier* classes, between employer and employee classes, or even between skilled and unskilled labor, the factor of status is obviously present. But when we subdivide these classes again, our arrangement tends to become functional, and the element of status dwindles and at some points disappears. A good illustration is offered in the elaborate classification adopted in the 1911 Report of the British Registrar General, in which the population is grouped under the following main divisions:

Class I. Capitalists, enterprisers, managers, scientists, artists, professional workers, etc.

Class II. Small shopkeepers, artizans where work contains some element of the artistic and creative, and the lower (operative) ranks of the professional, scientific, and artistic groups. Farmers, i.e. agricultural employers.

Class III. Skilled labor, including transport service, metal trades, building, furnishing, leather, paper trades, etc. Domestic service.

Class IV. Labor requiring a lower grade of skill, where strength is usually essential.

Class V. Unskilled labor. Street traders, etc.

These five categories constitute an economic hierarchy or status-system, but when we turn to their numerous subdivisions there is no longer a definite order and they are arranged on a basis of function, without consideration of status. No doubt the subtler distinctions of social hierarchy can be traced inside the larger classes, say in Class I, with its subdivisions of barristers, solicitors, navy and army officers, physicians, dentists, actors, clergymen of various churches, teachers, and so on. But the sole determinant of the subclassifications has become economic function, whereas in the main groupings it was economic status. It may be noted that the aim of various forms of socialism is to substitute for a social order based largely on status an order in which function shall entirely dominate.

In the classification just given it may be observed that farmers are included under Class II, intermediate in position between the professional class and the class of skilled workers. In a country less industrialized than England the farmers would naturally constitute a whole class by themselves, and they reveal in a very interesting way the nexus between occupation and status. Formerly there were two great classes associated with the soil, the land-owner and the land-cultivator or peasant. Through the introduction of a money economy and other far-reaching social changes, and in North America through the parcelling out of the land into homesteads or small farms, an intermediate class of owner-cultivators rose into prominence. They differ from the 'free' husbandmen and yeomen of earlier days in that they are no longer dominated by a land-owning aristocracy. This difference is accentuated in North America by the greater mobility of the farming class, as witnessed by the fact that in recent years one-tenth of the total farming population has migrated every year to the towns or back to the farms.[1] Thus the land loses its old character as

[1] R. Heberle, *Über die Mobilität in den Vereinigten Staaten* (Jena, 1929), ch. III, § 5.

a family inheritance and becomes more nearly an investment of capital, like any other. These farmers employ few laborers outside of the members of their own families, and their relation to the hired worker, who is often a temporary or occasional helper, is entirely different from that of the landlord to the peasant. In fact the peasant in the old sense has dwindled with the decay of feudalism and in North America is practically non-existent. Consequently the social and economic difference between the owner-farmer and the tenant-farmer has diminished, and the two together form an agricultural class with common interests and common problems, with common characteristics arising from the nature of their occupation, with a more or less common standard of living, and a common class-consciousness. They form a social class as we have defined it, for the factor of status is bound up with their mode of living, their sense of proprietorship, their relatively low and inelastic income, their economic solidarity set over against that of other groups, and their relative, though diminishing, segregation from the cultural influences which play upon urban populations.[2] Here we have in fact the whole complex of factors which is requisite for the constitution of a social class.

The class principle is clearest when status is associated with one controlling factor around which the others cohere. This is witnessed to by the fact that the commonest as well as the oldest social classification is a dichotomous one. Its various forms distinguish the few and the many, the gentry and the commonalty, the privileged and the disprivileged, the free and the servile, the rich and the poor, the ruling class and the ruled, the educated and the uneducated, the productive and the unproductive (or leisure class) and, in Marxist formula, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. A dominant factor is also obviously present in such tri-partite divisions as 'upper', 'middle', and 'lower', or in the feudal distinction of nobility, burgher, and peasant. One of the most interesting examples of a class-system based on a single characteristic, in

[2] For a detailed analysis of the social status of the farmer class see Sorokin and Zimmerman, *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology* (New York, 1929), ch. III.

this instance detached from the other factors usually associated with class, is the reversal of the historical hierarchy by the Soviet state, in the order of the workers and peasants, professional groups, and traders. It may be noted that in the simpler societies the various factors in the class complex cohere more closely, so that the system is more compact and more stratified at the same time; whereas in the mobile capitalistic societies of the modern world they tend to become dissociated, so that class demarcations are blurred. Under the latter conditions wealth takes on a more determinative rôle, and wealth, though in degree associated with mode of living, cultural opportunity, occupational advantage, and political power, is of all attributes the most detachable from personality and from cultural attainment. Particularly in a democracy are the older bulwarks of a class-system undermined, so that whatever cohesion that system still possesses depends mainly on the influence of wealth. The older determinants may still modify or limit it, but they can hardly prevail against it. In America, for example, the descendants of the *Mayflower* or of the Fathers of the Constitution, the established families of New England or of the South, the Colonial Dames or the Daughters of the American Revolution, may assert counterclaims of class distinction, but a study of even the "Social Register" shows with what limited success, particularly outside a few strongholds of old tradition, such as Boston or Richmond. Or a broader class distinction may be asserted in the name of the pride of race, such as that between the West European stocks and the 'new immigration', between the Gentile and the Jew. But these barriers do not create clearly-defined social classes, and in some measure they seem to be transitional lines, becoming less determinative in the degree in which cultural differences between groups are merged in the new environment. Only the racial barrier of color completely resists the triumphant claim of wealth to be at length the chief determinant of class, and this defeat is less decisive because of the general poverty of the colored people.

When wealth is an important class principle, especially in a capitalist system where wealth may be acquired by individual

ingenuity or enterprise or cunning or by the turn of fortune's wheel, classes themselves are less fixed, less cohesive than under other conditions. This fact is seen in the contrast between our own and the feudal class-system. Under the latter status was more rigid, being predetermined by birth. In mediaeval times a man was born to his estate in life, and the chance of a transition to another was small, though possible avenues of advance were provided by the army and the church; to-day his personal aptitudes, and more especially his aptitude for money-making, decide the degree of probability that he—and still more his children—will 'rise in the world'. Opportunity in this regard is still far more limited for the very poor, but it is never wholly closed. This relative fluidity of the modern class-system is correlated with other features of it. In feudal days a different costume marked off the lower classes, different modes of living, of recreation, and so forth. To-day all classes follow the same fashions and all view the same spectacles, plays, and so forth, the difference lying in the expensiveness, and therefore in the relative advantage, of the location. To-day the class-system is a gradient, in feudal times it was a series of disconnected stages.

In a word, the feudal order approximated to a caste-system. When status is wholly predetermined, so that men are born to their lot in life without hope of changing it, then class takes the extreme form of caste. This is the situation in Hindu society. "Every Hindu necessarily belongs to the caste of his parents, and in that caste he inevitably remains. No accumulation of wealth and no exercise of talents can alter his caste status; and marriage outside his caste is prohibited or severely discouraged." [3] Caste is a complete barrier to the mobility of class. In principle it involves an absolute and permanent stratification of the community. The levels or strata are kept apart by the exclusion of the lower from the more intimate forms of social intercourse with the higher, and especially by the ban of intermarriage, by the observances of obeisance due from the lower to the higher, and by the reservation of honor-

[3] *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, 1930 (Cmd. 3568), Vol. I, ch. IV.

able ceremonies, functions, and occupations to the higher while certain despised offices are relegated to the lower. In India, with its multitudinous caste compartments, the higher caste groups, at the top the Brahmin and next in order the Kshatrya and the Vaishya, are thought of as beings of different clay from the low caste group of the Sudras, while beyond these again lie the 'outcasts', the 'untouchables', whose very presence is a defilement to the rest, who pollute food and water by their touch, and who in some regions may not even approach the neighborhood of the high caste Hindu. The idea of defilement is common in every caste-system and it reveals most clearly how caste prevents the common participation of the various groups in the communal life. Sometimes an outcast group is associated with one particular occupation, like the blacksmiths of the Masai tribes.[4] A similar phenomenon appeared in the middle ages, and has left traces even to our own day, in the relegation of money-lending and other financial operations to the Jews.

The rigid demarcation of caste could scarcely be maintained without communal disruption were it not for strong religious persuasions. It is only the hold of religious dogmatism over the mind, with its supernatural explanation of things otherwise unreasonable, with its doctrine of the elect and of the 'pale', with its attribution of a mystic cleanness and uncleanness, with its instillation of reverence and awe, and with its overruling conception of the sacred and the profane, which could maintain a social equilibrium on the disjunctive principle of caste. We know little of the origins of caste. We may conjecture that it arose out of the subjection or enslavement incident to conquest and perhaps also out of the superposition of one endogamous community on another. But the power, prestige, and pride of race thus engendered could give rise to a caste-system, with its social separation of those who are not set apart by clear racial signs, only as the resulting situation was rationalized and eternized by religious myth. As Max Weber observes, caste signifies the enhancement and trans-

[4] Cf. Lowie, *Origins of the State*, ch. II, with quotation on the Masai from M. Merker, *Die Masai*.

formation of social distance into a religious, or more strictly, a magical principle.[5]

2. *Class Attitudes and Class-Consciousness*

We turn to the inner aspect of class, the sentiment which inspires the relations of men towards the members of their own and other classes, establishing that social distance which is the essential feature of class distinction.[6] Class sentiment, as was suggested in the last chapter, exhibits striking contrasts with community sentiment. If the latter admits no grades, the former is founded on the principle of hierarchy. The sentiment of class is above all a sentiment of disparity. It does indeed unite those who feel distinct from other classes, but it unites them primarily because they feel distinct. Above all, it unites the 'superior' against the 'inferior'. It emanates from the belief in superiority, so that class-division is really imposed on the lower by the higher classes. Hence class sentiment involves entirely different attitudes, in respect of one another, of the various groups within the hierarchical system. In so far as tradition rules, the attitude of the lower to the higher is one of respect and subservience, while the higher exhibits condescension and patronage to the lower.[7] Since intermediate classes look both ways, class feeling under such conditions differs most markedly at the two ends of the social scale. If on the other hand tradition weakens and class struggle emerges, the attitudes of the opposing classes, one conservative and striving to maintain, the other radical and striving to overthrow an order, cease to be complementary and become as different as the

[5] *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* (Tübingen, 1923), Vol. II, p. 44.

[6] As P. Sorokin points out (*Social Mobility*, New York, 1927, ch. I) the concept of social distance as applied to class distinctions has nothing to do with personal liking or aversion. A 'gentleman' and his valet may be very fond of one another, but they regard themselves as occupying different stations in life, and the difference controls their relationships. *Social* distance is the bar to free intercourse between individuals which arises from their belonging to groups rated as superior or inferior in status. It is hardly necessary to add that 'superior' and 'inferior' are here used with no implication of differences of character or intellect.

[7] For a fuller list of upward looking and downward looking attitudes see chapter IV.

social values for which they respectively strive. Class sentiment has thus no generic quality comparable with that of community sentiment. Moreover, class sentiment and community sentiment operate to limit and restrain one another. The one divides those whom the other integrates. In less mobile societies communal tradition, religion, custom are so strong and pervasive that the dividing influences of class or caste cannot prevail against them. In more mobile societies the counter-active play of the two types of sentiment is particularly noticeable. For example, the competitive spirit of class expresses itself in the restlessness of fashion as against the stability of custom. This aspect of class sentiment will be more fully discussed when we come to deal with these phenomena.

It is significant also that the sentiment of class may have a wide or a narrow range. We often think of class-consciousness as a sentiment uniting a whole group who occupy a similar social status, but there is a more personal form of class sentiment which frequently determines the conduct of individuals towards one another without involving on their part any express recognition of the whole groups to which they respectively belong. Class feeling in the latter sense is one thing, the feeling of class solidarity or corporate class-consciousness is quite another. When Mr. A blackballs Mr. B from membership in his club, he does not usually think of himself as thereby upholding the standards or the interests of a whole class of Mr. A's; when Mrs. A patronizes Mrs. B or refuses to call on her, she does not on that account feel her solidarity with a whole order of the 'superiors' of Mrs. B. The response is immediate, specific, personalized. This quality of class sentiment is characteristic of the competitive system of modern society rather than of a caste-divided structure. In modern western society class solidarity, as we shall see, arises chiefly under the spur of strong economic incentives, and it is most apt to gain strength at the extreme ends of the economic scale, in the struggle to maintain or to destroy a predetermined status. It is 'Society' on the one hand and the low-paid wage-earning groups on the other who most clearly exhibit class-consciousness in this sense.

The sentiment of class, in fact, takes a different range as well as quality according to the degree in which the element of caste is present. When a man's lot in life is fixed by anterior social conditions, he more readily identifies himself with the whole group of his fellows subject to the same conditions. If the mores of an authoritative religion hold sway, so that the members of the group accept the "duty", in the language of the English Book of Common Prayer, "to order themselves lowly and reverently to all their betters," then the class-consciousness of the subject class is a conservative influence. If the old mores break, as they do in the process of industrialization, then this class-consciousness becomes a powerful engine of social change. In either event the solidarity of class-consciousness depends on the sense of a sharp cleavage and of a barrier under existing conditions insurmountable. The situation is very different where there is 'vertical mobility', more specifically, where the belief prevails, supported by instances, that a higher status may be individually acquired or that a present status may be lost. Such a situation breaks the solidarity at least of the socially subordinate classes. In North America particularly the man in overalls or the clerk has before his eyes the examples of those who from the same station have risen to social power and economic affluence, and the more ambitious and energetic members of these classes are buoyed by the prospects of a like success.[8] Consequently they do not feel that permanence of station which creates solidarity and stimulates class organization. Class sentiment may be even stronger than among groups with rigidly determined status, but it now becomes localized. The class-system is no longer tier above tier, but a continuous incline. Class struggle resolves itself into the ambitious striving of individuals and families to maintain their place and still more to 'rise in the world'. Appearances consequently count for more, since class is judged by external signs. The standards

[8] It is hardly possible to compare the degree of vertical mobility for different times and different countries. Sorokin, *op. cit.*, ch. XVII, compiles some evidences of the greater divergence between the occupation of fathers and sons in western societies, which however is an indication rather than an index of vertical mobility.

and modes of living of the higher prestige groups are imitated by those below them. The phenomena so caustically described by Veblen in his *Theory of the Leisure Class* are in evidence—the emulation, competition, display, and the "conspicuous consumption of valuable goods" which signalize a class order dominated by the principle of wealth.[9] As Veblen himself pointed out, somewhat similar phenomena may be observed in pre-capitalistic societies. The institution of the potlatch characteristic of certain Pacific Coast tribes offers a curious example. The potlatch is a distribution of gifts, by which a man of substance acquires renown within the tribe. The recipients are under customary obligation to return the gift twofold at some later date, and if they cannot they lose prestige. Often the potlatch takes the form of a lavish feast in which a man seeks to outbid his rivals. Sometimes this rivalry is manifested in the deliberate destruction of property. "A chief will burn blankets, a canoe, or break a copper, thus indicating his disregard of the amount of property destroyed." And if his competitor cannot follow suit, "he is vanquished by his rival and his influence with his tribe is lost." [10]

This competitive class spirit is so distinct from corporate class-consciousness that the two are fundamentally antagonistic. The contrast is excellently illustrated by the position taken by Karl Marx and his followers in their endeavor to accentuate in the working classes the consciousness of their corporate unity. While they professed as their final goal the abolition of social classes altogether, their immediate objective was the solidarity and consequent organization of the whole class which they called the proletariat. In seeking it they not only subordinated those sentiments which unite classes, and above all the sentiment of nationality, they also minimized the distinctions that exist within each class. They insisted on the common status, common conditions, common interests,

[9] Thorstein Veblen, *op. cit.* (New York, 1922), ch. IV.

[10] F. Boas, *The Social Organization and the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians* (Washington, 1897), pp. 353 ff. The copper is a copper plate of particular shape which has a conventional value, representing often a large number of blankets. Its sale takes place at festivals, and the value of a copper depends on the amount of property distributed at each festival at which it is sold.

common subjection of one main class, and on its economic, social, and even cultural separation from the other main class, the bourgeoisie. To them the wage-earning class was essentially homogeneous, and the competitive struggle for position between its members was inimical alike to their general interest and to their solidarity. Hence the program summed up in the famous words of the *Communist Manifesto:* "proletarians of the world, unite."

But certainly in the countries of western civilization the Marxist dichotomy is too simple and sweeping to fit the facts of the class-system. So broad a division and so sharp a cleavage is more applicable to a feudal order, such as that of prerevolutionary Russia, than to a complex industrialized society. The Marxist class-philosophy became an historical factor of vast significance, the full outcome of which we cannot foresee, but it became so because it gave a vision and a policy to propertyless and often exploited industrial groups. In Russia, a country industrially undeveloped and lacking the 'middle classes' of industrial and urban civilization, the chaos and disaffection created by a disastrous war and an incompetent autocracy gave to a small group of very remarkable men the opportunity to rebuild a whole vast society on Marxist principles, but even under these conditions it meant and still means the rigorous suppression of the spontaneous forces which in every social order generate major and minor class distinctions. Under the more complex conditions of western society the Marxist system reveals its inadequacy as an interpretation of the social fact. On the one hand there are many influences uniting the classes which this system sets in stark opposition to one another. On the other hand there are many variant and intermediate forms of class sentiment which cannot be fitted into the system.

The cultural resemblances of social classes vary greatly in extent and intensity according to the conditions. We saw, however, that caste itself can exist only on the basis of a common culture in the form of a dominant religion. In the feudal world we can trace the expansion of common thought-forms, such as the official Christian conception of marriage and the

family, over all classes of society. In the modern world the facilities of communication greatly increase the cultural homogeneity of classes. This fact is indicated in a thousand ways. Even when certain cultural influences appear at first in the higher economic classes, such as the influences leading to the decline of the birth-rate, they permeate rather quickly to the lower economic classes.[11] As Ross points out, cultural influences radiate from the prestige groups until the whole society is leavened by them.[12] The attempt therefore of the Marxist advocates to distinguish a bourgeois from a proletarian culture is more in the nature of propagandism than of an objective interpretation.[13]

Moreover, the scheme ignores the class sentiment as well as the social importance of all those who are grouped together as the 'middle classes'. It is an unjustified simplification of the facts to group together, over against the 'proletariat', the classes of officials, the professions, the civil servants, the shopkeepers, the farmers, the technicians, the 'white-collar' groups, as though they exhibited either the solidarity or the mentality of a single great class. It is unjustifiable to think of them all as belonging with the large capitalists and financiers. If they are united, it is only in a negative position, as being generally anti-socialistic, but this is hardly enough to constitute them a social class. They differ widely in their social stations and ambitions. Their economic interests are diverse and often conflicting. Marx, centering his interest in one class, is led to group all the rest of the population as an opposing class, ignoring the fact that they lack the like attributes and the common station which class designates. On the other hand, even his 'proletariat' class exhibits in a complex society such divergence of class attitudes that its unity is doubtful. In America, for example, the class distinction between skilled and unskilled wage-earners is so great as to frustrate the class solidarity which he sought to arouse. In many respects, as the history of the American Federation of Labor has shown,

[11] Cf. ch. XXIII, § 3.

[12] *Social Control* (New York, 1901), ch. XXVI.

[13] I have heard a Marxist exponent refer even to 'bourgeois' astronomy.

the social attitudes of skilled labor resemble those of the *petite bourgeoisie* more nearly than they do those of the lower economic categories of wage-earners. The opposition of the small capitalists to the 'big interests' is another indication that the Marxist classification was too simple and too propagandist. Marx believed in a "law of the accumulation of capital" which would reduce an ever-larger portion of the population to the proletariat class.[14] In other words, he thought of the middle classes as a merely temporary obstacle to his system. But, although he proved right in predicting the tendency towards a greater concentration of the *control* of capital, his prediction regarding the dissipation of the middle classes has not in any degree been confirmed by the course of recent history. The evidences which we possess, in the form of income-tax returns, statistics as to the number of small investors, and so forth, resist any such conclusion.

3. *Class and the Social Structure*

The class-system at any time reflects and also profoundly influences the whole life of a community. Its relation to the whole social structure is apparent if we contrast briefly the character which it assumes in various countries. Thus in the United States we find a lack of formal class distinctions, considerable class mobility, a relative absence of cultural barriers between classes, and on the positive side, a high development of wealth prestige or plutocracy. In England, by contrast, we find still, in spite of the power of wealth on the one hand and of political democracy on the other, deep grooves of class superiority and inferiority, an established, if no longer unchallenged, aristocracy, supported by still prevalent traditions and traditional attitudes, as witnessed by the subservience of many groups towards their social 'betters'. In France, since the Revolution, we find the social dominance of a middle or bourgeois class, with surviving localized aristocracies. In Germany we find the abrupt though long-prepared transition from a feudal, military class structure, the collapse under military defeat of the social prestige of a land-owning aristoc-

[14] *Capital*, Vol. I, Pt. VII, ch. XXV.

racy giving free play to the social ferment of industrialism. In Russia, we find a class-system unparalleled in the history of mankind, a system under which prestige and privilege belong to the proletarian, so that "the very word proletarian is the highest badge of honor in the land." [15] This catalogue, showing the differences of class-system corresponding to general differences in social structures, might be continued indefinitely, but we will conclude it with the remarkable contrast exhibited in this respect by India and China. In India we have a vast society deeply permeated by the immemorial tradition of caste, so that every aspect of life, religion, education, occupation, social intercourse, is governed by its rigid code of distances, even though at length the growth of nationalism is showing some signs of undermining it. In China on the other hand we have the contrary spectacle of another vast society in which class distinctions play a very minor part—so overwhelming has been the value attached to the family as such that loyalty to this organization, at once so universal and so limited, has outweighed other considerations in determining the respect which a man receives from his fellows.

The character of a class-system, whether it be closed and rigid or open and mobile, whether it make birth or wealth or military prowess or occupation or cultural quality the main determinant of social distinction, has a profound influence on modes of living, on the ideals of the group, and on the whole process of social selection. It is obvious, for example, that a caste order discounts intrinsic merits and capacities and by denying opportunities for advancement to those who belong to the lower castes deprives itself of the potential contributions which might emanate from their ranks. We may reasonably infer that in so far as any society limits opportunity to privileged groups within it, that society is needlessly losing the aptitudes and talents which might otherwise be brought to light within the ranks of the unprivileged. The established fact that many more persons of personal distinction and high social achievement arise in the higher income groups in proportion to their numbers, while often used as an argument for

[15] M. Hindus, *Humanity Uprooted* (New York, 1929), ch. XI.

the intrinsic superiority of those groups, might with at least as much logic be made an argument for the expansion of opportunity.[16] A further serious penalty of a system which limits the evocation of intrinsic merit is that it establishes other than merit standards, and therefore false standards, in the privileged class. This penalty attaches not only to the caste-system but also to the competitive plutocratic system. Under the latter not only is a condition peculiarly detachable from personal quality—the amount of one's wealth—made a ground of esteem, but also the keeping up of appearances becomes an end of life. 'Good form', the conventions and shibboleths of the prestige group, is apt to assume an importance superior to character. The gain sought by the social climber is a purely relative one, so that the satisfaction of success is speedily dimmed by the new comparisons which each new step on the ladder brings into view. In the middle classes particularly 'respectability' is apt to become a fetish. It becomes the measure, for example, of a 'good marriage', and it sets standards in the choice of mates which ignore the primary qualifications of eugenic fitness. A good illustration of the opposition between class standards and intrinsic qualifications is also presented by the system of appointment and promotion in the military and naval hierarchy. Army and navy officers, especially in countries with long-established traditions, are peculiarly apt to form something resembling a caste, in which ability is subordinated to considerations of status, so that there is little promotion from the ranks to the officer grades in times of peace. But the stern necessity created by warfare alters the situation, gives the man of military capacity some opportunity to rise to command, and reveals the initial weakness of a system which identified the officer with the 'gentleman'.

On the other hand, there is an argument on behalf of the social function of an upper class marked off by predetermined status. This type of class-system has been defended as a means of protecting and elevating culture standards, of developing a mode of living which stimulates refinement and prevents the encroachment of vulgarity, and of evoking and

[16] See ch. XVI, 2.

providing a market for artistic and intellectual abilities. The wonderful flowering of the artistic life in fifth century Athens and under the patronage of the Medici in fifteenth century Florence is cited as evidence of this function. Sombart in his studies of modern capitalism shows how modern luxury and the arts that minister to it were the offspring of the courtly establishments of the middle ages.[17] It is true that if a dominant class is itself cultured it will promote those cultural expressions which are not out of accord with its interests. It will promote, for example, the arts of painting and of music and of architecture rather than that free intellectual activity which tends to question the social *status quo*. Moreover, the basis of a class-system is the possession of power, not of culture, and there is no historical evidence that power and cultural attainment must go together. Against the instances cited must be set many other examples of upper classes which did little to promote the development of the arts. Patronage is a precarious stimulant of artistic endeavor. Even the music-loving aristocracies of Central Europe kept Mozart and Beethoven in poverty and allowed Schubert to die in destitution. Class power is a close neighbor of class intolerance, and a dominant caste is more apt to dictate cultural conditions than to permit their spontaneous development. In countries where the great masses are sunk in poverty a dominant caste will certainly maintain a luxury otherwise impossible, and thus give an incentive to the finer arts and crafts, though it may involve further depression of the standards of living of the rest of the population. In countries enjoying a wider distribution of economic prosperity the social function attributed to ruling classes may be more freely performed by the special culture groups which a more complex society produces. As Catlin points out, these culture groups are not necessarily power groups. The same writer suggests that in the development of such groups, "as men become more fully conscious of themselves and more educated in their own gifts," the future of the world would seem to lie.[18]

[17] W. Sombart, *Luxus und Capitalismus* (Munich, 1913), ch. IV.

[18] G. E. G. Catlin, *A Study of the Principles of Politics* (New York, 1930), ch. VII.

The intimate relationship between the class-system and the whole structure of a society may finally be shown by the fact that in the historical process the transformation of classes has accompanied all great revolutionary movements. In ancient Athens for example, the reforms of Cleisthenes and of Solon, reducing the political control of the old families, were made in response to deep-seated economic and social changes. In ancient Rome the status of the patricians was gradually undermined in correspondence with the conditions of an empire which; as it grew in extent, profoundly changed the distribution of wealth and poverty. The conditions which transformed feudalism into our modern state-systems brought also, both as consequences and as causes of that transformation, the enfranchisement of the serf, the disintegration of old classes, the rise of the burghers, the greater importance of office and function as against predetermined status, and finally that new power of the capital-owning classes which overcome the aristocracy of land-ownership. The new status of the industrialist and the financier reflected the new social economy, a transformation which broke up old traditions and old thought-forms, and which affected every aspect of life—morals, religions, philosophies, no less than the modes of work and leisure.[19] It brought with it also the phenomenon of a class to which the new conditions of industrial employment gave a cohesion and a degree of solidarity and of definite organization hitherto lacking, a class whose discontent with the economic system has become the main incentive of its unity. This phenomenon may prove to be one of the most important factors in the further modification of the class-system of western civilization.

In America the process of industrialization and the transformation of classes took a somewhat different form from the European. The period following the Civil War witnessed a vast and sudden access of industrialism, in which an agrarian economy with its farmers, traders, and small individual capitalists yielded before a system of 'big business' and centralized

[19] For the history of this class-transformation see, for example, K. Bücher, *Industrial Evolution* (tr. Wickett, New York, 1901).

finance, with its dominating magnates of steel and oil, of mine and railroad. The old traditions, whether of New England Puritan or of Southern gentleman, whether of the hardy pioneer or the thrifty artizan extolled by Franklin, could not resist the tide which carried to power the political boss and the trust-builder. The old 'middle-class' conceptions of democracy, of individualism, of Jeffersonian equality were undermined by the new concentration and distribution of economic power on the one hand and on the other by the new heterogeneity of a population to which successive waves of immigration added workers of alien culture and lower standards of living.[20] The old traditions have not perished but they have lost vitality. And in the process the present competitive and confused class-system, with its strongly plutocratic tendencies, came into being.

[20] Interesting indications of the changes here summarized may be found, for example, in V. Parrington, *The Main Currents of American Thought*, especially Vol. III, *The Beginnings of Critical Realism in America* (New York, 1930).

CHAPTER SIX

THE HERD AND THE CROWD

1. *The Crowd Phenomenon*

The crowd is the most transitory and unstable of all social groups, yet it exhibits characteristics which not only are highly significant in themselves but also throw light on the very nature of the social bond. Consequently the study of the crowd has been a favorite meeting point of psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists. The crowd belongs to our category of unorganized groups. We mean by this not that the crowd exhibits no patterns, no characteristic modes, but that the units in it are not organized in relation to one another. It may be instigated into being, but it falls into no predetermined order. It may be led, but only whither its own impulses direct. It owes its peculiar qualities, as we shall see, to this fact that it arises only in the interstices of social organization.

Many writers on the crowd do not distinguish it from the herd, but although the two have resemblances they differ in important respects. Strictly speaking, human societies are never herds, and when we apply the term to social manifestations we are really imputing to them attributes which we find more simply and more clearly present in the behavior of those ranging aggregations of animals properly named herds. As Hocking remarks, the nearest approximation to a true herd in the modern world is that somewhat rare phenomenon of social disruption, the "aimless migration of refugees." [1] The herd is, for certain gregarious animals, a permanent mode of life. The herd spirit, present even in civilized societies, is also a relatively permanent factor. But the crowd is ephemeral. It is not a mode of life but an incident, an eruption, a disturbance of a normal mode of life. Possibly it is what we name

[1] W. A. Hocking, *Man and the State* (New Haven, 1926), ch. XVIII.

the herd spirit which reveals itself in the sudden concerted action of the crowd, but if so it is under conditions which never occur in the normal life of the herd proper. We can understand the crowd only if we perceive it as an unorganized grouping occurring within, and in contrast with, a system of social organization. A brief description of the herd spirit will prepare us to see the difference and may serve as an approach to the distinctive character of the human crowd.

The herd spirit is that type of imitative cohesion which prompts men when they conform blindly to the traditions and beliefs and ways of the group, when they approve of things because they are accepted and disapprove simply because they are divergent from the established norms, when they are moved by the slogans, the stereotypes, the conventions, the 'idols', of their tribe. The herd moves as one—and we exhibit the herd spirit when our conduct is determined by the question—What do others think and feel about this, what is the *correct* thing to do? The herd spirit leads men to cast out of their society those who do not worship at their own shrines, including those who are more sensitive, more intelligent, more independent, than themselves. The herd spirit, in a word, identifies mores and morals, conformity and solidarity. All who differ from its opinions are 'undermining' the social order, morality, the constitution, the church, or whatever the firmament be to which they cling against the menace of change.

The herd spirit, however, is witnessed not only in the blind resistance to change but also in the gregarious pursuit of some superficial novelty. It operates in the acceptance of fashions no less than of mores. There are certain accredited leaders who can set the direction for the herd. Or again there is an apparently simultaneous discovery by the group that some new thing is the vogue, the craze—some song, some password, some parlor game, or whatever it be. These 'crazes' come and go, and while their origin may seem mysterious their departure is not difficult to explain, since the novelty on which their appeal depends soon wears off. A more significant manifestation of the herd spirit is the emotional epidemic which sometimes sweeps through a country or even a wider culture-

area. These epidemics give vent to emotions which are inherent in the beliefs or superstitions of the culture and which are roused to intensity by some accident, crisis, or conjuncture. They have frequently taken religious forms, as evangelistic 'revivals', where they occur under the stimulation of some leader who is either fanatical himself or else has learned the art of breaking the dams of religious emotion in his audience. Such epidemics conform to the prevalent tendencies of the communities and periods in which they occur, and are accentuated in the degree in which superstition is unchecked by science and intellectual discipline. The middle ages were characterized by the crusades, the persecutions of heretics, the wild obsessions of witchcraft, the flagellant manias (in which people went about whipping one another). But perhaps no epidemic of that epoch rivalled in its strange release of fears and breakdown of inhibitions the dancing delirium which began in Europe late in the fourteenth century; sometimes the ecstatic bacchante outbursts were inspired by visions of the heavenly host, sometimes they took the form of demoniacal possession, while in Italy the strange belief arose that these dances were the antidote to the deadly bite of the tarantula (a harmless spider) the fear of which became a general delusion.[2] The herd terror of demons was prevalent in the centuries which followed, and no inhumanity, no torture, was too fiendish to be visited on those who were supposed to be possessed by evil spirits. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a very different type of epidemic developed, expressive of a new social economy, the speculative contagions which were represented by the Dutch tulip mania, the South Sea Bubble, and the Mississippi Scheme. In modified forms, with the development of stock-markets, these speculative fevers have recurred down to the present.

Observe that the types of herd manifestations we have just been discussing are inspired mainly by self-regarding fears and hopes—individual fears of demons, hopes of individual salvation or of individual profits. They fall therefore in our

[2] For an account of this and other epidemics see B. Sidis, *The Psychology of Suggestion* (New York, 1911), ch. XXVIII.

category of like-interest social phenomena—conveyed by suggestion, under appropriate social conditions, to whole groups. From these we must next distinguish another very significant type of herd expression, through which is manifested the sense of common interest, the deep 'instinct' of community. Any occasion which suddenly touches the sentiment of community is apt to stimulate an emotional impulse of an epidemic character. It is seen on a smaller scale in the fervor which seizes a group when their college or city team is victorious against a rival. It is displayed more broadly when a whole nation is aroused by a national triumph of some simple spectacular sort, or by a disaster, or by a supposed insult to its honor. The crisis of war, or of the menace of war, is peculiarly apt to evoke this tense communicable emotion, which engulfs each individual so that his individuality is lost while his egoism is enlarged. 'We' have won, 'we' have been insulted—in this 'we' he is emotionally absorbed, in this 'we' his native egoism is exalted and liberated from social pressures because its goal is now identified with that of all the rest. It is an immense simplification of thought and feeling, a sudden resolution of the problem of his relation to society. That his individuality is lost in the process, that deliberation and reasoning are overwhelmed, does not concern him while the fever lasts. His pride, his itch for power and glory, his desire to love and to hate, are given an unwonted social justification. At the same time that he feels one with his fellows he is free to indulge the passions which society under normal conditions holds most in check. This double release is correspondingly powerful.

These various epidemics suggest the gregarious nature of human beings. In the herd, as Sidis points out, the sensitivity to common danger and the rapid communication of the sense of danger through the suggestible 'subconscious" mind is a factor of safety. These tendencies in civilized life may be survivals from a remote past, ill-adapted as they often are to the conditions of modern society. They often give rise to the phenomenon of the crowd, but as we have seen they occur on a far broader scale.

The crowd proper we distinguish as a physically compact aggregation of human beings brought into direct, temporary, and unorganized contact one with another. It is quickly created and quickly dissolved. It is an unorganized manifestation occurring in a world of organization. There are of course myriads of casual meetings of friends, acquaintances, or strangers occurring at all times in every society, occurring on the street, on the house-porch, on the pullman-car, in the business office, and so forth. These unorganized meetings differ from crowds in that they are 'face-to-face' meetings and that they are on a much smaller scale. Numbers are necessary to make a crowd, and the numbers are randomly contiguous. In the latter respect the crowd differs from the organized group, such as the assembly, public meeting, reception, and so forth, where the participants fall into a predetermined order, and are arranged according to some principle of selection. The borderline case is that of the group which casually gathers to listen to an orator in a park or public square. Here the organization into which the group falls is reduced to a minimum, that of a circle of listeners around the focus of a speaker. In the crowd mere conjuncture takes the place of any definite order controlling the relation of each to each.

We can now distinguish two main types of crowd, corresponding to our two types of herd manifestation. Compare, for example, the crowd that gathers to watch a fire or an accident with the crowd that participates in a popular celebration, in a strike demonstration, in a riot or a lynching. The former is a like-interest crowd. It is brought together by the curiosity of individuals who happen to be in the vicinity. It has no common purpose. Each person could satisfy his curiosity much better if he were not incommoded by the presence of the others. There is no doubt an enhancement of the curiosity of each from the presence of numbers; there is the possible thrill of being in a crowd as well as the thrill of watching the fire. But the immediate object of each does not need the presence of the rest. There is a common external focus of interest but not a common interest. This character is still more obvious in crowds composed of persons seeking at the

same time, and to the inconvenience of one another, to board some means of transportation, to enter a theater or a stadium, and so forth. The like-interest crowd can do nothing *as a crowd.* If it breaks out in protest against some inconvenience which it suffers, it is transformed into a common-interest crowd and its nature is radically changed. If it decides, say, to put out the fire which it is watching or to render aid in some accident, it at once undergoes organization, falls into an order, and ceases to be a crowd at all.

From the sociological standpoint the common-interest crowd is far more significant. If all crowds arise in the interstices of organization, this type comes into being to do something for which the existing machinery does not provide. The occasion may be a sudden need, a crisis, a spontaneous outburst of group joy or hatred, a festival, the death of a hero. Crowds of this sort are not necessarily antagonistic to the established order. But there are also crowds which break through the trammels of organization. Sometimes they merely manifest a desire to escape the discipline, the pressure of regimentation, seeking release through some common spontaneous activity, as college youths are apt to do under some incitement such as the victory of their team. But sometimes they arise to protest against, to defeat, even to destroy order itself. A lynching crowd is an example, or again the crowds which have signalized all revolutionary movements. Such outbursts offer the most remarkable revelations of the inner nature of the crowd. To this, the spirit of the crowd, we must now give more particular attention.

2. *The Spirit of the Crowd*

Crowds differ greatly in spirit according to the character of the interest which pervades them. If it is a general or vague like interest, such as that of the crowds who promenade the streets during intermissions of work or in the evening, most of the characteristics which are usually attributed to the crowd-phenomenon may be absent. Some occurrence may make the like interest of such a crowd more specific—a parade, an accident, for example—and at once an elemental

curiosity gives the crowd a focus of attention and thus evolves its particular attributes. There is the jostling, the excitement, the loss of poise, the simplification of purpose. If the occurrence touches more nearly the vital concerns of the assembled persons, the peculiar quality of crowd sentiment and crowd conduct reaches a height. There is a sudden communication and cumulation of emotion, a loss of the sense of responsibility, a breakdown of inhibitions, abrupt and unconsidered movements, violence and impetuosity. Under such conditions the crowd overthrows the standards and the habits which the education and discipline of civilized life had built up in its members. It lives at a more primitive level. The mental organization which distinguishes the man from the child is in abeyance. How sudden and overwhelming this change from normal mentality may be the phenomenon of panic reveals. With appalling swiftness an orderly audience can, on an alarm of fire for instance, be transformed into a maddened crowd, heedless to every consideration beyond the blind impulse of flight. It is the stampede of the herd over again, but now demolishing all the reserves of reason and all the resistances of civilized habituation. This disastrous victory of primal instinct, in situations which demand the greatest resourcefulness of the trained reason, is what gives the crowd its peculiar and sinister fascination.

But the full significance of the crowd spirit is seen most clearly in the behavior of the common-interest crowd. Now the crowd senses its own solidarity. In the like-interest crowd the presence of the others at least partially interferes with the desire of each constituent—in the panic it is often fatal to these desires. But in the common-interest crowd the presence of the others supports the desire of each. Numbers give strength to the protest, to the celebration; numbers make possible the destructive fury, the storming of Bastilles. In all crowds the close physical contacts, the multitudinous swaying motions, the gestures, the murmurs or shouts, are conditions of a characteristic excitement. In the common-interest crowd there is a further condition, the 'cause' which leads each to identify himself with all the rest. The others are with

him, on his side. This participation brings an emotional release, a social sanction for individual irresponsibility. The sense of absorption is intensified. The sentiment of community, released from the bonds of organization, runs wild.

Without organization, its emotion heightened while the capacity to reflect is lowered, the common-interest crowd can do nothing constructive. It may express tumultuous admiration of its heroes, it can cheer and wave its banners. But its impulse to action is most liable to find a destructive outlet. To destroy requires neither system nor deliberation. It is easy to cast stones, to trample a man down, to maim and kill. Perhaps too, under the conditions of crowd excitement, hatred and revenge are more easily stimulated than love and admiration, though Martin seems to go too far when he speaks of the crowd as always "a creature of hate." [3] Certainly the crowd easily finds a victim or an enemy, and is very open to suggestions of punishment or vengeance. This spirit of the crowd seems to communicate itself to the guardians of order who oppose its excess, so that they are frequently accused on such occasions of needless cruelty and violence. The mere suggestion of a victim not infrequently turns a peaceful crowd into a raging mob, offering a vent to the restless undirected energies let loose within it.[4] And since in organized society the impulse to hate and to destroy is that which is most held in check, the release is all the more violent as well as the more congenial to the primitive and no longer restrained spirit of the crowd. Perhaps it is a similar release which accounts for the thrill aroused by rumors of war in some normally peaceful and otherwise reasonable persons.

Various attempts have been made to interpret the peculiarities of crowd behavior. Some writers hold that the removal of inhibitions which characterizes it brings into play not only the consciously repressed desires of men but also those hidden and unconscious desires which the discipline of normal life has buried. The suggestibility, the exaltation, the lack of self-consciousness, the egoistic expansion, which the members of

[3] *The Behavior of Crowds* (New York, 1920), ch. V.

[4] By a mob is here meant simply a crowd in motion.

the crowd exhibit, are phenomena susceptible of this kind of Freudian explanation. The 'censor' within man is set aside, and the primitive or infantile nature, the dream life, comes to the surface.[5] Others maintain that in the crowd, with the loss of individuality, a form of group-consciousness develops, a fusion of mind with mind, a sympathetic participation of each with each on the emotional level which is common to them all. The crowd becomes so attuned that it responds only to the appeals, the slogans, the ideas which are conformable to this de-individualized mentality.[6] The Freudian explanation, it should be observed, does not need this postulate of a group-consciousness, nor does there seem any adequate reason for describing the *rapport* of mind to mind under the influence of crowd excitement as implying anything that could properly be termed a single controlling 'collective mind' or 'collective representation'.[7]

A study of the actual conditions under which the peculiar mentality of the crowd develops is illuminating. Always there is something which touches some strong elemental emotion. (In the common-interest crowd a blinding emotion suffuses the militant sense of solidarity.) In the panic it is the emotion which the threat to self-preservation evokes. In the crowd which makes a 'run on the bank' and in the crowds which assemble in a stock-market crisis it is the sudden dread of impoverishment. In the harvest festivals and other dance celebrations of primitive peoples the emotions associated with sex are stimulated, as also in various 'carnivals' among ourselves. Sex-emotion seems also to be prominent in crowd phenomena which ostensibly arise from quite different motivations, such as certain types of religious 'revival' or those lynching outbreaks which "uphold the honor of white woman-

[5] The basis of this theory, adopted for example by Martin, is to be found in Freud's *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, and in various other works of the psycho-analytic school.

[6] A statement of this explanation is given in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 893 ff.

[7] On the subject of the 'collective mind' see my *Community*, Bk. II, ch. I, § 3. It is interesting that McDougall (*The Group Mind*, Cambridge, 1920, ch. II) rejects the hypothesis of a group-consciousness while still adhering to the formula of a group-mind.

hood." The fierce vindication of the established norms of sex-relationship which characterizes both these types of crowd may be regarded as a mode in which repressed sex tendencies take their revenge.

Given the emotion-evoking occasions, various devices may be deliberately employed by leaders or 'agitators' to enhance the crowd spirit. The skilful politician, the evangelist, the fiery 'patriot', the advocate of class-war, the tribal witch-doctor, all use similar methods, on the one hand the tricks of mannerism, gesture, and voice which rivet attention on the speaker and on the other the reiteration and cumulation of images and ideas which present reality in the colors of the dominant emotion. The 'spell' of the orator lies in this, that he enlists on the side of the prevalent state of feeling the reasoning power which previously was resistant and critical of it, but he usually achieves this end by dulling or as it were hypnotizing the reasoning power itself. The crowd is persuaded by arguments that addressed to its individuals in isolation would fail to convince, and is credulous of statements that in the normal mood of its members they would more cautiously scrutinize. The wildest rumors gain credence in a crowd in proportion as its excitement grows, and in turn they increase its excitement. A similar condition, apart from the physical crowd, occurs in herd manifestations in time of war. The crowd, like the nation in war-time, is so attuned that it accepts as truth every calumny cast at its enemies while convinced of the splendid righteousness of its own cause.

Aside from the factitious stimulation of emotion by the arts of the leader there is a spontaneous accumulation of excitement within the crowd once assembled. There is what McDougall calls "sympathetic induction," the symptoms and expressions of emotion coming to each constituent as a mass influence and heightening the fever in each.[8] As the mood of each grows into conformity with that of the others they all tend to exhibit simultaneous and rhythmic gestures.[9] The group sways and

[8] *Op. cit.*, ch. II.

[9] Max Reinhardt makes effective use of this feature for the dramatic portrayal of crowds, in such plays as *The Miracle* and *The Death of Danton.*

surges in unison. It is significant in this regard that primitive peoples often employ the reiterated monotonous beat of a drum or other percussion instrument to evoke an orgiastic spirit. Similar devices are used in the more fervent displays of religious emotion which characterize the assemblies of the Shakers or the 'Holy Rollers', and the 'wakes' and 'revivals' of negro communities. These reveal in an extreme manner the hypnotic quality which Le Bon and others have attributed to the crowd. By the religious devotees, as of old by the followers of Orpheus or Dionysus, it is felt that 'the Spirit' or 'the God' has taken possession.

The manifestations of crowd feeling deserve study not only because they reveal the significance of this transitory form of aggregation, but also because they throw light on other social phenomena. Some element of crowd contagion is often present in the more ordered assemblies of men, even though the fact of organization hinders its free expression and development. The audience that listens to a public address, the spectators who watch a game or other spectacle, the members who take part in a parade, are all liable to the influence of the crowd spirit; and if anything occurs which suddenly arouses them above the normal pitch they may easily break loose from the bonds of organization altogether and for the moment become a mere crowd. Moreover, the study of the crowd illuminates the principle of solidarity itself. For the crowd exhibits the social impulse as it overflows the channels of custom and habit, and thereby exhibits the undifferentiated gregarious sense which in more limited, refined, and specialized forms animates our social contacts. In the crowd we return to the primitive feeling of society, at once simple and profound, wherein differences are submerged, where all act as one man. But it acts as no one man would act in his ordinary senses, for the crowd, waving its banner or shouting its slogan, is under a spell. It is back to the world of magic, where things happen unaccountably. Thus though it often means well, it can rarely act well. The very law of its being renders it unthinking in its love and ruthless in its hate.

In conclusion, the crowd offers a special opportunity for the

emergence of the herd spirit. But that same spirit has other avenues of expression, apart from the physical crowd. These avenues of communication are increased by the technical facilities of communication. The press, for example, is often an agency for its transmission and development. It may suggest that a foreign people or an opposing political party or any group, religious, racial, economic, which can be distinguished in some simple way from the group to which it appeals, is essentially inferior, suspicious, evil, designing. The herd emotion coheres around the 'consciousness of kind' when the 'kind' to which we belong is set in sharp contrast with some other. This primaeval emotion, based on one simple distinction, refuses to make any other, for that would threaten its sway. Intelligence is the ability to make distinctions, and this ability is in abeyance. Hence the prejudicial quality of this undiscerning herd emotion in a modern society, where groups of all kinds are in necessary contact. Hence the peculiar danger of its manifestation in international relations, where it deludes peoples into destructive antagonisms though their interests are interdependent. Hence, finally, the need for that social education which calls on us to resist those herd emotions based on simple unreal dichotomies of good and evil, by which our individual discernment is liable to be overthrown.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE FAMILY

1. *The Nature and Sociological Significance of the Family*

In our study of the social structure the family serves as a bridge between the community and the association. It satisfies this rôle in a twofold manner. In the historical process the family grouping has been transformed from a more or less self-contained and self-sustained unity into a definite and limited organization of its adult members, and especially of the original contracting parties. On the other hand the family, even in the most differentiated societies, serves as a community for the lives born within it, gradually relinquishing this character as they grow towards adulthood. The family, more profoundly than any other organization, exists only as a process, and we can understand it only through a study of its changes, the changes it has undergone in the history of the race and the changes which occur within it in the life-history of each individual example. In our treatment of the family we must therefore anticipate the subject of the last division of this work, where we take up the general theme of social change.

Of all the organizations, large or small, which society unfolds none transcends the family in the intensity of its sociological significance. It influences the whole life of society in a myriad ways, and its changes, as we shall see, reverberate through the whole social structure. It is capable of endless variation and yet reveals a remarkable continuity and persistence through change. It is the nuclear organization of the larger society, the most universal of all forms, found in every range of life from that of animals quite low in the evolutionary scale up to that of civilized mankind. It can adapt itself to the most different environments. It is of necessity a group very limited in size, for it is defined by natural or biological

conditions which it cannot transcend without losing its identity. It is based on a complex of the most profound impulses of our organic nature, those of mating, procreation, maternal devotion, and parental care, and is fortified in man by a highly significant and close-knit group of secondary emotions, from romantic love to the pride of race, from the affection of mates to the desire for the economic security of a home, from the jealousy of personal possession to the baffled yearning for perpetuity. It presents the first social environment and the profoundest formative influences of the awakening lives of which it is the source. It is the stimulant of and the compensation for the most arduous toils, sustained from adolescence to the end of life.

At the same time it is the focus of the most perplexing social problems. Guarded though it is, more than other associations, by social taboos and by legal regulations which rigidly prescribe its form, it changes greatly from age to age, while the taboos and the regulations are themselves most variant for different peoples. Among civilized peoples, though now there are some exceptions to this rule, it is the only association which the consenting parties may freely enter into but may not freely leave. The marriage contract on which it is based has thus a peculiar character. Moreover, the legal or contractual aspect of marriage is entirely inadequate to explain the nature of the association or to reveal the inner bonds which hold it together.

The family has another peculiarity which demands our special attention. Although as a social form it is enduring, each individual instance is bound up and ends (if it lasts so long) with the life of the original partners. What we often speak of as an old-established family is really a succession of families bearing the same name and in some degree perpetuating the same stock. During this life-history the family is recruited from within itself, and in this process the association undergoes the greatest, most inevitable, and most difficult transitions. It involves a continuous change alike in its interests and in its emotional foundations, a constant transformation in the relations of its members, old and new, to one another. So far as the original partners are concerned we can

distinguish in the history of the normal family, among other stages not so clearly marked by external signs, the following four—the formative pre-nuptial stage, the nuptial stage before the arrival of offspring, the stage of child-raising, and the stage in which, the children no longer requiring parental care, the biological functions of the parents have been fulfilled. It is of course true that all families do not pass through all these stages. Perhaps as many as one in five or six families are childless. Perhaps in as many as one out of five the progression is interrupted by death or separation or divorce before the final stage is reached.[1] But these stages form an inevitable time-succession wherever the family endures and fulfils its primary social function. The length of each varies with the social conditions. Thus in modern civilized society the fourth and sometimes the second stage tends to be lengthened while the third stage tends to become a shorter span.

The first or preparatory stage is marked by an increasing intimacy of man and woman, an exploration or revelation by each of the personality of the other, or at least of those aspects of personality which a growing sex attraction emphasizes and heightens. This is generally the case even where economic or other social considerations are determinants of marriage, but it is particularly true where the sentiment of romantic love prevails. The second stage is the beginning of the family proper, the living together of mates, creating the environment of the home, evoking new experiences, initiating new attitudes of the partners towards society and of society towards the partnership, subtly establishing new habituations between the man and the woman. The third stage fulfils the family proper, linking the partners to one another by the vital link of their own children, the fruits of the sex union, introducing new sentiments which can fortify and in a measure replace the initial ones, bringing new interests and also growing responsibilities. The fourth stage comes with the liberation of the partners from these responsibilities, so that again, especially in these days of the limited family, new interests and new

[1] For statistical evidence see W. F. Ogburn, *The Changing Family*, in Volume XXIII of the PUBLICATIONS of the American Sociological Society.

activities must take the place of old ones, more particularly for the wife on whom the heavier tasks of child-bearing and child-raising had fallen. It would take volumes to describe the significant variations of human relationship which occur during this endlessly repeated process. In fact a very large part of modern literature is devoted to this subject, which in its detailed interest seems inexhaustible. The psychological adjustment of the members of the family to one another in the course of its inexorable changes creates perhaps the most important series of the numerous problems, personal and social, engendered by an association which affects so intimately and in such incalculable ways, which more than any other engrosses, expresses, and circumscribes, the personality of man. Men and women are generically like, unlike, and complementary in divers respects.[2] Thus the stage is set by nature for the innumerable complex situations, so rich in possibilities of harmony and disharmony, which, according to their circumstances and their individual characters, unfold for the members of the family partnership from its initiation to its close. At the outset, in view not only of the varying forms which the family assumes but also of its varying degrees of attachment to some larger kin-group, the sib or clan, it is important to explain the sense in which we use the term *family*. Its essential components are husband and wife, but the relationship expressed by these terms implies, normally, the further relationship of parents and children. The family then is a group defined by a sex relationship sufficiently precise and enduring to provide for the procreation and upbringing of children. It may include collateral or subsidiary relationships, but it is constituted by the living together of mates, forming with their offspring a distinctive unity. This unity has certain common social characteristics wherever it is found, of which the following five are particularly significant: (1) a mating relationship, (2) a form of marriage or other institutional arrangement in accordance with which the mating relation is established and maintained, (3) a system of nomenclature, involving also a mode of reckoning descent, (4) some

[2] See, for example, Havelock Ellis, *Man and Woman* (New York, new ed., 1929).

economic provision shared by the members of the group but having especial reference to the economic needs associated with child-bearing and child-raising, and generally (5) a common habitation, home, or household, which however may not be exclusive to the family group.

While these five conditions are so universal as to seem essential to the very nature of the family, they may be met in extremely different ways. Every possible variety of way is found somewhere in the map of human society. The mating relation may be lifelong or of shorter duration. It may take the institutional form of monogamy, which may be strict or modified by subsidiary sex relationships, socially accepted or otherwise, or it may be polygamous, involving either polygyny or polyandry. Even a form of group marriage is sometimes found. It may be socially compulsory to marry within a group to which one belongs (endogamy) or else to marry into another group (exogamy). Different societies have differing prescriptions as to the prohibited degrees of relationship within which a man or woman may not marry. Descent may be reckoned through the male or through the female line. The husband may in accordance with social usage join his wife's people or the wife may join her husband's. The rights of the parties in respect of the ownership, control, use, and transmission of property take many forms. Various customs qualify the main distinctions here outlined, such as the admission of concubines in some forms of the patriarchal family or the practice of wife-lending in guest hospitality as found in American Indian and numerous other tribes. The varieties of the family are endless, and the range of its functions, no less than the mode in which it performs them, varies enormously.

In this welter of variations students of society have naturally raised the question, Which was the original form of the family, the type of which the others are derivatives? They have thought that an answer to this question would throw light not only on the evolution of the family but also on its essential character and its roots in human nature. It may be that the question is unanswerable, perhaps that it is wrongly put, but in view of the importance of the whole subject we shall con-

sider some recent attempts to answer it. Thence we shall proceed to trace the lines of its historical evolution in western society.

2. *Early Forms of the Family*

It seems established that so far back as we can penetrate into the conditions of the primitive human world we nowhere find a group in which some form of the family does not exist. Always we discover some form of mating, some degree of social regulation over sex relationships. It is in fact hard to conceive any order of society, and especially of primitive society, in which such regulation could be entirely absent. Although at one time it was held that the 'original condition of mankind' was one of sexual promiscuity, that doctrine has been weakened by the weight of anthropological evidence.[3] It is true that there are many primitive peoples among which practical promiscuity exists prior to mating, but always there is a mating or marriage system and often its rigorous regulation stands in sharp contrast to the pre-mating license. It has sometimes been supposed that the so-called classificatory system of relationship—that under which all the members of a senior age-group are indiscriminately called 'fathers' or 'mothers', of a co-aeval age-group 'brothers' and 'sisters', while the children of that group are all 'sons' and 'daughters', and so on—points back to a primitive sex-communism, but closer investigation shows that this extension of the terms of kinship is a conventional device for social purposes, particularly the regulation of exogamy. Thus a man will distinguish his actual wife by some term signifying 'own' while still applying the equivalent of 'wife' to all the women from whom it is permissible for him to choose a wife, in contrast to those women, his 'sisters', with whom marriage is prohibited under the rules of exogamy. This naming device is perfectly intelligible without any assumption of a prior promiscuity.

Various attempts have been made to discover the 'origin' of the family. It has been held that it arose in consequence of

[3] Lowie, *Primitive Society* (New York, 1920), and Malinowski, *Sex and Repression in Savage Society* (New York, 1927), may be cited among many other authorities.

some particular trait or 'instinct' of human nature and that consequently there was one original form of which the others are derived varieties. The assumption that any deep-rooted social arrangement is the expression of some one particular attribute of humanity is a very dubious one and is very apt to involve an undue simplification into the problem of origins. In his *History of Human Marriage* Westermarck supported the theory of Darwin that the family took shape from the operation of male possessiveness and jealousy, the dominant male claiming monopolistic rights and guarding them by force until they were secured by custom. Hence he regarded pair-marriage as the normal form which the jealous assertion of property rights took and traces the origin of monogamous marriage back to the sub-human world, maintaining that it prevails among the higher apes. While the traits to which Westermarck points have certainly been important factors, any theory which lays exclusive stress upon them is inadequate. This has been shown by Briffault among others, in his severe and well-documented criticism of Westermarck's position.[4] He illustrates abundantly the prevalence of matrilocal and matrilineal institutions throughout primitive society and the fact that in various primitive communities women hold a social position equal to and sometimes superior to that of men. He points to the ignorance of the fact of paternity exhibited by some primitive peoples. He shows the absence of jealousy and the absence of the love-sentiment, from which it often springs, under primitive social conditions, maintaining that these and other feelings, such as sexual modesty and the esteem for chastity, are not aboriginal but acquired in the course of social development. He concludes that the family arose out of the insistent need of the mother for the economic and social protection of herself and her children, that in following the profoundest instincts of her nature she won out against the more casual and merely sexual interest of the male and thus brought the family into being. Consequently it is part of his argument that the earliest form of the family was matriarchal and that only with the development of higher agriculture and

[4] Briffault, *The Mothers* (New York, 1927), especially Vol. II, ch. XIII.

the concomitant economic dominance of men did the patriarchal type succeed it.

Again we must acknowledge the importance of the facts to which Briffault points and the weight of the argument based on the insistence of maternal need and maternal instinct. But as an explanation of origins it is open to the same objection as that of Westermarck, that it lays too exclusive stress on a single factor in a complex situation. The idea that this factor was the original determinant of the family, and that mankind has passed from a system of 'mother-right' to one of 'father-right', is by no means established and is in fact discomfited by the variety of conflicting evidences. For example, some of the most primitive groups have patrilineal institutions, such as the Central Australians and the Philippine negritos, while some highly developed groups, including two of the most advanced societies among the American Indians, the Iroquois and the Pueblo, are matrilineal.[5] Nor is there any clear correlation between matrilineal institutions and a high social status of women, as Lowie has pointed out in his *Primitive Society*.[6] Briffault has rightly emphasized a factor which has often been neglected, but it would nevertheless seem to be only one of the converging factors of which the family is a resultant.

While it is not possible here to elaborate the argument we may state the general conclusion which in our judgment is indicated by the evidence. The family has no origin, in the sense that there ever existed a stage of human life from which the family was absent or another stage in which it came into being. The family has no one origin, in the sense that it is explained by any single trait or attribute of human nature. The family has no one original form, in the sense of a specific primal type of which all the others are later varieties. A complex of human desires and conscious needs, finding somewhat different expression in different environments, everywhere gave birth to some form of family system. Of the conditions on which the institutions of the family have depended and still depend, the following are of universal importance.

[5] Cf. Rivers, *Social Organization* (New York, 1924), ch. V.
[6] *Op. cit.*, ch. VIII.

There is in the first place the sex instinct, seeking to establish a basis for its satisfaction, to find some safeguard against the precariousness of unlimited competition, revealing various degrees of sensitiveness and discrimination, gradually attaching to itself certain secondary sentiments, and thereby creating customs which define its expression and limit its range. There is in the second place the reproductive or philoprogenitive urge, strongly manifested in the mother but reinforced in the male by such social considerations as the pride of race, the desire to transmit property or a name to his descendants, the desire to have offspring to work with or for him and to support his old age, and so forth. Even apart from such considerations the consequences of the sexual act create a problem of which the obvious solution is the family. There is in the third place the economic need or group of needs which in the complementary life of man and woman combine with the biological factors to create a system of sex relationships. Beyond the functions directly dependent on sex there are economic functions which the woman fulfils in relation to the man and to the family group, just as there are economic functions which the man similarly undertakes.

These three factors are the chief variables from the particular combination of which the forms of the family arise. Even if we call the sexual and the reproductive impulses by the name of instincts it does not follow that they have uniform unvarying manifestations. Moreover the biological conditions under which they operate, such as the 'natural' proportions of the sexes, are not themselves constant, and they are further modified by social practices, such as infanticide and war. Still more variable are the economic conditions with which they are associated. It is obvious, for example, that the life of the hunter or the nomad gives the woman different functions and consequently a different status from that allotted to her in an agricultural economy. It is also obvious that her position is affected by such other conditions as the presence in the community of inferior or slave classes, the war-like or pacific character of the group, the vicissitudes of conflict and conquest, the contact of peoples and the mingling of traditions, and so forth.

Customs and institutions controlling sex relationships are socially created and are certainly not the sheer expression of original 'instincts'. Anthropologists have shown that many of the sentiments of sex, involving taboos and inhibitions, grew out of the interpretation which primitive man gave to his experiences in the business of living, in his perennial task of accommodating his desires to his necessities.

The various forms of the family so created can be divided into two broad types, the patriarchal and the so-called matriarchal. Strictly defined, the matriarchate means a form of family in which the headship belongs to the wife or mother. There are grave doubts whether such a system has ever existed in primitive society. It is true that Briffault, reasserting the older view of Bachofen, offers evidences that women, especially the old women, were sometimes dominant in primitive groups, such as the Eskimos, the Iroquois Indians, and various African tribes.[7] But these instances are certainly exceptions to the rule, and the fact that women appear as queens or rulers no more establishes the claim than the instance of Queen Elizabeth proves that a matriarchate existed in the England of the sixteenth century. The term 'matriarchal family' is more loosely applied to the system under which status, name, and sometimes inheritance are transmitted through the female line. The matrilineal (or metronymic) principle prevails in many parts of the earth and it is sometimes associated with actual ignorance of the physiological fact of paternity. Malinowski gives evidences to show that among the Trobriand Islanders the curious view prevails that although a virgin cannot conceive yet pregnancy is caused by the entry of 'spirits'.[8] At the same time the matrilineal system is found among peoples who are perfectly aware of the fact of paternity, and it is only a guess that it goes back to an earlier stage in which that fact was unknown.[9] Sometimes inheritance is transmitted through the father while descent is reckoned through the mother. Sometimes the matrilocal principle is combined with

[7] *The Mothers*, Vol. I, pp. 316 ff.
[8] *The Father in Primitive Psychology* (New York, 1927), ch. IV.
[9] Hartland, *Primitive Paternity* (London, 1909), Vol. I, ch. IV.

matrilineal descent and sometimes the former exists apart from the latter. A main distinction of 'matriarchal' society is that authority over the children belongs to some member of the wife's family, most frequently to the maternal uncle.

In main contrast to the 'matriarchal' stands the patriarchal family. As the latter characterized not only the greater civilizations of antiquity but also the feudal civilization from which our own has evolved, it demands more detailed consideration. The growth of property, the development of agriculture, the concentration of authority, and the specialization of function, which characterize the more advanced societies, were more in harmony with the patriarchal principle, and may in many cases have led to its victory over the matriarchal. Moreover, the patriarchal principle permitted the family to serve as a compact unit of society. Here there is no division of functions between the father and some relative by marriage, such as the matriarchal principle involved. Under the patriarchal principle a society generally takes the form of a system of exogamous groups; under the patriarchal, it becomes a system of family units consolidated into larger kin-groups. It should be understood that the patriarchal and the matriarchal types are not the only alternatives. Sometimes, even among primitive peoples, we find the patrilineal system without patriarchal authority, as among the Bedouin tribes described by Robertson Smith in *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia.*[10] The patriarchal family itself assumes a variety of forms but it is a type realized in various degrees throughout the history of civilization. Under the patriarchate the family is a closely-knit inclusive system in which all authority belongs to the paternal side. The family is the social unit in the widest sense. Sometimes it is part of a 'joint-family', the whole forming one household. Among the Kabyli, for example, the individual family households are ranged round a common courtyard with a single entrance, they use a common well and have property in common, and the whole

[10] Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia* (London, 1903), ch. IV.

group is subject in certain respects to the patriarchal authority of the grandfather or the eldest male.[11]

With the inclusive functions of the patriarchal family go the inclusive powers of its head. He presides over the religious rites of the household, he is the guardian of the 'family gods', of the sacred hearth; and where, as in China, the ancestors of the family are themselves the object of religious devotion, the entire maintenance of the traditional religion is under the charge of the paterfamilias. In China, woman was subject to the three successive obediences prescribed in Li Ki, the ancient Chinese book of the law, first to her father and mother, next to her husband, and last, if a widow, to her son. In the patriarchal system the head of a household is also a representative of the state, and the political council is composed of the fathers, the *patres*. Our language testifies to this fact, for the word 'senate' means the meeting of the old men and we still speak of the 'city fathers'. The power of the patriarch over his children, even when grown up, was often almost unlimited. In ancient Palestine he could sell his daughter into servitude.[12] In ancient Rome the *patria potestas* meant the power of life and death. The position of the wife was one of complete social subordination. She could not own property in her own right, she had in fact no standing before the law over against her husband. Among the Jews, as among the Romans of earlier republican times, she could be divorced on certain grounds at the will of her husband, though of course she had no reciprocal right. It is significant that in the most highly cultured communities in which the patriarchate flourished women took practically no share in public life and received no general education aside from training in the arts of the household. At Athens the wife and the daughters were secluded in the 'women's apartments' and not expected to go out of doors except with the husband's permission. In fact the only women who possessed any freedom were the hetairai or 'companions'—who were frequently foreigners and as such were not subject to the moral restrictions of the patriarchal

[11] Maunier, *La Construction Collective de la Maison en Kabylie* (Paris, 1926).
[12] *Exodus* XXI, 7.

system. These conditions broke down in the later period of classical civilization, through influences similar to those which, as we shall see, dissolved within our own civilization the patriarchal régime.

In our western civilization the patriarchal family, descending from the feudal age, has succumbed to the onset of new economic forces. Many features of it survived into the nineteenth century, and traces of it still remain. In eighteenth century England scarcely any career or any public position was open to women—unless they were queens. A woman had few property rights, beyond a dower which went to her at her husband's death. On her marriage her property vested in her husband, and even such earnings as she might acquire by her own labors belonged to her husband. At law she was treated as a 'minor' or a 'ward'. The family was still an economic unit, owned and managed by the husband. In the households of poor and rich alike the women co-operated in economic tasks that have now almost everywhere been transferred to other agencies. In America the same conditions generally prevailed. The law of colonial days enforced the principle that it was the duty of women to serve and obey their husbands. While in the South the position of women was rather higher owing to their scarcity in the earlier settlements and owing to the relegation of household work to the slaves, in Puritan New England the rigor of the Mosaic law was reaffirmed. The codes of Connecticut and Massachusetts contained enactments which recalled the *patria potestas* of Rome or the stern judgment of Palestine, a statute of Connecticut even going so far as to decree death for the "stubborn and rebellious son."[13] The elders of the church, as in the Geneva of Calvin, exercised a formidable inquisition over the life of the family, and the penalty of adultery might be death. While no doubt a study of the letter of the law may lead to an exaggeration of the severity of the prevailing mores, it is still indicative of the general temper of the age. There were significant mitigations of that severity long before the end of the eighteenth century, and New England in particular sought to protect the wife

[13] Quoted in W. Goodsell, *Problems of the Family* (New York, 1928), ch. V.

against ill-usage by the husband, but patriarchal rule, with its subordination of women, still flourished until the nineteenth century felt the impact of the new economic forces which the eighteenth had brought to birth.

With changes in the social structure go changes in social attitudes. Nothing illustrates better the remarkable transformation which since the end of the eighteenth century the family has undergone than the contrast between the attitudes towards the place of women in society current then and now. In the year 1791 Mary Wollstonecraft published her manifesto entitled *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, a work regarded at that time as bold or even dangerous, though to us its most extreme demands are accepted commonplaces. It was the time when the scientist Erasmus Darwin could still sum up the patriarchal attitude in these characteristic words:—

> The female character should possess the mild and retiring virtues rather than the bold and dazzling ones; great eminence in almost everything is sometimes injurious to a young lady; whose temper and disposition should appear to be pliant rather than robust; to be ready to take impressions rather than to be decidedly marked, as great apparent strength of character, however excellent, is liable to alarm both her own and the other sex, and to create admiration rather than affection.[14]

Mary Wollstonecraft demanded that women be given a broader education for the business of life. Her argument was in part directed against the views of Rousseau, who in his treatise on education, *Émile*, wrote that "the education of women should always be relative to that of men," for they "are specially made to please men." That this conclusion should have satisfied the great radical theorist of the eighteenth century is itself a revelation of the change which the following century was to accomplish.

3. *The Evolution of the Modern Family*

Long before the days of the Industrial Revolution the patriarchal family began, especially within the civilization of

[14] Quoted in W. Goodsell, *A History of the Family as a Social and Educational Institution* (New York, 1927), ch. IX.

the cities, to lose the self-containedness which belonged to its typical form, to surrender certain of its inclusive functions to other agencies of society. The state was undermining its political functions, gradually divorcing citizenship from kinship.[13] Wherever democracy grew, citizenship ceased to be an exclusive right of the established or 'patrician' families. The state curbed the domination of the paterfamilias over his wife and children and appointed its own courts to decide issues over which the head of the family had once been supreme. The right to vote, which at first belonged to a man in virtue of his being a propertied householder, became by degrees an individual right. The religious functions of the family diminished. The idea that the family was of divine ordinance and its laws divinely appointed became less prevalent. Words which had given a religious connotation to familial loyalty or obedience—like the word *pious*—changed their meaning. The growth of markets supplemented the inadequate and toilsome self-sufficiency of the home.

These slowly accumulating changes received a vast impetus from the eighteenth century inventions which substituted the power-machine for the manual tool. More and more, as the development and the application of the new techniques advanced, they stripped the family of its economic functions and in so doing profoundly affected the whole character and the social significance of the family. They took increasingly both the work and the workers out of the home. Above all, they drew ever larger numbers of women into workshops and factories and offices. They broke down the age-old doctrine—"man for the field and woman for the hearth." They gave wives and daughters some earning power independent of the jurisdiction of husbands and fathers. For the first time in history the work of women began to be specialized like that of men instead of being devoted to the promiscuous tasks of the household. And at the same time the results of industrial discovery began to penetrate within the home, not only in the substitution of bought for home-made commodities but also in the application of labor-saving devices. The

[15] See my book, *The Modern State*, ch. I.

net consequence was the gradual reduction of the amount of energy and time involved in the economic tasks of the family, in the business of home-keeping.

These processes are still going on before our eyes. The transference of women from domestic to 'gainful' employments has advanced rapidly since the beginning of the twentieth century. It was of course peculiarly marked during the war years, but the 1920 census showed that in the United States 23 per cent of all married women were so employed and almost 40 per cent of all young women between the ages of seventeen and twenty-four. The very large proportion of young women drawn temporarily into industry is significant for a variety of reasons. It shows that economic occupation is rather a condition of than an alternative to marriage and family life. It shows also that the woman's relation to the family is, as in some respects it must always remain, different from that of the man, and that the difference places her at a competitive disadvantage in the economic field. Economic change has deeply affected the form and character of the family but it does not affect the basic biological facts and the social needs which create the essential functions of the family. We may in fact look upon these changes as an aspect of the great evolutionary process of society, later to be discussed, in which its organizations have become specialized to perform more limited and more exclusive functions. In this process the family has been gradually stripped of functions irrelevant to its peculiar character as a system of more or less enduring social relationships based on the fact of sex. Let us see how these changes have affected the mode in which the family is to-day fulfilling what we here call its essential functions.

We shall limit ourselves for the present to the consideration of one primary function, the perpetuation of the race, understanding thereby not merely the procreation of children but also the early nurture of the home, the initial adjustments to the world in which they must live. The chief changes which have more recently occurred in this regard are the following. (1) Various social organizations have been developed to aid the family in the fulfilment of its function. These include the

maternity hospital, the baby clinic, the crèche, the kindergarten, and other pre-school agencies. Here the problem to be met has been twofold. On the one hand there is the situation of the mother whose economic work lies outside the home and who can neither leave her children behind nor bring them with her to factory or office. On the other hand there is the more general problem of bringing to the home the benefits of modern hygiene, sanitation, and preventive medicine, and the techniques of child welfare. (2) Various systems of economic aid from public or private funds have been devised in order that the family, no longer upheld by the larger kin-group, may be able to fulfil its function in the competitive life of a large-scale society. Public aid is tending here to take the place of the assistance given by child-welfare and other philanthropic associations. There are three main forms in which this public aid is provided in modern states. One is the system of mothers' pensions, developed in New Zealand, Denmark, Canada, and most of the states of the union. Another is the similar provision made in countries which have national systems of social insurance, as in Germany, Austria, Great Britain, and other European countries. The third is the system of 'family allowances', characteristic of France, under which, through an industrial pooling system encouraged by the state, additional wage payments are made to workers in proportion to the number of the children whom they have to support.[16] We should note that none of these policies aim to take away from the family its primary function but on the contrary seek to make it more capable of performing it efficiently. Even in Soviet Russia, where the system of day nurseries for the children of factory workers has been much developed, the idea of the substitution of a public institution for the private family has been wholly rejected. (3) The third change we have to mention is of a very different order from the other two and has a more profound significance for the future of the family. It is the decreasing rate of procreation, the lessening of the fertility of marriage.

[16] For a summary account of these methods see Goodsell, *Problems of the Family*, chh. X–XII.

Since the seventies of the nineteenth century the birth-rate has been falling in the countries of western civilization. The decline has been more marked and more rapid in some countries than in others, but they have all, sooner or later, revealed it. It has been more conspicuous in some classes than in others, being greatest for the most prosperous economic groups, for the more highly educated groups, for city-dwellers, and for those occupational groups in which the largest percentage of married women are 'gainfully employed'; but it is exhibited so widely throughout the population as to be a phenomenon of our civilization itself. In a later chapter we shall dwell on the great evolutionary significance of this phenomenon.[17] Here we are merely concerned to point out that this change has not involved the substitution for the family of any other agency to undertake its primary task, but that on the contrary it has been accompanied by a tendency for the reduction of the percentage of births 'outside the family'. Moreover, the decline of the birth-rate has been associated with a decline of the death-rate, and especially of the infant death-rate. In so far at least as the two processes have been concomitant they represent a vital economy of a new and profoundly important character, diminishing the waste and sacrifice of human life, health, energy, and efficiency in the family's task of maintaining the generations of men. This result is in harmony with the working of those other processes of change which, as we have shown, have brought about a diminution of the expenditure of energy by the members of the family in the sheer task of its maintenance. The resulting social economy means the liberation of the members, especially the women members, of the family for other activities. No doubt this new liberty, like every other, creates new problems which society must seek to solve.

Along with the changes in the functions of the family have gone changes in its form, institutional changes affecting the marriage contract and the relation of the members to one another. In the first place the contract is entered into more autonomously by the contracting parties. People are less

[17] Ch. XXIII.

subject to parental control and other forms of social pressure in respect of whom and when they shall marry. The social pressure is lightened particularly for women, on whom it weighed most heavily. The term *old maid* has fallen into relative disuse and has lost much of its old connotation of contempt. Women have attained a new legal status and more recently a new political status, in which there is little or no discrimination between their position and that of men. What is even more important, they have attained a degree of economic independence, in the more prosperous classes as property-owners, in the general population as actual or potential wage-earners or professional workers. They are still far from possessing, on the whole, an equal economic status to that of men. There are minor sex disabilities which stand in the way, and above all the heavier claims on women of the life of the family increase their competitive disadvantage before as well as after marriage. Nevertheless the movement has been towards equality and there are still great possibilities of its advance, whether under a capitalistic or under a more collectivistic régime. The degree of economic independence already achieved has had significant results. In old days the young woman had no alternatives beyond an early marriage or continued dependence upon and subjection to the parental home. Now she can earn her own living and thus gain a sense of immediate independence which affects her whole attitude, gives her more power to choose when and whom she shall marry and even to decide in terms of her own life whether she shall marry or not. There are relatively few women who regard an economic occupation as a permanent alternative to marriage, but the fact that it is a temporary alternative is enough greatly to alter a situation which was bound up with her economic helplessness.

The new situation is revealed by many signs. To begin with, the character of the marriage contract has altered, more perhaps in fact than in form. The traditional marriage ceremony in western civilization was based on the principle of male dominance and female obedience. The wife promised to 'obey', but even where this word remains in the ritual of the

marriage ceremony it is obsolescent, for the most part a meaningless relic of the past. In this connection we may mention also the general decline of ecclesiastical control over marriage. Marriage has become essentially a civil contract though it is often attended by religious rites. It is true that in New England, in early colonial days, the civil character of the marriage contract was insisted upon, but this was due, as in other Calvinistic communities of that age, to the struggle of non-conformist religion against an established church and did not prevent a strong religious determination of the whole system of marriage. This control is now greatly relaxed. For a considerable portion of the population religious rites, when not omitted altogether, assume a secondary importance, and in any event they are not necessary for the validity of marriage in the eyes of the law. There are exceptions to the tendency, as in present-day Italy, but on the whole, the authority of the church over the conditions of marriage, including also the conditions under which it may be dissolved, has markedly declined. This is a factor of great importance for the understanding of the present situation. For the church has always been much concerned with marriage and with sex, and the influence of the Christian church in particular, reinforced by the explicit teaching of St. Paul (see I Cor. VII), was towards sexual asceticism, on the theory that sex itself was 'impure', a theory easily associated with the subjection of women.

Not only economic change and religious change but the whole process of modern civilization within which they fall has worked towards giving women a new position in society and especially in their relations to men. The reduction of the functions of the family, the lightening of the tasks of the home, bringing more leisure to large numbers of women, the shortening of the period of child-bearing or the lengthening of the interval between the arrival of successive children, these and other conditions presently to be discussed, have transformed the family into a new kind of partnership and created new and most interesting problems for the family of the present and of the future.

One evidence of the freer or less authoritarian character of

marriage is found in the increasing frequency of divorce. In many primitive communities custom permitted the husband to divorce the wife on stated grounds—it might be for witchcraft or even for bad cooking—though the wife much more rarely had a similar privilege. Among the ancient Hebrews the husband could likewise give his wife a "bill of divorcement", and the *patria potestas* of the Romans of the earlier republican times included also this right, while the later Roman law extended it rather liberally to the wife. But the patriarchal family of Christendom rested on social and religious beliefs and was bound up with economic conditions which made divorce a rare phenomenon when it was admitted at all, and so it is only recently that the question of divorce has become one of serious practical importance. Although there has been a general increase in the divorce-rate, it differs remarkably for different countries. The extreme disparity is seen if we compare two countries that until recently were closely bound within the same system of traditions, England and the United States. In England, in 1928, the total number of divorces granted ("decrees *nisi* made absolute") was 4018, and this figure represented such an increase over previous years that many English newspapers referred to it as a "national scandal". In the United States for the same year the total number of divorces granted was 195,939. Other countries exhibit figures falling between these extremes. Thus the rate is relatively low for Norway, Sweden, and Belgium, being for the year 1927 respectively 21, 32, and 30 per hundred thousand of the total population. It is higher for Germany, France, Austria and Switzerland, with 58, 45, 81 (1925), and 63 respectively. Nearest to the United States come Japan and Soviet Russia, Japan showing in 1927 a rate of 83 per hundred thousand and Russia 167 (1925) compared with 163 (1928) for the United States.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of these figures is that the frequency of divorce does not conform to the degree of industrial and urban growth, and thus it presents a different problem of interpretation from that involved in most of the changes we have so far been considering. The divergence

is seen still more clearly when we compare the rates for various regions of the United States. The divorce-rate is lowest in the Middle Atlantic states, next in order being the South Atlantic states and New England; the East South Central and West North Central states occupy an intermediate position, with the East North Central states a little higher; while the Mountain, West South Central, and Pacific states, in ascending order, head the list.[18] Why should the West be so much more prolific in divorces than the East? Why should a rather sparsely settled state like Oregon have a rate of one divorce to every 2.5 marriages, while in, say, Pennsylvania there are 8.5 marriages for every divorce? [19]

Many of the explanations offered seem inadequate. Religious differences, such as the proportion of Catholics, are no doubt involved, but some non-Catholic countries, like England, have a very low rate. Racial differences complicate the problem, but the rate is distinctly higher for native whites than for foreign-born whites, so that it is essentially an indigenous development. Differences in state laws afford secondary explanations—obviously they explain why South Carolina has no divorces and why Nevada, as the haven of divorce seekers, has more divorces than marriages. But the laws themselves presumably reflect in some degree the temper of the different communities, and in any event they cannot explain the fact that divorces throughout the whole country have increased nearly 500 per cent since 1880. The inadequacy of the legal explanation is further revealed when we look at the situation in other lands. In general, there are three broad legal attitudes towards divorce. There is the attitude somewhat cryptically expressed in the saying, "whom God hath joined let no man put asunder," as this is interpreted by the Catholic church (though it permits itself on occasion to discover grounds for nullity). This principle is written into the law of Fascist Italy and is found in its most extreme form in

[18] A clear analysis of American divorce statistics is given by Professor Ogburn in Groves and Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships* (New York, 1928), chh. XXII-XXIII.

[19] Figures for the year 1928.

the law of South Carolina. There is the attitude that marriage is normally indissoluble but that divorce is permissible on the suit of either partner when certain grave offenses are committed by the other. This attitude is the basis of the laws of many European countries and of all English-speaking countries except the Irish Free State, which inclines to the Catholic attitude. Lastly, there is the attitude that, with certain safeguards, marriage should be regarded as any other contractual partnership and should be terminable by mutual consent. It is in one respect the exact counterpart of the second attitude. In the United States or in England if both parties want a divorce or contrive together to get it, they thereby commit the crime of collusion. Whereas in Norway, Sweden and Denmark, and a few other countries of Europe as well as in China and in Japan, the mutual consent of the two partners is a valid and sufficient ground. (In Soviet Russia marriage is terminable on the demand of either party.) But here we see the danger of a legalistic interpretation of divorce, for under the free system of the Scandinavian countries or of China the rate is relatively low, and vastly lower than in the United States.

The whole subject of the causation of divorce requires far more study than it has so far received. In the absence of such investigation we can merely hazard the following suggestions to explain why its increase does not conform to the main trends of the changing family, why it is most prevalent in the United States, with Russia and Japan coming next, and why as we proceed westward in the United States we encounter higher rates. Divorce appears most prevalent in the modern world wherever the entrance of women into the economic life is associated with an abrupt break in old traditions, as in Russia and Japan, or with a general individualistic trend in which old traditions lose their hold, as in the United States. The family has been the rallying-point for the sense of social continuity, with its perpetuation of the name as well as of the race. The same home sheltered its successive generations. But the mobility of life so characteristic of the United States and particularly of the West, has weakened this sense of con-

tinuity. It weakens also the external pressure of public opinion. It is well recognized by students of society that physical mobility, such as the tendency to move from one residence to another within a city, is apt to release individuals from group control. That it has its influence on family life is brought out by such a study as that of Professor Mowrer, in which he gives evidence that within the city of Chicago there is a "close relationship between family disorganization and mobility."[20] Under these circumstances difficulties and grievances which in other countries such as England or France would be adjusted or tolerated are consequently sufficient to disrupt the family. Two other factors may have contributed in the United States to this result. One is the legacy of puritanism with its insistence that any infidelity is destructive of the marriage partnership. The other is the growth of the idea that romantic love is the only proper foundation of marriage. This is a modern development which was alien to the spirit of the patriarchal family. It is in harmony with the character of our present-day civilization, as is evidenced by the great stress laid upon it in the modern novel and drama. If, as some observers maintain, "in America the romantic view of marriage has been taken more seriously than anywhere else," it might help to explain the prevalence of divorce.[21] For a sentiment so individualized, so responsive to the happy conjuncture of the harmony of moods in a changeful world, is more calculated to heighten the quality of living than to be the basis of a permanent institution.

Leaving for later consideration the problem of divorce we may observe that the other important changes dealt with in this section have all a decidedly evolutionary character. The family in the course of modern history has parted with a great many functions which were not essential to its nature. These functions have been taken over by other social agencies which in turn have become specialized to perform them, and which

[20] *Family Disorganization and Mobility*, in Volume XXIII of the PUBLICATIONS of the American Sociological Society.

[21] This quotation is taken from Bertrand Russell's book, *Marriage and Morals*, ch. VI.

perform them with more economy and with greater efficiency. The workshop and the office can fulfil their economic tasks in a complex world more effectively than the family ever could. The school can provide many kinds of education which the home could never provide. The hospital can offer medical service which the family has neither the skill nor the equipment to maintain for itself. And so with a large number of other agencies. In the cities many traditional tasks of the household, such as laundrying, preserving, and baking, and in some measure even cooking and cleaning, are becoming specialized. The process may advance still further. Some critics of the day are pointing out how uneconomical it is to have a hundred householders in the same block all tending their individual furnaces—which they no longer do in apartment houses—or to have a hundred housewives all paring potatoes or darning socks when one expert could do it for the lot—and no doubt it is, always provided the housewives can find some job in which they too can specialize. But whatever further changes take place, the process we have described is, as we shall see in the last division of this book, the way of social evolution.

So at last we are brought face to face with the question, What are the essential functions of the family? In other words, what are the functions which it is peculiarly fitted to perform and which give it its justification in a world of specialized agencies and institutions? The sex partnership of the family has a different basis and has different purposes and different consequences from those of any other partnership. Its social claims and social responsibilities are correspondingly different. The process in which irrelevant functions have been stripped from the family has also made clear its essential nature. The peculiar claim of the family is not that it alone fulfils any one function; it is that it alone provides a way of combining and harmonizing certain closely related functions. The functions for which it provides this common basis are at the minimum three in number:

(1) the perpetuation of the race—this is the broader social aspect, but from the point of view of the partners in marriage it includes the satisfaction of philoprogenitive desires, in-

volving not only procreation but also the care and nurture of the young.

(2) the more stable satisfaction of the sex instinct.

(3) the provision of the home, with its combination of material, cultural, and affectional satisfactions.

In a successful family, and in it alone, these functions are so united that each of them reinforces and enriches the satisfaction of the others. Sex becomes not a detached phenomenon but part of a larger experience of comradeship in work and in life. And the nurture of children is given the setting of the home which, as much experience seems to show, is a far more favorable environment for them than that of the state nursery or other public or private institution. In our modern society the family, denuded of its ancient socio-economic functions, stands (or falls) on its claim to harmonize those needs and satisfactions we have just described.

In conclusion, we should observe that the evolution of the family has meant more than the process which has in the main limited it to certain specific functions; there has also been in some degree an evolution of these functions themselves, and it is obviously in respect of these alone that any further evolution can take place. The shedding of irrelevant functions prepares the way for the development of relevant ones. Let us consider from this standpoint each of the three above-mentioned aspects.

The task of race perpetuation is to-day as much the function of the family as it ever was. In fact, it is more exclusively a function of the family than it has been in most periods of history, since the number of 'illegitimate' births has greatly fallen in most civilized communities. Moreover, that task is, on the whole, being much better fulfilled by the family than ever in the past, in the sense that more skill and intelligence is devoted to the care of the new-born and the young child. The objective witness to this fact is the marked decline of the infant death-rate and the greater control over infantile diseases. It is true that in the achievement of this result other agencies have come to the aid of the family, but the responsi-

bility for calling in their aid still belongs largely with the family. On the whole, with the increasing knowledge of child hygiene and the increasing study of child education, the duties devolving on parents have increased also. In general, though much remains to be done, the importance and complexity of the problem of the upbringing of children, of fitting them not only to survive within but to adapt themselves to the conditions of modern society, is becoming more fully realized. The only offset to this advance is that through the practice of birth control married people are enabled as never before to avoid the responsibility of having a family. Like all beneficent forms of human control this also is liable to abuse, and it is always possible that the tendency might proceed so far as to strike at the very existence of society. But such prophetic fears may well be vain, since mankind usually learns to adapt to the general necessities of its continued existence the powers which its own ingenuity has devised.

The satisfaction of the sex instinct is a second function of the family. The degree in which the partnership of marriage suffices to satisfy this instinct is, when we think in terms of human experience and not of ethical dictates, highly variable and subject to perplexing differences of temperament and of the union of temperaments which marriage involves. Moreover, the satisfaction involved may vary from the mere release of physical appetite to the profound sense of total renewal in mutual love. It holds so many aspects that dogmatic and sweeping assertions on the subject, so common in sociological literature, are peculiarly futile. But this much seems clear, that, in contrast with the patriarchal family the modern family is built on a more intimate sense of personal relationship. The choice involved in marriage is more free, and thus personal qualities, and personal attraction of the man for the woman as well as of the woman for the man, count for more. This personal basis for marriage, while it has the danger already pointed out, cannot but affect the degree in which normally, so long as that basis lasts, the satisfaction of the sex instinct is attained within the family. Inevitably, when the economic bonds of the family were weakened under the onset of indus-

trialism, the demand that it should satisfy within it the personal life of the partners grew stronger. The family was thus called upon to fulfil a more difficult task but one which arises out of its very nature. This task has been partly aided, but also much complicated, by the modern practice of birth control. This practice has introduced *within the family* the distinction between the sexual and the reproductive functions. In the unlimited patriarchal family the two were necessarily combined. The independent satisfaction of sexual desire was commonly associated with extra-marital practices, such as concubinage and prostitution. Whereas the limited family of the present permits a greater reconciliation within it of the two functions. This however is but one of the many social consequences of the development of birth control. It must be remembered that the use of contraceptives removes one of the most important determinants of the mores relating to sex in our society, the fear of pregnancy as a result of intercourse between the unmarried. With this powerful incentive in large measure removed, it is to be expected—and signs are already evident—that these mores themselves will for large groups be subject to change.[22]

The third function of the family is the provision of the satisfactions of the home. At all times, for men as well as for women, the desire for a home, an abiding-place personally created, a congenial 'hearth', the shelter or focus of life's activities, has been a powerful incentive to marriage. It is true that in all complex civilizations there are other agencies, such as, in our own, the club and the hotel, which in part compete with the family in offering these satisfactions. But the family provides them in a more intimate form and in that setting of the conjoint life of man and woman and of parents and children with which they are so naturally associated and so readily combined. In this respect also it may be maintained that the change from the patriarchal to the modern family has liberated its potentialities for the fulfilment of its peculiar functions. For the patriarchal family the household

[22] Cf., for example, W. Lippmann, *A Preface to Morals* (New York, 1929), ch. XIV.

was both workshop and home, and the aspect of the workshop, within which the wife was often devoted to the drudgery of incessant labor in addition to the continual bearing of children, was not conducive to the finer quality of the home. If the home has lost some of its former unity because other agencies compete with it there is the corresponding gain that it has become more liberated from conditions, both of drudgery and of male dominance, which prevented it from being, in the full sense, a home. Now that the members of the family pursue their economic tasks outside its walls, now that they go beyond them for various forms of recreation and leisure-time activities as well, the demands which they make on the home are different but not less essential, in some respects narrower but more exclusively directed to those satisfactions which spring from its very constitution.

The position of the family at the present day is both a result and a stage of the great evolutionary process we have been tracing. It is only in the light of that process that we can attempt to understand, as we shall now seek to do, its present character and some of the social problems which it creates.

4. *The Family of To-day*

Throughout the whole range of western civilization the patriarchal family system has dissolved. In the earlier part of the nineteenth century Le Play could point the contrast between the evolving family of Western Europe and the rigid patriarchate of Russia and Eastern Europe.[23] But the latter also has crumbled before the onset of the new forces. The patriarchal family was upheld by authority, buttressed by the religious and the political traditions conformable to an agricultural economy. The authority has departed, the traditions have been eclipsed, and the old economy has been undermined or revolutionized. The modern family has emerged, itself no doubt transitional but in its stage presenting problems of profound interest and social import.

Since the time of Le Play it has been customary to contrast

[23] Le Play, *Les Ouvriers Européens*, Vol. II, *init.*

the stability of the patriarchal family with the instability of its modern successor. Undoubtedly that contrast exists. The patriarchal system was so deeply embedded in the social structure of feudal times that the voluntary dissolution of the individual family was rarely thought of and was rarely possible. For the woman particularly there was no refuge outside the family except the nunnery. The contrast between then and now is largely a contrast between social status and social mobility. Social status was essentially the status of the family, and the identification of the two was confirmed by such legal-economic principles as primogeniture and entail and, for the poorer classes, the family-inherited craft or the rights of the peasant family in the land it cultivated. For these reasons and others already mentioned the family faced the world as a unit, toiled and enjoyed and suffered as a unit. To-day the economic division of labor and the concomitant increase of specific social agencies have greatly diminished the range of direct family partnership in the various interests of life, whether in work or in play. The process is still going on before our eyes. Thus the authors of *Middletown* observe that in the city of their study "accompanying this incipient decline in home parties is the almost total disappearance of whole-family parties before the specialized parties for each age group and the self-sufficient social system of the high school."[24] The members of the family, children as well as parents, establish more individual contacts with the world outside the home. The family, in the urban areas, is a less inclusive system of social relationships than perhaps it ever has been before. This fact has made possible the instability which is charged against it.

Let us then examine this modern instability of the family, as it is revealed by the frequency of divorce, separation, desertion, and the other evidences of disharmony or lack of

[24] R. S. and H. M. Lynd, *Middletown* (New York, 1930), ch. XIX. The authors add the following illustration: "Almost unknown to-day is such a list of guests as appeared frequently in the papers of the nineties:

'Among the many present at the surprise party were Grandma Walker, Mrs. C. P—— and family, S. C—— and family, John W—— and family, Isaac B—— and family, James W—— and family and S. H—— and family. . . .'"

cohesion which come to light particularly in the courts. Our survey of the evolution of the family has prepared us to discover two main causes. It was pointed out in the first section that the individual family passes through more drastic psychological transitions than any other grouping. In the patriarchal family the adjustment of the partners to one another through the tensions and crises of these transitions was imposed, if not otherwise attained, by economic necessity and social pressure. To-day the necessity and the pressure are lessened, and the family, no longer strongly if rudely cemented by extraneous functions, has to surmount in its own strength the psychological tests of its own cohesion. These tests are intensified by the second great cause affecting the stability of the family. The family has become not only a more limited union but one which depends on the harmony of two wills, no longer on the dominance of one. The importance in this regard of the greater personal and social independence of women is very great. It has developed new attitudes which stand in marked contrast to those engendered by the patriarchal régime. It was only at the close of the eighteenth century that the first important manifesto against the social subservience of women, Mary Wollstonecraft's *Vindication of the Rights of Women* (1791), was published, making claims which at that time were regarded by many with abhorrence but which now are commonplace. The prevalent spirit of that closing age might be summed up in the words of its greatest radical, Rousseau, when he declared that "women are specially made to please men." No doubt the acceptance of this doctrine made for a more stable family. In every relationship a union dependent on two wills—a real partnership, in fact—is apt to be less 'stable' than an autocracy of one, and this is peculiarly true of the intensely personal and subtly changeful relationship of sex. The unity is more experimental, more variable, and more liable to disturbance.

The two causes we have mentioned obviously go hand in hand. The less inclusive and the less onerous the tasks which the family performs as a unit, the more possible it becomes for the members to develop and express their personalities, each

in relation to the other. Economic conditions in the past made of the family, for the most part, a forced union so far as the woman was concerned. For the great majority of women their condition of at least partial economic dependence is a determining factor in their attitude towards the family. But this dependence is more relative, more mitigated, than it formerly was, and for the more prosperous classes it practically does not exist. It is very possible that the process which has brought about this change may advance further. In that event the problem of instability will become more urgent.

Before we deal with this problem we must observe that this instability is not a phenomenon which can be detached (and perhaps evaluated) apart from the whole complex of conditions in which it occurs. The contrast between the patriarchal and the modern family is not simply or mainly a contrast between stability and instabilty. It is also a contrast between a more coercive and a freer union. It is not a contrast between a type of family which presented no social problems and one which presents many. It is a contrast of different ideals, different advantages and disadvantages. While the sex life of our age reveals a grave array of problems and maladjustments it also provides an approach towards the solution of some of the most serious problems which the patriarchal system either created or could not solve. Its attitude towards sex is more intelligent and clear-eyed, less clouded by those taboos and dogmas and fears which forbid any rational endeavor to adjust social systems to human needs. Perhaps the greatest of all the gains springing from this new attitude is the dispersal of the unclean superstition of the uncleanness of sex, the atavism of ancient priestly hatred of life. But the new situation has brought with it more measurable gains. The rigor of the patriarchal system has generally had for its concomitant that institution which brought peculiar degradation to an economically defenceless class of women—prostitution with its train of sexual disease. And this at least can be said for the freer sex relations of the present age, that where they exist prostitution is diminishing. Its legacy of disease still remains and is in fact guarded

by another inheritance of the former order, the refusal to apply here the medical knowledge of prevention which has practically abolished all other forms of contagious disease from the world of civilization. The more open-minded attitude towards the facts of sex has still this victory to gain over those who look on disease, no matter though it affects the innocent as well, no matter though it attacks the vitality of the race itself, as a punishment for 'sin'. Another concomitant of the patriarchal family has been its lack of consideration for the unmarried woman, reaching its extreme in the social repulsion of the unmarried mother. The latter attitude might be socially justified in so far as its basis was solicitude for the parental care of children, but the treatment of the 'bastard' child, still visible in the fact that the mortality rate for illegitimate children in cities of the United States is nearly four times as great as for other children, is hard to reconcile with that interpretation.[25] The practice of birth control which is one of the cardinal facts within the modern family, is affecting also, and is likely to affect more greatly, the rate of illegitimacy. We may expect it likewise to affect the resort of abortion which, made more perilous because practised under the ban of the criminal code, has nevertheless been far more common than is usually realized.

One extremely significant aspect of the situation which has brought with it the instability of the family is the manner in which it reconciles the old opposition between individuation and perpetuation. These were the terms in which Herbert Spencer presented the conflict between the fulfilment of the individual life and the maintenance of the species. As he pointed out, the costs of reproduction are heavier when the birth-rate and the death-rate are high and they fall when the birth-rate and the death-rate fall together. The evolution of the modern family has brought close to its limit a process which is operative throughout the whole course of organic evolution. In the lowest forms of life the excess of reproduction over survival is enormous. It diminishes as we mount the scale of evolution, and it is least in the societies of civilized

[25] See Ruth Reed, *The Modern Family* (New York, 1929), ch. XV.

man. A point has now been reached such that in countries with a low death-rate an average of between two and three children per marriage is sufficient to maintain the level of the population.[26] Although there are problems connected with this development which we shall examine later, it is hard to exaggerate the gain in social economy, the reduction of the waste and the suffering of human life, and the emancipation of the personality of women which it represents. The life of woman is no longer exhausted in the toils of child-bearing, suckling, and the inadequate care of numerous offspring, with its attendant mortality, with the perpetual poverty which accompanied it. The responsibility and devotion of the family in the upbringing of children is more fully compensated by the satisfactions which they add to the life of the parents. Thus the demands of sex and the demands of procreation are both more fully harmonized with the whole complex of interests and needs which make up the existence of civilized man.

This is the larger situation within which the instability of the family falls. It is sometimes thought that the development of this situation means the breakdown or even the disappearance of the family altogether. The present evidences give little support to this prediction. We have seen that the tendency is for the frequency of marriage to rise rather than to fall. We have shown that the frequency of divorce, though increasing, is not strongly correlated with the trend of our industrial and urban civilization. We have shown also that the reproductive function is being more exclusively fulfilled within the family than before. In respect of its most essential social function no other agency is taking the place of the family, and as the fulfilment of this function is the first condition of the survival of society it seems very unlikely, apart from a complete revolution of the present mores, that the family will disappear. Within the life of the family are found the chief motives for offspring and the chief compensations for the responsibilities they entail. Even if the taboo on

[26] Cf. Havelock Ellis, *The Family*, in *Whither Mankind* (ed. Charles A. Beard, New York, 1930). See also the author's *Community*, Bk. III, ch. VI, section I.

the illegitimate child were removed, the increasing knowledge of methods of birth control would tend to make its advent more rare. This fact might well furnish an argument for the breaking of that taboo, but nevertheless the woman with strong maternal desires would still have important inducements to seek her satisfaction through marriage if at all possible.

It may further be doubted whether the facility of divorce offers a general solution of the difficulties created by the new character of the marriage partnership. There are of course certain conditions which make the marriage relationship intolerable to one or both of the partners, and where such conditions exist, where the family is no longer fulfilling its social function, it seems unreasonable to compel the partners, in the name of some traditional dogma, to remain together. What special justification has the state when it refuses to admit as a ground of divorce the insanity of either partner or continued desertion or such a degree of incompatibility that the intimate relationship of sex is utterly distasteful or abhorrent? It may be said that the state can never know the inner facts and that therefore if it admits the last-mentioned ground it is opening the doors to easy divorce and to the shirking of marital responsibility. This is precisely true, but all the state can effectively insist upon is the fulfilment of *external* obligations, which is a very different thing from enforcing a union whose true foundations have dissolved. If it is agreed in respect of other social arrangements that the less they depend on enforcement the better, there are peculiarly strong reasons why this should hold of so intimate a union as the family. Consequently there is much to be said in favor of the position taken by countries like Norway and Sweden, where divorce is relatively easy and relatively infrequent. If the family is to serve its most important functions under the conditions of modern society, what is needed is not more divorce and certainly not more compulsion, but new mores adapted to the new situation. Like that of all other great social agencies the sphere of the family has in the course of evolution become more defined and more limited. It is not a universal partnership, for that would destroy the

autonomy of the partners and bind each for life to the possessive will of the other unless liberation is sought through divorce. If the only alternatives presented were unlimited possession or divorce, then divorce would become much more frequent and seriously threaten the family itself. The way out would seem to be the recognition, which is already more apparent in some countries of Europe (such as the Scandinavian countries or France) than in North America, that every disturbance of the marital relation is not a reasonable ground for the dissolution of the family. The family exists for other purposes than the mere satisfaction of sexual desires and in no stage of civilization has the monogamous family been able to persuade men to seek that satisfaction always within its bounds. What Müller-Lyer calls "sexual neophily" characterizes at least a considerable portion of mankind. Certain conditions which suppressed it, such as strong religious beliefs or social fears, have lost some of their power. This is a situation which must be admitted and faced if the family is not to suffer disorganization. How it should be met is a difficult problem, for which no hard and fast prescription can be offered. The adjustment to one another of two personalties admits of endless variations in individual cases. The point here made is simply that divorce is no solution of a problem which society must somehow solve, how to retain within the changing order the essential functions and services of the family.

The problem itself is in part due to the rather exclusive stress put upon romantic love as the true bond of marriage. The flowering of this sentiment is one of the great experiences of life. It involves an integration of sex with the whole personality of the individual. Nevertheless by itself it cannot normally sustain the family through the changes which it inevitably undergoes. In the course of time it has to be supplemented in part, and in part replaced, by other sentiments. The relation of lovers to one another is one thing, the relation of parents to children is another, and from the standpoint of society at large the latter is the more important relationship. The prevalent literature of romantic love and perhaps most of all the screen presentation of it are concerned almost

exclusively with the initial stages of the family and inculcate the idea that the later stages are merely a continuation of these into the future. These simplifications are seriously misleading and constitute a false preparation for the life of the family. Thus romance turns into illusion and the marriage partners embark on experiences which might enrich their lives in new ways but for which they are unprepared and often totally untrained. They stumble, for example, against differences in the emotional nature of man and woman and against biologically determined differences in their parental responsibilities which the glow of romantic love tends to conceal. In old days social conditions and economic pressure made it imperative for the family to hold together in spite of such difficulties. In our day it must depend far more on its intrinsic strength. Hence the importance of an education which is based on facts and not on illusions. Hence the importance of a new set of mores which is adapted to the conditions of the age and which therefore represents the discipline of knowledge. This education should include not only an adequate knowledge of the facts of sex, but also an understanding of the rôle of the family in society. It is, for example, a fact of great social significance, however we interpret it, that there is considerably less crime, less insanity, and less pauperism exhibited by the married than by the unmarried population, and that for men, though not for women, the death-rate for the age-groups from 30 to 50 years is in the United States more than twice as great for the unmarried as for the married.[27] If, as is strongly suggested, the marital condition itself is an important factor in the causation of these differences, it would indicate that, beyond its direct services, the family is one of the conditions of social solidarity and social strength.

5. *The Family and the State*

One peculiarity of the marriage partnership is that the state exercises over it a more stringent control than it is apt to exercise over any other partnership or association. It does not leave the form of the contract to the will of the members.

[27] Groves and Ogburn, *op. cit.*, ch. X.

They cannot prescribe for themselves its conditions or its duration. It fixes a minimum age of marriage. It determines degrees of relationship within which people must not marry. It treats certain violations of the contract (bigamy, for example) as criminal offences. It defines the economic and other responsibilities of the husband towards his wife and of the parents towards the children. It treats the property of the partners as, in some degree, not individual but family possessions, limiting in the name of the family the freedom of bequest. These regulations vary considerably in different states, but everywhere the state is an important determinant of the form and character of the family. When, for example, the French state after the Revolution prescribed, with certain limitations, the equal division of the patrimony among the children of the family, abrogating thereby such old customs as primogeniture, it accelerated the break-up of the joint family and gave an impetus to the process of family limitation.[28]

On what grounds does the state control the family so much more rigorously than other associations? One answer at least is evident. The family performs one function of extreme importance to society, the function of race perpetuation. The union brings new lives into being and therefore involves responsibilities utterly unlike and more profound than those of any other voluntary relationship. Because of this fact the marriage contract, though the most intimate of all contracts, is not simply the personal concern of the contracting parties. The state, as the agent of society, is also deeply interested. The ground we have mentioned, the relation of marriage to procreation, is sufficient, and alone sufficient, to justify a peculiar control of the state over the family. The state has in fact regulated the family on other grounds of much more doubtful validity. It has exercised control on religious grounds which modern political theory regards as beyond its competence.[29] Nor does it justify the coercion of the state to claim—even if the claim could be established—that it is for the good of the partners themselves that they should remain,

[28] Cf. Helen Bosanquet, *The Family* (London, 1906), ch. V.

[29] See my book, *The Modern State*, ch. V, 1.

against their will, in the 'bonds of matrimony'. That is a claim which social experience and education, not political compulsion, should ratify. In his suggestive book, *The Social Good*, Professor E. J. Urwick puts forward the argument that married persons cannot derive the ultimate satisfaction of marriage, "the consciousness of a permanent and unbreakable friendship," unless marriage itself is made a normally unbreakable contract.[30] But such an argument cannot without grave danger be made a ground of legal coercion. It is not simply that the claim may be attacked on psychological principles, though the fact that there are relatively few divorces under the mutual consent system of Norway and Sweden reveals its weakness. It might also be claimed on the other hand that enforcement in matters where personality is intimately concerned is often a means of destroying the good it would enforce. But there is a broader objection. History shows how perilous it is to force people to do or endure things for what others believe to be their good. If the state says, addressing its adult citizens, "you must do this because a majority thinks it good for you", it is asserting a principle which would justify any tyranny, over morals, over religion, even over opinion. It is a quite different affair when the state says, "you must do this because if you fail others will suffer a definite hurt". Hence we conclude that the protection of child life, the safeguarding of its future citizens, affords the only clear ground on which the state can reasonably claim to regulate marriage beyond all other contracts.

If this principle is accepted it leads to important conclusions regarding the policy of the state. It would follow, for example, that the state has no particular concern with childless marriages, which in fact are the most fruitful of divorce. It has very little concern with the period of marriage after it has fulfilled its primary function, when the children no longer need the special guardianship of the family. If the welfare of the race is its chief interest it should seek to protect most those children, including illegitimate children, who most need its aid. Generally, it should regulate marriage just in so far

[30] *The Social Good* (London, 1927), ch. VII.

as by that regulation it can serve the cause of the young and the helpless. If a condition arises under which a marriage fails to realize its primary social purpose, it should not, on moralistic grounds, insist on its maintenance unless it has good reason to believe, in each particular case, that its continuance is demanded by the interest of the children of the marriage. Where the failure is deep-seated, where the probability is that, on account of extreme or long-established incompatibility of the partners or because of cruelty, insanity, venereal disease, or other serious evil, the marriage is actually harmful to the welfare of the children or of the race, the duty of the state is rather to dissolve the partnership than blindly to insist that it be maintained. No other environment has proved as favorable for the upbringing of children as the home which the parents create, if that home is even relatively harmonious; but if the home is utterly inharmonious or positively harmful, the state cannot by compulsion end the trouble and must seek to protect the children in some other way. The future of the family does not depend on state coercion but on human experience of its benefits, in the last resort on the recognition of its superiority, as a means of satisfying certain human needs, over any alternative system.

On the whole, the trend of state policy has been in the direction we have indicated. Social experience shows that there are some matters which it is competent to control and others over which its control fails. As social conditions change the character of its control must correspondingly change. The state, for example, has tried to make adultery a crime, but even where such a law remains on the statute book its enforcement has proved so impracticable or inexpedient that the law is generally a dead letter. The state has tried to prohibit the knowledge of birth control but, with consequences which it did not foresee, has succeeded only in keeping it from the very poor and the very ignorant. On the whole, the traditional policy of the state, now gradually breaking down, has been aimed at the preservation of the *status quo ante*. But no social institution can stand eternally remote from change in a changing age. And no institution can or should stand in its own sanctity, immune

from the process of experiment. Force cannot in a complex society prevent experiment, though force may pervert it. That there is much actual experimentation in sex relationships is beyond dispute. The advocates of what is named 'companionate marriage' propose that the state give its official seal to one form of experiment, but such action is also, on our principle, beyond the competence of the state. Since the arrangement in question does not contemplate offspring, there seems no strong reason why the state should either recognize it or, directly or indirectly, prevent it. It is rather a question of *social* approval or disapproval, according to the standards of different groups. It is meant to solve, without hypocrisy and without disguise, certain undoubted problems of sex life under the conditions of modern society—to make possible an honorable sex relationship for those who are not in an economic position to establish a family or to institute a period of trial and adjustment before the partners are committed to the bonds and parental responsibilities of marriage proper. As such, it has advantages and disadvantages. Its chief disadvantage, that instead of being a preparation for marriage it might tend to reduce the social significance of that institution and the sense of social responsibility which it demands, would be increased by legal recognition. We see no reason here to make an exception to the general principle which is becoming in some other respects accepted by the modern state, that its right to control marriage fundamentally rests upon the fact that marriage is the avenue to the life of the family, to the procreation of children, whose welfare, being the welfare of the race, must always remain a primary consideration of the state.

We have spoken so far only of the regulative or coercive function of the state, but it should be recognized that the state has another and more constructive function, that of bringing positive aid and support to the family. The state can, apart from compulsion, uphold the family in many ways. This is in large measure a modern and a growing task for the state, and one in the fulfilment of which, instead of opposing the processes of social change, it is endeavoring to make fruitful application of them. In modern society the welfare of the child requires the

provision of manifold services which the state can stimulate or supply, which above all it can make available to those families which through poverty are unable to supply them for themselves or through ignorance are unaware of the need for them. The equipment of the child to take his place in society, the equipment of mind and body through appropriate training in an environment made healthy, is an immense task the nature and extent of which is gradually being recognized. Without the aid of the state the vast social heritage cannot be made available to the majority of families. In a previous section we referred to another new task of the state, the financial support of parenthood under modern competitive conditions. A further task, which is still very experimental and rather poorly developed, is the institution of juvenile courts, child-welfare clinics, and other agencies to meet those maladjustments of child life which arise under the conditions of modern society and which the family fails to overcome.[31] An interesting experiment of another kind is the court of domestic relations which is found in various cities. Such a court, if presided over by persons of wide social experience and understanding who offer friendly counsel instead of laying down compulsory law, can not infrequently prevent a temporary discord from leading to permanent disruption. This too is an entirely different service from the traditional coercive function of the state.

There remains nevertheless, if the state is to fulfil its function as already defined, a place for coercive control. The prevention of controllable conditions which are clearly inimical to the welfare of the race becomes a definite obligation of the state. For example, in the United States the statutory minimum age of marriage for girls ranges, with one exception, between twelve and sixteen years, there being still twelve states which retain the lower of these limits.[32] There is sufficiently clear evidence of a physiological nature that these minima are set too low. Again, the state still sanctions mar-

[31] An illuminating account of this subject is contained in *The Child in America*, by W. I. Thomas and D. S. Thomas (New York, 1928), Part II.

[32] See Richmond and Hall, *Child Marriages* (New York, 1925). The figures quoted above are for the year 1928.

riages which, on account of some grave and deep-seated taint, hereditary or acquired, in either partner are beyond doubt dysgenic. It is the duty of the state to discourage and if possible to prevent such marriages. This is attempted under the well-known Wisconsin law, which requires medical certification for marriage, especially to prevent the mating of those affected with venereal disease. The law in question has not proved an entire success, partly because inadequate provision was made under it for the medical services which it involves, partly because its demands can be evaded in various ways.[33] But there can be no objection in principle to a law of this kind, though experience shows that it can achieve its end only if backed up by social education. It should, however, be pointed out that if the state is in earnest in its attempt to combat venereal disease it must not only permit but encourage the application of medical knowledge for prophylaxis as well as for treatment. Another aspect of the danger of confusing moral and medical problems is seen in the law of Idaho which permits the sterilization of "mental defectives, epileptics, habitual criminals, moral degenerates, and sex perverts." Only in respect of the first of these classes is there reasonable biological evidence to justify compulsion in the name of the welfare of the race. As Bertrand Russell observes, "the law of Idaho would have justified the sterilization of Socrates, Plato, Julius Caesar, and St. Paul."[34] A recent law of Oklahoma actually provides for the sterilization of third-term criminals! Compulsion cannot, without serious risk, do more than obviate the more extreme social dangers. Beyond that, it is necessary to rely on social education. It is important to remember that marriage itself is the most significant of all forms of social selection. It is a form of selection which has become intensely personal, but that fact makes it all the more important that the younger generation should receive a training for parenthood and be taught the responsibilities of marriage. By its policy the state, if it avoid the dangers of propagandism, can lead the way.

[33] See F. S. Hall, *Medical Certification for Marriage* (New York, 1925).
[34] *Marriage and Morals*, ch. XVIII.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE ORGANIZED GROUP OR ASSOCIATION

1. *Interests and Associations*

We dealt first with communal and quasi-communal groups, the spontaneous groups which are prior to organization. We saw that the family occupied an intermediate position, being for its younger members a community and for its adults an association. Now we turn to purely associational forms. The difference is not hard to discern. It is seen in the contrast between the crowd and the assembly, between the class and the party, between the nation and the state. The association establishes a specific and limited relationship between the members. We are members of it by virtue of specific attributes or qualifications, corresponding to the specific objects for which it is organized. As pointed out in chapter IV, it is in terms of interests rather than of attitudes that we can explain the formation and maintenance of associations. Attitudes encourage or discourage, but they do not create organizations. Associations come into being as means or modes of attaining interests. An association is liable to be formed wherever people recognize a like, complementary, or common interest sufficiently enduring and sufficiently distinct to be capable of more effective promotion through collective action, provided their differences outside the field of this interest are not so strong as to prevent the partial agreement involved in its formation. It is obvious that a heterogeneous specialized community affords more opportunity for the creation of organized groups than a simple or primitive community. The former is more able to distinguish particular interests from the general one and more tolerant of differences which are irrelevant to the pursuit of any particular interest. The constant changes which occur in a specialized community precipitate occasions favorable to the emergence of new groups. Nothing is more char-

acteristic of modern societies than the multiplicity of organizations which they contain.

The recognition of an interest which can be promoted by organization is not of itself sufficient to bring an association into being. There are inertias, prejudices, problems of ways and means, still to be overcome. Here is where the service of leadership is most manifest. Usually it is the initiative, enthusiasm, and energy of one or a small number which prepare the ground. The leaders, whether from sheer devotion to the cause or from the sense of incidental advantages to themselves in the form of place or power or prestige or economic gain—usually no doubt from a combination of these motives—accentuate the advantage of organization and seek to establish attitudes in the potential members favorable to its formation. Often some precipitant, some crisis or conjuncture of events, stimulates the leaders themselves to action. The psychology of leadership in the formation and development of groups is an interesting theme which we cannot here pursue. The tasks of the leader in the nascent stage are to create or intensify the consciousness of the need for the new organization, or in other words the sense of the interest around which it is organized, to instil confidence in themselves and thus in the efficiency of the organization they propose, and to harness this heightened sense of need to the practical necessities of financial or other co-operation on the part of the members. In order to organize an interest, it must first be presented in a certain detachment from others, and then, *in its organized form*, it must be brought into harmony with the complex of interests of the members.

The nature of the interest to be organized determines the specific task of leadership. The latter is obviously different where the interest is of an economic nature from what it is when a cultural interest is in question. It is different where the interest is general and vague and where the interest possesses an intimate and limited appeal. Let us take one example. For multitudes the promotion of international peace is an interest, though an indefinite one. A peace organization arises and at once gives it some definition, offering a practical

goal, a specific way of focussing and furthering the interest. The particular obstacles which in this instance the leaders must overcome in the potential members are the sense of remoteness from the controlling factors in the situation and thus of the futility of the nascent organization, the danger of cleavages over policy which a project so general and so 'ideal' is apt to engender, and the resistance of traditions which associate the advocacy of peace with a lack of patriotism, with something dysphemistically named 'pacifism'. This last barrier exemplifies a problem which often arises in the promotion of cultural organizations. The generality of men are reluctant or unable to observe likenesses or unlikenesses which disturb their social attitudes, which break what Lippmann has named their 'stereotypes', confounding their established complacencies regarding social values and unsettling that sense of unity and difference which confirms limited solidarities and 'social distances'. A 'pacifist' is such a stereotype to many, belonging to the same order as the stereotypes which represent the Catholic to the Protestant and *vice-versa*, the Jew to the Gentile, and so forth. A new organization which evokes these stereotypes, such as the Ku Klux Klan, is likely to grow more rapidly though its foundations may be less secure than one which opposes them.

Since interests are determinant of the form and character of associations we shall proceed to classify associations in terms of interests. First however we must classify interests themselves. In the next section we shall classify them in respect of their intrinsic character or content. Here we are concerned simply with the modes of relationships which the interests of *different* individuals exhibit. In accordance with the usage established in chapter II, we shall speak of like interest when two or more persons severally or distributively pursue a like object, each for himself. The means of satisfying the primary appetites constitute a like interest for all individuals. We have a like interest in gaining a livelihood, in food and drink, in health, and so forth. When on the other hand two or more persons pursue an aim or object which remains a unity for them all, which they seek as a whole, each

seeking it for all, we call it a common interest. A family, a neighborhood, a city, a nation, a custom, a code, the relief of the destitute, scientific advance, cultural standards—these are types of common interest. They evoke in us the desire to maintain or establish them for others as well as for ourselves. They evoke loyalties which unite us with one another in an inclusive quest which is not resolvable into a simple aggregate of individual quests.[1]

An association may be formed primarily to promote either a like interest or a common interest of the members. An economic association is generally based on like interest. Its main function is usually to provide wages or salaries or profits or dividends for those who belong to it. A cultural association is generally organized around a common interest, though this does not imply that the common interest contains the main motive which inspires the adherence or devotion of its members, but only that apart from the common interest it could not come into existence or be maintained. Moreover, in spite of this initial difference between these two types of association it is an essential truth that, once in being, nearly all organized groups represent, for at least some of its members, both a like and a common interest. This double character of the interest which an association sustains is so important for the understanding of the social structure that we must illustrate and explain it more fully.

Let us take first a college society, a team, say, or a fraternity. Obviously the members get an individual or private satisfaction through belonging to it. Membership in the team, for example, satisfies their like interests of recreation and physical exercise, perhaps brings some distinction with it; it also satisfies the like and the complementary interest of companionship. But it has a further interest for its members. They want the team to succeed not simply because it redounds to their credit as individuals. They want it to succeed also for the credit of the team or for the credit of the college. Their individual interests merge in this inclusive interest. If a player does badly

[1] For a fuller classification of these modes of relationship between interests see *Community*, Bk. II, ch. II.

he is still gratified that the team wins; if he shines, he is still distressed that the team loses. Each has in degree the sense of the whole. Each shares a common interest.

Or take again a family group. Again it satisfies certain like and complementary interests of the members. But the family itself is normally an interest to each, a common interest. Each has some concern for the well-being of the others, not merely because their well-being is a means to his own, but because also he cares directly for his family. When one of the family distinguishes himself, the gratification of the others cannot be resolved merely into a sense of reflected glory. When one member disgraces himself the others are downcast not simply because it affects their own reputations or because it makes the family a less desirable or less efficient agency for the fulfilment of their self-centered interests. The family itself is an interest to each, so that like interest and common interest are for each inextricably combined. In the pride and sorrow which the members share, in their attachment to common traditions and common achievements, in their struggles and sacrifices for the welfare of the whole, in their memory of its past and their hope for its future, they reveal in varying degrees that social solidarity which marks the presence of a common interest. If this fact be challenged, it is enough to adduce in proof the anxiety of members of the family to provide for others in a future beyond their own lives. This sense of responsibility for others can arise only in the presence of a common interest.

Finally, let us take an instance in which the initial dominance of like interests is manifest, as in a business firm. It is established to provide dividends or profits, but if it endures it tends to mean something more in the lives of the partners or directors. This does not mean merely that in addition to profits they find it the source of power or personal prestige. It is likely to appear in their eyes as a co-operative enterprise, perhaps also as a service to the community. They find some satisfaction in its success, in its tradition, in its institutions, apart from their personal advantage. They will spend money, not wholly for its advertising value, in erecting a beautiful

building, a model factory, a temple-like bank. A common interest has developed out of a like interest.[2]

We shall fail to appreciate the social significance of the association unless we realize that it is held together by the twofold interest of its members in it, by the subtly interwoven bonds of like and common interest. When an association of the economic order brings like interests into co-operative harmony it is at the same time supplementing the like interest by a common interest and thus enlarging the sphere of common interest. In this way, within the limits of membership, each association sends a taproot down to the deep sources of society. The more enduring the association the stronger this taproot is likely to grow. Within every association there arises also the conflict of dividing interests, of the competitive desires for place and power. These are normally kept within limits because the existence of the association itself becomes a primary condition on which their satisfaction depends. In other words, the like interests must be accommodated to the common interest. It is worth observing that every organized group, seeking its own preservation or expansion, endeavors in various ways to cultivate the common interest. For example, it devises symbols of its unity and keeps them before the attention of its members. There is a multitude of ways in which the common interest is emphasized—slogans, appellations of brotherhood, emblems, flags, festivals, parades, processions, initiation rites, rallies, inter-group competitions, and

[2] The existence of this common interest, as defined, is sometimes denied because of a psychological confusion. It is inferred that because we get satisfaction out of something we do it in order to get this sense of satisfaction and that therefore the interest is self-centered. This psychological hedonism, as has often been pointed out, is unsound. One would not in fact get the sense of satisfaction in question unless the thing from the achievement of which or the group from the well-being of which our satisfaction springs were the direct object of our desire.

We should at the same time observe that like and common interests are not to be identified respectively with selfish and unselfish interests. Such ethical terms are misleading and irrelevant in a psychological analysis.

Finally, confusion arises because we do not distinguish adequately between an interest and a motivation (see chapter III). The group as a whole remains a common interest no matter what motives we may discover in the minds of those who entertain it.

so on, all designed to evoke or sustain the *esprit de corps* of the members, to make them feel their solidarity. The student will find it worth while to compare the various ways in which different associations, according to their kind, trade-unions, business firms, churches, schools and colleges, rotary clubs, mystic brotherhoods, political parties, make appeal directly or indirectly, through symbols or through exhortations, to the common interest.

2. *Associations Classified in Terms of Interest*

In a complex society associations tend to be specialized so that each stands for a particular type of interest or interest-complex. In primitive society, where there is less division of labor and where change is slower, there are few associations and they are more inclusive. They are communal or semi-communal in the range of their interest. A new-developed interest does not create, as with us, a new association, but is incorporated in the general body of interests pursued by the existing organization. Thus in primitive life associations lack the specific limited functional character which our own possess. They take such forms as age-groups, kin-groups, sex-groups, secret societies, rather than the economic or professional or political or cultural varieties familiar to ourselves. This contrast will be shown more fully when we come to the subject of social evolution. Meantime, it may suffice to note that the functional differentiation of modern organized groups makes it possible for us to classify them according to the characteristic interests they severally pursue.

Certain cautions should, however, be kept in mind when we seek after this fashion to classify associations. One is that the ostensible interest is not always determinant. The professed or formulated aims of an association do not necessarily reveal the full or even the true character of the object which it chiefly seeks. But at least a part of this difficulty disappears when we take as the basis of classification the immediate field of interest rather than the remote objectives or purposes, when in particular we avoid the confusion of interests and motivations. It would indeed be a hazardous

task to classify associations in terms of professed objectives or ulterior aims. For one thing, a disparity not infrequently arises because the association, passing through historical changes, clings traditionally to older formulations—as religious bodies are particularly apt to do—or because the leaders idealize its aims, in the desire to broaden its appeal, to strengthen its public position, to secure funds, and so forth. Such idealization is seen not only in the platforms of political parties but also in the pronouncements of many other organizations. Often an organization will stress the more altruistic of the objects which lie within the field of its interest. A department store will proclaim that it exists to serve the community. A professional organization will emphasize the necessity of rigid qualifications for membership on the ground that the service of the public must be safeguarded while it is more or less silent on the competitive advantage thereby gained.

We should also observe that we are far from expressing the distinctive character of any individual association when we have placed it in its interest category. The character of an individual association is often very subtle and it is only in the light of a considerable study of its activities that its true nature and proper distinctiveness can be found. Moreover, in every case the interest it pursues is colored or modified by the character of the constituents and the character of the community in which it functions. There are elements in the nature of many organizations which are not brought into the focus of consciousness by the members or even by the leaders. For example, an organization which has gradually abandoned a traditional basis of solidarity may gropingly move in a new direction and gain a new kind of solidarity, related to but different from that which its leaders believe and certainly state that it possesses. This situation is illustrated in the history of certain semi-religious organizations such as the Y.M.C.A. and the Y.W.C.A. Shall we classify them as religious or recreational or generally educational or in a broad sense as social clubs? What element is focal or dominant in the interest-complex? For reasons just suggested

it is hard to answer. The Y.M.C.A. or the Y.W.C.A. is a characteristic association, a certain 'kind' of association with its own social 'flavor'. But it is a different kind in a rural area and in, say, a metropolitan area. In each region it has responded to certain social exigencies, seeking in the face of competing social agencies still to represent something, something in some way different from the rest, for when an organization loses its specific identity it loses its reason for existence in our much-organized society.

Another problem of classification, arising out of the changing relation of associations to interests, is revealed in the struggle to survive of those which have fulfilled their original *raison d'être*. Organizations too are tenacious of life. They refuse to die when their day is past. They seek new interests, a justification of their life in a continuing purpose beyond the one that is dead. The will to live centers in the officials of the organization. A political association comes into being to achieve some piece of legislation. It is attained, and the association lingers on. Thus a league for the enfranchisement of women turns into a party organization when women are enfranchised. An ancient guild is rendered obsolete by industrial change. Yet it survives as an "honorable company", to perpetuate ancient ceremonies at annual dinners. Once an economic organization it has passed over into another category.

A more important obstacle to a satisfactory classification is presented by those organizations which stand for a variety of different interests in such a way that it is hard to designate any one as dominant. Shall we classify a denominational college as a religious organization? Sometimes religion is the primary interest, sometimes merely the historical matrix. Shall we assign an organization for workers' education as economic or as cultural? It may exist to train trade-union leaders or to inculcate the principles of Marx or to provide a general education—and it may combine all these interests in one. Shall we call a business men's club an association for social intercourse or an economic association? One aspect may be dominant at one time, the other at another. These are examples of the difficulty which frequently occurs when

we seek to place associations in the categories described below.

And this difficulty leads up to our final caution. We are making interests the basis of our classification, but the correspondence of interest and association is not, even in our specialized society, a simple one. There are some strong interests, such as the interest of power and of distinction, which do not normally create specific associations but ramify through associations of every kind. The dynastic state might be termed a power-organization, but the quest of power in some form invades every political system, underlies the interest of wealth which is the direct object of economic association, and in fact is found wherever organization of any kind exists. We might call certain kinds of club prestige-organizations, but as the interest of prestige is fostered no less in many other kinds of association, and particularly as men do not pursue prestige except through the medium of other interests, such an attribution would only confuse our classification. Again, the interest of companionship or of social intercourse is so pervasive that it is in some degree satisfied by every association and thus it is often dubious whether or not it is the main determinant. We take the club as the type-form association corresponding to this interest, but social intercourse is not the focus of all bodies called clubs and on the other hand there are various groups ostensibly established for other objects, from library associations to spelling-bees, from charity leagues to sewing-meetings, which are sustained mainly by this interest. The main interest of a group cannot be inferred from the name we apply to it. A gang, for example, may be little more than a boys' brotherhood, or it may be essentially an economic organization, exploiting a neighborhood by illegal means for economic ends.

Turning now to our actual classification, we first divide associations into unspecialized and specialized, according as they stand for the total interests of a group or class or on the other hand represent either a particular interest or a particular mode of pursuing interests. We include the state among specialized associations, because in spite of the vast

range of its interests it works through the particular agencies of law and government. As has been pointed out, unspecialized associations are less characteristic of modern society—and less effective within it—than specialized associations. The latter are classified in terms of the distinction between primary and secondary interests. By the latter we mean those interests which *by their very nature* are means to other interests. It is true that any object we seek can become the very goal of our search, so that we look for no utility beyond it. We may seek wealth merely to possess it and not for its ulterior services; we may construct mechanisms, perhaps even social organizations, because we enjoy doing so and not because they will aid us to achieve other objects.

Nevertheless the economic system would not exist but for the interests which underlie it, and mechanisms would be idle and soon-forgotten toys but for the necessity which makes them our instruments. We divide these secondary or utilitarian interests into three classes, the economic, the political, and the technological. Another large group of interests, the educational, may perhaps be placed as intermediate between secondary and primary, since they are both utilitarian and cultural. It may be held that all genuine education, elementary or higher, technical or 'liberal', is, in its degree, at the same time essentially an equipment for living and a mode of the fulfilment of life. Set over against the secondary interests are the cultural interests, the objects which we pursue apart from external pressure or necessity. Here again it is true that they may serve us merely as means, but their utilitarian service is incidental to the fact that we, or some of us, pursue them for their own sakes, because, that is, they bring us some direct satisfaction. The significance of this distinction and its justification will be seen more fully in later parts of this work.[3] It will reappear in the distinction between civilization and culture.

[3] See ch. XII.

The classification of interests in this section is based on the same principle, though differently treated, as that given in the author's *Community*, Bk. II, ch. II.

TABLE I

GENERAL CLASSIFICATION OF INTERESTS AND ASSOCIATIONS

Interests	*Associations*
A. UNSPECIALIZED	Class and caste organizations Tribal and quasi-political organizations of simpler societies Age-groups The patriarchal family Perhaps also such organizations as vigilante groups, civic welfare associations, etc.
B. SPECIALIZED	
I. *Secondary*	
(a) Economic interests	Type form—*the business* Industrial, financial, and agricultural organizations Occupational and professional associations [4] Protective and insurance societies Charity and philanthropic societies [5] Gangs, etc.
(b) Political interests	Type form—*the state* Municipal and other territorial divisions of the state Parties, lobbies, propagandist groups
(c) Technological interests	Associations for technical research, and for the solution of practical problems of many kinds [6]
II. *Intermediate*	
Educational interests	Type form—*the school* Colleges, universities, study-groups, reformatories, etc.

[4] These combine economic and technological interests; where the latter are dominant the associations fall in I (c).

[5] The economic interest is usually though by no means always the focus of these associations. The fact that it is the economic welfare of others than the members which is sought does not affect the classification.

[6] The technological interest is generally subordinate to the economic, i.e. it is a means to a means. Hence it is usually pursued through subagencies of the economic order. Sometimes it is organized under political auspices, through such divisions as a department of agriculture, bureau of standards, etc.

TABLE I—*Continued*

GENERAL CLASSIFICATION OF INTERESTS AND ASSOCIATIONS

Interests	*Associations*
III. *Primary*	
(a) Social intercourse	Type form—*the club* Various organizations ostensibly for the pursuit of other interests
(b) Health and recreation	Hospitals, clinics, etc. Associations for sports, games, dancing, gymnastic and other exercises, for diversions and amusements [7]
(c) Sex and reproduction	Type form—*the family*
(d) Religion	Type form—*the church* Religious propagandist associations Monasteries, etc.[8]
(e) Aesthetic interests, art, music, literature, &c.	Corresponding associations
(f) Science and philosophy	Learned societies

The foregoing classification is meant to serve as an introduction to the study of the social structure. Our task in this study is to reveal the distinctive types of association which enter into the social structure—distinctive in respect of the kinds of social relationship which they exhibit—and at the same time to show their place and function in the society, their relation to one another and to the whole. We shall see that the nature of the interest is the main determinant of the character of the association, though complicated by the peculiar circumstances of each group. Within the broad fields of interest specified in Table I there are of course a great many varieties. An economic interest, for example, may have a wide or a narrow range, may be limited to the gain of the members

[7] The interests of health and of recreation may of course be entirely dissociated. The interest of recreation is on the other hand often associated with the aesthetic interests, so that various associations could be classified under III (b) or under III (e).

[8] The monastery is a quasi-community but if religion is the main determinant of its activities as well as the basis of organization we can retain it under III (d).

or extend far beyond it or be essentially altruistic, may be a temporary or an enduring objective. It is not then simply the interest as a type but the interest in its variety which serves as a clue to the structural character of the association. Associations within the same field may be transient, rapidly successive, or permanent. They may be permanent as established *forms* of social organization like the family, though the individual instances are mortal, or they may be long-lived, potentially immortal, as individual structures, like the corporation. In the following table we neglect the interest-types in order to classify associations in terms of the distinction just mentioned.

TABLE II

ASSOCIATIONS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO THE DURABILITY OF THE INTEREST

Interests	*Associations*
(a) Interests realizable once for all— definite temporary objectives	Associations for the achievement of a specific reform, reconstruction, etc., political or other (e.g. anti-slavery); for a celebration, erection of a memorial, &c.; for an emergency such as a flood, economic crisis, war
(b) Interests peculiar to a definite number of original or potential members—the "broken plate" situation [9]	Groups composed of the members of a school or college class or year, of army veterans, of the survivors of a shipwreck, etc.
(c) Interests limited to age-periods of a relatively short range	School and college teams, debating societies, etc.; boy scouts, junior leagues, etc.—associations continuous as individual structures but with rapidly successive memberships

[9] The reference here is to a famous illustration given by Simmel (*Soziologie*, Munich, 1923, p. 60). A group of industrialists were seated at a banquet when a plate was dropped and shattered into fragments. It was observed that the number of pieces corresponded to the number of those present. Each received one fragment, and the group agreed that at the death of any member his fragment was to be returned, the plate being thus gradually pieced together until the last surviving member fitted in the last fragment and shattered again the whole plate.

TABLE II—*Continued*

ASSOCIATIONS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO THE DURABILITY OF THE INTEREST

Interests	*Associations*
(d) Interests limited by the tenure or life-span of some original or present members	Partnerships of various kinds; groups of friends; the family—permanent as a social system embodied in successive individual associations [10]
(e) Interests unlimited by a time-span	The corporation; most large-scale organizations, state, church, occupational associations, scientific associations, etc.—associations individually continuous through the recruitment and incorporation of new members

Finally, there is one very simple division of associations which is very helpful as an introduction to the study of the social structure. It is based on the structural distinction between the unit or uni-cellular groups, called by Cooley face-to-face groups, and the complex or multi-cellular organizations which establish the main lines of order in a large-scale society. In the face-to-face group the relation of the members to one another is direct and personal. It needs little internal organization, and on that very account its study gives us a more intimate understanding of the nature of the social bond and of the primary social processes that occur in the life of the group. Traditionally all large-scale associations have begun as face-to-face groups, and they still retain, though in a modified form, these personal groups within them, as necessary

[10] The larger patriarchal family or the 'joint family' does not fall within this class, but the modern individual family does. We speak of the family in another sense, as when we say that a person is a member of an 'old' family, but in this sense the family is not an association.

Observe particularly the difference between the groups under (b) and under (d). The interest which creates an association under (b) is unique, peculiar to the members, and dies with the association. It has therefore little significance for the social structure. The interest under (d) is universal in its appeal and particularizes itself in a multitude of individual associations. The interest under (b) is in fact the social bond itself, whereas the interest under (d) is the perennial source of the social bond.

nuclei of their more elaborate structure. We shall therefore consider first the character of the face-to-face group, before we pass on to the complex associations.

3. *Conflicts of Interests within Associations*

The interest for which an association stands is the primary ground of its unity, the basis of its particular cohesion. This unity is reinforced by other bonds, by the shared tradition and prestige of the association or the associates, by the sustenance of the general need of society which it may provide, by the incidental life-habits which it supports, by the other common interests which the members share in whole or in part. But at the same time there are forces generated or revealed within the association which cause tensions and strains in its solidarity. There are conflicts in the field of the particular interest and there are conflicts arising from oppositions between that interest and the other interests of the members. Like the greater communal types of cohesion, that of the association is imperfect, unstable, representing, while it endures, the victory of integrative over disintegrative elements. A study of the conflicts and harmonies of interest which appear within the life of an association might be in fact a preparation for the study of that greater unstable equilibrium which is society itself.

We select for brief discussion three main types of conflict which occur persistently in the history of associations. The first arises from the lack of harmony between the objectives which fall within the interest-complex. An obvious illustration is frequently presented within professional or occupational associations. The economic interest, the maintenance or enhancement of the emoluments of the service they render, is not at all points reconciled with the professional interest proper, the quality and extent of the service. The medical profession offers a peculiarly interesting situation. If it could achieve its professional ideal, it would thereby reduce to a minimum the need for its therapeutic service while enlarging greatly its preventive service. The former is mainly private practice, the latter is largely socialized, provided through

clinics, hospitals, state departments, public and semi-public institutions of various kinds. Here a dilemma is apt to arise not only because private practice is more in accord with the traditions of the profession but also because it tends, under prevailing conditions, to be more remunerative. If economic interest alone determined the policy of a professional organization, whether medical or other, we would have simply a conflict between the associational interest and the public interest. But the medical association, like other professional groups, is concerned with the efficacy of the service which it represents.[11] Hence there arises a conflict of interests within the association itself, in the attempt to work out a policy which will reconcile or adjust the economic interest and the professional ideal. It would be easy to show that similar problems of the adjustment of interests arise within bar associations, educational associations, business firms, trade-unions, and other bodies. The conflict is seen very clearly also in political groups. It is only in extreme exploitative organizations, such as that centering round a political boss, that the economic interest entirely drives out the professional interest, that of the standard of service—and when this happens the organization becomes simply and solely an enemy of society.

The second type of conflict arises where the specific interest of the association demands a course of action which is opposed to some other interests not relevant to the association as such but also entertained by some members of the group. A highly qualified negro, let us say, seeks admission to a university. He possesses the requisite qualifications, for racial difference

[11] Sometimes conditions occur under which a professional organization may practically disregard the professional interest proper. Thus the authors of a report on British professional associations (Supplement to the NEW STATESMAN (London), April 28th, 1917), stated that the civil service associations "all fail as yet to give any but the slightest attention to the development of their particular branch of technique or the improvement of their own vocational training." In the same report it is suggested that the difficulty of reconciling economic and cultural interests explains the break-away of scientific associations from general professional associations—as seen in the formation of the sections of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, of the Chemical Society, the Historical Society, the Philosophical Society, and so forth.

is no bar to scholarship. But other considerations which have nothing to do with the express purpose of the association enter in and create within the association a conflict concerning policy. In one form or another such conflicts are constantly occurring. Outside interests prevent the association from pursuing with single-mindedness its proper objectives. Group prejudices modify the devotion of the association to its avowed objective. Individual jealousies and predilections thwart the interest which is the *raison d'être* of the organization. Thus confusion and disharmony appear within its councils.

We may include in the same general category the conflict which arises owing to the fact that the interests of the officials or leaders are not identical with those of the other members. The officials are anxious to enhance their authority, though this may lead to policies detrimental to the general interest. Or they have an economic interest which is at variance with the interest, economic or other, of the group. The degree of maladjustment varies not only with the personalities involved, but also with the nature of the interest. A particularly significant illustration is furnished by groups founded on principles of equality. It has been maintained that because leaders, as soon as they acquire power, are driven by the logic of their position to anti-democratic attitudes, no democratic or socialist organization can ever translate its principles into effective practice.[12] The argument may be too sweeping, but the numerous instances adduced by the proponent of this "iron law of oligarchy" sufficiently illustrate the serious conflicts and confusions created by the dilemma of leadership.

A third source of conflict is found in the constant necessity of the new adaptation of means to ends. By the end we understand the provisional basis of agreement regarding the interest of the association, which has to be translated into action by means of a policy. A group meets to decide a course of action in a given situation. The group-interest has already been defined and redefined by past decisions, has been canalized in the series of adjustments which the group has undergone. But the new occasion demands more than a routine following of the

[12] R. Michels, *Political Parties* (New York, 1915).

channel. Being different, it demands a fresh decision, a new expression of policy. The members meet on the assumption that all are agreed regarding the end—the problem is the appropriate means. A business must decide how to deal with a new competitive threat. A club must raise funds to meet a deficit. A church must decide how to act in face of a declining membership. A settlement house must adapt itself to a changing neighborhood. The agreement on ends is implicit, taken for granted, but the agreement on means must be explicit. The necessity for it is a touchstone to evoke the differences of temperament and viewpoint within the group. Shall the club raise the necessary funds by an extension of membership or by a levy on its present members? Shall the church popularize its regular services or undertake additional social activities? Shall the settlement house go further afield to find its old clientele or modify its program to meet the needs of the newcomers? The more conservative members answer one way, the less conservative another. The interplay of divergent personal factors is in reality very complex. Normally the sense of solidarity prevails, an adjustment is reached, and a policy framed, but in the process acute differences may emerge.[13]

Where the association stands for a broad cultural interest or one strongly charged with emotional elements there is greater danger that difference will lead to schism. A main reason is that differences on matters of policy are apt to extend down into differences regarding the implicit end which the policy is meant to serve. The interest of a business firm is relatively simple. The end to which its policy must be adapted is accepted and understood without dispute. But it is otherwise with the interest of a church, of an artist group, or perhaps of a political party. Dissension over means may here reveal the inadequacy of the more basic agreement over ends. The end itself, at some level, is brought into the arena of conflict, and thus the solidarity of the organization may be shaken. When a church faces a declining membership it may be forced to raise the further question concerning its proper mission. When the

[13] An excellent analysis of the process of group decision is given in Grace Coyle's *Social Process in Organized Groups* (New York, 1930).

business faces declining sales, its endeavor to restore profits raises no ulterior question regarding the appropriate definition of its quest. Such considerations help to explain the tendency to schism exhibited by churches which do not adhere strongly to authoritative interpretations, by left-wing parties generally, by artistic and other bodies united around some cultural creed.

The ways in which various types of association deal with the differences which arise within them are of such significance for the understanding of the nature of society that we shall return to the subject in the next chapter.

CHAPTER NINE

THE PRIMARY GROUP AND THE GREAT ASSOCIATION

1. *The Face-to-face Group*

The simplest, the first, the most universal of all forms of association is that in which a small number of persons meet 'face-to-face' for companionship, mutual aid, the discussion of some question that concerns them all or the discovery and execution of some common policy.[1] The face-to-face group is the nucleus of all organization, remaining, in a modified form, within the most complex systems. It is, as it were, the unit-cell of the social structure. It is the group which, in the form of the family, initiates us into the secrets of society. It is the group through which, as comrades and playmates, we first give creative expression to our social impulses. In primitive society, and still often among ourselves, it is found as a free or unattached unit, such as a tribal council, a local brotherhood, a partnership, a gang, an independent study-group. From this free form we may distinguish groups which are part of a larger organization. These may be loosely affiliated, such as the clubs, recreational groups, teams, and so on, whose members are connected with some business firm, church, college, or other large-scale organization. Or they may be functioning units of the larger whole, such as a committee, departmental organization, college class. But the nature of the face-to-face group is revealed most adequately in the detached form where the members freely come together, not as representatives or delegates constituted, defined, and limited to allotted tasks by a predetermined interest, but spontaneously and apart from

[1] The expression, *face-to-face group*, is taken from Cooley. See on this subject particularly his *Social Organization* (New York, 1909), chs. III and IV. Since we are here dealing with organized groups, we are using the term in a more restricted sense than Cooley did. We do not, for example, include the neighborhood, which belongs to our category of community; we do include the play-group which is a simple form of association.

executive direction. A group which of its own initiative comes together for debate or study or conference meets this requirement more fully than, say, the class that assembles in a college lecture room. In the former instance the group principle is more directly and convincingly revealed, and the group process more untrammelled. Our attention therefore will be directed first to the primary group, the uni-cellular association.

Let us take our independent study-group as an illustration. Why does such a group come together? What do its members gain from association which they could not achieve by isolated study? Certain external advantages are sometimes an inducement. For example, the group as a whole can afford to hire a teacher which each member might not be able to hire for himself. But obviously there are other advantages of a different sort. The presence of the others is, within limits, a stimulus to each. Most pursuits are enhanced, more keenly appreciated, more ardently followed, when they are shared by a congenial group. This is one reason why the true university can never be, as one sage claimed, a "collection of books." Association affects alike the nature of our interests and the manner in which we pursue them.

Association changes the quality of our interests. We see them as they appear to others, from new angles. Through participation the interest gains a new objectivity. We see it through the eyes of others and thus it is in some measure freed from irrelevant personal implications. It is defined more closely for each of us, for being now both mine and yours it must have a common meaning for us. Before we can effectively pursue it together we must learn to perceive it together. Each seeing it from his own viewpoint seeks to convey that aspect to his associates. Thus the character of the interest is enlarged and enriched, as each contributes something different to the understanding of it. Our study-group, for example, soon discovers that the problem it is discussing holds unexpected potentialities which gradually come to light as the play of different minds is directed upon it.

But the same illustration shows us also that there are decided limits to this process of definition, concentration, and

enrichment of interests. In the first place effective participation is possible only for quite limited numbers. There is always a point, though varying for different kinds of group, at which increase of numbers means dispersion instead of concentration, dilution instead of reinforcement of the common interest. In the second place the members must be not only congenial but also on approximate levels of experience and understanding. Each must have something to contribute, to give as well as to take, or his presence encumbers the group. There is thus a level on which every group must dwell, and he who is too far above it, while he may teach, no less than he who is too far below it, though he can learn, disturbs the true process of group participation already described. Here we see also the necessity for the third proviso, that if the group is to achieve the best results compatible with the quality of its members, these must come together in a participant co-operative spirit. In other words the constitutive interest of the group must be dominant in their minds. The interest must be stronger than the self-assertive impulses which are exhibited in the attempt to impress others, in the rejection of open-mindedness, in the love of argument for its own sake, in the obstinate reiteration of one's own opinions, in short, in all those tricks and devices which distinguish eristic and oratory from the process of co-operative thinking. And we must always remember that the result of association is relative to the purpose of association. If people meet in order to confirm each other's prejudices, they will probably succeed in doing precisely that. If they meet to study a subject together, they will on the other hand enlarge their vision and reduce their prejudices.

The fulfilment of these conditions is in certain ways promoted by the ease and extent of communication which modern society provides. The freedom of association and the improved means of communication make possible more selective and more specialized groupings. Groups dependent merely on locality or neighborhood tend to give place to groups brought together from a wider area on the basis of a common interest. People devoted to, say, modern music or ancient philosophy or international affairs or mystic cults or butterfly-hunting or

any of a myriad human interests come together, not from the same street—unless the street itself is highly selective—but from the whole area of a city and its borders. The passing of neighborhood life brings at least this compensation.

Under the conditions just described, the nature of any interest becomes focussed and enriched in the group process. And now we can add a further reason for this result. Not only does the presence of others contribute directly to the interpretation of the common interest which each acquires, it contributes also indirectly, since through association each acquires a stimulation, a heightening of the emotional significance of the interest. "As iron sharpeneth iron, so doth a man the countenance of his friend." Each is spurred on in his pursuit by the fact that others are pursuing with him. When his own energy and devotion flag, for there is ebb and flow in all human endeavor, he is sustained by the energy and devotion of his fellows. It is partly the evocation of the competitive spirit, but it goes deeper than that. The interest, by being shared, acquires a new significance, a new emphasis, a new valuation. It has a breadth of support which it formerly lacked. The interest is thus maintained for the group more nearly at one level of intensity than would be possible for the isolated individual. That it is generally a higher level is seen in the fact that people are ready to pursue interests in association which they would find too arduous or too uninspiring to pursue in isolation. A study-group again offers an illustration, since for some members of nearly every such group the choice does not lie between studying in isolation and studying in association but between co-operative study and none at all. To take another illustration, there are people who find gymnastic exercises too tedious to practise by themselves but yet are ready to practise them in company. It may be said that this is because another interest, that of companionship, is added, but the latter is reflected in the enhanced value of the pursuit itself.

Not only the character of an interest, but also the method of its pursuit, is changed by association. In the face-to-face group we have the clearest illustration of simple or direct co-

operation, where men do the same thing together, in contrast with complex or indirect co-operation, where men do different things interdependently, in other words specialize. Direct co-operation is as characteristic of the face-to-face group as specialization is of the large-scale association. The members of a group discussing the same problem make different contributions, but they do not have separate functions; all participate in the same *process*. In complex co-operation, the so-called division of labor, all contribute to the same result, but not in the same process. On the other hand the face-to-face group, though it admits of subsidiary and preparatory division of labor, is essentially a mode of sharing a common experience. A play-group involves a certain division of 'labor', but the pitcher, the batter, and the fielders must all *play* together if they play at all. The members of a study-group may undertake separate tasks in preparation for the activity of the group, but they must bring their results into a common process at the point where the group-activity begins. They cannot, if they are engaged, say, in learning a foreign tongue, so specialize that one learns the nouns, another the adjectives, a third the irregular verbs, and so forth. In short, the group is a unity in the performance of its function. Being thus united in the process, and not merely in the product, the face-to-face group has a peculiar social significance. It serves a function which no other kind of organization can fulfil, a function additional to, and in the last resort more necessary than, the increment of economy, convenience, and efficacy which comes from co-operation. It satisfies most fully the essential need of man for society.

We have said that the process of the face-to-face group is a sharing or communicating of experience. How then is experience shared? How from being mine or yours does it become ours? We shall examine but one aspect, though a crucial one, of this intricate and searching question. How does a group achieve a consensus, a harmony, in respect of the differences of opinion which appear within it? To what extent are the differences which the members bring to the group harmonized within it? If we assume that the degree in which consensus

it attained is a measure of the degree in which experience is shared, here would be a test question for the reality of the social process within the primary group. Let us then examine it.

We should first observe that all groups do not need to seek consensus. There are some which can function as well, perhaps better, when the members do not agree on the issues raised by the group. A debating society is an obvious example, but the statement holds also, in degree, for a group of neighborly gossips or for a discussion group. The salt of friendly difference gives to such groups their savor. But all policy-determining groups are compelled by their function to reach a group decision. It is clear that this decision may be arrived at in various ways and represent various degrees or levels of agreement. The minimum of group participation is found where the decision comes from the dominance of authority, involving no more than the acquiescence or assent of the subordinate members. In this case the potential contributions of these members to the process of decision are wholly or largely suppressed. Or again the decision may represent a compromise, in which, while the agreement is formally unanimous, the contending parties yield some portion of their respective claims or waive in part their differing opinions in order that a unified policy, giving all some measure of what they desire, may be carried through. This type of decision is distinct from the authoritarian one, both in the mode and in the content. The differences of the members here affect the decision, but the process is one of bargaining, of give-and-take, and therefore they remain unreconciled. A third type of decision is expressed through voting. This differs from the former two in that there is not even formal unanimity in the registration of policy. It is determination by majority (whether of persons, of voting shares, or other units). The differences of the members remain in stark opposition. The necessary basis of agreement is not found on the level of the issue determined by voting but lies further back, perhaps merely in willingness of the members to abide by the result of the poll.

No one of the three types of determination just described is

the expression of a complete harmony within the group. No one reveals the group as a unity with one mind and one will. If then we conceive of a group as potentially such a unity we must seek for a further type of decision, in which the differences of the members are neither suppressed nor compromised but instead harmonized or synthesized, transmuted, without loss but rather with gain, into a group idea or group policy. Some writers put this principle forward as expressing the only effective and finally desirable type of agreement. Its relation to the others can be most briefly presented if we classify them as follows:

TYPES OF GROUP AGREEMENT

Basis	*Process*	*Nature of decision*	*Treatment of differences*
I. Authority	Acquiescence and assent	Formal unanimity	Suppressed or held in abeyance
II. Compromise	Give-and-take	Formal unanimity	Registered in the result but not reconciled
III. Enumeration	Inconclusive discussion	Majority determination	Registered in the process but not in the result
IV. Integration	Conclusive discussion	Real unanimity	Expressed in the process and conserved in the result

The last of our types raises a question of peculiar importance for our understanding of that social nature which finds its home within the group. Should we regard it as an ideal type to which the reality of group agreement never fully attains, or is it as verifiable in experience as any of the others? Does the character of our interests on the one hand or the character of our minds on the other admit of this comprehensive integration? Is it, in short, a dream or an actuality? The exponents of the principle reject the first three types as contrary to the spirit of group participation. The group idea, says Miss Follett, is not compromise, for "just in so far as people think that the basis of working together is compromise, just

so far they do not understand the first principles of working together." Nor is it the majority idea. Nor is it the consensus derived from the persuasion of some by others, for "we have no more right to get our own way by persuading people than by bullying or bribing them." The group idea is a "composite idea," evolved through the free admission of difference. In fact "the only use for my difference is to join it with other differences." So we begin with individual thinking and we end with "joint thinking."[2] The differences are not lost in the result, they are "integrated". There results from the process "a mutual appreciation and conservation of *all* the values which all the groups to the conflict hold as vitally significant."[3]

Now integration so understood may be regarded either as an ethical ideal or as a social-psychological process. If taken under the former aspect, we do not claim that it expresses the actuality of group life. It is not, as such, a principle we can demonstrate. All we could demonstrate would be the consequences which follow from its acceptance, as revealed in such approximations to its realization as we can find. We can claim on such grounds, as do its exponents, that its acceptance would create a new harmony of society, a new joy of cooperative living. We can claim that it is a principle of peculiar importance in the complex societies of our age, where people of very diverse types must get along together and to do so must overcome the prejudices of class, religion, and race. We can claim that it has a special appeal in a democratic society, where the ground of authoritarian decision is undermined so that another basis of solidarity must be found.

But an ideal can be realized only as it is brought into relation to the experience of living. We must therefore consider integration in its other aspect, as a social-psychological process. We must then ask how far, under what conditions, with what limitations, does it actually occur? We must observe that the

[2] The above quotations are taken from M. P. Follett, *The New State* (New York, 1926). For other writers of this school see Notes on Further Reading (appendix).

[3] Quotation from a bulletin of *The Inquiry* (New York City), an organization specifically devoted to the promulgation of this principle.

principle of integration not only makes certain demands on the members of a group to which they may or may not respond but also that it makes certain assumptions regarding the nature of human differences and the way in which they are modified in group activity. In particular it assumes that the differences of attitude and belief are such that they can be harmonized, and that in the process of open-minded discussion this harmonization is or can be effected. But these assumptions are certainly not of universal validity. In so far as differences of attitude are dependent on mere misunderstanding or on sheer prejudice, they can hardly be harmonized, though they may be cancelled in the light of fuller knowledge. In so far as differences of attitudes are due to variant disposition and temperament, the assumption that they can be 'integrated' seems to underestimate the quality and permanence of individual character. In so far as differences arise from variant experience, they offer the best hope of integration through a sharing of experiences, but there are also differences of insight, and here again integration in a full sense is questionable. Finally, there are differences which arise from economic and social disparities, differences dependent on situations lying beyond the activity of the group, and so long as the situations remain the differences can hardly be 'integrated'. Workers and employees meet around a table—they may thus come to understand, to appreciate, each what the other side stands for; they may come to an agreement; they may even reach a subjectively harmonious conclusion, but if so is it not rather because each side makes allowance for the difference of attitude of the other than because these differences are 'joined together'? Certainly it is hard to find examples of the latter result, hard even to know what it would mean.

Furthermore this principle of unity makes certain demands on the group. It demands that they meet in a certain spirit, not merely that they be open-minded but that their objective be the very attainment of harmony. The former is a reasonable demand, however hard to secure. But open-mindedly we may be seeking something other than harmony. A group of

scientists meet to discuss a problem—their primary aim is truth, not harmony. In so far as they are scientists it must be. People in all kinds of groups have other interests than the attainment of this comprehensive harmony. Moreover, the demand of open-mindedness does not imply that we should hold every belief as merely provisional. If all the evidences we honestly discover point that way for us, we should lack character not to hold to it, not to try to persuade others of its truth, not to prefer difference to an agreement which did not accept it. The integrationists at times demand a degree of plasticity which is not attainable and which, it might well be claimed, is not even desirable—for sometimes it is the higher loyalty that a man stand firmly on his conviction, that he stand, if need be, *Athanasius contra mundum.* Even unanimity is no criterion of truth, of rightness.

It may in conclusion be suggested that the principle we have been examining combines and even confuses two quite different forms of unity which are better kept apart.[4] We should distinguish between subjective harmony and objective harmony, between harmony of attitudes and harmony of ideas. There is a social unity within which people feel at one though their opinions still differ. Integration, as we have been discussing it, demands a unity on the intellectual level. We come together thinking differently and end thinking alike. We evolve a composite idea in which all the different viewpoints of the members are harmonized—as though the group itself became a mind with an idea of its own—and the result is "a way of joint action which will appeal to everyone concerned", because it comprehends the desires of all. But we have seen that this program makes excessive demands on human nature, and that there are many differences which, psychologically, are not amenable to such integration. We might add that the history of the various attempts to secure unanimity on this level, down to our present-day jury systems, reveals the impossibility of the demand. It is more reasonable

[4] Precisely the same criticism applies to Rousseau's concept of the 'general will', from which the principle of integration is historically derived. See my *Modern State* (Oxford, 1926), pp. 444 ff.

to seek the harmony of the group spirit than of the group idea. In the sense of community with our fellows we can find those sympathetic relations in which differences cease to divide, in which they stimulate and evoke our individuality while forming no bar to the pursuit of interests in common.

2. *From the Face-to-face Group to the Great Association*

Where life is simple, as in a primitive community or in a frontier settlement, or where for any reason the area of effective communication is small, as in the highly civilized cities of ancient Greece, the face-to-face group suffices for most purposes. But where society expands another kind of association grows necessary, the large-scale association with its impersonal relationships and its specialization of functions. Interests become differentiated. The service of experts is required. Techniques are elaborated, and the average member has neither the time nor the energy nor the skill to attend to them. The new range of the interest demands a complex organization. It is no longer localized and no longer controllable by the local group. The members are too numerous and too scattered to conduct their business through personal relationships. Specially selected persons must act on behalf of the whole, a hierarchy of officials arises, and the executive or controlling group becomes distinct from the mass of the members. In these multi-cellular organizations, with their various departments, face-to-face groups remain in a modified form, as directorates, as committees, and so forth, but their character and function have changed. Their members have become agents, delegates, leaders; they have become authorities or experts. As for the lay members, they are now reduced to a more passive rôle, and while their relationships to one another and to the whole may become more complicated, they are for the most part less engrossing. Everything is more formal, more mechanically regulated. There is concentration of direction as well as division of labor. Thus in the large-scale association the average member occupies both a passive and an active rôle, and the two are not always easy to reconcile. As in the state he is both citizen and subject, so in degree

he is in every great association. The passive rôle bulks more largely the greater the association grows and thus the members are apt to feel that its elaborate machinery lies wholly outside themselves, beyond the area of their control. This feeling exists particularly among the members of the great state, but perhaps even more among the shareholders of the great economic corporations.

In the preceding paragraph we have suggested three main distinctions between the face-to-face group and the great association. In the first place, as the scale increases, indirect co-operation dominates over direct. In the small group the members work together, listen together, play together, worship together, discuss together, decide together. In the large organization it is only the objective, no longer also the process, that binds the members together. One works for the other, not with him; they do different tasks towards a common product; they have not only different functions but different powers, different degrees of participation, different rights and obligations. Consequently, in the second place, the transition from the small to the large association involves a movement from status to contract. In a famous sentence Maine characterized this movement as the direction of "progressive societies." [5] If we substitute the word *complex* for *progressive*, the statement can scarcely be challenged. It is of the very nature of the larger organization that the duties and functions of the various members must be defined, made specific, and thus explicitly or implicitly contractual. The working of a complex system cannot be entrusted to the spontaneous adjustments which occur in the face-to-face group. Another aspect of the same principle is the substitution of formal for informal regulation. Every large-scale organization becomes an administrative mechanism. Not only is its structure intricate in itself but it must be fitted into a complex social order. This adjustment demands formal rules, a formal authority with designated powers, a precise delimitation of interests and benefits, a clear-cut division of labor in which the function of each is specified in relation to the functions

[5] Maine, *Ancient Law.*

of all the rest. Hence also, in the third place, there is a substitution of impersonal for personal relationships. The face-to-face group depends upon the congeniality of the members. The large association puts other requirements first. The face-to-face group demands a social qualification for membership because it must satisfy—or otherwise must baulk—the need of its members for sociality. The large association is detached from this interest and therefore generally makes no such demand. It is an agency and as such is more indifferent to the personal qualities of its members, provided they contribute to the associational interest. This is a main reason why, in a complex society, the members are more liberated or more detached from group control over their intimate life, though at the same time they are subject to a system of meticulous regulation proceeding from sources felt to be remote from themselves.

Consequently, in the large association, the world-old problem of liberty and authority presents a new aspect. If the forms of control are less intimate, less indefinite, perhaps less arbitrary, they are also less spontaneous, less visible, less personal. In the small group, as in the patriarchal family for example, a custom-sustained authority expresses itself in commands; in the large association a constitutional authority operates through formal regulations or laws. Each kind has its menace as well as its necessity. The menace of the second kind arises particularly from the separation of the authority from the subject of it, so that its inner working is hidden from him. Explicit standing rules are necessary in every complex organization. Without them it could not achieve its peculiar services of order, efficiency, and economy. But there is the danger that an established order may stand in the way of that flexibility which responds both to changing situations and to individual needs. The official is apt to prefer the routine, the uniformity of the smooth-running machine. It saves energy and trouble for himself. Vested interests grow within the organization which are opposed to adaptive changes. The power of the official lies in his enforcement of rules, and the urge of power persuades him that they should be rigorous.

The rules thus tend to grow sacrosanct in his mind, and the permanence of the institutions through which he acts impresses a like sentiment in the minds of the lay members. In short, the danger of elaborate organization is that it tends to grow stereotyped. This tendency is so prevalent that it scarcely needs illustration, but peculiarly striking examples are afforded by the history of those cultural associations which began as liberating movements. In the sphere of religion the history of the Christian churches reveals the constant tendency of organization to stereotype a system in defiance of its initial principle. A newer illustration may be cited from the short history of the Bahai religion, a humanistic faith whose founder was profoundly opposed to dogmatic creeds and formal organization. It spread with remarkable rapidity, and on the death of the founder exhibited a distinct trend towards an established orthodoxy. In a recent report its paid secretary declared that "the individual must be subordinated to the decisions of the spiritual assembly." [6]

Faced with this problem of retaining liberty while securing order and efficiency, of making authority an agent instead of an exploiter, large-scale associations have experimented with two principles of organization. One we may call the federative principle. It seeks to build up an order on the basis of local or regional units, possessed of as much autonomy as is compatible with the ends of the association. In the political sphere it appears in the contrast between a federal and a unitary government, and also in the devolution of authority to municipalities, counties, and other administrative areas. In so far as it means that local interests are determined locally, it is a workable and salutary principle. Its range, however, is limited by the fact that in a complex society few interests remain purely local, though they retain peculiar local aspects. What is needed, therefore, is the adjustment of the local to the wider interest, a balance of centralization and of decentralization. In a pioneer economy people drew water by hand-pumps from wells sunk on their respective properties; in a

[6] Cf. Ruth White, *The Bahai Religion and its Enemy the Bahai Organization.* No comment is here implied regarding various allegations made in this report.

metropolitan area they depend on an elaborate common system by which their water-supply is derived from an area covering fifty or a hundred miles or more. This is a simple example of a process which signalizes the growth of civilization. The interests of a locality cease to be localized and in so far local representation must be substituted for local control.

What applies to particular interests applies also to the complex of interests formerly characteristic of a neighborhood. A good illustration is offered by the problem of 'community centers' and settlement houses in an expanding community. With the delocalization of many interests the locality becomes less and less a neighborhood, and the functions of such organizations as the settlement house must change accordingly. In other words, they too must specialize to succeed, must serve diversified interests in particular ways, generally seeking from a less limited area those who share these interests. "Greenwich House," writes the director of one of these organizations, "is a neighborhood house. But what is a neighborhood nowadays? With rapid transit, with city-wide policies, with the rapid change in population, with new standards of living, the neighborhood has become not so much a separate self-enclosed entity as a sample cross-section of the city's life." [7]

A cross-section is no longer a unit, and can no longer be organized as such. The attempt to integrate the social life of an area through a community center when the interests of the inhabitants are no longer centered within the area can hardly be expected to succeed, and experiments in this direction have generally failed. It is reasonable to hold that the small group is necessary to mediate between the individual and the large association. "In various ways," writes Professor Dewey, "and on diverse subjects there have been growing up small groups devoted to securing a clearing house of facts and ideas by conjoint discussion with a view to attaining a common mind, that might be put into effective action. It may well be that the historian of the future will find that one of the most significant features of present social life is manifest

[7] Mary K. Simkhovitch, *Report on Greenwich House* (1929).

in the rapidity with which the word 'group' has come into general use, and will discover that the pooling of experiences by groups in order to reach genuinely co-operative decision and action is their characteristic that reaches furthest."[8] But such groups are likely to be special-interest groups in a local setting rather than neighborhood groups in the old significance of that term.

It may further be pointed out that the degree of effective localization varies with the nature of the interest. The general principle which emerges is that cultural organizations can be more fully localized than those which pursue civilizational interests. A college, for example, must be in essentials localized. A fellowship organization, such as that of the rotary club, must be composed of local groups. A church, no matter how highly centralized in respect of its government, depends for its life on the local assembling of its members. The reason is that the cultural interest must be directly or personally communicated.[9] Technical advances may change the size of the local unit. The radio, for example, makes the local musical assembly the home instead of the concert hall. But no technical advances can substitute, for cultural purposes, the central organization for the local unit. A central organization can make treaties or tariffs or currency regulations for a whole country—or for a whole civilization. There are universal aspects of order and efficiency which are best provided by a highly centralized control. But culture belongs to another kind of reality. The agency can here never be a substitute for the direct activity of the participant members. Any central organization in this sphere is meaningless apart from the unit-groups. Consequently the federative principle has greater play.

It might be similarly shown that, in the sphere of civilization, the local unit has a more important rôle the more personal

[8] Introduction to A. D. Sheffield, *Training for Group Experience* (Inquiry Bulletin, New York, 1929). Similar claims are made in various other works such as M. P. Follett, *The New State*, and Seba Eldridge, *The New Citizenship* (New York, 1929).

[9] The significance of this point is brought out more fully in the discussion of culture and civilization, pp. 228–229.

the service which the organization renders. An automobile plant or a steel factory can from one center provide effective service for a whole country. A retail store has a much narrower range, and therefore a combination of units takes the form, not of a single central plant, but of a chain-store system. The less standardized the service the more the local unit resists absorption. Thus at the end of the scale the luxury shop, the fashionable tailoring, dressmaking, or millinery establishment flourishes as a purely local concern. The same principle may be illustrated from the political organization. We can do without local legislatures, but we cannot do without local courts.

All the great associations must achieve some equilibrium of centralization and decentralization, varying in accordance with the nature of their functions. Since some of the most important organizations, those which supply the more uniform or standardized services, such as insurance or electricity or political order, lend themselves to a high degree of centralization, we must resort to some other principle than the federative in the attempt to solve the problem of control, to save efficiency while resisting domination. Here is where our second principle, that of responsibility, enters in. It is of peculiar importance in respect of the most powerful and comprehensive of all organizations, the state, especially as a state in which the principle of responsibility is assured can thereby prevent the undue encroachments of other organizations. It is the essential principle of the democratic state, though its full realization is beset by many difficulties. In so far as it is achieved, arbitrary authority, authority acting in its own right, yields to functional authority. In other words, it turns governments into public agencies and officials into delegates or representatives, acting on behalf of and subject to the control of those whom they govern. The earlier champions of democracy too readily concluded that in our complex and heterogeneous societies this end could be achieved merely by the mechanics of popular election, but we have realized through experience that it is possible only in so far as a people is enlightened and public-spirited. The business of government, like all other

large-scale business, needs the service of experts. The people in general cannot understand its intricacies nor adjudge the qualities requisite for the conduct of this business. The relics of direct popular administration, such as the jury-system, are cumbrous and perhaps moribund. But experience also shows us that a politically intelligent people can establish and maintain a system of government which on the whole is subservient to the wishes of the majority. In spite of the practical difficulties and problems involved, the principle of responsibility is formally and to a considerable extent substantially attained in many modern states, and is liable to be overthrown only in times of grave crisis.

Outside the two main principles we have mentioned there is another influence—we shall call it the principle of automatic control—which tends to keep the great organizations in some measure flexible and subject to the interests of those whom they serve. It has less application to the compulsive organization of the state or to monopolistic corporations, but it powerfully affects such organizations as are fully competitive. A department store, for example, is not maintained just to serve the public, but unless it does serve the public as they want to be served it will cease to exist. Likewise any association the members of which are free to leave it at will is bound to consult continuously the wishes of those members. A club which was not responsive to the majority of its members would suffer a decline. So would a trade-union or a church or any of the numerous free organizations of a complex society. The efficacy of this principle in modern societies has increased in respect of cultural organizations, since these have been so largely liberated from the compulsions of a politico-religious authority, but it has serious limitations in the economic sphere, owing to the growth of vast combinations restricting the play of competition.

In conclusion we may point out that the increase of large-scale associations does not and cannot involve the substitution of these for the face-to-face groups. The latter renders one essential service which the former can never satisfy—the satisfaction of the primal need for society itself. This satisfac-

tion demands the personal participative union, within which, no matter what other services it may render, the deeply-embedded need of man for the sustaining presence of his fellows is liberated and fulfilled. Even under the most auspicious conditions the specialized order and routine of the great association involves some degree of impersonal constraint, against which the human spirit is apt to chafe and from which it seeks refuge in the more spontaneous grouping. Perhaps that is why there are so many clubs and coteries—and so many 'joiners'—in our large-scale civilization. If in this process of civilization the old face-to-face groups, those of family and kin and church and neighborhood group, are less inclusive and less absorbing, men seem impelled to devise others through which they seek to save, against the pressure of organization, the insistent impulse towards free personal relationships.

Our world of large-scale organizations is inevitably a mechanized impersonal world. Within it each man has his specialized function, his delimited calling. His work confines him within the routines and techniques of a smaller and smaller portion of the social order within which he lives. For the greater that order the smaller is the part which a man's work directly reveals to him. The engrossment in this limited task, imposed in the first instance by economic necessity, is often thought of as a peril to the realization of the fuller life of man, of his essential humanity. Doubtless the danger exists, and it is probably impossible to balance gain and loss. But specialism is only one aspect of this greater order, and the same conditions which impose it bring also certain means of possible deliverance from its perils—vastly greater intercommunication, a much extended period of general education in which the foundations of a broader culture may be laid, and new potentialities of leisure which, wisely directed, may liberate the mind from the dominance of the narrow task.

CHAPTER TEN

THE GREAT ASSOCIATIONS I. POLITICAL

1. *The Nature of the State*

The state is the object of the science of government, or political science. Our concern as sociologists is not with constitutions and forms of government, nor with the modes in which states fulfil their various functions. In this chapter we are seeking to discern the character of the state as a distinctive form of association, to discover its sociological type, so to speak, and thereafter to show its typical relationships to the other parts of the social system. We shall proceed in a similar way in the two succeeding chapters. The great associations have brought into being their own distinctive sciences. Sociology can neither be inclusive of the subject-matter of these sciences nor be a substitute for them. To offer a smattering of them would be foolish. But the great associations exhibit significant differences of type, and they are interwrought in the whole structure of a society. For these reasons they are of profound interest to the sociologist.

In all the more complex societies the organizations of the political and economic order become the comprehensive framework of the social structure. They ramify everywhere, creating an ever wider and ever more intricate scheme of relationships. They link land with land over all the earth, often outstripping in their advance the associations of the cultural order. They link the savage to the civilized man. They ignore in large measure differences of creed or nationality or color. This condition arises out of the peculiar character of political and economic interests. We have already classified them as 'secondary interests', being as it were neutral means to which all other interests of men are related and through which all other interests may be pursued. Consequently, given the technological basis of communication, they are capable of unlimited expansion.

Together they constitute the great mechanism which men must use to obtain the objects of their desire. In their development they establish great forms of social order which both liberate and limit the expression of all our primary interests.

The political interest creates the state and also the numerous associations whose purpose is to determine or influence the policy of the state. We pointed out in chapter Two that the state itself is a form of association. Since this conception is of cardinal importance for the understanding of its nature we must here return to it. When we call the state an association we mean that it is a specific organization of society. We distinguish it thereby from the country or the nation on the one hand, from the unity of the social structure on the other. The confusion is still a prevalent one. It is encouraged by language, since we use the same terms, *the United States*, *England*, *Germany*, and so forth, to denote both the country and its people or the state and its government. We say 'the United States makes a treaty'—and here we mean the state—or we say 'the United States has a standard of living'—and here we mean the people. It is fostered by the tradition of old theories which regarded the state, contrary to definite evidences, as a *universal* partnership. It is a mistaken inference from the fact that the state does actually control or regulate a great part of our social activities and relationships and that it is *constitutionally* competent to control a still greater part. It is consequently maintained that if the state lets other aspects of social life alone "it is none the less dealing with them—it only lets them alone in a certain way and on certain terms."[1] But even if we accepted this position it does not follow that the regulator is to be identified with that which is regulated. Moreover, there are, as we have seen, various social codes which are distinct from and only in small part controlled by the code of the state. And there are many associations to which we belong which are in no sense merely divisions or branches of the great association of the state. As social beings, we are more than merely citizens of a state. The real problem,

[1] Quotation from a letter to the author by the late Professor Bosanquet, who asserted this point of view in his work, *The Philosophical Theory of the State.*

that of the relation of the state to the whole social structure, is only obscured if we begin by identifying the two. Every modern constitution sets limits to the things the state can do. Generally, for example, it forbids the state to require the profession of any religion of its citizens or to discriminate between citizens in respect of their religion. We say it forbids the state and not simply the government. For it proclaims—or rather the people proclaim through it—that laws of a certain nature shall not be passed and that certain liberties shall not be abrogated, and to this end it usually provides that a mere majority shall not suffice to alter these constitutional guarantees. Whatever practical difficulties may arise from such provisions they surely bear witness to the intention of 'the people' or the community to set limits to the place and power of the state itself.

The state then is an essential part, but never the whole, of the social structure. It is best conceived of as an agency of the community with very broad and important functions, but nevertheless limited. It does not, and cannot, take the place of other agencies; these have their own functions, which they alone are fitted to perform. The family has its place, the church has its place, and so forth. How far the state *should* regulate other associations is a question admitting vast experimentation; how far the state *can* take over the functions of certain associations, particularly of the economic order, is another question of great significance. But under no conditions which we can conceive of, and certainly under no conditions which exist anywhere in the civilized world, is the state all-sufficing. If the communistic state, for example, absorbs into itself nearly the whole system of economic organization, it leaves the family more uncontrolled than do capitalistic states. The state can effectively supervise only the external aspects of life. Beyond all else, it cannot, under any conditions, be a substitute for those cultural organizations which express the variant beliefs, opinions, interests, and ideals of the diversified groups of a modern society.

The reason for this limitation, historically revealed through many a painful struggle and most of all in the great conflicts of

church and state, depends on the peculiar nature of the state. The state is an organization with special attributes, special instruments, special powers. What primarily distinguishes it from all other associations is its instrument of political law. We have already seen that this kind of law differs from all other social laws in two ways, first, that there is attached to it the peculiar sanction of socialized and unconditional compulsion, second—a corollary from the first—that it applies without exception to everyone within a geographical area. In these respects the legal code has an advantage over all other codes, but it must pay a price for it. Because it applies to everyone, it can apply only where uniformity of control is felt to be desirable by those who uphold the state—it cannot apply to matters where its members claim the right to differ from one another. Because its sanction is force, its power of appeal is limited. Other associations, to which men freely belong, can on that very ground use means of persuasion with greater efficacy than can the state. They appeal to the free will which is automatically secured by voluntary membership. The state cannot ensure the free adhesion of its citizens in that way. In other associations the malcontents have the alternative of leaving; if grave differences arise within them, the association itself can dissolve or split. But obviously these alternatives are for practical purposes ruled out in the case of the state. In earlier stages of civilization a group which disapproved the policy of the state might, with hardship and peril, secede and establish a new one, as did the Roman plebeians or the Pilgrim Fathers, but in the modern world this recourse is practically impossible. The state has thus a compulsive aspect which very definitely limits its control over the spirit of its people. In an earlier chapter we pointed out the grave limitations of sheer compulsion.

It follows that there are certain things which the state can do well, others it can do less well than the free associations, and others which it cannot do at all. What actions fall in these various categories depends in part on the particular conditions of individual states. The functions of the state vary greatly at different stages of its history. Sometimes the state has been

mainly an exploitative power, controlling the rest of the population in the interest of a dominant class. As the basis of citizenship broadened, it assumed to a larger extent protective functions, and these must always remain an important aspect of its task. In quite recent times another aspect has begun to assume significance, that of the state as a positive agency of social welfare. Thus in some countries of Europe we see old strongholds, the seats of a former exploitative nobility, turned into employment offices and health insurance bureaux. The three aspects of the state exist together, with varying emphasis, in present-day democracy. Thus we are introduced to our next question, that of the functions of the state in modern society.

2. *The Functions of the State in a Complex Society*

Perennial controversy rages around the functions of the state. They are the issues of party warfare. They vary from state to state, from period to period, even from year to year. The capitalistic and the communistic state seem at opposite poles in their solutions of the question. The liberal state and the fascist state give contradictory answers. One is tempted to think that the functions of the state are whatever functions the controlling power within any state cares to assume. And this view is supported by the traditional doctrine of state sovereignty. "The sovereign," said a characteristic exponent of this tradition, "has the complete disposal of the life, rights, and duties of the individual." [2] The sovereign, said the jurist Blackstone, is "a supreme, irresistible, uncontrollable authority." But in reality, whatever the legal or constitutional form may be, the state has limits to what it can do. It is limited by the instruments and means which it must use. It is limited also by the resistance offered to political action by the mores of the community. And it is limited by the existence, in any complex society, of other organizations which exercise functions of their own. Practically everyone agrees that there are social functions which the state alone can perform, that there are others which it is more qualified to perform than any other

[2] Cornewall Lewis, *The Use and Abuse of Political Terms* (Oxford, 1898), ch. V.

association, that there are others for which it is less qualified, and finally that there are functions which the state is wholly incapable of performing. There are wide divergences of opinion concerning the items that fall in these various categories, but if we examine the categories themselves in the light of the practice of modern states we shall discover that there is nevertheless a substantial amount of agreement.

Let us take these categories in order, premising that there is no way of determining what the functions of the state are or what they should be other than the test of experience. In other words, the business of the state is to do what it is capable of doing well, provided the citizens of the state want it done. Men differ regarding what the state can do well as they differ regarding what needs doing at all. But social experience has already laid down certain broad lines of the state. Social experience led the state to take over, for example, the administration of justice and the provision of elementary education, and political experience has confirmed the state in the exercise of these functions. As new social situations arise they create new problems regarding the functions of the state. Thus the development of international finance, of industrial monopoly, of inventions such as the radio, and so forth, raises constantly new problems of state regulation. Above all, the vast economic and technological changes associated with capitalistic methods of production and distribution have created profound and still largely unsolved political issues. Different states attempt to meet them in very different ways. The soviet state presents the extreme instance of centralized political control over the whole area of economic activity. It accepts the principle of the unified planning of a country's economic development. Other states though animated by social philosophies of an entirely opposite character, have assumed considerable control over economic policies, as did mercantilist France and as does Fascist Italy. Here remains the greatest of all political problems, still in the region of controversy and experiment. The success or failure of these experiments will no doubt help to determine still further the main functions of the state, though these must always be

subject to variation in accordance with the social and economic development of different communities and the traditions and attitudes which prevail within them.

First then, there are social functions which the state alone can perform. The state alone can establish an effective and basic order in a complex society. The state can maintain such an order because of the peculiar attributes which we saw that it and it alone possesses. On the one hand its law is binding on *all* who live within an entire geographical area; on the other hand it possesses the ultimate right of enforcement. The establishment and maintenance of a universal order is thus an essential function of the state, its function *par excellence*. The state alone can make rules of universal application. It alone can guarantee facilities which shall be equally available to all the members of a community. It alone can establish rights and obligations which admit of no exemptions. It alone can establish conditions of equal opportunity. It alone can ensure the universal validity of units and standards of measurement, weight, quality, and value. It alone can set up minimum standards requisite for decent living with the assurance that none shall be allowed to fall below them. It alone can define the areas and limits of subordinate powers. It alone can co-ordinate within one great social framework the various organizations of a society. The state, in short, is the guarantor and the guardian of the public order.

The immensity of this service, at least in every complex society, is hard to realize. A momentary glimpse of it is provided in the rare crisis of revolution when all legal safeguards are in abeyance and the machinery of society is paralyzed. In a simple society community-guarded custom suffices to maintain order; in a complex society order is impossible apart from the state. For here it is necessary to prevent not only the encroachment of individual on individual but also the encroachment of group over group. And these groups in the complex society are not only very diverse but vary endlessly in their range and in their power. But for the restraining influence of the state the social and economic conflict between them would lead to chaos. But for this influence ruthless

organizations would exercise an intolerable tyranny broken only by equally ruthless uprisings against them. Even within the order of the state lawless organizations sometimes emerge, where government is corrupt or ineffective. The so-called racket in our present American cities is an example. Moreover, the state is necessary not only to prevent the usurpations of power but also to maintain the vast and elaborate contractual system which a modern society requires. Unless this system is guaranteed under the civil code the business of the community would be utterly disrupted. Order is the first requirement of the diverse specialized interdependent activity of modern man, and this order the state alone can maintain.

But the state cannot be content with the mere establishment of order. The order maintained by a tyranny or by a slave-state or by an empire differs vastly from the order of a 'free' or democratic state. Order is always based on some principle, and the state is vitally concerned with the broad social policy of which a given order is the expression. Order may rest on privilege and status or it may be guided by the ideal of equal opportunity. It may be designed to keep the weak in subjection to the strong or to prevent the strong from encroachment on the weak. Some principle of *justice* is inevitably involved, and the attainment of justice is a far more difficult and more controversial function than the attainment of order. It is obviously not secured by the simple 'rule of law' which makes everyone equally subject to its dictates, which, as Anatole France remarked, "in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep in the streets and to beg bread."[3] One of the fundamentals of any order is a system of property rights, and since such rights are not given by 'nature' they must be determined by authority. Justice, in the old phrase, is "to give every man his own" (*suum cuique tribuere*), but how to decide what a man's own may be is an ever-perplexing problem. The old individualistic notion, translated into modern economic terms in the 'labor theory of value',

[3] On this subject cf. G. E. G. Catlin, *A Study of the Principles of Politics*, ch. VII, from which the above quotation is borrowed.

that men gain legitimate titles to goods in terms of the toil they expend in transforming them from their natural state, becomes meaningless in the world of economic and social interdependence. Yet the state cannot fulfil its clear and inevitable function of maintaining order without involving itself in the further and infinitely harder task of securing justice. And in the last resort, so far as this end can be achieved it can be achieved only through the instrumentality of the state. Alone possessing jurisdiction over all the members of a community it alone can represent the interests common to all of them as against the interests which divide them.

We turn next to those functions which the state, in virtue of the means at its command, is more fitted to perform than any other organization. In this category comes the conservation of natural resources. Against the competitive interests which seek immediate economic gain the state can uphold the interest of the whole and the interest of the future. Reluctantly and often belatedly the state has had to intervene to prevent the wasteful consumption of the community's resources, its forests, its fisheries, its wild life, its irreplacable mineral assets. The squandering of the oil resources in various lands, and particularly in the United States, offers one of the most recent as well as of the most remarkable instances of the need for the state in respect of the safeguarding of the economic basis of society against reckless individualistic exploitation. And if the state is needed to control the social dangers of competition it is also needed to check the domination of private monopoly. Wherever particular interests manifestly infringe the common interest, the state is called upon to uphold the latter, though often the political pressure exerted by those particular interests prevent or even pervert its function. It is not possible within our limits to specify the magnitude and the variety of this task. Only recently has the state come at all to realize its significance. All so-called social legislation, the establishment by law of various forms of industrial protection and insurance, may be regarded as coming within this category.

The conservation and the development of the personal, no less than of the economic, resources of the community devolves in large measure on the state. Included in this function is the general provision of education. Every civilized state has found that this essential service cannot be left to private agencies, that to be at all adequate for the needs of the future as well as of the present the endowment and control of general education must be publicly established. Only thus can standards be maintained for the community as a whole, and the more glaring inequalities of opportunity, which more than anything else stand in the way of the discovery, evocation, and utilization of human potentialities, be substantially reduced.

As we have said, there is no *a priori* limit to what the state can do for the service of the community. In so far as with its vast and comprehensive organization it can support and stimulate other agencies providing non-controversial services there seems no reason why it should not do so if its aid is not out of proportion to the cost. The case for such support is particularly strong in respect of those cultural services, of which education itself is an example, which do not yield an immediate economic return proportionate to their cost. How far the state can and should go in this direction must depend on the cultural values of the community, but the more enlightened it becomes the more the state can contribute to the development of science, to the encouragement of art, and in general to the economic equipment of those services which yield to mankind the more enduring and less competitive satisfactions. Together with such functions we may include that of the provision of the means and opportunities for the study of the greater and more urgent questions of social policy and for the collection, as in the census, of statistical and other information bearing on the welfare of the people. Other agencies can perform these tasks in part, but none so efficiently and on so great a scale and with such authority as can the state.

We pass thirdly to those social functions in the performance of which the state is at a disadvantage as compared with

other agencies. These again must vary with the conditions, but in all societies there are limits to what the state can effectively do. The multitude of diverse associations in an advanced civilization witnesses to those particular needs and selective purposes which the state cannot adequately satisfy. The state is the agency of the *whole* community. There are more intensive, more specialized, and more limited interests which unite groups within it. There are divergent and conflicting interests which properly create their own associations. There are experimental objectives which are far better pursued by the smaller interested groups. There are also interests which unite men on a great scale, but not as members of the state. To this order belong the broader cultural interests, including the religions. The state is not well-adapted, in the light of its nature as already described, to sponsor the more intimate or more personal interests, those which admit a variety of spontaneous and variant expressions. Voluntary associations have a flexibility, an initiative, a capacity for experiment, a liberation from the heavier responsibility of taking risks which the state rarely, if ever, possesses. They can thus foster, in ways not permissible to the state, the nascent interests of groups, and encourage enterprise, social and economic, at the growing points of a society. Even the rôle of arbiter is here not within the competence of the state. It is not qualified to decide the merits of artistic, literary, scientific endeavor or to arbitrate, say, religious controversies. The state can deal effectively only with the established, or with that which it has the power to set up as established, in the broad domain of its authority.

There is a thin border line between the things which the state is ill-qualified to do and those which it cannot do at all. Can the state control people's opinions? Given a sufficient support, it can prevent non-conformist groups from expressing their opinion overtly. But it is not thereby meeting opinion on its own ground, it is using the alien instrument of compulsion. An opinion claims truth, and force is entirely irrelevant to this claim. Often the suppression of belief has been worse than futile; sometimes it has given a secret strength to the

persecuted belief, but at all times it has prevented belief from meeting the only true test, that of frank examination and discussion.[4] Can the state control people's morality? It can, given sufficient support, control the external aspects of conduct, but if morality means a set of attitudes towards our fellows and towards life in general, again we have entered a sphere in which mere enforcement is foolish or futile and in which the appeal to the feelings of men comes with greater efficacy from the free associations which, if they claim authority at all, claim it on grounds to which the compulsive state cannot aspire. The history of the state's attempt to control religion is one of the longest and most tragic chapters in the record of man's stupidity, but at least it has revealed this lesson to those who can read and understand, that there are in human nature certain resistances to compulsion which it is beyond the power of tyranny to destroy. Nor is it only the deeper, more spiritual impulses which resist this control. There are, as we have seen, codes regulative of conduct which are largely independent of the legal code. Custom sets limits to it, and no less does the seemingly superficial code of fashion. In the latter sphere men—and women still more—accept dictation from the prestige-owning arbiters of dress which they would violently reject from the government of the state.[5] In short, the more intimate details of conduct as well as the more deeply cultural traits claim a freedom from compulsion which places them largely outside the region of state control. The trends of culture, of the arts and the sciences, may be affected by the activity of the state but they owe their vitality and their direction to forces inherent in the community and beyond the capacity of the state to determine.

[4] The excellent argument of Mill on this point, in chapter III of the essay *On Liberty*, still holds good. For a fuller discussion see H. Laski, *Liberty in the Modern State* (New York, 1930).

[5] A government may sometimes, though rarely, prescribe a particular material or type of dress on economic or other national grounds, as Frederick William of Prussia prescribed the wearing of cotton clothes. The Turkish government could proscribe the wearing of the fez and the veil, but these were the insignia of a discarded civilization. In neither of these instances was fashion involved.

3. *The State and the Greater Society*

We have so far considered the functions of the state within the area of its proper jurisdiction or within its own frontiers. But the range of society extends far beyond the borders of any state. It is, and becomes increasingly, international. No single state in the modern world is coterminous with the area of a civilization. Economic and cultural relationships are gradually encompassing the earth. Within its own frontiers the state establishes the foundations of order and of social development. But modern civilization demands an international order, and though states have by treaties and conventions aided in the building of such an order, in another aspect they have presented a constant menace to it, and thus to their own internal security. Within its borders the state is endowed with force, and this force is the assurance of order, is adjusted to the functions which it serves, and in large measure is safeguarded by the constitutional devices which have made its exercise subject to the control of the community. Beyond its borders the force of the state has an entirely different meaning. It is a mode of settling disputes between states, and once loosed it becomes an engine of destruction, without safeguards and without responsibilities. Consequently we face the paradox that the state is, nationally, the great instrument of social security, but internationally, the greatest menace to that security.

This situation, growing ever more aggravated as the range and intensity of social and economic interdependence increases, has led to various tentatives and programs aiming at the establishment of international security. Among such tentatives we may perhaps include alliances of states intended to secure a balance—or rather supremacy—of power such as would deter other states from making war on them. This equivocal method has never for very long been successful. In more recent times many treaties have been signed by various states—a movement in which the United States took a prominent part—for the peaceful settlement of their disputes. This movement may be said to have culminated in the Pact of Paris. The establishment of the League of Nations and of

the Permanent Court of International Justice represents a further step in the creation of an international system. But so far none of these plans has eliminated the menace of war. All the great states are still burdened by heavy expenditures on the means of war.

Various obstacles have stood in the way of a more adequate international system, among them the rival efforts of the greater powers to gain possession or control of the economic resources of the less civilized portions of the earth. Another obstacle has been the nationalistic attitude which thinks of states as inclusive economic entities, so that the interests of each are set in opposition to those of the others. Fostered as this attitude is by the interests which immediately profit by it, it is out of harmony with the realities of economic interdependence. A famine or a boycott in India, a revolution in China, a depression in the United States affects the economic well-being of the whole civilized world. National policies based on a misunderstanding of this interdependence recoil on the peoples who promote them. National sentiments based on ignorance of this interdependence hurt the causes to which they are devoted. There are conflicts of interests between groups large and small, including groups as large as the nation itself, but wherever interdependence exists there is also an underlying harmony of interests, the condition of a common interest to be realized. The use of political force for settling these differences destroys the common interest which is more fundamental than the conflicting interests. There is a gross discrepancy here between political means and economic ends.[6]

Beyond all the other obstacles there lies, however, the traditional right of states to settle their disputes by force, a right supported by the principle that each sovereign state is the sole final arbiter of its own claims. Around this right cling sentiments both noble and ignoble, high devotions and unscrupulous interests. The greatest problem of modern states-

[6] On this subject cf. Norman Angell, *Foundations of International Polity* (London, 1914); H. N. Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold* (London, 1918); M. Delaisi, *Political Myths and Economic Realities* (New York, 1927).

manship is how to conserve the values of the state, alike the devotions which it inspires and the services which it renders, while nevertheless finding a way to safeguard that international order without which our whole civilization is imperilled. How this may be achieved is a question which is beyond our purpose here. But it is not unreasonable to think that, given a sufficiently clear and widespread realization of its necessity, its achievement is then made practicable. The final obstacle is the emotional attitude—the suspicion, prejudice, and fear—which does not apprehend the needs of the civilization we have created.

The right of the state to make or declare war is the immediate issue. There were times when other organizations than the state engaged in war, when families and clans carried on murderous feuds, when feudal barons possessed the right of 'private war', when trading companies extended their operations by force of arms, when individuals fought socially sanctioned duels. All these 'rights' have been abolished by the state. It was necessary for the state to abolish them in the name of order and of justice. Now only the state itself claims this right over against other states, and the same necessity for its abolition applies with even greater cogency against this last reservation of uncontrolled force.

For the sociological argument against this claim of right by the state is that here there is no congruity between force and function, between means and ends. To serve social ends, power should not only be responsible power, it should also be limited in correspondence with the ends it serves. Since no ends are absolute or unlimited, no exercise of power should be. The right of war-making assumes that no other ends of life, no other human interests, weigh anything in the balance against political ends and political interests. War is an instrument of policy, the *ultima ratio regum*, the "barrister of crowns." But it is an instrument utterly disproportionate in its effects to the social significance of the policy which sets it in motion, unloosing utterly incalculable processes of destruction such that the initial 'cause' of the war is likely to be entirely forgotten in the issues which the struggle itself creates.

The picture presented by the Great War is one of the unleashing of such monstrous forces that its initial motivations were submerged in a blind struggle first for domination and then for national survival.

If however we conceive the state as an agency of the community, limited by and related to other agencies, if we appreciate the fact that citizenship is not the whole office or duty of man, we are led to see that the power of the state, as an instrument of external policy, must be limited no less than its internal power is already limited and controlled by the consensus of the community. A greater consensus, extending beyond national bounds, is needed to secure this limitation. Only so can the extraordinary disparity between power and function, in an age when science has revealed a technique of destruction beyond the imagination of any earlier age, be reduced within the bounds of reason.

This disparity has in truth become so overwhelming that it is inspiring stronger anti-war social forces than existed in past times. Man is far from being a completely 'rational' animal, but nevertheless all his institutions are ways he has devised of achieving some end or satisfying some need. From this point of view war as an institution has broken down. It is doubtful whether, under the new conditions of warfare, there is necessary even a 'moral equivalent' for it. For war in its present technical development offers no liberation of those qualities which the social restraints of peace may hold in leash. War is a process more mechanized than the working life of peace. It presents a cataclysm and not a solution. The traditional language of glory and high enterprise becomes meaningless in the presence of the monstrous regimentation, broken by fits of nerve-destroying fever, which it imposes. It subjects the fighters to an intense accumulation of horrors and whole nations to vast miseries. From its inferno no reward can arise which is not insignificant beside its devastation. It ruins the victor as well as the vanquished, if indeed these appellations retain any meaning in their reciprocal demolition of the gains of an interdependent civilization. No high policy seems a recompense for the destruction of the manhood of a

whole generation, for the culture-disrupting falsehoods and hatreds without which it cannot be waged, for the jeopardy of civilization itself. If man is not wholly rational, he is not wholly irrational. Perhaps at no time did the actual experience of war generate in those who came into most direct contact with it, the common soldier, the ravaged peasant, the women and children over whom it swept, that mythology of glory which its captains and its kings entertained and which its historians pictured. Perhaps the footsoldiers of Menelaus and of Hector never could say that they too had

> drunk delight of battle with their peers
> Far on the ringing plains of windy Troy.

But assuredly in no earlier age were the fighters and the peoples exposed to so incessant an impact of mechanical horror as the Great War brought, nor was any previous war followed by so sheer and far-reaching a revelation of its true nature. The significant literature of the Great War—not the memoirs of generals and statesmen but the novels and plays—is in this respect unlike that bred by previous wars, and may point to a new orientation of man towards an institution which has not grown obsolete in fact but which has proved to be tragically incongruous with the changed conditions of human life.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE GREAT ASSOCIATIONS: II. ECONOMIC AND OCCUPATIONAL

1. *Distinction of the Economic from the Political Method*

By contrast with the varieties of cultural association economic and political associations fall within the same broad category of social structures. It might be said of them that organization constitutes their very being. They are in effect sheer means to ends realized through but not within the association, whereas the ends of cultural associations are realized in large measure within them, directly in the very process of communication which they establish. But economic and political associations satisfy our social needs indirectly, by the products they yield. They are agencies of control, of power, means of attaining certain products of organization—order, wealth, and so forth. The social participation they offer is purely incidental, accessory. It is not the specific social needs of fellowship, of communication, which bring them into being. They are essentially external to the inner social life, though of course every organization that men create is utilized in some measure to satisfy their social impulses. But these associations are rather conditions of the social life than aspects of it. As such they are of profound social significance, but their significance, as we shall see more fully in the next chapter, has a very different quality.

Since both economic and political associations are concerned with universal means to human purposes, means which may be applied to many varied and divergent ends, they are capable of great expansion. Apart from cultural resistances, there is no reason why they should not form a great closely-interwoven network covering the whole earth. The logic of order sets this consummation before the political system, and the logic of economy works to the same end in respect of the economic system. The broad trend of civilization is in this

direction. It has freer range in the expansion of the economic structure, while in the political structure it is retarded by the identification of the state with the cultural unity of the nation. But the necessities of order and the extension of cultural likeness through the development of communications are bringing influences to bear which make towards the transcendence of the national state as the ultimate range of free political organization.

Moreover, as we have also seen, the economic and the political systems are in large part different means of attaining the same ends. In a socialist state many objectives are sought by political methods which in the capitalist state are sought by economic methods. In no community is it possible to draw a hard-and-fast line between the functions of the two systems. Wages and working conditions, for example, are in part determined by economic agencies, and in part by political regulation. Industrial disputes may be settled by trade agreements or by the action of governments. The credit system depends on arrangements in which governments cooperate with public, semi-public, or private banks. Within the economic order men seek by means of private savings to provide against the contingencies of life, unemployment, sickness, accident, old age. Within the political order the same result is sought by social legislation. Even in waging war the state must resort to economic weapons, and under modern conditions it is upon these that victory or defeat seems finally to depend.[1] The economic and the political order interlock at a myriad points, even in the most individualistic society, and the old *laissez-faire* idea, that each can 'mind its own business' without interference by the other, is an outworn illusion. *The distinction between the economic and the political organization is not a distinction between spheres of activity but between methods of action.* It is only a confusion to suppose that economic interests are or can be the exclusive concern of what we name economic associations. In some degree they are interests of every form of association. But the difference is that what we specifically name economic associations are

[1] Cf. Delaisi, *op. cit.*, ch. XV.

primarily devoted to the acquisition of wealth, to money-making or at least the provision of the means of living, without reference to the uses to which these means are subsequently applied. The economic means is their end-result, the disposal of these means lies beyond their interest.

The method which associations so constituted pursue, we may term the economic method. It stands in significant contrast to the political method, and an analysis of the difference will serve as an introduction to the study of the nature of economic association.

The economic method is devoted to the exclusive or private control or possession of wealth. In the economic association men seek wealth in conjunction, but ultimately in order to gain individual control or possession. In the process of acquiring wealth, first the association and then its individual members alienate or appropriate means for exclusive use. The political method on the other hand socializes or communizes wealth. Having done so, the state may of course return this wealth to the economic system by a process of redistribution, but in so far as the state retains it, it assumes a public character. When for example the state establishes a national park or the municipality a hospital or school it withdraws these possessions from the processes of the economic system. They become subject to a new and very different kind of regulation. Socialized or communized goods are removed from the sphere of exchange and of the regulating economic forces of supply and demand. In so far as they are communized they arouse no longer the competitive economic interest, any more than do the winds and the clouds.

The economic method differs therefore from the political in that its principle is ultimately distributive. Political action, no matter what private interests may underlie it, is at least ostensibly in the name of, and for the sake of, the common welfare. It is therefore, as I have pointed out elsewhere, uni-centered within the area of a whole community, whereas economic action is multi-centered.[2] No matter how far the integration of economic associations advances through amalga-

[2] *The Modern State*, ch. IX.

mations, trusts, cartels, and other unions, the economic system, by its very nature, remains an arena of competing forces. But the political method is anti-competitive and assumes a complete unification of interest. It may be mistaken or perverted, and even when it does seek the common well-being it may be opposed or thwarted by dissentient economic forces, but at least it preserves the form of unity, the conception of the whole, and thus its intervention is, and always has been, necessary to preserve that unity against the disruptive and partial interests of the economic arena.

Since the economic association as such is indifferent to the uses of the means which it seeks, it reaches its developed form only when these means themselves are entirely detachable from any particular uses. When this stage is reached, as under modern systems of currency and credit, the economic method becomes more clearly differentiated from the political method. Its results are expressed in abstract units of exchange. A dollar is a convertible good, and a good only because convertible, convertible at the will of its possessor into any one of a myriad specific goods. The economic method is the pursuit through an elaborate mechanism of production, distribution, and exchange of this free kind of buying power. It is the detachment of this power from specific embodiments in forms of property which has made it so formidable and so pervasive. This situation is an aspect of modern capitalism. In old days, for example, land-ownership was never a purely economic category. It had a special social status and a definite political significance. Land was not bought and sold freely in the market-place. It was too closely bound up with sentiments and traditions and privileges to be a mere 'economic good'. It was the inheritance of a family, with all the personal and social attachments consequent thereon. In the process of industrialization it has lost this earlier significance and become, for the most part, a form of capital. Labor itself has undergone a similar and no less momentous revolution. It is now, under capitalism, a free contractual good; in other words, it is bought and sold, with certain limitations, on economic terms agreed upon between the buyers and the sellers. It has passed

from a condition of status to one of contract. The laborer is no longer attached to the land nor is his work and pay determined by the local traditions of an ancient craft. He offers his labor-power in the open market, by the hour or by the 'piece'. He seeks, through combination with his fellows, to affect in his favor the conditions of labor supply, and that is because his labor is now an economic category, so that his wages, and his employment or lack of employment, are immediately determined by the prevailing conditions of supply and demand.

These illustrations may serve to show how the economic method has grown distinct from the political method. In a capitalistic society economic power, with its peculiar detachment from social objectives, with its consequent lack of direct responsibility for social consequences, and with its vast power entrenched in the new forms of economic organization, offers a formidable challenge to political power. On this account political power, with its emphasis on unity and its claim on behalf of the common welfare, has in turn been compelled to extend its range, seeking at the least to mitigate certain of the more obvious dangers arising from the inequalities of economic power, and at the most, in the world-moving instance of Soviet Russia, to destroy that power altogether.

2. *The Nature of Economic Association*

Following our distinction of the economic from the political method we define as economic associations those which primarily pursue the former. The purely economic association would then be one whose interest is limited to the acquisition and control of wealth, without reference to the ends to which the acquired wealth is devoted. The members of the association, of course, seek this acquisition or control for various ends. They may be animated by private motives or by considerations of public service but the purely economic association as such is constituted without reference to the different and often incompatible goals which its members pursue. The association is the common meeting ground of diverse aims, because the means to them, with which alone it is directly concerned, are

common means. In a narrow sense it is the association which is directed by the profit motive, but in a broader sense it includes as participants and beneficiaries the workers no less than the shareholders and officials. The growth of this pure type of economic organization is a feature of modern specialized society. Its growth has depended particularly on two other developments. One is the establishment of free markets, so that the organization provides its particular goods and services indifferently to known and unknown clients, so that therefore it provides these goods and services in anticipation of and not merely in response to demand. The economic association which thus works 'for the market' is detached from the personal considerations which limit the economic motive and the economic method under the simpler conditions where men work for their immediate neighbors in response to specific demand. Obviously the wider or less localized the market the greater can be the detachment or 'purity' of the economic method. The wider market means at the same time greater specialization and an opportunity for production on a larger scale, both conditions operating to free the economic method from ulterior social interests.

The other development is that of the principle of incorporation. While associations of all kinds now assume a corporate character, this principle has peculiar significance in respect of the economic association. Incorporation gives to an association a specific legal 'personality'. It defines and limits the functions of the association and the liabilities of its members. Incorporation turns the association into an agency, acting through appointed officials, such that ownership of capital is distinguished clearly from management. Many of the owners, the shareholders, become passive recipients of dividends, just as the bondholders become passive recipients of interest. Their concern thus becomes limited to the efficiency of the association as a producer of economic gains for themselves. The process by which these are produced is hidden from them. In turn the chief responsibility of the directors and management is to ensure due returns for the owners. Thus again the economic method is liberated from extraneous considerations.

Moreover, through the principle of incorporation the amount of capitalization and the number of shareholders are capable of indefinite expansion. The 'billion dollar company' becomes feasible and with it the vast enhancement of the economic power of the directorate. This process in turn accentuates the separation of the financial from the industrial administration, of the pecuniary interest from the technological interest. This is the distinction which Veblen stressed when he contrasted the 'instinct of workmanship' and the drive for profits.[3] Incorporation as it expands tends to give dominance to the financial interest, the detached economic interest. Its main concern is with the balance-sheet, the surplus of profits over costs. It thinks in terms of *values* rather than of goods, and *values* are mathematical entities, subject to the abstract process of division and multiplication, and capable of many kinds of manipulation. Finally, incorporation conveys a kind of impersonal immortality. The corporation, unlike the partnership, is not limited by the life of its existing members. Before the development of this principle, such immortality belonged only to associations like the state and the church, and perhaps to a few chartered trading or banking companies. Now it is set up everywhere in the flux of the economic life and serves to entrench more deeply within the community the power of economic associations.

At the same time the liberation of the economic method reveals the more clearly that antithesis between group interest and social function which, existing everywhere within society, is peculiarly accentuated in the relation of the economic association to the whole social system. The specific interest of the economic association is the acquisition of wealth for its members. Its specific function is to make shoes or houses or steel rails or credit instruments for the community. The assumption that the interest and the function are reconciled through some pre-established harmony belongs to an individualistic creed which is neither proven nor any longer generally acceptable. It was possible for Adam Smith to accept it

[3] In *The Theory of the Leisure Class, The Instinct of Workmanship,* and other studies.

because of his belief in the beneficent equalizing power of competition. Competition, in his thought, made economic reward correspond to social function by levelling undue advantages, by destroying, because of the eagerness of competitors to seize each opportunity for gain, the increment that is not earned by service.[4] We need not discuss the adequacy of this argument, since the condition he postulated, the free competition of equal individuals, is so totally remote from the reality of the world of unequal economic associations. In this world the guarantees that reward will correspond to service are wholly inadequate, for reasons which every student of economics understands. There is no assurance that in pursuing to the utmost the enrichment of its members the economic association is therefore fulfilling most effectively its function of economic service.

It is true that there are certain checks on any excessive divergence of the two. Demand is not so clear-sighted as the classical economists presumed. The public is exposed to the representations of salesmanship and untrained to discrimination of quality in respect of the myriads of specialized commodities. There are few agencies whose function it is to guide the consumer and many which seek to persuade him. Even the co-operative consumers' associations, which have reached such high development in various countries, are, on the whole, designed rather to make the consumer a participant in the profits of trading than to direct him in respect of the quality and serviceableness of his purchases. But within limits, and especially in respect of standardized products, some judgment of the value of goods and service is effective. What is harder to determine is the relation of costs and prices, and this is particularly important where the good is produced under monopoly or semi-monopoly conditions, such as apply to public utilities. Here there is no safeguard against a gross discrepancy between service and return, except in so far as a vigilant scrutiny and regulation is maintained by constituted authority.

The maladjustment of the specific economic interest and

[4] Cf., for example, *The Wealth of Nations*, Book I, ch. X, *init.*

the broader social interest constitutes only one of the tensions to which economic organization is subject. As was pointed out in the preceding section the economic system is always an arena of contending forces. This condition is inherent in the very nature of the economic method. For it rests on two premises, competition and bargaining. Competition is the simultaneous offer of like or of alternative economic services to the same potential purchaser. Bargaining is the process by which the antithetical interests of supply and demand, of buyer and seller, are finally adjusted. The relation to one another of the manufacturers of the same goods or of substitute goods is a competitive one; the relation of the producer of raw materials to the producer of manufactured goods, of wholesaler to retailer, of retailer to consumer, of employer to employee, of lender to borrower, is a bargaining relationship. The two types, though often confused, are entirely distinct. Competitors do not need one another—they seek to oust one another. Bargainers offer complementary, not competitive services. Each stands to gain from the transaction, because each wants what the other offers. Bargaining is the process which ends in the act of exchange. Exchange is reciprocal giving and taking, and the giving is the price of the taking. Price is at once cost and reward of service, so that always the antithesis of economic interests is found in every transaction. The increase in the scale of economic organization creates larger areas from which the tensions of competition and of bargaining are in part or in whole removed, but these tensions still exist, sometimes in a more acute form, between the larger economic units thus created. For the competition of individual producers there is substituted the competition of large-scale businesses. Instead of the individual bargaining of employer and workman there appears the collective bargaining of the associations of capital and of labor. In fact, the bitter conflicts involved in the bargaining process between organizations of capital and labor reveal the profoundest and most universal of all the tensions which beset capitalistic society. On the other hand the competitive conflict is mitigated by organizations of capital and of labor respectively. In the larger areas

created by price agreements or by agreements allotting the proportionate production of the various units (through 'cartels') or the respective market-territories of the units (as in certain types of 'combine'), some forms of competition are removed while others remain active. In the relatively rare instances where monopoly is nearly complete, competition—though not bargaining—loses significance, but thereby other tensions are set up, for now the demand of the consumers for protection makes some form of political regulation inevitable.

The economic system therefore presents itself as an intricate combination of conflict and interdependence between its units large and small. It is definitely a system, in spite of these conflicts, because even competitive units are subject to common conditions, to certain rules of the game set up either by themselves or by economic tradition or by political authority. It is a system also because there are forces operative within it as well as without it which reveal a potential common interest, however little recognized or organized, of the whole. The most obvious signs of this potential common interest are the fluctuations of the economic cycle, involving varying levels of prosperity and of adversity over the widest areas. It is a system because, with the development of banking and credit systems, a decision taken by any strategic group has swift repercussions near and far. "A simple rise in the New York bank rate, if it be sudden and steep, may threaten disaster to every struggling industry the world over, bring privation to millions of workers' homes, and change the pulse of life itself." [5] It is a system because there is an automatic readjustment of part to part throughout its whole fabric whenever the conditions anywhere change, when the demand for any product rises, when the wage-rates of any group fall, when fashions change, when a new law is passed, when a bad harvest occurs. Finally, it is a system because this pervasive interdependence inevitably creates foci of regulation, some within the system, such as central banks, some without it, such as direct government control, some limited by national bounds, some attaining an international

[5] H. N. Brailsford, *Olives of Endless Age* (New York, 1928), ch. XI.

character. The slowly ripening experience thereby gained, together with the increasing recognition of the world-wide nexus of economic cause and effect, is an augury pointing towards a vaster future organization.

We have seen that the economic order, unlike the political, reveals itself in automatic adjustments, affected through the price system. But these automatic adjustments are in part, from the point of view of the lives subjected to them, maladjustments. The more complex the system is, the more obvious and the more serious become these maladjustments. They are seen in the gross disparities of poverty and of wealth, of power and of helplessness, in the wasteful exploitation of resources, in monopolistic advantage and in the competitive disadvantage of those whose services or goods are in too free supply, in the excessive production of some types of commodity, as compared with others, in the over-expansion of plants in relation to the demand for their products, and perhaps above all in the persistence of unemployment as well as in those recurrent crises when unemployment becomes acute. The specific description of these economic maladjustments and of the conditions determining them belongs to the study of economics. What we are here concerned to point out is that they are evidence of the automatic working of the economic system and that, because of their vital bearing on the well-being of the community, they form a challenge to the constructive abilities of men which, in so far as it is accepted, may lead—as in degree it has already led—to a greater unification of control within the economic order itself.

3. *Occupational Associations* [6]

In the previous section we distinguished the pure type of economic association. In so designating it we do not imply that its actual pursuit of wealth is not tempered or qualified by any social considerations, but we do imply that its interest,

[6] Much of this section, with a few variations, is reprinted from an article entitled "*The Social Significance of Professional Ethics*," which appeared in THE ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May, 1922.

as an association, does not include any social objectives beyond the stage of wealth acquisition and control. Since the economic interest is to some extent involved in practically all association and since many types of association resort to some extent to the economic method, we find all degrees of approximation to the pure type. The way in which the economic interest combines with others is one of the most intricate and significant aspects of social organization. We shall examine it here with especial reference to professional associations.

The occupational groups commonly recognized as professions are in this respect in a somewhat different position from business associations, associations of manufacturers, employment managers, insurance agents, real estate agents, and so forth, and also from trade-unions. The functional concept is not explicitly recognized and formulated in working codes by business organizations. It is otherwise with the professions. They assume an obligation and an oath of service. "A profession," says the ethical code of the American Medical Association, "has for its prime object the service it can render to humanity; reward or financial gain should be a subordinate consideration," and again it proclaims that the principles laid down for the guidance of the profession "are primarily for the good of the public." Similar statements are contained in the codes of the other distinctively organized professions. "The profession," says the code of the Canadian legal profession, "is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money-getting occupation." Such professions as teaching, the ministry, the civil service, and social work by their very nature imply like conceptions of responsibility. They imply that while the profession is of necessity a means of livelihood or of financial reward, the devoted service which it inspires is motivated by other considerations.

The more nearly an association approximates the pure economic type the less does it present the aspect of a profession. Moreover, in the world of business there is a further obstacle in the cleavage of interest between capital and labor, employer and employee. This internal strife reveals a fundamental

conflict of acquisitive interests within the business world and not only accentuates that interest in both parties to the struggle but makes it impossible for the intrinsic 'professional' interest to prevail. The professions are in general saved from this conflict. Within the profession there is not, as a rule, the situation where one group habitually employs for gain another group whose function, economic interest, and social position are entirely distinct from its own. For this and other reasons the professions have been better able to adjust economic interest and social function and so to attain a clearer sense of their relationship to the whole community.

Once that position is attained the problem of occupational conduct takes a new form. It was stated clearly long enough ago by Plato in the *Republic*. Each 'art', he pointed out, has a special good or service. "Medicine, for example, gives us health; navigation, safety at sea, and so on. . . . Medicine is not the art—or profession—of receiving pay because a man takes fees while he is engaged in healing. . . . The pay is not derived by the several 'artists' from their respective 'arts'. But the truth is, that while the 'art' of medicine gives health, and the 'art' of the builder builds a house, another 'art' attends them which is the 'art' of pay." [7] The ethical problem of the profession, then, is to reconcile the two 'arts', or, more generally, to fulfil as completely as possible the primary service for which it stands while securing the legitimate economic interest of its members. It is the attempt to effect this reconciliation, to find the due place of the intrinsic and of the extrinsic interest, which gives a profound social significance to professional codes of ethics.

Nevertheless, as was pointed out in chapter Nine, this reconciliation of the economic interest with professional function is no easy task. We may distinguish, apart from the economic interest, three others which are operative in various degrees in professional associations. Most closely allied with the economic interest is that in the authority and the prestige of the group. It generally seeks exclusive privileges, such as the right to limit the entrance to the profession, to exclude

[7] *Op. cit.*, Bk. I, 346 (Jowett's translation).

from membership those who fall below certain professiona standards or do not accept the professional 'etiquette', to ex clude from the practice of the profession all who are no registered as members of the association and do not posses certain qualifications represented by diplomas, degrees, o other distinctions. These demands, made in the name of th functional requirements of the profession, obviously have als an economic importance, as giving control over the condition of service and a degree of monopoly to the association itself Closely bound with this in turn is the technical interest, di rected to the art and craft of the profession, to the mainte nance and enhancement of its efficiency, to the quest for nev and better methods and processes, and to the development o the sciences which underlie its techniques. Finally, we may in clude a definitely cultural interest. To illustrate, in the pro fession of teaching the technical interest in the system o imparting knowledge is one thing, and the cultural interes in the knowledge imparted quite another. The distinction i clear also in the spheres of the sciences and of the fine art where the interest in truth or beauty may be discerned fron the interest in the technique of investigation or of expression In other professions it may be harder to identify the cultura as distinct from the technical interest, but if we interpret th term *culture* widely enough to include such aspects as th beauty of workmanship, it may be maintained that the cul tural interest belongs to every profession and is in fact one o the criteria by which to determine whether or not a give occupation is to be classed as a profession.

Interwoven as are these strands of interest, nevertheles they are subject to the pulls of opposing forces. Thus bette technique may at points be antagonistic to economic ad vantage. The lawyer may lose a source of profits by the intro duction of a simpler and more efficient system of conveyancing The architect, working on a percentage basis, may find hi pecuniary advantage at variance with his professional duty t secure the best service for the least cost. Again, the limitatio of membership may be based on the sense of vested right o traditional prestige and may involve irrelevant exclusion, apar

from the fitness of the excluded to carry on the professional function. The refusal to admit women to the practice of certain professions, though no longer so prevalent, is an illustration. Likewise, opposition may arise between the economic and the cultural interest. The teacher and the preacher may suffer loss from a wholehearted devotion to the spirit of truth as they conceive it. The artist, the playwright, the author, may have to choose between the ideals of their art and the more lucrative devices of popularity. Finally, the technical and the cultural interest may work apart. Routine methods and processes may dominate the professional mind to the obscuration of the ends which they should serve. A notable statement of this opposition is given in the valuable investigation into professional organization in England which was published in two supplements of the New Statesman (April 21 and 28, 1917). The investigation points to "the undisguised contempt in which both solicitors and barristers, notably those who have attained success in their profession and control its organization, hold, and have always held, not only all scholarship or academic learning of a professional kind, but also any theoretic or philosophical or scientific treatment of law."

The main problem which these cases illustrate is once more that of the reconciliation of group interest and social function. The professions generally seek to lay down the lines of reconciliation by the establishment of special codes. Some codes distinguish elaborately between the various types of obligation incumbent on the members of the profession. The lawyer, for example, is declared to have specific duties to his client, to the public, to the court or to the law, to his professional brethren and to himself. It would occupy too much space to consider the interactions, harmonies, and potential conflicts of such various duties. Perhaps the least satisfactory reconciliation is that relating the interest of the client to the interest of the public, not merely in the consideration of the particular cases as they arise but still more in the adaptation of the service to the needs of the public as a whole as distinct from those of the individual clients. Thus the medical profession has incurred to many minds a serious liability, in spite of the

development of its service to actual patients, by its failure for so long to apply the preventive side of medicine, in particular to suggest ways and means for the prevention of the needless loss of life and health and happiness caused by the general medical ignorance and helplessness of the poor.[8]

The difficulty of harmonizing group interest and social function is increased by the general and by the specific bias which a profession, like every other group, exhibits. The general bias may be seen in such attempts to maintain a vested interest as may be found in the undue restriction of entrants to the profession—undue when determined by such professionally irrelevant considerations as high fees and expensive licenses; in the resistance to specialization, whether of tasks or of men, the former corresponding to the resistance to 'dilution' in the trade-union field; in the insistence on a too narrow orthodoxy, which would debar from professional practice men trained in a different school; in the unnecessary multiplication of tasks, of which a flagrant example is the English severance of barrister and solicitor. Another aspect of the general bias is found in the shuffling of responsibility under the cloak of the code. This is most marked in the public services, particularly the civil service and the army and navy—and incidentally it may be noted that the problem of professional ethics is aggravated when the profession as a whole is in the employ of the state. "An official," says M. Faguet in one of his ruthless criticisms of officialdom (*The Dread of Responsibility*), "is a man whose first and almost only duty is to have no will of his own."

This last instance brings us near to what we have called the specific bias of the profession. Each profession has a limited field, a special environment, a group mentality. Each profession tends to leave its distinctive stamp upon a man. The group environment creates a group bias. The man of law develops respect for property at the risk of his respect for personal rights. The teacher is apt to make his teaching an over-narrow discipline. The priest is apt to underestimate the costs of the maintenance of sanctity. The diplomat may

[8] See on this point pp. 167–168.

overvalue good form and neglect the penalty of exclusiveness. The civil servant may make a fetish of the principle of seniority, and the soldier may interpret morality as mere *esprit de corps.*

But the bias of the occupational group is subject to a process of correction which is not operative to control the bias of class and other non-functional unities. For it is organized in terms of a specific service which its members fulfil, not to themselves but to the community. It must therefore be responsive to the demands of the community. The social function, in the name of which the association exists, is itself capable of continuous development and thus resists the stereotyping of group attitudes around group interests. The great growth of occupational associations is one aspect of social differentiation. We have seen that professional associations represent a unity of service which is not attained in the sphere of business, where dividing interests, and above all those of capital and of labor, are separately organized. Professional associations therefore embody the fullest present attainment of the principle of functional organization, the principle which seeks to modify economic interest by subordinating it, where the two conflict, to social function. Their increase is therefore part of a movement whereby the fulfilment of function appears as a definite social force, not only above the sheer drive of economic interest, but also in part-substitution for the principle of non-functional organization, for the tradition of birth and race and even of nation. In this process the activity of service becomes a basis of social organization, as distinct from the passivity of status.

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE GREAT ASSOCIATIONS: III. CULTURAL

1. *The Distinction of Civilization and Culture*

Within the whole range of the great associations the broadest contrast is that between associations predominantly concerned with the instruments of civilization and those which are predominantly cultural. To the former category belong the state, the business corporation, the occupational association; to the latter the church and all the associations designed to foster art or literature or drama or pure science or philosophy or any mode of thought or of life, of spiritual or aesthetic fellowship or of sport and recreation. Since we are here using the terms *civilization* and *culture* in a special sense, and since the contrast we draw between them is important not only for the classification of social structures but also for the interpretation of social change, it seems desirable to dwell at some length on the character of this distinction.

When the anthropologist speaks of 'culture', he thinks of specific patterns, traits, and material objects which are manifestations of human behavior. We must here use the term in an older and equally valid sense, and one which is akin to the usage of modern German sociologists.[1] Let us contrast, say, a factory and a monument, a machine and a picture, a camera and a movie film, a legal document and a play. On the one side we have placed utilitarian objects, means which we employ to satisfy our wants; on the other, things we want, so to speak, for themselves, for the direct satisfaction which

[1] The distinction of culture and civilization here brought out is in general accord with the analysis offered by Alfred Weber in the 47th Volume of the ARCHIV FÜR SOZIALWISSENSCHAFT UND SOZIALPOLITIK. It follows the lines of the distinction given in the author's *Modern State*, ch. X. The latter statement was made before the author was acquainted with A. Weber's work, which may explain why the treatment follows a somewhat different method from the penetrating exposition of this German writer.

they bring us. It is one form of the contrast between means and ends, between the apparatus of living and the expressions of our life. The former we call civilization, the latter culture. By civilization, then, we mean the whole mechanism and organization which man has devised in his endeavor to control the conditions of his life. It would include not only our systems of social organization but also our techniques and our material instruments. It would include alike the ballot-box and the telephone, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the railroads, our laws as well as our schools, and our banking systems as well as our banks. Culture on the other hand is the expression of our nature in our modes of living and of thinking, in our everyday intercourse, in art, in literature, in religion, in recreation and enjoyment. While, as we shall see, many objects possess both a civilizational and a cultural element, we can often decide the question of their classification by asking: do we want these things themselves or do we merely use them in order to attain some other thing we want? [2] Do they exist because of some outer necessity or because we seek them as such? Often we make a virtue of necessity and impress on utilitarian objects a cultural quality, as when we build banks to rival temples, but if these objects would not exist at all for the *direct* satisfaction they yield us we may classify them as within the category of civilization. On the other hand many objects combine both elements so inextricably, for example our clothing and our homes, that we must be content simply to distinguish the two aspects of the service they render.

The distinction between the two categories is seen in the way they respectively enter into the social heritage. An achievement of civilization is generally exploited and improved, going on from strength to strength, until it is superseded or rendered obsolete by some new invention. It is true that in past ages some achievements of civilization have

[2] It may be said of all objects that we want them for the satisfaction they bring, but the question here raised concerns the immediacy of the relation between object and satisfaction. A typewriter, for example, is an intermediary to the novel which we directly enjoy. Hence it falls among the objects of civilization.

again been lost. Men forgot the arts which raised the pyramids of Egypt and which constructed the roads and aqueducts of the Romans. But these losses occurred through catastrophic changes which blotted out the records of civilization. With the widening of the areas of civilization and with superior methods of recording discoveries any utilitarian or technical gain becomes a permanent possession within the social heritage and the condition of further gains. Civilization is thus a cumulative process, a 'march'. It is otherwise with cultural achievements. They do not lead assuredly to higher or improved ones. Since man first invented the automobile, it has continuously improved. Our means of transportation grow constantly more swift and more efficient. They are vastly superior to those which the ancient Greeks employed. But can we say the same of our dramas and our sculptures, our conversation and our recreation? Here certitude fails us. There are no automobiles to-day so comparatively inefficient as the first vehicles of Henry Ford—his work and that of other inventors inevitably prepared the way for better ones. But our plays are not necessarily better to-day because of the achievements of Shakespeare. There is no 'march' of culture. It is subject to retrogression as well as to advance. Its past does not assure its future.

Observe also that we can generally speak with confidence of 'superior' and 'inferior' when comparing the products of civilization. They are means whose efficiency of service can readily be estimated. The only difficulty lies in our judgment of the value of the ends which they serve, either in themselves or relatively to other ends. No one disputes the superiority of the tractor over the hand-plough or of the modern currency and credit system over primitive barter. No one disputes the superiority of the machine-gun over the tomahawk, though here the question arises of the wisdom or folly which employs the superior engine of destruction. We dispute concerning 'scientific management' and labor unions and trusts and socialistic policies, not so much because we cannot measure the efficiency of these means towards the achievement of particular ends but because we differ regarding the relative value

of these ends in the total scheme of life. It is always the cultural aspect which raises the ultimate unarbitrable problem of values. And so with the greater achievements of culture. We have no universal measuring-rod by which to assess them. Different ages and different groups vary in their judgments. At best we content ourselves with the slowly gathered wisdom of a succession of 'authorities', knowing that this also is precarious. If Shaw claims that he is a better dramatist than Shakespeare, no one can prove—or disprove—his claim; we can only disagree—or agree—with it. Progress, in the absolute sense, which means cultural progress, remains a matter of faith, of the congruity between the facts as we know them and the particular conceptions we entertain as to what is ultimately worth while. And no matter what standards we accept we find an ebb and flow, a lack of certitude in the movement of culture which stands in marked contrast to the victorious march of civilization.

In a word, the social heritage does not ensure the future of culture with the same probability with which it provides the conditions of civilization. Culture, being the immediate expression of the human spirit, can advance only if that spirit is capable of finer efforts, has itself something more to express. Civilization is the vehicle of culture: its improvement is no guarantee of finer quality in that which it conveys. The radio can carry our words to the ends of the earth, but the words need be no wiser on that account. The civilization around us can be enjoyed without any special effort, without any particular merit on our part. The culture we 'inherit' is ours only if we are worthy of it. A new generation cannot enjoy the culture of the past unless they win it afresh for themselves. Culture is communicated only to the like-minded. No one without the quality of the artist can appreciate art, nor without the ear of the musician can one enjoy music. Civilization in general makes no such demand. We can enjoy its products without sharing the capacity which creates them. Moreover, the process of creation itself is different. Lesser minds improve the work of the great inventors, but lesser poets do not improve on Shakespeare. The product of the artist is more

revelatory of his personality than is that of the technician, just as the quality of a people is peculiarly expressed in its culture rather than in its civilization.

This more intimate relation of culture and society is seen also in the fact that culture is not transferable in the simple mode characteristic of civilization. Given adequate means of communication, any improvement in the apparatus of life will quickly spread. In fact with the modern development of communications a single system of civilization is already encompassing nearly all the earth. Even the savage is ready to discard his bow and spear and to adopt the rifle. The power-machine displaces the hand tool wherever men have the means to acquire it. The corporate form of industry encroaches everywhere on older forms as irresistibly as the factory displaces the domestic system of production. We have pointed out that these techniques are readily comparable and the relative superiority of one over the other is easily adjudged. Civilization has its objective tests so that it is a simple matter to decide that one mode of hygiene or one method of road-building is preferable to another. The advance of civilization is seriously resisted only when the older form is closely associated with the culture of a people. For a people will not freely abandon its culture for another, since to do so would be to sacrifice its intrinsic quality. Even when one civilization covers the globe great cultural differences, modified as they become under such conditions, will endure, just as they endure to-day among the industrialized peoples. It is true that cultural 'borrowing' occurs, but it is selective and seemingly wayward, dependent on a degree of affinity, of like-mindedness, in the borrowers and always colored or even distorted by their personality. The history of religious conversion and proselytism affords sufficient evidences of this selective process. The Geneva of Calvin and the Scotland of Knox and the Massachusetts of Cotton Mather were receptive of certain strains in the multiform tradition of Christianity, selecting ascetic, authoritarian, patriarchal, eschatological elements within it and translating them into a system which they identified with Christianity itself, just as other peoples and other

times selected and transmuted other elements to form their creeds. It may also be noted that this selective 'borrowing' is not limited to recent or contemporaneous contributions to the stock of culture. In this also it differs from the process by which civilization spreads. Culture elements may be adopted as readily from the past as from the present, from any epoch of the past no less than from the present hour. Cultural affinity may revert to the legends of Greece or of the German forests, to the art of tenth century China or of pre-Raphaelite Florence, to the meditations of Job or of Marcus Aurelius. Its range of selection runs from the newest culture-fashion to the myths that linger from the dawn of history.

In the light of these distinctions it is obvious that the expansion of a civilization follows different principles from those which determine cultural development. Where communications admit, the former tends to proceed more rapidly, more simply, less selectively, always spreading outwards from the foci of technological and economic advance. The products of civilization are conveyed over every trade route, and they prepare the way for the techniques and systems which created them. People trade with one another before they understand one another. The expansion of civilization has perils on that very account. For the interdependence of peoples within a common civilization outstrips the formation of those cultural attitudes necessary for its maintenance. This peril was glaringly exposed in the Great War. The spread of civilization makes certain cultural readjustments imperative.

Having distinguished the phenomena of civilization from those of culture we must now show their relation to one another within the total environment. We have just pointed out that there may occur a 'cultural lag', such that our cultural attitudes may be out of harmony with the conditions of our civilization.[3] The attitudes of the 'cave man' may survive in the modern city. We may fail, particularly in a time of rapid civilizational change, to understand and utilize the new instrumentalities so that they will enable us the

[3] The expression is taken from Ogburn's *Social Change* (New York, 1923), though he uses the term *cultural lag* without the connotation given above.

better to fulfil our lives. It is a very old observation that it is possible *propter vitam vivendi perdere causas.*[4] It is also a commonplace that the engrossment of men in the machinery of civilization is apt to deflect their minds from cultural pursuits. These observations point to the *need* for harmony between civilization and culture. But they also indicate that the two orders are in fact closely bound together, and it is this actual interrelationship which we shall here consider.

Let us recall that the phenomena we are dealing with, the objective expressions of civilization or of culture, fall into two main groups. One consists of concrete or material objects, such as a mechanism on the one hand and a work of art on the other. The second group consists of social organizations or institutions, such as a system of government on the one hand and a public celebration on the other. It will be seen that these phenomena rarely fall exclusively into one or other of our two categories. Objects that predominantly belong to the side of civilization nevertheless may possess a cultural aspect. Objects that we class as cultural nevertheless require a technical medium or vehicle. Here then we find our first principle of interrelationship. It may be stated briefly as follows: *the phenomena of civilization exhibit in various degrees a cultural quality while the phenomena of culture invariably possess a civilizational basis.*

Men are seldom content with the purely utilitarian aspect of the instruments they use, they want the utility embellished. They want style in an automobile as well as performance or comfort. The degree in which a cultural character is superadded to the mere utility varies with the nature of the object and with the social conditions. It is a general rule that what the economists term 'consumers' goods' are more 'embellished' than 'producers' goods.' The steam-shovel, for example, is less stylized than the automobile. Another interesting point is that the longer an object of civilization endures, the more likely it is to acquire a cultural aspect. When the instruments of production tend to grow rapidly obsolete and to be replaced by more efficient or at least newer types they

[4] Juvenal, 8, 84.

are likely to assume more purely utilitarian forms. The culture of the community has not time to express itself in them. But in more static primitive communities the tool is more than a tool, it is the bearer of tradition, a symbol of culture, on which accordingly the craftsman lavishes his art. Under these conditions the techniques of production as well as the products have a ceremonial, symbolic, in general a cultural, quality. When the savage builds a canoe, the technique is associated throughout with a ritual expressive of the folkways. Some relics of this blending of technique and culture remain among ourselves, as in the ceremony of laying a foundation stone or of launching a ship.

What applies to the concrete instruments of civilization applies still more obviously to institutions and organizations. A constitution or a code of laws is not simply a means of government. At the same time it expresses the spirit of a people and as such tends to be endowed with a cultural value apart from its utility. It tends to be treasured for its own sake as the embodiment of tradition. This merging of the cultural with the utilitarian creates a resistance to change. The engineer, dominated by the idea of efficiency, never admires the mechanism of the past or the present so much that it impedes his search for improvements, nor in turn is he impeded by the attachment of his fellow men to antique designs. But men are more apt to admire the social agencies of the political or the economic order, the work of their forefathers hallowed by time, in such a way that they refuse to exercise upon them their own constructive powers or to consider objectively the advantages and disadvantages of proposed changes.

Let us now consider the second part of our first principle of interrelationship. All the phenomena that we classify as cultural expressions depend on some technical medium and technical process. The expression is limited and modified by technical requirements, whether the medium be language or paint or stone or gesture or other external sign. That is why, for example, it is harder to translate a poem than a treatise on engineering into a foreign language. It is impossible really to reproduce the former, to give in another medium the entire

significance of the original blending of meaningful sounds and rhythms. Every artist has a constant struggle to master his medium. When we try to communicate to others some experience we have had or some scene we have witnessed, we find ourselves forever hampered by the difficulties of expression even in the most familiar of all media, our own language. We may mean what we say, but it is vastly harder to say what we mean. In a court of law we swear to tell the whole truth, but no one, with the best will in the world, can do so, can present to others a whole situation precisely as he has experienced it. The greater the artist, the more he succeeds in making the medium express his thoughts or his purposes. This problem of the technical medium applies not only to the fine arts but also to the art of living, to the pursuit of the everyday satisfactions which are the cultural expressions of the majority of men. These also must be sought and attained under the conditions and the limitations set by the civilization in which we live.

In passing it may be mentioned that many of the devices of civilization are of minor importance as direct vehicles of our culture—our elaborate mechanisms of production, for example. These mechanisms are more capable of serving our culture indirectly, as a means of exploiting nature and thus of liberating energies which otherwise would be used up in the necessities of mere living. The degree and the manner in which these liberated energies are utilized may themselves be a criterion of our culture. The elaborate apparatus does not inevitably raise its standard or its quality. Under certain conditions it may even prove an obstacle. The engrossment of energies in the expansion of civilization when conditions are favorable to it may be prejudicial to culture, and this charge is often brought against periods of great mechanical advance such as the United States has experienced in conjunction with a rapidly growing population. The quantitative growth of civilization may check the qualitative growth of culture. It may be claimed on the other hand that some peoples have a greater genius for the building up of civilization than for the achievement of culture, a comparison which receives

some support from the examples of Greece and Rome and which for these peoples was in fact admitted and proclaimed by the greatest of Roman poets.[5]

Under our first principle we have been considering the specific embodiments of civilization and culture. We have seen that these phenomena do not fall solely or simply into one category or the other but embody aspects of both. We can, however, sufficiently distinguish the two main orders within the social environment. We can still differentiate the forms in which the art, the taste, the philosophy, the devotion, the loyalties and satisfactions of a community are expressed from the devices and instruments which serve its purposes. We can therefore examine the relation of each order as a whole, with the conditions and the interests which accompany it, to the other. This is a harder and more significant task, and leads us to the great problem of the causation of social change. We shall return to it in the next division of this work, but meantime we can state in general terms our second principle of interrelationship as follows: *Civilization and culture are interactive, so that changes initiated in either category operate to induce changes in the other.* We shall see in a later chapter that various theories of social change assign a primacy to one category or the other or to some one set of conditions under either category. However that may be, there can be no doubt that the products, activities, and interests associated with a civilization do influence and modify the concomitant culture, and that the reverse relation also holds.

Civilization does more than provide channels and outlets for culture. The relation between the mind and the environment cannot be summed up in that external way. The instruments we use are the creatures of our desires, but they evoke, modify, and deflect our desires in turn. Mechanisms devised as mere utilities affect our lives, our thoughts, our aims and hopes and fears, in ways entirely beyond our foreknowledge.

[5] Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera.
(credo equidem), vivos ducent de marmore vultus,
orabunt causas melius caelique meatus
describent radio et surgentia sidera dicent,
tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento. Virgil, *Aen.*, VI, 847–851.

Our civilization, as it were, takes revenge upon us. Like a Frankenstein, it cannot be wholly controlled by its creators. The machine age has stimulated new habits and enjoyments, new philosophies and ethics, as well as new methods of production and means of locomotion. The telescope revises our ideas of the universe, the microscope our ideas about the nature of life, and thus more subtly they influence our religions and our conduct. The power-mechanism, inexorably fulfilling immutable if new-discovered laws, instils new conceptions of the nature of authority. If in ancient Egypt or Judaea the wonders of electrical energy had been revealed the peoples of these lands would also have had a different 'revelation' of God, which might well have affected the course of history. In the eras of slower change the influence of civilization on culture was less observed, but in our own age, with its rapid technological development, the fact has become a commonplace, though, as we shall see later, the precise nature and limits of that influence are exceedingly hard to diagnose.

What our age has witnessed has been the impact of a new civilization upon an older culture. It has witnessed incidentally the opposition of traditional elements within that culture to such techniques of the new order as seemed to undermine them, disturbing old beliefs and practices. Even the objective discoveries of science in the field of astronomy, of geology, or of organic evolution, have been resisted by the votaries of ancient faiths. Still more definite has been the resistance to the practical controls which the age has developed, such as the use of contraceptives or the prophylaxy of venereal disease. On the other hand, our age has clung to outworn systems in the economic and political order, although they are manifestly unworkable or irrational under the technical conditions of the new civilization. This indictment applies most obviously to the institution of war. Yet in spite of these resistances the new techniques have effectively reacted on our beliefs no less than on our ways of living. In the Orient with its much older culture no less than in the West we can perceive their influence. In Japan, for example, we see industrialism rendering obsolete certain media of the traditional life

and thus changing cultural attitudes. In China the borrowed civilization has destroyed such cultural forms as the old classical examination system and is undermining, no less certainly if more slowly than in the West, the old processes of the family life.[6] With such triumphs to its credit, we can readily understand the vogue of those doctrines which ascribe all significant social change to the forces of civilization.

In view of the prevalence of these deterministic theories it is important to insist on the other side of our general principle. Through our civilization we seek to liberate ourselves from the compulsions of the world around us, to attain a greater degree of liberty to express and fulfil our own natures. The advance of civilization assures one condition requisite in order that a social group may develop its culture, for it makes possible the fuller satisfaction of those desires which otherwise are repressed through the sheer necessities of primary toil. The greater the civilization the more numerous are the alternatives which are opened up to human endeavor. The varieties of cultural expression within the more advanced civilization constitute in fact a disproof of the extreme doctrines of economic and technological determinism. The apparatus of civilization is in a degree indifferent to the use we make of it. The powers we harness for productive purposes stand ready to produce whatever we will. The industrial plant can turn out necessaries or luxuries, the comforts of life or the munitions of war. This increasing indifference of the agencies of production expresses the degree in which our culture is itself a determinant factor. The civilizational means may be represented by a ship which can set sail to various ports. The port we sail to remains a cultural choice. Without the ship we could not sail at all; according to the character of the ship we sail fast or slow, take longer or shorter voyages; our lives are also accommodated to the conditions on ship-board and our experiences vary accordingly. But the direction in which we travel is not predestinated by the design of the ship. The more efficient it is the more ports lie within the range of our choosing.

[6] See, for example, Paul Monroe, *China; a Nation in Evolution* (New York, 1928).

2. *The Church as a Type of Cultural Association*

In view of the great variety of cultural associations in modern society it is not possible within our limits to deal with the different sociological types they present and the manifold revelations of social behavior which a study of them would reveal. We shall here confine ourselves to that form of cultural association which has had the most remarkable historic continuity and which in the nearer past has been a preponderant influence over our cultural life. The part played by the church in the evolution of modern society will be discussed at a later stage. Here we are concerned to bring out the distinctive features of the church as a form of association.

The character of the church, as a religious association, is in one fundamental respect different from that of every other type. For religion implies an attitude of man, not primarily to his fellow man, but to some power beyond his range, a power regarded by every monotheistic religion as supreme. Consequently the church seeks to establish a form of communication or *rapport* with an invisible and superior being. Thus it postulates a supra-social form of relationship which within the religious assembly prescribes the social relations of the members. The church is a form of association in which men enter into relations with one another ostensibly determined by a prior relationship to a non-human being or beings, whether a universal spirit, a local god, a ghost, a dead ancestor, even a stock or stone regarded as imbued with supernatural might. Here lies the difference between religion and magic, closely interwoven as the two have been. For magic is a system of manipulation of the unknown. It is pseudo-science, based on a false conception of causality, assuming a control over powers not understood by means the relation of which to these powers is not subjected to the test of objective exploration. But religion seeks to enter into communication with the higher powers. Its modes of communication, such as worship, intercession, prayer, and hymn, do not imply control. Magic involves no social relationship. Religion involves generally twofold communion, that of man with a non-human power and a derivative communion of man with man.

This twofold relationship throws light on various other attributes of the church as a form of association. In the religious assembly there is a restraint on the more familiar and more intimate aspects of behavior. The sense of a higher presence induces in the faithful a reverential attitude which limits their relations to their fellows. The distinction between the 'sacred' and the 'profane' or 'secular' holds sway and introduces an appropriate set of inhibitions, while it may, in certain moments of religious exaltation or ecstasy, dissolve others. These attitudes find expression in characteristic ceremonies and rituals.[7] Every occasion of a solemn character is apt to be celebrated through such devices, which create regular and prescribed channels for the orientation and limitation of social intercourse.

Moreover, since the being or power to which the religious attitude is directed can not be known by the normal modes of perception or by the procedures of scientific investigation, the church becomes in a peculiar way the exponent and repository of a lore. More than other cultural associations it depends on continuity of doctrine. It generally assumes an original revelation, set forth in inspired writings but requiring the interpretation of the leaders in the faith. Consequently a church has usually a strong authoritarian character. If it has endured long, its authority is rooted in the past and is strongly impregnated with the tradition of interpretation. Hence its teaching is essentially deductive. It lays stress on orthodoxy, on the true faith delivered once for all. Its doctrinal problems are problems of exegesis, and since it claims, in its more dogmatic forms, to be "the pillar and foundation of all truth," it seeks the truth through an authoritative interpretation of the inspired word. This orthodoxy is further impressed on the faithful by the supernatural sanctions which it usually associates with the acceptance and rejection of belief. To the social taboos on non-conformist conduct the church adds the formidable taboos based on rewards and punishments in an afterlife.

We are discussing here the nature of the church, not of

[7] On the nature of ceremony and ritual see ch. XIV, 2.

religion. The church takes a religious faith, often at first inchoate and flexible, and gives it a systematic form. The free expression of the religious sense is canalized in creeds and formulae and edicts and glosses. Such appears to be the history of all the greater faiths. We can follow, for example, the process by which Christianity, in its first manifestation so anti-formalist, became institutionalized as a closed system of thought-forms, acquiring, through church councils such as that of Nicaea, a precise dogmatic character. Official interpretation creates a canon of conformity, and this canon is repressive of all new interpretations. It becomes 'the will of God', and as such tends to be a profoundly conservative influence on all social thinking. Revelation stands in the way of revaluation. No doubt the trend of civilization in subtle and often unrealized ways affects churchly doctrines and the religious life, but, especially in the days before modern science undermined the basis of many religious dogmas, the claim of supernatural authority has been one of the most powerful of all controls and one most resistant to the spontaneous social expression of the conceptions corresponding to a changing social order. It has been said that "modern social theory, like modern political theory, develops only when society is given a naturalistic instead of a religious interpretation, and a capital fact which presides at the birth of both is a change in the conception held of the nature and functions of a church."[8]

Numerous illustrations could be offered of the resistance of religious organizations to the social adjustments which new inventions or new conditions seemed to demand. Because of the traditional nature of religious formulations, often derived from a source remote in time, in national character, and in evolutionary stage, the authority of the church has constantly sought to retain practices and conceptions which were growing alien to the changed character of the surrounding culture. Scarcely any new illumination of man's life and destiny or any new means of controlling it, from the knowledge of the starry heavens to that of human evolution, from the establishment of republicanism to the emancipation of women,

[8] R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (New York, 1926), ch. I.

from anaesthetics to birth control, but has been condemned or proscribed in the name of religion. The retention of Sabbatarian laws in various countries is a good example of the way in which the authority of the church has clung to prescriptions emanating from the radically different conditions of life under which the code was originally formed. The 'day of rest' naturally took, under the conditions of life among an ancient pastoral people like the Jews of Palestine, a form which might be ill adapted to the circumstances of life in a mechanized age and in a modern city.

It is true that traditions resistant to new needs cohere around all established institutions, economic or political as well as religious. But the institutions of the church have generally claimed a unique finality. The church, dealing with ultimates, has regarded its own truth as ultimate, as absolute instead of relative to time and place and the process of knowledge, as sacrosanct and eternal. Consequently it has set up a dichotomy of the sacred and the secular, of the supernatural and the natural. Thus it proclaims a prior standard by which social institutions of the 'natural' order are to be judged and to which they should be subjected. The church, in Catholic theory, is a "perfect society of supernatural universal character." [9] The predetermined order which it assumes makes it more difficult for the social experience generated within the religious group to find expression through a readjustment of its own institutions or of the institutions over which it exercises control. For example, a system of caste is usually supported, as in India, by religious dogmas, and thus exercises a dominance over the mind which prevents the free criticism of its social values and the transition to a more flexible order which changing conditions within and beyond the society would otherwise promote.

Nevertheless in times of social ferment the pressure of authoritarian religious prescription is liable to be broken in various ways. In our present age, when large numbers owe no serious allegiance to a church, the ease with which members can withdraw from its communion reduces the internal

[9] Cf. the papal encyclical of January 11th, 1930.

stresses which characterized those ages when a church affiliation was socially or even politically obligatory. Under the latter conditions insurgent religious movements created schism within the established church and led to the formation of a variety of sects each claiming to possess the true interpretation of the same original faith. Hence arose two social phenomena peculiarly associated with the history of religion, persecution or attempted suppression of the 'heretic' and proselytism or the attempted conversion of those who espouse other beliefs. A church is rarely exclusive in respect of membership—it is rather in keeping with its spirit that it should bring the whole world into its single fold. But the days when this ideal seemed feasible are past, and the claim of universality, so influential in certain historical stages and so markedly in contrast with the exclusive spirit of most other associations, is submerged by the multiplicity of sects, the tendency in our times for new religions rather than for new sects to arise, and the withdrawal of large members from all church connections. The decline of dogma in some of the more 'protestant' forms of religion has led on the other hand to a movement for their unification.

The peculiar sociological character of the church is more fully seen if we turn to consider the interests which it satisfies. The supra-social orientation of religion is of course the expression of certain human impulses. In more primitive forms religion may reveal the desire to appease the formidable powers which seem to beset the life and determine the lot and fate of men. But this desire may be regarded as the germ of a more inclusive impulse, the essentially religious yearning for cosmic security, for an adjustment of the individual being towards the universe as he is able to conceive it. The core of this religious principle is expressed in the famous words of St. Augustine: "our heart is restless till it finds rest in Thee." It is the esoteric way of escape from those fears and negations and frustrations which surmount ordinary human contrivance. As these change with changing experience, so does, at length, religion. The church stabilizes and, as we have seen, in part checks this process, setting up explicit formulations of the

conditions under which the individual can achieve the sense of cosmic unity. It propounds, for example, a schematic doctrine of an after-life in response to the yearning for immortality. It develops a formula for the expiation of sin or guilt in response to the feeling of imperfection, frailty, or wrong doing. In short, it elaborates a compensatory thought-system designed to assure those adjustments of the emotional nature of man towards the order of the universe which seem to be contradicted or at least unattainable on the level of everyday experience.

But while this is the principle which distinguishes the church from other cultural associations it is one which is too nearly related to the social interests and pressures of the group to find a pure or simple embodiment in social organization. Religion, so understood, could scarcely be expected to emancipate itself from more immediate concerns. Alike its compensations and its penalties were rooted in the mores of the group, past or present. The distinction of the religious and the moral is still a hard one even for the reflective mind. So the church was inevitably a strong agent of social control, the more powerful because of its absolutist claims and the consequent passivity of its lay membership. Being conservative by the instinct of its being, it was a potent instrument of social submission, and as such was consciously or unconsciously exploited by the dominant forces in the community. The consequent confusion of its aims, and particularly the difficulty of its relationship to the powers of the state, will be considered in a later chapter.

Moreover, the church lives in the assembling of its members, in local units of fellowship. Hence for its members and others it is a social rallying-point, furnishing in many rural communities the chief occasion for the regular meeting of the folk. Under such conditions the church is less a specific association than a communal institution. It is the focus for the celebration and symbolization of the great occasions and crises of life, a cultural center of the life of the community. It conducts and controls many social activities, political, educational, charitable, recreational. In the more complex society other agencies

take over, in part at least, these functions. Hence the church has had to face a problem similar to that which has confronted the family, that of finding its place and rôle within a more specialized system. With the decline in the hold of dogmatic religion, especially in the large cities, this problem has created for the church a peculiar dilemma. Its traditional basis becomes uncongenial to a social life which has in other respects abandoned old traditions, and yet it is exceedingly hard for a church to reformulate its basis without losing its distinctive character or with any assurance of thereby fulfilling some function which is not more definitely fulfilled by other organizations.[10]

The manner in which churches have served as a rallying-point for cultural interests is well revealed by the strength which they possess among groups which feel their cultural unity but lack adequate political means for its association. The cultural cohesion of the Jewish people has been in great measure expressed through the synagogue, rabbinical rituals, and religious commemorations. In Catholic Ireland in its struggle for independence the church played an important part. In French Quebec, incorporated within a political area dominated by English traditions, the church has retained an authority which it has lost in France. In other countries, such as Poland, where two peoples of different religions and different traditions are associated, religious affiliations have retained a greater social significance It has often been observed also that immigrant groups in the United States cling to their traditional church with an added intensity because of their cultural isolation. On the other hand, the militant free-thinking of the Czech population is an expression of nationalist opposition to Austrian catholicism.[11] The church has thus played historically a double rôle: claiming universality it has preached the brotherhood of man but it has also embodied and perpetuated in its different forms the social traditions of diverse and often conflicting groups.

[10] Cf. H. Paul Douglass, *The Church in the Changing City* (New York, 1927), and E. C. Lindeman, *The Church in the Changing Community* (published by The Community Church of New York, 1929).

[11] For fuller illustration of these points see H. A. Miller, *Races, Nations, and Classes* (Philadelphia, 1924).

PART TWO
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

(B) REGULATIVE PRINCIPLES

PREFATORY NOTE

In our study of the social structure we have seen that every type of group possesses both a characteristic outer aspect and a characteristic inner quality or 'spirit'. Associations possess the further attribute of specific function. In a broader way these attributes distinguish an entire social structure as well as its parts. A society on the scale of a nation or of a whole civilization has, for all its variations, a distinctive form and a distinctive quality. It has its own unity and its own sense of unity. It has its peculiar coherence and its peculiar meaning, though these are often more evident in historical retrospect than in the vision of its contemporaries.

How the whole structure coheres and maintains itself is the question we must now face. Always changing, it has this definite character to which the new elements are in some measure assimilated, while many of its major forms, such as the family, the state, and the church, have shown great persistence of type through change. There must be correspondingly permanent attitudes and interests of social man. These are recorded and embodied in certain institutions, established thought-forms and modes of procedure. Such conservative factors are thus also part of the social structure. At a later stage we shall study the influences which make for instability and change; here we are concerned with those which make for coherence and stability.

We enter here a region where sociology and psychology meet. For these regulative principles are of a universal character, and they seem to be as constitutive of human mentality as they are of human society. At the same time the codes and other agencies of control with which we shall deal do not wholly express or invariably regulate the strivings and the thoughts of men. So we are brought face to face with the question of the adjustment of these principles to the variant individual situations which they never fully envisage. The consideration of this question will prepare the way for the study of those antithetical principles which instigate social change.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

SOCIAL CODES AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

1. *Codes and Sanctions*

Although the social structure is subject to incessant change, it would not be a structure at all unless it were sustained by the operation of certain principles or norms of conduct which assure some regularity, uniformity, and predictability of behavior on the part of the members of a community. The more abrupt and convulsive of social changes may for the time being overthrow some of these principles; the slower and sometimes more permanent changes may undermine their old prescriptions. The content of the principles may and must change but the principles themselves are eternal. For they have their roots in human nature, in the human need and the abiding consciousness of society; in the conditions of reciprocal service no less than in the likeness or conformity to type which characterizes man and therefore his conduct. These regulative principles are not in the last resort imposed upon men, either by their rulers and leaders or by their own past. Such sheer imposition occurs under certain conditions in the political and the economic spheres, where a people or a class exercises domination over another, but apart from these situations the codes represent the accommodation of the group as a whole to the necessities and the amenities of common living, as recognized at its level of intelligence and opportunity. With this exception, they are inherited from the past just in so far as the group in general accepts the inheritance and they are changed in the present as the group grows conscious of the need for change.

These regulative principles have a social quality which distinguishes them from the undeviating laws of physical nature and even, though here in degree only, from the spontaneous modes of conduct by which every species of organic

being, high or low in the scale, lives according to its kind. They are social *norms;* in other words they are standards set up by a group for the control of the conduct of its members, in face of and in respect of one another. Possessing this social quality, they constantly run counter to the inclinations of individual members. They reveal the solidarity of the group, but the solidarity is never complete. At every moment the self-centered interest of individuals runs counter to the general interest, and that of the small group to some demands of the larger which includes it. The social norms of conduct are often too restrictive for the enterprising, too narrow for creative minds, too altruistic for the self-seeking. All their prescriptions are not equally obeyed or equally respected. Within the same society there are variant codes and variant interpretations. Furthermore they are all codes in respect of which it is generally to the interest of the rest that each member of the group to which they apply should obey them when centrifugal influences incline him to disobedience. For this reason they are all guarded by sanctions of more or less potency, counteracting the tendency to disobey. This is no less true, as Malinowski has pointed out, of primitive custom-ruled peoples as of civilized ones.[1] In no situation is there unswerving automatic obedience. In every instance the group sustains the code by the exercise of some degree of pressure on the individual violator.

This social restraint of violation is called the sanction of the code. The term *sanction* may be applied to the social reward of conformity but it more generally and more properly refers to the social consequences of non-conformity. Here, however, it is necessary to make an important distinction. The social sanction is a definite form of social pressure, the displeasure or contempt of the group or some form of punishment. One motive of obedience is the desire to avoid this consequence, but it is only one of many. People obey the code also because they think it right to do so, because they have become habituated to it so that obedience is the line of least resistance, because they wish to stand well with

[1] Malinowski, *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*, Pt. I.

their fellows, because it serves their interests, because they want to set an example to others, and so forth. Motives are always manifold and mixed and hard to disentangle. They vary endlessly from person to person, from situation to situation. Sanctions on the contrary are definite and relatively simple. Motives are always individualized, sanctions are social. In our discussions of the regulative principles of society this distinction must be kept in mind. We shall classify these principles in respect of their sanctions, for reasons which this distinction renders obvious, but we must always remember that, in the complicated play of motives which underlies human conduct, the sanction is not so much an explanation of conduct as a reinforcement of those promptings to conformity which otherwise would be overborne by the strength of opposing tendencies in an individual situation.

Every community as well as every type of association imposes rules on its members. In a civilized community these rules are of more diverse kinds and their sanctions are more differentiated. The rules of a club, for example, are sanctioned by the loss of membership or some privileges of membership or by a fine imposed for violation as a condition of retaining membership or by the loss of esteem or status within the club. These in fact are the general sanctions of all 'voluntary' organizations, though sometimes the rules of the organization are linked up to sanctions of a more absolute nature. The workman who disobeys the regulations of the factory may lose not only his position but his livelihood. The believer who offends against the code of his church may suffer excommunication involving for him the loss of spiritual consolations and perhaps the sense of the displeasure of the deity. The doctor or lawyer who seriously violates the professional code of his calling may lose the right to practise, though in such instances the additional sanction of the legal code is necessary. Communal codes have less specific, but often no less important, sanctions. The rule of custom is sanctioned only by some degree of social displeasure or ostracism, but this, in its extremer forms, is one of the most powerful sanctions that exist. The rule of fashion is guarded

by a milder form of the same sanction, the sense of superiority or contempt which is felt towards those who do not conform to the code. A very effective safeguard of fashion and generally of convention is the ridicule bestowed on the violator, what Maunier [2] calls the "satiric sanction," since the fear of being laughed at is deeply rooted in the heart of social man. The moral code is in an ambiguous situation as regards sanction, but only because, as we have already seen, the term *morals* or *moral law* is used confusedly in two different senses. Sometimes it means those rules of conduct which are held by the group or community to be right and proper and which they impose on aberrant members by various degrees of the same sanctions which are the guardians of customs in general. In this sense morals are simply those customs the violation of which is regarded in the community as definitely wrong—in a word, they are what we have learned to call mores. In the stricter sense the moral code is that body of rules which the individual 'conscience' upholds as constituting right or good conduct, and here there appears, sometimes in harmony with, and sometimes in opposition to, the social sanction, an inner and personal sanction, the feeling of guilt entailed by violation.

It is true that for most of our daily occasions mores are nearly synonymous with morals. What we regularly do in conformity with usage—or what usage prescribes even when we disobey it—is the proper thing to do, it feels morally right. If we live in a group where early rising is the rule, then early rising is *ipso facto* a virtue. But the crucial instances are those in which the individual feels a moral obligation contrary to the prescriptions of the group. Then we must distinguish the moral code in its strict sense from the social code in question. Moral codes vary from person to person, but the mores characterize the community.

Finally there is one code, and in civilized countries one only, which has the ultimate sanction of physical enforcement, of unconditional fine, imprisonment, or death. This is the legal code of the state. In a quite limited sense the code of the

[2] *Introduction à la Sociologie*, ch. II.

family may be upheld, in respect of the more juvenile offenders against it, by some exercise of force, and similarly the code of the school. In some countries also there remain vestiges of the right by which the church through its own courts administered and executed its own law. But in modern states these qualified rights, where they exist at all, exist only by the tolerance and permission of the state, within the limits and under the conditions which the state imposes. In the last resort only the law of the state owns the sanction of force, and in this sense, in the ancient words applied to it by the philosopher Hobbes, "there is no power on earth which can be compared with it."

The number and variety of the social codes correspond to the complexity of the society. The code of the state maintains the general framework of social order but it is supplemented by many other codes of a more flexible nature. There are, for example, many varieties of economic code, from the definite rules of a workshop or of a trade-union to the vaguer codes of business ethics. There are codes of professional etiquette and of professional honor. There are codes even of the violators of codes, the rules of the gang, for example, or the 'honor among thieves'. And all of these have their own sanctions. The sanction is, as it were, the antithesis of the advantage that accrues from obedience to the code. This advantage may be in many instances a more direct stimulant of obedience than the sanction. But by focussing attention on the sanction we shall understand more clearly the distinction of code from code and the process by which they have grown distinct.

In primitive society these distinctions were not developed. There were no legal codes, no religious codes, no economic codes, set apart in form one from another, independently instituted and sanctioned, under the guardianship of separate organizations, and generally distinguished from the code of the customary law, the norms of the kinship group. Still less were the distinctions we draw within these various codes, such as that between civil and criminal law, developed. This truth has been pointed out by nearly all students of early society, and has been particularly insisted upon by such writers as Maine and

Durkheim. More recently it has been in part challenged by Dr. Malinowski, in his *Crime and Custom in Primitive Society.* He shows that savages make distinctions between certain fundamental rules dealing with life, property, and the essential structure of kinship, which he calls legal or juridical, and religious rules, ceremonial rules, or the code of manners. He maintains that these 'legal' rules have sanctions entirely different from those which govern the craftsmanship of the native, or the observance of festivals, or the conduct of magical rites. But one or two of his own illustrations will show that the main contrast we are drawing between primitive and civilized peoples is not affected by this argument, significant and valuable as it is in other respects. There are of course varying degrees of importance attached to the several prescriptions of any code, and this holds of the code of custom. But the fact that, within the customary code of a primitive community, "some rules stand out from the rest in that they are felt and regarded as the obligations of one person and the rightful claims of others" and that they are sanctioned by the loss of reciprocal services which the failure to implement them involves, does not entitle us to call such rules *legal* in the modern differentiated sense of the term. The loss of return services and the social disesteem attendant on the shirker of socially recognized obligations is different from the specialized sanction of the law, the fine or penalty visited upon the violator by a definite organ of society, the court of law. It is misleading also to speak of the magical protection of property by charms or formulae which are supposed to bring automatic hurt to the thief as "legal mechanisms". These are primitive *equivalents* of our legal institutions. Among the Trobriand Islanders, according to Dr. Malinowski, two of the most important of these "legal mechanisms" are sorcery and suicide. A man who breaks an important rule of exogamy is publicly insulted by an injured rival and throws himself after the native custom from the top of a cocoanut palm, which leads to a quarrel between his clansmen and those of his rival.[3] Here the essential characteristics which distinguish law, as we understand it, from cus-

[3] B. Malinowski, *op. cit.*, Pt. II, ch. I.

tom are lacking. The punishment is self-inflicted. It is not even commanded by the powers that be, like the suicides common in the reign of Nero, nor does there seem to have been any authority which would have taken action if the self-slayer had not followed the tribal custom. Moreover, the fact that the last words of the suicide call upon his clansmen to take revenge shows how far we still are from the developed forms of political law.

The distinctions of codes and sanctions of which we have been speaking arose in the great process of social evolution. They had already made some advance, as Dr. Malinowski has shown, among such groups as the Trobriand Islanders. Even among ourselves the differentiation, as we shall see later, is still far from being complete. In our world to-day the ability to draw in practice some of the finer of these distinctions is a sign of more advanced culture. The socially intelligent person in our complex society of manifold and overlapping codes, makes distinctions as to the kind and degree of obligation which they severally possess for him which would have been quite impossible in the primitive world.

2. *Sustaining Forces*

We would go far astray if we thought of sanctions as wholly or even chiefly responsible for the maintenance of the codes. They are powerful influences in deterring individuals or minorities from breaking away from the established order, but unless the codes were rooted in the human nature of the group they would soon prove unavailing. If we speak of public opinion as a sanction of conduct there must be first a public opinion which disapproves certain conduct. Behind every sanction there is a group loyalty, a group conviction. These convictions and loyalties are fostered by education and habituation. The adaptable sociality of man responds readily to the insistence of these appeals. The codes become forms of our thinking, none the less so when we yield to the temptation to violate them. No more convincing evidence of this fact can be found than the remarkable diversity of the group-codes controlling sex relationships. The most powerful impulse of

sex, which we have every reason to assume to be basically alike in the native endowment of different social groups, is nevertheless subjected to the most variant and even the most contradictory codes, each seeming natural to the groups adhering to it though it may be quite abhorrent to others. Again when a great social upheaval places in power the revolutionary prophets of a new order, they realize quickly that the codes they promulgate cannot take root and endure unless they can by persistent education mould the minds of the young to the desired pattern of loyalty and conviction.[4]

Under all conditions, social indoctrination, the inculcation of habits and of modes of thought in the young, is surely the most powerful of all regulative and conservative influences. One need think only of the incessant inculcation of 'right' modes of conduct made on the child from infancy by parents and by teachers and by comrades. The Jesuits recognized this profound impact on the growing mind and body by claiming that if they were given the child up to seven years of age he was thereby, in the present-day phrase, 'conditioned' for the rest of his life. In this formative period the physiological and mental aspects of habit, the ways of acting and the ways of thinking, are most thoroughly and most intimately unified. A child may resist the specific commands of his elders, but he cannot resist the system from which they emanate. He knows no other with which to compare it—it fills his whole horizon. And above it, as an atmosphere, there is the language he learns and hears, with its idioms and emotionally charged expressions, so that he cannot speak or think except in terms of the approvals and disapprovals of the group.

The great sustaining force behind the code is then the sentiment of solidarity, as by training and habituation it becomes attached to the social system which the code expresses. This attachment is strengthened by various more specific influences, partly personal and partly impersonal. Of the former, the

[4] The vigorous effort of the Fascist and the Soviet governments to indoctrinate the rising generation are obvious illustrations.

most significant is authority or leadership, of the latter, ritual and symbolism.[5]

There is no doubt that personal authority is a strong determinant of the established order, though it is also of primary importance in the insurgent movements which attack it. Simmel calls the relation between the leaders and his followers the most important of all social relationships. Authority takes a multitude of forms, and inheres in all organization. In its crudest and least socialized forms it rests merely on the power of enforcement. This is the authority of the master over the slave, of the despot over the subject, of the magistrate over the criminal—and, we may add, frequently that of the employer over the employee, though the enforcement belongs to a different order. Here authority may depend solely on the sanction which it controls. But nearly all forms of authority involve more than this, an attitude of responsiveness and of deference, an admission of subordination on the part of the subject which in turn helps to create as well as to justify the authority itself. The grounds of this voluntary subordination are diverse. Acceptance of authority may be the tribute paid to age or to wealth, to experience or to character or to reputed skill. It may be based mainly on the mere recognition that authority is necessary if the tasks of the everyday life are to be effectively performed or the greater order to which our lives are bound is to endure.

> Take but degree away, untune that string,
> And hark, what discord follows!

It reflects often the respect for office or station or class, conveyed to the holder or representative of it. Authority may appear as the personal embodiment of position, just as the majesty of kingship is personalized in a king, apart from

[5] Simmel distinguishes three types of authority, according as the attitude of submission is directed towards a person or towards a group (majority) or towards an impersonal principle (ideal)—see his *Soziologie*, pp. 141 ff. or Spykman's *Social Theory of Georg Simmel* (Chicago, 1925), pp. 97–108. Some other writers, such as Krabbe in his *Modern Idea of the State*, contrast the authority of the personal sovereign and the authority of the impersonal law. We are here speaking of authority only as vested in or focussed in a person.

whatever attributes of his own he may possess. Tradition and religion may weave a spell about the person who upholds the order to which they belong. More self-interested motives also play their part, and submission is fostered by the anticipation of the rewards which the leader can bestow on his friends and followers. There is a type of leadership which depends mainly on the prowess and prestige of the leader, with little reference to any particular policies or ideals which he stands for. Thus, in some politically undeveloped countries parties are named after the leaders they follow rather than in terms of any principles they advocate. On the other hand, authority may be dependent on the sympathetic understanding of and adhesion to the aims and ideals espoused by the leader, combined with confidence in his ability to realize or further them. Finally we come to the type of leadership where the leader is little more than the delegate or simply the mouthpiece of his supporters—no longer followers—but at this point authority tends to vanish.

It will be observed then in the preceding list of the grounds of authority we have passed from those where the subject is most passive or deferent in the creation of the relationship to those in which he is most active. Authority arises out of conditions to which the wielder and the subject of it respond in complementary ways. In all except the extreme forms we have mentioned it is the common product of their reciprocal attitudes. And in most cases the aegis of authority is woven of many diverse elements contributed by both parties to it, arising out of their respective qualities, out of their interactive ambitions and traditions, their hopes and fears.

We turn next to certain impersonal influences which are bound up with the codes and help to enforce them. Ritual and symbol may be prescribed and established as part of the codes themselves, but they are essentially adjuncts of the codes, means by which their deliverances are impressed upon the minds of the group. By ritual we mean a formal rhythmic procedure controlling a succession of acts directed to the same end, a procedure repeated without variation on the appropriate occasions, and distinguished from mere habit or

routine in that it is accompanied by a peculiar sense of rightness and inevitability.[6] To deviate from it in any way, no matter what the circumstances, is felt to be wrong or undesirable, not on utilitarian grounds, but because deviation breaks the rhythm, disturbing the emotional response, the solemn and often mystical *rapport* between the person and the occasion. Ritual may be merely personal or it may have a social character. It may, for example, be associated with the act of dressing in the morning or with the act of public worship. But it is most powerful when the propriety of the procedure is socially established. Ritual invests an occasion with importance or solemnity, and thus combats the process by which often repeated acts become tedious or commonplace. Hence its peculiar place in religious usage, and in such public and private celebrations as are thought to demand an attitude of special dignity or reverence. Ritual is seen at its best in a church service, in judicial proceedings, at court functions. Hence also its frequent use to maintain a level of dignity in social assemblies, such as lodges, fraternities, clubs, where, without it, the normal familiarity of the members with one another would dissipate the importance they wish to attach to certain occasions. The inviolable rhythm of ritual evokes its own emotional response, and because each successive act is predetermined and known in advance, each tends to evoke the emotional quality of the whole procedure. To the outsider who does not share the interest or the belief of the participating group, ritual is apt on that very account to appear ridiculous, because he feels no adequate justification for the solemnity or exaltation which it demands.

Ritual, so understood, is the core of ceremony. In fact, it may without much difficulty be identified with ceremony. But perhaps it is better to regard ceremony as a more comprehensive genus within which ritual falls. Ceremony then means any established procedure of a formal and dignified

[6] Some definitions of ritual seem too narrow to cover the usual acceptance of the term. We cannot, for example, agree with Sumner and Keller (*Science of Society*, Vol. II, No. 279 and Vol. IV, No. 279) that it is mostly a propitiatory device associated with ghost fear, nor do they adequately distinguish between ritual and magic. On the nature of magic see below, pp. 441–442.

nature designed to mark and impress the importance of an event or occasion. It does not necessarily imply the rhythmic precision and undeviating repetition of ritual, though ritual is the distinctive element of most ceremonies. From of old, ceremony has been recognized as a powerful means of sustaining the social order. Ceremony is "the bond that holds the multitude together; and if the bond be removed, these multitudes fall into confusion."[7] Ceremony proclaims the elevation and fixity of the social order, establishing distance and priority lest familiarity breed criticism and lack of respect, while its ritual works more subtly on the feelings of men, inculcating reverential attitudes towards the principles which it embodies. Ceremony is the dignified garb with which social functions are invested. It has therefore more influence on the unreflecting than on the critical-minded, and thus in an age of criticism it is liable to lose its hold. The critic, discerning the disparity between the ceremonial appearance and the underlying reality, is apt to declare with Teufelsdrockh that "society is founded upon cloth."[8] But profounder speculation distinguishes between the hollow ceremony that seeks to conceal the fraud or pretence behind it and the ceremony which gives a necessarily symbolic and external form to our social valuations.

A symbol is a representation of a meaning or a value, an external sign or gesture which by association conveys an idea or stimulates a feeling. All communication, whether through language or otherwise, makes use of symbols. Society could scarce exist without them. The unity of a group, like all its

[7] Sacred books of the East, *Li Ki*, Bk. VIII, § I, quoted by Ross, *Social Control*, ch. XIX.

[8] Carlyle, *Sartor Resartus*, chh. VIII and IX. Cf. the passage: "Often in my atrabiliar moods, when I read of pompous ceremonials, Frankfort Coronations, Royal Drawing-rooms, Levees, Couchees: and how the ushers and macers and pursuivants are all in waiting; how Duke this is presented by Archduke that, and Colonel A by General B, and innumerable Bishops, Admirals, and miscellaneous Functionaries are advancing gallantly to the Anointed Presence; and I strive, in my remote privacy, to form a clear picture of that solemnity,—the Clothes fly-off the whole dramatic corps; and Dukes, Grandees, Bishops, Generals, Anointed Presence itself, every mother's son of them, stand straddling there, not a shirt on them; and I know not whether to laugh or to weep."

cultural values, must find symbolic expression. In primitive society the identification of the symbol and the thing symbolized is often so complete that the symbol becomes a *totem* and is regarded as an objective embodiment, no mere representation, of the spirit or solidarity of the group. The flag is a symbol of the unity of the nation, a visible emblem which is the same for all its members. It has different significance for the educated and the ignorant, for the peace-lover and the militarist, but it is a common rallying-point for all who accept it. This is a peculiar property of the cultural symbol, that it admits of variant interpretations and yet excites in many minds a like devotion. This fact helps to explain the rôle of symbolism in the more mystical forms of religion. Their rituals are saturated with symbolism, and the symbols, because their meaning depends essentially on acquired associations, can often be freely re-interpreted to suit the changing demands of the age. This is probably one reason why the Roman Catholic religion, with its strongly ritualistic character, does not disrupt into sects as do the protestant faiths, and why the Catholic, faced with the questionings of modern science, is apt to become a 'modernist' rather than an 'unbeliever'.[9] Ritual and symbolism together bring strong reinforcement to the established codes. Many symbols are, in fact, 'morale symbols.'[10] They suggest and convey the inarticulate sense of group unity. This is the main function of the symbols employed in rites of initiation; in the rituals of lodges and fraternal orders and trade-unions; in the badges, ornaments, pins, keys, tokens, pennants, gestures, formulae, and other signs which convey to the 'brethren' the sense of exclusive membership in a mystical unity. And it is an important part of the business of leadership to make effective use of these tokens, to interpret or re-interpret them, and thus to rally the members in a stronger cohesion and devotion to the common cause of the group.

[9] Cf. the article on *Ritual the Conserver*, by L. S. Cressman, in the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY for January, 1930.

[10] This is well brought out by Grace Coyle, *The Social Process in Organized Groups* (New York, 1930), ch. VII.

3. *Social Cohesion in Utopian Communities*

The conservative forces described in the preceding sections are illustrated in a remarkable way by those communities which follow a distinctive and peculiar mode of life, such as separates them sharply from the greater communities which envelop them. In order to maintain at once their separation and their solidarity they must resist in an unusually drastic manner the forces of change, whether arising from within or assaulting the group from without. Such communities accordingly exhibit a very high development of the agencies of social control. The situation is exemplified by the various communistic societies which have existed in the United States, generally on the basis of a religious creed or of some special 'revelation' vouchsafed to the founders. Certain of these communities have been the object of sociological study. In 1875 a survey of those flourishing at that time was published by C. Nordhoff, in his book entitled *Communistic Societies of the United States*. Supplemented by later studies of particular groups, this survey enables us to compare the principles exhibited by a considerable variety of these 'utopias', and to arrive at certain conclusions touching the conditions under which an intensive and exclusive solidarity is maintained in the face of unusual difficulties.

Each of these communities upheld a set of mores sharply divergent from those of the surrounding culture. All of them were in greater or less degree communistic and held in check various human propensities which are allowed freer scope in non-communistic societies. Consequently each of them deliberately instituted a peculiar system of controls designed to inculcate in the growing generation the habits of work, of thought, and of life which were in harmony with its social order. These local communities were in a different position from that of a large communistic system such as Soviet Russia, but it will be observed that some of their principles can be found also in this vastly greater experiment. While they differed from one another in many respects, they employed similar social devices to maintain solidarity. Of these the following seem most significant.

First, they generally sought to assure their cultural integrity by geographical isolation. They were mostly agricultural communities, essentially self-sufficient, and thus could in large measure insulate themselves from the rest of the world. If the expansion of neighboring communities threatened their peace, they were apt to move further away. The very name of one of these communities, the Separatists, indicates a tendency common to them all. The group known as the Perfectionists, who settled at Oneida, N. Y., were a partial exception to this principle. Being an industrial community, they could not cut themselves off as completely as the others. It is important to notice that though these communities sought to live by themselves, remote from contacts, they were never so remote that malcontents, those who strongly rebelled against the system, could not leave and join the world outside, thus removing from among the group a source of disaffection.

Again, each of these communities took special educational measures to inculcate in its members, and especially in the younger generation, the principles to which they were attached. Their social discipline was thorough and rigorous. Though communistic—or perhaps because they were communistic, they were under strict leadership, whether of an individual or of an oligarchy of elders. Each community thought of itself as having "the one right way of life," or as being a "peculiar people" in some sense set apart from the world. For example, the Amana community, a group which migrated from Germany to Iowa, named itself the "congregations of true inspiration." There was a strong social pressure towards uniformity of belief and of conduct, manners and modes of living in general, including such externals as dress and habitation. This uniformity was strengthened by the custom of doing things together, of coming together not merely for worship and inspiration but also for meals and other daily occasions. Since the communities were small, everyone was under the eye of his neighbors and the tendency to heterodoxy in any respect was at once detected and discouraged. Among the Perfectionists, who differed in so many respects from the others, an institution entitled 'criticism' was set up

for this purpose. Members of the community offered themselves at regular Sunday sessions for the criticism of their brethren, and on such occasions their deficiencies of character and of conduct were dealt with very faithfully and publicly.[11]

Furthermore, the sense of social exclusiveness was in practically all instances supported by strong religious sanctions. The religious bond was generally of an exclusive character. They held in common a faith which was not shared by the world outside. Sometimes it was strengthened by the memory of persecution. It was moreover a faith which required a strict orthodoxy. It is very doubtful whether the unswerving obedience which these communities required of their members could have been maintained apart from the fixity of the religious sanction. One of the communities investigated by Nordhoff, the Icarians, who migrated from France to Illinois, professed no religion, but he describes it as "the least prosperous of all the communities I have visited." The community split in two in a relatively short time. One of the divisions soon dispersed, and the other, which settled in Iowa, was quite unsuccessful in maintaining its scanty numbers. Nordhoff remarks that communism itself was a religion for these people, but without strong leadership it proved not enough.

All these communities found it necessary to take very special precautions for the control of sex relationships. Here lay perhaps the greatest peril to their communistic systems. Unless sex relationships were rigidly controlled, a spirit of individualism would enter through the jealousies and divergent interests which the impulse of sex stimulated. Moreover, the family itself, with its exclusive possessions, presented a constant menace to the communistic solidarity. A recent study of another communistic society, the Hutterites, points out that within this group "the family becomes the point of invasion of capitalism into communism." [12] The resistance to community controls over the intimate life of the members is generated within and inspired by the family. Consequently

[11] Nordhoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 289–293.

[12] L. E. Deets, *The Hutterische Communities* (not yet published).

we find that various and sometimes curious precautions were taken. Some communities discouraged anything that suggested the appeal of sex. Fashion was generally tabooed. Dress was simple, generally some kind of uniform. "In Amana, and also among the Shakers, the intention seems to be to provide a style (for the women) which shall conceal their beauty and make them less attractive to male eyes. . . . At Oneida the short dress, with trousers, and the clipped locks, though convenient, are certainly ugly." [13] Some of the societies, like the Rappists and the Shakers, were celibate. The latter lived together in small communes instead of in families. The men and women met under carefully prescribed conditions, and did not even eat together. The Amana community, though non-celibate, exercised great care "to keep the sexes apart. On Sunday afternoons the boys are permitted to walk in the fields; and so are the girls, but these must go in another direction." When, in spite of these precautions, a marriage takes place, "it is treated with a degree of solemnity which is calculated to make it a day of terror rather than of unmitigated delight." [14]

Even the community which seemed a sheer contradiction of this rigid principle of sex control, the Perfectionists, was in reality seeking in an opposite way to avoid the danger which sex presents to communistic solidarity. For this remarkable group, with its practical promiscuity, sought to discourage in every way they could the "exclusive and idolatrous attachment" of two mates for each other. It is not difficult to see why the Perfectionists regarded this attachment as "selfish love," inasmuch as it formed a rallying-point for interests which were not in accord with that entire abolition of exclusive possessions on which the community was built.

To all these communities the assertion of individuality appeared as 'self-seeking' or 'selfishness.' For them all the social bond assumed an inflexible authoritarian character. All divergence was dangerous to their unity. The conditions

[13] Nordhoff, *op. cit.*, p. 398.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

which generally sustained this unity were religious enthusiasm, strong leadership, simplicity of life, and a relative poverty which made hard work the rule. But when one or more of these conditions failed, centrifugal forces began to operate effectively, dissensions and cleavages developed, and the end of the order was in sight. The high mortality of these societies and their inability to adapt themselves to changing conditions shows the one-sidedness of their systems. They achieved socialization at the cost of individualization, and we have already seen that some harmony of these principles is a primary condition of every enduring social order.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

RELIGION, CUSTOM, FASHION, MORALITY, AND LAW

1. *Religion and Morals*

The interdependence of religion and morals is often so close that they are very liable to be confused. If we are to draw a proper distinction between them it must be in terms of the authority and sanction attached to their respective prescriptions rather than in terms of the contents of the codes themselves. Religion prescribes rules of conduct, and in so doing tends to identify these with moral obligations. On the other hand, some ethical cults, such as positivism, claim to be also religions. Yet it is necessary to draw a distinction, since those who profess no religion have still their moral codes. Since religion, as we understand the term, implies a relationship not merely between man and man but also between man and some higher power, it normally invokes a sanction which may be called supra-social, whether it be primitive ghost fear or the present 'wrath of God' or the penalties of an after-life "where the worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched" or merely, in the more refined forms of religion, the sense of being "out of tune with the infinite" when its supposed laws are disobeyed. We may also name as part of a religious code any ordinance which emanates from an authority accepted on religious grounds as the interpreter of a creed or the 'vice gerent of God.' Religion of course prescribes also the relation of man to man, but in so far as the sanction of this prescription is thought of in the above-mentioned terms its code is religious rather than strictly moral. It becomes strictly moral in so far as the sanction comes from the apprehension of evil social results directly accruing from the conduct which the code forbids. Here we have the distinction between the religious idea of 'sin' and the moral idea of 'wrong'. The two ideas are naturally blended or associated in the religious mind,

but we cannot understand the difference between religion and morals unless we distinguish them. The one may still remain as the support of the other, and some writers, such as Benjamin Kidd in his *Social Evolution*, assume that a moral code cannot endure without the support of religion. Other thinkers, like Spencer or Huxley or Bouglé, maintain that a moral code can never become pure and wholly responsive to the needs of a changing society unless it grows dissociated from the special sanctions of religion.[1] It is significant, by the way, that both of these schools of thought characterize the moral sanction, in contrast to the religious, as a 'rational' one.

There has been much discussion as to which of the two codes was the primordial one and as to which of them was derived from the other. Some have held, like De Coulanges in *La Cité Antique*, that religion was the matrix of morals; others like Tönnies in his little book *Die Sitte*, that the morality of the group became gradually reinforced by the religious sanction, gaining through tradition and the authority of the elders, that aura of reverence and awe which led on the one hand to the worship of ancestors and on the other to the supra-social sanction of the conduct which they prescribed. As we shall see later, such views imply an initial distinctness between social factors which in truth became distinguished only in the slow process of social evolution. Religion incorporates principles derived from social and moral reflection. We cannot say that either the religious or the moral code came first, just as we cannot say that custom preceded morality or law. The distinction of these elements was concealed in the primitive outlook upon life, even as it is partially concealed in the outlook of the simpler and less educated minds among ourselves. Herbert Spencer thought that the earliest forms of religion contained no moral element, pointing out that they were intended to propitiate evil rather than good spirits and that they were characterized by cruel and atrocious observances.[2]

[1] Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. III, ch. XIV; Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*; Bouglé, *The Evolution of Values* (tr. Sellars), p. 145.

[2] Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. III, p. 152.

But this fact does not prove his point, since a moral code too may be misguided and may make atrocious demands. The morals of a primitive tribe are no more the morals of Spencer than its religion is his religion. It would be more true to say that primitive religions contained, though in solution as it were, other than moral elements.

Ever since moral and religious codes have been distinguished by the human mind they have had a great influence on each other. Moral codes, with such prescriptions as the duty of humility, of obedience and respect for elders, have prepared the way for the perpetuation of religious beliefs. Religious codes have strongly reinforced with their supernatural sanctions the prevailing morals of the group. But the equilibrium of their joint control over conduct has been subject to many strains. The religious code, as the more conservative of the two, has come into frequent conflict with the moral discernments responsive to changing social needs, and as the more authoritarian has menaced the autonomy of judgment which is the prime condition of an enlightened adult morality. The more conservative religions have resisted the fresh moral insights and the social applications derived from advancing science. They have opposed, for example, the quest for the truth concerning human origins, the first employment of anaesthetics for the alleviation of pain, the admission of divorce where marriage was a living death because of the insanity or cruelty of either partner, and the practice of birth control. This rupture between religion and morals has been partly disguised, and often partly healed, by the consequent transformations of religion itself and the appearance of new religious creeds in response to moral demands. In general terms, religion seeks to confirm established moralities, and new moralities seek to modify religion. In the long run, and particularly in modern societies where the divisions of religion itself prevent any one form from dominating the mores and where the sense of definite and dread types of supernatural sanction has dwindled, the social consciousness brings both religion and morals into relative harmony with social needs. One acute writer on this subject, Max Weber in his *Sociology of Religion*, has developed

a theory previously suggested by various novelists and historians, that the ethics of Calvinism, in contrast to the religious teachings of the preceding age, was not only in conformity with, but an essential preparation for, the growth of capitalism, insisting as it did on those virtues of thrift, discipline, personal responsibility, self-help, and unremitting toil which were congenial to the capitalist spirit.[3]

All social norms, however derived, whether the reputed revelation of the Gods or the inherited wisdom of the past or the ordinance of the present, reveal the ideas prevailing in the group concerning the social relations and modes of living which they hold desirable. The chief difference between religious norms and all others, including the strictly moral codes, is that the former are addressed indirectly or mediately to the social situation. The code inhering in a religious creed expresses an orientation of conduct and attitude towards a reality conceived of as transcending human life and human aims, and seeks to establish social relationships in which human purposes are linked up with, and frequently subordinated to, the assumed will of superhuman powers regarded as benign or demonic or even as indifferent to humanity—in its higher forms to the 'will of God', to an ideal power postulated as either supreme within or as struggling for realization in the universe itself. Since man, especially in pre-scientific ages and circles, has been free to conceive such powers according to his fancies and his fears, in his ignorance and misinterpretation of the phenomena of nature, his religious codes could scarcely be a true reflection of his social needs. They often perverted social relationships and admitted or inspired conduct detrimental to social interests, the proscription of useful foods, human sacrifice, religious prostitution, maiming initiation rites, stultifying superstitions. They became powerful

[3] Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, Vol. I, ch. I. (tr. T. Parsons, under the title, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, (New York, 1930)). Brentano (*Die Anfänge des modernen Kapitalismus*) and Tawney (*Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*) criticize Weber's argument as being one-sided in its imputation of causes but this does not affect its importance as bringing out the close relationship between a religious and an economic and social development.

engines of control to maintain the interests of the established order against the processes of change, as, to take a modern instance, the Greek Orthodox Church became a bulwark of the tyranny of the Russian Czars. Yet in the interpretation and promulgation of religious codes the social ideas of the group inevitably found a place and a partial accommodation was made to social needs, though the interest of the interpreters, the medicine-men or the priests, tended to check the process. In any event the reconciliation of religious code and social need could never be complete so long as the code was based on dogmatically false conceptions of reality, of the laws of nature to which human nature is inextricably bound.

Religious norms and moral norms are interwoven; precepts incorporated in a religious code, as in the Ten Commandments, may be inspired more by social than by religious considerations since in the formative stage of interpretation it is easy to make the 'word of the Lord' the expression of a sense of social need. But the formal distinction between the two types of precept remains. A code is religious—no matter whether its precepts are concerned with the relation of man to God, as in the first four commandments, or with the relation of man to man, as in the last six—when its source is presented as divine authority and its sanction is supernatural or even the penalty exacted in the name of religion by the 'vice gerent of God.' A code is moral when it promulgates standards of conduct which directly derive their sufficient justification from the human sense of good and evil.

For dogmatic religion the reconciliation of the religious and the moral code, so defined, is always difficult and always imperfect. Social welfare, when not made subordinate, is viewed in the light of a supra-social principle. The conflict is clearly seen in the distinction between 'faith' and 'works'—adherence to a creed and social conduct respectively—and in the protestant controversy as to their relative importance; and it is worth remembering that the religious problem is their relative importance in the 'sight of God.' Another instructive indication is "the system of concessions, tolerances, mitigations and reprieves which the Catholic Church with its official super-

natural morality has devised for the multitude," thereby seeking to adjust the rigor of the religious code to the common temper of the age.[4] This practice has an interesting analogy in the treatment of the supernatural sanction among primitive peoples, as disclosed by Malinowski. Among the Trobriand Islanders there is a system of magic which, if duly applied, protects the trespasser against it.[5] Here, incidentally, we see one contrast between religion and magic, for magic seeks merely, by a kind of occult mechanics, to manipulate or control the higher powers, not, like religion, to obey them or worship them or enter into communion with them.

A progressive solution of the conflict is found in so far as religion comes to transcend the egoisms of tribe and nation and, purified by science of its stubborn misinterpretations of reality, grows world-conscious or cosmos-conscious. Under these conditions it loses the fierce compulsive power which unites the faithful in strong social bonds against the infidel, and sends a nation forth to conquest with the promise, *In hoc signo vinces*. It becomes instead the emotional integrating sense of the whole, whose range of immensity and power is beyond our understanding, so that we can only *feel* our communion with it and dimly divine our mite of individual purposeful life as a moment in its eternal being. Then it no longer divides people and people, and within a people the orthodox from those who "go awhoring after strange gods," with that final intolerance which only the exclusive visionary possession of an unreasoned faith can inspire. Religion, growing world-conscious, may well sustain the nearer sense of our community with one another and thus fall into consistency with a purely moral code. But it can no longer dictate an authoritative morality, since thus sublimated it is no longer capable of defining moral precepts for the particular occasions of life. No longer do most men expect a church, as in the middle ages, to lay down precise rules touching the morality of monopoly and usury; and if this limitation is true of the more conservative

[4] Quoted from the Introduction to Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, 1922).

[5] *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*, Pt. II, ch. I.

religions in the modern world it is still more true of the wider faiths. If in this way morality has lost an anchorage, though one that moored it too fixedly to the past, at least there is the compensation that a freer morality, springing from the consciousness and sheer experience of social good and evil, has become possible, and that, for those thus enlightened, one of the ancient and obdurate clashes between authority and human nature is at an end.

2. *Custom and Law*

We pointed out in chapter Thirteen the peculiar quality of the law which the state upholds, the law which alone in a modern society has behind it the authority of unconditional enforcement. We saw that all social codes have some attribute of authority, as revealed in the sanctions which guard them, but that the sanction of the legal code is in this respect unique. This fact enables us to draw a clear line between legal rules and the rules of other associations. The rules of other associations are conditional on membership, and the failure to obey them involves only the loss of membership or of some of the rights or privileges which attach to membership. The legal rules are coercive in a wider sense, their sanction can not be evaded by the sacrifice of membership.[6] Law, a term which throughout this section we shall use to mean the code upheld by the state, is thus a guardian of society itself. There need never be any confusion between the kind of rules which rest on the authority of the state and those which are maintained by clubs and colleges and churches and economic corporations.

It is easier to confuse custom and law, both on account of their historical relationship and because they are, even after they have become distinct in the historical process, intimately connected in various ways. Law is the body of rules which are recognized, interpreted, and applied to particular situations by the courts of the state. It derives from various sources, including custom, but it becomes law when the state, which means in the last resort the courts, is prepared to enforce it as a rule binding on citizens and residents within its jurisdic-

[6] See my *Modern State*, Introduction and ch. VIII.

tion. Inadequate definitions of law often create confusion on this subject. Law is not simply that which the legislature enacts, or statute law. Law is not an ethical rule, "prescribing what is right and forbidding what is wrong." Law is not any kind of rule which society in some way or other compels individuals to obey. Not only anthropologists but also jurists sometimes fail to observe this distinction. They see that certain social codes served in other stages and types of society the same function which is now fulfilled by law and accordingly want to define law in such a way as to include these codes. Thus Pollock points out that legal enforcement is a relatively modern phenomenon.[7] "If we look away from such elaborated systems as those of the later Roman Empire and of modern Western governments, we see that not only law but law with a great deal of formality, has existed before the state had any adequate means of compelling its observance—and indeed before there was any regular process of enforcement at all." What this fact really means is that law under such conditions was not fully differentiated from customary and ethical codes, but we can define anything only as it appears when it is sufficiently differentiated to reveal its distinctive nature.

Under simple or primitive social conditions there is little need for a legal code. Custom serves well enough to regulate the conduct of life. The primitive group is a 'face-to-face' group, every man is a neighbor of all the rest. No one escapes beyond the range of group opinion and group control. Seldom does any novel situation arise for which custom cannot provide. With the weight of tradition behind it custom ordains every occasion, assigns to each his rights and duties, adjusts the claims and interests of each to those of the rest. But the further we pass from primitive conditions, the more necessary it becomes to supplement the rule of custom by other social codes and especially by law. There are several reasons for this fact. Custom, lacking an agency of authoritative jurisdiction in cases of dispute or transgression, frequently must leave to the injured party the right to vindicate his claims against another. Custom allows him to retaliate, to take vengeance or retribu-

[7] *First Book of Jurisprudence* (London, 1923), ch. I.

tion. But such retaliation and the feuds which it engenders cause more serious disturbance to the interests of the rest of the community when in the more developed society these interests grow more complex and interdependent.[8] Moreover, custom cannot quickly adapt itself to changing conditions. Its authority diminishes in the complex society where impersonal relations take the place of personal ones and where individuals are further removed from the direct control of the group as a whole. Custom is a clear guide only where the old ways can be utilized to meet the new situation. When new techniques confound the old ways, as for example in the change to a money economy in England in the sixteenth century, another authority and another kind of code is demanded, a code which does not slowly evolve but one which is made expressly for the situation. Finally, custom is most effective when there is no strong organization of social power, whether for military or economic exploitation. Such an organization makes its own rules, thrusting custom aside. Custom has poor means of defence against the conflicts that arise within a power system. Alike those who dispute for power and those who are subject to it call for an arbiter, a judge. And the judge, even though he begins as an interpreter of custom, ends as a maker of law.

The same conditions which explain the birth of law help to explain its growth into the voluminous codes of modern states. The body of law is always being increased and modified to meet new general situations or new problems of application to special cases. This is done partly by direct legislation, partly by judicial interpretation. Modern industrial developments have occasioned enormous additions to the code. Another factor which has added to the bulk of law is the assertiveness of authority which, once established, is urged both by the drive of power and the pressure of interests to more and more regulation. Gradually, and chiefly through conflict, modern states have been compelled to learn that there are some matters which law is not qualified to control, that it cannot be in general a substitute for custom or for morality, that it cannot,

[8] See Dickinson, *Social Order and Political Authority*, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. XXIII, pp. 324 ff.

without defeating the values it would preserve, prescribe religious or other forms of belief. Law can command only external observance and therefore, where the value of an act depends mainly on the spirit in which it is performed it is not a proper subject for legal control. Law is an instrument of government and the nature of the instrument assigns its capacities and its limitations. The great functions of law may perhaps be summed up as being (1) the maintenance of a fundamental order within which men shall find security and the common conditions of opportunity, and (2) the adjustment of those conflicts of interests between individuals or groups which they cannot settle for themselves or in settling which they encroach on the interests of others. Within the territory so marked out there remain debatable areas, for example certain regions of economic struggle where an acceptable legal code is not yet developed, but it is obvious that in our modern societies the range of legal settlement is, and must be, very large indeed.

In the historical process law and custom have grown distinct, but they remain in important and interesting relationships. A brief discussion of these relationships will help to bring out their respective qualities and social functions. We have to remember that customs grow up spontaneously, gradually come into being, whereas laws are created, emerging at the moment of legislation or of judicial recognition. Thus around law itself customs gather. Laws which are generally approved initiate attitudes as well as procedures out of which new customs evolve, and these in turn become a support of the laws. In fact unless such customs arise to strengthen laws the latter retain a precarious hold on the community. For custom has a superiority over law in the spontaneity of its appeal to our obedience. Custom incorporates our own desires. It does not come to us from without, demanding acceptance. It does not appear to us, as law without its aid tends to do, as involving a control over our desires either for the sake of others or in the name of authority. Therefore a law which attacks a widespread custom, even though a majority support it, both lacks a ground of support which is essential to its effective operation

and creates a force of resistance which endangers its authority. If the law in question is not aided by social conditions favorable to the growth of a supporting custom it cannot succeed. An illustration is the Sunday observance law of certain states and localities, which is out of accord with the customs of the present. And it is obvious that the Volstead Act is being subjected to the test of its effect on custom. Certainly a law cannot succeed if it is opposed by strongly resistant and deep-seated customary attitudes. The nullification of the Fourteenth Amendment seems the inevitable result, under existing conditions, of the customary attitude of white to colored people not only in the South but in large measure throughout the United States. The judicial 'interpretations' of that amendment, distinguishing for example between 'differential' and 'discriminative' treatment, are mainly subterfuges intended to validate the customs which the amendment denied. Nor can it be otherwise unless the attitudes in question undergo a change which law by itself is powerless to induce.

The fact that custom establishes a social order of its own is often forgotten in discussions of the clash of custom and law. It is an unfortunate situation when law and custom are opposed and men prefer to follow custom rather than obey the law, but the alternatives presented to them in such a situation are not properly expressed as law-abidingness and anarchy. At the point of conflict they must choose between two codes. Both make strong claims on their allegiance and, though law has a formal superiority, both are necessary for the maintenance of society. The problem of the individual, compelled to choose between the prescriptions of opposing codes, will come before us in a later section.

The interdependence of law and custom, already suggested, may be illustrated in other ways. Custom not only, under normal conditions, becomes a support of law, it also supplements law and prepares the way for its development. Thus business customs, gathering around law, are in time incorporated within it, as for example the provision of three days of grace on bills of exchange.[9] On the other hand law estab-

[9] Gray, *Nature and Sources of the Law* (New York, 1927), p. 282.

lishes conditions which bring new customs into being. Thus industrial legislation, such as factory and workshop acts regulating hours of labor or requiring hygienic conditions, undermines old customs and prepares the way for new ones. Laws establishing military training induce the customs associated with the military life and outlook while laws abolishing such training destroy the conditions on which these customs rest. It is in this indirect way, by creating an external order in which the old customs no longer correspond to our desires, that law is most effective in influencing custom, rather than by a frontal attack upon it.

If we turn finally to another kind of law than that with which we have been dealing, the fundamental or constitutional law of the state, we find that it is still more intimately related to custom.[10] Constitutional law, though in part formulated in special documents, lives by usage, and around it a further body of usage grows up which amplifies or modifies or even annuls portions of the written formula. Thus the custom that the President shall not seek a third term of office amplifies the American Constitution, the custom by which the Electoral College acts on party lines modifies it, and the custom of differentiating between the political rights of white and colored people in effect annuls certain of its provisions. Still more obvious is the part played by custom under an 'unwritten constitution' such as England possesses, where the old forms are subject at every point to the growth of customary procedures. Formally, the king can refuse his assent to a bill passed by both houses of parliament, the cabinet can retain office after it has lost the support of the Commons, and so forth. But this formal 'can' is through custom supplanted by an actual 'cannot'. In fact one difference between constitutional and ordinary or 'municipal' law is that in the former sphere custom is not so much a source and support of the law as an integral part of the system. A similar conclusion holds regarding the important and developing body of rules which is called international law.

[10] For the difference between constitutional and municipal law see my *Modern State*, ch. VIII, 1.

3. *Fashion and Custom*

If custom differs from law in the spontaneity of its origin and the immediacy of its sanction it differs from fashion by reason of the more enduring character of its prescriptions, its closer relation to the intimate life and temperament of the group, and its traditional quality. Fashion, on the other hand, is definitely anti-traditional. It controls those aspects and expressions of conduct, generally the more superficial aspects, which are apt to escape from the sway of custom. In some aspects it supplements rather than conflicts with custom. Thus in respect of dress there are general types of garment which are prescribed by custom for particular occasions, such as weddings or funerals or sports; or particular seasons, such as summer and winter; and for particular times of the day, such as morning and evening; while within these types the changing modes and styles are regulated by fashion. Fashion here determines the fugitive varieties of the custom-prescribed genus. If, however, the trend of fashion exhibits continuously the same direction, showing no doubt the influence of some deeper principle, it may at length undermine the custom which at first it merely variegated. Thus the trend of women's fashion in dress has led to the obsolescence or disappearance of certain garments which were previously sanctioned by custom. In a similar way fashions in art, in literature, in play, may lead to the disappearance of customary types and to the establishment of new customs.

The fact that fashion deals with the free variations of an accepted form enables us to distinguish fashion from other social phenomena with which it is often confused. Thus fashion is distinct from convention or etiquette. Convention and etiquette are aspects of custom. Etiquette prescribes the detailed formalities to be observed on ceremonious occasions. Convention prescribes those usages the basis of which is felt to be merely social agreement rather than any significant connection between the usage and the meaning attached to it. Thus both convention and etiquette take one of a number of equally possible ways of representing or symbolizing a social attitude and in a seemingly arbitrary manner rule out the

others. Hand-shaking is an example, since alternative forms of greeting, such as saluting, might serve the purpose equally well. Any variation in the practice, such as a different mode of hand-shaking, may properly be called a fashion, but a change from hand-shaking to saluting would strictly be a change of convention and not of fashion. No doubt the line is often hard to draw, but we can discern the nature of fashion much more clearly if we think of it as concerned with the transient styles which can occur within a custom or convention or any cultural form. Where practically no variation or modification of the type is permissible, as in the case of a uniform, then fashion is almost entirely ruled out. This distinction also enables us to understand the significance of fashion as applied to artistic and other cultural changes. For every true artist his style is his own, but if any such style is followed widely by others, by those to whom it is culturally a matter of indifference, then the element of fashion enters in. The range of fashion is in short the limit of variation made possible by cultural indifference. It will be observed that we do not here regard as 'fashion' the cultural current of a period, but only the more detachable manifestations and mannerisms which are capable of easy imitation. A fashion is not to be explained by imitation, for reasons that will presently appear, but yet part of the definition of fashion is that it is an external form of observance capable of being easily imitated.

Though fashion accordingly plays from moment to moment on the surface of social life, behind its seemingly inconsequent changes there may be deeper forces at work. In its immediate onset it is concerned with the externals and superfluities of existence. It deals with those observances which can be changed without affecting the things we hold dear, the associations which we cherish, the practical aims which we pursue—this being the negative condition of the strong tyranny which it exercises. It promises no utility, it makes no direct appeal to our reason. It regulates those aspects of life concerning which we are, on the whole, individually indifferent and therefore socially susceptible. Within this region it curiously harmonizes the satisfaction of two strong demands of our

nature which in other regions often come into conflict—the demand for novelty and the demand for conformity. In other words it turns the desire for novelty into social practice. It makes novelty the right and proper thing for the group. Thereby it may limit the range of innovation at any one time but it compensates for this by accelerating the tempo of innovation. With the desire for novelty there is associated also the desire for distinction, and this desire also fashion succeeds in accommodating to the rule of conformity. For fashion generally, though not always, radiates from the élite, the prestige-owning groups. Moreover, fashion prescribes a style, not a uniform. Within it there is room for minor, but for the purpose of distinction, important variations. It admits of being individualized. People can still conform to fashion 'with a difference'. It may also be noted in this connection that although fashion is all prevalent, it is always an item in the cost of living. There are various forms of it, in the matter of recreation and sport, for example, which are limited to those who can afford its expense. Democratic trends are accompanied by a wide prevalence of the same fashion types, the differences within the type expressing standards of income and of taste, while aristocratic trends seek to establish distinctive types for different social classes.

The area over which the same rule of fashion extends and the speed with which it makes and abrogates its laws have both greatly increased within our modern civilization. The conditions of our age have given a free play to fashion which it never possessed before. This is due in part to the change in the character of our class structure which we have already discussed (pp. 83 ff.) and in part to the enormous development of the means of communication. The former has broken down the class barriers of fashion, the latter the time and distance barriers. Spencer was probably right in correlating the growth of fashion with the transition from a military to an industrial society.[11] At any rate the former is bound up with the insistence on rank, ceremonial, and status, with an inflexible order of subordination which checks the democratizing reign

[11] Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. II, pp. 213–214.

of fashion. Another factor which has increased the range of fashion has been the increase of prosperity and leisure—this not only for the reason offered by Spencer, that it enables a larger class to emulate the style of living of the aristocracy but also because, as we have said, fashion is chiefly concerned with the superfluities of life or with the superfluous decoration of its necessities. We do not think of fashion in overalls; there is more of fashion in the body of an automobile than in its chassis; there are no fashions in steam-shovels. Consequently, the higher the standard of living, the more material there is for fashion to operate upon.

One further point may be added to this explanation of the modern growth of fashion. In the numerous and complex contacts which our civilization produces, especially in the more populous centers, the area assigned to custom has diminished. Custom is always most powerful and far-reaching in the regions remote from communications. Contacts bring alien customs together and diminish the sanctity attaching to many of the established ways. Moreover, the cumulative inventions of the industrial age, as applied both to modes of work and to modes of living, are inimical to the older customs and introduce a continuous process of change which limits the formation of new ones. Thus there is an increase in that area of moral indifference which is controlled by fashion. Where custom loses hold fashion gains new ground. In extreme cases, among frivolous or very sophisticated groups, fashion may become the main guide of life. In decadent civilizations it may usurp the place of morals. Thus Tacitus, in deploring the decline of morals in the Rome of his day, declared that "to corrupt and to be corrupted is called the fashion." [12] Within its proper sphere fashion serves a useful social function. It introduces a common pattern into the area of indifference, a formal or conventional likeness which enables people of very diverse interests and dispositions to meet on common ground and which makes it easier for them to retain beneath that surface, in harmony with one another, their essential individual and group characters. It has on

[12] Tacitus, *Germania*, 19.

that account a special significance in the extensive range of a diversified democratic civilization. But when its control passes beyond the superficialities of life it offers a poor substitute for the more established sanctions. For its rule is shallow and inconsequent, concerned with the form and not with the substance of living, devoid of conviction and of stability.

It is easier to describe the rôle of fashion than to explain the source of its authority and its peculiar hold over the minds of men. One of the earliest attempts at explanation was that of Tarde who defined fashion as the imitation of contemporaries, as contrasted with custom which was the imitation of ancestors.[13] But this is a superficial explanation. The fashion must exist and be recognized before it is 'imitated'. It is followed because it is the fashion. It has leaders as well as followers, and the leaders are those who have prestige in their particular field. They also must have a flair for the prevailing mood or temper of the time, whether in matters of dress or of art, of language or of thought. Even the most reputed leaders may fail at times to divine this mood and lose prestige for the moment, as the Paris fashion experts have done more than once.[14] Nor can fashion be explained in simple terms of economic interests. It is quite capable of dealing ruthlessly with any particular economic interests which do not serve its purposes, as the woollen and other textile industries have known to their cost. It is true that important economic agencies are at work to stimulate the growth of fashion and above all to accelerate the change of fashion. When once the new mode is sensed, vast publicity is applied by these to persuade the community that a fashion has arrived and to urge its adoption. The claim that a book is a 'best seller' or that a new song is the 'rage' or a new play the 'hit of the season' or that some particular color or material is being worn in the 'best circles', provided it has a modicum of truth, helps to substantiate itself. But economic interests do not create the appeal of fashion, they

[13] Tarde, *Laws of Imitation* (tr. Elsie C. Parsons, New York, 1903), ch. VII.
[14] An example was the innovation of the 'harem skirt'.

merely reinforce it. Nor is fashion purely wayward, equally ready to move in any direction that the leaders choose. Fashion in the long-run may ally itself with profounder forms of social control, adapting its prescriptions to moral, religious, or economic changes which give it narrower or fuller play. While from season to season it seems to move forward and backward, in the longer perspective it exhibits distinct trends.[15] These trends are sometimes indications of more important changes within the community. It is no accident, for example, that with the change in the economic and social status of women there should have gradually come about certain definite modifications of feminine dress. It is probably no accident that in the war and post-war period the dress of women was assimilated to that of men. Fashion, playing at the surface where resistance is least, responding to the social whim of the moment, discovering on this level a compensation for the restraints of custom and habit and the routine of life, may through its passing conformities be helping to bridge the greater transitions of the process of social change. It may create a series of seemingly inconsequent steps leading from one custom to another.

[15] See, for example, Kroeber, *On the Principle of Order in Civilization as Exemplified by Changes of Fashion*, AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, N. S., Vol. XXI, No. 3 (July–September, 1919), pp. 235–263.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

SOCIAL CODES AND THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE

1. *Social and Individual Norms*

The social codes we have been considering are norms or standards set up and sanctioned by society, either arising spontaneously within the community, as customs, or ordained by the state as laws, or established by a large variety of associations, family, school, church, business, club, and so forth, which are regulative only within the limits and under the conditions of their particular memberships. Sometimes the common aspect of all these norms creates in individuals the sense of a great social pressure, of an overbearing demand for conformity, which may even lead to graye maladjustments or 'neuroses'.[1] But the majority conform because, although at times everyone feels an inner resistance to some items of the code, most of us accept the code most of the time and nearly all of the time approve of the conformity of others. In a civilized society the number and variety of group codes impose on the individual the problem of personal selection. He acquires in consequence a code of his own compounded of many elements, selective within the limits imposed by the stronger sanctions of law and custom, deeply responsive to the influences of education and of the social environment but nevertheless expressive on the whole of his particular personality. This liberty of choice in code-making is one of the essential marks of adult self-hood and the range of this liberty reveals the culture of a society. It is of necessity accompanied by the mitigation of various drastic external sanctions, such as those of a compulsory fear-inspired religion, belonging to less advanced types of society.

The social codes are standards, but they are not in the full sense ideals, of conduct. They are for the most part work-a-day

[1] So Trigant Burrow in his curious book, *The Social Basis of Consciousness.*

rules, deriving in part from tradition and in part from the exigencies of the common life, revealing also the dominant interests of the power-holders and constituting at best a rough translation into formulae of the limited experience and reflection of the average mentality of the group. The selective code of every individual expresses, in proportion to the strength of his character and the clarity of his intelligence, a more definite and vivid and intimate set of valuations. These individual codes could not exist without the support of the social codes, but they exceed the latter in substance, vitality, and detail. The mainspring of life is in truth the inner set of valuations which the individual cherishes. Even within these valuations there is often conflict and contradiction, involving in normal cases a progressive if sometimes painful adjustment to new experiences but in extreme cases going so far as to disrupt the personality. At the same time there is also a degree of conflict between the individual code and some dominant social code, a conflict which is most apt to show itself in relation to the sex code, the economic code, and in many communities to the religious code of the group to which the individual belongs.

Here then are two main types of conflict, that in which personal interest or personal valuation is opposed to a prevailing code, and that in which the individual is pulled opposite ways by the prescriptions of different codes, such as the religious and the political, both of which are applicable within the situation. These two conflicts provide, because of their intrinsic interest and their social consequences, the supreme subjects of literature, especially of the novel and of the drama. An illustration of the former is Ibsen's *Enemy of the People*, of the latter Sophocles' *Antigone*, where the heroine has to choose between the prescriptions of her religion, involving her sacred duty to her dead brother, and the edict of the king. Frequently the two motifs are combined, as in the play of *Hamlet*. Confining our examples to the drama, we may say that in its whole range, from the Orestean trilogy to the plays of modern authors like Ibsen, Shaw, Galsworthy, and O'Neill, its main theme has been the predicament of the 'hero', incarnating some personal code and beset by the sanctions of an

opposing social code. It is significant that when, as in the *Agamemnon*, *Macbeth*, *Hamlet*, *Ghosts*, *The Emperor Jones*, the social sanctions triumph over the 'hero', the drama takes the form of tragedy; but when, as in the Falstaff plays, *Peer Gynt*, *Arms and the Man*, and innumerable other plays with a 'happy ending', the 'hero' outwits, triumphs over, or achieves some form of reconciliation with the code, the result is technically a comedy.

It is not only, of course, the sanctions of the social codes which may come into conflict with personal valuations and schemes of life. The pressure of poverty, the lack of congenial work or of congenial surroundings, the inability resulting from inner weakness or outer circumstance to realize one's hopes and ambitions, the very limitations imposed by the organic nature itself, make serious and often tragic onsets on the cherished valuations of the personal code. This too, the defeat of aspiration by circumstance, has been the theme of much great literature, especially in the form of the novel.[2] Perhaps most of all, for the great majority of men, have the cramping necessities of their economic lot, with the formidable insecurities and fears of the unremitting struggle to win a narrow livelihood, oppressed and worn down their native sense of values. This struggle, like all struggle, has no doubt evoked fine qualities in those whom it has not submerged, but until practically our own times it has been so severe or so hopeless as to submerge the mass of the population, while many who have succeeded in the consequent competition for economic goods have sacrificed the ends or values of life for the sake of the means. It is only in our own industrial age that, with the rise in the standards of living and the social establishment of insurance from these corroding necessities and other protections against economic hazards, the hope of deliverance, on the broad scale of national life, has dawned.

In this endless struggle of personal ideals with the conditions alike of the social and the material environment man has always longed or striven to remould these conditions

[2] Thomas Hardy's works, and particularly *Jude the Obscure*, might be cited as illustrations.

"nearer to the heart's desire." The longing has sometimes been expressed in the form of the social 'utopia'. The utopia is the literary expression of the kind of value-dream, sometimes the myth or illusion, which is nevertheless a very real and important part of the personal ideal. It serves both as an escape from the world of necessity and a secret guide of conduct. Similarly, as Mumford has pointed out so well in his *Story of Utopias*, the utopia, the conscious literary projection of this dream, exercises a double function. On the one hand, "it seeks an immediate release from the difficulties or frustrations of our lot." On the other, it "attempts to provide a condition for our release in future." There are thus "utopias of escape" and "utopias of reconstruction," as one or the other function dominates. "In one we build impossible castles in the air; in the other we consult a surveyor and an architect and a mason and proceed to build a house which meets our essential needs; as well as houses made of stone and mortar are capable of meeting them."[3] The social codes represent only the standards acceptable to the group in general. They can never, as we shall see, fully meet the demands of the individual situation or fully regulate the attitudes of the individual towards his group. The significance of this fact will be more obvious if we consider first the difference between a principle of social regulation and a principle rooted in the individual life—in other words, the difference between custom and habit.

2. *Custom and Habit*

Few distinctions throw more light on the nature of society than that of custom and habit. It is unfortunately a distinction which is often clouded with ambiguities. We think of custom as a social, and habit as an individual phenomenon, and this is true if we interpret it aright. But it is not enough to regard customs as the habits of the group or as "widespread uniformities of habit."[4] It is true that any particular habit

[3] L. Mumford, *op. cit.* (New York, 1922), ch. I.

[4] So defined by Professor Dewey in *Human Nature and Conduct*, ch. IV. On this one point I differ from the author's account of custom and habit in that chapter, presenting as it does a penetrating and very suggestive analysis.

which, growing out of a common situation, characterizes many of the members of a group is likely to take on the quality of a custom but as that occurs it becomes more than habit. A custom is then formed on the basis of habit, gaining the sanction and the influence, the social significance which is peculiar to custom. Wherever there is a widespread habit there is probably custom *as well.* Habits create customs and customs create habits. But the two principles, though intricately related, are distinct. Customs could not exist unless the corresponding habits were inculcated into the rising generations, but habits can exist without the support of custom. A Robinson Crusoe must live without customs but he cannot live without habits.

Habits are modes of behavior which through repetition have grown canalized, so that the native tendency to respond in a similar way to a similar situation is confirmed and defined —grooved, as it were—by organic and psychical modifications. The transition from will to deed is thus rendered easy and familiar, relatively effortless and congenial. Habit means an acquired disposition to act in a certain manner. What was once a potentiality becomes through habit a capacity which, in the profound unity of body and mind, is both incarnated in the organism and impressed on the personality. In this sense habit is 'second nature', or more strictly our realized nature, the established, rooted, and often almost indelible modes of response for which we have exchanged the unformed potentialities of our heredity. Since human nature is so adaptable, so rich in potentialities, so accommodating, since the young life can be trained in any of so many diverse ways, indoctrinated in any of so many diverse skills and capacities, the formation of habits is of supreme importance in the process of education. For habit realizes one alternative by shutting out many others. Habit closes countless avenues of life in order that a few may be more easy for us to tread. Without habits we could not achieve anything, but *which* habits we form and perhaps still more *how* we form them is of decisive moment.

How we form habits determines whether habit shall be a

tyrant or an instrument of our lives. In this determination the varying limitations of heredity enter in, but so also does the manner of our education. Take for example the habit of learning itself, no matter what it is we learn. We may learn to do things by the authoritative imposition of a routine, in which the process of learning is denuded of meaning and only the mechanical result is counted. The supreme example of this type of habit formation is the average army-sergeant method of drilling recruits, the inculcation of automatic obedience—"theirs not to reason why"—but unfortunately it finds also frequent illustrations in the classroom when teaching becomes dictation and knowledge, instead of being the exploration of a world of endless interest, becomes a task of memory. "When we think of the docility of the young," says Professor Dewey, "we first think of the stocks of information adults wish to impose and the ways of acting they want to reproduce. Then we think of the insolent coercions, the insinuating briberies, the pedagogic solemnities by which the freshness of youth can be faded and its vivid curiosities dulled." Another type of automatic habit is that imposed in our industrial age by the machine, whose endless cycle of unvarying repetitions calls for a similar routine in those who feed and tend it. But this latter routine is in each instance so limited and specialized that, unless it is accompanied by other conditions which rob life of interest and dignity, it does not bite so deeply into character as the enslavement of habits which impose themselves in the name of authority and not merely of necessity.

Habit as the instrument of life economizes energy, reduces drudgery, and saves the needless expenditure of thought. Wherever there are purely repetitive acts to be performed, such as shaving in the morning or walking to one's work or typing letters or punching holes in steel, it is a vast gain to be able to entrust the *process* to the semi-conscious operations of habit. We could never learn to do things easily or well if we had to think afresh each step of the process. This applies not only to mechanical tasks but to the finest and most creative arts. In the mechanical tasks thought, liberated from the

conscious superintendence of the process, must divorce itself from an activity which offers no scope for its free play. In the creative arts the artist seeks to express himself through the habit-controlled technique, subordinates it to the thing he is seeking to express and thereby prevents it from hardening into mere mechanism. His satisfaction, his achievement, is not merely an end-result of the process but also a concomitant of it. Here we find the distinction between vital habit and mechanical habit. Where an operation is performed solely for the end-result, where there is no interest sustained and developed within the process which leads to it, habit is drudgery or tyranny. If the conditions of life render it necessary, it is still an unhappy necessity, and men seek relief from it, unless at length it has wholly deadened their spirit, in sport or excitement or some hobby or creative employment of leisure which restores the unity of act and thought. But we should not regard such devitalized habit, itself most frequently the result of economic necessity and at least as characteristic of pre-industrial toil as of our own forms of labor, as revealing the inherent nature of a phenomenon the essential function of which is to save and thus to liberate our energies.

This caution should also be borne in mind when we speak of the 'power' of habit. In an eloquent and famous passage William James described it thus:

Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor. It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps the fisherman and the deck-hand at sea through the winter; it holds the miner in his darkness, and nails the countryman to his log-cabin and his lonely farm through all the months of snow; it protects us from invasion by the natives of the desert and the frozen zone. It dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that disagrees, because there is no other for which we are fitted, and it is too late to begin again. It keeps different social strata from mixing. Already at the age of twenty-five you see the professional mannerism settling down on

the young commercial traveller, on the young doctor, on the young minister, on the young counsellor-at-law. You see the little lines of cleavage running through the character, the tricks of thought, the prejudices, the ways of the 'shop', in a word, from which the man can by-and-by no more escape than his coat-sleeve can suddenly fall into a new set of folds. On the whole, it is best he should not escape. It is well for the world that in most of us, by the age of thirty, the character has set like plaster, and will never soften again. [5]

Whether this hardening of character is "well for the world" may be an open question. In the instances here presented habit should be thought of as making more easy and tolerable, rather than as dictating, the persistent activities of men. Habit makes necessity tolerable, but it does not make the necessity. Habit accommodates us to necessity, so that it seems so no longer, so that at last it shuts out even from our imaginations the alternative experiences and goals which seemed more appealing before the exigencies of life closed upon us. In time the prisoner may come to love his chains.

But human nature is not so simple, and there is another side to this picture. The energies economized by habit, if they find no outlet in or beyond the activity, the potentialities unutilized or obstructed by it, may break the dams and channels of habit, seeking in new ways a hitherto denied satisfaction. This is the phenomenon which in a particular religious manifestation is named conversion. Another form of it is seen in the conquest of addictions, such as those created by drugs. It is usually thought of as the revulsion from 'bad' habits, but it may no less occur as the sudden rejection of 'good' habits, imposed by past authority or by social pressure. This abrupt habit-defying change of the personal life corresponds to the social phenomenon of revolution, the sudden rejection of custom and institution which have grown repressive beyond endurance. The parallel, though suggestive, is not complete, since the custom against which we rebel is now felt to be external and alien while the habit is still incorporated in our own nature.

[5] William James, *Psychology*, ch. IV.

When therefore we speak of the power of habit or the 'slavery' of habit we should remember that habit is not some master ruling us against our will. This conception has a qualified significance when applied to the abnormal group of drug-induced habits with their peculiar physiological character, though even here the truth is rather that our will is divided against itself. We both want the drug and to be free from it. But in general habit is the accommodation of the individual life to the conditions under which it must carry on its existence. It is our will in operation, not as it chooses between alternatives but as it persistently follows an alternative already chosen. It is the set of our will, confirming the decisions we first made without its aid. There is a fundamental contrast between the rich variety of the alternatives which our nature admits and the narrowness of the choice which the necessities of livelihood enforce on most and the limitations of energy and time impose on all. Man can live in the snows or in the tropics, in the city or in the country, under the conditions of any social and almost any physical environment; he can enter on any one of a thousand occupations and there are a multitude of interests and diversions which may claim his leisure. Somehow the choice has to be made, under the influences of the nearer environment, of education and training, of temperament and capacity, of economic opportunity. Once made, habits begin to confirm the choice, to counter its disadvantages and disappointments, to close the alternatives. In the earlier stages they are more subject to revision and readaptation, but once fully established, especially as we leave youth behind, they weave themselves into our nature, habit joining with habit to form the pattern of our lives. Then only the strongest eruptive influences can prevail against them, and only with profound disturbance of our whole being.

The significance of habit—its function, its advantage, its sacrifice of alternatives—is seen with peculiar clearness in the case of those habits which, unlike more technical aptitudes, strike roots in the emotional deeps of our nature. Such are pre-eminently our moral and religious habits, including also our ways of thinking and acting on those economic and po-

litical issues which closely affect our interests. The spectacle of the endless diversity of moral codes and practices exhibited by different peoples or groups, while each nevertheless regards with strong revulsion the divergent practices of others, has been the subject of wondering comment since ancient times. It is an obvious anthropological fact that even in so vital a concern as sex relations different peoples can successfully accommodate themselves to a great variety of different systems. The primary instinct of sex, the same human nature, can adapt itself to such various forms of expression, but the various possible alternatives could not all remain open, since chaos and social disruption would result. Some one system is evolved under the particular circumstances of each group, suited to the modes of living resulting from its geographical and economic environment, to the fixations arising from its groping translation into law of the accidents and inevitabilities of experience, and to the whole complex of customs of which it is a part. Under each system custom becomes the ground of habit, and through their combined influence the deep emotions of sex convey a profound moral import to the accepted ways. No doubt also the strong centrifugal tendencies of an urge so imperative that there is always present the possibility of its breaking loose from the prescribed channel of custom and habit help to generate the corresponding strength of taboos and prohibitions. Similar considerations apply to the other habits which possess for us a high moral significance. In respect of them all the danger is that the very necessity which imposes them tends to wrap them in a shroud of blind emotion, thus precluding the possibility of growth, of flexibility, and of intelligent re-direction. Here as well as elsewhere, here perhaps more than elsewhere, the only assurance against needless limitation, against stagnation, or against equally blind revolt, lies in the constant association of habit and reflection. When either habit or custom grows sacrosanct, beyond cool scrutiny, there is peril.

We can now proceed to draw the distinction between habit and custom which was suggested at the outset of our discussion. If we are content to identify customs, as is commonly

done, with "the habits of the group", then either there is no distinction at all or a merely quantitative one, between the two concepts. But such an identification ignores the social quality, the social sanction, of custom, a quality which is in no sense part of the meaning of habit. Habits formed in isolation, as by the hermit, or through personal idiosyncracy are just as truly habits as those formed under the influence of and in conformity with the conduct of the group. A custom, on the contrary, exists only as a social relationship. If, for example, I go to church because it is the thing to do, because it is the practice of the group to which I belong, because if I fail to do so, I am subject to some degree of social disapprobation, because by doing so I establish some useful business or social connections, then I am conforming to a custom. If when I am away from my group I have no prompting to attend church, then my former conduct, even if habitual, is to be attributed to custom rather than to habit. Custom has for the individual an external sanction. It is a mode of conduct of the group itself, as a group, and every custom is in consequence adjusted to the others which the group observes. It is part of a complex of determinate relationships sustained and guarded by the group. Each individual sustains it, even though it gains also the support of habit, in the consciousness of his membership in the group. We would not give the name of customs to those habits of technical aptitude which we acquire in learning a trade or a profession. It is true that we owe these also to our social heritage, but they need no social sanction because they are direct objective means to the ends we seek. The professional skill of the surgeon is habit, not custom, but his professional etiquette is custom though it may also be habit.

The peculiar social character of custom is revealed in the fact that there is one great class of customs which cannot be practised except collectively. Nearly all celebrations, rituals, and ceremonies fall within this class. They derive their significance from the fact that people come together and by participating in a common occasion stimulate the social consciousness of one another. There are many emotions for whose

full satisfaction a social setting and the participation of others is requisite, and a whole range of customs, the ritual of worship, the dance, the reunion, social games, and so forth, arises to meet this need. Such customs are in no sense uniformities of habit, and many of them in fact involve a diversity of rôle on the part of the various performers.

If custom and habit are thus distinct they are also bound in a causal nexus. The customs of the group, impressed on the plastic natures of the young, shape and direct, focus and limit their native potentialities. Undirected potentiality is also sprawling helplessness. Education is rendered both possible and necessary by the pressure of alternatives. The customs of the group are translated through education into the habits of each new generation, and the habits thus formed perpetuate the customs. In this educative process customs may be thought of as preceding habits, but if this were the whole story the weight of the past would repress all innovation, all readjustment, all development. Human nature is assertive as well as plastic. It refuses to take on the perfect mould of the past. One aspect of this truth is that habits also precede customs. Our habits are a more intimate part of our personality than are our customs and they arise not only from social education but also as our personal response to the immediate conditions of our lives. Thus they exhibit a greater variability than do customs and as they impinge on customs they make these in turn more flexible and subject to modification. When the habits thus personally created are sufficiently similar, such as those induced by the discovery of new techniques, they are apt not only to modify old customs but also to induce new ones. Many of the customs of our industrial age may in this sense be attributed to the habits necessitated by machinecraft or the opportunities released by invention. The new habits prompted by the telephone and the automobile have undermined old customs and established new ones in their place.

3. *The Concrete Situation and the Individual Life*

Aristotle in a famous sentence contrasted law and equity, the former being like a rigid rod that can measure only flat

surfaces and the latter a leaden rule that can be fitted into the flutings and cornices of actual buildings. A like distinction may be drawn between social norms of every kind and the determinants of individual conduct in each concrete situation. The social norms never envisage the full particular situation in view of which conduct is always directed. They cannot descend from their high altitude of generality to prescribe in detail the course of action befitting the immediate occasion. In the infinitely varied texture of life no two occasions are exactly alike. Social norms are limiting principles within a zone of conduct, and even the most docile and subservient of individuals could not regulate his life by their aid alone. They are not schoolmasters which assign the definite task for the present hour. Seldom can they say, Do this here and now, and even when they go this far, as political law in some degree does, the reference is then only to the external aspect of conduct. In fact the kind of law which prescribes the immediate external act cannot on that account prescribe the motive or spirit of action, while on the other hand the kind of rule, such as the moral code, which appeals to the spirit of conduct, is thereby prevented from laying down the immediate and particular act. The moral code enjoins truthfulness, but it would be absurd to hold that it calls for the telling of the whole truth about everything to everyone on every occasion. It enjoins fair dealing between man and man, but who beside the individual concerned can decide what fairness is in the hour of action? Who can decide which of the various codes and which of their various precepts is the most relevant to the situation but the individual who finds himself in it and who must interpret both the situation and the code?

There are two closely associated ways in which the social codes become effective within conduct. In the first place, through education and inculcation, they form the basis of habits. In the process of education the code is continually translated to the young in the form of specific injunction. Gradually, in proportion to their teachableness, they come to recognize a situation as one in which such and such con-

duct is expected of them. The similar elements in successive situations become the stimuli of the growing habit. To the youth trained to churchgoing the aspect of Sunday morning, with the changes in the household routine and the cessation of regular work, with the discarding of work-a-day clothes, the ringing of church bells, and so forth, constitutes a total stimulus that readily evokes, as a step in a habitual series, the act of church attendance. But we must not assume that human beings resemble insects, or the mere homunculi they appear as being to the imagination of extreme behaviorists, in their simple responsiveness to stimuli. The functioning of habit involves response to the similar elements which are recognized and selected for attention in constantly varying situations. The whole nature of the human being is implicit in every conscious act. He acts as a person, endowed with intelligence and a temperament, and fits the act, dimly or clearly, into the scheme of his life. He cannot help forming habits of his own, but he may modify or reject altogether, if they prove out of harmony with his growing nature, many of those inculcated by authority or impressed by training in his earlier years. The codes become incorporated into habits, not simply because the younger generation is plastic to the teaching of the older, but because, being of like nature to the older, it finds these ways of life congruous with and serviceable to its own desires. In the long run, when they cease to be so, because of growing knowledge or of changing technique, no amount of inculcation will assure their survival As the Industrial Revolution has spread from people to people it has everywhere initiated vast transformations in the social codes.

But there is a second way, distinct from its translation into specific habit, in which the code exercises influence over conduct. Man is a social being, sensitive to the opinions of his fellows. The proud motto of a Scottish family—"They say. What say they? Let them say"—may express a group attitude to an outer circle, but no man in his heart is indifferent to, or unaffected by, the views of his neighbors. As we have seen, the entire sanction of certain codes, including custom and fashion, is found in the pressure of public opinion, while it

forms an additional sanction of other codes, such as those of religion and of law. The omnipresent sense of what others will think of us, expressing itself on the one hand in the positive satisfaction of conformity, and on the other in the aversion from the direct and indirect consequences of non-conformity, sustains and perpetuates the common code against many of the temptations of private rebellion. We are uneasy if we fail to do what our associates expect of us, and this uneasiness readily assumes a moral significance. Our social nature conspires with our training to give the quality of wrongdoing to the acts which occasion it. (A like feeling of uneasiness and of moral violation accompanies the breach of habit, unless the habit is one of which our group disapproves.) We are thus led to select for attention in each concrete situation those common aspects which are of interest also to our group and to conduct ourselves accordingly.

Nevertheless the complexity of the concrete situation cannot be disregarded nor can it be met in terms of social expectancy or by a simple appeal to a common code. The code prescribes a typical or standardized conduct. There is moreover the frequent situation wherein more than one precept or more than one code claims equal validity. How, for example, can the code solve the problem of the youth who has to choose between doing lip-service to a creed he disbelieves or causing grave distress to an invalid parent, or of the girl who has to choose between her lover and her religion, or of the writer who must sacrifice his literary ideals to ensure a decent living, or of the business man who has to decide between bankruptcy or the adoption of competitive methods of which he disapproves, or of the workman who is asked to participate in a strike which he believes is justified but which would bring his family to want? These are a few obvious illustrations of the problems of conduct which, in far more specialized and difficult forms, occur continually in everyday life. It is therefore going too far to say that "for practical purposes morals mean customs."[6] No doubt the nearer we get to primitive life, the more true this statement becomes, but if we are seeking for the differ-

[6] Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, Pt. One, § V. See also Pt. Four, § IV.

ences between social phenomena it is obviously to the more developed societies that we should look, and in these there is considerable opportunity to observe or reject customs, to approve or to adjudge them "more honored in the breach than the observance." It may even be misleading to identify moral conduct with social conduct, unless we mean by the latter that mode of behavior which persons *ought* to exhibit in view of their social situation and the responsibility it imposes. It is misleading if it implies that there can be no moral conduct except in a social setting. This would involve the curious commentary that the decisions of a Robinson Crusoe, whether he yields to despair or lives on bravely, whether he lives like the animals or builds a decent hut, whether he grows addicted to a poisonous drug or maintains his self-respect, are morally indifferent, without distinction of right and wrong or its basis in better and worse.[7]

The real significance of the concrete situation cannot be understood unless we perceive that the social codes are quite essential and yet quite inadequate for the conduct of the individual life. Even in the simplest situations the code has to be selected, accepted, interpreted, and applied. How large an element of personal discretion enters in can be seen if we consider the analogy of the judge, whose business it is to apply to a particular case the most explicit, detailed, and objective of all the codes, that of the law of the land, to a case which he knows only from the outside and without the distraction of personal interest. Yet even here, with his books of recorded precedents before him, the judge has to rely largely on his own sense of what justice *should* be and the issue is often doubtful until the decision is delivered. Substitute for the professional judge the individual arbiter of his own case, who has to determine the course of action to be taken and not merely to assess it afterwards, who has no single authoritative code which it is incumbent on him to apply, who is immersed

[7] It is of course true that morality is historically and psychologically derived from the experience of social relationships, but we must distinguish between origins and developed significance. The conduct of a Crusoe is affected by his past social life, but the question is whether it has a present moral significance.

in the situation by personal interest and familiar engrossment and does not sit *in cathedra* in cool and ample reflection over it. The conclusion is surely clear that the mere acceptance of the social codes is quite inadequate for the guidance of conduct, apart altogether from the fact that such acceptance, were it feasible, would denude the individual of initiative and all the quality of character. (It may be noted that it is in matters of opinion and belief, which accord with or do not touch our immediate practical interests, that the unreasoning observance of the social codes can be and is most completely fulfilled. The range of such observance seems to vary inversely with the extent of our practical interests and the degree of our intelligence.) Yet if we deny the adequacy for conduct of the social codes we must no less insist on their necessity. Without them the individual would be utterly distracted and helpless. Engrained in his nature through habit and continually impinging on him from his social environment, they reduce the limits of individual determination within practicable proportions. Without them the burden of decision would be intolerable and the vagaries of conduct utterly distracting. They build a solid foundation on which man can deal with man and fulfil his social nature in social relationships. They reveal to him both his likeness to and his unity with his fellows. They bring home to him his membership in the group, his present hour of participation in the great continuity of the past and future of the race, his unit of contribution to the life of the whole society whose destiny includes and vastly transcends his own and the hidden law of whose being may be dimly discerned in the faltering deliverances of the social consciousness.

How then shall we reconcile the necessity of the social code with the equal necessity of individual judgment? The answer lies in the fundamental and reconciling fact, already discussed, that to be individualized and to be socialized are two aspects of the same phenomenon of development. The individual who slavishly follows the nearest code is unconscious of or unfitted for a greater social obligation. For him society lies without; it has no deep roots within his being. He is bound to it by the superficial and uncreative bonds of imitation and compliance.

He reflects but does not express society; for him it is not *community*. No human being is in fact so pure an embodiment of the herd spirit. The primitive savage has been so pictured by such writers as Bagehot, but more recent anthropology has undermined "the assumption that in primitive societies the individual is completely dominated by the group—the horde, the clan or the tribe—that he obeys the commands of his community, its traditions, its public opinion, its decrees, with a slavish, fascinated, passive obedience."[8] What needs further to be observed is that this spirit of passive obedience, to which of course we find approximations both in civilized and in primitive society, especially in matters of belief, is the least and not the most fully developed expression of social-mindedness. To be fully social is to be socially *responsible*, to bring the whole social situation, as it affects and is affected by one's conduct, into the focus of one's consciousness and act accordingly. Here too we have stated the pure type, this time the ideal, to which in actuality we can only approximate. We approach the nearer to it the more our conduct is guided, not by social codes coming to us from the outside as detached and abstract imperatives, but by our individual judgment of what the situation, as each of us perceives it for himself, demands of us. Conduct is imperfectly social if it is determined by what others think, not by what we think, by what others expect of us, not by what we expect of ourselves.

Morality, in other words, is more nearly pure the more autonomous it is. We can be responsible only in the degree in which we are self-directing. So again we find that the social and the individual aspects of conduct are indissolubly linked—in the last resort they are more than linked, they become one. Responsibility is the social aspect, and it exists in precisely the same degree as the individual aspect—autonomy. This autonomy does not exist in the void, it is the autonomy of character with all its defects and all its limitations. It may be erratic and detached from responsibility though, as we have just seen, responsibility can exist only in the degree in which autonomy does. In this union of autonomy and re-

[8] Malinowski, *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*, Introduction.

sponsibility the social codes find their true place. They become, in finer and selective forms, individualized. Reason and morality, as Dewey has said, "grow into them as well as out of them." They are shaped to more liberal and more expressive forms and in turn they help to create richer and freer individualities.

The place of autonomy and responsibility in conduct increases with the complexity of society. In complex society, changeful as a whole and mobile as to its members, with the meeting and clash of standards and moralities, with the specialized codes of its specialized functions, the regulative principles cannot maintain control in the simpler mode characteristic of a primitive tribe. The concrete situation calls for a greater autonomy, giving more scope to the individual, more play to his enterprise, while the greater variety and intricacy of his relationships call for a more finely trained responsibility. And the basis of this training must always be a complex of social codes appropriate to the need for it.

PART THREE
SOCIETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

PREFATORY NOTE

We turn from the study of the social structure and its sustaining principles to the study of the environment on which man and all his works is for ever dependent. To its conditions he must conform and with its changes he must change. In this sense there is a continuous adaptation of every living thing to its environment, for otherwise there would be a break in that universal principle of order which all our experience confirms and on which all our science rests. But the activity of man is incessantly engaged in modifying his environment, in order that the inevitable adaptation may be more in harmony with his desires and his evaluations. This endless quest is a constant stimulus to co-operative or social conduct. The environment, nature-given, is changed more and more by social man, until in our present world of civilization it has become exceedingly complex. We shall study first the physical aspects which are least subject to human control, passing on to those aspects which bear the fuller imprint of the hand of man but which are scarcely less rigorous in compelling the adaptation to them of their creator. It will be observed that in this division we are turning from the description and analysis of social fact to the great problem of social causation. The nature of this problem will appear throughout this part, first when we approach the vexed question of the relation of heredity and environment, and then when we consider the respective influences of the various factors or elements of the elaborated environment of modern society. Thus we again approach the question which must occupy us in the last part when we come to the interpretation of social change.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

ENVIRONMENT AND LIFE

1. *The Significance of Environment*

We are apt to think too simply and too mechanically of environment, merely as that which surrounds us, and thereby to underestimate its importance. In truth the relation of life and environment is extremely intimate. The organism itself, the life structure, is the product of past life and past environment. Environment is present from the very beginning of life, even in the germ-cells. We think of our organisms as ourselves, and environment as that which lies outside us. But the capacities and attributes of the organism are relative to the whole environment in which they manifest themselves. The environment is more than a 'conditioning' factor of a life that can be conceived of apart from it. Imagine, for example, that we were suddenly transported to a much larger planet. Our bodies would instantly become much heavier, and that fact alone would involve a myriad other differences. We would no longer know ourselves, we would no longer, assuming we could exist at all, *be* ourselves. We never know life except in an appropriate environment, an environment to which it is already adjusted. Life and environment are in fact correlates.

So closely interwoven are the two that every variety of life, every species, in fact every individual living thing has its own particular environment, in some degree different from that of others. The environment is as specialized as the life that is lived within it. Every change in a living creature involves some change in its relation to environment, and every change in the environment some change in the response of the organic being. To appreciate this truth we must understand that the environment is not simply the

world without, but those aspects of that world with which we enter into relationship. It is our habitation in the completest sense. It includes the conditions which are common to all and the conditions which are peculiar to each group. In its totality, as relative to any group (and ultimately to any individual), it is thus a factor of great complexity. Every difference in our habits, our ways of living, means a difference in our environment, a different adaptation to it on the one hand and a different selection within its aspects on the other. The more active and the more intelligent the life the more it modifies the given environment to its needs, but it remains none the less true that each state of the environment demands in turn our adaptation to it. Through a process of constant selection and constant adaptation the moving equilibrium of life is maintained.

The correspondence of life and environment is amply illustrated in the case of social groups. Just as every region of a country is in some respects different from every other, so also are the inhabitants of each region. An inhabitant of the Ozarks or of the Kentucky mountains thinks and feels differently from an inhabitant of New York City, a New Englander from a prairie dweller. The difference in some way—though, as we shall see, the precise expression of the relationship is fraught with great difficulties—is relative to the environment in which they respectively dwell. Common observation tells us that as people change from country to city, from agriculture to industry, from mountain to plain, from hot to temperate climates, they become accommodated to the new conditions, undergoing a process of change as their environment changes. It is obvious that a well-to-do group has a different environment from a poor one, a colored urban group from a white one, a professional class from an artizan class. Take the largest effective community we can find, whether that of a nation or of a whole civilization, and its character is seen to be in some way reactive to that of the total environment within which it has grown. Take the smallest group, such as the individual family, and there too the correspondence manifests itself.

The revelation of the manner in which the environment moulds and itself is modified by the life of the group is one of the chief achievements of sociology. From ancient times men observed certain rough correspondences between broad physical conditions and modes of living. It was noted, for example, that the inhabitants of tropical regions exhibited characteristic differences from those of temperate or of arctic regions, and again that the sea-farer was typically distinct from the inlander. These observations have been gradually refined and elaborated into a more scientific form. French sociology has been specially prominent in the development of such studies from the time of Montesquieu to the present, inspired by leaders like Le Play, Demolins, Durkheim, and Brunhes. The subject was taken up by the German school of 'human geographers', led by Ratzel, and is now being vigorously pursued under the name of 'geo-politics'. In America it has created the 'ecological' school, which has particularly devoted itself to the cultural phenomena associated with certain urban regions. These phenomena, as the term *ecological* implies, are regarded as revealing a process of adjustment or accommodation of the life of the group to the special conditions represented by a locality. All such studies combine to reveal both how complex an environment is and how completely it penetrates the life of a social group. It is true that they raise rather than solve the more difficult question, how far the environmental factor can *explain* the characteristics of the social life which it 'conditions'. This question, the ultimate scientific question, we shall face at a later stage.

At this point we should observe that the term *adaptation* is used in different senses, and the failure to distinguish them frequently creates confusion in the discussion of this subject. There is in the first place a purely physical adaptation which occurs whether we will it or not, which is independent of our strivings and of our aims. The sun will tan our skin if we expose ourselves to the sun. That is a form of physical adaptation, whether it helps us to live in a sunny climate or whether it does not. Fresh air will stimulate our lungs and poisonous

gas will destroy them. Physically, the one is no less an adaptation than the other. Strength or weakness, health or sickness, is equally an expression of natural law. The green leaves of spring and the falling leaves of autumn are alike obedient to this necessity. Death itself is the final statement of the adaptation which nature everywhere demands. Whatever the conditions are, whether wilderness or city, penury or prosperity, whether in the eyes of men they are favorable or unfavorable, good or evil, this unconditional adaptation remains with all its compulsion. But we also speak of adaptation in a biological sense, meaning that the life is fitted to survive or to prosper under the conditions of the environment. We say that fish are adapted to a marine environment or tigers to the conditions of life in the jungle. In this sense, though not in the former, we can speak also of maladaptation. A tiger is maladapted to the conditions of the desert or of the polar snows. We mean thereby that the conditions are not such as to permit the adequate functioning of the organism, that in fact the inevitable *physical* adaptation is detrimental to the biological demands. In order that a certain equilibrium, involving the survival or fulfilment of the organism, be attained, the environment *must* be such and such. But the *must* here is an imperative, addressed as it were to the organism. An extension of this biological meaning of adaptation brings us to the idea of social adjustment. It is adjustment in terms of a standard of values, a conditional adjustment. *If* we are to live in ways we desire the environment *must* be such and such. Man does what every living creature does in proportion to its intelligence; he selects and modifies his environment in such a way that the inevitable adaptation shall admit the greater fulfilment of his wants, the completer expression of his nature. In this social sense adjustment definitely implies valuation, whereas in the sheer adaptation always necessitated by nature there is no implication of well-being, no virtue or merit. When we speak of maladjustment we do not mean that the universal principle is defeated, we mean that the existing adaptation involves a less complete satisfaction of our wants and of our ideals than would be possible if the environment were altered

in a particular direction. It is obvious that, in the light of the restless questing nature of man and the multiplicity of his desires, every equilibrium of his life with his environment contains some degree of 'maladjustment'. In the light of our desires we criticize the adaptation which, as a natural phenomenon, is always perfect. What we are really criticizing is the environment to which our lives are thus adapted, or ourselves because of our failure to control it, to change the conditions of the equilibrium.

This criticism takes practical form in our incessant efforts to modify environment, but in so doing we create a further environment on the level of which the eternal struggle is continued. This new environment for which man is responsible has a twofold character, an outer and an inner aspect. The outer consists of the physical modifications of nature, our houses and cities, our means of transportation and communication, our comforts and conveniences, the whole apparatus and machinery of our civilization.[1] The inner is society itself, the structure we have been describing, with all its codes and all the heritage which it sustains. For every member of society this system is just as much a part of the environment as is the world without, except that his adjustment to it is not of the same inexorable character, not being imposed by natural law. Nevertheless he cannot escape its influence, for he is trained up and habituated to it, and none of his desires can be fulfilled unless he takes it into account. We may say then that the total environment of every human being consists of (1) an outer environment in various ways modified by man, in the centers of modern civilization vastly modified, but under all conditions still requiring an unconditional adaptation, and (2) an inner or social environment made by man himself, to which he is adjusted through conscious response and habituation. In either case maladjustment, in the evaluational sense of the term, is apt to occur, so that man is

[1] Rignano points out that this physico-technical structure would endure for some time if the society itself perished, whereas the institutional structure ends with the society (in an article in the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, November, 1928).

always active in his endeavor to change both nature and society.

In the more recent stages of social evolution this twofold process of change, with its attendant readjustment, has been peculiarly rapid. It is sometimes claimed that man's successful efforts to change his environment have furthered some of his needs at the expense of others, that human nature is not at home in the world of civilization which it has made for itself. One aspect of this criticism has found a well-known expression in the contention of Graham Wallas that the modern environment baulks some of our 'instinctive dispositions'. "Man is born with a set of dispositions related, clumsily enough but still intelligibly, to the world of tropical or subtropical wood and cave which he inhabited during millions of years of slow evolution." These dispositions, he maintains, have been through ages adjusted to respond to the stimuli offered by such surroundings, and being thus suddenly (in terms of the span of evolution) dissociated from them they function uneasily and capriciously.[2]

It is no doubt true that in modifying our environment to satisfy more fully some of our desires we may make it less favorable for the satisfaction of others. But whether we should accept the contention just stated is open to some doubt. There are maladjustments created by the conditions of modern life, but it seems possible to explain them without reference to inherited habituations. If man inhabited caves for ages we do not find any great yearning on his part to return to that mode of life. What he most lacks in many urban environments is rather a full share of the universal requirements of a healthy human organism, such as fresh air and sunlight and freedom of movement and the refreshment of the world of outer nature. For many city-dwellers the conditions of habitation and of work are cramped and unhygienic. At the same time these conditions make demands and offer excitations which, unless limited and controlled, induce nervous strain. Particularly to those brought up in the country the transition to the life of the city, like any other transition from familiar surroundings, often

[2] *The Great Society* (London, 1920), ch. IX.

brings a sense of deprivation, of nostalgia; and as in the rapid growth of cities a large proportion of their population is country-bred this malaise must be a widespread phenomenon. These present factors, most of which may be remediable within the environment, may account for the indications interpreted by Wallas as baulked hereditary dispositions. Where the environment has been subject to rapid modification through the development of technique, there is sufficient evidence of two forms of temporary maladjustment. On the one hand there is the personal disturbance of the individuals who, habituated to one set of conditions, are brought in the process into relation with a different set, and on the other hand there is the general 'lag', as Ogburn has expressed it, between the social conditions conformable to the new technical order and the social conditions inherited from a past order.[3] The more difficult and obviously less demonstrable assumption of a deeper discrepancy, between man's conscious desires as they are active in the remoulding of his environment and his organic or 'instinctive' dispositions, should be resorted to only if the other and more demonstrable explanations prove inadequate.[4] If there is any profound contradiction between the activities of man and his own instincts it is at least a curious anomaly of nature. Such facts as the improvement in the health and amenity of cities as the new environment has come under greater control, if taken in conjunction with the statistical evidence that city-bred youth do not evince so definite a longing for the permanent life of the country as country-bred youth show for that of the city, make us hesitate to attribute the tensions of city life to the blocking of atavistically derived tendencies. As for the more general thesis, so eloquently expressed by Spengler, that the city represents both the fulfilment and the suicide of civilization, it is the dogmatic presentation of a conservative temperament, based on entirely inadequate evidences.[5]

[3] *Social Change* (New York, 1922), Pt. II, ch. VIII and Pt. IV, ch. I.

[4] For a somewhat different view, cf. Balz, *The Basis of Social Theory* (New York, 1924), ch. IV.

[5] *The Decline of the West* (tr. Atkinson), Vol. II, ch. IV. For a criticism of this presentation see my *Modern State*, ch. X. See also *infra*, ch. XXV, 3.

2. *Heredity and Environment*

While the studies to which we referred in the last section have been revealing the fuller significance of environment, another group of scientists have been exploring the significance, over against environment, of the hereditary factors which are transmitted from generation to generation and which every living being carries with it through all environmental change. It is an age-old observation, recognized in the solidarity of family and kind and displayed in the consciousness of race, that the blood of the parents flows in the children, that like begets like. The difference in heredity, then, might account for the difference in the traits and qualities of individuals or groups, even in very different environments. To this explanation the biologist naturally leaned while the students of environment were stressing the other aspect. Thus a great dispute has arisen as to the relative importance of the two, and it still rages. In explaining the variations of human beings and their societies some claim that heredity is far the more weighty determinant while others belittle heredity in the name of environment. Some claim that certain qualities, such as those of health or intelligence, depend mainly on heredity while they admit that other qualities, particularly the social qualities expressed in morals, customs, and beliefs, depend more directly on environment.

The whole issue was raised in a definite form by Galton, when in 1869 he published his pioneer work on *Hereditary Genius*. He sought to show in this work that, while there is seeming chance in the appearance of genius, the probability of the occurrence of highly gifted children is vastly higher when the fathers are of superior intelligence. The work of Galton was carried on by Karl Pearson who applied his method of correlation to the problem and was led to the conclusion that, in the explanation of important human differences, the influence of environment was far less than that of heredity. He actually claimed that it was possible by his method to measure the relative efficacy of the two and gave evidences purporting to show that for people of the same race within a given community the factor of heredity was more than seven times as important

in the determination of differences as was that of environment.[6] Many other researchers have followed the path of Pearson. Some have taken class or occupational categories and shown that the groups with the higher social or intellectual rating have been more productive of men of genius or distinction. Thus Woods discovered that royal families produce in proportion more geniuses than any others,[7] Visher that the families of the clergy produce in America the largest proportion of notable men, followed in order by the other professions, businessmen, farmers, skilled and semi-skilled laborers,[8] Cattell that American men of science emanate in largest numbers from the professional classes and in smallest numbers from the agricultural class,[9] and so forth. Others have taken racial or national categories and by the application of psychological tests have brought out considerable differences between them, as in the well-known army tests of immigrant groups in the United States and more generally of native-born, foreign-born, and negro groups.[10] Particular attention has been devoted to the comparison by 'intelligence tests' of white and colored groups, giving in all cases a higher rating to the whites.[11] Others again have taken selected family groups for comparison, giving us the famous contrast between the prosperous and distinguished lineage of Jonathan Edwards and the wretched descendants of the Jukes and the Kallikaks.[12]

On the whole what these numerous studies have done is to give more precise and scientific evidence regarding matters of common observation, that those who are born in the families or groups possessing distinction or prestige and who in consequence are brought up in a more favorable environment are

[6] Karl Pearson and others, Eugenics Laboratory Lecture Series.

[7] F. A. Woods, *Mental and Moral Heredity in Royalty* (New York, 1906).

[8] S. S. Visher, in AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, March, 1925.

[9] J. McKeen Cattell, *American Men of Science* (3rd ed., New York, 1921).

[10] See, for example, R. M. Yerkes in MEMOIRS, National Academy of Sciences, Vol. XV.

[11] A tabulated statement of results is given in Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, ch. IV.

[12] A. E. Winship, *Jukes-Edwards* (Harrisburg, Pa., 1900); H. H. Goddard, *The Kallikak Family* (New York, 1912); R. L. Dugdale, *The Jukes* (New York, 1877), and A. H. Estabrook, *The Jukes in 1915* (Washington, 1916).

more likely to develop intellectual or other attainment. An example of these results is shown in the following table from Visher:

THE OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF THE FATHERS OF 18,400 INDIVIDUALS WHOSE NAMES APPEARED IN THE 1922–23 EDITION OF *Who's Who in America*

	Number of fathers of persons reporting in Who's Who	*Number of eminent persons per approximately 48,000 men*
Men of leisure	49	?
Unskilled	94	1
Skilled laborers	1,165	30
Farmers	4,310	70
Business men	6,473	600
Professional men, except clergymen	4,265	1,035
Clergymen	2,036	2,400 [13]

Facts of this character are interesting and important but when we deal with them it is essential to distinguish fact from inference. What they tell us directly is that, accepting a certain criterion of distinction, certain occupational groups in a particular country produced eminent persons in varying proportions to their numbers, the divergence between classes being so great that the son of a clergyman, born a generation or two before 1922, had a chance of inclusion in *Who's Who* perhaps eighty times as high as that of the son of a skilled laborer. The criterion itself may be an imperfect measure of eminence, just as the psychological test may be an imperfect measure of 'intelligence', but for our purpose that is a minor consideration which we need not here discuss. What we must observe is that such figures tell us nothing directly about either heredity or environment. They tell us something about various combinations of the two, for, as we saw in the last section, every specific group has a different specific environment. Many of the researchers who have collected these facts draw from them the conclusion that heredity is a more potent factor than environ-

[13] S. S. Visher, in AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. XXX (1924–1925), pp. 551–557. Visher computed on the basis of the 1870 Census that 48,000 unskilled laborers would contribute, on the average, one notable son to *Who's Who in America*, 1922–1923.

ment, but the facts themselves might just as well—and just as illegitimately—be used to support the opposite conclusion. Thus Woods declares that the resemblances between members of royal families must, in view of the different milieus from which their ancestors came (but they were all alike members of royal courts!), have been brought about "through the germ-cells alone." And Popenoe and Johnson declare that, as revealed in his lower intellectual rating, "the negro lacks in his germ-plasm excellence of some qualities which the white race possesses." [14] To establish such conclusions it would be necessary to discount the effect of different environmental conditions—a problem to which we must return. It may be observed in passing that Galton himself was much more guarded in his inferences, as when he said: "there is no escape from the conclusion that nature prevails enormously over nurture *when the differences of nurture do not exceed what is commonly found among persons of the same rank of society and in the same country.*" [15] If we give as much weight to the condition which I have here italicized as to the first part of the statement, no objection can be taken to the conclusion, but in that case it tells us nothing about the 'potency' of heredity as compared with that of environment.

Let us briefly examine some of the evidences in order to show the danger involved in drawing general conclusions regarding the 'rôle' of heredity from figures revelatory of total social situations. We will take first one of the various studies of the comparative intelligence of negroes and whites. Yerkes, from the data provided by the psychological tests applied to U. S. army recruits, found the average mental age of the negroes to be 10.4 years as contrasted with 13.1 years for the whites.[16] Such a result requires interpretation, and there are two important questions which it immediately raises. In the first place, how far can we conclude concerning the general level of mentality of the two races from the results of specific tests applied to selected groups? The problem of sampling we may

[14] Popenoe and Johnson, *Applied Eugenics* (New York, 1926), ch. XIV.
[15] *Inquiries into Human Faculty* (London, 1883), p. 241.
[16] In MEMOIRS, National Academy of Sciences, Vol. XV.

disregard, inasmuch as the results are on the whole in conformity with those attained by many other investigators. The problem of the validity of the specific tests is harder to meet. There are two difficulties here. One concerns the hypothesis that tests involving degrees of facility in performing particular operations under particular conditions faithfully represent degrees of general intelligence or 'mental age'. For example, a test requiring accuracy measures accuracy in respect of the operation in question, and if a time factor is included it measures accuracy in conjunction with quickness of reaction. Can we conclude from these results regarding the general and hard-to-define attribute we speak of as 'mental age'? The other difficulty concerns the cultural background of the two groups. Are the common tests impartial in the sense that they measure equally those aptitudes through which intelligence displays itself under the life conditions of each group? The woodsman, for example, would fail miserably in the test in which the bank clerk would score highly, and *vice-versa*, and it is no easy matter to devise common tests which could give reliable indications as to their comparative 'mental age'. The fact that the background of the negro in general differs from that of the white makes the difficulty here too a serious one.

Let us suppose, however, that these difficulties are surmounted. Then we come face-to-face with our second main question. We have found, we now assume, adequate indices of the 'mental age' of the two groups. Shall we then conclude that our indices reveal the hereditary or racial difference in intelligence of the two peoples concerned? By no means, for we have done nothing so far to eliminate the factor of differential environment. No such tests can discount the influence of differential training, experience, home life, social opportunity. If in linguistic tests the negro comes off worse than in music tests, has the environment nothing to do with it, the environment as a whole, including not only such aspects as economic disadvantage, inferior linguistic schooling, the shorter school year, but also the less objective aspects such as the lack of the social stimulations and prospects which the white

enjoys? The environment of the past is written in our lives as well as the environment of the present. Can we ever so deal with it as to measure its influence and therefore also the influence of heredity? It is sometimes claimed that we can, and to the meaning of this claim we must return. All that we here assert is that no such tests as we have mentioned permit us to assess heredity. They are useful as showing differences that exist here and now, but at best they are not absolute measurements of anything except that which is actually tested, a specific performance of the human product of race and environment. If we examined in the same way the intelligence rating of the army recruits of different nationalities we would see that a further consideration must be reckoned with, that of selection, in this case the social selection involved in the immigration movements of the various peoples.

Let us take a second example in which some of the above-mentioned difficulties appear to be absent. Physical traits are more concrete and certainly more easily measurable than mental traits. In this case the range of variation for groups of different nationalities can be easily represented by frequency curves. Measurements of Japanese and of American soldiers show a range of variation for the former between something under 56 to 69 inches and for the latter between something over 61 to nearly 75 inches.[17] The average stature for the one group is 63.24 and for the other 67.51. It may be observed in passing that such figures do not accurately measure the comparative average stature of the males of the two populations—which is perhaps an impossible task—but they are certainly useful indications of difference. The chief danger would lie in the assumption that they measure, with any degree of accuracy, an hereditary difference between the two groups. We have not yet eliminated the effect of continuous subjection to different environments. We cannot say that the conditions of life, the kind of food, the kind of nurture, the kind of climate, have nothing to do with the differences

[17] For graphs showing these results see R. E. Chaddock, *Principles of Statistics* (New York, 1925), p. 227; see comments in Hankins, *Racial Basis of Civilization* (New York, 1926), Pt. II, ch. II.

revealed. The studies of Boas on the physical differences between the American-born descendants of immigrant groups and their parents indicate changes in stature and even in head formation.[18] Further investigation on a larger scale and over several generations is desirable, but in view of the present evidences it is mere dogmatism to assert that heredity is alone responsible for the physiological differences between national or racial groups.[19]

Let us take a third example in which the factor of race does not present itself. Karl Pearson, in his Eugenics Laboratory studies, found a correlation between the stature of parents and that of their children equal to +0.50 and concluded that this is a measure of the influence of heredity. We are not for a moment denying in this instance, or in the previous ones, that heredity contributes towards the measurable result, but we do deny that the figure quoted has been shown to be an accurate measurement of its contribution. We have evidence that some environmental conditions affect stature; we know, for example, that it may be affected by nutrition and by disease in the period of growth. Even if we could regard the small samples as fully representative, we still are ignorant as to whether the environment of the families of the less tall children was equally favorable for the trait of physical height as that of the families of the taller children. The problem of the measurement of hereditary differences is far more complicated than the biometricians generally realize. We know, through Mendelian and other studies, that offspring inherit in some degree qualities or traits which may be latent in their parents but are revealed in their grandparents or remoter ancestry. In other words, we must think of heredity in terms of several generations at least. If, on the other hand, we think of environment in terms of a single generation we may draw misleading inferences regarding its importance. There is reason to believe that the general stature of European peoples has increased since the days of armored knights. If so, then

[18] F. Boas, *Changes in Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants*, Vol. 39. Reports of the Immigration Commission (Washington, D.C., 1912).

[19] See on this point F. Hertz, *Race and Civilization* (New York, 1928).

it is hard to rule out the long-run influence of environment as well as of heredity. And if this is true of physical traits it is more obviously true of mental and social traits, which, as we shall see, bear indubitable indications of the efficacy of the social heritage.

Our last example will be the famous contrast between the family of the Jukes and that of the Edwardses. In 1877 twelve hundred descendants were identified of a certain Juke, who was born in New York in 1720. Of these 440 were physically defective or diseased, 310 were paupers who had already amassed between them 2,300 years of life in poor-houses, 300 had previously died in infirmaries, 130 had been convicted of crimes, including 7 murderers. More than half of the women plied the trade of prostitute, while scarcely any of the men knew any trade beyond that of professional beggar. A further investigation in 1915 unearthed 2,820 descendants, and of these 600 then living were mentally defective. The cost of the family to the state was calculated at around two and a half million dollars. Against this picture of squalor and crime, prostitution and feeble-mindedness is set the bright record of the descendants of Jonathan Edwards, of whom 1,394 were identified in 1900. No less than 295 of these were college graduates, and many of them adorned the professions, as lawyers, clergymen, physicians, professors, army and navy officers, and so forth. Thirteen were presidents of important colleges and one was a vice-president of the United States. Others had made a success in business. Not one, so far as the record showed, had ever been convicted of a crime.

The contrast is certainly striking, but those who immediately claim that it reveals the incontestable supremacy of heredity over environment are ill-advised. In the first place we must ask, in what sense are the Jukes and the Edwardses of the present generation the same families as those of nine generations back? Each generation is a fresh admixture, and the blood of countless admixtures flows in each of us. "Many a person bears the name of some distinguished ancestor but does not have a single one of his chromosomes or hereditary traits, whereas others who do not bear his name . . . have

received his chromosomes and are his true inheritors." [20] If we can accept current biological teaching regarding the mechanics of heredity we learn how precarious is the imputation to far-off descendants of the qualities of ancestors. "These germinal causes of traits, which are called genes, are transmitted unchanged, but in the fertilization of the egg one-half of the genes from each parent is lost and is replaced by half from the other parent. So numerous are the genes that the combinations of them in the offspring are rarely, if ever, the same in two individuals, and so complex is their influence upon one another and upon the process of development, that no two sexually produced individuals are ever exactly alike. Consequently the best traits may appear in parents and be lost in their offspring; genius in an ancestor may be replaced by incompetence, imbecility, or insanity in a descendant." [21] The differences observable between members of the same family support the warning, and the study of these introduces new environmental factors to complicate our search for causes. We discover, for instance, that some socially manifested differences between children are related to such conditions as the order of birth and the changes in parental attitudes as the parents grow older and their social and economic position changes.[22] We may still accept the position of the more moderate eugenists, that like *tends* to beget like.[23] We have no more justification for denying the importance of heredity than some eugenists have when they deny the importance of environment. What the above-mentioned considerations impress upon us is, first, the complexity and uncertainty of heredity itself, and, second, the rashness of imputing solely to the character of some ancestral

[20] E. G. Conklin, *Heredity and Environment* (Princeton, 1923), p. 312.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] See, for example, Blanche C. Weill, *The Behavior of Young Children of the Same Family* (Harvard Press, 1928).

[23] For example, Leonard Darwin, in *What is Eugenics?* (New York, 1928) puts the case for heredity in the following reasonable terms: "We cannot foretell what will be the qualities of a man before he is born. But if we know the qualities of his near relations we can tell a good deal about what his qualities will *probably* be. This means that, though we should make many bad shots, we should be generally far nearer the truth than if we went by chance."

stock the social qualities or defects of some group of 'descendants'.

The nature of the Juke-Edwards exhibit suggests in other respects the need for caution. "The number of eminent among the Edwardses makes a composite of about 600. Out of how many? One thousand three hundred and ninety-four identified out of a possible 50,000? No one can state the *number omitted* any more definitely than he can state that the blood of Elizabeth Tuttle is the determining factor in effecting the eminence of the Edwards clan." [24] Observe also that the more easily identifiable members of the clan are those who have won some kind of distinction, just as in the case of the Jukes it is those who have failed most signally who are most easy to trace. Still, no doubt, the difference remains; we search for the Jukes in asylums and poor-houses and find some of them there, while for the Edwardses we look successfully in the roll of distinguished service. But at this point we must not forget that the Jukes had an unfavorable social environment whereas the Edwardses had a favorable one. To claim that the group determines the environment more than the environment the group is to prejudge the case. We cannot deny that in the making of college graduates opportunity, economic, social, and educational, is a factor, and that therefore it affects the entry to the professions which the Edwardses adorned. There is evidence that some members of the Juke family who moved out of the unfavorable environment became decent members of the community. If it is said they moved out because they were different, may it not also be said that they were different because they moved out? It seems impossible to get away from this incessant interaction. Those who disparage environment see only one side of it, those who disparage heredity only the other. Since the character of the environment and the character of the group are always correlates it is easy to draw opposite conclusions from the same phenomena. The correlations themselves are well-established—there is no doubt that

[24] P. A. Witty and H. C. Lehmann, in AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. XXXIV (1928). See also an article by the same authors in AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. XXXV (1930).

the children of successful parents are on the whole more successful than the average. But our prior attitude is apt to determine whether we ascribe their degree of success wholly or in greater measure to heredity or to environment.

In this scientific dilemma various researchers have sought for methods by which either of the factors could be held constant while the other varied, on the principle that the differences revealed in such experimentation, where society admits or supplies it, can then be attributed solely to the variant factor. The botanist can take the seeds of the same plant and grow them under varying conditions of soil and climate. He can then attribute the differences to the environmental factor, or more precisely to the combination of the same heredity with different environments. Can the sociologist discover similar instances? It has been maintained that he can, and that so this baffling problem may be solved. Let us turn next to examine these claims.

3. *Crucial Instances and Some Conclusions*

From the beginning of the scientific study of heredity special attention has been devoted to those cases in which the biological inheritance might be regarded as practically identical, since these afford a peculiar opportunity for assessing the rôle of the variant environmental factor and thus of heredity also. The opportunity is supplied by the occurrence of 'identical' twins, presumably derived from the same ovum. Galton initiated these studies and from the very marked similarity which such twins exhibited under all conditions reinforced his conclusions regarding the dominant part which heredity played in the causation alike of human resemblances and of human differences.[25] Some later investigators in turn have endeavored to find the reverse situation, in which children of different heredity have been brought up in practically the same environment. Both these types of situation encourage the hope that we can surmount the difficulties which embarrassed the studies already dealt with.

It has been well established that twins exhibit closer re-

[25] *Inquiries into Human Faculty.*

semblances, physical and mental, than siblings who are not twins. Among others Thorndike has shown that for twins as compared with ordinary brothers and sisters the coefficient of correlation derived from various tests is very distinctly higher.[26] He claimed also, though here the evidence is less conclusive, that the degree of unlikeness that exists between them is not reduced but rather tends to increase during longer subjection to the 'same' environment, from which he infers, also somewhat dubiously, that the inborn differences are thus finding expression. Others have made studies limited to identical twins, or at least to twins of the same sex who because of unusually high resemblance might be regarded as such. They have found some instances of such exact resemblance, both of mind and of body, as to justify the favorite old plot presented in the *Comedy of Errors*.[27] And again the triumphant conclusion has been drawn that the influence of environment is feeble as compared with that of heredity.

Unfortunately these instances are not so crucial as at first sight they might appear. In the first place the instances of extreme resemblance are such as naturally to have attention drawn to them, so that they may receive undue importance as a basis for generalization. Nor must we forget that twins *begin* in the same environment, the womb of the mother, and that usually through their most plastic years they remain in the same family environment. Here then we have an extraordinary conjuncture of our two factors, and this must be adduced in the explanation of the extraordinary resemblance. Some instances are recorded where the twins were separately brought up from infancy, but they still remained in somewhat similar environments. The really crucial instance would be one in which from birth the twins were reared in vastly differ-

[26] *Educational Psychology*, Vol. III (New York, 1914). It may be observed that the degree of resemblance between ordinary twins is very variable, so that the fifty pairs which Thorndike investigated form an inadequate sample for statistical generalization. The writer has twins of his own, boy and girl, who differ markedly both in appearance and in temperament.

[27] For an example, see A. Gesell, *Mental and Physical Correspondence in Twins*, POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY, 1922.

ent situations. If one were brought up in an American home and the other in the wilds of Africa, or if one of the two suffered the fate of Caspar Hauser, then we might have a conclusive test, and it is reasonable to surmise, from such indications as we shall give in later chapters of this book, that it would vindicate the title of environment to be a co-equal arbiter of our development and of our fate.

The few instances of presumably identical twins reared apart which have been studied are certainly far from conclusive. In three cases investigated by Professor Newman considerable divergences appeared.[28] Two of the three cases revealed in the twins a great similarity of emotional and temperamental traits together with a quite significant difference of intellectual qualities. In the third case the situation was reversed, great similarity being displayed in the expression of mental ability together with striking differences in personal interests and attitudes. In the two former cases Professor Newman relates the differences in intellectual ability to environmental factors, including that of education. On the other hand Professor Müller came to the conclusion, from a case investigated by himself, that mental ability is genetically determined while the variations in 'non-intellectual' characteristics must be attributed to environment.[29] These discrepancies show that once again the attempt to segregate the influence of heredity from that of environment, and with it the claim to the discovery of an absolute measure of the potency of heredity, has failed. It is still possible for the geneticist to argue that even in 'identical' twins there are hereditary differences. And it is equally possible for the environmentalist to relate the differences which they display to the life situations within which they are expressed. If Professor Newman is right regarding the biology of 'identical' twins, when he maintains that they need not be genetically identical, then we must abandon the assumption that in these instances we can regard heredity as the constant and environ-

[28] H. H. Newman, in THE JOURNAL OF HEREDITY, February to April, 1929.

[29] H. J. Müller, in THE JOURNAL OF HEREDITY, Vol. XVI, No. 12.

ment alone as the variant, and may well accept his own conclusion that from them "no definite law is to be posited as to the relative potency of nature and nurture."

Let us turn now to the alternative quest, which hopes to solve the problem from the study of instances in which environment may be taken as the constant. It is, as we have seen, impossible that any two individuals should have an identical environment in all respects. The best approximations we can find are instances in which children of different heredity have been brought up from infancy or early childhood in the same foster home. A number of studies have been made along these lines, two of which are contained in a recent work devoted to the whole subject we are now discussing.[30] They differ somewhat in their conclusions. In one, conducted by Freeman and two other investigators, evidence is offered to show that the character of the foster-home definitely affects the degree of intellectual ability attained by the children subjected to its influence, that children admitted to the superior home at an earlier age made greater intellectual progress than those who entered it at a later age, and furthermore that in the superior environment of such a home some children exhibited an advance both in conduct and in ability greater than the character and intellectual status of their parents might have led one to prognosticate. These results stand in interesting contrast to some we have already mentioned. Here too caution is necessary when we pass from the facts to the interpretation. There is too much of the unpredictable about individual heredity to justify general conclusions concerning the influence of environment from such indications as the authors give. The environment is always complex and always changing; the heredity can never be

[30] *The Twenty-Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education* (Bloomington, Ill., 1928). The studies referred to in the text are: Freeman, Holzinger, and Mitchell, *The Influence of Environment on the Intelligence, School Achievement, and Conduct of Foster Children;* and Barbara S. Burks, *A Comparative Study of Foster Parent-Foster Child Resemblance and True Parent-True Child Resemblance.* For a criticism see the article of Witty and Lehmann, already cited, in the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY for January, 1930.

fully known. But all studies of this kind at least help us to see more fully that we must always reckon with environment no less than with heredity, and here the authors avoid that misleading and illogical precision which pretends to measure the exact contribution of either.

Measurement is once more attempted in the second investigation. Miss Burks, in a study of the resemblance exhibited by foster children and foster parents as contrasted with that of children and parents proper, not only concludes that heredity is vastly more potent but actually tells us the percentage in the variability of children which is attributable to differences in home environment—it is seventeen per cent! In view of what has already been said it is easy to perceive that a result of this type could be attained only through the acceptance of several quite untenable assumptions. The investigator in question points out, in another contribution to the same volume, some of the statistical pitfalls which lurk in this field of study. But there are also non-statistical pitfalls, and she herself does not escape them. The statistical result is reached on the false assumption that the heredity of the children is definitely knowable and that it is actually measured by the tests applied. By no such mechanical process can valid measurements of innate ability be found. On the other hand the complexity of environment is not realized nor the intricate interaction between the growing life and the changing life-conditions. Even if we accepted the figures offered us, we might still wonder how the investigator drew from them her conclusion that environment is relatively unimportant, being "dwarfed" by the force of heredity. We are informed that the best home environment may contribute 20 points to the child's I.Q., and that the worst may depress it by the same amount. This is a comparison within the range of American home life—it is not a comparison between the 'best' and the 'worst' of possible environments. By what logic then can the investigator conclude that "the total contribution of heredity (i.e., of innate and heritable factors) is probably not far from 75 or 80 per cent"?

We waste our labor if we persist in asking the wrong kind

of question. We are asking the wrong kind of question, as our argument to this point shows, if we start with the assumption that we can ever say, as between heredity in general and the environment as a whole, which of the two is the more important or the more potent. Every phenomenon of life is the product of both. Each is as *necessary* to the result as the other. Neither can ever be eliminated and neither can ever be isolated. Both are, in every particular situation, exceedingly complex. Both have been operative, to produce every particular situation, through unimaginable time. For these reasons it seems impossible even to conceive two situations involving precisely the same combination of hereditary and environmental factors. Every situation is in this respect unique, just as every human face is in some way different from every other. Where two or more factors are equally necessary for a given result it is vain to inquire which in general is the more important. Is labor more necessary than capital for the production of a manufactured good? Is food more necessary than air for the sustenance of life?

Heredity—the germ-cells—contain all the potentialities of life, but all its actualities are evoked within and under the conditions of environment. What then is the kind of question which we can intelligibly ask and which we may hope to answer? It is never a question regarding the *absolute* contribution of either factor, as a whole. But there remain questions of vast significance both to the biologist and to the sociologist. The biologist, for example, is interested in tracing the inheritance of those unit characteristics, such as blue eyes, albinism, haemophilia, and so forth, which suggest separable specific determinants in the hereditary mechanism. He is interested in the manner in which specific organic predispositions, such as the tendency to certain diseases, reveal themselves under varying conditions of environment. The sociologist is interested, for example, in the way in which a group deals with its general environment. He is interested in the way in which a group, brought up in a given environment, is affected by changes occurring within it or by their transference to a different environment. An immigrant group, no matter what

its hereditary antecedents, exhibits new common characteristics when transplanted from Italy or Greece or Ireland to North America. One cannot but be impressed by the way in which customs, attitudes, and modes of life change in response to changed economic conditions, to new occupational activities and so forth. We have numerous examples of how the transition from poverty to wealth or *vice-versa* registers itself in the attitudes and standards of individuals and groups. We have so many historical examples of how the aspect of group life has altered when some change has occurred in the conditions. The proud vengeful marauding Scottish clans of the seventeenth century were transformed into the settled industrious population of the eighteenth. The mores of pioneer life are transformed as the frontier of civilization moves on. Primitive peoples have shown characteristic reactions when the techniques of western civilization have been brought to or forced upon them. Agricultural populations all over the earth, in America or Russia or Japan, have revealed significant changes in the process of industrialization. In spite of innumerable variations we can discover typical responses to typical changes within the environment. Here we have a clue to the understanding of the relation between environment and life.

The study of these changes will not tell us whether heredity or environment is the more 'important', but at least it will tell us *why* each is important and in what ways its importance is revealed. When a new element is injected into a situation and a significant change results we must not attribute the change solely to that new element. A seemingly minor change in a chemical formula may mean all the difference between a food and a poison, but it is the new combination of the constituents which is poisonous, not any one by itself. So likewise in the profound unity of hereditary and environmental factors, a seemingly minor change may induce a definitely new situation, but we must not on that account conclude that environment is more important. The social demand for inventive talents which the machine age fosters has brought to eminence men who in an earlier age would have remained in obscurity; the modern opportunity to amass wealth through

the capitalistic system has brought distinction and power to men brought up in humble surroundings, such as Carnegie and Ford and so many of the industrial and financial magnates of America, who in the feudal age would in all probability have remained mere clerks or toilers. A new social situation or a happy chance may give a genius the opportunity to reveal his power, but no amount of favorable conjuncture will turn a person of mediocre mentality into a genius. On the other hand we must not assume, with some protagonists of heredity, that genius will make its way no matter what the environmental impediments may be. If some have triumphed over circumstance, does that entitle us to conclude that all potential greatness must be able to "break its birth's invidious bar"? In this field we must particularly guard our judgment against the subtle forms of bias which are prompted by our station, our class-consciousness, and our degree of success or failure in the struggle of life.

Instead, then, of seeking to exalt the importance of one factor over the other, we should recognize, as one aspect of the correlation on which throughout we have been insisting, that the finer or the greater the heredity the more does the character of the environment matter. This follows from the initial principle that heredity is potentiality made actual within an environment. The higher the potentiality the greater is the demand made on environment. The more plastic the life the more is it at the mercy of environment save in so far as it learns to control the environment for its purposes. Man, the most plastic of all animals, has therefore been seeking through unknown ages to make his environment more conformable to his growing needs. The quest of the more appropriate environment is for him, alone of all the animals, eternal. We may add that for a like reason the 'fitness' of the environment matters most during the most plastic stage, the earlier years, of human life. The stimulations afforded by the milieu in which we live—and likewise its depressing influences—affect us most when we are most impressionable. For this reason if for no other, we should accept the co-equal importance of these two ultimate determinants of everything that lives.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

THE GEOGRAPHICAL ENVIRONMENT

1. *Geography as a Social Determinant*

The habitat of mankind is the surface of a small planet, swinging in its orbit around one of the countless suns of space, a mere speck in the immensity of the universe but one provided with that rare conjuncture of conditions, such as atmosphere, moisture, and range of temperature, which are necessary in order that life, as we know it, should exist. By the geographical environment we mean the physical characteristics of the earth's surface, including its configuration, relief, soil and subsoil properties, distribution of land and water, climate, flora and fauna. Of the factors which together make up the geographical environment some are utterly beyond the control of man while others in various degrees bear the imprint of his activity.

Among the uncontrollable factors must be reckoned the relation of the earth to the sun and to the moon, the area of the earth, the extent and location of its mineral resources, the distribution of continents and oceans, of plains and mountains, rivers and lakes, the seasons, the tides, the ocean currents, the rainfall and the winds, the electric energies. Man cannot change, save infinitesimally, these factors; if they do change it is through forces beyond his power. Man is not wholly at the mercy of these elemental facts, for in degree he can utilize them, seize the advantages which they offer him, overcome some of the barriers which they present to his purposes. He cannot control the winds but he can set his sails to catch them. He cannot remove mountains but he can tunnel through them. He cannot direct the path of the thunderstorm, but he can make electricity convey his words and operate his machines. He cannot alter the seasons but he can protect himself against the heat and the cold. There are other geographical factors which are in part amenable to the direct

control of man, which he can modify and not merely utilize. These are principally the distribution of animal and plant life and the fertility of the soil. He takes those animals and plants which serve his needs, breeds and cultivates them, dispossessing or destroying others to that end. The result is that the 'natural' balance of organic life is completely overthrown by man. Selecting a few species he breeds varieties of them such as wild nature neither knows nor tolerates, and gives them pride of place upon the earth. Large areas are characterized by a vegetative life introduced and assiduously maintained by man alone, belts of wheat and cotton and corn and tobacco and rice, and these in turn become associated with the culture and the social institutions of the regions where they occur. Thus in addition to and often crossing the geographical areas demarcated by natural phenomena there arise new geographical areas determined by human exploitation of the other forms of organic life. Having destroyed the natural balance man has to fight continuously to maintain this artificial balance against other exploiters whom he has not succeeded in conquering, against weeds, insect and other pests, fungi, and micro-organisms. The specialized cultivation of the earth by man tends to exhaust its natural fertility, but he has gradually learned the art of restoring and even of enhancing the properties of the soil. Where five hundred years ago in Europe the yield was only about four times the seed sown, now it is fifteenfold or greater. There is some evidence to associate the fall of the ancient civilizations of the eastern shores of the Mediterranean with the impoverishment and dessication of the soil.[1] In our modern civilization man has gained increasing if still limited control over this geographical factor.

One of the most important aspects of civilization is the control over the external environment which it affords. The relation of man to geographical conditions is revealed in the principle that, as civilization advances in this respect, he becomes less directly and less completely dependent upon and influenced by the immediate or local environment in

[1] See, for example, V. G. Simkhovitch, *Hay and History*, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Vol. XXVIII (1913), pp. 385–403.

which he is situated. The character and the justification of this principle will be shown in the present chapter. As a preliminary indication let us observe that the first great civilizations arose in regions prepared for them, as it were, by nature. They began in the fertile river valleys, where two great requisites were immediately available, a natural system of easy transportation and communication and a natural fertility of the soil, making possible for certain classes an economic surplus and therefore a degree of opportunity and leisure. The valleys of the Euphrates, the Tigris, the Ganges, the Nile, the Yangtze—such were the homes of the first great inland civilizations. As man learned to navigate with confidence the seas there followed the commercial coast civilizations, such as those of Crete and Troy and Athens. In these earlier times always the main channels of civilization were the seas and the rivers. These geographical factors remain important but they have become less dominant. Man-made agencies of communication have made possible new foci of civilization. Agricultural fertility has become less determinant of the size or the wealth of a population. Industrial skill, commercial and financial enterprise, and those economic opportunities dependent in part on man's control over nature, have caused great shiftings of the centers of population. In England the center of population changed after the Industrial Revolution from the agricultural south to the less fertile north, while more recent economic changes have tended to displace it again. Economic conditions established the textile industry in New England, whence in turn it has migrated in part to the Carolinas—but the geographical factors have remained the same. The incessant movement of economic, political, and cultural dominance is sufficient to reveal this relative independence of society from the sheer determinism of the immediate geographical factors. One writer has sought to show that the march of civilization has been "coldward" since the age of the Sumerian and the Egyptian empires up to the present.[2] The generalization is doubtful and the im-

[2] S. C. Gilfillan, in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Vol. XXXV. For a criticism see Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 182–185.

plied connection between higher civilization and lower temperature is precarious. What the record of these changes does effectively demonstrate is the way in which forces generated within society determine increasingly the habitat of the leading civilizations.

It is not difficult to explain why this should be so. In primitive life man is circumscribed by the limitations of locality. He is dependent on the food products, the building materials, the fabrics for his clothing, provided by the immediate neighborhood. If there is a local drought he has no recourse against famine. His whole economic activity is directed upon the products which the locality offers freely or yields to his limited techniques. His arts and crafts are responsive to the local environment. Anthropologists are fond of describing primitive cultures in terms of some characteristic product of the region, such as the *buffalo culture*, the *maize culture*, and so forth. Religion, like everything else, is localized in terms of the natural phenomena of the neighborhood. The growth of civilization diminishes the influence of all these local conditions. The civilized man draws products in great variety from many regions. Many of his occupations have no relation whatever to the geographical environment. His means of communication bring him into contact with the customs and the ways of living of other lands. The way is open for the more rapid diffusion of cultural influences. There is less local homogeneity on the one hand and less cultural contrast between localities on the other. In the new world, built up by modern civilization without the restraining influences of old cultural conditions, we find the same modes of life and attitudes prevailing over vast areas of very different geographical character although in the great urban centers marked diversities live side by side. In the old world we still find interesting cultural differences as well as dialectical variations between near localities, and the more so the more remote they are from the pervasive influence of those triumphant techniques which mark the latest stage of human control over nature. It is often held that these influences induce a cultural uniformity lacking in the richer, finer, and deeper qualities which characterize

the indigenous life of the region, and European writers sometimes express the fear that Europe is becoming 'Americanized' in this respect. It may well be that the cultural qualities have profounder roots in human nature than such speculations suggest. What is certainly true is that with the growth and expansion of civilization the varieties of geographical location less positively and less distinctively correspond to the varieties of cultural expression.

We can now state more fully our initial principle. As man's control over nature increases, or more precisely as he learns better to utilize for his own ends the inexorable laws of nature, his dependence on the nearer geographical conditions is modified in two primary ways. On the one hand he gains geographical mobility and thus a greater power to select and to change his physical location. He can now move swiftly, without personal exertion, and with relatively little economic cost, from one part of the earth to another. The effective limits to migration are now set by society, not by geography. On the other hand, in whatever location he finds himself, the influences of complex cultural conditions derived from many sources, near and far, bear upon him, and the presence of an elaborate social heritage intervenes between him and the full impact of the geographical environment. In a word, as the social heritage grows, the immediate geographical factors assume a less important rôle in the interpretation of society.

Nevertheless geography has still to be reckoned with. It still exercises both an obvious and a more subtle influence on the life of society. More obviously, geography provides certain conditions which remain of great economic significance. Jean Brunhes has pointed out six main types of human activity which take their specific character more directly from the geographical facts, these being habitat and housing, the character and direction of the roads, the cultivation of plants, the breeding of animals, the exploitation of minerals, and the devastation of plants and animals.[3] The importance of the geographical facts varies with the development of the industrial arts and in general with the degree of civilization. Thus

[3] Jean Brunhes, *Human Geography* (New York, 1920), chh. I–II.

coal beds became important when the industrial age began, and more recently oil fields and the sources of hydro-electric energy have assumed an importance they never possessed before. The strategic centers of trade change as the modes of communication and transportation change. Countries have become prosperous and populous with the aid of geographical factors and later, as the technical arts have advanced or spread to other lands, have lost their advantage. Changing conditions brought dominance to Venice or to Cadiz or to the Hanse cities, and new changes took their leadership away. Always it is the relation of the geographical to the technological and social factors which counts, but always some geographical factors are significant. A good illustration is found in the location of the great cities of the world. Thus in the United States "of the twenty large cities . . . nine (Boston, Providence, New York, Newark, Jersey City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, New Orleans, and San Francisco) are located on the coast, five more along the northern lake frontier (Buffalo, and Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, and Milwaukee), and five on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers (Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis, and Minneapolis)." [4]

It is when we turn to the more subtle influences of geography that particular caution is necessary It is easy to find correlations between climatic or other physiographic conditions and social phenomena. A group of writers, such as Dexter and Huntington, have pointed out correlations between climate and crime, suicide, insanity, physical and intellectual vigor, and so forth.[5] But correlation is not explanation, it is merely a challenge to further study. Even a perfect correlation would not establish causation. Should we find a high correlation between sunspot activity and economic prosperity it might or might not *mean* anything. Should we find, as one writer does, a correlation between the motions of the planet Jupiter and the death-rate, it in all probability *means* nothing. We

[4] E. C. Semple, *American History and its Geographic Conditions* (New York, 1904), ch. XVI.

[5] E. G. Dexter, *Weather Influences* (New York, 1904); E. Huntington, *Civilization and Climate* (New Haven, 1924), and other works.

must be able to trace the connection between the physical and the social fact before we can attribute any causal significance to the former. Hot weather does not breed crimes against the person in the way that the sun melts snow. We have still to discover the intermediate links in the chain. We have to discover the relation of the climatic fact to the condition of the human organism; we have to relate in turn the latter to the motivations which express themselves in the social phenomenon. Since motivations are obviously subject to other than climatic conditions, we are likely, as we pursue our researches further, to discover situations in which the initial correlation does not hold. Thus a number of criminologists have shown that crimes against the person are more frequent in summer than in winter. There are some fairly obvious reasons which can be offered in explanation of this fact, such as the opportunity for a greater range of personal contacts which the summer provides in the temperate zone. But these explanations must be tested. We learn, for instance, that in South Carolina the maximum number of homicides occurs in December, with July taking second place. We find that the correlation in this state between the mean monthly temperature and the number of homicides is very low. On the other hand we find that the maximum of homicides occurs on Christmas day, a fact which at once suggests an explanation in terms of social and not climatic factors.[6]

A rare and admirable investigation of the nexus between a climatic factor and a social phenomenon is presented in Durkheim's study of suicide. Many previous researches had shown that in European countries the proportion of suicides in the warmer half (March to August) was always greater than in the colder half of the year. But a further analysis shows that the actual temperature level has little to do with the fact. The monthly variations in temperature do not accord with the variations in the suicide rate. Moreover, there are some very hot countries in which the suicide rate is quite low. We turn therefore to the correlations between suicide and certain

[6] See H. C. Brearley, *Homicide in South Carolina*, in SOCIAL FORCES, Dec., 1929.

social factors, correlations which have more direct significance. The number of suicides increases as the level of civilization rises. Moreover, there are in proportion more suicides in the city than in the country, there are more among the single or widowed than among the married, and there are more among Protestants and among non-religious persons than among Catholics. This suggests an explanation of a social character—in fact, that suicide occurs characteristically where conditions encourage social isolation, where people lack the sense of solidarity created by strong social responsibilities, where they are most apt to be thrown back on their own resources for comfort, companionship, and consolation. Here is a hypothesis which has a more definite meaning than the hypothesis that high temperature impels to suicide. With it in mind we turn back to the climatic correlation, and the suggestion occurs that after all the chief conditioning factor may not be the temperature of the summer months but the greater length of the day. In the longer day of summer social life is more active and more intense. It provides greater opportunities for those wider contacts in the very presence of which the sense of social isolation is most apt to develop. With much ingenuity Durkheim shows that this theory is in accord with the variations of suicide from season to season, from month to month, and from one day of the week to another. The fact, for instance, that suicides occurred most frequently on Mondays, when the work of the week was renewed, while nevertheless there were more suicides of women on Sundays, since on that day more women were likely to pass beyond the social contacts of the home, fits excellently into the explanation.[7]

We have dwelt on this study because it seeks to meet the requirements of a rigorous methodology, often unhappily neglected in the interpretation of environmental influences. Geography provides an external set of conditions under which the life of man in society proceeds. These conditions can never be ignored by the sociologist, but his task is to show their relation to the direct determinants of social phenomena, the attitudes and interests of men. Man adapts himself to all

[7] E. Durkheim, *Le Suicide* (Paris, 1897), especially Bk. I, ch. III.

kinds of geographical conditions, but he is not resourceless in meeting them. He changes, in ways still largely unexplored, when he is subjected to a new environment, but he also puts his imprint upon it. The white man living in the tropics becomes a different white man, but he brings with him his own civilization. The Englishman in India develops differences from the Englishman at home. Climatic conditions affect his energies, but he does not usually become contemplative and mystical as the Indian tends to be. Other factors are obviously present, an alien civilization, races to which he feels alien and over which he exercises authority. It is not only the land that is different but his whole situation. Many environmental factors conspire wherever human societies exist, and to discover the causal relation to any given social phenomenon of these interwoven factors is our final problem. To this task we shall at a later stage return.

2. *Land and Population*

Among the geographical factors of primary importance is the productivity of the earth, including not only the fertility of the soil but also the availability of mineral resources. Man is utterly dependent on the productivity of the earth both for his sustenance and for that equipment which turns mere living into a manner of living. The size of a particular population or that of the earth as a whole—and not only the numbers but also the material advance of a society—are obviously related to the provision thus made by nature. This fact was impressively stated by Malthus at the beginning of that age which saw the greatest technological advance in history. There were prophets of that time who in the light of scientific discovery predicted a new and happier time in which comfort would be universal and the drudgery of toil abolished. Men like Godwin and Condorcet anticipated a future 'golden age', a new Eden for humanity, as the result of technological advance.[8] But Malthus declared that such conjectures "far outstrip the modesty of nature." Science might advance, but

[8] Godwin, *Political Justice* (1793) and *The Enquirer* (1797); Condorcet, *Tableau Historique de l'Esprit Humain* (1794).

the capacity of the land to supply the primary needs of men was limited. The 'natural' rate of reproduction is such that, unless in some way checked by deliberate control, it inevitably surpasses the potentiality of the earth to feed the growing population. As Huxley in a later day put it, "the Eden would have its serpent, and a very subtle beast too."

What Malthus said in effect was that the limiting factor alike to the growth of population and to the advance of society was the geographical one. In his *Essay on Population* Malthus drew a sharp contrast between the fertility of mankind and the potentiality of the food-supply.[9] Population is always multiplying up to—and beyond—the limits of subsistence. The gains of civilization are taken out in a larger population, not in a higher standard of living, and still the pressure continues. Nature interposes, when the limit of her provision is overstepped by the "instinct to multiply," her own dread agencies, starvation and disease with their concomitants of war and of vice, to restore the necessary balance. Scientific and technological advance will not raise the standard of mankind unless some powerful incentive can be adduced to control the rate of increase. To this end Malthus set the preventive check of "moral restraint" against the "positive" checks of nature, but the tenor of his argument, aided by his survey of the history of population in various countries, scarcely encouraged the hope that it would prove effective against the imperious urge to reproduction.

The relation of land to population has been the subject of much investigation and also of much controversy since the days when Malthus undertook to refute Godwin. Many investigators have accepted, though in different terms, the rather pessimistic outlook of Malthus. His followers expressed it in 'the law of diminishing returns.' Later writers have pointed out that the extraordinary increase in the population of Europe and America which occurred in the last hundred and fifty years must be regarded as an exceptional, in fact an unprecedented occurrence, due to an unusual conjuncture of favorable conditions. They point out that there remain now no virgin

[9] See particularly the first two chapters of the *Essay* (edition of 1803).

agricultural lands to be exploited by modern science, that the new lands of America are, as they fill up, consuming more and more of their own agricultural products. They maintain, with Professor East, that mankind is still at the cross-roads, having to choose between lower fertility and lower civilization.[10] They take stock, with W. S. Thompson, of the capacity of the earth to produce wheat and corn and cotton and other basic commodities, and find that the still rising tide of population menaces the future.[11] They point out the international perils which the pressure of population on resources, in the more congested or less favored regions of the earth, is creating.[12]

Others have taken a more optimistic view. Earlier American economists, such as Carey, were apt to see a concomitance between the growth of population and the growth in comfort. Various European writers also, such as Kropotkin and Leroy-Beaulieu, emphasized the unexplored possibilities of scientific agriculture.[13] The larger population of the world is far better fed than the smaller population of pre-industrial days. The advance of science, striking as it appears, may be only a beginning. The price of the basic commodities has fallen rather than risen in comparison with other prices. The farming industry is depressed in consequence, and the trouble is a relative surplus rather than a scarcity of the products of agriculture. Under such circumstances the alarms of Malthus seem less formidable to-day.

It is still true that the increase of the means of subsistence cannot possibly keep pace with the reproductive powers of any population. It is true that nearly all the fertile areas of the earth are already subject to cultivation. It is true that many lands are so densely peopled that the great mass, under existing methods of cultivation, live on the margin of subsistence. But in the regions of modern civilization new phe-

[10] E. M. East, *Mankind at the Crossroads* (New York, 1923).

[11] W. S. Thompson, *Population; a Study in Malthusianism* (New York, 1915); see also his later work, *Population Problems* (New York, 1930).

[12] W. S. Thompson, *Danger Spots in World Civilization* (New York, 1929).

[13] P. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid* (London, 1902); Leroy-Beaulieu, *La Question de la Population* (Paris, 1913).

nomena have developed which are of vast importance and which set the problem of population in a new light altogether. In civilized lands the potential fertility of the population has ceased to correspond with the actual fertility. The birth-rate has been falling for all classes and in all civilized countries, but most of all for the more prosperous classes and in the most prosperous countries. The 'instinct to multiply' has been checked, not in the way which Malthus preached, through 'moral restraint,' but through the use of methods of birth control. New problems have thus been brought into being, but certainly (for the groups subject to these influences) the old Malthusian problem has lost its significance, and if, as seems not unlikely, these methods spread to other groups over an ever wider range of population, the particular menace which Malthus raised may disappear at length. If so, it would disappear for the first time in recorded history, for Malthus rightly showed, what later researches have sufficiently confirmed, that the pressure of population on the means of subsistence has been at all times, save for a few favored classes and a few dominant peoples, ruthless and insistent, revealed in widespread misery and internecine strife, and mitigated only, for the most part, by such alternative evils as abortion and infanticide.

The saving fact in the new situation is that the higher the standard of living the more effectively it puts in operation forces leading to its preservation and checking the 'natural' or biological rate of multiplication. The higher standard of living, in other words, introduces checks on population long before the level is reached at which the positive checks, the eliminative forces that maintain the absolute equilibrium between gross numbers and the gross food-supply, begin to operate. The Malthusian danger exists only in so far as populations live at or near a subsistence level. It is diminishing therefore for the peoples of modern civilization. It remains for them rather as an indirect threat from those peoples whose multiplication is checked only by the drastic methods that rule the lower organic world. But they too are gradually adopting or having thrust upon them the techniques of our

own modern civilization and to that extent are likely, at length, to become subject to the same influences which limit multiplication. There is thus at least a reasonable hope that the menace of overpopulation may pass away in the calculable future.

Once again we see therefore that the geographical factors represent rather limiting conditions than immediate determinants of the social situation. On the one hand the numbers which the land can sustain depend on the techniques which man has developed. Ratzel and his school have shown how the density of population varies with the manner of making a livelihood. Hunter tribes, according to the conditions, require anything from a few square miles up to two hundred per person. Pastoral nomads exhibit a density of from two to five persons per square mile. When they combine primitive agriculture with the pastoral life the ratio rises to from ten to fifteen persons per square mile. The agricultural peoples, under favorable conditions, can support one to two hundred persons and, with the aid of some industry, as high as five hundred to the square mile, while of course industrial populations exhibit sometimes a much greater density.[14] On the other hand the mere potentiality of subsistence ceases to determine the numbers of a population as human control extends from the external conditions to the processes of life itself.

[14] See, for example, Semple, *Influence of Geographic Environment* (New York, 1911), ch. III.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

THE TOTAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE SOCIAL BEING

1. *The Intervention of the Social Heritage*


The environment in which man dwells is never, and never has been, a merely physical or 'natural' one, and even the purely physical aspects are construed by him in ways expressive of his own nature. To the savage, the woods are places where he can hunt and where spirits no less than animals wander, places conceived in terms of his hopes and fears, his experiences and his imaginations. The objects that surround him are never mere physical realities, they are the properties of his life, colored and interpreted by his mentality. It is so also for the child. The "infant appears in a world where nothing is 'physical' and just that, where nothing appears in the stark skeletal inflexibility that is signalized by science. . . . 'Things' are things that are owned, found, made, aided, feared, loved and sought after, hedged about with prohibitions or colored with possibilities of enjoyment, full of promise if action be aggressive or demanding prudent retreat. Things are nuclei of social relationships." [1] Nor is it otherwise with the civilized adult save that the meaning of things is for him at once socially enriched and scientifically refined. We never stand face to face with sheer objective nature. Our social heritage always intervenes. In the process we call civilization we increasingly modify the physical environment so that it shall respond more nearly to our demands upon it and at the same time we modify our conceptions of its character in correspondence with the experience thus gained. But in this more perfect correspondence of our thoughts and the outer realities we do not, any more than does the savage or the child, treat the world without us as a separate and purely objective reality. The scientist does so as a scientist, not as a

[1] A. G. A. Balz, *The Basis of Social Theory*, ch. II.

social being—and to the physical scientist this world is not environment but only nature.

The concrete reality which presents itself to us as our environment is a complex totality of many aspects. The aspects are distinguishable but not, in so far as they affect our lives, separable. They are in fact less separable with the advance of civilization. For now society reveals itself, even more fully, as the creator of environment, but this environment which it creates—the modified outer world including all the mechanisms and equipments and external symbols that are both parts of it and means of control over it—reflects and depends upon the inner world of social structure. A classification of these aspects may be offered at this point, in order to bring out the relation of the physical or outer to the social or inner environment. It should now be clear that this distinction between 'inner' and 'outer' belongs rather to the logic of our science than to the experience of the social being. The fields which we designate as physical environment are for him property, the houses are homes—the social and physical aspect are blended in every concrete reality. Similarly the institutions and organizations which we classify as the inner environment have external embodiments. The church is revealed in an edifice, the holiday manifests itself in the changed aspect of the world about us. It should also be observed that each aspect in our classification merges into another. The line between the environment as given in nature and the environment as altered by man is scarce discernible. The physical environment, as it grows instrumental, becomes a mere agency of society, and when it becomes symbolic it at length derives *all* its significance from the social fact which it represents. The external symbol and the institution are in turn inseparable. Lastly, we should note that we are here classifying environmental factors as relative to the individual life, and therefore the social group appears in its capacity as environmental to each of its members.

The aspects of environment here classified are all intimately interactive, and thus together they constitute a total environment which is specific to and characteristic for every social



grouping. Through unknown ages man has been active in and upon his environment, and this process takes on a cumulative character because man is less content than the other animals with mere habituation and adjustment to given conditions, because he acquires thereby a social heritage which is the basis of further acquisitions. With Graham Wallas we use the term *social heritage* to signify "the knowledge and expedients and habits" which are socially, not biologically, transmitted, being handed down from generation to generation through some process of social participation and education.[2] The arts, devices, techniques, lores, traditions, symbols, and institutions of man—all his agencies for the control of the outer environment which in turn constitute a part of his total environment—are social possessions. "If the earth were struck by one of

[2] *Our Social Heritage* (New Haven, 1921), ch. I, p. 14.

Mr. Wells' comets, and if, in consequence, every human being now alive were to lose all the knowledge and habits which he had acquired from preceding generations (though retaining unchanged all his own powers of invention, and memory, and habituation) nine tenths of the inhabitants of London or New York would be dead in a month, and 99 per cent of the remaining tenth would be dead in six months. They would have no language to express their thoughts, and no thoughts but vague reverie. They could not read notices, or drive motors or horses. They would wander about, led by the inarticulate voices of a few naturally dominant individuals, drowning themselves, as thirst came on, in hundreds at the riverside landing places, looting those shops where the smell of decaying food attracted them, and perhaps at the end stumbling on the expedient of cannibalism." [3] Such tales as that of Caspar Hauser indicate the utter dependence of man on socially transmitted powers. Instinct suffices for those orders of life which have no record of achievement, which simply accommodate themselves to the realities among which they live. Man is never satisfied with reality, and his dissatisfaction becomes effective through social rather than biological agencies. Instinct, losing its fixity, is supplemented by folkways; the tool and then the machine comes to the help of the hand. We have thus, as Wallas pointed out, become "biologically parasitic on our social heritage."

This new dependence is the correlative and condition of that advance which successfully rejects certain of the demands of the outer realities. The price we pay is that we have become, even biologically, less fitted to live without the aid of our social heritage. But again this truth must not be misunderstood. It does not mean that our life has ceased to be 'natural', provided it is in accord with human nature. Why should we call it natural, for human beings, to live that resourceless and stunted life from which the presence of the social heritage delivers us? The so-called state of nature, in which life remained "poor, solitary, nasty, brutish, and short," has no valid claims upon us. Nor does it mean that we are biologically

[3] *Ibid.*, ch. I, p. 16.

weaker. We have lost some of the qualities with which the savage is endowed. Our teeth may be weaker; the process of child-birth is harder. But civilized man, with the aid of his own arts, is "on the average much stronger, more efficient, and longer-lived than the savage." [4] We do not raise the unanswerable question as to which is the happier, for the kind of happiness attainable is relative to the kind of life so that comparisons are impossible. But biological fitness has surely no other measure than that of success in living, maintained throughout the generations.

It is because we depend so utterly on this growing heritage that education is of ever-increasing importance in human society. This social heritage of ours differs in certain significant ways from a mere economic inheritance. It is not simply handed over to us to enjoy and use forthwith. We are only conditional heirs to it, the condition being that we must qualify ourselves to receive it, and make it ours by our own efforts. Social in one sense, it has nevertheless to be individualized part by part, in the various members of the society. Some parts of it are easily acquired—we soon adapt ourselves to the comforts and amenities of civilization, and with comparative ease we utilize most of the inventions and mechanisms which human ingenuity has devised. Some parts we acquire by simple habituation, such as our speech, our manners, many of our devices and techniques, and most of our customs and folkways. Other parts are more difficult to acquire, demanding of us in the first place exacting proof of our fitness to receive them. The skill that contrives and improves the means of civilization belongs to the few, but the many can enjoy the advantages provided by that skill. On the other hand the appreciation of the higher elements of culture is rare enough. Those parts that are easy to acquire have a less intimate relation to personality. They reveal the nature of the society in general, rather than of particular individuals within it. If at birth any of us had been transferred to a foreign country, we would have as readily acquired the different manners and modes of speech which it exhibits, as those we actually prac-

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

tise. The parts of the social heritage that are harder to acquire depend in greater degree on our hereditary qualities. They are more fully individualized in those who achieve them. They are more selectively interpreted, and assume for each of us a personal aspect. Music, art, philosophy, the finer expressions of literature or of religion—they mean something distinctively different to each of us. Moreover, universal as their appeal is, they embody in a profounder way the qualities of the society in which they originate.

The social heritage, then, is something which the members of society unequally possess. No individual, in our complex social world, can master more than a fragment of it. Specialization applies to the process of learning no less than to the tasks we severally perform. It is not necessary for the full personal life that we should possess individually more than a fragment of the social heritage, though it is desirable that the cultural portion of this heritage should be shared as widely as possible. The reason for this difference has already been brought out in the discussion of culture and civilization. Here our object has been to show the rôle which the social heritage plays in sustaining the complex totality of environment which is the counterpart of the life of the greater society.

2. *The Process of Adjustment to a Total Environment*

We have seen that our environment is not the world about us but rather that world, with all its aspects, as it comes into relation to our lives. The more complex the life the more complex must the environment be, and the more complex the adjustment to this total environment. As we pass from lower to higher forms, direct physiological adjustment becomes a smaller part of the whole system of relationships. Organic adaptations are more and more supplemented by the devices of civilization. Inherited patterns of conduct lose their rigidity and the more flexible patterns learned through the social heritage become increasingly important. Consequently the adjustment of the civilized man to his total environment differs typically from that of the savage, and *a fortiori* from that of the lower animals, in the following respects. First,

it is always a partial adjustment, a compound of conflict and accommodation—by the latter term, we mean the process in which the person or the group comes to fit into a given situation and to feel 'at home' within it.[5] Civilized man rarely feels in perfect harmony with his environment. His wants are so complex and the conditions are so complex that a perfect sense of equilibrium is hard or impossible to attain, except for those dulled by the combined influence of age and economic prosperity. The eternal discontent of civilized man is the spur of his incessant endeavor towards new achievement. Second, it is never a stable adjustment. The environment of civilized man is for ever in flux. His habituations to it, even were they perfect in some hour of unlikely coincidence, are always liable to disturbance either through this external change or through the insurgence of new demands within himself. Third, it is a highly selective adjustment. Civilized man ignores a great part of his potential environment. "One man's meat is another man's poison." To each, opportunity presents itself in the light of his own nature. In the same physical environment of the city there exists a myriad different *milieux*, such that those accommodated to one would feel themselves totally alien in many of the others. Finally, it is an adjustment which, for all its complexity, perhaps rather because of it, permits a remarkable degree of mobility, a power of relatively swift readjustment to other and different environments. Civilized man acquires a certain mental versatility in coping with the changing complexity of his situation, and this enables him to adjust himself more readily to other environments. Moreover, his adjustment, being largely civilizational, is in considerable measure subject to his deliberate control and can be modified accordingly. So he can range from the tropics to the polar snows, just as he can migrate from his own world of civilization to that of the primitive savage.

[5] The difference between 'adjustment' and 'accommodation', as we use these terms, is simply that the latter stresses the psychological aspect rather than the valuational one. Accommodation is attained in the sense of harmony between man and his environment. This emphasis is perhaps implied in the use of the term by the 'ecological school'. See for example E. W. Burgess, article ACCOMMODATION, in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences.*

Every settled community works out a continuous adjustment and readjustment to its physical environment, impressing thereon its own characteristics so that the institutions of society and the external features of nature convey to every member a sense of congruity, so that they form a unity of environment with manifold aspects. To this total environment every member of the society becomes more or less accommodated, and this accommodation is a large part of social education. The process of accommodation can be seen more vividly if we consider, instead of this universal education which the social heritage ensures, the special situation of the migrant from one community to another. Here is a problem which the mobility of civilized life increasingly creates in all degrees of intensity, and most frequently of all in North America. The countryman migrates to the city. Over the area of a continent people change their homes. The alien arrives from every country of the earth bringing with him the habituations of every civilization and every culture. Since he often joins with groups of his fellow countrymen there arises a problem of group no less than of individual accommodation. But more difficult and formidable than any of these problems is that created by the presence of a large minority belonging to another of the main divisions of humanity and marked off by color and other physical traits from the dominant peoples. It will be noted that for the negro as for the immigrant from Europe the crux of the problem is one of social adjustment, not of biological adaptation. Thus the United States offers a unique laboratory for the study, in its endless varieties, of the process by which men and groups of men, transplanted from one social environment to another, learn to live within a society other than that in which they or their fathers were born and bred.

The conditions under which individuals or groups enter an alien social environment are so diverse and so complicated that only a few general indications of the resultant processes can here be offered. Where the newcomers belong to a widely different racial or cultural organization from that into which they enter the process of accommodation is naturally rendered more difficult. If they are the bearers of prestige and of power

they may dominate the native population and even, where the disparity is very great, be the cause of their extinction, as the white immigrants in Tasmania and in parts of Melanesia have been; the decline of most American Indian tribes bears witness to the same process. Under other conditions the dominant incomer may build an alien endogamous society from which the natives are excluded and to which they may oppose an active or passive resistance, such as has developed in India. Under other conditions miscegenation may take place, involving the gradual dilution of the original native stocks, which thus acquire some degree of adjustment to the new civilization imposed upon them. This has occurred, for example, in New Zealand. Communities of higher culture, such as the Chinese, may successfully oppose the political and economic domination of the immigrant foreigner, while at the same time the gradual infiltration of the technical civilization of the latter tends to undermine the basis of their own culture or assimilate it to that of the alien. These are but a few of the types of situation which arise in the clash of widely different cultures within the environment of either of them.[6] The problem of the negro in North America presents its own distinctive features. In the age of slavery the status of legal inferiority determined the mode of his accommodation to the new environment. The formal abolition of that status created a new situation, fraught with new potentialities as well as with new dangers. Social inferiority remained, though subject to protest and occasional challenge as educational and economic opportunities were slowly widened. Thus was created the present state of uneasy partial accommodation. So long as the prevailing bar (whether legal or social) on intermarriage endures, this condition must persist with all its difficulties, unless the subtle processes of social selection, operating within the negro race in the new environment, create in the course of centuries an approximation of physical type and even of color such as will bring about a gradual 'passing' and a final assimilation.

When the entrant into a new social environment neither

[6] See, for other illustrations, Pitt-Rivers, *The Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races* (London, 1927).

possesses in himself nor arouses in others any strong sense of 'social distance', of inferiority or of superiority, the process of accommodation is obviously facilitated. There seem to be considerable differences in the ease with which different individuals and groups on similar cultural levels learn to feel at home in a new environment. The Serbian scientist Pupin after a preliminary struggle becomes wholeheartedly devoted to the American scene; the Jewish writer Lewisohn, conscious of racial antagonisms, finds the conflict unending.[7] The Scottish immigrant seems to lose the feeling of exile more readily than, for example, the French. The aspect of an alien environment often leads immigrant groups, especially when they form 'colonies' or semi-communities, to cling the more closely for a time to their own folkways, sometimes to prize them more highly than they did in their native land. They feel their unity the more because of their detachment from the conditions which created it. But in time, unless a dividing line of caste is set up between the immigrant and the native-born, the influences of the new environment encroach upon and then triumph over the resistances derived from the old. This is sufficiently revealed in the changed attitudes of the children of immigrants. One external evidence is the extent of intermarriage.[8] The original speech, the idioms and turns of phrase, customs of the old land, the reunions and celebrations commemorative of it, lose their appeal. Often a difficult transitional stage is entered upon, in which the younger generation, finding the ways of their parents despised in the larger community into which their schooling, their work, and their play initiate them, revolt from the family traditions and reject the nearer social controls before they have acquired the discipline of experience. Such a state of disorganization is at least suggested by the prevalence of delinquency among these groups.[9]

[7] M. I. Pupin, *From Immigrant to Inventor* (New York, 1923); L. Lewisohn *Upstream* (New York, 1923).

[8] See Julius H. Drachsler, *Intermarriage in New York City* (New York, 1921); E. de S. Brunner, *Immigrant Farmers and their Children* (New York, 1929); Niles Carpenter, *Immigrants and their Children* (Census Monograph, Washington, 1927).

[9] Cf. E. H. Sutherland, *Criminology* (Philadelphia, 1924), pp. 100–101.

An undue eagerness to 'Americanize' the children of immigrants may exaggerate the problem.[10] The child of the immigrant has the hard enough task of accommodation to a total social environment containing the diverse and unreconciled mores of family and community.

Much has been written regarding the manner and degree in which individuals and groups accommodate themselves to the social conditions of a new environment and the problems and resistances which they encounter in the process.[11] The conditions of accommodation are too complex and variable to admit of summary statement, and we must here be content to point out one general principle, revealed in the contrast between a more primitive and a more evolved society. In the latter, because of the differentiation within it, there can be no question of the complete assimilation of the newcomer to an entire set of community patterns. The differences in manners and morals, in customs and beliefs necessarily make the demands of the community less rigid and less inclusive. The new member has more opportunity of selecting his social relationships, of finding his own place, of expressing under the new conditions his own individuality. In the advanced society, for the immigrant as for the native, there are many mansions. Yet the readiness with which the entrant into the new society becomes accommodated to its conditions is not wholly dependent, apart from his own adaptability, on the evolutionary stage. Some communities are by disposition more tolerant or more receptive than others, less swayed by authoritarianism or by the exclusiveness of religious and national dogma. The Chinese, for example, have historically exhibited these qualities, as is seen from the fact that the Chinese Jews have become, while retaining their religion, completely integrated in Chinese social life.[12]

[10] Cf. Edith Abbott, *The Immigrant and the Community:* "In our zeal to teach patriotism we are often teaching disrespect for the history and the traditions that the ancestors of the immigrant had their part in making. This often means disrespect for the parent himself." (P. 226.)

[11] Special reference may be made to R. E. Park, *Old World Trails Transplanted* (New York, 1921); R. C. Dexter, *Social Adjustment* (New York, 1927); and E. C. Lindeman, *Social Discovery* (New York, 1924).

[12] Cf. Maurice Fishberg, *The Jews* (New York, 1911), pp. 134–136.

In conclusion it should be noted that what we have here been considering is solely the process in which *outsiders* become accommodated to a total environment into which they enter. This must not be confused with the process in which groups adapt themselves to their habitat, to the merely external factors of environment. It should also be observed in this connection that there cannot be in human societies anything strictly comparable to the purely physical adaptation of plants and animals transferred to a new habitat. The social medium always intervenes. Consequently we cannot regard the differences exhibited by any human society as 'ecological' in the precise sense in which the term is used in botany or zoology. We may very profitably take local geographical areas as a basis of social investigation, but we must never assume that the conditions we discover are explained by the external characteristics of these areas. If we find, for example, that the rate of delinquency in the city of Chicago is highest in the zone immediately beyond the Loop and recedes progressively as we advance outwards, we cannot assume that the locality as such is in any degree responsible, that the greater frequency of the phenomenon represents a process of adjustment to the physical factors of the area.[13] Geographical distribution in a social environment is in no sense geographical determination. Every social phenomenon is a function of a total situation, and the search for causes is only begun when we have delimited it in terms of a physical environment. Moreover, as we have seen, the social environment is very complex and there are all kinds and degrees of accommodation to its manifold aspects represented in the modes of living characteristic of a social group. The following quotation from *Middletown* admirably illustrates this fact.

Living moves along in Middletown, as we have seen, at a bewildering variety of gaits. Differential rates of adjustment in the performance of the same function have been observed between elders and their juniors and between people living next door to each other, while the females have exhibited greater conservatism

[13] The illustration is taken from C. R. Shaw, *Delinquency Areas* (Chicago, 1929).

than the males at many points, and the males, with seemingly no more coherence or pattern in their adjustments, are more resistant to adaptation at many other points. In many activities, as has been repeatedly pointed out, the working class today employs the habits of the business class of roughly a generation ago; if it were possible to differentiate clearly the gradations by which each of these two major groups shades into the other, it might appear that many changes are slowly filtered down through various intermediate groups. Shifts sometimes diffuse, however, in the reverse direction, from working class to business class, as has been noted, for example, in the use of commercially baked bread and canned foods.

Not only do these variations, in many cases pronounced enough to affect markedly one's capacity to deal with one's world, appear between individuals and between different age, sex, and other groups within Middletown in the performance of the *same* life-activity, but the city as a whole and groups within the city live in different eras in the performance of *different* life-activities. It is apparent that Middletown is carrying on certain of these habitual pursuits in almost precisely the same manner as a generation ago, while in the performance of others its present methods bear little resemblance to the earlier ones. Among the six major groups of activities a rough hierarchy of rates of change is apparent. Getting a living seemingly exhibits the most pervasive change, particularly in its technological and mechanical aspects; leisure time, again most markedly in material developments such as the automobile and motion picture, is almost as mobile; training the young in schools, community activities, and making a home would come third, fourth, and fifth in varying order depending upon which traits are scrutinized; while, finally, on the whole exhibiting least change, come the formal religious activities. [14]

With such diversity before us it might seem that the attempt to discover causal connections between the social structures and the external factors of environment is baffling and hopeless. Certainly we cannot hope to find that any environmental factor is *the* cause of any social phenomenon, but such an hypothesis could be entertained only by those who have an antiquated and erroneous idea of the nature of all causation. Every environment forms part of that interdependent whole of which the social phenomenon is also a part. We may

[14] R. S. and H. M. Lynd, *Middletown*, pp. 496–497.

find that the diversities within it nevertheless exhibit type features or patterns which correspond to the type of the environment, and with this clue to guide us we may more cheerfully attack the final problem of causation. The following chapter, relating the varieties of social life to two great *types* of environment, the rural and the urban, may help to reveal both the promise and the difficulty of such an attack.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

CITY AND COUNTRY

1. *The Terms of the Comparison*

One of the broadest and most revealing of all social contrasts is that exhibited in the differences of rural and urban life. The city is itself an environment created by society, in which for the purposes of common living many aspects of the natural environment are modified or entirely eliminated. Consequently the contrast brings into conspicuous light the very nature of society, the conditions of its control over environment and the tendencies of human relationships where they are least obstructed or limited by the forces of outer nature. Under rural conditions social attitudes and social institutions present characteristic differences from those developed within the city. Nevertheless the comparison is beset with difficulties. To describe the differences is itself no simple task; to interpret them is much harder. It is, however, when we push our analysis back into the problem of causes; when in seeking to discover the pure influence of environment we are forced to discover once more that environments select and attract as well as influence those who live in them; when we remember also the incessant process in which man modifies as well as readjusts himself to an environment so that conditions found at one stage of city growth, say certain health conditions, will not be found at another; when lastly we reflect on the interplay and unequal exchange of influences that radiate from one environment to another; it is then that at once the deeper interest and the greater difficulty of the comparison appears.

Unless we realize these complicating factors we are most apt to draw false inferences from our comparison. It is so with all comparisons of social groups, whether of nations or classes or localities or occupations. The socially untrained person is constantly being misled, even when his observations

are true and he does not generalize rashly from a few examples, because he imputes the differences between two total situations to some one element in each. He compares, say, the English and the French, the Gentile and the Jew, the immigrants to the United States from West European and from East European countries, and attributes the observed differences, usually themselves grossly simplified and exaggerated, simply to race. He compares the social characteristics of Protestants and Catholics and attributes the differences solely to religion. He compares the politician and the business man, the inventor and the money-maker, the artist and the executive, and makes their respective occupations responsible for the qualities they display. He compares the New Englander with the Southerner and the outcome is explained as due to climate. We shall best avoid these simplifications if, as in the comparison before us, we analyze the various factors which enter into the complex of each contrasted situation as it now appears, and if, furthermore, we examine the historical process in which the two situations have developed to their present forms, each in relation to the other. The latter of these requirements of a proper comparison we shall seek briefly to satisfy in the present section, the former in the sections which follow.

City and country are for our present purpose the two great generic modes of human habitation. But there is no sharp demarcation between the two, to tell where city ends and country begins. Scattered farmsteads pass imperceptibly into villages, villages into towns. A country mansion set in the forest, an hotel on the mountain-top, may be essentially urban in character. We draw lines for statistical convenience, and decide that every area with a certain density of population to the square mile, or every cluster of habitations containing 500 or 2500 or 10,000 people, shall be regarded as urban. Differences in the method of reckoning are often a source of confusion. Differences within the groups respectively accounted urban and rural put more serious difficulties in the way of comparison, since the social characteristics of a town of 2500 inhabitants are obviously unlike those of a great

metropolis. And there is the further complication that the city, especially the large city, is not only a whole environment for all its inhabitants but also a series of extremely different environments for the groups within it. While rural environments differ considerably one from another, each one exerts in far greater measure a common influence on its inhabitants than does the city. In the city the ways of life are legion and the diversities of its man-made scene admit extreme variations of equipment and opportunity. There is no sense of a common and vital dependence on the aspects of the seasons and the vagaries of the weather. There is no sense of a common earth, a common fortune, and a common fate. There are few common tasks, few incidents in which all men share. There are no impressive signs to call out at the same moment those universal comments and reflections which make man feel kin to man—the devastation of the storm, the flow of the sap, the fall of the leaf. There are no common hours of work and rest, no common occasions of meeting for personal gossip or public discussion. The heterogeneity of city life is enormous. Within a few blocks of one another its inhabitants live alien and utterly disparate lives. If we take vital statistics alone, we find remarkable differences in birth-rates and death-rates, in conditions favorable to health or to disease, for different groups and districts. A great metropolis, like London or New York, will exhibit for localized groups within it extremes of healthiness and unhealthiness, no less than of wealth and poverty, surpassing those found elsewhere in the whole countries to which they belong.[1] The city is the home of opposites, and in these respects it is misleading to take the average figures for city and country respectively, to treat as unities for the purpose of comparison the less homogeneous and the more homogeneous.

The difficulties just mentioned can be met by adequate statistical analysis, but a still more formidable difficulty re-

[1] Thus in respect of health "London shows greater extremes of excellence and superiority" but "the worst in London are lower than the worst elsewhere." (W. L. MacKenzie, *The Health of the School Children*, p. 65, quoted by Sorokin and Zimmerman, *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology*, p. 170).

mains. The phenomena we are comparing do not stay constant. The cities tend to grow at the expense of the country, and in large measure through migration from the country. This is peculiarly true within our own civilization. In this process the city comes to include a much larger proportion of country-bred residents than the country does of those bred in the city. There are two factors here to be considered. One is the greater comparative fertility of country populations, the other consists in the technical-economic conditions which bring it about that the city affords a livelihood for an increasing proportion of the total population. As a result of their joint operation the city must readapt to its own changing environment large numbers who were born in and habituated to very different conditions. It is therefore quite possible that many phenomena which we attribute to the city as such are in part phenomena of migration citywards rather than of urbanization proper. We hear for example of the loneliness and unfriendliness of city life, and it would be worth while enquiring how far this trait belongs to the experience of the newcomer as distinct from the experience of those brought up within the city. Or again, if we turn to physiological adaptation, we know that certain groups, negroes for example, have higher death-rates from tuberculosis in the city than in the country, and it would be important to discover how far the greater incidence of the disease applies to migrants and how far to those born in the cities. So far as the writer can discover, the knowledge is not at present available.

The growth of cities and the migration from the country to the city has been witnessed in the course of every great civilization. In fact the original meaning of the word 'civilization' is just urbanization. As Nineveh and Tyre, Mycenae and Tiryns, Troy, Babylon, Athens, Sparta, Rome, Carthage, the Egyptian Thebes, Alexandria, Byzantium, Florence, Venice, rose in influence and power, so did the corresponding civilizations grow; as these cities declined so did their civilizations decline. Cities grow wherever a society, or a group within it, gains control over resources greater than are necessary for the mere sustenance of life. In ancient civilizations these

resources were mainly acquired through the power of man over man, and the growth of city life rested on the precarious foundations of slavery, forced labor, and taxation by the conqueror or ruling class. In modern civilizations, though exploitation of man has not been absent, a surer basis has been found in the power of man over nature. It is the great extension of this power in recent times, an extension the limits of which are not discernible, which has been the primary cause of the unprecedented growth of cities and the ever-growing proportion of city-dwellers in the total population. It is not so much the Industrial Revolution, in its narrower interpretation, as the agricultural revolution which is responsible. Whoever makes two blades of wheat grow where one grew before is adding to the size of cities. Every improvement in the machinery of the farm, in the use of fertilizers, in the quality of the seed sown or of the breed of cattle, in the preservation and transportation of the products of agriculture, is likely to increase the percentage of the urban population.

These advances have been followed both by an increase in the population and by a higher standard of living. The latter tendency has, we have seen, operated to restrict the former, and has thus still further encouraged the growth of cities. As the standard of living rises, for a whole country or for any group within it, there is an increasing demand for the kinds of commodities and services which are supplied in and by cities, as contrasted with the relatively inelastic demand for agricultural products. Because of the improved technique of agriculture a smaller percentage of the population can supply the agricultural needs of the whole; because of the increased demand for the specific products of civilization a larger percentage can win a livelihood in the cities. The proportion of urban to rural inhabitants is thus not a matter of choice. It is on the whole determined by economic conditions. If, for example, more females than males migrate to cities like New York and Philadelphia, while more males than females go to Akron, Ohio, or Gary, Ind., the obvious explanation is economic.[2] Migration within a country is determined, except

[2] See *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1930, pp. 22–25.

that political barriers do not interpose, by much the same principles as international migration. It moves in the direction in which economic opportunity presents itself. We must not, as is sometimes done, regard country and city as equally competing attractions, between which people can decide at will. The city is a selective environment, rather in respect of the types than of the numbers which it attracts, and because the numbers are determined mainly by the possibilities of making a living in one or the other environment, other and more imperative considerations than personal preferences play an important part. This also must be borne in mind in our comparison, especially as people frequently deplore the 'rush' to the cities and the 'depopulation' of the country-side.

With these cautions before us we may now proceed to compare the social characteristics of country and city.

2. *Urban and Rural Contrasts*

If in spite of all the cross-differences of race and climate, of location and of resources, there is still a marked and general contrast to be drawn between the social life of the country and that of the city, it must be on account of factors which belong exclusively or predominantly, under all conditions, to one or the other environment. Let us first state these factors, in order to justify the comparison which follows.

Most obvious is the relative isolation of the country life. It is an isolation, not of the individual, except in the case of occasional solitary trappers, hunters, and prospectors, but usually of the homestead or group of homesteads. It is the semi-isolation of the family. The family circle must supply the greater part not only of the economic needs but also of the social needs of its members. The necessities of common toil and reciprocal service strongly corroborate the ties of family relationship. The unity of the family is the dominant social fact. It is emphasized by the physical separation of the homestead. It has often been observed that in a sparsely settled district neighboring families are apt to be at strife with one another, and this may be explained by the intense and exclusive cohesion of the individual group. Its attitudes are

family attitudes, its morals are family morals. It grows self-centered and to a large extent spiritually self-sufficient. The habits of the group, undisturbed by the constant succession of new contacts and new stimuli which await the city-dweller, grow more deeply rooted. The rarer contacts with the outside world are apt merely to sharpen in the mind of the country-dweller the contrast between his ways and theirs and to confirm him in his own. He has neither the opportunity to cultivate an attitude of broadmindedness nor the temptation to become a superficial seeker after new things. Custom rules over him, and for fashion he has, generally, nothing but contempt. His ways are fixed for him, and his vicissitudes are mainly those which come in the natural sequence of the seasons and in the inexorable course of human destiny.

With the relative isolation and immobility of the country life we must reckon also the influence of a predominant mode of occupation. Outside of the most primitive peoples the countryman is pre-eminently a farmer, a tiller of the soil and a breeder of cattle; but whether he is farmer or hunter or fisherman he is in constant contact with nature, an engrossment little mitigated by the presence of his fellow men. He sees nature not as the artist who observes her moods in the detachment of aesthetic appreciation nor as the scientist who seeks to know her secrets for their own sake, but as the practical worker who must wrest a living from the soil. He sees nature as friend and as enemy, as the ripener of crops and the sender of weeds, as the bringer of drought and moisture, of storm and sunshine. He must win her rewards through struggle and endure her caprices with resignation. It is the reproductive forces of animate nature on which his livelihood depends and to which his main effort is directed. He is thus inclined to view all nature as animate. The forces which he must utilize are largely beyond his control and even beyond his reckoning. In their presence the countryman grows imbued with religion and with superstition. He must come to terms with inscrutable powers, and the limits of his own power are the portals to a land of traditional beliefs, often rendered the more somber by the austerity of his experience.

This predominant occupation of agriculture has other attributes which impress themselves on the mentality of the countryman and are reflected in his social life. He is not, like the urban wage-earner, an employee working under immediate supervision at a task specifically assigned to him. Whether he is a tenant or a freeholder, even where he is a serf, his times and seasons, his varying tasks and his alternations of work and rest, are set for him not by the commands of a master but by the exigencies of nature. Frequently he owns or part-owns the soil he cultivates, and when he does not his ambition is still to possess the most seeming-substantial of all heritages and the primary source of all other wealth, the land itself. He has therefore, unless under grave oppression, a strong sense of the rights of property, with a consequent belief in the fixity of the social order. But his conservatism differs here from the more nervous conservatism of the capitalist-employer. It is not dependent on an unstable distinction of economic class. The countryman is not a professional employer of labor. Most often he has no permanent helpers beyond his own family, and when he does hire one worker or at most a very few, he still engages in the same manual tasks as his help. He remains both artizan and employer in one.

Furthermore the work of the countryman is unspecialized as compared with that of the city-dweller. Specialization grows in direct ratio to the size of the community, for obvious reasons. The direct operations of agriculture are themselves diverse, and beyond them the agriculturist must be conversant with a dozen other crafts, as woodsman and carpenter and cattle-doctor and tanner and smith and hunter and so forth. He is incessantly turning from one kind of task to another. If modern invention has lightened his labors it has also made a new craft imperative, that of the mechanic. For his wife the round of daily duties is even more variegated. She must help where she can in the farm work, hoeing weeds, feeding animals, milking cows; must add to her household tasks the preparation of many commodities, their number varying with the distance or accessibility of a country store, which the city housewife

buys ready-made; must cook and wash and knit and sew and darn and spin and weave in the intervals of bearing and caring for the many children of the usual country home. Some of these tasks are eliminated or lightened as the means of communication improve and modern retail trading penetrates to remoter parts, but the typical contrast between the diversity of work entailed on the countryman and the specialized and concentrated labor of the city-dweller remains. The toil of the former is generally more arduous and unremitting, and this fact too finds expression in his social attitudes, in his moral code and in his philosophy of life. Nor does he have the hope, which even the most exploited wage-earner can cherish, of promotion or at least of a change of work. His lot in life is more deeply fixed, and so are his ways and his thoughts.

Finally, the rewards of his toil are rarely bountiful. If they are also somewhat speculative, it is usually between the limits of penury and a modest livelihood. In bad years he falls into debt, in good years he does little more than recover. If he is a proprietor he is still a manual worker and his income is nearer to the average income of the whole class of manual workers than to that of property-owners.[3] His mode of living, even when times are good, is simple and frugal. It is not, after the manner of the city, competitive. The countryman feels less the spur to 'keep up appearances', for the range of wealth in the country neighborhood is narrower, contacts are fewer, and in the intimate cohesion of the family life he is less tempted to the adventitious and superficial struggle to set a pace for his neighbors or keep one set by others. In this, as in other ways, he is less subject, for better or worse, to the stimulations which come from social proximity. Where, as in various older civilizations, primitive, feudal, and oriental, a class system pervades the life of the country, it has a relatively fixed or caste-like character, so that again it offers little incentive to the ambitions of the mere tiller of the soil.

[3] It is very hard to obtain comparable figures of the income of farmers and other classes, but such figures as exist substantiate the above statement. For North America see Zimmerman and Black, *Minnesota Bulletins* 234 and 246; and Sorokin and Zimmerman, *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology*, ch. III.

Here, then, we have the elementary factors which distinguish in general the rural from the urban life. Together they form an environmental complex which acts on the mentality of the countryman and profoundly influences his social responses. In the city, roughly in proportion to its size, the antithesis of these conditions is established; aggregation instead of physical isolation, associations of many kinds supplementing or supplanting the functions of the family, contacts with humanity superseding contacts with nature, the differentiation of economic classes and the specialization of economic tasks ranking and grading men in ways unknown to the country, limiting and also intensifying the work of each, and therewith endless diversities and disparities of opportunity and of fortune creating an intricate design of competitive living utterly alien to the rural scene. Here we have the basis for the social contrasts we next proceed to describe.

Let us consider first the fundamental aspect, the manner in which the individual belongs to his society. It may be said generally that in the rural life, with the dominance and relative self-containedness of the family, a group responsibility prevails which tends to be more and more dissolved in the growth of the city. In the comparative absence of other forms of relationship, the family retains the patriarchal type and imposes a greater control over its members. The status of the individual is likely to be the status of his family. Property is thought of as a family possession. There is a family opinion about most matters of interest, which is apt to permeate all its members. There is less individual questioning, less individual rebellion. Marriage is a duty to the family, a responsibility of the individual for the maintenance of its name and its property, determined largely by the family for its members, both as to whether and whom the individual shall marry. Not only his marriage but also his religion, his occupation, his mode of living, his recreation, his politics, are far more strongly influenced by family tradition in the life of the country than in that of the city. His morals are the morals of family cohesion. There is less tolerance of aberration from the established code, especially in sex relations, since this is above all an offence

against the unity and the function of the family. It is true that prohibited sex relationships occur, but more often in the form of casual and shame-faced outbursts of repressed desires, with little semblance of romantic 'love'. Divorce is generally less frequent than in the city. There is little place for the man, and still less for the woman, whose orbit has not some family hearth as focus.[4]

In the city, although in this as in every other respect it exhibits great diversity of social attitudes, the family is typically less engrossing. We have already dwelt on the manner in which the city denudes the household of economic functions and throws the individual into associational relations determined by specific interests of work and temperament. In drawing the contrast, however, between the self-determination of the city-dweller and the subjection to family and communal mores of the country-dweller, it is important to avoid the bias of personal predilection. It does not follow that the city-dweller is less profoundly a social animal because his family relationships are less inclusive and because many of his contacts are of a more impersonal character. The scale and variety of his relationships are extended so that they can range from the most superficial to the most profound. In the country relationships gain in quality because they are more persistent; in the city because they are the more definite choice of the individual. It does not follow either that the countryman is more stupid or that the city-dweller is more superficial, because the responses of the latter are attuned to a greater variety of social stimulations. It does not follow that the family in the city is 'decadent', because its functions also, like those of all urban organizations, are specialized and limited and it must now find its place alongside of other organizations. The city leaves the choice more to the individual's own nature, but that nature is no less a social nature and the choice is no less a social choice. Society is not to be identified

[4] These general characteristics are borne out by all important studies of the life of agricultural classes, where they exist in relative isolation. They are well illustrated by Le Play and his successors, Demolins and Durkheim. They are amply illustrated in such modern works as Thomas and Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant* (New York, 1927).

specialization is "the size of the market." The country calls for the 'all-round' man, the city for the skilled artizan, the technician, the professional man, the inventor, the business administrator, the politician, the financier, the artist in all his varieties. Even unskilled labor has its work specialized in the city, by limitation to a single type of task, while skilled labor grows more specialized both by limitation of tasks and by differentiation of skill. Look up the trades directory of a large city and you will find among their bewildering variety the most curious and unsuspected of callings. This economic differentiation is the source of social groupings, both 'vertical', i.e. involving compartmental divisions on the same social level, and 'horizontal', or in terms of status. But these divisions are furthest removed from the immobile caste divisions which characterize the older types of country life. For the city is in all things competitive, and men move up or down its social scale according to their ability and eagerness to seize the opportunities which it offers. This competitiveness is always the concomitant of high specialization. The process of selection is keener, and the chances of promotion for the possessor of ability are greater. Business is keyed to a higher pitch, and management selects employees more rigorously and is more ruthless in discharging those who fall below the competitive standard. The able man has a greater incentive to utilize and improve his ability, for he is always pitted against his equals or his superiors. In this mobile society men are rated more in terms of their individual capacity than in the more slowly moving countryside. The city has its particular place for all, from the lowest to the highest, according to the economic and cultural standards of the community. The city sifts and segregates. Take education as an example. It provides separate schools for the rich, the moderately well-to-do, and the poor; but it also provides distinctive schools for different forms of education, elementary and advanced, cultural and technical, professional and artistic; and it is beginning to provide schools designed for different grades of intelligence, for the mentally defective, for the backward, for the average, and for the bright scholar. In the isolated country environ-

ment these would all have been thrown together. This illustration may serve to show that while status still is a determinant and limit of opportunity in the city—comparisons are matters only of more and less—its lines are for ever being crossed and broken by the lines of individual choice and of sheer competitive advantage.

One aspect of this process of urban specialization is the blocking out of distinctive areas within the city which show marked peculiarities, both social and cultural. "There are regions in the city in which there are almost no children, areas occupied by residential hotels, for example. There are regions where the number of children is relatively high, in the slums, in the middle class residential suburbs, to which the newly married usually graduate from their first honeymoon apartments in the city. There are other areas occupied almost wholly by young unmarried people, boy and girl bachelors. There are regions where people almost never vote, except at national elections, regions where the divorce-rate is higher than it is for any state in the Union, and other regions in the same city where there are almost no divorces. There are areas infected by boy gangs and the athletic and political clubs into which the members of these gangs or the gangs themselves frequently graduate. There are regions in which the suicide rate is excessive; regions in which there is . . . an excessive amount of juvenile delinquency and other regions in which there is almost none." [6] The larger the city the greater is the specialization. Thus in a metropolis like New York there are, to take only the specializations in wholesale trading, areas predominantly devoted to the buying and selling of fur, of silk, of clothing, of shoes, of leather, of millinery, of jewelry, of drugs, of paper, of hardware, of tea and coffee, of dairy produce, of fruit, of fish, and of meat.

With specialization and competition the speculative element enters more strongly into the life of the city. With greater opportunity and greater mobility comes greater uncertainty as to the future. Where so many possibilities of individual enterprise are opened up, the mere vagaries of for-

[6] R. E. Park, in *The Urban Community* (ed. Burgess), pp. 11–12.

tune, good and ill, have increased play. A man's career is not, as in the country, fore-ordained in his own sight. An accident, a lucky contact, a sudden opportunity seized or missed, a change of fashion, a happy or unhappy forecast of some event far beyond his control, may revolutionize his prospects in a day. The sense of chances is always present in the city, and although it does not essentially diminish the intensity of the competitive struggle, the operation of what, so far as the individual is concerned, is simply the turn of fortune's wheel, it frequently affects its rewards.

These combined influences of the urban scene react on the mentality and conduct of the city-dweller and are thus in turn accentuated. They stimulate what may be called, for short, an associative individualism. In the thronging presence of his fellow men, and more immediately and variously dependent on their specialized services than is the countryman in his direct struggle with nature, the city-dweller must selectively organize his social relationships. He is accepted by his fellows more in terms of his own specific qualities. His social instincts are fulfilled, not in one hereditary or familial all-embracing milieu, but in a series of more or less independent memberships. He must co-ordinate these into the unity of his own social life. Here too he has greater chances of success or failure, of a finer harmony or of a graver disharmony. As a unit he must make his own terms with society; he is detached except for the stronger or weaker attachments of his will. This condition distinguishes the whole wide range of social attitudes characteristic of the city. Its collectivism and its individualism belong to the same order.

The constant initiative demanded in the social relationships of the city as well as in the whole character of its competitive struggle evokes qualities which stand in marked contrast with those demanded by the country. The country calls for persistence, a rather stern and dogged fidelity to the appointed lot and way of life; the city calls more for alertness, the quick mind that responds to the changing occasion. What is seen superficially in manners is revealed more profoundly in morals. 'Urbanity' belongs to the city, the polite

manner which makes casual contacts easy and smoothly accommodates itself to the diversities of personality and of situation. Likewise, in the diversity of moral codes, of religions, of modes of life, of tastes and of opinions which are presented before him the city-dweller is more likely to learn tolerance and to make allowances. He is less prone to divide the world into the sheep and the goats, the latter being those who disagree with him. He learns that "it takes all kinds to make a world." It is generally the more rural communities which seek to put a legislative ban alike on doctrines and on ways of living which the majority disapprove. The countryman holds his beliefs with greater rigidity and greater absoluteness. His faith is stronger, more dogmatic, less rationalized. He is apt to be as confident of ultimate realities as of the things near to his hand. He is less subject to the comparative criticism which leads alike to the refinement and to the limitation of belief. In their traditional and unswerving character his moral codes are formally as strict as his beliefs, though many a lapse of conduct and many a tragedy is written in the history of every countryside. Yet the countryman is generally secure from the questioning spirit of the city, which undermines weak beliefs, brings distraction to the lives of many, and permits strength of faith only to those who can find the roots of it in their own hearts.

A very interesting and still very unexplored subject is the influence of the city environment on the social life and attitudes of women. It is obvious that the changes and functions of the family which the city develops have been of peculiar significance to woman, alike as mother, as wife, as housekeeper, and as economic producer. It has limited her tasks and liberated her from the exclusiveness of domesticity. But in this respect there is a vast difference between the cities of older civilizations and those of our own. It is not the city as such but the city as itself changed by modern industrialism which has revolutionized the life of woman. In the older cities, alike of the West and of the East, it was only the women of the upper classes, if even these, who were citizens in the wider sense of the term; apart from them there was only one class of

women who found a differentiated rôle. A woman could be a queen or a courtesan, but little else outside the traditional duties of the home. We need not repeat the story of how modern industry and trade, concentrated in cities, has opened up a myriad of careers, has put men and women on a more equal footing, economic and social, has given a special importance to women as the consumers and distributors of surplus wealth, has admitted the development of individuality and variant capacity which society once accorded to men alone, and has detached them from that exclusive significance, in their own eyes and in those of men, which found expression in the denomination of women as peculiarly 'the sex.' The individualization of women has undoubtedly been fostered by urban life, and the freer reciprocity of relationship between men and women, as individuals, which has resulted from it, is exercising and will doubtless continue to exercise, since the process is still advancing, a profound influence on the whole structure of society.

We cannot conclude this brief survey without referring to certain cultural contrasts, as these are affected by the two broad types of environment and in turn affect the two broad types of society. It is perhaps true, as Spengler maintains, that all great cultures of the past, in the general forms of creative imagination and world outlook which inspired them, have originated in the country and been developed in the city. It is certain that a purely urban culture, divorced from the sources of inspiration which the life of the country contains, would be fundamentally unbalanced and spiritually impoverished. The country has the secret of permanence. It leads man beyond the circle of humanity, into the vision of the majestic forces of nature and into the presence of the teeming interdependent life of plant and animal, of the mightier pattern of which his own life, for all the power of his civilization, is but a part. It offers the ageless wonders of life, beside which all the works of man's hands are puny and pretentious and ephemeral. It reveals, for those who can see and hear them, an infinitude of forms and colors and harmonies and rhythms, which may bring constant renewal and fresh inspiration to

the arts of man. Thus the country provides the raw materials of the cultural as well as of the economic life. In the life of the countryside they retain a relatively simple form, as folk lore, folk legends, folk songs, folk dances. They are taken up into the arts of the city and reshaped to its different and variant demands. For the city, being changeful and habituated to many stimulations, wants novelty and excitation, though besides the many who seek these things it contains as well those who can appreciate and welcome the higher creations of the human mind. So it utilizes these materials in its own distinctive ways, in its superficial aspects merely embroidering or cheapening them into sophisticated and transient forms, in its profounder and rarer aspects transforming them into something rich and strange, something finer and higher, just as the symphonies of Beethoven are vastly more than mere variations of the simple folk-airs which he adopted for his purpose.

There are numerous detailed contrasts to be drawn between the culture of the countryside and the culture of the city, contrasts which stand in spite of the great diversities exhibited within the latter. We cannot discuss them here. They are pursued in those demographic studies and surveys which were first developed by Le Play and his school and which have since grown so numerous. They are revealed, often more finely though under the guise of a "local habitation and a name", in the works of the greater novelists depicting town or country life. The very spirit of the countryside breathes, for example, in such novels as Hardy's *Tess* or *The Return of the Native*, or Hamsun's *Growth of the Soil*, or Rölvaag's *Giants in the Earth*. If it is harder to name works which with equal comprehensiveness present the spirit of the city, it is because the latter is so much more variegated and complex. The social structure of the city is necessarily as complex as its culture, presenting as many extremes and modulations as does the latter, but always, in contrast to the countryside, with a difference, with a certain accentuation, intensification, or sophistication which in the last resort is the consequence of environment, of the nature, kind, and number of contacts to which the members of each group are exposed.

In the preceding discussion we have dealt with the influences arising out of or within the respective environments, and, not to complicate the comparison, we have treated each as though it were self-contained, as though no influences passed from the one type of environment to the other. But there are great processes of interaction and of dominance at work, in our own civilization more than ever before, which qualify our contrasts, more particularly by modifying the character of rural society and bringing it nearer to that of the city. To complete our picture we must consider the effects of interaction, and especially the growing de-ruralization of the countryside.

3. *Interaction and Dominance*

In the process of interaction the attitudes, the modes of life, and the institutions of the city tend to become, in biological terms, prepotent over those of the country. The reasons are not difficult to trace. The city has the prestige of power and wealth and specialized knowledge. It holds the keys of finance. It is the market-place to which the countryman must turn in order to buy and sell, to lend and to borrow. Its people, habituated to contacts, have the advantage, when town and country meet, of being more articulate, more expansive, and, superficially at least, more alert. The products which the city sends to the country, unlike those it receives from it, carry with them something of the urban scheme of life, of its techniques and adaptations. Consequently, in the intercourse of city and country the former tends to dominate. In all the great civilizations of the past, where nevertheless the vast majority of the population remained peasants, the influence of the city has dominated. In our own civilization that influence has been greatly intensified by two new phenomena. On the one hand the contacts of city and country are far closer and more numerous than ever before. On the other hand the urban population has been increasing in proportion to the rural, until now, in practically all lands where industrialism is well advanced, an actual majority of the total population are in some sense town-dwellers.

The distinctive rise of these two related phenomena belongs to the history of the past century and a half. By the close of the eighteenth century the growth of cities was already manifest in England, the home of the Industrial Revolution. But while at this date England had 21 per cent of its population inhabiting cities of 10,000 or more, France had less than 10, Prussia about 7, and Russia and the United States were close together with less than 4 per cent. The rural population of these and other countries has been declining in proportion ever since, with remarkable regularity as decade succeeds decade. By 1930 it had fallen in the United States to 43.8, all aggregations of 2,500 and over being reckoned as urban; in Germany by 1926 to less than 36 (urban limit 2,000), and in England and Wales, with the urban limit set as high as 5,000, the rural population was recorded in 1921 as only 20.6 per cent.[7] The countries are few in which every new census does not reveal a further advance of the process, and it is now beginning to penetrate, though more slowly, the older civilizations of the East.

During this process cities themselves have been both growing in size and differentiating. While there is still, in most countries, a metropolis out-topping all the rest in its intense concentration of power and influence, other great cities have arisen, diverse in quality and in form, each a distinctive embodiment of the urban spirit. Chicago has a different character from Philadelphia, Philadelphia from Detroit or from Los Angeles. Beside them flourish smaller cities of all ranges, mediating between the metropolis and the countryside and often more alien to the former than to the latter. At the other end of the scale tower a few cosmopolitan centers, preeminently New York, London, Paris, and Berlin, whose power and influence radiate far beyond the boundaries of any state, holding among their own prerogatives the financial dominance of the world. The vast range of difference between the world-city and the country-town adds a further complication to the general contrast of the urban and the rural environment. Moreover, as has already been mentioned, the contin-

[7] Figures taken from official statistics.

uous growth of the urban population, involving a great migration not only from country to city but also from city to city, may lead us to misinterpret as intrinsic or inevitable factors of urban life conditions which either reflect a period of uncontrolled expansion or express the maladjustment which accompanies any process of uprooting and transference from one environment to another. Some at least of the restlessness and loneliness and tension and nervous instability which are laid to the account of the city may be properly reckoned as phenomena of growth and of migration.


This is a point to which we must return, since the failure to appreciate it has led to unduly pessimistic theories regarding the future alike of the city and of its civilization. But before we consider this debated issue there are other consequences of the growth of cities which can be stated as beyond dispute. If most of the great civilizations of history were city-fostered and at least in their later stages city-dominated they still left the country on the whole unchanged in spirit. They could tax it for their luxury or devastate it for their wars, but they could not change its nature. The peasant, as Spengler has said, was "beyond history." Modern civilization knows no such bounds. It is not simply that the technique of our civilization is inexorably turning the majority of the population into city-dwellers but rather that the very technique which draws men to the cities carries the influence and spirit of urban life to the remotest recesses of the countryside. One of the chief manifestations of the power on which it rests is the annihilation of physical distance as a barrier to intercommunication, to the contagion of ideas and modes of living. Of the factors we enumerated in the last section as determinant features of the rural environment one in particular, the cultural isolation of the country, is being eliminated, and with its elimination the influence of the remaining factors, agricultural occupation, the presence of nature, and the relative social isolation, is inevitably reduced. For it is a commonplace of sociological observation that social influences radiate from the centers of prestige and wealth and power. The new techniques enormously facilitate this process. One has only to think of the

profound rôle being played by the automobile, the aëroplane, the telephone, the radio, the press, in linking the remotest parts to the urban foci. The two last-mentioned are pre-eminently the carriers of culture, though no implication is here made as to whether the culture so carried is 'higher' or 'lower'. The point is that it is always the more urban culture which they carry to the country, and not *vice-versa*. It is the radio stations of the great cities which speak and advertise and sing and play to the countryside. It is the syndicating offices of the great cities which supply the country newspapers with the cheap 'boiler-plate' which fills their columns.

Behind the social prestige of the city and behind its technical advantages there lie more profound explanations of its growing dominance. Wherever the opportunity presents itself, the tendency is for specific common interests to become articulate and organized. The small isolated community holds these interests under restraint. Its foci of organization, its meeting-places, from the corner grocery to the church, necessarily assume a general level and an inclusive interest. Its social occasions, the feast, the funeral, the parade, the village entertainment, the husking bee, can make little provision for the varying desires of different men. Where locality is the basis of association the sense of community is pervasive but undifferentiated. There is a certain repression of all interests which cannot be accommodated to the more homogeneous life. The repression may be unrecognized, especially in the older members who have grown habituated to it. But that it is real is shown by what happens whenever communications and contacts are facilitated. The locality basis of organization gradually yields to the demands of specific interests. The country approaches nearer to the form of social organization characteristic of the city. This change is brought out graphically in the following chart, taken from an article by a writer who has done much to illustrate the distinctive quality of rural organization.[8]

[8] J. H. Kolb, *Family Life and Rural Organization*, in Vol. XXIII of the PROCEEDINGS of the American Sociological Society.

THEORETICAL GRAPH SUGGESTING THE RELATION OF INTEREST GROUPS TO LOCALITY GROUPS



The city is the nurse of innovation, and, with this constant impact of one-way influences the social conservatism, the established custom, of the country is steadily undermined. The results are evident in many directions. Statistics of many lands, viewed over a period of from thirty to sixty years, show that, in respect of birth-rate, death-rate, age at marriage, infant mortality, divorce, suicide, church affiliation, and so forth, rural indices are moving nearer to urban indices. These changes could not take place unless the more subtle and less measurable characteristics of urban life, its competitive spirit, its less rigid moralities, its more questioning attitudes, were filtering into the rural environment. It is sometimes held that the migration to the cities of such large numbers of the country-bred has on the other hand conveyed to the urban environment "all the essential characteristics of the rural people and their culture." [9] But the migrants, dispersed within the urban environment and subject to its direct influences, sooner or later adjust themselves to city conditions and lose their

[9] See Sorokin and Zimmerman, *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology* (New York, 1929), p. 615.

rural characteristics. All the evidences point to the domination of the urban culture.

Another factor is here involved which, being much more difficult to estimate, we have so far left out of the account, namely the selective action underlying all this migration. We have good evidence that the city attracts to itself the adolescent and the younger adult rather than the very young or the old. There is also some evidence that it attracts young women no less but rather more than it does young men, possibly because the country offers less economic opportunity to the former than to the latter.[10] But when we turn to the *quality* of the migrants as compared with that of those who stay behind, we enter a region of controversy over the dubious interpretation of statistics. From certain studies made in Minnesota the inference has been drawn that it is from the less successful farm families that children most often migrate, but this conclusion, even if more widely corroborated, throws no light on the question whether it is the more or the less efficient members of farm families whom the city chiefly attracts and whom it retains.[11] There are those who are urged to the city by sheer economic pressure, since the country birth-rate is higher and its occupational opportunities are diminishing. There are also those who find their capacities repressed and their ambitions thwarted in the rural environment and who eagerly turn to the avenues of advance which the city offers. It can scarcely be doubted that among the latter there is a high proportion of the more gifted among the country-born. The larger cities provide better schools and more specialized training, both cultural and professional; and after training they promise "the career open to talents." Such studies as that of Huntington, showing that of the country-born persons sufficiently prominent to be listed in *Who's Who in America* and in the corresponding German volume the overwhelming percentage live in the cities, merely confirm conclusions which are in accord with common ob-

[10] See A. F. Weber, *The Growth of Cities* (New York, 1899), ch. V.

[11] See Zimmerman, *Migrations to Towns and Cities*, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. XXXIII, No. 2.

servation and a knowledge of human nature.[12] But besides the necessitous and the talented there are those whom the city attracts on other grounds, the restless, the seekers after amusement or excitement, the exploiters, the non-conformists, the crowd-lovers. To such classes, including the genius and the criminal, the sensitive and the superficial, the makers of civilization and those who prey upon it, the atmosphere of the great city is far more congenial than that of either the small town or the country-side. The city is a complex selective agency, even though the rapid expansion of the urban population blunts its discriminative efficacy. And the nature of this selection is such as to enhance the dominance of the city.

Nor should it be forgotten that within the city itself a further selective process takes place. There is migration from, as well as to it. There are types of temperament and of constitution, perhaps also of nationality or of race, which adapt themselves more quickly or more thoroughly to its conditions. Here we are making no assumption that such types are 'better' or 'fitter' in any broad moral or biological significance, for there is adaptation to city slums as well as to its 'residential areas,' there is adaptation to the privations which the city, with its congestion and its high cost of living, enforces on the poor no less than to the luxuries which it opens to the rich. The principle of social selection, as will be shown in a later part of this work, is far too intricate and many-sided to be reduced to the delusively simple dichotomy of better and worse. Every environment is selective in manifold ways, by its attraction for certain types and groups and by its operation on those who live within it, sorting and segregating, affecting grade and station, success and failure, even life and death. It appeals to some types more than others, calling them from without, but it also modifies all types within its range. The total result alone is clear to our eyes. So with the urban environment. How far urban characteristics are due to the fact that the city attracts particular types, how far to the fact that it works selectively on all within its influence, no one can tell. We find, for instance, that statistics of many kinds cor-

[12] Huntington, *Pulse of Progress* (New York, 1926), ch. IV.

roborate the thesis that, whether the standard of comparison is health or intelligence, city children display a greater range of deviation from the mean than do country children. We find also that, *with reference to the standards devised for the purpose of intelligence tests,* the average and the median rating is higher for city than for country children. We have numerous facts of the order that there is less illiteracy in the city, that there are more suicides, and so forth.[13] But the reader who has followed the argument of chapter Sixteen will realize the hazard of the attempt to measure the respective contributions of modification and of attraction, of heredity and of environment, to the substantive result. As well might one seek to discover whether the warp or the woof of a blanket does more to keep out the cold. As well might one reason that, because two parts of hydrogen combine with one part of oxygen to produce water, hydrogen is sixty-six and two thirds per cent 'responsible' for water. Here we must be content with the conclusion that the selective action of the city upon its membership combines with its attractive action to produce those types which establish its cultural and social dominance.

This dominance of the city is regarded by one group of sociologists as offering an explanation not only of the development but also of the decay of civilizations. The most impressive statement of this view is that given by Spengler in his chapter on "the soul of the city." [14] For him the world-city, the cosmopolis, represents a stage in the history of each great civilization, a stage which prepares its dissolution. The world-city fulfils a tendency inherent in all city life. It evokes to the full the intellect of man and equally undermines his instinct. Its artificiality is set over against the native simplicity of the country; its tension against the animal harmony of the peasant life. It dissipates the solidarity of the kin, the family, the 'blood', the nation, and within its competitive stress fosters the disintegrating attitudes, as the author regards them, of individualism, of socialism, of rationalism, of cosmopolitanism.

[13] Numerous evidences of this sort will be found in Sorokin and Zimmerman's *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology.*

[14] *Decline of the West* (tr. Atkinson), Vol. II, ch. IV.

At length the meaning of these attitudes is revealed in the sterility of civilized men, the failure of the racial will to live. Depopulation ensues. "The wheel of destiny rolls on to its end; the birth of the city entails its death." The chief difference between the doctrine of Spengler and that of various other proponents of the cataclysmic rôle of the city is that while Spengler speaks as though the city were the *cause* of these 'phenomena of decay' he really thinks of it as merely a symptom of an inevitable process. He is dominated by the mystical analogy of the organism. The great city is for him merely the environment appropriate to a late stage in the fated life-history of every civilization.

With this enticing but deluding analogy we shall elsewhere deal, as well as with the historical inductions which seem to support it. The view that all great civilizations end in an "appalling depopulation" after the cities have drawn to themselves and 'sterilized' the best blood of the country is an unjustified generalization from the fate of certain empires which once flourished in a geographical area, that of the Eastern Mediterranean and the lands beyond its eastern coasts, which through the devastation of wars, the unscientific exploitation of the soil, or changing climatic conditions, grew progressively more barren, deforested, and dessicated. But these considerations are beyond our present scope. We must be content to point out a few factors which apply within our own civilization and negate the more extreme views regarding the destructive rôle of the city. In the first place it should be noted that, so far as healthful living is concerned, man is gradually making the urban environment more adjusted to his needs and perhaps at the same time is adjusting himself more adequately to its conditions. It is simply a matter of the intelligent extension of a quite feasible control over the urban environment, as is evident from the fact that the most favorable districts of the city at least equal in healthfulness and length of life the best records of the country, while the once so deplorable summer death-rate of infants in the larger cities has now been reduced to such an extent that in a number of countries infant mortality is even lower in the urban

than in the rural districts. It is true that, lumping the best with the worst into a general average, we find the country still distinctly superior to the city in its health statistics. But it is also true that there has been a vast and progressive improvement in the health of cities as a result of improved sanitation and the development of preventive medicine. That much further improvement is possible is obvious to all who realize the remediable evils of urban congestion, who appreciate how relatively little has yet been done to abate such evils as city smoke and the lack of light and air and living space in its crowded tenements, who know how haphazard and uncontrolled and exploitative has been the growth of most cities and with how little care for the health and convenience of the poorer citizens they have generally been administered. It is only in quite recent years that most urban communities have begun to realize that city-planning is something vastly more important than the laying out of a checker-board design. How great and how unrealized its potentialities are such studies as the New York Regional Plan are now revealing. The city, as Park and Burgess remark, is "the natural habitat of civilized man." To establish a greater harmony between his physiological needs and the urban life which expresses his cultural needs is a task upon which man has already embarked with much promise of success.

The belief that the great city could not maintain its numbers by its own fertility, that its continuance (not merely its growth) depended on the constant influx of country migrants, and that the urban family tended to die out within three generations or so, may well have been justified under the unhygienic conditions of urban life in past centuries. Such rough estimates as we possess, such as those of John Graunt for seventeenth century London, indicate a mortality which more than counteracted the natural increase. That the belief is untrue to-day has been shown by the studies of Weber and Kuczynski.[15] It is acknowledged by Sorokin and Zimmerman, who exhibit at certain points an anti-urban bias, that since the middle of the nineteenth century the city population has

[15] Weber, *op. cit.*, ch. VII; Kuczynski, *Zug nach der Stadt* (Stuttgart, 1897).

on the whole been able to maintain itself in the equilibrium of births and deaths.[16] True, the growth of cities could not have taken place save for the influx from the country, but it is no less true that the country could not have maintained its higher fertility, without a relapse into the poverty of previous centuries, were it not for the economic opportunities which the city afforded to its surplus. The remarkable process revealed in the growth of cities is one to which both city and country have made equally important but very different contributions.

This statement brings us to our last point. We have shown how the influence of the city is dominant in our civilization. But the city and the country can no longer be viewed as standing apart, in relative isolation and perhaps in antagonism. The two great types of human environment are tending to coalesce. The country is becoming, in important respects, urbanized, and a new environment is being shaped for large numbers of city-dwellers which includes an element of the country. The city throws its suburbs further and further into the country. With improved means of communication it is already possible for many to live in the country and work in the city, and for still larger numbers to spend their week-ends and their holidays in some contact with nature. The development of electrical power is removing the economic advantage of industrial congestion. The city is creating a great hinterland which is gradually forming one community with the urban nucleus. Just as the dwellers in city and in country are being brought nearer to one another in the process of interaction and dominance, so, if in lesser degree, are the environments of city and country tending to become the common possession of men. This also may be a tendency of great import for the future of civilization.

[16] Sorokin and Zimmerman, *op. cit.*, p. 532.

PART FOUR
SOCIAL CHANGE

PREFATORY NOTE

The social structure is subject to incessant change, growing, decaying, finding renewal, accommodating itself to very variant conditions and suffering vast modifications in the course of time. Its contemporaneous aspect holds and hides the secret of its past. We know its nature, as we know the nature of the living person, only in the comprehension of it through a time-span. Its meaning is never revealed in any moment of its existence, but, finally and fully, only in the whole process through which it passes. To understand the social structure we must therefore view it in the historical process, seeking continuity, relating time-difference to time-likeness. We must, in other words, discover the direction of change, or all is meaningless. That is why the principle of evolution becomes of supreme significance.

But as soon as we study a changing social structure, we are impelled to face the great question we have so far skirted, that of causation. Description no longer suffices. After giving evidences to show the reality of social evolution we proceed to examine the underlying changes on which it is dependent. Here we pass in review the larger systems of interpretation which give predominance to some one dynamic factor, the main issue appearing to be that between the determinist schools which lay stress on environment and the anti-determinist which seek for principles of change inherent in the potentialities of human nature. It becomes evident, as we proceed, that the problem of social causation is exceedingly complex.

In the last chapter we seek to deal with this complexity, to discover the manner in which the many changing aspects of a total situation are related to the particular phenomena of social change. This is the hardest task which confronts the student of society, but as it may also be the most illuminating, the student who has followed us so far should be prepared to face it.

CHAPTER TWENTY

SOCIETY AS PROCESS

1. *The Significance of Social Change*

A thousand years ago, in Europe and America, the face of society was vastly different from that with which we are familiar to-day. A thousand years hence it will assuredly have undergone vast new transformations. What it will be like ten thousand years from now—what shiftings and readjustments, what new groupings and solidarities, what changes in the very foundations of the most fundamental forms such as the family and the state, what permeations of new ideals into social institutions, what social responses to new scientific discoveries, will have taken place—lies beyond the power of the imagination to conceive. Men have in all ages played with social prophecies, but the distantly-born future has always outwitted their dreams.

A thousand years is but a moment in the history of the earth, in the history of the rocks, of the species of living creatures, of human nature itself. Yet in a moment of that moment, in the course of a mere generation or two, significant changes can and do occur in human society. The society of Russia has been drastically reconstituted in the time that light takes to reach us from the nearest star. Of all the objects we can study, none changes so rapidly before our very eyes as the works of the restless spirit of man, and particularly the social structures which he builds. Of all sciences, none is so dependent upon—and so embarrassed by—its changing historical content as is the science of society.

For the astronomer, for the physicist, even for the biologist, the territory he explores has remained essentially the same since men first sought to be scientists. Though here too all is process, yet for purposes of study the past stays past even as the present stays present. Even a subject so closely allied

to sociology as is psychology has to deal with a human nature which it cannot assume to have been different in important respects a hundred, even a thousand years ago. But the territory which the sociologist explores changes even as he explores it. This fact has an important bearing both on his methods and on his results. Here at least we cannot seek for eternal laws. If we seek for laws, it must be for principles of change. And it is with such that we shall be concerned in this last Part.

Moreover, these principles are not such that they enable us to forecast with any assurance, even over a brief period, the changes which society will undergo. The reasons for this statement will appear as we proceed. It is sometimes claimed that the power to predict is the hall-mark of true science. It is a dubious claim, if prediction means the forecasting of variation, and not of recurrent uniformity or of the persistence of processes already in being where no new factors intervene to change their direction. As we pass from the physical sciences to the biological and then to the social, the conditions are more unstable as well as more complex, and therefore the limits of prediction are increasingly narrow.

Moreover, social phenomena are historical phenomena in a profounder sense than any other. This point is a hard one to grasp, but if the student perceives it he will understand aright why unconditional prediction in sociology is impracticable, not merely on account of our inadequate knowledge but on account of the very nature of our subject-matter. Society exists only as a time-sequence. It is a becoming, not a being; a process, not a product. A physical object persists through time; throughout a particular period it may remain identical or so nearly identical that the difference is insignificant. During such a period time is, as it were, accidental, external to it; in other words, it has no history of its own. It is a product carried bodily through time, like a fossil. In degree the same is true not only of the material relics of man's past culture but even of his immaterial cultural achievements. They are products which are transmitted down the generations, such as the Homeric poems, and in so far as human nature retains the

same capacities they remain a vehicle by which past generations communicate with the present. The process which created them has vanished, the product endures, and enduring has no inner history. But society is a process of relationship which cannot escape thus from history. It is sustained only in activity, as activity. A mode of relationship cannot be abstracted from the life of which it is an expression. A social structure cannot be placed in a museum, to save it from the ravages of time. The class-system of Homeric days could no more stand still than the age of a living creature. Inexorably it changed, having appeared historically as a stage in a process.

The illustration we have just given will also show the importance of distinguishing the study of society from the study of culture. Culture embodies itself in products which persist and exercise an influence by their continued presence, while the society in which they arose lives on only as a changing equilibrium of present relationships. Social change is therefore a distinct thing from cultural change, entering in a different way into the time-process. Once more we must insist that our direct concern as sociologists is with social relationships. It is the change in these which alone we shall regard as social change. When we speak of social evolution we shall not mean human evolution, but only an aspect of it, nor shall we mean cultural evolution, but only a concomitant of it.

Our theme is the changing ways in which human beings relate themselves to one another. All other elements of human history we shall consider only as conditions of these changes. Nor does it fall within our scope to trace the history of social change. We are concerned rather with the interpretation of social change, with an historical process revealed in the present just as in the past. Our problem is one of causation. In studying it we shall, as hitherto, concentrate our attention first on structure, since otherwise we lose the definite reference to objective forms which saves us from confusion in the endless process of change. But we cannot advance far in our interpretation without considering the meaning of these forms, the valuations which they represent and the functions which they fulfil, in order to appreciate the forces which are always at

work to shape and to change them and above all to give direction to their changes.

2. *The Permanent Conditions of Social Change*

A social structure is a nexus of *present* relationships. It lives only as it is maintained by the will of social beings in the present. It is upheld from moment to moment, as were the hands of Moses by Aaron and Hur. It is like a web that exists only as it is newly spun. If it seems to persist through time, it is because the attitudes and interests of social beings persist, so that they will its continuous existence. The most sacrosanct and seeming-permanent institutions exist by no other right and in no other strength than that which they derive from the social beings who think and act in accord with them. If the conditions of human life were unchanging, then might the social structure be unchanging also. But these conditions are always unstable. There are primitive societies which we think of as stationary, partly because we know less about their past, partly because, owing to the limits of their control over nature, their relative seclusion, their smaller size and therefore greater homogeneity, the changes which occur are slower and less determinate. But it would be unwise to assume that they are really unchanging, and that the crust of custom, on which writers like Maine and Bagehot laid such stress, pens them inexorably. People have similarly spoken of the 'unchanging East', but they spoke with cultural aloofness, and the social ferment now apparent in Japan, China, India, Turkey, and other Eastern lands has already refuted these obsolete judgments.

Whether or not human nature itself changes, the conditions under which it expresses itself are never constant. The environment changes, partly through forces beyond human control, partly through man's own design; and every change in man's relation to his environment means some change in his relation to his fellows. A new machine, for example, dictates a new division of labor. So far the social change is a by-product of man's effort to control his external conditions. But the change does not end there. Child-labor laws or labor-

unions are not a necessary consequence of the use of machinery. Thus in modifying his environment man sets up a double process of social change. Certain social relationships are imposed on him by his civilization, others are imposed by him on his civilization. Moreover, there are springs of change that lie deeper than either the direct or the indirect results of man's changing relation to his environment. There are instabilities intrinsic to the very being of society. We may set out accordingly the following ever-present conditions of social change, passing from the more external to those which are inherent in the conditions of social life.

We begin with the physical environment. The surface of our planet is never at rest. There are slow geographical changes as well as the occasional convulsions of nature in storm, earthquake, and flood. Besides the seasonal variations of climate there are longer alternations of weather conditions, secular variations of temperature, humidity, prevailing winds, and beyond these the epochal changes which raise and submerge portions of the earth's surface, which bring ice-ages and thaw them out again, and so forth. Since such changes are practically unaffected by human activity, the social changes which they initiate may be regarded solely as adaptational responses. Here, and here alone, we find one-way causation.

The difference is clear when we turn to another order of environmental changes. Most of us have seen abandoned lumber-towns or mining camps or depopulated farming areas. The natural resources of these regions have been impoverished or exhausted, and the social life has ebbed away. But it was man's activity which initiated these changes. Similar changes on a larger scale have in the past profoundly affected great areas of civilization and changed the whole future of human society. All round the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean, in Southern Italy, Greece, Palestine, Egypt, and westward towards Morocco, a long process of desiccation and soil impoverishment has taken place, changing not only the centers of population, the routes of trade, and the seats of empire, but also the modes of culture and the whole system of social institutions. In the regions where once the power of Arabia,

Persia, Babylonia, and Assyria flourished similar processes have occurred. How far these changes were due to man's ignorance of scientific agriculture, to his destruction of the forests, to his devastation of the land in peace and in war, entailing unforeseen consequences of drought or giving opportunity to insect pests and other injurious influences, and how far to the operation of climatic changes outside of man's activity, remains a difficult question.[1] Every civilization is exploitative of the resources of its environment. Its continuance depends, *inter alia*, on its ability to conserve or replace these resources or to find substitutes for them. Our own civilization has reached a stage of control where it can maintain the fertility of the soil while satisfying its present agricultural needs, but it has as yet found no adequate means of replenishing the sources of power which it derives from the exhaustible supplies of oil and coal, nor is there an endless stock of the metals, such as iron and copper, which it finds so necessary.

So far we have dealt with environmental changes which, whether or not dependent on man's activity, are certainly not the expression of his designs. But man also puts the definite stamp of his own science on his world, and thus he creates, as we have seen, a modified physical environment responsive to his techniques of control. This technological environment in turn occasions unintended and often profound changes in his social life. It is as when we build a new house and discover afterwards that we must change our settled habits to enjoy it. Here then is another source of social instability. In devising new means to satisfy old wants we stimulate new wants as well. When only a few generations back the steam-engine was made to work for man, neither the inventors nor the users realized that they were precipitating great social changes

[1] Some writers place much stress on inevitable climatic and geographical changes, as E. Huntington in *World Power and Evolution* (New Haven, 1919) and other works. V. G. Simkhovitch has on the other hand traced the effects of soil impoverishment through unscientific agriculture on Roman society (*Hay and History*, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 385–403). Another aspect of the unsuccessful 'struggle with nature' is suggested in Jones's study of the aetiology and consequences of malaria in Greece (W. H. S. Jones, *Malaria and Greek History*, Manchester, 1909).

which would overturn old customs and institutions, old political systems and even old faiths. When the telephone and the automobile and the radio were made practicable, men did not dream of the ways in which these inventions would influence the life of the family. The repercussion of these technical applications is so far-reaching and so momentous that some sociologists, such as Veblen, regard them as the main explanation of social change.

But there are other aspects of the changefulness of society. We cannot think of social change as solely adaptation or response to environmental change, whether the latter be attributable to nature or engineered by man. For one thing, it occurs not merely as a consequence of man's new devices of exploitation, it is also deliberately initiated in order to increase his power. The control of nature requires co-operative activity, and the new co-operation precedes as well as follows the new control. We shall see later the ever-present danger of one-way interpretations of the causal nexus between society and environment. Social integration and control over nature advance together. The nature and disposition of the machinery in a plant determine in degree the tasks and relations of the workers, but the management organizes and reorganizes these tasks and relations, changing the machinery in the process and sometimes preparing the way for the introduction and even the invention of new machines.

In the plant the objective of the management is simple and predetermined. In a society a myriad objectives, concordant and conflicting, are present. Man's desire to control nature is itself directed by its ulterior desire to express his own nature. Every new invention changes his opportunity to do so. Industrialization and urbanization are only in part a response to the primary necessities of his organic being under the conditions created by the advance of the arts; they assume a variety of forms and directions determined also by the variety of his cultural interests. The interpretation of social change is, as we shall have reason to see, a question of extreme complexity.

Moreover, every community is an unstable equilibrium of

diversified groups, large and small—families, classes, occupational groups, cultural groups. Each seeks influence, prestige, control, partly at the expense of others. There is endless social struggle as well as co-operation. For this reason alone society can never manifest a stable equilibrium. Every change of circumstances, every advantage accidental or contrived, changes the status of groups in respect of one another. Trends develop according as conditions favor the relative success of this group or that. On a broader scale whole communities, even whole civilizations, are in relation to one another subject to similar trends. And the trends are never at rest.

Yet another source of changes is rooted in the biological conditions of social continuity. All life, except the very simplest, arises from crossing, from intermixture, so that every new life is a different distribution of qualities and potencies. For mankind, being plastic, not instinct-bound like the lower animals, therefore variable, this mingling and crossing of hereditary factors is a guarantee of change. We tend to think of heredity as a conservative force, but it is also the basis of variation. Moreover, heredity is a selective agency. In the first place it rejects half the elements of the parental units. And there are selective processes of various kinds determining who shall be parents, and to what extent. The combined action of intermixture and selection makes it impossible that society should be really static. Because of them no new generation can ever be an exact replica of the old. In a small homogeneous society these principles have less scope, but in a complex society with all its avenues of communication the range of potential variation is vastly increased.

Apart from intermixture and selection altogether each new generation is a new beginning. Even were it a replica of what the old once was, it starts with new energies in an altered world. What has already been done furnishes a basis for its own doing. The social heritage is cumulative, though here too there is selection and rejection. The greater the social heritage the greater too the potentiality of change. Herein again human society differs from that of the lower animals. For they, having no accumulated possessions, no instruments they can im-

prove, no culture they can modify, cannot build on the past any more than they can reject it. In human society, with its social heritage, the young cannot do over again just what the old have already done. It is part of the meaning of that heritage that no young life can be content with simple habituation to the conditions which once-young life has established. No matter what the direction, it must go a yet untravelled road.

We have now mentioned the main conditions which conspire to make society changeful. They are enough to show that the social structure is never anything but an historic moment in a process of change. Whether we should regard this list as exhaustive is more doubtful. Perhaps it does not sufficiently admit such influences as the dominant or creative minds within a group or those processes of social contagion which reveal themselves in what we name the spirit of the time, the *Zeitgeist.*

Viewing these conditions together we see two great questions emerge, to which the rest of this book will be devoted. First, can we trace any direction, any continuity of meaning, in the social flux? Second, can we explain how the factors combine, how they are related to one another, what parts they respectively play, in bringing into being the social phenomena which somehow are a resultant of them all?

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

THE WAYS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

1. *Preliminary Distinctions*

There are many ways of change. A fashion comes and goes with swift seeming-capricious steps; a custom slowly forms and, most often, slowly dissolves. Economic prosperity tends to move cumulatively to a crisis and then to break into a more or less serious recession, succeeded by a slow process of recuperation. A political system may slowly develop or may be suddenly established. Besides such variations in the mere tempo of change there are also qualitative variations. At first a new invention mimics the older device which it replaces—as the automobile imitated the horse-carriage—and then gradually establishes its own type. A science tends towards greater coherence and integration, partially disturbed from time to time by revolutionary discoveries or theories which prepare the way for a completer synthesis of its material. An applied science moves towards greater efficiency or economy of means. A fine art, on the other hand, having no such clear appointed goal, seems to move irregularly as prompted by an ever-changing fusion of ideals and techniques. This contrast is part of that broader distinction between culture and civilization on which we have already dwelt. Wherever cultural values enter in, the way of change becomes complex and objectively indeterminate. Those parts of our civilization which are remote from final valuations move in a different way from those which are more subject to their influence. The science of electrical engineering has a simpler path to follow than the science of politics.

We must distinguish various terms which connote a type or quality of change. The term *change* itself is wholly neutral, implying nothing but a difference through time in the object to which it is applied. When we speak of social change, we

suggest so far no law, no theory, no meaning, no direction, no continuity even. The idea of continuity is introduced when we refer to a social change as a *process*. A process means continuous change taking place in a definite manner through the operation of forces present from the first within the situation. Thus we speak of the 'group process', or the manner in which the relations of the members of a group, once brought together, acquire a certain distinctive character. In a process we observe a series of transitions between one state of being and another. There is no necessary implication as to the relative quality of the two states of being, or as to the direction followed. A process may be up or down, forward or backward, towards integration or disintegration. All that is meant by process is the definite step-by-step manner through which one state or stage merges into another.

Another set of terms is needed when we express not only continuity but direction of change, and for scientific purposes the most important of these is *evolution*. The idea of evolution is in other sciences, and especially the biological, the grand key to the comprehension of change. It would hardly be too much to say that where we cannot discover an evolutionary element in change, there the past belongs to the historian and not to the scientist. Evolution means more than growth. The latter term does connote a direction of change but only one of a quantitative character. Evolution, as we shall presently see, involves something more intrinsic, a change not merely in size but at least in structure also. So do the associated terms *development*, *regression*, *retrogression*. The suggestion of 'forward' or 'backward', of 'higher' or 'lower' in respect of some scale, is present in them all.

Here another distinction, of supreme importance to the student of society, must be introduced. When we speak of 'higher' and 'lower', of 'more' or 'less advanced', on the evolutionary scale, we do not, or certainly should not, impute any standard of valuation. We do not mean 'better' or 'worse' in any ethical sense. We should beware of confusing the *concept* of evolution and the *concept* of progress. When we speak of progress we imply not merely direction, but direction to-

wards some final goal, some destination determined ideally, not simply by objective consideration of the forces at work. What defines this goal is the value-judgment of the spectator, not the inevitability of causation. It may be that the evolutionary process moves in accord with our conception of desirable change, but there is no *logical* necessity that it should, and in any event the judgment of final value varies with the mentality and experience of the individual and the group, whereas the process of evolution is objectively given, waiting only to be discovered and understood. If the process so revealed satisfies also *our* sense of values, if the direction of evolutionary change brings also a fuller realization of the values we cherish, then *for us* it is also progress.

There remains a group of terms which signify not the change of one object or system in itself but the changing relation of two or more objects or systems to one another. These terms are often wrongly equated with the terms of the last two groups. They are *adaptation*, *adjustment*, *accommodation*, *assimilation*, and their negatives. To these we may add such vaguer terms as *harmony*. We have already dwelt on their meaning. We should note, however, that the positive terms cannot as such *mean* either evolution or progress. They signify merely that the two objects conform to one another within a common process, but whether that process should be named evolution or progress remains thereby undetermined. How it should be determined is the subject to which we now proceed.

First we may sum up these preliminary distinctions as follows:

TERMS SIGNIFYING TYPES OF CHANGE

I. Determinate continuous change	*Process* Movement, etc.
II. Determinate continuous change in a specific direction	
(a) quantitatively defined, with respect to size	*Growth* Accumulation, etc.
(b) qualitatively defined, with respect to structural or functional differentiation	*Evolution* Development Regression Retrogression

TERMS SIGNIFYING TYPES OF CHANGE—*Continued*

III.	(c) qualitatively defined, with respect to its conformity to a standard of value	*Progress* Decline Decay Decadence Degeneration
IV.	(d) defined by reference to some other object or system, with respect to their compatibility within a common process	*Adaptation* Adjustment Accommodation Assimilation Harmony and their contradictories

2. *The Concept of Evolution Applied to Society*

Evolution is literally 'unrolling', a process in which hidden or latent aspects or characters of a thing reveal themselves. It is an order of change which unfolds the variety of aspects belonging to the nature of the changing object, in which potentialities lying within it are made actual. Evolution cannot properly be predicated of anything whose nature is already completely revealed in the present. Nor can we speak of evolution when an object or system is changed merely by forces acting on it from without. The change must occur within the changing unity, as the manifestation of forces operative within it, so as to constitute a fuller revelation through time of its own capacities. Since, however, nothing is independent of the universe about it, evolution is a process involving at the same time a changing adaptation of the object to its environment and a further manifestation of its own nature. Consequently it is a change permeating the whole character of the object, a sequence in which the equilibrium of its entire structure undergoes modification.

We have not yet stated the basic moment of the evolutionary process, the essential criterion of its presence. The term *evolution* is often loosely used to signify any process of becoming, the series of transitions between two stages of the existence of anything. In more scientific usage it is still applied with somewhat varying significance to different types of object, though with a common core of meaning. Thus we speak of

the evolution of an individual organism, of the evolution of a species, and of the evolution of life through different species. We speak also of the evolution of the earth, or the solar system, or the cosmos itself. We speak again of the evolution of any established system, though here the term loses its sharpness, for generally we mean no more than the process by which it has become established.

The concept of evolution gained its wide modern vogue as a result of its successful application in the field of biology. When Charles Darwin wrote of "the evolution of species" he traced a process by which the multiplicity of organic types emerged from earlier, fewer, less differentiated forms of life. The particular mechanistic explanation of this process which Darwin offered may or may not be valid, but the scheme of evolution which he so clearly traced does not stand or fall with any theory of the manner in which it has come about. The scheme itself is corroborated by myriad evidences; the scientific issue is no more the reality of biological evolution but the causal interpretation of it. The basis of the scheme is the correlation of the time-order with the order of appearance of more complex or more differentiated species. Many divergences occur, many collateral variations which do not exemplify this primary correlation, but it remains the nucleus of the grand plan of organic evolution. It is not of course implied that the later in appearance is necessarily the more evolved, but only that the more evolved is later in appearance than the less evolved and proceeds from it by means of the variations somehow emerging in the interplay of heredity and environment. The kernel of organic evolution is therefore differentiation, the process in which latent or rudimentary characters take on distinct and variable forms within the unity of the organism, giving rise to new and more complex types of life. We shall find presently that a similar principle has great significance for the study of society. We shall find too that the differentiation of structure must be related to the differentiation of function.

In this quest we shall not follow the dangerous semi-deductive method of analogy. Reliance on this method has

impaired the contribution of Herbert Spencer and other sociologists who have followed the evolutionary clue. There are many unities or systems which reveal a process of differentiation, but the process itself varies with the nature of the subject which undergoes it. Thus differentiation occurs (a) where the subject is the whole organic world, branching into its genera and species, (b) where the subject is a particular species, revealing *either* a modification of its type in this direction *or* the emergence of several varieties from an earlier type, (c) where the subject is an individual organism, in the course of its development from the germ to the full-grown being, and (d) where the subject is any unity or system which comes to assume a more determinate form or a variety of forms through the operation of inherent forces. Society falls in the last of these groups, and there has been a constant danger of confusing it with one—or all at the same time—of the other three. For example, it is often treated as if it fell at the same time into both group (b) and group (c), a confusion appearing in the pages of Spencer and many other writers. We should observe particularly the difference between these two groups as subjects of evolution. Group (b) exhibits an evolutionary process which has no determinate limits, whereas the process in group (c) is bounded by the life of the individual organism. A species maintains its existence by the reproduction of its members, an individual organism is not self-perpetuating but only a factor in race-perpetuation. An individual organism therefore grows old and is always at some stage in the process from youth to age; its evolution is the expression of an initial life-energy within it. None of these statements can properly be predicated of a species, and it is only a hazardous guess which asseverates that they are true of other self-perpetuating unities, such as communities or even the social systems which they create.

All organisms grow old and die, and though life has flowed on some species have become extinct. We have found in differentiation the clue to the evolutionary order, but when the process of decline towards death or extinction sets in differentiation ceases and some counter-process takes its place. Or

again a species, once self-maintaining, becomes parasitic, like the duck-weeds in the vegetable kingdom, and some of its evolved organs degenerate. Shall we then include within the meaning of evolution those reverse tendencies? It seems simpler to do so. Decay and parasitism, whether in a species or in a society, are never simple reversals of a former trend, mere returns to an earlier stage. Age is never, literally, second childhood. From the beginning to the end new aspects of the nature of the organic being appear. We find in differentiation the clue to evolution and we can therefore also call evolutionary any process which comprises both differentiation and some sequel of differentiation, which includes an 'upward' and a consequent 'downward' course. When it is desirable to specify an 'upward' course only, a process, that is, of increasing differentiation, we can use the appropriate term *development.*

We are now in a position to see what evolution means in its social reference. Wherever in the history of society we find an increasing specialization of organs or units within the system or serving the life of the whole, we can speak of social evolution. Observe that such specialization does not mean simply more complexity and is not equivalent to the appearance of mere novelty, for to meet our sense of differentiation such complexity or novelty must be integrated within the social structure, or, what we shall see is here another aspect of the same principle, must contribute to the interrelation of function between the whole and the parts. A diseased condition of the organism may involve additional complexity and introduce new phenomena, but no one would call this an evolutionary process.

Often it is said that evolution is a process of differentiation *and* integration, but the term *differentiation*, properly understood, connotes integration. In a society it manifests itself in such ways as the following: (a) a greater division of labor, so that the energy of more individuals is concentrated on more specific tasks and so that thereby a more elaborate system of co-operation, a more intricate nexus of functional relationships, is sustained within the group; (b) an increase in the number and the variety of functional associations and insti-

tutions, so that each is more defined or more limited in the range or character of its service; and (c) a greater diversity and refinement in the instruments of social communication, perhaps above all in the medium of language. We may regard the last of these conditions as rather a mark than a mode of differentiation, but as the history of language can often be more accurately traced than the life-history of those who spoke it, it is obviously a record of very great importance for the study of the earlier evolution of different peoples and of the same people at different stages.

When the above-mentioned changes are proceeding society is evolving. It does not follow that the people who maintain the more evolved system are 'better' or better fitted to survive, or more moral or more healthy or more happy than those we call primitive. Even if the opposite were true, it would not refute the fact that their society is more evolved. The place of a people on the evolutionary scale does not depend on our ethical judgments. There must be, of course, some relation between the character of the social structure and the kind of life which is lived within it. But this relationship is expressed in quite other terms. To understand it we must examine the distinction between evolution and progress.

3. *Evolution and Progress*

Differentiation, where it occurs, is an evolutionary fact. We can therefore, provided we have the knowledge, classify different societies with entire objectivity as more or less highly evolved. We cannot be accused of arbitrary or subjective valuations when we say that a civilized society is more highly evolved than that of the Eskimos. But if we claim also that civilized life is a better life, the case is different. The Eskimo might deny it—where is the common ground on which we can meet to decide between us? If our life better satisfies our ideals, so does his life his—who then is the arbiter of ideals? Moreover, we do not ourselves agree that civilization is better. Some deny it, and again who is to judge between us? If the rest of us affirm it, are these not equally entitled to deny it—as did the young Rousseau or Schopenhauer or Max

Nordau or von Hartmann or Tolstoi or Spengler, as do the religious prophets who identify progress with the spread of a faith or with the heyday of a church, as do the hedonists who define progress as more happiness and assert that the savage is happier than the civilized man? Does it not appear that the affirmation of evolution depends on our perception of objective evidences whereas the affirmation or denial of progress depends on our ideals, and therefore on our temperament, on our fortune in life, on our age, perhaps on the state of our liver or our digestion; in short, that evolution is a scientific concept and progress an ethical concept?

Now there is no necessary opposition between the scientific and the ethical attitude, for the one is directed to the comprehension of what is and the other seeks to determine our relation to what is in such a way that what is and what is good shall so far as practicable coincide. But there is much confusion of the two attitudes, and consequent clashes. For our ethical judgments may rest on misconceptions of the scientific fact and our scientific conclusions may be warped by our ethical preconceptions. The social sciences suffer particularly from this confusion. To avoid it is a profoundly difficult task. The difficulty is twofold. In the first place we are brought up and constantly indoctrinated in the valuations of our group. The business of living in society makes social valuations of some sort necessary. Unfortunately these vital valuations, owing alike to the prejudices of the group and to our individual misreading of experience, contain ingredients of scientific error. They rationalize the ultimate judgment, 'This is good' or 'This is bad' (with its corollary, 'This is right' or 'This is wrong') into the relative judgment, 'This is bad, because such and such results follow from it'. Now the latter is a presumptive scientific judgment, in so far as it postulates a causal nexus between two phenomena. But the emotional drive of ethical ideals or social pressures often overrides the cool scientific scrutiny of the alleged causal nexus or forbids it altogether—the rationalization, for example, of the contradictory sex taboos of different cultures affords abundant illustration—and thus our science suffers.

In the second place, we cannot adopt the simpler solution of the physical sciences by keeping outside the realm of ethical valuations altogether. In a very important way these valuations, socially conditioned as they are, enter into our subject-matter. Subjective themselves, they determine the objective phenomena of society. As scientists, we must endeavor to keep our own valuations from coloring our perception of social reality, but the reality we perceive is through and through permeated with the valuations of its creators. Ethical concepts have a direct power of moving the world which scientific concepts lack. In some manner they are active in every process of social change. We study, let us say, war or marriage or divorce, but the very existence of any one of these phenomena depends on a sufficient belief or disbelief in its desirability. A like statement can be made of every social organization and institution. In this respect our facts differ *toto caelo* from physical facts, and that is why we cannot dismiss valuations—or such concepts as progress—as lightly as can the physical sciences.

It is all the more important for us to distinguish carefully the two types of concept, the scientific and the ethical. It is one thing to recognize value-facts, to trace their operation, to study them as the realities they are; it is quite another to impose our own valuations on them. We should therefore not define social evolution as if it were the same thing as social progress. It may be that the course of social evolution is in harmony with the direction prescribed by our particular concept of social progress. The ideals or values which any of us accept may be more fully realized in the evolutionary process, and it is quite legitimate, when we have stated what we mean by social progress, to trace the degree or the manner in which it is embodied in evolutionary change. For this correspondence may be traced in a way which any student of society, whether or not he accepts our ethical postulate, can accept. But it is possible to do this only if we define social evolution in ethically neutral terms. Otherwise the confusion we have spoken of will be present from the start.

This danger, for example, is not wholly avoided in so broad

and thoughtful a study of social evolution as that offered in the works of L. T. Hobhouse. His concept of social development seems to sway between the concepts of social evolution and of social progress. Thus in his book called *Social Development* he sets out the following criteria: "a community develops as it advances in (1) scale, (2) efficiency, (3) freedom, and (4) mutuality of service." By efficiency he means the "adequate apportionment and co-ordination of functions in the service of an end, whatever the end may be and whether it be or be not understood by those who contribute to it". By freedom he means "scope for thought, character, and initiative" on the part of the members. By "mutuality of service" he means "the service of an end in which each who serves participates". In so far as these four are combined "we have efficient organization with all its power of collective achievement based on the intelligent will of individuals because it meets their needs, and relying on their support in all difficulties".[1]

These criteria are in several respects unsatisfactory. Increase of scale, of the size of the community, may be a condition, but is a doubtful criterion, of social evolution, and a more definite structural clue seems necessary. Hobhouse's next criterion, efficiency, is functional, but again lacks precision. Efficiency, or economy in the utilization of social energies, may be a concomitant or a consequence of evolution, but if we define it only as the "adequate apportionment and co-ordination of functions *in the service of any end*", it gives us relatively little help in the evolutionary comparison of different societies, for the ends themselves change in the process. A society organized for war is efficient in a different respect from a society organized for industry; a society highly organized for money-making from a society in which cultural interests are stronger. These, however, are minor difficulties. The more serious one is that the two further criteria, freedom and mutuality, belong to a different order altogether. What

[1] *Social Development* (London, 1924), ch. IV. Other works in which Hobhouse deals with social evolution include *Morals in Evolution* (New York, 1919) and *Social Evolution and Political Theory* (New York, 1911).

Hobhouse is now putting forward is his concept of progress. What he is now thinking of is that condition of society, whatever its form, in which there is more opportunity and stimulation for initiative, freedom of thought, and strength of character, and in which there is free participation in the common benefits of reciprocal service. We may approve these formulations of a social ideal—the present writer in fact does—but the attempt to combine these attributes with the former two in a concordant set of evolutionary criteria is unfortunate. Not only does it introduce an element of subjectivity but it prevents us from investigating clearly the real problem, the correlation between the order of evolution and an order which accords with a particular concept of progress. The two orders are merged at the start, and therefore their relation to one another is either assumed or obscured.

The need for a clear distinction between them is shown in another work of which Hobhouse is part-author.[2] In this work over four hundred of the 'simpler peoples' are classified according to evolutionary stage. The basis of classification is here definite and objective, being the degree in which these peoples have advanced in material culture, that is, in the control over nature reflected in their arts—a more precise form of the criterion of efficiency. The authors then take certain institutions which have an obvious ethical import and investigate the extent to which they are present in the different stages. Some of the results are given as follows:

CASES OF PEOPLES HAVING CERTAIN INSTITUTIONS SHOWN AS FRACTIONS OF TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLES IN EACH CLASS

Class	*Polygamy general*	*Nobility*	*Slavery*
Lower Hunters	.29	0	.02
Higher Hunters	.32	.11	.32
Agricultural I	.18	.03	.33
Pastoral I	.53	.20	.37
Agricultural II	.43	.15	.46
Pastoral II	.74	.24	.71
Agricultural III	.64	.23	.78

[2] Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, *The Material Culture and the Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples* (London, 1915).

The last column suffices for our purpose. Clearly the institution of slavery contradicts the principles of freedom and of mutuality and yet it is more in evidence among the more advanced of the primitive peoples included in the study. The authors also point out that for these stages "organized war rather develops with the advance of industry and of social organization in general".[3] How then could we classify these peoples according to evolutionary stage if we sought to combine the four criteria given by Hobhouse?

The relation of social evolution to social progress is in fact a problem which presents many difficulties, and they arise chiefly because of the variable and inconclusive character of the concept of progress. It has a different significance for different individuals, for different times, and for different social groups. To the eighteenth century 'enlightenment' progress meant emancipation from the bonds of tradition and the tyranny of power. To later-nineteenth-century America it seemed to be identified with the triumphant expansion of society and the exploitation of the resources of the earth.[4] The concept of progress is a chameleon that takes on the color of the environment, when we are adjusted to that environment, and some contrasting color when we feel maladjusted.

It is still sometimes claimed that progress is a 'scientific concept', in other words, that it can be so defined as to express an ideal on which all who use the term 'scientifically' can agree and one which is itself present in actuality in a degree which can be positively ascertained. Thus one sociologist regards the goal of progress for the individual as "the complete functioning of an integrated personality", and thence proceeds to define social progress as consisting "in those changes in the social structure which release, stimulate, facilitate, and integrate human functioning".[5] But any such solu-

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 228.

[4] "It is a misfortune", said V. L. Parrington in Volume III of his *Main Trends of American Thought* (*The Beginnings of Critical Realism in America*, p. 19) "that America has never subjected the abstract idea of progress to critical examination."

[5] Article entitled *Is Progress a Scientific Concept*, by Professor Hornell Hart in SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH, March–April, 1929.

tion is apparent, not real. The expressions *complete functioning* and *human functioning*, are, like the term *progress* itself, not symbols of definite meaning but verbal brackets which are given different content by different users. Complete functioning, if we try to take the phrase strictly, would turn the plastic human animal into a chimera. All functioning is selective, and everyone defines progress, for himself, in terms not only of the extent but also of the quality of the functioning.

Can we get no further than this negative result? Although different minds interpret progress differently, is there not a common core of meaning? Are there not fundamental desires common to all mankind, and do they not provide the raw material of the concept of progress, however differently it may be worked up by men of different extraction and circumstance? Do not our psychologists reveal to us the deeper urges of the race, and do not our sociologists tell us of the 'four wishes' and other simple formulations of the primary motivations of all men? [6] And if there are perversions and mutilations and aberrations of these, cannot we regard them as deviations from the norm and still find in the norm itself the ground on which to construct a sufficient concept of progress?

To answer these questions let us state more explicitly the character of the valuation which the concept of progress involves. When we speak of progress without a qualifying adjective, such as 'economic' or 'material', we invoke an ultimate, not an intermediate or conditional, standard of value. Economic progress means no more than increase in the economic means to progress. The latter can be measured, but what cannot thereby be measured is the degree in which the measurable increase of the means contributes to the ill-defined and unmeasured end, which is progress itself. On this account we should not, as economists such as Pigou do, speak of economic welfare as a part of total welfare—it is a condition, not

[6] The 'four wishes' of W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki (*The Polish Peasant*, Vol. I, Methodological Note, pp. 72–73, and Vol. III, Introduction) are response, recognition, security, and new experience. In a later book, *The Unadjusted Girl*, Thomas modifies this classification.

a part.[7] By increasing welfare, or progress *per se*, we must mean the nearer or fuller realization of a state of being which accords, not even with our desires, but with our sense of the desirable. We are in the realm not only of ultimate values, but of ultimate *ethical* values. In this realm agreement proves nothing except that we agree. If Bornean tribes accept success in head-hunting as progress, it is merely their judgment and may be denied by another people or another civilization. And so with our own social goals. We must go by our own sense of values, for there is no appeal to any higher court, and yet the judgment of the only court we have does not bind even the conscience from which it emanates.

Moreover, when we leave out the qualifying adjectives, like 'economic' or 'material', we are then evaluating not this factor or that in the scheme of things but the whole scheme itself. There are so many diverse elements involved that it is hard to comprehend the whole and still harder to evaluate it. In the great movements of social change there is, whatever standard we adopt, loss as well as gain. In what we may designate advance there is assuredly not an equal advance of all the items in our catalogue of goods. Every achievement has its costs, and men often differ as to whether the costs outweigh the values accrued. The 'simpler peoples' achieved higher social organization with the aid of slavery—was this progress as it was certainly evolution? Our own civilization has multiplied commodities and services through mechanized, standardized routine. The facilities and stimulations of urbanization go with congestion and the loss of the free contacts of nature. To balance the gain and loss in each total emerging situation is a hazardous personal judgment, and yet such an accounting is involved in every attribution of progress.

It may be said that we ourselves create by our preferences these new social situations, that it is our own devices and techniques which bring them into being, and that therefore they express at least the majority choice, the general estimate of the direction in which progress lies. But the truth is not

[7] Cf. A. C. Pigou, *The Economics of Welfare* (London, 1929), ch. I.

so simple. Whole situations are not presented to us to choose between. They may be the result of a large number of partial conditioned preferences but they are certainly not the result of an all-round preference. Whatever motives lie behind the inventive spirit, whether the sheer joy of technical mastery or the desire for profit or for fame or for the lightening of toil or the increase of goods, it is certainly not actuated by the desire that more men should live and work in cities and fewer in the country. Yet the chain of causes into which invention enters brings inexorably the last-mentioned result. The various individual items of desire which we pursue—even when they can be co-operatively or harmoniously achieved—do not merge into a whole which is the fulness of our desire. Besides, the distinction between the desired and the desirable here again arises to confute our attempted solution. Mill was surely wrong when he stated that there is no way of knowing what is desirable except that men desire it.[8] Our ideals not only stretch further than our desires—sometimes the two are in actual conflict. Creatures of habituation as we are, there are crucial situations when we must say, "I want this, but I know I would be happier or better if I did not want it, or wanted that instead." What we desire and what we feel we ought to desire are here opposed, and it is with the latter and not with the former that we link the idea of good, envisaged as realized or as in process of realization. Even were there universal agreement on the fundamental urges or the 'wishes' of mankind, that agreement would not yield an adequate definition of progress.

From these difficulties in the way of a 'scientific' concept of progress there seems no escape. Two paths tempt us, but they both lead to the same impasse. We may accept the subjectivity of the concept, and seek a definition in subjective terms. Of these the favorite is 'happiness'. Suppose then we agreed that progress means more happiness—though dissent would in fact arise from various quarters—yet happiness has no common reference. The lover and the religious enthusiast, the epicure and the ascetic, do not merely find it in different

[8] J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, ch. IV.

directions but actually experience it as different subjective states. And if we say, Be it so, but a precise definition of *social* progress is not on that account barred, for social progress means a change of social conditions such that more people achieve happiness, or more happiness, in their respective ways, then again we are faced with the utilitarian difficulty of the computation and comparability of happiness and with that even more formidable difficulty before which the greatest of the utilitarians yielded, when he said that it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.[9]

Finally we may try the other path. Premising that human beings are fundamentally alike, have the same organic natures, the same initial appetites, the same germinal capacities varying in degree of potency or of evocation, we may seek for a common content of progress by setting down those goods or forms of satisfaction which all men seek in the degree of their opportunity. If we examine the actual conduct of men—and all conduct is practical valuation—do we not find a large agreement concerning the things they both desire and find desirable? Can we not place in this list of goods, health, length of life (given health), assurance of the means of living, sustaining social companionship, the respect of one's fellows, and some degree or kind of power and prestige? And can we not then say that social progress means such change in the conditions of a society that these are provided in greater measure for its members? Observe, however, that our very limited list of common goods contains already two categories, certain minimum requirements of organic well-being and certain desiderata of a social nature. Now the first group contains nothing the desire for which distinguishes the savage from the civilized man or even the man from the lower animal. We should surely regard these fulfilments as elemental conditions of progress rather than as substantial contents of it. The establishment of the social conditions necessary to establish these requirements for the great majority is still far from being attained, and concerning these at least we may agree, concerning this first step on the road of progress. The second

[9] *Ibid.*, ch. II.

category gives us a little more trouble. In it we include one desire that is characteristically, well-nigh universally, human, that for distinction, prestige, or power in some direction. But the peculiarity of this desire is that it cannot be translated into a social ideal, for the reason sufficiently summed up in the homely words of the satirist, "when everyone is somebody, then no one's anybody".

Moreover, our minimum list omits certain of the more profoundly human purposes in living. If there is a large measure of agreement concerning its items it is because they are thought of chiefly as means rather than as ends of life. As soon as we try to import into it those cultural items which are more strictly ends, the consensus goes. It is in times of expanding civilization, when men are much preoccupied with means, that whole peoples are most apt to share a common belief and a common confidence in progress, merely because it is falsely identified with the means in which they are engrossed. In short, it is only when civilization and culture are confused that progress is thought of as a 'scientific' concept. When that distinction is adequately recognized and people endeavor to express their ideals of the 'good life', the difficulties we have already discussed reappear. There is, to begin with, the question of the priority of the goods in our list. The relative importance attached to primary or bodily satisfactions varies greatly. Temperament and education become involved, and the relative, fluctuating, subjective nature of the concept of progress is then apparent.

4. *The Place of the Concept of Progress in Sociology*

If the concepts of evolution and of progress belong to such different orders of thought, if the one reveals the emotional neutrality of scientific thinking and the other the varying coloration of our purposes and of our dreams, is it not the business of sociology, in studying social change, to discard the latter altogether? Is it not one of those alien intrusive concepts which have perturbed, from the days of Plato to the present, the attempt to see society as it is?

Certainly we must oppose the confusion of evolution with

progress. We need always to be on guard lest our personal valuations distort the reality we are seeking to understand. We must, as scientists, care more for the truth than for the consequences of the truth. The causal nexus of things must be investigated with scrupulous care for the evidences, whether they confirm or deny our prior beliefs. But if we endeavor to meet the conditions imposed by science we must also reconcile them with the conditions imposed by our subject-matter. As has been pointed out, this is no simple task. We cannot, in the manner of the physical sciences, leave human values out of account, uninvestigated, unscrutinized. There is a sense in which no social science can liberate itself from the realm of values, can be, in the German phrase, 'value-free' (*wertfrei*). Even the fine exposition of sociological *Wertfreiheit* by that excellent sociologist, Max Weber, leaves something out of account.[10] It is not merely that to understand any social institution we must see it in terms of the valuations which create and maintain it, it is not merely that these sustaining valuations are never given to us historically but have to be unwrapped from the confusing layers of overt professions and rationalizations in which they often lie concealed—it is also our problem that there is frequent discrepancy between the values attached to an institution and the values which it actually serves or disserves, and unless we know the institution as it is thus set in the antagonisms and harmonies of a system of social values we do not know it at all, and we certainly cannot interpret its changes. In this quest we are seeking still only for the truth, but this kind of truth is never, in the strictest sense, 'value-free'.

The concept of the desirable, and its comparative, that of progress, is never absent from human affairs. All conduct implies a consciousness of welfare, of less and greater welfare—we could neither live nor act without it. To live is to act, and to act is to choose, and to choose is to evaluate. Hence as human beings we cannot get rid of the *concept* of progress, though we are of course entitled to deny the reality of progress.

[10] Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre (Tübingen, 1922), pp. 451–502.

The fact that it is a subjective concept, that others differ from us, that we cannot demonstrate the validity of our concept as against theirs, only makes it more indubitably ours. If none can prove it none can refute it. At the least it is a vital myth, ineradicable from the creative strivings of life. What alone is subject to scientific scrutiny is the historical reality of progress, however defined; the manner of the dependence of progress, past or future, on specific means or agencies; and the content of the concept as it is framed by different individuals or groups.

It has been stated that the concept of social progress is a modern one, a birth of western civilization whose parents were the Darwinian theory and the Industrial Revolution. It would be truer to say that the confidence in the reality of continuous progress is modern. The *concept* of progress may be as old as mankind. True that often it appeared in the reversed form, so natural to every ageing generation, that the world is growing worse, but logically we cannot have the *concept* of 'worse' without that of 'better'. The lamentation for the 'good old times' is a commonplace of all literature. We find it in folk-myths everywhere. It is present in the third chapter of *Genesis*, which tells of the loss of Eden and the fall of man. Even thereafter, "there were giants in the earth in those days". But sometimes the eyes of the prophets were filled with the vision of future greatness and their minds with the belief in a deliverer who would usher in a new era. In classical literature, as in Jewish, the golden age was generally thought of as lying in the past, but there were dreams of its return, as in the fourth Eclogue of Virgil. The belief in achieved progress is not, however, absent. It underlies the *Prometheus* of Sophocles and it rings through the funeral speech of Pericles. On a wider scale, and most notably, it is the theme of the *De Rerum Natura* of Lucretius. Lucretius, who also had remarkable intimations of the modern principle of evolution, implicitly distinguished it from progress and significantly saw the latter as essentially a liberation from the thraldom of superstitious atavistic beliefs and practices. After the classical period the dominance of religious authority, with its rigid

views of the pre-ordained lot and destiny of mankind weighted down all interpretations of social progress. Such limited expressions of the principle as did emerge, from Augustine's "city of God" to Dante's *universitas humana*, were conceived in an entirely different spirit.

Many other examples could be given, but these may suffice to show that the concept of progress is not a modern invention. What is modern is the placid assumption, characteristic of groups or peoples living in an expanding industrial economy, that progress is the normal quality of social change. And perhaps no less the assumption that material gain, statistically measured economic increment, is a sufficient indication thereof. But in some sense or another the concept of progress operates as an historical factor in social change and must be reckoned with as such.

A final question remains. Granting that varying conceptions of progress operate in the historical scheme, that they throw light on the character of the societies which harbor their respective forms, that they are influences in shaping the laws and other institutions of these societies, and that on these counts they are amenable to sociological study, can we go further and in any way admit the right of the sociologist to introduce his own concept of progress? Or must he lay it aside altogether as a scientist while returning to it as a man? Here we approach more dangerous ground, but believing that the compartmentation of the human being is also dangerous, that the attempt to separate the *homo* from the *homo scientificus* is bad for both and perhaps in the last resort as ineffective as the setting up of the abstraction of the *homo economicus* or the *homo politicus*, we shall try to cross it. If science is truth, every region of life into which it can penetrate should be open to it.

We may suggest three positive ways in which the problem may be met. In the first place, we can freely recognize that progress is a variable concept concerning the validity of which agreement is impossible, but each of us can then simply say: To me, constituted as I am, progress means so and so, the increase of certain qualities or states of being which in a certain order or in a certain harmony I regard as desirable. I know

that others differ from me, but all I can do in this respect is to make my own conception clear. Then I can examine the history of society to see how far and under what conditions my concept of progress is actualized at various stages. For me, that constitutes concrete progress, but for you only so far as you accept my premises. My work remains scientific, provided that, having stated my assumption, I am genuinely inquiring how far and under what conditions a certain order of values, which I happen to believe in, has advanced in the historical process, and this investigation, if so conducted, remains perfectly objective, whether you accept or reject my standards of progress. I may, for example, accept the principle of democracy or of the more equal distribution of wealth as a criterion of progress, while you reject it, but a study of the historical success or defeat of either principle need be no less scientific, and the selective interest which determines it is as valid as any other. The degree of democracy and the manner of the distribution of wealth are social facts, and bias lies in wait, and must be avoided, whatever our attitude to them. Even neutrality is no prescription against bias, for neutrality may spell an indifference which fails to comprehend the social emotions clustering round the facts.

In the second place we may seek to reduce the area of disagreement regarding the concept of progress. It is only ultimate valuations which are beyond the reach of science. Many of our differences concern in large measure not ultimate ends, but the means through which they may be attained. An individualist and a socialist may have a common conception of social welfare, and differ mainly about the means. But any dispute regarding the relevancy of means to ends is amenable to scientific investigation. What we have to face here is simply bias, unwillingness to examine the imputed relationship of means and ends, not the ineradicable difference of the sense of good and bad.[11] No doubt, because of the complicated and changeful situations to which these opposed prescriptions are applied, any demonstration of their effects is difficult, but

[11] By *bias* we mean a disposition to reject the logic of evidence in favor of a preconceived belief.

the ceaseless social experimentation must in time throw light on them. The concept of progress which we have admitted to be beyond demonstration and therefore outside of science cannot be finally stated in economic, political, or technological terms, for such terms all refer to means, and the relation of means to any end whatsoever is not beyond the scope of science. Thus the differences of men concerning democracy or the distribution of wealth, to take our recent examples, may be restored to the list of subjects with which science is competent to deal. Such institutional arrangements can claim only to be conditions of a well-being which must be expressed in other terms.

Lastly, we may, as already suggested, investigate how far the course of evolution is accompanied by, or itself fosters, particular attributes of living which have a bearing on the concept of progress. This is in fact what various sociological writers, such as Spencer, Ward, Hobhouse, Oppenheimer, have done, though not always with a clear distinction between the two orders thus correlated. If we follow the objective course of social differentiation we see that it has a demonstrable relation to certain standards and modes of social life, that, for example, it involves a larger area of peaceful relationships, a diversity of functions and organizations which gives more scope for the expression of the variety of human nature, a greater control over nature which increases the economy of effort and in some degree liberates men from fixed irrational views of human destiny. Whether these changes be progressive or not remains a question on which men may differ, but that they are concomitant of the evolutionary process is a matter of investigation.

Let us in conclusion restate the essential and unbridgeable difference between the concepts of evolution and of progress. Evolution is the 'unfolding' of the nature of a thing, in the course of which it adapts itself in new ways to its environment, reveals more fully its potentialities, shows the variety and complexity hidden in its earlier stages and does so by objective signs which are summed up in the word *differentiation*. Progress, on the other hand, is the approach of reality to some

ideal. The concept of this process is formed in terms of our ideals, not simply of our knowledge. Progress implies a selective process of a different kind from that of evolution, for it chooses and rejects among the actualities of existence whereas evolution chooses among its potentialities. It is thus rooted in our practical life, in our conscious needs. It is a cause of change and is always relative to the conditions we want changed. It involves a picture of something seen by the mind but not yet visible on earth. It contains the sense of a present imperfection, an inadequacy which we seek to remove—only to find another inadequacy beyond it. It is one form of the quest for fulfilment, which all life seeks in its degree.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

THE REALITY OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

1. *The False Quest of Origins*

It has been fashionable in the last decade or two for American anthropologists and sociologists to minimize the significance of the evolutionary clue to social change. One prominent sociologist hails "the substitution of the term 'social change' for that of 'social evolution'."[1] One school of anthropologists is constantly attacking the doctrine of 'unilineal evolution' and tends to disparage the evolutionary method altogether.[2] These tendencies may signify revulsions from over-simple and sweeping formulations of the evolutionary hypothesis. With increasing knowledge we learn the endless diversities of social systems. But it is also true that there are endless diversities in the species of life, which fact does not prevent the biologist from discovering the evolutionary stages to which they belong. There can be vast differences between societies at the same evolutionary level, and in fact at any of the higher levels there must be—for this itself is part of the significance of evolution—great variations of one from another. If the ambiguous phrase, 'unilineal evolution', means a sequence in which specific institutions of the simpler societies pass by similar processes into specific institutions of the more advanced societies, then it is certainly to be rejected. But we have no reason to interpret evolution in this way. Differentiation, the emergence of more distinct organs to fulfil more distinct functions, may take a myriad forms. The system of law differs widely in, say, the United States and in France, but in both countries it has a character which entitles us to call it more evolved than the corresponding system in Melanesia.

[1] Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, p. 729.

[2] Cf. A. Goldenweiser in *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences* (ed. H. E. Barnes, New York, 1925), pp. 221 ff.

The main interest of the evolutionary method is not the modification of specific form into specific form but the emergence of a variety of more specific forms from the less specific. It is the very essence of the evolutionary principle that it is concerned not with the beginning but with the becoming of things, that it deals not with points of origination but with processes of change. The question of origins has always been an engrossing one for the human mind, and the mythology of all peoples contains crude answers to it. But the question itself, in most of its forms, belongs to pre-evolutionary thought. People used to ask—and answer—the question, How and when did society begin? That particular question has grown obsolete, and the answers to it, such as that of the 'social contract' theory, have been discarded. The seed of society is in the beginnings of life, and if there were such beginnings in any absolute sense we know nothing of them. But we still raise similar questions regarding the family, the state, the church, the law, and other social formations, though the quest for their origins may be as vain as that of the social contractualists. It seems at first sight a reasonable enough question. There was certainly a time when there was no state and no church, therefore, we argue, they must have had an historical beginning. So we have various theories of origin, that the state, for example, was the result of war and conquest and slavery or of the establishment of a dominant class or even of some convention or constitution on which people all at once agreed. But all these theories are misleading, because they misconceive the nature of an evolutionary process. There was a time when there was no state, and yet the state has no beginning in time, no point of origin. This is a paradox but not a contradiction, as it would have seemed to pre-evolutionary thought. We recognize now that even salient or revolutionary social changes need have no absolute moment of origination. When, for example, did the 'Industrial Revolution' begin?

Let us take one theory of the origin of the state to show how such theories mislead us. Franz Oppenheimer in his book, *The State*, gives the following version of the well-known Marx-

ist doctrine of its origin.[3] There are, he points out, two fundamental and fundamentally opposed means whereby man seeks to supply his needs. One is work, the other robbery, or exploitation of the work of others. The former is the economic, the latter the political means, and the state arose when the political means was organized. There are peoples who possess no vestige of the state, primitive grubbers and huntsmen. They have a social structure but no political structure. The latter originates among herdsmen and among vikings, the first groups to exploit others or rob them of the rewards of their toil. Among these arise class distinctions based on wealth and poverty, on privilege and the denial of privilege. The most decisive of these distinctions is that between the slave-owner and the slave. It was the warrior nomad who invented slavery, the seedling of the state. The grubbing peasant who toils for his own would never have discovered it. When he is subjected to the warrior and pays tribute, the land state begins. Similarly, through coastal raids and robberies the vikings created the maritime state.

Now if Oppenheimer had set out to show the importance of the rôle played by robbery and exploitation in the early making of the state, it would have been a valid enterprise. It would have involved a study of the relation of this factor to other factors and a close and difficult historical investigation which he avoids only by making certain dogmatic assumptions. It is, in the first place, arbitrary to *define* the political means as robbery, from which it follows all too simply that the state, being the organization of the political means, was established in the manner he describes. On this definition a pirate band would be a state, and not because it is organized but because it is organized to rob. Since the organization of the state certainly serves other ends, since it is concerned to establish some principle of internal justice so that the disputes between man and man are settled by a tribunal and not by violence,

[3] English translation, New York, 1926. The exploitation theory is not peculiar to Marxist writers, it is also put forward by authors of quite different schools, such as Gumplowicz in his *Soziologische Staatsidee* (2nd ed., Innsbruck, 1902).

since the economic factor is only one of its interests, only one of the ways in which from early times the solidarity of the group was maintained by the state, to identify the political means with exploitation is the simplification of an inadequate psychology. Significant as that motive was, it did not work alone. The authority of the elders over the younger kin was not exploitation, but it played a part in the making of the state. The tribal sense of justice evoked agencies of jurisdiction, and they too were conditions of the emerging state. And many factors contributed to create the kind of political loyalty without which the state could never have grown to maturity.

We are thus thrown back on the question, What does the state, *once it has clearly evolved*, mean? It implies, we may say, a territory over which a unified order is maintained by means of law, involving some kind of coercion of those who violate the order and therefore some kind of authority to which appeal can be made. This is the objective fact, the expression surely, of more than one aspect of human nature. Now there seems to be no people among which there are not rudiments of this order, a foreshadowing of the state. There may be no settled government, but there are always some elements of organization out of which such government may evolve. There will be elders, or an individual headman or medicine man who wields some sort of authority. This authority will be ostensibly based on age or birth or prowess or religious lore or magical power, but the authority is not wholly without a political aspect. In a small group, say of Andaman Islanders, there is no state as we define the term, but there are already germs of the state organization, custom which prevails by social sanction over a locality, and skilled or aged men who have prestige and win respect and obedience.

We should speak then of the emergence of the state rather than of its origin. It is a structure which in a certain process grows more distinct, more elaborate, more permanent. Its organization becomes distinguished from the organization of kinship. Custom passes into law. The patriarch becomes the political chief, the judge becomes the king.[4] Following this

[4] See my *Modern State*, chh. I–IV.

process historically, we can better understand the statement that though there was a time before the state was, the state itself has no beginning in time. Its birth is a logical fact, only its evolution belongs to history. The idea of historical origins is here related to that of specific creation, in the pre-evolutionary sense. There is no state among the Yurok Indians or the Andamanese, yet in some degree these are political beings, just as in some degree they are religious beings, though they have no church.

We pointed out in another context that our application to earlier social stages of terms indicative of later and more evolved conditions is apt to confuse our understanding of this fact.[5] Sometimes a term is sufficiently generic to comprehend the less evolved and the more evolved types of the social form referred under it. The term *family* is an example. But in other instances our modern terms denote specializations which did not exist as such in earlier stages. Of these the term *state* and the related terms *sovereignity*, *government*, and *law* are examples. The specific forms and functions so denoted are lacking not only in primitive tribes such as the Melanesians and the Eskimos, but also under much more advanced conditions. And even when political institutions are themselves highly evolved, as in classical Greece, it is often doubtful whether we should use our term *state* concerning them. As we shall show presently, specific institutions evolve earlier than specific associations. The people of Athens or of Sparta had themselves no separate term for the state. Their word *polis* did not distinguish the state from the community.[6]

Every community, no matter how primitive, contains germinal elements of the state. We think of primitive communities, in contrast to modern ones, as based on kinship. But this does not mean that the general bases of community, the common living and the common earth, were absent from their consciousness of solidarity. In some degree they were both present and determinative. Lowie well brings out the point that in the ostensibly kin-based community locality also served

[5] See pp. 252–254.

[6] Cf. *The Modern State*, ch. III, 3.

as a social bond.[7] If the sense of contiguity had not also been active, the social cohesion of the kin-group would have been dissipated. It is in part at least because of this sense of contiguity that the tribe exercises jurisdiction over the differences between families within its area, that it adopts strangers into the kin, and so forth. And other bonds, such as that of religion, merged with the bond of kinship. In fact, under the aegis of kinship were half concealed all the grounds of social relationship, including the rudiments of the state.

What we have shown concerning the state, that the search for specific origins is vain, could also be shown concerning the other significant elements of the social structure. We have already seen how unsatisfactory has been the attempt to find an original specific form of the family.[8] And we shall presently see, when studying the emergence of the church, how that process precludes the idea that it had a specific historical beginning. In this context it is permissible to speak of origins only if we mean thereby a process of formation which itself has no *terminus a quo*.

But surely, it may be said, some social phenomena have beginnings and endings. Have not many institutions disappeared and others come into being? Is history not strewn with accounts of the passing of organizations, from empires to outworn sects? We answer that we are dealing with social types, not with individual embodiments of the type which of course are always appearing and disappearing. But the type itself is a different category, and is revealed only as process. Here again it may be objected that type-forms also disappear at historical moments. Has not slavery passed away, or if it lingers in some parts of the earth is not its total abolition practicable? Have not totemism and the classificatory system of kinship disappeared in the more advanced societies? If things have an end, have they not also an origin?

Let us take the last two cases first. It is not indeed necessary to our argument that no social types should vanish alto-

[7] *The Origin of the State* (New York, 1927), ch. IV. Cf. also Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization* (New York, 1922), ch. XII.

[8] Ch. VII, 2.

gether. In the same way the doctrine of the continuity of species is not affected by the disappearance of some forms of life. Nor does the argument hold that what ends in an historical moment also begins in an historical moment. For what ends is a specialized form, and it does not begin as such but only grows into specificity. Even so, the social type-forms which we think of as dead are remarkably persistent. Totemism in its full significance as a basis of social identification and classification is absent in civilized society while characteristic of a wide range of primitive peoples. But the type-form of totemism is present vestigially among ourselves, as Goldenweiser points out, in the use of animal mascots, the emblems of political parties, badges and crests and other tokens, in such symbols as the flag and the college colors, in such orders as the Elks, the Lions, and so forth. "The names and things that are thus used as classifiers and symbols, habitually rest on a background of emotion. In the case of regimental banners, the emotions may reach great violence, while in the instance of animal and bird mascots there arises a complex of attitudes and rites so curiously exotic as to invite an exaggerated analogy with primitive totemism. The fact remains that the supernaturalistic as well as the social tendencies of totemic days live on in modern society. But in our civilization these tendencies, in the absence of a crystallization point, remain in solution, whereas in primitive communities the same tendencies . . . function as a highly distinctive vehicle of culture."[9] Conversely it may be said that many tendencies which 'remain in solution' in primitive society are 'crystallized' in our own civilization. Again, the classificatory system which is seemingly so alien to us has its paler analogues among ourselves. We apply the terms *brother* and *sister* to the members of various social orders, and, as Goldenweiser also points out, we even use for classificatory purposes some kinship terms (*uncle* and *aunt*) which were not so employed in primitive groups.

Finally, let us take the case of slavery, since it illustrates a further distinction. Slavery was abolished from among us

[9] *Early Civilization*, ch. XIII.

at a precise moment of history. It was an ancient institution of mankind. We need not pause to consider whether the surviving use of the term, in such expressions as 'wage slave' and 'white slave', are significant or fanciful, for certainly the definite type of economic relationship properly called slavery has disappeared. What has here happened is that a once socially accepted system has been legally or constitutionally disestablished. Since slavery involved an essentially coercive relationship, it could exist in a complex society only if legally established. Modes of social regulation can be set up and can be discarded. All specific institutions which depend for their existence on convention or prescriptive law have an hour of birth and may have an hour of death. But the great social forms are more deeply rooted. Regulation may modify them but it neither creates nor destroys them.

Social relationships are subject to an endless process of transformation, of growth and decay, of fusion and separation. Since they are all expressions of human nature, the social relationships of the present are found in germ at least in the past, and those of the past survive, if only as relics, in the present. We distinguish social stages, not by the sheer presence or absence of social factors, but by their prominence, their relation to others, their organizing function.[10] (Even abolished institutions, like slavery, may be present 'in solution', ready to 'crystallize' again if an opportunity is given.) The most significant social changes are not those which bring an entirely new thing into being, but those which alter the relations of eternal or omnipresent or universal factors. The pattern is always changing but the threads endure. What is new is the emphasis, rather than the factor emphasized. Thus, for example, democracy is not a kind of rule—or a mode of life—wholly apart from oligarchy or dictatorship. The elements of all are present together—the difference is the degree of dominance of one over the other.

[10] We may distinguish technological, as distinct from social, stages by the presence or absence of particular devices or inventions, as Müller-Lyer, for example, constantly does in his *History of Social Development* (Eng. tr., London, 1923).

Continuity, then, is an essential character of the evolutionary process. Continuity is the union of change and permanence, and when in this union we move in the direction of social differentiation we are following the road of evolution. The general nature of this road will occupy us next.

2. *General View of Social Evolution*

A primitive society is functionally undifferentiated. Its main divisions—families, clans, exogamous groups, totem groups—are segmentary or compartmental. It may have a fairly elaborate system of ceremonial offices, and a more elaborate system of kin-distinctions than is characteristic of an evolved society. But there are few groupings or categories into which, for the practical purposes of co-operative living, the members fall. The kin-grouping is usually predominant and inclusive. To be a member of the kin is *ipso facto* to share the common and inclusive rights and obligations, the customs, the rituals, the standards, the beliefs of the whole. These are of course certain 'natural' groupings, particularly those of age and sex. There may be prestige-groups, perhaps a simple system of classes or castes, though these latter are not found under the most primitive conditions. There may be some rudimentary occupational distinctions, but the division of labor is narrow and usually follows 'natural' lines, such as that between the sexes or between the older and the younger. The great associations do not yet exist. There is no separate organization of religion—still less of religions; there are no schools, no distinct cultural associations; there is little specialization of economic productivity and exchange. The only clearly associational groups, other than temporary partnerships in trading ventures and so forth, are usually 'secret societies', not specifically functional, and the very fact that they are 'secret' is significant, implying that the group has not yet found a way to incorporate them effectively within its unity.[11]

The undifferentiated character of primitive society is seen

[11] On primitive secret societies see H. Webster's book so named (New York, 1908); also F. Boas, *The Social Organization and the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians* (Washington, 1897).

in the prevalence of a simple communism. The tribe devises a system of participation in the booty of the chase and the products of the earth. Where private or family rights are admitted, it is in the usufruct, not in the ownership, of the land. Even what are to us the most intimate or personal of rights were then rights pertaining to the blood brotherhood. The lending of wives to tribal guests, common to American Indians and many tribes of Africa, Polynesia, and Asia, may be regarded as a mode of admission to the 'freedom' of the tribe. It may be, as Lippert interprets it, that thus "the guest enters into all the rights of the tribal members, and the special sanctity of the relationship revives the ancient rights of the latter".[12] The sanctioned licence at primitive marriage feasts, the institution among some African peoples of the 'bride-hut' where the bride was free to the men of the tribe, the pre-marriage prostitution of the woman as a Babylonian temple-rite, may be interpreted as survivals of sexual communism or at least as the assertion, before their alienation through marriage, of rights regarded as belonging intrinsically to the tribe.[13]

Such a communism typifies the simple solidarity of an undifferentiated community. Such differentiations as exist are based on the natural distinctions of youth and age, of man and woman, of different aptitudes such as that for leadership, and on a few socially acquired distinctions, such as the inheritance of ceremonial office or of magical lore. The myriad aspects of differentiation belonging to a civilized society are latent. The divergent interests, aptitudes, capacities which may appear in rudimentary forms have no opportunity to develop within the restricted range of the communal life. The social heritage is too rude to afford them selective stimulation. The mores appropriate to that narrow heritage tend to be repressive of such differences, as endangering the solidar-

[12] *Evolution of Culture* (tr. Murdock, Macmillan, 1931), p. 217.

[13] So many writers, such as Frazer (*Golden Bough, V*, pp. 36 ff.), Lubbock (*Origin of Civilization*, pp. 535 ff.), Lippert (*Evolution of Culture*, tr. Murdock, pp. 207 ff.), Howard (*History of Matrimonial Institutions*, Vol. I, p. 50), and Briffault (*The Mothers*, Vol. I, ch. XI) have interpreted these practices. Westermarck (*History of Human Marriage*, Vol. I, pp. 218 ff.) takes a different view.

ity of like-mindedness, the only solidarity of which the group as a whole is yet capable.

By a long and difficult process the civilizations of the past and of the present emerged from that early stage. How they emerged, through what blind forces of conquest and subjection and expansion, creating differences of wealth and of class, through what nurture of the arts, through what clashes of customs and faiths leading to some liberation of the mind, through what increments of scientific knowledge and its application, is the main theme of human history. For us here it is enough to point the contrast. It is characteristic of our own stage that we have a vast multiplicity of organizations of such a nature that to belong to one has no implication of belonging to the rest, that every kind of interest has created its correspondent association, that nearly every kind of attitude can find some social corroboration, and that thus the greater social unity to which we belong is conceived of as multiform, not uniform. This is the necessary intellectual feat demanded of the participants in the 'great society', and the many who still cannot achieve it belong to it in form but not in spirit.

Needless to say, the establishment of this present stage of differentiation was the task of many centuries, and pressures emanating from the older conception of solidarity have been strongly directed against it and are still in some measure operative. In the making of modern society it has usually been the state—though sometimes the church—which has sought to prevent further differentiation by making all other organizations a part of its own structure and subject to the conformity it imposed. Hobbes in the seventeenth century had denounced free associations as being like "worms in the entrails of the natural man", and as late as the end of the eighteenth the French Revolution had sought in the name of liberty to abolish all corporate bodies. Rousseau no less than Burke, the philosopher of revolution as much as the philosopher of reaction—so slowly do our minds perceive the growing social fact—could still not admit the separate organization of state and church, still believed in the 'universal partnership'

or the 'total surrender' which made the membership of a society culturally inclusive. Even to-day partial attempts are made to re-establish great societies on the basis of the simpler solidarity, as seen in some of the manifestations of both the fascist and the communist principles. But whatever the claims of these opposing principles—and again it should be clear that we are speaking of social evolution and not of social progress—it is significant that the attempts in question have been successful only in countries which had experienced to a lesser extent the diversifying conditions of modern industrialism, the cultural variations revealed in divergent faiths, and the centuries of conflict over the issue of free association; that they have succeeded only by establishing a coercive control suppressive of the differentiations which would otherwise arise; and that they have occurred as the sudden sequel of catastrophic and abnormal events, not in the more orderly course of social change.

We cannot attempt to trace the historical process by which these various grades of differentiation have come about, but if we turn to our primitive societies we can see the generic lines which that process follows. Since the social structure exists only as the creation of mentality, behind the differentiated form lies always the differentiating mind. Before institutions come attitudes and interests. As these grow distinct they become reflected in customs which assume a more and more institutional character. The continuum of social thought is interrupted by the spur of special interests which experience and circumstance detach from the undifferentiated sense of solidarity. There is thus a constant deflection of the social being from the uniformity of the social path, to be ignored, winked at, or suppressed by the guardians of the tribal ways. But if the deflection occurs repeatedly and in the same direction, aided by changing circumstance or opportunity, it may gain recognition, creating a zone of indifference within the older institution or establishing a new one beside it. Thus the ways of the group are diversified without loss of unity. Moreover, by slow accretion lores and skills are increased and particular members of the group become their repositories and

acknowledged practitioners. Specific modes of procedure, specific taboos, specific approaches to the mysterious powers of nature or to the *sacra* of the tribe, are thus developed—in other words, new institutions are formed.

The formation of institutions usually precedes, and often by a very long interval, the formation of associations. In fact, in relatively primitive societies the step from institutions to associations is seldom taken at all. For the associational phase implies an elasticity of the social structure which primitive conditions and primitive mentality can hardly admit; it implies the more difficult unity which difference combines with likeness to create. Social evolution must be already well-advanced, the scale of society expanded and the pressure of the common mores lightened, the diversification of interests enlarged through the advance of knowledge and the specialization of the economic life, before the right of free association becomes effective. Only under these conditions does the family detach itself sufficiently from the social matrix to become an autonomous unit, dependent for its creation and for its dissolution on the will of the consenting parties. Only under these conditions does the uniformity of communal education break into the variety of particular schools and other educational associations. And finally the great politico-religious system which claimed to control all the rest reveals the internal disharmonies of its enforced unity, and in their different ways the associations of the state and of the church are formed.

Schematically this process may be presented as follows:

I. Communal Customs
The fusion of political-economic-familial-religious-cultural usages, which pass into
II. Differentiated Communal Institutions
The distinctive forms of political, economic, familial, religious, cultural procedures, which become embodied in
III. Differentiated Associations
The state, the economic corporation, the family, the church, the school, etc.

The passage from the second to the third of these stages means a momentous transformation of the social structure. There

may, of course, be some minor incidental associations under primitive social conditions, but the great permanent forms of association, as we define that term, are as yet unthinkable. Primitive solidarity requires that if you belong to the tribe you belong also—or are adopted into—the kin, that if you share its life you share also its gods. The diversity of institutions, as they unfold themselves, is at first only the diversity of the aspects of communal life. In that growing diversity is hidden the germ of a new order, but it takes ages to develop. For the new order means a new and freer diversity. In our second stage there is one set of political institutions for the whole community. In our third stage there is still one state, but there are also political organizations embodying diverse ideas concerning the state. In our second stage there is one set of religious institutions recognized by the community, and these are bound up with its political institutions. In our third stage not only have they become detached from the state, culturally autonomous, but they have in consequence created a variety of religious associations. This freedom of association admits an indefinite multiplicity of contingent forms, with endless possibilities of inter-relationship and independence, based on the general foundations of a community life, the obligatory aspects of which are now safeguarded by the state.

The differentiation of the great associations from one another is accompanied by vast differentiations within their respective structures, responsive to the same forces which bring about the former. To deal in any detail with this whole process would occupy a large volume in itself. All we can do in the present work is to offer, in rather brief compass, a single illustration of it, so as to bring out more clearly the main principle. For this purpose we shall examine the process by which the organization of religion has evolved.

Before we turn to this illustration, it may be well to point out, in view of present disparagements of the principle, the kind of service which its establishment offers towards the understanding of society. While there are many social changes which may seem as undirected and inconsequential as the

waves of the sea, there are others which clearly fall within an evolutionary process. And in tracing these the student gets a firmer grip on the social reality and learns that there are great persistent forces underlying many movements which at first he apprehends as mere events in the historical flux. More particularly, the evolutionary clue, where it can be traced, has the following advantages.

In the first place, we see the nature of a system better as it 'unfolds' itself. Evolution is a principle of internal growth. It shows us not merely what happens to a thing, but what happens within it. Since in the process latent characters or attributes emerge, we may say that the very nature of the system emerges, that, in Aristotelian phrase, it becomes more fully itself. Suppose, for example, that we are seeking to understand the nature of custom or morality, things we are still very apt to confuse. We understand each the better by seeing how the two, fully merged in primitive society, have grown distinct as the range of conduct over which custom rules has diminished. And so with many another distinction, such as that between religion and magic, or crime and sin, or justice and equity, or right and privilege, or economic and political power.

Again, the evolutionary clue enables us to set a multitude of facts in significant order, giving them the coherence of successive stages instead of tying them on the purely external thread of chronology. For the historical record presents us with a confusing multitude of events, a mere chaos of change until we find some principle of selection. Inevitably we seek to discover the type or type-situation which these events indicate in a particular frame of time and space, and then to relate that type to earlier and later types. The latter aim is realized if we discover an evolutionary character in the series of changes. Take for example the endless changes of the family. In studying them we discover that within a certain area of modern history the functions of the family have become more limited to those essentially arising out of its foundations in sex, in short a significant time-succession is revealed. Just as biological science achieved order by following the

evolutionary clue, so here at least does social science. And the evolutionary principle, where discernible, is of far-reaching significance because it relates whole successive situations, no matter what their magnitude, to one another and consequently has proved serviceable in every field of science. So universal a clue must lead us nearer to the very nature of reality than any more partial one. It is surely a primary order of change that is revealed alike in the history of Rome and of Japan and of America, alike in the record of the snake and of the bird, of the horse and of man, alike in the brief story of each organic being and in the inconceivably immense record of the cosmos itself.

Again, the evolutionary principle provides us with a simple means of classifying and characterizing the most diverse social systems. If we tried to classify all societies on the basis of the kind of customs they followed or creeds they accepted, or of their diverse ways of making pottery or pictures or so forth, our classifications would be elaborate, cumbrous, difficult, and limited. When on the other hand we classify them according to the degree and mode of differentiation shown by their customs and creeds and techniques, we are taking as our basis a structural character applicable to society as such, and one with which the endlessly variant manifestations of customs and creeds are integrally bound.

Finally, the evolutionary clue spurs us to the quest of causes. Where we discover direction in change we know that there are persistent forces cumulatively at work. Some of these are indeed sufficiently obvious. We can trace, for example, the differentiation of the professions, and it is easy to see how the principle of efficiency or economy—which is one form of the expression of intelligence—would, given the conditions for its exercise, such as greater economic resources, a wider market, and better technological equipment, lead to this result. As early as the days of Hesiod, it was said of a man that "he had skill in many things, but little skill in any." In its degree this is true of every non-specialist. The following quotation from an American historian illustrates the condition out of which the differentiated professions arose:

bued form an integral part of the idea to the primitive, who views it as a synthetic whole." [15] Religion was an aspect of his way of thinking about things, about all significant things. "It was at the first, as it were, a mental atmosphere which enveloped every society, clinging most densely, like mist on the hills, to the salient features and occasions of its life, to sex and birth, to spring and harvest, to death and pestilence, to darkness and to the light that pursues it, to the sudden revelations of natural powers, to the kin-custom, and to the authority of the chief." [16]

Perhaps we should not call this pervasive emotional attitude, so hard for us to appreciate or describe, by the name of religion at all. It is rather the attitude out of which religion grows. Since the primitive mind has no conception of the operation of natural laws, the distinction of the natural and the supernatural, even the disturbing distinction of the physical and the spiritual, is not yet developed. It is not merely that disease and misfortune are attributed to malignant powers against which a system of protection, by the evocation of other powers, may be devised. It is that these powers themselves are both physical and non-physical, like the *mana* of the Polynesians and other peoples, mysterious properties indwelling in things, combining with the rain and the sunshine to make things grow, combining with the flight of the spear to hurt a man. The 'ghost' of a man, even his name or his mark or his painted image, has the same kind of potency as the man himself. Or again the man and his totem are one, identical expressions of the same quality. Even when the gods became distinct, they were but greater men living on the same plane or descending to it. For, as in *Genesis*, "the sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair."

This native response of the primitive mind towards an unknown world becomes, in time, traditionalized in the social heritage, becomes a lore with its rituals and creeds. Guesses at the unknown become formulated, socially accepted, instituted. The mysterious potencies of earth and storm, of ani-

[15] *Primitive Mentality* (tr. Clare, New York, 1923).
[16] MacIver, *The Modern State*, ch. V, 2.

mate and inanimate nature, become more definite beings, who must be approached according to prescribed formulae. Priests and interpreters, medicine men and workers in magic arise. The fused religious emotion, thus institutionalized, is gradually narrowed to certain aspects and phenomena of life. Thus cults are formed and are elaborated with accretions from various sources. Among the Californian Indians, for example, Kroeber sums up this process as "a progressive differentiation during four fairly distinct periods. During these four eras, the most typical cults gradually changed from a personal to a communal aim, ceremonies grew more numerous as well as more elaborate, influences from the outside affected the tribes within California, and local differences increased until the original rather close conformity had been replaced by four quite distinct systems of cults." [17]

These cults are not yet religions in the proper sense of the term. They are hallowed ways of doing things or of celebrating things done, and the sanctity is apt to be transferred from the function or occasion to the rite associated with it. The social is still fused with the supra-social. There seems to be no clear distinction of quality between the 'ghost' which migrates from the body and dwells in some physical object—the form of possession called fetishism—and the spirit which pervades inanimate nature. Above all, religion and magic are still closely intertwined. The distinction between them must emerge before we can speak of religion in any adequate sense. For magic is an art based on a pseudo-science, translating for purposes of manipulation non-causal association into causal connection. It takes, for example, the parings of a man's nails and by fanciful processes works evil on the man himself, or it makes a waxen image of him, and believes that the treatment to which it is subjected befalls the man also. It stills the storm by incantation and makes the earth produce by a charm. In magic there is no mediation, the act by its inherent virtue produces the result. It has certain elements that belong also to religion—ritual and mystery, but in essentials it is utterly different. For the object to which religion

[17] A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York, 1923), ch. XII.

is directed is to be approached in an attitude of reverence, creating relations of worship and of communion as with something high or divine, leading to a rule of life. It is true that even in developed religions the element of magic lingers, such as the belief in the mystic efficacy of ritual or again the belief that a religious ceremony by itself makes something good, such as sex relationship, which apart from it is evil. But in developed religions these are non-essential and even alien elements.

Such religions could not arise until the human was set in clear contrast to a supra-human reality regarded as divine and to be worshipped as a first cause. But since life was full of perils and pains, of injustice and violence, the growing moral sense was often compelled to distinguish between supra-human principles of good and of evil. Demons and devils thus became the counterpart of the gods, and as the issue between them was defined, a new fusion, of great significance for the later development of religion, appeared, that of the moral and the religious principle. In some advanced civilizations, the moral principle becomes so dominant that the religious principle proper grows obsolescent, as in the 'religions' of China and India. In others the two remain integrated, leading to many difficult problems of interpretation and preparing the way for the evolution of sects, as the variant moral sense sought to harmonize itself with theological traditions.

But that is a much later part of the story. The earlier follows another road. As religion is institutionalized, it becomes in a sense the property of the community. Dead heroes, dead kings, dead ancestors, real or mythical, are translated to the ranks of the gods, and the living kings already possess the attribute of divinity, as in Japan. The nature-powers, not only of native rock and plain and shore, but also of the air and the sky, become localized deities. Among this plethora of divinities order is achieved by the dominance of one over the rest, and according to the degree of dominance the religion tends either to henotheism or to polytheism. The henotheistic type, waiting to develop into full monotheism, was characteristic of many Semitic peoples, worshippers of Yahweh

or Baal or Chemosh or Dagon or Milcom. The Aryans tended to polytheism. Sometimes there were the special gods of the small community and beyond them the gods of the larger people, as in Attica the local deities were distinct from the Olympians. Localization went still further, down to the presiding deities, the Lares and Penates, of the household.

Religion, thus localized and institutionalized, became the exclusive possession of the group. To leave the community was to leave its gods also. The gods of the tribe watched over them, rewarded and punished them, gave them victory in battle—an attitude to which civilized peoples also revert in time of war. Religious institutions are then gradually demarcated from other social institutions. Religion itself tends to develop the distinction between the profane and the sacred, its organized mysteries are set apart from the everyday life. Special 'religious societies', that is, groups who severally possess certain religious beliefs and 'secrets' and practise their own rituals, arise within many communities. Sometimes the distinction takes a curious form. Thus among the Southern Kwakiutl Indians religious societies alternate seasonally with totemic clans. "In the summer (the *profane* season) the clans constitute the social organization; whereas in the winter (the season of the *secrets*) these are replaced or, more accurately, overshadowed by a system of religious societies." [18] Among more advanced peoples the relation of the priest to the ruler becomes the crucial issue in the process of differentiation. Where the two once coalesced, both the functions and the officials tend to grow distinct. In Israel the people demand a king apart from the sacerdotal judge. In ancient Greece as in Rome the priestly functions of the rulers atrophy and are in part invested in separate officials. In Egypt the conflict for supremacy between priests and kings assumes an age-long character.

The process in which religious and secular institutions become demarcated is too variant and elaborate for examination here. We must pass to the next transition, from the religious

[18] A. Goldenweiser, article TOTEMISM, in *New International Encyclopaedia*, 2nd ed., Vol. XXII.

institution to the religious association, the church. The 'religious societies' of the primitive world were not at all religious associations in our sense. They were semi-communal, partitioning the community like clans or totem-groups; they were not composed of members drawn selectively, by their own adherence, from a whole community. The institutions of religion grew distinct long before the concept of a church arose. The socio-religious organization of each group remained a unity. It was a question of harmonizing religious and other social institutions, more particularly religious and political authority, and the discords that arose were due to the struggle of the two powers exercised over the same community. Sometimes the socio-religious unity was threatened by the introduction of alien religions, not accommodated to the social system, like that of Baal in Judaea or the Orphic and Thracian mysteries in Greece or the oriental faiths and finally Christianity in Rome. But either they were driven out or they existed on sufferance, as exotic cults. China presents an interesting contrast here, for the religious principle was so dominated by the ethical that it lost its other-worldly theological characteristics and became a traditionally inspired way of life, admitting without great difficulty the variant interpretations of its prophets, native or introduced. Thus the struggle was far less acute. It is true that sometimes Buddhism was the official religion, sometimes Taoism, that on occasion the one endeavored to suppress the other, while at least once both were officially suppressed in the name of Confucianism. But on the whole these 'religions' were able to exist side by side without much disturbance.

In the ancient western world the greatest assault on the socio-religious unity was that made by Christianity within the Roman Empire. Christianity, perhaps for historical reasons arising out of the situation of the Jews within the Roman Empire, definitely dissociated itself at the outset from the political realm. Its kingdom was "not of this world". It formed a conclave distinct from, in fact separate from, the social order. With the introduction of such a faith the unity of the old socio-religious system was threatened. But the

issue never culminated. By a strange reversal, in the disintegrating Roman Empire, Christianity, changing vastly in the process, became the established religion, driving its predecessors underground. In its new form it gained at length an extraordinary control over a social life which had lost its other bonds of unity. The nascent association, with its distinct membership, disappeared, and the socio-religious union is reasserted. Throughout the middle ages two sets of institutions, two forms of order, two differently derived authorities, controlled the same society. The communities, themselves simple, relatively passive, predominantly agricultural recipients of a common culture, are subject to strains and stresses arising not within them, but in the unstable hierarchy that ruled them. The favorite mediaeval conception of the 'two swords', the secular and the spiritual, reflects the ultimate conflict of authority. The issue was whether the two powers should be in the same hands, or whether they should be separated, and if separated, which should dominate the other or how in general they should be related. The idea of two separate memberships, of two associations with distinct spheres and not necessarily the same range, was not yet born.

In the European middle ages the conflicting claims of ecclesiastical and political authorities were never reconciled. The spiritual sword might compel an emperor to do penance in the snow, or the secular sword might send the papacy into exile. But neither Avignon nor Canossa settled the question. Nor did the Reformation establish a new principle in this regard. The claims of Calvinism were at least as absolute as the claims of *Unam Sanctam*. The functions of the two authorities, the ecclesiastical and the political, were not delimited in respect of one another. The ecclesiastical authorities exercised political functions through their own courts and councils, and the political authorities exercised religious functions, making religion compulsory, controlling ecclesiastical appointments, and so forth. These conditions prevented the formation of the distinctive religious *association*, the church, having free spiritual authority over its own members only. And we may observe also that it prevented the clarification of the nature

of religion also—and more particularly of the religion in the name of which the issue was fought, for it immersed religious institutions in the atmosphere of political intrigue and above all it injected into this religion the alien element of enforcement. The nature neither of church nor of state could be realized until this element was extruded. Hand in hand with the social confusion went an intellectual confusion.

A long process of differentiation was necessary to remove this confusion. "After, as before the Reformation, the parish continued to be a community in which religious and social obligations were inextricably intertwined, and it was as a parishioner, rather than as a subject of the secular authority, that (the villager) bore his share of public burdens and performed such public functions as fell to his lot. The officers of whom he saw most in the routine of his daily life were the church wardens. The place where most public business was transacted, and where news of the doings of the great world came to him, was the parish church. The contributions levied from him were demanded in the name of the parish. Such education as was available for his children was often given by the curate or parish schoolmaster. Such training in co-operation with his fellows as he received sprang from common undertakings maintained by the parish, which owned property, received bequests, let out sheep and cattle, advanced money, made large profits by church sales, and occasionally engaged in trade. Membership of the Church and of the State being co-extensive and equally compulsory, the Government used the ecclesiastical organization of the parish for purposes which, in a later age, when the religious, political, and economic aspects of life were disentangled, were to be regarded as secular." [19]

The ecclesiastical authorities might properly seek, provided they used only 'spiritual' means, to make religion permeate the social order, but when they sought to extend their rule over that order they were faced with a hopeless dilemma. They could not grasp the secular sword without losing their proper identity. This was in fact the problem of the later mediaeval

[19] R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (New York, 1926), ch. III (ii).

church, torn between the Catholic conception of it as the all-comprehending arbiter of society and the contrary conception of its more spiritually-minded members and groups. The issue was complicated by all manner of more earthly motives on both sides but without this internal conflict could not have come that final disruption of the 'universal church' which was in a measure the unintended result of the teaching of men like Luther, who attacked at the same time the immersion of the 'church' in the evils of the social order and the control which it exercised over that order, who protested in the name of "religion pure and undefiled", the religion of the heart—a concept whose far-reaching implications utterly escaped him—who distrusted all institutions and handed them ruthlessly over to the civil power. Within the reformed church the inveterate belief in theocracy arose again to strength with Calvin, who restated the Catholic tradition for a society of burgesses and small traders, and to secure its supremacy translated religion into a tyranny more irresistible than that of any temporal Caesar, in that it rested for popular support on the inculcated superstition of hell-fire. Its intolerable character was sufficiently revealed in the Geneva of Beza and the Boston of Cotton and Endicott.

These conditions, with their cultural confusions, have in western civilization been, on the whole though by no means completely, dissolved in the process which from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century led to the establishment of the church on an associational basis and the concomitant differentiation of church and state. This differentiation, now attained in many western societies, is based on these principles: (1) that the church is a body of believers, a distinctly organized membership, distinct in its offices and services, possessing as a corporate body only cultural means of influencing its members and not claiming to exercise any kind of control over those who are not its members, membership being voluntary and based on fellowship within a faith; and (2) that the state, being an organization exercising compulsion and claiming territorial control, refrains from interference on religious grounds with the members or non-members of any church.

The establishment of these principles in western civilization, subject as they still are to qualifications and exceptions, was the work of centuries of struggle. It was the solution of a problem, the reconciliation of the unity of citizenship with the diversity of belief. But the problem was not solved as problems in engineering are solved, by the deliberate intelligent consideration of its true nature. Politics and religion are too close to human prejudices and passions to admit this method on so crucial an issue. The solution was reached because the old socio-religious unity broke down and every attempt to reassert it was defeated by the underlying conditions. Suppression and persecution and the compromise of 'toleration' alike failed.[20] Conditions had arisen under which authority could no longer secure religious conformity. Various influences conspired to bring this result—what stress should be laid on one and another of these inter-active forces is a much debated question—one instance of that perplexing problem of social causation which we shall consider presently. Certainly among them must be included the advance of science leading gradually to new conceptions of the universe and disturbing old thought-forms, the more critical and more realistic thinking stimulated by the rediscovery of the Graeco-Roman culture and the changing attitude towards authority engendered in the political and economic struggles of an age in which nationalisms were forming and the bases of the economic life were shifting.

Under these conditions the great ecclesiastical schisms occurred, and religious sects, hitherto held in check by the suppressive unity of church and state, arose and multiplied. Religion, in short, became to a vastly greater extent a personal affair. The final result was that the organizations of religion lost in many countries much of their social control. The earlier result was that in the countries where anti-authoritarian influences were most in evidence protestant churches, on a

[20] For the transition from toleration to religious autonomy see my *Modern State*, pp. 171–175. For the subsidiary questions of relationship between state and church which arise under this autonomy see *ibid.*, pp. 175–180. Cf. also Evarts Greene, *Persistent Problems of Church and State*, in AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, Vol. XXXVI, pp. 257–273.

definitely associational basis, grew strong. It has been excellently shown by Max Weber that the spirit of these churches was more favorable to the industrial capitalism which was emerging in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[21] How far that spirit prepared the way for the new economic order and how far it was itself an accommodation to changing economic conditions is again one of the open questions of social causation. Certainly, however, the two were congenial. The corporate individualism of the new industry was animating an evolution of the economic order and raising a problem of its relation to the state which, though it required a different type of solution, was in this respect similar to the evolution of the religious order, that it led from a stage of specialized institutions to a stage of specialized associations. The variety of economic interests, like the variety of religious interests, expressed itself in a world of manifold associations. This is the evolved character of the social structure in which we live, and it is from this basis that any further changes of an evolutionary character must proceed. Perhaps, for example, we may expect a future development of many varieties of other cultural associations whose seeds were hidden in the once-dominant organization of the church. As we have suggested, the associations of the cultural life are capable of a degree of detachment within the unity of the social order which is not possible for the associations of the economic system.[22] Economy, order, and peace require that men live in a closely integrated economic-political system, but the system is in itself indifferent to the endless variety of potential human ends which it may serve.

[21] *Religionssoziologie*, Vol. I (tr. Parsons, under the title *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, New York, 1930).

[22] Cf. ch. XII.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

EVOLUTIONARY FORCES: I. NATURAL AND SOCIAL SELECTION

1. *Natural Selection within Society*

The conditions of social instability which we enumerated in chapter Twenty combine in various ways into active principles of change. It is within these principles that we must look for the directive agencies of evolution. In this chapter we shall deal with the principle which has generally been regarded as the key-explanation of organic evolution and thence has been transferred to the realm of human society, and we shall set it in contrast to another type of selection which is inherent in the very nature of society itself.

The principle of natural selection takes into account two in particular of the conditions of social instability, hereditary variation on the one hand and the necessary adaptation of the variants to the same or to a changing environment on the other. The principle itself can be stated in a few words. Variation is always occurring under the laws of sexual reproduction. These differences from, or rather within, the type may be fluctuating results of transient conditions or—a point on which recent theories of organic evolution lay more stress—they may be distinctive 'mutations' capable of hereditary transmission. In either event they are apt to occur in every direction, but they are not equally favorable to the existence of the variant individuals. The less favorable are eliminated in the struggle for existence, the more favorable are encouraged and, if they prove to be mutations, are perpetuated. This is a process which obviously admits a direction of change, through the accumulation of favorable variations, and thus can assume an evolutionary character.

The struggle for existence has various aspects. It includes adaptation to the rigors of nature, to climatic and seasonal changes, to variations in the food-supply, and so forth. It

includes the resistance of microbic and fungoid infections or the acquisition of specific immunities against them. But also it includes the struggle between the individuals of a species for food, for shelter, for mates. And to this struggle, involving sometimes the preying of individuals on one another, must be added the struggle between species, or more strictly the struggle of the preying species to capture their prey and of the latter to avoid capture. It was the pitting of individual against individual, whether of the same or of different species, on which the earlier Darwinian theory placed such emphasis, and it was this picture of nature "red in tooth and claw" which seized the imagination of those social thinkers who made conflict the spur of evolution, though they tended to substitute the conflict of groups for that of individuals.[1]

From natural selection we should distinguish sexual selection as well as the selection exercised through the differential birth-rate. These latter forms, existing in the lower animal world, take on a new significance in human society, within which they are elaborated and intensified. But society is the foe of natural selection, which is sheerly eliminative of those who cannot meet the conditions set by nature. The principle of natural selection requires not only the continual emergence of biological variations but also a considerable surplus of reproduction above the numbers necessary to maintain the species. The intensity of its operation is limited by the excess of reproduction over survival. Its range is thus more and more limited in human society as the survival rate approximates more and more nearly to the birth-rate.

We are not here concerned with the debated question as to the efficacy of natural selection below the level of human society. It should however be noted that the term 'natural selection' expresses not a fact of observation but an inference. The indisputable fact is natural elimination, which is so adjusted that it tends to preserve the balance of numbers of a species through time and relative to other species. Though this balance is liable to disturbance it is generally maintained

[1] Among proponents of this doctrine of internecine conflict may be mentioned Ratzenhofer and Gumplowicz.

by the greater elimination of the individuals of those species which breed most or fastest. Not even the most extreme Darwinian would maintain that consequently the more prolific species, like the cod or the rabbit, are the most highly selected and therefore the most 'fit'.[2] Obviously a considerable amount of elimination has no relation to 'fitness'. The more moderate Darwinian argument is, however, that in the sweep of the eliminative forces the weaklings are destroyed so that the level of the species is maintained, and that among the individuals which escape premature death are likely to be those which vary in a direction advantageous to their survival.

So stated, the principle is a truism. It is not on that account unimportant, but it ceases to be the master-key which unlocks all the doors of evolution. It takes on the more modest rôle of a limiting condition, preventing variation from pursuing unfavorable roads. Nevertheless the facts show that the favored roads are also numerous. Fitness is always relative to environment, and there are many potential environments as well as many ways of adaptation to them. So far as the principle of natural selection is concerned, it is indifferent whether survival is assured by strength or by cunning, by boldness or by disguise, by speed to pursue or by speed to escape, by native vigor or by high fertility. And it has been sagely remarked that the very existence of the preying animals depends on the existence of the preyed-upon.[3] Moreover, while natural selection may be adduced to explain the maintenance of organic fitness within a species, it certainly does not explain the emer-

[2] Yet some sociologists seem to reason in a similarly over-simple fashion concerning the intricate question of the efficacy of natural selection within society. Thus, for example, Sorokin (*Contemporary Sociological Theories*, p. 306) approves as follows certain conclusions of the natural-selection school: "A low birth-rate, accompanied by a low mortality, means an elimination or weakening of the factor of natural selection; in other words, a survival of the weaklings who would be eliminated under the condition of high mortality which accompanies a high birth-rate. Under such conditions, the population of such a society is likely to be composed more and more of the progeny of the weaklings and less 'superior' people". For a criticism of this simplification see my *Community*, Bk. III, ch. VII, §§ 3–5.

[3] Cf. Tönnies, *Soziologische Studien und Kritiken*, Vol. I, ch. IX: Wenn nur die fressende Tiere überlebten, welche würden dann ubrig bleiben? Und wie würde es den fleischfressenden selber ergehen, wenn ihre Beutetiere vertilgt wären?

gence of variations, especially of mutations, and it further encounters grave difficulties when it attempts to explain the trend of these mutations towards more evolved types or species. The standard of fitness to survive justifies the unevolved amoeba at least as much as it justifies the piece of work called man.

When we turn to consider the operation of natural selection in human society the simplicity of the principle is lost. In respect of the lower animal world it was the term 'selection' which created our difficulties, here it is also the term 'natural'. The conditions of survival, of success in living and in reproducing, are profoundly modified by society. The struggle for mere existence becomes less individualistic and tends to be converted into struggle on other levels. The cohesion of groups destroys the sheer alternatives of nature under which the individual must wrest his living from her or perish. The struggle of groups with one another becomes more significant than the struggle of individuals, but this new struggle is not of the life-and-death character demanded by natural selection. (Life-and-death struggle survives only in the spasmodic outbreak of war between national groups, in which the fittest *individuals* are *socially* selected for destruction, an entire reversal of the presumptive plan of nature.) The range of co-operation extends more widely, restricting and modifying the action of the eliminative forces. We have seen that this extension of co-operation is a necessary concomitant or part of social evolution, so that there is an actual opposition between social evolution and the principle adduced to explain organic evolution.[4] Above all, the excess of reproduction over survival, the raw material on which natural selection works, grows less and less as the evolution of society proceeds.

Some eliminative forces are intensified under socially-created conditions, others are reduced—all are modified. It is only a blind transference of the principle to an alien sphere which could allow us to speak of the higher death-rate of stone-cutters from tuberculosis as natural selection, or the summer mortality from diarrhoea of slum-bred infants. If the conges-

[4] This point was cogently made by Huxley in his *Evolution and Ethics*.

tion of cities or the conditions of factory life are unfavorably reflected in the death-rate or if on the contrary preventive medicine and hygiene applied to these situations lead to a diminution of the death-rate, neither can the former be called 'natural selection' nor the latter a perilous interference with it. Selection, we have seen, is always relative to the environment, as is the 'fitness' which is selected, and now the environment itself has ceased to be, in the particular sense of the term implied by the principle, natural. Man follows his own road, widely diverging from that of all other animals. It is his nature to do so, and he must in doing so meet the demands of the universal nature to which he belongs. If he fails, the eliminative forces are always waiting to destroy him or force him back. In this sense, though in this sense only, he is subject to the limiting conditions of natural selection. But the ways to which natural selection is indifferent, which we have seen to be fairly numerous even in the lower organic world, are now vastly increased.

The social heritage everywhere modifies the stark alternatives of natural selection. The more advanced it is the more are the impulses of men set to other goals than mere survival. It increases the area of indifference within which variant ways of social living are possible and unchecked by natural selection. Society may even reject certain of the ways which natural selection prescribes for those forms of life which have no social heritage. Organic needs, in their raw simplicity, become a smaller part of the whole system of needs which urge men on. A further point is well made in these words of Lloyd Morgan:

> While mental evolution as such is still dependent upon organic evolution, it is no longer wholly subservient to organic needs; nor is it save to a limited extent conditioned and controlled by natural selection. Mind to some extent escapes from its organic thraldom and is free to develop in accordance with the laws of its own proper being, but in relation to a new environment. And although continuity of mental development in the race is still rendered possible by organic heredity, mental progress is mainly due not to inherited increments of mental faculty but to the handing on of the results

of human achievement by a vast extension of that which we have seen to be a factor in animal life, namely, tradition.[5]

The conclusion follows, in the words of the same author, that "natural selection is a constantly diminishing factor in the evolution of civilized man". As we shall see, another factor operating in a very different way, social selection, becomes a substitute for it within the increasing area to which natural selection is indifferent.

This conclusion is confirmed when we consider the rich variety of folkways revealed by different societies or, in the larger civilizations, by different groups within the same society. If variations are the raw material of natural selection it is here in abundance. But the rooting-out process is little in evidence. No doubt folkways that are profoundly injurious to the group must either be eliminated in time or they will destroy the group either by their direct effects or indirectly, by sapping its vitality in the struggle with other groups. But the survival of folkways, even under relatively primitive conditions, is no convincing proof of their 'fitness'. Unfavorable folkways, cherished in ignorance and superstition, may be established, may persist and erect formidable barriers against favorable change. We may take as example the endless magical devices for controlling disease, the taboos against valuable foods, Indian child-marriage, the celibacy of the more educated orders in the middle ages, and such curious practices as that of the Shingu tribes cited by Keller, where the old men obtain the young women for wives and the young men the old.[6] If even in the primary concern of sex every possible type of relationship is somewhere instituted, it would suggest that as between folkways natural selection does not act very rigorously. Groups have been eliminated in warfare or invasion by other groups, but this rude test is inconclusive since so many factors enter in besides the character of their respective folkways—numbers, economic resources, the possession of superior weapons, leadership, military organization, and so forth.

[5] *Habit and Instinct* (London, 1896), pp. 333–334.

[6] *Societal Evolution* (New York, 1915), the reference being to an account of the Shingu tribes by von der Steiner.

Primitive peoples have been wiped out by the imposition on them of the conditions of an alien civilization, but this again has hardly more claim to be called natural selection than the extinction of animals held in captivity. Depopulation has overcome once prosperous peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean, and this has frequently been attributed to their social vices, but without denying that such an explanation may sometimes be tenable we must observe that the extreme depopulation in question occurred in regions where the conditions of nature became less hospitable to man.

In general, therefore, a survey of the diverse customs and institutions of many peoples leads to the same conclusion as before. There is a certain amount of effective competition, growing as the range of social contacts increases, between the techniques and practical arts of different groups, leading to the elimination of the less effective *methods*. We may, by a stretch of language, speak of this as natural selection. But even this modified form has little application to the folkways. We may quote here the language of a writer who devoted his life to their study.

> In short, as we go upwards from the arts to the mores and from the mores to the philosophies and ethics, we leave behind us the arena in which natural selection produces progressive evolution out of the close competition of forms some of which are more fit to survive than others, and we come to an arena which has no boundaries and no effective competition. The conflicts are freer and freer and the results of the conflicts less and less decisive. The folkways seem to me like a great restless sea of clouds, in which the parts are for ever rolling, changing, and jostling, as temperature, wind currents, and electric discharges vary. . . . If they conform to the conditions and forces from moment to moment, that is the end of their existence.[7]

But where the eliminative processes are less in evidence, there is another selective process, peculiarly social in its character, which is at work, a process which takes over the area of indifference from which natural selection retreats.

[7] Quoted from an essay by W. S. Summer in Keller's *Societal Evolution*, ch. VIII.

2. *Social Selection*

In so far as forces generated within human society and operating through social relationships create conditions which affect the reproduction and survival rates of the population as a whole and differentially of the various groups within it, we can term the process *social selection*. In its modes of operation it stands in marked contrast to natural selection. Natural selection acts solely through the death-rate, selecting between beings already in existence, while social selection acts through the death-rate but also, and more characteristically, through the birth-rate. As regards the death-rate, social selection may raise it for some groups and lower it for others, as is evidenced by the differential mortality from occupational diseases. If stone-cutters have a high mortality from tuberculosis or if the children of workers in white lead have a lessened chance of survival, the lethal forces of nature are here implemented by conditions for which society is responsible. If on the other hand, the child mortality of all classes, though in different degrees, is lessened by better nutrition and hygiene and the various applications of medical science, here the lethal forces of nature are checked by socially created conditions. As we have seen, natural selection within society is never, at any social stage, 'natural'—it is always modified, whether diminished or intensified, by social influences.

The instances we have just given illustrate a distinction between two modes of social selection, one the mere sequel of social conditions established with different ends in view, the other the direct result of social planning towards the end thereby achieved. In a great many ways the organization of society, apart from any such intention on the part of its members, alters the balance of reproduction and survival. The social conditions determining the relative success or failure of different groups, the rules regulating economic inheritance, the distribution of occupations responsive to technological advance, the opportunities for the employment of women, the length of the training required for the professions—these are simply a few of the more obvious factors which, as they change, affect also the modes of social selection. But in this process

direct controls of various kinds and degrees emerge. Society directly controls the death-rate by rules concerning sanitation and hygiene, by the institution of medical facilities in general, more especially by the application of preventive medicine; by rules intended to safeguard its members against material hazards endangering life and in some degree by penalties against homicide, infanticide, and abortion. Society controls the mating relationship partly by definite regulation of the marriage contract, establishing a minimum age limit, proscribing bigamy, permitting or denying divorce, requiring in some states a certificate of health, and so forth: but the control exercised through the mores is far more significant than that exercised through the laws. Society attempts to control the birth-rate by prohibiting, permitting, or facilitating the dissemination of knowledge concerning birth control; by mitigating through tax exemptions, wage allowances, and other devices, the costs of raising a family; providing for the segregation, and in some instances for the sterilization, of the very 'unfit': but here again the controls exercised through the mores of each group and community, controls made effective through individual volition and not through public regulation, are of vastly greater moment.

In these direct controls, both of the laws and of the mores, the profound difference between social selection and natural selection is revealed. Before natural selection the organic being remains passive or merely resistant. It is in no wise an expression of his nature, still less of his desires. But social selection is volitional, the direct or the indirect result of human purposes. Natural selection offers only the alternatives of death or successful adaptation, social selection offers many alternatives. It is not merely or mainly eliminative; it is in part preventive and in part creative, it determines the beings who are to be born, not only the beings who are to survive. It is concerned with preferences, it makes effective certain out of many possibilities. If we think only of one aspect of it, sexual selection, we can apprehend the infinite variety of its operation. Natural selection demands simply adaptation to an existing environment, it has no other standard. It favors equally the scrub

of the desert and the tropical forest. Social selection creates its standards in accordance with the society. Natural selection stands on guard outside the increasing area of indifference which the social heritage assures; social selection works within it, turning this indifference into its service. Natural selection limits the directions along which humanity may travel; social selection decides the direction within these limits. It would seem therefore that social selection offers the more promising clue to the interpretation of evolutionary change within society.

We have seen that society is subject to incessant change, often so rapid that no change in outer nature can compare with it. These social movements unloose particular selective agencies the efficacy of which is revealed in many ways. One of the most remarkable examples is that offered by the decline of the birth-rate since the seventies of the nineteenth century. An annual birth-rate of between 35 and 45 per thousand of the population seemed to characterize most of the countries of Europe in the earlier part of that century, though a few of the more industrial countries ranged between 30 and 35. Following a decline of the death-rate came the trend to a lower birth-rate. First apparent in France, it began abruptly in England in 1878 and in the eighties was markedly revealed in the statistics of Sweden, Denmark, Holland, and Australia. Thence it spread to the countries of Central Europe, and to America, at length including within its range, though in various degrees, every country of western civilization. This extraordinary development was accompanied by a no less remarkable continuation of the decline of the death-rate, more especially of the infant death-rate. This double phenomenon is perhaps the most signal instance the world has known of the sudden emergence of new forms of social selection, or as some prefer to put it, of new interferences with natural selection. The birth-rate which now characterizes the countries of Western Europe is below 20; the birth-rate of the registration area of the United States in 1928 was 19.7.

There is of course a limit to the decline of both rates, and there are some evidences that the limit is in sight in certain countries. The rate of the decline of the birth-rate diminishes

markedly when a certain level is reached. For example, in the eighties of last century Germany had a high birth-rate (in 1876 it was nearly 41) while France, which led the movement, had what seemed an ominously low one. By 1927 the rates of the two countries were practically equal (19.5 for Germany as against 18.8 for France) but the convergence was due overwhelmingly to the fall of the German rate while the French moved very slowly lower. As for the death-rate, the changing composition of the population under a falling birth-rate must eventually put a halt to its decline, even if the application of medical science and the healthiness of living conditions continue to advance. The changing composition of the population tends on the other hand to lower the birth-rate still further, even though the actual fertility, as measured by the number of children born to women of child-bearing age, remain constant.[8] But the future cannot be mechanically prognosticated by statistical projections of incompleted trends. This method would have led to false results if applied at any earlier stage of the decline. Those who interpret the decline in the birth-rate as race-suicide should turn their attention to the fact that, throughout the period of this decline, the absolute population of every civilized country, with the exception of France, where the control of the death-rate has not kept pace with the fall of the birth-rate, has considerably increased decade by decade.[9] In fact, during the whole period of the declining birth-rate, the actual increase of the populations of Europe and America has been enormous, and if we take instead the longer period since the decline of the death-rate began the increase has been unprecedented in human history. Since many of the consequences of this growth do not appear until after the lapse of a generation, it is not surprising,

[8] For the precise nature of this phenomenon see Kuczynski, *The Balance of Births and Deaths* (New York, 1928).

[9] It is true that the higher absolute death-rate of France, as compared say with that of the United States, is largely explained by the difference in age composition of the population, but it is nevertheless somewhat higher than the death-rate of the United States or of the low birth-rate countries of North-Western Europe would be under present conditions provided their age composition were the same.

particularly in times of large-scale unemployment, that many observers should still be impressed with the opposite fear, that of over-population. It is surely unreasonable to expect this absolute increase to continue for ever. The adjustment of population to changing conditions is itself a changing adjustment and is perhaps more subtle than we generally realize. Only if the total population were seriously dwindling would the fears generated by the present stage of the process seem justified; and if that condition were to appear who can say that it would not in turn set in motion corrective forces? The history of population theories since the eighteenth century shows the precariousness of short-run interpretations and the difficulty—but also the necessity—of the long-run view. Where severe population declines have occurred in past civilizations they have been associated with war and invasion, with pestilence, or with the denudation of the soil. The primal urge of race perpetuation is not necessarily undermined because it accommodates itself to new conditions. The fear of race-suicide may sometimes be another form of the ancient majestic terror that "men have become as gods, knowing good and evil".

Meantime the lower birth-rate combined with the lower death-rate indicates the development within civilization of a new agency of social selection. Like every assumption of control over the nature within or outside him, this new power presents civilized man also with new tasks, new responsibilities, new risks, and new prospects. Particularly, since the control of the birth-rate is a matter of individual or family volition, as affected by the standards and modes of living of different social classes, it has led, transitionally at least, to some conditions which may be prejudicial to the maintenance of the hereditary standards of the race. The more educated, the more successful, and the more prosperous are under present circumstances the least prolific. The lower child mortality among these groups by no means compensates for their lower natality. But there are indications that the tendency to lower birth-rates is spreading from the classes first affected to other classes of the population, so that the disparity, which is probably in part due to the barriers raised

against the knowledge of birth control, barriers only for the poorer and the less enlightened classes, is likely to decrease. Moreover, the equation of economic success and eugenic superiority is itself a precarious one, and in any event, the great disparity of standards of living which to-day is associated with the disparity of the birth-rates of different social classes under a highly competitive economy cannot be projected into the far future as an inevitable and permanent condition.[10] Nevertheless this new control, which we should never forget has been called into being, or at least justified, by man's control over the death-rate, creates the same kind of responsibility, though in a more vital concern, as every other means of control which man acquires: if its potential benefits are to be won it must evoke the mores of a new responsibility, especially on the part of those members of the community who are most highly endowed.[11]

The significance of the social selection involved in the declining birth-rate cannot be comprehended by a consideration of the general statistics indicating national trends or even class trends. The process is a most intricate one, showing a flexible accommodation to the variant conditions, and especially to the modes of living, of all the groups so distinguished within a community. While the process has permeated a whole civilization, overcoming all barriers of race and religion and territory and class and occupation, it exhibits a myriad differences of operation. An examination of some of these differences will show us its nature more clearly and lead us to understand more fully the human motivations through which it acts.

3. *Fertility and Mode of Living*

It has long been evident that both the birth-rate and the death-rate are correlated with the economic standard of living,

[10] On the relation of eugenic worth and economic value there are some good reflections in chapter IX of James A. Field's *Essays on Population* (Chicago, 1931).

[11] It is not of course implied here that the control of population is itself new; what is new is a method of achieving it. Entirely primitive peoples achieve a limitation of population by correspondingly primitive methods, closer to the 'positive' checks of nature than to the 'preventive' check of birth control.

and that in our own civilization both rates are lower where the standard of living is higher. But later statistics, while in general confirming this correlation, show that other factors than mere economic rating are involved. There are, for example, highly significant differences between occupational groups on the same income level. A study of these differences leads us behind the economic fact, behind the standard of living, to the modes of living of each group, in the determination of which the standard of living combines with cultural, occupational, and class differences. It is when we turn to the mode of living that we attain a more adequate understanding of social selection. Here is fully revealed the extraordinary responsiveness of human groups to the differences of social environment.

We shall use by way of illustration two census studies, one British and one American. The British *Report on the Fertility of Marriage* (Census of England and Wales, Vol. XIII, 1911, published only in 1923) is a landmark in our knowledge of this subject.[12] It divides the population first into eight classes, the five social status classes referred to on pages 79–80 and three classes taken, for reasons which will presently appear, out of the general ranking. These are the textile workers, the miners, and the agricultural workers. The Report shows the usual linking of higher child mortality and higher natality with lower economic and social status, but two of the special classes are anomalous in this respect. The textile workers vary unfavorably, having a relatively low birth-rate with a high death-rate; the agricultural workers show the opposite character of a death-rate lower than that of the whole class into which they fall both economically and with respect to the birth-rate. The third of the special classes, the miners, differs chiefly in the abnormally high birth-rate level which it attains. Already in these broad classifications we see the necessity for taking the mode of living into account.

[12] Cd. 8678. Part II contains an admirable analysis of the statistics. The discussion of this Report which follows in the text is in part taken from an unpublished paper read by the author before Section F of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (annual meeting, 1924).

We may note in passing that the Report gives definite evidence that in the higher economic classes, at the period of the census, the lower death-rate did not compensate for the lower birth-rate sufficiently to allow them to recruit the population proportionately to their members. The following table, based on the figures provided by the Census, brings out this fact in a simple form.

TABLE I

EFFECTIVE FERTILITY OF SOCIAL CLASSES [13]

Social Class	*Number of males enumerated in Census report*	*Total children surviving at Census date, born to couples included within the class*	*Effective fertility ratio*
I. Upper and middle classes	1,305,580	1,253,643	.96
III. Skilled workmen	2,664,169	3,977,351	1.49
IV. Intermediate	2,018,427	2,851,233	1.41
V. Unskilled workmen	1,831,778	2,765,322	1.51
VI. Textile workers	440,848	501,059	1.13
VII. Miners	900,317	1,466,000	1.63
VIII. Agricultural workers	617,784	905,278	1.47

The peculiar interest of the Report lies, however, in the revelation of inter-class differences. Let us take, for example, the professional groups who form part of Class I. The following table is particularly illuminating as to the relation between fertility and mode of living. We have added to it the first column in order to suggest that the professions fall into certain types corresponding to their relative fertilities. It will be observed that the professions are listed in order of ascending standardized fertility, in other words, in order of their fertility when allowance is made, in accordance with established statistical procedure, for the difference between the average age of the wife at marriage in each profession and the average age at which women married in the general population.

[13] Class II is omitted because of inadequate census data.

TABLE II

Type of Profession	*Profession*	*Wife over 45 at Census. Children born per 100 couples*			*Per cent excess standardized over crude*	*Per cent of children born per 100 couples who had died before 1911 census*
		Crude	*Standardized*	*Surviving*		
A. Professional class with very variable income and status and where conditions of profession are adverse to fertility	Actors	288	294	205	2.1	28.8
B. Professional class with relatively high income and status but attained after lengthy and rather expensive training	Barristers	280	308	241	10.0	13.9
C. Professional classes with high status and relatively low professional income but steady and assured, generally possessing private means. Conditions of profession somewhat adverse to fertility	Naval Officers	305	323	250	5.8	18.0
	Army Officers	316	330	253	4.4	19.9

TABLE II—*Continued*

Type of Profession	*Profession*	*Wife over 45 at Census. Children born per 100 couples*			*Per cent excess standardized over crude*	*Per cent of children born per 100 couples who had died before 1911 census*
		Crude	*Standardized*	*Surviving*		
D. Professional classes with variable income, dependent mainly on fees for individual services	Physicians and Surgeons	283	328	242	15.9	14.5
	Solicitors	322	352	282	9.3	12.4
	Dentists	359	365	293	1.7	18.4
	Architects	351	379	294	8.0	16.2
E. Professional classes engaged in literary and artistic pursuits, with uncertain incomes and generally not assured	Authors, etc.	317	336	262	6.0	17.3
	Painters, Sculptors, etc.	326	354	265	8.6	18.7
	Musicians, etc.	369	386	288	4.7	21.9
F. Professional classes with relatively established status and with relatively low income, but steady and assured	Schoolmasters, etc.	329	357	273	8.5	17.0
	Clergymen, est. church	322	391	275	21.4	14.6
	Clergymen, other religions	362	415	291	14.7	19.6

We observe that actors have the lowest standardized birth-rate of any group in the population, that in sharp contrast they exhibit the highest child mortality in the list of the professions, and that the excess of their standardized over crude birth-rate is extremely low for a professional calling. We may fairly infer that as a class they do not postpone marriage on prudential grounds, that on the other hand they restrict their potential fertility to an extreme extent, and that the conditions of the profession are prejudicial to the rearing of children. This last fact is in part explained by the migratory life which the profession involves, and in part by the professional employment of their wives. Each of these conditions is associated throughout the list of occupations with the tendency to a lower birth-rate and a higher child death-rate.[14] Clergymen offer the most complete contrast with actors. With a much lower child mortality they have the highest excess of standardized over crude fertility, and they exhibit the highest standardized (though not the highest crude) fertility in our list. In other words their habit is, probably on prudential grounds, to postpone marriage later than any other profession does. Possibly they tend also to marry wives of maturer years. But once married they do not restrict their fertility as much as other professions seem to do. The contrast between clergymen of the established church and other clergymen is of some interest in this connection. The lower birth-rate of the former is correlated with a longer postponement of marriage. Is this to be attributed to the hierarchical custom of the Anglican church, retarding as it might the marriages of curates as compared with the at once fully-fledged ministers of other denominations? If we go down the scale to the Class II category of "Itinerant Preachers, Scripture Readers, and Mission Workers" we find that not only is their excess of standardized over crude fertility much less (7.2) but also their standardized fertility is distinctly higher though it is accom-

[14] The employment of wives in what may be termed middle class occupations, such as those of teachers, clerks, post-office officials, and shopkeepers, entails these consequences to a very much less extent. (*Report*, Part II, Table XLIX).

panied at the same time by a higher child mortality. It may also be significant that, as compared with the general population, even clergymen exhibit a low standardized fertility, though high for Class I. The situation may be summed up in the words of the Report that "the Church appears to have held out to some slight extent against the general movement towards middle class sterility".

Other important differences between the professions are brought out by Table II. It is fairly obvious that the length of training undergone before occupational status or at least earning power is attained tends to delay the age of marriage and is correlated with low fertility rates, both crude and standardized. This is well illustrated by the rates for barristers and physicians. It is worth while contrasting also the returns for barristers and solicitors. In England the legal profession is divided into the two ranks of barristers and solicitors, entrance to the former group being generally more difficult and also more expensive. The former have a distinctly lower birth-rate, though for some reason the latter have the lowest child death-rate in the whole list. A sharper contrast is shown in the respective rates of physicians and dentists. Dentists do not appear to require to postpone marriage as the more severely trained physicians do—at any rate that is suggested by the fact that the difference between their standardized and crude fertility is extremely small. It is interesting that American statistics do not show this disparity; evidently the conditions of the profession are different in the two countries or were at the date of the English Census.

The relation between mode of life and fertility is illustrated at the other end of the social scale, by Table III, which shows the rates for selected occupations in Class V. It is especially noticeable that while in Class I the crude rates are always increased by standardization, in Class V the crude rates are with very few exceptions higher than the standardized. In other words, the age distribution of the wives in Class V is much more favorable to fertility. The members of this class, whether because they are less prudent in the present or have less to hope from the future, marry on the average at an earlier

period and consequently the age of their wives at marriage tends to be lower. It may be inferred that prudential considerations delaying the age of marriage and voluntary restriction of fertility after marriage tend to be present or absent together for the same social class. There are indications that the former factor has always operated more strongly in the middle and upper classes, but that the increasing discrepancy manifested in recent times between their fertility and that of the lower social classes is due far less to a further postponement of marriage, though that has occurred, than to the new operation of restrictive practices.

TABLE III

CLASS V OCCUPATIONS

Occupation	*Wife over 45 at Census. Children born per 100 couples*			*Per cent standardized less crude*	*Per cent of children born per 100 couples who had died before 1911 census*
	Crude	*Standardized*	*Surviving*		
Navvies	515	546	365	6.0	29.3
General Laborers	542	548	396	1.1	26.9
Scavengers	539	533	372	− 1.1	31.0
Dock and Wharf Laborers	546	537	372	− 1.6	31.8
Agricultural Lab'rs	547	561	455	− 2.3	20.7
Iron and steel manufacture, including rolling mills, tin-plate manufacture [15]	619	554	463	−10.5	25.1
Puddling furnaces, iron and steel rolling mills	622	571	434	− 8.2	30.2
Coal and shale mines; workers at the face [16]	652	604	462	− 7.3	29.1

[15] Includes also some Class IV members.

[16] Class VII.

We observe that at this end of the scale also there are considerations which modify the generalization that fertility is in inverse ratio to economic rating. Navvies share with the upper classes the distinction of having a considerably higher standardized than crude fertility.[17] This may be partly an effect of occupation, since many of them work on railways or for other reasons find it hard to have a settled abode. But it is interesting that the whole class of casual labor, represented in this list by navvies and general laborers, have a fertility relatively low for their general status. The next pair of occupations on our list, the dockers and scavengers, have also certain peculiarities. The Report shows, and calls attention to the fact, that if we take marriages of continuing fertility, i.e. where the wife's age was under 45 at date of Census, these two occupations exhibit the highest actual fertility rates in the whole series, surpassing even that of coal-mine workers at the face. But on standardization these rates are greatly reduced. It appears on analysis that both groups marry very young. Dockers take the first prize for youthfulness of wives at marriage, one-fourth of their marriages being with girls under twenty years of age, as compared with 13.4 per cent for the whole population. But along with this goes the significant fact that there are relatively very few young dockers and still fewer young scavengers. These are occupations into which men drift at a later age, generally after marriage, a fact which is reflected in the Census returns by the high proportion of marriages of longer durations recorded for them. It is therefore strongly suggested that their ranks are recruited by those who have failed to make good in other occupations, and that those who marry very young are less likely to make a success in life. Whether early marriage is the cause of this type of failure or merely an indication of the improvident and unambitious character which lacks the quality making for success we must decide on other than statistical grounds. Some light is thrown on the question from the other end of the social scale, where unusual lateness of mar-

[17] 'Navvy' in England means a pick and shovel worker on railways, embankments, etc.

riage is associated with what we may perhaps term the most ambitious professions.

Continuing our examination of Table III we may next note the contrast between the prolific agricultural laborers and the still more prolific workers in iron and steel. The healthier life conditions of the former are shown in their lower mortality rates, both child and adult, and consequently their effective married fertility reverses, as compared with the iron and steel workers, the order of crude fertility. Finally, we come to the most prolific class of all, the workers at the face in coal and shale mines. Miners are a class apart, with a distinctive social life of their own. They show again how necessary it is to take into account in studies of fertility the whole mode of life, for their economic rating in England was at the date of the Census higher than that of many occupations which exhibit lower fertilities.

If we had space to go through the whole list of occupations in the several classes it would reveal at many points the need of interpretation in terms of the mode of life, but a few further illustrations must suffice. A striking example is that of domestic employments. Domestic indoor workers have a crude birth-rate, for marriages of completed fertility, almost as low as that of barristers and an effective fertility even lower than that profession. Likewise, domestic service reduces the rates for coachmen and chauffeurs, considerably below that for the group in which cabmen and taxi-drivers come. Another indication is that certain employments, other than those of Class I, show a marked decrease of comparative total fertility for increasing duration of marriage. The occupations in question are heterogeneous, being those of domestic coachmen and chauffeurs, bank officials, and lodging and boarding house keepers and publicans, but in none of these cases does it require much ingenuity to relate the phenomenon in question to the conditions involved in the employment. Another significant, if surprising, fact is that the two very prolific classes, the agricultural workers and the miners, share with the professional part of Class I, and to a greater extent exhibit, the tendency to increase of *comparative* fertility with increase of

wife's age at marriage. Here we have a good example of the problem which the interpretation of fertility statistics involves. Must we assume that even among miners and agricultural workers neo-Malthusian practices are to some extent operative in the case of youthful marriages? Or shall we rather assume that these classes are less affected by the considerations, scarcely to be called Malthusian, which may operate in other classes to lengthen the interval between child-births at later marriage periods? Whatever the explanation, we must see here again some relation between specific mode of life and fertility. And there remains the supreme example of this relationship in the case of the textile workers whose low fertility, most of all in the case of the spinners, is entirely abnormal for occupations of similar economic status.

These occupational differences in fertility strongly suggest the conclusion that modern humanity is very sensitive to social influences, as distinct from racial or biological conditions, in this vital matter. It is much easier to assume that the conditions of occupation control the variations they reveal than that men select themselves for occupations which discourage fertility, say the occupation of spinner or of bank official, by virtue of a weaker instinct for large families. A like conclusion forces itself upon us when we consider the unprecedented decline in crude fertility which has been in progress throughout the civilized world in recent times, or again when we reflect on both the divergences and the similarities of population rates for different peoples.

The Report offers many further evidences of the sensitiveness of fertility to social conditions. One curious indication may be mentioned in conclusion. "The birthplace of the husband", says the Report, "has much more influence upon the size of the family than that of the wife". This means that in cases where either the husband or the wife has migrated from areas of higher to those of lower fertility, or *vice-versa*, the family tends to approximate more nearly to the fertility type of the area in which the husband was bred. For example, "rural-born husbands, married to London-born wives in London, return a standardized rate of 266, and rural-born

wives, similarly married (i.e. to London-born husbands in London) one of 250, a male excess of 16, while London-born husbands, married to rural-born wives in the rural counties, return a rate of 257, and London-born wives, similarly married, of 273, a female excess of 16." If we accept the hypothesis that the husband exercises the dominant influence—or did in England before 1911—the variation fits in well with our argument. A parallel is found in the English experience of marriages in which either of the contracting parties is an alien. Thus "Irish-born men married to English-born women have considerably larger families than English-born husbands with Irish-born wives, and the same difference applies to Anglo-Russian marriages" (*Report*, Pt. II, p. cliii). It would be extremely interesting to discover how far American experience, with its large proportion of inter-nationality marriages, corroborates this conclusion, but adequate statistics are not available.

We have dwelt so long on this Report because no other, at the date of writing, throws so much illumination on the intricate processes of social selection. Its evidences, however, are generally supported by statistics from many other sources. The predominantly social, as distinct from biological or 'natural' character of the influences making for differential fertility rates as well as for the general lowering of all rates, is clearly indicated. The tendency for these social influences to permeate from the groups of higher economic or social status to those lower in the scale is also seen.[18] It is the groups which are semi-isolated from these influences, living by themselves as quasi-communities, such as the English agricultural workers and the miners, which are most exempt from the process. And again it is those relatively self-contained communities, with mores strongly opposed to cultural change, such as the French Catholics of Quebec, which retain the old equilibrium of a high birth-rate and a high death-rate. The power of prestige and

[18] Significant evidence was given by Dr. Edin at the World Population Conference of 1927 (see Report of same, pp. 205–207) that in Stockholm the well-to-do classes were actually having larger families than the poorer groups among the working-classes.

the contagion of suggestion, as well as the slower impact of the same cultural influences, all work in the same direction. Nor are there economic obstacles to the spread of these influences such as limit the range of other practices of the well-to-do. In fact, in an age of compulsory schooling, child-labor laws, and old-age insurance, the former economic obstacles are transformed into economic inducements. The situation out of which this permeation of influences grows is well suggested in the following summary of conditions in a moderate-sized American city.

> The behavior of the community in this matter of the voluntary limitation of parent-hood—in this period [1890–1924] of rapidly changing standards of living, irregular employment, the increasing isolation and mobility of the individual family, growing emphasis upon child training and upon education and other long-term family plans such as insurance and enforced home ownership on a time payment basis—presents the appearance of a pyramid. At the top, among most of the business group, the use of relatively efficacious contraceptive methods appears practically universal, while sloping down from the peak is a mixed array of knowledge and ignorance until the base of ignorance is reached. Here fear and worry over pregnancy frequently walk hand in hand with discouragement as to the future of the husband's job and the dreaded lay-off.[19]

We turn now to some American statistics which reveal, though on broader lines, the influence of occupation and concomitant mode of living on the birth-rate, while they also throw light on some other aspects of social selection peculiar to a country of immigration. For convenience of reference we shall quote mainly from a recent U. S. Census monograph, entitled *Ratio of Women to Children*, 1920.[20] The Census gives annual figures showing by occupations the number of children ever born to wives who were reported as mothers of that year. The figures for 1920 show miners at the head of the list—the average number of children per family is given as 4.3 for mine operatives, while for foremen, overseers, and inspectors it is

[19] R. S. and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown*, pp. 125–126.

[20] Census Monograph, XI, by Warren S. Thompson (Washington, 1931).

4.6. Unskilled workmen (manufacturing and mechanical occupations, "laborers not otherwise specified") are high with 3.7; farm laborers show 3.5 and semi-skilled workers 3.0 while various skilled groups are distinctly lower; clerical occupations come towards the end of the list, ranging from 2.2 for clerks to 1.9 for stenographers and typists.[21] These figures are obviously not so conclusive as those cited from the English Report, since they do not show the size of completed families, and hence those occupations which fall to older men have unduly high averages. If we take on the other hand the figures showing the number of children ever born to women completing the child-bearing stage (aged 40 to 44), as given for the year 1925, we find again that Class V occupations head the list (miners 9.1, farm laborers 8.6, manufacturing laborers 8.3), followed by farmers with 8; that Class IV occupations, represented by semi-skilled manufacturing operatives, come next with 7.2; that Class III, represented by carpenters and plumbers, follows with 6.9 and 6.7; and that in Class I clergymen are highest with 6.3, while bankers show 4.5, and physicians and dentists respectively 4.3 and 3.9.[22] These figures, with one exception already noted, correspond closely to the English figures, though by themselves they are less conclusive. They probably exaggerate the size of the families in all classes, since a larger number of the more fertile wives would likely be mothers in any given year, and again more of the more fertile would be liable to have children when aged 40 to 44. The classes practising birth control are certainly least apt to have children at these ages of the wife. For other reasons also the samples cannot be regarded as adequate, especially for the groups having the smaller memberships.

Returning to the Monograph, we observe next the marked disparity in birth-rates of different parts of the country, no doubt corresponding to different cultural attitudes and modes of living. Everywhere of course the more rural areas exhibit higher rates than the adjacent urban areas, but there are

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[22] For an analysis of these statistics, see the article on this subject by Ogburn and Tibbitts, SOCIAL FORCES, September, 1929.

complicating factors which do not fall along these lines. "The highest rate for the entire population in any of the states (Utah, 151.8) is slightly less than twice the rate in the lowest state (California, 77.6). . . . The highest rate for women born in the United States (Utah 64.5) is slightly more than twice the lowest rate (Connecticut, 31.2)." [23] Another significant contrast is presented as follows: "North Carolina, which stands highest in the ratio of children to native white women, has over two and two fifths times as many children per 1000 women as California which stands lowest." [24]

There are also considerable disparities between the birth-rates of the native-born and of the foreign-born, as also between the rates for the native-born of native parentage and for the native-born of foreign parentage. The full social significance of the relevant figures would require the breaking up of these broad categories into their component groups, but the general classification is sufficient to show the rapid response of the members of many and diverse peoples to the social conditions generated in the same new environment. Generally the birth-rates of the foreign-born are considerably higher than those of the native-born, although in the Southern States, where they are few, and in Utah, "the rate for native white women is larger than that for foreign-born white women".[25] In different parts of the country the birth-rates of foreign-born women and their ratio to the birth-rates of the native-born vary greatly. Thus "West Virginia with 1,231 children per 1000 foreign-born white women has more than twice the ratio of Georgia with 560".[26]

It appears further that, while the percentage of the foreign-born who are married is much the highest for the three categories, the native-born of foreign or mixed parentage marry proportionately less than the native-born of native parentage. This very interesting fact is brought out in the following table.[27]

[23] Census Monograph, p. 5. The rates are in terms of the number of births per 1000 women aged 20 to 49.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

TABLE IV

Nativity	*Per cent married*	
	U. S.	*Cities of 100,000 inhabitants and over*
Native white	74.2	66.5
Native parentage	77.0	69.6
Foreign or mixed parentage	67.3	62.9
Foreign-born white	85.5	82.9

Only in two of the agricultural states, Wisconsin and Utah, do the foreign or mixed parentage groups show a higher proportion of married women than the native parentage groups.[28]

These figures are in accord with various other evidences regarding the second-generation immigrants. They point to the disturbing effects of a transitional social stage, which are also illustrated by the relative frequency of delinquency among the children of certain immigrant groups. The ways of married life are apt to be more settled ways.[29] Consequently we might expect the less settled, less adjusted groups to be less married. The first-generation immigrant clings the more closely to his traditional usages, but his children subjected in the formative stage to the clashing demands of the old and the new environment, with family influences on the side of the old and education and generally social prestige on the side of the new, are faced with a different and sometimes insoluble problem of adjustment.

Perhaps a not dissimilar conflict may be present in the change of social environment to which college education introduces in this country so many young men and women, and may be adduced in partial explanation of the low marriage-rates of women graduates and even of the peculiarly low birth-rates of college graduates as witnessed by certain studies.[30] No doubt other factors enter in. In the case of women graduates, for example, the argument may be put

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[29] Cf. Groves and Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships* (New York, 1928), ch. X. See also *supra*, p. 145.

[30] See, for example, John C. Phillips, *A Study of the Birth-rate in Harvard and Yale Graduates* (HARVARD GRADUATES' MAGAZINE, Vol. 25).

forward that a larger percentage of those girls who are in any event less likely or less disposed to marry may be expected to carry through a college career. But the author is inclined here, as also in respect of certain phenomena of urban life referred to in the discussion of the city, to lay more stress on the influence of the migration from one social status or one set of mores to another than on the effects of the new condition *per se*, in this case the effects of a system of education. An examination of this subject would, however, involve too detailed an analysis to be entered upon in this discussion.

Reviewing the manifold evidences of the activity of social selection, we are impressed by one great difficulty which all investigations along these lines encounter. We find social selection everywhere at work, but we never *see* its results as such. The causes are clear, the results are hidden. How, for example, does the present generation, because of the disproportionate recruiting of its members from the various economic and social classes of the past generation, differ from the latter? Can we *know* that the particular characteristics which its members display are differences in any degree due to social selection? They have been brought up in a changing social environment, and we can observe their responsiveness to these changes. The selective influences belong within that environment, and we can perceive how these influences affect their conduct, their social relationships. We can perceive how the lower birth-rate and lower death-rate are factors changing the family, not through selection however, but through the subjection to them of their present members. The results of accommodation to environment we can trace, the results of selection remain a hazardous inference. It is true that many writers speak confidently of the results of selection, writers like Ammon, Lapouge, Karl Pearson, McDougall, and a host of others, but their confidence depends on their various assumptions and not on the demonstrated establishment of a causal nexus. The most disconcerting fact, which they do not face, is that the whole social environment is changing at the same time that selection is taking place. It might be held—though even this assumption is, as we have already seen, somewhat

dubious—that physical or biometric traits are withdrawn from the influence of the social environment, and that a study of their changes reveals the specific work of selection. But the conclusions thereby attained, such as Lapouge's 'law' that the selective influence of urban life tends to eliminate the short-headed types in favor of the long-headed, are conflicting or contradicted by other evidences. We seem forced to the position that selection is always at work but what precisely it accomplishes remains unknown. It is certainly far easier to explain the genesis of a selective force, such as the differential birth-rate, than to interpret the resulting selection.

Baffled in this quest we turn to what seems a more hopeful one, the interpretation of changing life in terms of changing environment. Our study of selection suggests that this latter mode of explanation can never be complete in itself, but here at least the phenomena to be explained exist in contemporary and intelligible interaction with the phenomena which we adduce to explain them.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

EVOLUTIONARY FORCES: II. THE PROCESSES OF CIVILIZATION

1. *Civilization as Determinant of Society*

Our study of selection as an evolutionary principle was halted by a peculiar difficulty. In spite of the manifold evidences that selection is at work we were baffled when we sought to trace its effects on society. As will appear more fully in chapter Twenty-six, the only social changes we really understand are those in the presence of which we can reasonably infer the corresponding motivations of social beings. Social change immediately arises in the interaction of changing groups and changing situations. Obviously both group and situation must be in existence before we can have the psychological process which modifies social relationships. But social selection is determinative of a factor in change that never appears as such. It decides the hereditary composition of each new generation. It decides which of the endless variety of combinations of genetic elements possible at every moment will be actualized. But with the intricate complications of hereditary transmission, multiplied by the myriad diversely selective pairings which occur in a society, the attempt to learn what difference it would have made if selection had run on different lines is utterly hopeless. We must seek in other directions if we are to comprehend social change—perhaps by following them we can even circumvent this impassable barrier. For social selection is not an isolated factor working independently. It too is always changing in response to social demands. It too is rooted in social conditions and when the conditions are broad-based and continuous selection must seek to perpetuate the tendencies to which they give rise in the present.

Why then do social demands and standards change? Why do the selective forces themselves vary from time to time?

Always we have before us changing groups and changing situations. These two are the complementary factors of that constant process of accommodation which gives to society its ever-changing form. Shall we seek then for our evolutionary clue in the changing inner life or in the changing outer situation, in the creative or in the responsive activity of man? The latter direction offers greater prospects to the scientific mind. The outer is concrete, measurable, demonstrable. In so far as we can establish a clear relation between its changes and corresponding social changes we seem to be on scientific ground. In fact it was when sociology began to follow this road that it emerged from the realm of philosophy. Moreover, this approach has on other grounds a particular appeal and significance for our own age. The rapid changes of our society are obviously related to and somehow dependent upon the development of new techniques, new inventions, new modes of production, new standards of living. We live more and more in cities, and "in the city—and particularly in great cities—the external conditions of life are so evidently contrived to meet man's clearly organized needs that the least intellectual . . . are led to think in deterministic and mechanistic terms".[1] The most novel and pervasive phenomenon of our age is not capitalism but mechanization, of which modern capitalism may be merely a by-product. We realize now that this mechanization has profoundly altered our modes of life and also of thought. Attitudes, beliefs, traditions, which once were thought to be the very expression of essential human nature, have crumbled before its advance. Monarchy, the divine ordering of social classes, the prestige of birth, the spirit of craftsmanship, the insulation of the neighborhood, traditions regarding the spheres of the sexes, regarding religion, regarding politics and war, have felt the shock. The process, beginning with the external change and ending with the social response, is easy to follow and to understand. Take, for example, the profound changes which have occurred in the social life and status of women in the industrial age. Industrialism destroyed

[1] R. E. Park, chapter on "Magic, Mentality, and City Life" in Park and Burgess, *The City* (Chicago, 1925).

the domestic system of production, brought women from the home to the factory and the office, differentiated their tasks and distinguished their earnings. Here is the new environment, and the new social life of women is the response. The rapid transitions of modern civilization offer a myriad other illustrations. So men have abandoned the older concept of the innate fixity, delimited by race and nation and sex, of human nature—what was once thought to be the innate spirit of the social group appears as its response to a particular environment.

When the social phenomenon is thought of as purely a response, in other words, when the environmental change is regarded as prior, not itself dependent on changing human purposes, inevitably followed therefore by the particular response, we have the deterministic or, as it is often called, the materialistic explanation of social change. This type of explanation has many varieties, according as stress is laid on one or another aspect of the environment. If, for example, climatic or geographical changes are made primary, we are dealing with conditions which man certainly does not bend to his will, and the explanation becomes a very simple (though very inadequate) one. If, however, economic or technological conditions are stressed, the explanation becomes more complex, not only because these are constantly and often rapidly changing but also because they are themselves the expression of human activities and thus the determinism is never absolute. Such explanations can still be called deterministic if they assume that human nature remains unchanging through the process, so that the environmental change is always the initiating or precipitating factor of the social change, or if they make the social change the unintended but necessary result of environmental change which is indeed the work of man but only as the cumulative consequence of his efforts to satisfy his elemental desires. In one way or another we shall see that these assumptions underlie the important deterministic doctrines which we are presently to examine. In short, for the interpretation of social evolution they make the process of civilization primary, and cultural processes secondary and dependent upon them. . . .

The swift transitions of our industrial mechanized civilization have certainly given good ground for this standpoint. Not only have they been followed by far-reaching social changes, but very many of these changes are such as appear either necessary accommodations or congenial responses to the world of the machine. In the former category come the higher specialization of all tasks, the exact time-prescribed routine of work, the acceleration of the general tempo of living, the intensification of competition, the obsolescence of the older craftsmanship, the development on the one hand of the technician and on the other of the machine operative, the expansion of economic frontiers, and the complicated extending network of political controls. In the latter may be included the various accompaniments of a higher standard of living, the transformation of class-structures and of class-standards, the undermining of local folkways and the disintegration of the neighborhood, the breaking up of the old family system, the building of vast changeful associations in the pursuit of new wealth or power, the increasing dominance of urban ways over those of the country, the spread of fashion, the growth of democracy and of plutocracy, the challenge of industrial organized groups, particularly the organizations of labor, to the older forms of authority. With these conditions are bred corresponding attitudes, beliefs, philosophies. A great mass of contemporary social criticism seeks to depict and often to arraign the cultural concomitants of the machine age. Its tenor is generally as follows. Different qualities are now esteemed because the qualities which make for success, for wealth, and for power are different. Success is measured more in pecuniary terms, as possession is more detachable from social and cultural status. A form of democratization has developed which measures everything by units or by quantities and admits no differences in personal values save as they are attached to external goods or are the means of their acquisition. Men grow more devoted to quantity than to quality, to measurement than to appreciation. The desire for speed dominates, for immediate results, for quick speculative advantages, for superficial excitations. The life of reflection, the

slow ripening of qualitative judgments, is at a discount. Hence novelty is sought everywhere, and socially through temporary relationships determined by transient interests. The changing interests of civilization absorb men to the relative exclusion of the more permanent interests of culture. Men grow pragmatic in their philosophies. "Things are in the saddle and ride mankind." The mechanistic outlook explains life itself in behavioristic terms, as a series of predetermined responses to successive stimuli. The unity of life is dissipated, since from the mechanistic point of view all things are means to means and to no final ends, functions of functions and of no values beyond.

That the tendencies thus described are at least accentuated by the mechanization both of work and of the means and conditions of recreation is clearly established by a great mass of evidence. That they are the necessary or permanent concomitants of a mechanized civilization is much more doubtful. The critical reaction against them is itself significant of other influences, otherwise derived. Moreover, some of the tendencies which are attributed to modern technological conditions were attacked by the critics of past non-mechanized civilizations, by Thucydides and Plato and Tacitus and Juvenal for example. The critic properly lays stress on the aspects which he dislikes, so that they tend to fill the picture. But there are other and contradictory aspects in the magnificent complexity of a civilization. It is these which imperil the validity of all deterministic interpretations.

Moreover, the environment to which we respond is itself so intricate that our response must be selective. This fact creates a profound difficulty for every deterministic theory. Its one-way causation is defeated in so far as we exercise this power which in selecting also changes the environment. The difficulty is seen also in the internal inconsistency of the various deterministic theories. Suppose, for example, we are seeking to explain the peculiar characteristics of North American society. We cannot at the same time give priority, with Huntington, to the influence of climate and geography, and witb Turner to the influence of the frontier mode of life, and

with Marx to the economic system, and with Veblen to the habits engendered by the technique of industry. Any of these explanations may be sound for that matter, nor is one necessarily a determinist if he accepts any of them. Our argument is that none of them can be established on purely deterministic grounds, for we cannot on these grounds explain why a society responds to some at one time and reacts against them at another. The true nature of this difficulty will be seen when we examine the more explicitly deterministic theories. We shall see that they emphasize indubitable factors in the social process, but that they are inadequate when they postulate the over-simple psychology of stimulus and response which every form of determinism requires.

For this purpose we shall deal with two types of explanation, each of which has evolutionary implications. Economic determinism must be represented, if by one author only, by Karl Marx. Technological determinism, which is more congenial to American thought, will be represented by the incisive American sociologist, Thorstein Veblen.

2. *Social Evolution and the Economic Process*

The social stresses of the Industrial Revolution led in the nineteenth century to a revival, restatement, and sharper formulation of the theory that the structure of society is an economic creation and its changes essentially the sequel of economic changes. This movement may be said to have culminated in the evolutionary teaching of Karl Marx, particularly in what he called the materialistic conception or construction of history. In this construction we begin with the power of economic production as the determinant of primary economic relationships—given the stage of productive efficiency these relationships are "indispensable and independent of men's will".[2] This set of relationships is in turn the chief determinant of the whole social order, or, as Marx puts it in the third volume of *Capital*, "it is always the immediate relation of the owners of the conditions of production to the immediate producers . . . in which we find the innermost

[2] *Critique of Political Economy* (tr. Stone, New York, 1904), p. 11.

secret, the hidden foundations of the whole social structure". The cultural life of man, his intellectual, aesthetic, spiritual life, his creeds and his philosophies, and the social forms which are their vehicles, are the reflection of the economic order. Here is the 'material' reality which comes to consciousness in our ideals.

But the "material forces of production" are subject to change, and thus a rift arises between the underlying economic factors and the economic relationships built upon them. The productive process demands—and of necessity will secure—a transformation of economic relationships and therewith of the whole social superstructure. But the social and economic order does not conform to the gradual emergence of the economic demand. For the older order has created its 'ideologies' and its vested interests. It is those who are fettered by the now obsolescent order who awaken to the consciousness of its decay and accomplish its overthrow. A social revolution thus attends the birth of each new stage of society. The ideology of the dominant economic class opposes itself to the ideology of the class whom that order suppressed and whom the new would liberate. Thus, in the words of the *Communist Manifesto*, "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle".

As it was in the past, in the days of ancient slavery and in the feudal age of land-owner and serf, so it is to-day. The stage is different, but the process of evolution is the same—and so it will be until one further stage is reached, which obliterates the 'contradictions' latent or open in all preceding stages. The capitalistic order is in this sense penultimate. In it the class struggle is simplified, reducing itself more and more into the clear-cut conflict of two great classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. But the underlying processes of economic production are inevitably increasing the numbers of the proletariat in proportion to those of the bourgeoisie, preparing for the day when the latter shall become the whole and in the last revolution the class struggle shall end and the era of liberation from economic determinism itself shall begin.

How this last revolution will occur—and this is the only

aspect of the social process on which Marx lavishes his interest —is as follows. The principle of capitalism is the principle of profit-making through the hiring of labor. Labor is the only economic good that produces more than its 'cost'. It reproduces its 'cost', that is, the exchange-value of its own subsistence and maintenance, in so many working hours. This is the price the capitalist pays for it, but his profit is a 'surplus-value' that comes from the additional hours during which he secures for this price the services of labor. "Capital is a monster that is fruitful and multiplies". It is the law of its nature that it must grow in the hands of those who possess most of it. The rich become richer but fewer, the proletariat of wage-earners grows ever larger. This process moves to a climax. Capitalism begins with the 'expropriation' of the small owner, turning him into a wage-earner, then it advances to the 'expropriation' of the smaller capitalists. So the situation ripens to its overthrow. At last "the integument is burst asunder" and "the expropriators are expropriated".[3]

We need not here concern ourselves with the scientific quality, on which Marx prided himself, of his economic 'laws'. His theory of value and its corollary of surplus-value, his theory of the sole productivity of labor as such, and his law of the accumulation of capital, are derived from an outmoded, abstract, and narrow doctrine of the equivalence of price and cost, which modern economic analysis rejects. The importance of Marx does not rest on his elaborate but uncritical formulations of economic theory. It was as a dramatic and apocalyptic prophet that he stirred the world, appealing to myriads who suffered the hazards and the exploitations which accompanied the growth of capitalism and to whom his dogmatic assurance and his clear-cut forth-right program opened a door of hope or revealed a vision of conquest. From the scientific point of view his significance lies elsewhere. He postulated a theory of economic cause and social effect which became a challenge to later thought. He himself offered no substantiation of this postulate, though he was an effective critic of opposing doctrines. Accepting it, he found many illustrations of its practical operation,

[3] *Capital*, Vol. I, Pt. VIII.

but they were always illustrations, not proofs. For here we enter the perplexing realm of social interaction, and whatever factor we accept as prior in the process of change we can always show that it operates as prior, if only we ourselves begin with it. In seeking to answer Marx, later writers have been gradually forced back towards the apprehension of the intricate nature of social causation.

To see this problem aright we must set Marx in his historical setting. His theory of social evolution is methodologically akin to that of Hegel, whose postulate of the priority of reason as a causal principle was precisely opposite. Marx simply reversed the order. His 'materialism' is the counterpart of Hegel's 'idealism'. Hegel conceived social evolution as the unfolding in society of the universal spirit embodied in man. His interpretation leads from the postulated spiritual cause to the concrete phenomena of change; that of Marx from the concrete phenomena to the postulated spiritual result, the cultural reflection of the economic fact. Marx has the strategic advantage in this clash of opposites that he begins with the factor which can be objectively followed, so that the manner in which it is 'reflected' in cultural and social phenomena can be made the theme of scientific investigation. But he himself does not follow this difficult road. The logic of the reversed process remains the dialectic of his monster Hegel. It is still in form the three-fold movement of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Every social and cultural stage is unstable, for Hegel because it is a necessarily inadequate expression of the demand of the spirit for the freedom of fulfilment, for Marx because the economic order depends on productive forces that develop to new forms. Each stage therefore contains the seeds of its own decay, and they ripen into the opposing order of its antithesis, the counter-movement which asserts those aspects denied by the former. But the 'antithesis' is also a development of what was implicit in the 'thesis'. It attains a higher level, and in its supersession the 'synthesis' of the two comes into being. Here is the eternal process of evolution, but as Hegel was tempted to discover finality in the synthesis of the nation-state, so Marx, with his vision of a socialist goal itself

conceived as an ideal—though like all earthly paradises wisely left by him in visionary outline—ends with the synthesis of socialism.

In both systems social evolution is thought of as advancing through great well-defined stages, not by continuous sequence in the same direction but by the development of opposites. Marx gave a more drastic revolutionary quality to this concept. The Hegelian spiral becomes a kind of zig-zag. The temper of the new stage is first a revulsion from that of the preceding. The established social and cultural superstructure is pulled down in order to be rebuilt. It is of course a common observation, confirmed by many instances, that modes of thought no less than of external fashion grow stale and breed antithetical modes, that there is a 'swing of the pendulum', a critical revulsion of one age or even decade from the philosophies of the preceding, or of the children from the ways of the fathers. Such movements are especially marked in times of crisis, as the period in which the Great War fell amply illustrates. On a broader scale of time puritanism is bred from libertarianism and in turn passes into it again, classicism and romanticism succeed one another, and so forth. But often these changes occur within the same economic framework, and it seems sheer dogmatism to assert that they are necessarily and mainly inspired by *its* changes. There are other causes obviously at work, some on the cultural level itself. The man who voted for the ostracism of Aristides because he was tired of hearing him called "the just" was not an abnormal human being. The critical attitude, especially on the freer cultural level, is always present lest 'good' customs should corrupt the world or in order that 'bad' ones may be reformed. In short, the link between the social change and the economic process is far less direct and simple and sufficient than the Marxian psychology admits. An inadequate psychology is perhaps the fatal weakness of all determinisms. Marx asserted that human beings respond to the changes initiated in the productive system—how initiated, he does not tell us, for he speaks as though the changing technique of production explained itself and were a *causa causans*—in a simple determinate manner.

He ignores the complexities of habituation on the one hand and of revulsion on the other. He simplifies the attitudes that gather around institutions; the solidarities and loyalties of family, occupation, and nation are wholly subjected to those of class. Consequently he proclaims, in the words of the *Communist Manifesto*, that "our epoch has simplified the antagonisms of class" into those of bourgeoisie and proletariat, in spite of the fact that class lines are more simple, more demarcated, and fewer in a feudal order than in a developed capitalistic society.

Economic determinism, in short, does not solve the major problem of social causation. Its attempted solution rules out the influence of too many other factors. Economic influences are certainly powerful and penetrating. There are, for example, many indications that they profoundly affect political activities, and if Marx had merely taken the position that economic relationships are the clue to political relationships he could have offered, as other writers have done, a considerable, though by no means a total, substantiation of this view. Political like economic regulation is a means of control, and we have seen that these two means are directed in large measure to the same ends and are of necessity closely linked. But the relation of the economic to the cultural (and to its social embodiments) is less clear and certainly less conclusive. Our cultural interests are certainly affected by our economic interests. It is not difficult to establish correlations between social changes and economic changes, though it is harder to interpret them.[4] But how do we pass from these indications of interrelationship to the simple causal priority asserted by Marx? There seems no way, and certainly Marx failed to show one.

To this question we shall return. In passing, we may suggest a general reason for the expectancy that no such simple solution is possible. In one sense economic interests are primary, because they are directed to the means which are a basis for the satisfaction of all other interests. In another sense, however, they are secondary, because they are inspired by interests

[4] Cf., for example, Dorothy S. Thomas, *Social Aspects of the Business Cycle* (London, 1925).

beyond themselves, ulterior or intrinsic interests of which the economic means are merely the instruments, instruments which, as we have seen, are themselves relatively indifferent with respect to the alternative ends which they can serve.[5] They furnish the necessary equipment for whatever journey, to whatever destination, we undertake. We can agree so far with Marx that our dependency on the economic means determines largely our attitude to the whole social order which yields them to us in scantier or more abundant measure. We can agree that the conservatism or radicalism thus bred is apt to extend to the cultural realm, particularly to the 'stabilizing' cultural factors such as religion. We can agree that the mode in which the economic means are acquired influences the nature of the satisfactions we seek through them, that, for example, the competitive spirit engendered in the economic struggle affects our manner of living, our recreations, our philosophies, our ideals. We can agree that the struggle for the means of living, engrossing and perpetual as it is for the vast majority, must color, according to its character, the whole outlook of men. But in so agreeing we are simply admitting that the economic element is one highly important factor in the whole nexus of interactive influences which determine social phenomena. Its relative importance and its relation to other influences, varying according to the conditions, has still to be investigated—as we shall see, an intricate, difficult task. We cannot conclude that, because the painter is absolutely dependent on his paint-box, the nature of its contents explains the picture. No more can we conclude that the struggle of the artist to earn his living explains it. It would indeed be a remarkable conclusion, one certainly needing proofs which Marx never offers, that the means we use wholly elucidate the ends to which these means are applied.

Finally, even if we keep to the so-called materialistic ground we have no *a priori* right to single out within it the economic element as supremely determinative. Closely bound with the economic are the other aspects of civilization. The economic system, with respect to the distribution of property and the

[5] See ch. VIII, 1, and ch. XI, 1.

relation of producers to owners, may be revolutionized, as in Russia, while the technological system associated with the former order may endure and develop. We cannot assume that the social phenomena which distinguish a capitalistic civilization are essentially created by capitalism in that narrower sense of the term. Within it are other factors, mechanization itself, urbanization, the persistent and ever-swifter contacts of communication and transportation, the development of pure and of applied science, which can never be left out of the reckoning. In fact other forms of determinism give priority to one or more of these factors. As an example we shall take the doctrine of Veblen.

3. *Changing Techniques and Changing Society*

We saw that for Marx the causal series begins with changes in the techniques of production, but he relates these changes indirectly, rather than directly, with the changing social structure. They determine economic relationships, and it is the latter which are crucial in his interpretation. There is indeed considerable obscurity concerning the actual mode in which technical changes function in his system. But we regard him as essentially an economic, rather than a technological, determinist. Other writers have much more explicitly sought to show how social conditions are responsive directly to technological conditions. We may include among them F. J. Turner, who in *The Frontier in American History* depicted along well-known lines the social and cultural attitudes evoked by the life of the pioneer settler—the strong sense of self-determination combined with neighborly helpfulness, the rough practical versatility, the buoyancy and ready optimism, the belief in progress, the levelling spirit towards predetermined social distinctions together with the admiration of the 'self-made' man—and proceeded to trace the pervasive influence of these attitudes on American institutions. Many other writers have followed this or similar paths. Some have carried the method to the deterministic extreme, and as these raise most sharply the issue of social causation we select one of the most thoroughgoing of them for study.

Thorstein Veblen can quite strictly be called a technological determinist.

His guiding principle, reiterated insistently in his various writings, may be stated as follows. In human life the great agencies of habituation and mental discipline are those inherent in the kind of work by which men live and particularly in the kind of technique which that work involves. Here above all must be sought the influences which shape men's thoughts, their relations with one another, their culture and institutions of control. Habituation is the great moulder of the minds as well as of the bodies of men. "The way of habit is the way of thought." Man has certain drives or instincts, and these may be regarded as constants, but the habits to which they prompt vary accordingly to the varying opportunity for expression, according to the material environment. It is thus the difference in environment which explains the difference in the social structure. "A genetic inquiry into institutions will address itself to the growth of habits and conventions as conditioned by material environment, and by innate and persistent propensities of human nature." [6] These propensities are tendencies to act, to achieve, and they are fixed into determinate habits by the conditions of their expression. Man is what he does. "As he acts, so he feels and thinks." [7] The influence of the pragmatic philosophy is evident in Veblen's point of view, and combined with it is the influence of a contemporary mechanistic biology. Thus he tells us that "the forces which have shaped the development of human life and of social structure are no doubt ultimately reducible to terms of living tissue and material environment".[8]

The most explicit statement of Veblen's general view-point on social evolution is contained in the following passage:

> Social structure changes, develops, adapts itself to an altered situation, only through a change in the habits of thought of the several classes of the community; or in the last analysis, through a change in the habits of thought of the individuals which make up

[6] *The Instinct of Workmanship* (New York, 1914), ch. I.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 192.
[8] *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York, 1907), p. 189.

the community. The evolution of society is substantially a process of mental adaptation on the part of individuals under the stress of circumstances which will no longer tolerate habits of thought formed under and conforming to a different set of circumstances in the past. . . . A readjustment of men's habits of thought to conform with the exigencies of an altered situation is in any case made only tardily and reluctantly, and only under the coercion exercised by a situation which has made the accredited views untenable. The readjustment of institutions and habitual views to an altered environment is made in response to pressure from without; it is of the nature of a response to stimulus. Freedom and facility of readjustment, that is to say capacity for growth in social structure, therefore depends in great measure on the degree of freedom with which the situation at any given time acts on the individual members of the community—the degree of exposure of the individual members to the constraining forces of the environment. If any portion or class of society is sheltered from the action of the environment in any essential respect, that portion of the community, or that class, will adapt its views and its scheme of life more tardily to the altered general situation; it will in so far tend to retard the process of social transformation. The wealthy leisure class is in such a sheltered position with respect to the economic forces that make for change and readjustment. And it may be said that the forces which make for a readjustment of institutions, especially in the case of a modern industrial community, are, in the last analysis, almost entirely of an economic nature.[9]

Veblen explains this last statement further as follows: "Any community may be viewed as an industrial or economic mechanism, the structure of which is made up of what is called its economic institutions. These institutions are habitual methods of carrying on the life process of the community in contact with the material environment in which it lives."

Veblen never tires of showing the correspondence between cultural conditions and underlying techniques. Take the feudal order, for example. Technologically, it represents "a system of trained man-power organized on a plan of subordination of man to man". This characterization holds alike of agriculture and of industry. In the cultivation of the soil

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 192–193. The whole chapter (VIII) from which the quotation is taken should be studied.

it prescribes diligent unremitting toil and obedience to the superiors of the land. In industry what counts is, in the language of Adam Smith, the "skill, dexterity, and judgment of the individual worker", since as yet there is no place for the impersonal productivity of the machine and the qualities it evokes. The social structure has a corresponding character. The state is dynastic, based on personal authority and the subordination of class to class. Politics and war are fields of personal exploits, success depending on individual prowess and craft. Religion is personally authoritative, monarchical, hierarchical. But gradually the technological basis of this system is transformed, as mechanical power usurps the place of human power. New skills arrive and old skills pass, for the vocations of the designer, the engineer, the machine tender, call for other aptitudes than 'dexterity'. With habituation to the control of mechanism the idea of power itself changes. The dominating conception is no longer the arbitrary power of personal command, of will over will, but the regulated power of man over man-made mechanisms, obedient to inexorable law. In this reconstruction of the nature of power is inherent a new attitude, a new logic, which fights a winning battle against feudal preconceptions. The new technology, reinforced by the social necessities it creates, destroys the old organization of society. The institutions which resist the process most are those which are most remote from industrial influences. Thus in respect of high politics, the politics of war and imperialism, the old preconceptions are most tenacious. But the thrones on which they sit are undermined. The ancient virtues of "patriotic animosity and national jealousy" are hard beset by the necessities of international commerce and by the mechanization of warfare. Veblen illustrates this conflict particularly in the book entitled *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*, a conflict between the patriarchal imperial attitude of the ruling feudal class and the forces of industrialization within the country. The mores of the established order were contradicted by the lessons unconsciously learnt from devotion to technical advance, an advance the ruling class could not oppose because their own prosperity was bound up with it.

Thus the system of control became archaic and when the shock came its hollowness was disclosed. In other lands, as they became industrialized, similar conflicts have occurred.

The peculiar habits of thought of each age are then to be traced back to the particular discipline of life which is imposed by its techniques. Moreover, in the more democratic form of society the impact of technique is more unified and therefore more powerful. This idea Veblen puts forward in a chapter entitled "Evolution of the Scientific Point of View".[10] Here he points out that under a hierarchical system the technical basis of behavior has a widely different significance for the upper and the lower groups. The institutions of society are chiefly in the keeping of the upper classes, and their social function is the maintenance of the corresponding system of law and order. The discipline to which they are thus themselves subject diverges greatly from the discipline imposed on the subject or servile classes, to whom this maintenance of law and order is "at best a wearisome tribulation". Consequently there is a wide cultural difference between the upper and the lower classes. The upper are devoted to social institutions conveying prestige and authority, personal dignity and coercive control. The lower are disciplined by the specific techniques of every-day toil. But the spirit of this discipline, the habits of thought and life which their labor imposes, cannot penetrate to the upper classes who hold themselves aloof from participation in the productive process. Hence there are two cultures instead of one within society. Under the industrial-democratic régime, on the other hand, the influence of technique is more pervasive, and all behavior is more closely related to the same "work-day generalizations". Social attitudes and speculative thought conform more directly to the lessons and impressions derived from the industrial arts. All alike tend to think in terms of mechanism, of geometrical relations, of standardized patterns, of inexorable law.

For Veblen it is the "use and wont" of every-day life, whether it be pastoral, agricultural, or industrial in any of their forms, which is decisive. These habits embody themselves

[10] In *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization* (New York, 1919).

in institutions, and this "fabric of institutions intervenes between the material exigencies of life and the speculative scheme of things". There may indeed be a lag in the correspondence of the "speculative scheme" with the "material exigencies", because in times of transition men work in new ways while they still think in the old. The evolutionary process results from the accumulation of technical changes, from the 'march of civilization', from the improvement in the industrial arts towards greater efficiency. Social evolution is in short the process through which our social systems reflect technological advance.

Here a contrast between Veblen and Marx appears. Marx, in spite of his insistence on the scientific quality of his socialism, cannot conceal his ethical bent. He is an idealist in a deterministic disguise—and to this fact may be attributed the strength of his appeal to large numbers. He projects a goal or consummation of social evolution which, while ascribed to the operation of rigorous laws, will bring about a great liberation of the human spirit and a new social harmony. It is a form of revelation. Veblen, more faithful to the deterministic hypothesis, offers no revelation, no goal. His exposition is, to all appearance, peculiarly matter-of-fact. The process he expounds has no dramatic dénouement. "The growth of culture is a cumulative sequence of habituation."[11] If the resulting scheme of life can be called higher, this is merely a way of saying that its technological foundations have become more efficient and more complex, that the pattern of civilization is more elaborate, more subtle, and more diversified.

On these terms Veblen interprets the salient features of the current "scheme of life". Take, for example, the luxury of the leisure class. Its quality of "conspicuous waste" is the expression of the pecuniary estimation of worth which springs from the devotion to detached pecuniary rewards made possible by the financial structure and control of modern business. Take economic unrest. It is the expression, not so much of privation or exploitation as of the spirit of emulation and envy which the competitive character of modern economic life

[11] *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization*, p. 241.

engenders. The characteristics of the modern business world are due to the dominance of "pecuniary employments" over industrial activities. In the latter the desire for productive efficiency, a form of the "instinct of workmanship", rules, whereas the former are "predatory" and their spirit is one of "caution, collusion, and chicane".[12]

In his description of modern society the matter-of-factness which we have attributed to Veblen is relieved—and perhaps contradicted—by his caustic irony. It appears especially in his attribution of motives—the danger-point of all deterministic theories. Is it an adequate explanation which attributes the form of modern luxury to the principle of conspicuous waste? Does it differ in this respect from the luxury of Babylon or of Rome, or is conspicuous waste as much a motivation as a necessary concomitant of all luxurious spending? Is ugliness deliberately sought in the realm of fashion so that styles may be discarded more rapidly? Or, to take a more extreme suggestion of our author, was the purpose of the wearing of corsets by women to make them "permanently and obviously unfit" for work?

We are not questioning the value of the contribution which Veblen has made to the study of social evolution. He has revealed with much insight the close relation between the basic arts and the changing structure of society. But we must question the adequacy of his interpretation. Is habituation to changing technique so all-sufficient an explanation? We find marked cultural differences between peoples at the same level of technical advance, especially primitive peoples living in semi-isolation. May there not be grounds of variation inherent in the group itself rather than expressive of its external conditions? Can we be so confident, when we survey the changing trends within a single civilization, that cultural and institutional patterns are not woven from the stuff of ideas and creeds and interests otherwise evolved than as a response to our own material contrivances? What of the borrowing and assimilation of cultural ingredients? What of the reactions against established modes and conditions which are so frequent

[12] *The Higher Learning in America* (New York, 1918), p. 373.

in the higher expressions of culture? Man is a critic as well as a creature of habit—the irony of Veblen himself is a fine example of contemporary criticism of the social order. Criticism, like all other behavior, is relative to environment, but it is certainly not the expression of habituation. The environment, material and social, offers satisfactions and dissatisfactions, pleasures and pains, opportunities and repressions, in endless variety to the differently placed members of every large group. There is habituation and conformity on the one hand, there is stimulus and struggle and liberation and defeat and renewed struggle on the other. Was it not at the meeting-points of old civilizations, in the shock of their opposing cultures, that in the past the greater cultures of the greater societies have arisen? And is there not, in the wider ambit of modern civilization, the continuous contact of divergent ways of life and modes of thought to stimulate further changes?

Once more the determinist theory seems too simple, too sweeping, too conclusive. Emphasizing the concrete perceptual measurable factors it would follow the road of physical science to the goal of complete interpretation. But this tempting road does not lead us all the way to the social phenomena. We must therefore pursue other roads, even if they appear less promising scientifically, if we are to understand the full problem of social causation.

4. *From Deterministic to Anti-deterministic Interpretations*

All the interpretations of social change which we have so far examined have made it a function, as it were, of environmental change. They have not assumed that human beings and their social relationships are the mere playthings of external forces, but they have regarded them as essentially responsive to the conditions of the outer or material environment. If this position meant simply that with every change of his environment man also changes, it would be, as we have shown in chapter Sixteen, the most obvious of truths, the mere assertion of the universality of law. When the conditions are different society is different—a formula of this order is innocuous but unhelpful. But the deterministic theories give

priority to one term in the universal correlation. The equally valid converse, when society is different the conditions are different, has little significance for them. Changes in culture, changes in society, are not only resultants of the correlation, they are the effects on the active life-principle of the changes undergone by the environment. The more active factor in the correlation of life and environment is thought of as active only in response. Thus, to some, organic adaptation is the key-word; to others, conscious adjustment or maladjustment; to others, habituation. To some, the response of life is immediate and semi-automatic; to others, there is a lag before the cultural conditions are adjusted to environmental changes.[13] To all the environment is the initiating factor in the process of social change.

We have seen that, suggestive as these theories are, they give an unvalidated priority to one factor or set of factors. The exponents of natural selection do not come to terms with the conscious element of control involved in social selection or with the broadening zone of indifference to the operation of natural selection which the social heritage ensures. The exponents of social selection deal with socially generated forces which certainly act otherwise than selectively, which impress themselves on all who are subject to their influence; and, as we have seen, there is no way of determining the specific consequence of the selective process itself. The economic and technological determinists are too exclusively occupied with the psychology of adjustment or habituation, and, like the behaviorists, are apt to think they have explained a social phenomenon when they indicate that it is a 'response' to the 'stimulus' of given conditions. Certainly human nature is always responsive to environment, but how it responds may depend on its own creative character as well as on the environment which it in part creates.

Behind this doctrine of mere responsiveness there is hidden a peculiar dogma. Everywhere else we discover interaction, why here reaction only? The mind of man is plastic, impres-

[13] So W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (New York, 1923) and F. S. Chapin, *Introduction to the Study of Social Evolution* (New York, 1923).

sionable, but why plastic only? Why should it alone be subject to no immanent process of change, in which it becomes itself an active source of change within its world? The dogma that human nature does not change (from within) would make it an anomaly in the cosmos. If the configurations of the earth are changeful, if the skies themselves are so changeful that we can discern their inconstancy through abysmal depths of space, if every living thing bears the signs of its own different past, if man's body has evolved from something anthropoid and beyond that from shapes of dim age-buried creatures—how can one share the assurance that his mind, so restless and energetic, so uniquely purposeful, remains miraculously the same, or is so lacking in character, in the quality of development, that it for ever merely reflects a changing environment? If no two offspring of the same family are quite alike, if in truth men display remarkable diversities of disposition, why should the race be immutable or reveal no trend of change within itself? If man follows for ever his unresting purposes, visioned before they are realized in space and time, why should not these too prepare a path of change and how can they be dismissed as the only inefficacious realities in the whole scheme of things?

To take this point of view is surely to misunderstand the extreme complexity of relationship between life and environment, and especially the incessant and intricate interaction between man and his social heritage, that inner environment which is constructed not merely by his arts and his techniques but also by his beliefs, his desires, his fears, and his aspirations. It is here that the anti-determinists join issue with the determinists. They insist that human purposes are inherently creative. They insist, for example, that no scrutiny of the environmental conditions of ancient Greece suffice to explain the culture she developed. The old theories which attributed the culture or the social system of the Greeks or other peoples to the work of a few great minds or to the sheer genius of these peoples neglected the environmental factor. So do various modern anti-deterministic doctrines, those of the racialists and of certain 'idealist' schools such as the Hegelian or the Spenglerian. But this contrary one-sidedness should not

lead us to dismiss them altogether, any more than we dismiss the one-way theories of the determinists. We cannot thus rule out the cumulative work of human ingenuity, the critical discontent with things as they are, the endless trial and error, the visions baffled or fulfilled, the contagion of ideas. There may be many equally possible ways in which a group can adjust itself to the conditions of its material environment, many ways in which it can respond to its demands. There is room for the directive intelligence of the few. There is room for the play of conjuncture or chance, seized and directed in the unstable flux by the discerning mind. Even the social heritage does not impose one mode of conduct on those who 'respond' to it. They respond selectively. There is not one way of writing a novel or building a city or establishing a system of credit. Environment, the total environment, may be only a half-explanation of change. That it is the easier half to deal with in current scientific terms is no scientific reason for being content therewith.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

EVOLUTIONARY FORCES: III. THE PROCESSES OF CULTURE

1. *Immanent and Emergent Potentialities*

Society is a system of relationships between human beings who are in a process of continuous readjustment to one another, to the system as a whole, and to the continuously changing environment. Its moving equilibrium is itself a unity of these three closely inwrought aspects. The material environment is not the external world as it appears to the physical scientist; as environment it is now meaningful, the background of human purposes, pregnant with significance not intrinsic to it but derived from that relationship. It is the habitation of the group, whether it be the abode of the family or the fatherland of the nation, and its contents are now the furniture of their lives. This socialization, as it were, of nature is a fact of extreme importance for the understanding of social causation, and to it we shall presently return. Here we are pointing out that it makes possible the unity of the adjustment between man and man and between man and nature. If we truly appreciate the texture of this unity we shall be less ready to accept the one-sidedness of determinism. For it is a unity in which the processes of civilization and the processes of culture are interactive. To the determinists both the cultural and the social structure are epiphenomena, superstructures built on the foundations of environmental change; social attitudes are ways of thought which are either in correspondence with material conditions and thus realistic, or else they fail to correspond and become 'ideologies', parasitic thought-forms not deriving nourishment directly from the soil of reality. That the processes of culture are no less real than the processes of civilization, no less creative of the social system, is alien to their point of view. These realists attribute causality to one aspect of the interactive process in precisely the same manner

as do the opposing idealists who make society the realization of some purely spiritual or ethical principle, reason or liberty or the law of God. Alike they deny the immanence of causation; alike they separate the concrete social reality into abstract body and abstract spirit.

Let us turn again to the concrete reality of the social system and let us reverse the procedure of the last chapter, now making the cultural aspect our starting-point in the search of causation. There is no reason why we should not seek to discover the impact of changing culture on changing civilization as well as the reverse process. There is no *a priori* reason why, if we speak of a lag at all, it should not equally be a lag in which factors of civilization are inadequately adjusted to the cultural conditions. If new devices of civilization, developed without consideration of their cultural and social effects, have profound influences on the pre-existing culture, why should not new or old cultural demands mould the new civilization also? The hypothesis springs as simply from the fact of correlation, and its investigation, if seemingly more difficult, may be no less fruitful. Just as, for example, other writers have shown the effect of political, economic, and technological changes on religious attitudes, so has Max Weber, with no less cogency, traced the influence of religious changes, particularly the growth of ascetic protestantism, on the economic order. Curiously enough, the determinist school has provided the supreme illustration of the influence of cultural attitudes on society. The Russian Revolution was not inspired by the necessity to adjust the culture of Russia to the existing economic situation or to that of the other capitalistic countries. It was the social philosophy of Marxism, wrought into a dynamic evangelism and finding its opportunity in the suffering and disillusionment of a catastrophic war, which gained control of the economic and political order, and by persistent cultural propaganda, aided by the terrorism of the Revolution, transformed it over a vast feudalized territory.

In the quieter processes of industrial evolution the activity and creativeness of cultural forces may also be discerned. We are apt to think of the new industrial civilization as de-

throning the old culture, and again there are many evidences which point in that direction. We are apt to fear for the culture of countries which, like Japan or China or Mexico, are threatened by the invasion of machine production. Some among us fervently hope that countries wherein the threat is not yet fulfilled will resist the process to save their souls.[1] But the alternatives are not so simply stated. Every new factor, whether it be a creed or a machine, disturbs an old adjustment. The disturbance created by mechanism was so great that it seemed the enemy of culture, as indeed all revolutions seem. The wealth-bringing machine brought also ugliness, shoddiness, haste, standardization. The utilitarian gain masked for a time the cultural loss. But culture, if more slowly, acts in turn on civilization. It does not suffer even the machine to remain in crude utility, detached from the further purposes of living. It brings the machine also into the world of the imagination and endows it not only with power but also, often, with beauty. It makes the new means of living at length more tractable to the uses of personality, and new arts blossom on the ruins of the old. The new means become at length means to culture also, nor should we forget, because of the disturbance and the struggle for mastery, that a high culture needs the equipment of civilization. Culture will not be high simply because the equipment is present—it will not rise higher than its source in the spiritual quality of the people. But, as all past periods of great cultural achievement show, it needs the possession of resources, of leisure, of some degree of security, all of which the power of the machine can, if men care to use it so, provide in greater measure.

By his civilization man overcomes necessity, gains control over the means of living, establishes order in his world; thus he deals with conditions imposed on him by nature or by the sheer presence of his fellow-men. But the world without addresses no such imperative to his culture; in his enjoyments, his creative arts, his philosophies, he obeys rather the dictates of his own nature. Thus civilization and culture change or persist in accordance with different principles. The civiliza-

[1] Cf. Stuart Chase, *Mexico* (New York, 1931).

tion that passes is the civilization that under the given conditions is less effective as a means of control. The culture that perishes is the culture that no longer appeals to *us*, that *we* no longer care about. We adjust our culture to ourselves, but we adjust ourselves to our civilization. But this antithesis, though broadly true, is not the whole truth. As our civilization limits our cultural freedom, so does our culture invade the realm of necessity. If we look back, for example, to the culture of the middle ages, we cannot but be impressed with the manner in which certain cultural attitudes, derived from a mixture of classical, Christian, and Arabian traditions and compounded into a dogmatic system, pervaded the whole social structure. To all appearance these attitudes or thought-forms were not inevitable concomitants of a feudal economy, though they could be and were reconciled with it. It is hard to see how mediaeval ideas regarding alchemy, magic, transubstantiation, the virtue of chastity, the celibacy of the clergy, the authority of the church, and so forth, could spring from the mere soil of feudalism, and it is easy to see how they were in large measure adapted from different pre-existing cultures.

Instead, therefore, of explaining the social unity of adjustment between man and man and between man and nature in terms of his civilization alone, or of his culture alone, we should seek for the ground of unity in the human mentality which creates, under the spur of outer necessity or through the promptings of that inner necessity which is also liberty, both these aspects, and weaves them together. The same human capacities underlie the technological and economic systems, the cultural pattern, and the social order. The intelligence which creates the machine also reconstructs its philosophies and re-envisages its Gods. Thus we allow for the changing equilibrium of society but also for the emergence of history-making potentialities within man himself. Thus we can look more impartially on both sides of the shield and see that as human nature is moulded by history so history is moulded by human nature. From this standpoint we can proceed to a new attack on the problem of social causation. But before we

approach this final objective we may review some types o social interpretation which reverse, with equal one-sidedness those doctrines the inadequacy of which we have now ex amined.

2. *Social Evolution as the Realization of a Universal Princip*

The many doctrines which find in social evolution the grad ual revelation of a pre-existing principle fall into two mair groups. The one conceives some great cosmic value, some "pattern set in the heavens", which becomes in greate measure incarnated within the order of human life. To this group belong numerous theologies and cosmogonies and also ar array of transcendental philosophies from the Platonic to the Hegelian. The theologies, spun from threads of fantasy, need not concern us here. Of the philosophies, sometimes no less fantastic but claiming at least to stand in the light of reason, we select for brief consideration a system, that of Hegel, which has exercised a powerful influence, both directly and by stimulation of opposing theories, on sociological thought. The other group conceives some initial life-principle, immanent rather than transcendental, which fulfils itself in a cycle of development and dissolution. This is the 'organismic' doctrine of social evolution, which will be represented here by the work of Spengler.

The core of the Hegelian view of society is what we may perhaps call an animistic logic, the principle of the word made flesh, of an eternal logos or reason infusing itself into the forms of time and space. As in the scheme of Plato, this logos is ultimate reality, in its pure form 'the absolute', and human institutions, like all other phenomena, are real in so far as they express or reflect it. The reason in man seeks the universal, and moves towards it through a series of inadequate social forms. First comes the family—the kernel of community (*Gemeinschaft*)—in which the individual instinctively discovers or feels his relation to the universal of the race, the genus; within which, as always, he finds himself by losing himself, by absorption in the unity from which he derives his meaning. Hence sex is the first condition in the breaking down of the isolation

of the particular as the spirit in man seeks its home in the universal. The family contains three elements, a sex relationship, a relationship of rights and duties, and a spiritual relationship of trust and confidence. Through all three the self-centeredness of the individual is overcome as he shares the responsibilities, the activities, the possessions, and the loyalties of the group.

But the unifying reason cannot fulfil itself in these narrower bounds. Beginning with the family it embraces the group of families, the kin, and thus arises what Hegel in his curious nomenclature calls civil society (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*), the local group which discovers the reciprocal or complementary nature of its wants and thus the common institutions of protection in such external forms as police regulation. It results from the interchange of services and constitutes a system of devices for the satisfaction of diverse needs. Hence it is mainly an economic system established on an ethical basis. But it lacks the full unifying principle of the state, for in it individuals are after all seeking their particular satisfactions. Civil society remains unintegrated. It breeds oppositions which it cannot solve. The economic process within it leads to the increase of the wealthy on the one hand and of the common people on the other. They stand in mere juxtaposition, with no inner bond. Only in a higher unity can these oppositions be resolved. Thus civil society lies intermediate between the family and the state, or rather it is "the difference which steps between them".[2] In the logical order, though not in the temporal order, it leads up to the state.

The state, then, in the Hegelian logic, is the consummation or fulfilment of the quest for unity. It transcends all local and external needs, satisfying the deeper demands of humanity. It is not simply a protective agency, a system of government, but "the world the spirit has made for itself". In the state that spirit can find, again by surrender, by losing itself in the universal, the realization it has been seeking. The state is more august than its members or than their thoughts. It is the corporate unity of life, the very end for which its members

[2] *Philosophy of Law*, § 182.

exist. Consequently Hegel is always laying stress on man's duty to the state rather than on the service of the state to its members. When he speaks of it, into the abstract language of his dialectic he infuses the reverential emotion which is normally associated with the object of religious worship.

Hegel is accordingly the great prophet of all those who think of society as a 'collective mind', not so much constituted by the little minds we call individuals as transcending and absorbing them. It is a kind of God on earth. Conveniently for his place and time, Hegel found the chief abiding place of this divinity in his own state, and assumed that the national spirit of his people was a sufficient realization of the universal. The reason that transcended the family and the civil society needed to search no further for fulfilment. For to Hegel the state is an ideal, the embodiment of a first principle, and the actual state shines all too radiantly in its light. With remarkable complacence this philosopher justifies the forms of existing political institutions, such as war, autocracy, the order of classes, the system of property, as moments in the being or the becoming of eternal reason. The concrete narrower interests which maintain these institutions are transmuted into high ethical principles. If for Hegel the real is the rational, the real then comes near to a perilous identity with the actual.

The thought of Hegel has a remarkable sweep and range and behind its cumbrous scaffolding of logic there lay unusual insights. But it illustrates very well the perils of *a priori* interpretation uncontrolled by a searching scrutiny either of the initial assumption or of the social phenomena themselves. The assumption becomes a faith instead of an hypothesis. It grows dogmatic and obsesses its votary. In the assurance which it gives the difficult search for causes is abandoned. The problem of the relation between life and environment is ignored. Evolution and progress are merged from the outset. The initial assumption has an ethical quality, and the exposition becomes a justification rather than an explanation of existence. In Hegel, particularly in his work called *Phenomenology*, this justification sometimes is merely grotesque, as

when he deals with the quack-science of phrenology. But more serious is the uncritical acceptance of dominant tendencies as embodiments of universal truth. History does not cease at the point where the philosopher makes his survey. The nation-state, in the spiritually self-contained form which enlisted the worship of Hegel, is not the completed form of society. We can discover no finality in the flux of the social process but must instead follow patiently the indications that point from the present to the future. Our synthesis can comprehend only what is given, not what is yet to be, or, as Hegel himself picturesquely stated it, "the owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of evening are falling". Hegel took it for granted that logic and reality were one, or rather that his logic, in the categories of his own age, was the essential truth of a fully comprehended world. On this dogmatic foundation, falsely secure from the revelations which patient science might have in store, he rounded out his grandiose system.

Observe that for Hegel the guiding principle of social evolution is not the probing intelligence that seeks and makes its way but 'reason' expressed in terms of an abstract dialectic, standing in barren majesty and aloof from the impulses and interests that spin the texture of society. But this is merely one of the many ways in which men have sought to conceive the dynamic principle that animates the changing mechanism of life. Schopenhauer, who savagely attacked the doctrine of Hegel, substituted for it the blind will to live, which drives men on and on regardless of the pains of the struggle. A similar concept, though in a more optimistic form, was expressed by Bergson as the *élan vital.* There is no reason to think that men will not continue to seek for ways of representing the creative or directive urge that seems to join with the play of environmental forces in the processes of social change. If determinism is inadequate as an explanation of social evolution then there are immanent and emergent potentialities of life which, guarding against dogmatic formulations, we must nevertheless not exclude from our reckoning. We must, as the determinists do, relate social changes to the series of material and technical changes, but we must still say, until we learn

better, "that is how the human mind responds to these changes"—not "how it *must* respond". We cannot tell what these potentialities are until they unfold themselves, but we have learned enough to know that there is much unknown. It is safer therefore to avoid extreme hypotheses in either direction, and to follow the historical process in which human nature and environmental change co-operate. If deterministic theories warn us of dangers on one side, idealistic theories point to an opposite danger. What investigation actually shows is a concomitance of changes on both sides, and this concomitance must provide the ground from which we start on further explorations.

3. *Social Evolution as the Fulfilment of a Cultural Cycle*

It is a common reflection that all life, in fact, all being, exhibits recurrent rhythmic movement. Many illustrations lie near to us, the beat of the heart, the intake and exhalation of the breath, the recurrent appetites, the succession of the seasons, and the processes of organic growth and decline. Our mechanisms mimic the pulsations of the organism. The skies themselves move in rhythmic periods of the day, the year, and the mightier cycles of the outer cosmos. At the other extreme the scientist conceives the atom as a dance of electrons. The pulsations which thus permeate the universe seem to have their counterpart in social phenomena, in the seasonal rhythms of the volume of employment, the frequency of crime, the number of marriages, births, and deaths, and in the longer less predictable oscillations of prosperity, population growth, fashion trends, political attitudes, and so forth. Much ingenuity has been expended in the attempt to find order and causation behind these phenomena and especially to establish a cyclical regularity in their apparently erratic movements.[3]

The most impressive of these rhythms is that which has a definite beginning and ending, the closed cycle of birth and death for ever repeated within the life of the species. This theme is renewed on the vast scale of the cosmos.

[3] For a list of cyclical theories see P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 728 ff.

Worlds on worlds are rolling ever
From creation to decay.

A rhythm so momentous to human beings, themselves manifestations of it, has a peculiar attraction for the interpreter of social change. In all ages men have found a correspondence between the course of the individual life and that of the group, the nation, the empire, the civilization. "Sceptre and crown must tumble down" in fulfilment of the like destiny of all that lives. Generally this principle is merely a form of the inadequate organic analogy, and as such we have dealt with it elsewhere.[4] But sometimes other concepts of a more fruitful character are combined with it, and we have an example in the Spenglerian concept of cultural evolution.

For Spengler the range of social evolution is the range of a distinctive culture. His unit is therefore not the nation or the race or the community as such, but the area over which a common culture finds expression and development. He thinks, somewhat in Hegelian terms, of each culture as having its own proper 'soul', and all the manifestations of society are simply modes in which this 'soul' fulfils itself. The principle of the culture is the living reality. And each culture is self-fulfilling, self-developing, blossoming and fading, succeeded at length by another which goes through a similar cycle. Hence there is no evolution of mankind as a whole, but only of the specific spiritual manifestations which come to birth in the youthful dreams of an appointed people and grow to clear consciousness within determinate limits of space and time.

'Mankind' is a zoological expression or an empty word. But conjure away the phantom, break the magic circle, and at once there emerges an astonishing wealth of *actual* forms—the Living with all its immense fullness, depth, and movement—hitherto veiled by a catch-word, a dry-as-dust scheme, and a set of 'personal' ideals. I see, in place of that empty figment of *one* linear history which can only be kept up by shutting one's eyes to the overwhelming multitude of the facts, the drama of a *number* of mighty cultures, each springing with primitive strength from the

[4] See pp. 21–23. See also my *Community*, Bk. III, ch. II, and Appendix, and *The Modern State*, 21–23.

soil of a mother-region to which it remains firmly bound throughout its whole life-cycle; each stamping its material, its mankind, in *its own* image; each having *its own* idea, *its own* passions, *its own* life, will and feeling, and *its own* death. Here indeed are colors, lights, movements, that no intellectual eye has yet discovered. Here the cultures, peoples, languages, truths, gods, landscapes, bloom and age as the oaks and the stone-pines, the blossoms, twigs, and leaves—but there is no ageing 'mankind'. Each culture has its own new possibilities of self-expression which arise, ripen, decay, and never return. There is no *one* sculpture, *one* painting, *one* mathematics, *one* physics, but many, each in its deepest essence different from the others, each limited in duration and self-contained, just as each species of plant has its peculiar blossom or fruit, its special type of growth and decline. These cultures, sublimated life-essences, grow with the same superb aimlessness as the flowers of the field. They belong, like the plants and the animals, to the living Nature of Goethe, and not to the dead Nature of Newton. I see world-history as a picture of endless formations and transformations, of the marvellous waxing and waning of organic forms. The professional historian, on the contrary, sees it as a sort of tapeworm industriously adding on to itself one epoch after another.[5]

Each of these 'souls' fulfils its cycle from birth to death. Each is different and characteristic, revealing itself in a myriad ways, in art and architecture and music, in mathematics and physics, in religion and philosophy, in the works of civilization, in the structure of society. These phenomena are all bound together by the same indwelling principle. The classical is concrete, symmetrical, definite; the Arabian is permeated with the idea of magic, and so forth. The Western—the culture of Europe and America which had its birth at the beginning of the tenth century after Christ—is characterized by the absence of the sense of limits, by the will to power, and the quest for infinity, which Spengler discovers in a thousand manifestations, in its mathematic symbolism that deals with the surd and with the imaginary quantity (such as the square root of -1), in its belief in immortality, in its use of perspective in painting, even in its long-range artillery, and again in its sense of loneliness and its homelessness. "Siegfried, Parzeval,

[5] Oswald Spengler, *Decline of the West*, Vol. I (tr. Atkinson), p. 22.

Tristan, Hamlet, Faust are the loneliest heroes in all the cultures."

Spengler attempts to show both the unity of each of the great cultures and the quality which distinguishes each from all the rest, to discover in short its type, its genius. Strongly colored as the presentation is by the temperament of the author, it is rich in suggestiveness. But underneath it lies the doctrine that each culture develops from its own germ and fulfils its predestined course in the life-history of the peoples who possess it; that each passes through like stages from its first youth to its final dissipation; that each is at first intuitive, "dream-heavy", earth-born, attaining at length to systematic articulated forms and then subjected to the critical solvent of rationalism and sophistication; that correspondingly each begins in the untutored genius of the rural life, attains form in the growing city and ends in the detached soul-less individualism of the world-city, wherein the traditions of birth and class are lost in competitive tension and the bonds of social unity grow superficial and the very sense of race is lost in an ultimately fatal sterility.[6]

Here then we find the concept of a cultural fulfilment immanent from the first, not transcendental as in the Hegelian philosophy. But the value of the concept is lessened by the dogmatic and arbitrary schematism with which Spengler surrounds it. It is one thing to analyze the cultural quality of an age or of a people; it is another, and much more hazardous, to explain this culture as self-fulfilling, predetermined from its birth, predestined to die after a predictable life-span of some fourteen centuries. It is one thing to trace the process by which culture changes with the increase of urbanization; it is quite another to assume that all cultures must for ever begin in the simple life of the 'unspoiled' countryside and end in the gulf of the metropolis. It is one thing to find in history the surge and resurge of cultural movements, to comprehend the critical reaction which dissolves old forms and thus prepares the way for new ones; it is another to regard this process of criticism as belonging to the autumn of an entire cultural

[6] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, ch. IV.

development, leading inevitably to the winter in which it dies. The erudition of Spengler cannot conceal his romanticism or save him from numerous historical errors in his attempt to fit every culture to a predetermined cycle. He sets, for example, the most arbitrary limits to the great historical cultures. The Egyptian ends 1200 B.C. The Chinese and the Indian end at the beginning of the Christian era. The presence of individualistic or socialistic tendencies is a sign of decay. The ethical as distinct from the religious world-view is indicative of a dissolving culture, so the age of Lao-tze and Confucius must be a late stage in the Chinese culture, no matter whether it seems to flourish much more than a millenium after.

To any student of anthropology the Spenglerian conception of the time-limits of a culture seems strangely narrow and inadequate. The peoples we call civilized are the outcome of an extremely long process of evolution. They do not begin at the stage of heroic myth and legend from which Spencer dates the cultural process. Beyond that are ages of barbarism leading back to we know not what more rudimentary expressions of the human mind. In the 'heroic age' with which for Spengler the culture of Greece begins there were already evolved social institutions with a vast history behind them. The Homeric legends reveal traces of customs belonging to a much more remote antiquity, such as the matriarchal customs suggested by the women rulers of the fabulous islands visited by Odysseus. Why in this endless social flux make any point of time the beginning or the ending of the story?

Regarding culture as self-evolving, Spengler fails to discern the interaction between culture and civilization on which we have dwelt. He ignores entirely the influence of environment. Even when he deals with it, as in the contrast he draws between country and city, he regards it solely as effect, as the expression of a culture stage. To understand the greater cultures aright we must think of them in their historical setting, arising at particular epochs in the conjuncture of external conditions and racial intermixtures, both of which are for ever changing. There is no determinate body attached to this 'soul' of culture. Who, for example, were the people we call

be impressed upon a native one and give it a false characte
This 'pseudo-morphosis' the Arabian culture suffered und
the impact of the classical. But in the welter of influences it
most arbitrary thus to discriminate between true and fal
forms of culture—why not on the same principle regard th
Roman also as a 'pseudo-morphosis'? Spengler's unwillin
ness to come to terms with environment makes his treatmer
of this and many other aspects weak and unscientific.
peoples and cultures are so bound that they age together, wha
are the signs of decrepitude? On this theory, in a so-calle
ageing civilization the new generations must be less vigorou
less culturally creative, less socialized, than the older. And fo
confirmation he points, as conservatives have pointed in ever
age, to the doctrines and practices which he finds uncongenia
to individualism and socialism and internationalism. Thes
are the evidences of cultural old age.[7] Beyond that his chi
evidence is the infertility which characterizes the 'winte
time' of the cosmopolitan city, bringing at length an "appal
ing depopulation". But with this argument we have alread
dealt.

Observe finally that Spengler does not in any sense mak
the conditions of the great city effective factors in the causa
tion of the social phenomena which appear within it. It
merely the appropriate scene in which the last stages of th
cultural drama are played out. Here again we see the insuff
ciency of the idealist approach. The principle of causatio
is already given, it does not need to be discovered. Regardin
the search for causes as needless, all such theories tend to b
dogmatic. There is no scientific check on the intuitions o
the theorist. Whatever insights he may possess they are offere
to us in a form which cannot satisfy us. Our own experienc
and observation tell us that environment cannot be so lightl
discounted. We see, for example, how the temperament of
whole people is affected by its passage through the ordeal o

[7] By a curious irony, in this work written before the Great War and publish
in 1917, Spengler regards the culture of Russia as in the stage of early youth
contrast with the dying culture of Western Europe and America. And now
exhibits in the extreme form the attitudes which in his theory mark the en
But perhaps this is also a 'pseudo-morphosis'!

war. We see how the sudden change from prosperity to adversity or *vice-versa*, whether befalling a group or an individual, evokes new attitudes, and sets new directions. We cannot in the light of these and numerous other experiences regard the processes of industrialization and urbanization as simply modes in which the life of a people, when it reaches the appropriate spiritual stage, unfolds itself. We must reckon with environment in a way which the idealist ignores. Once more our search for causes must begin with the interaction of life and environment, an interaction too profound to admit the one-way solutions of either determinism or idealism.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

SOCIAL CAUSATION

1. *The Nature of the Problem*

We have examined various interpretations of social change. Each of them laid stress on some particular principle as explanatory or determinative of the whole process. But on analysis these various principles appeared to be at best no more than partial, conditioning, or limiting factors. We could in no instance admit the claim of the selected factor to be an exclusive or even a prepotent determinant. On different counts we have rejected the adequacy in this regard of natural selection, social selection, economic pressure, technological adaptation, the self-fulfilment of cultural potentialities, or the realization of reason or some other ideal goal. We have questioned the validity of the point of view which interprets social change solely as a 'response' to environmental change and of the opposite point of view which makes it solely the expression of capacities inherent or emergent in human nature. We have had to admit the profound significance of environmental conditions but no less of the potentialities revealed in the process of culture. Thus we return to our starting-point, the complex interaction of life and environment. But this is merely to state, not to solve our problem. If so many factors are contributory to social change, how and what do they respectively contribute? If every social phenomenon is the resultant of so many changeful conditions how can we assign to each its respective rôle? How can we understand its respective contribution to the whole system into which it enters? What can we do beyond enumerating the various factors and giving evidence that they are together operative in determining the social fact? Yet if we do no more than this we have not reached the heart of our problem. The nature of social causation for ever eludes us.

It is quite certain that there is no mechanical solution. By no assiduous collection of instances, by no computation of coefficients of correlation, can we ever measure the contribution of each co-operative factor. Collection and computation serve their own important purposes, but quantitative methods yield only quantitative results. Here we are not dealing with like units of homogeneous forces which combine to produce a total. The service of statistical methods in the study of social causation is to prepare the way, to reveal more precisely the nature of the factors involved, to isolate quantitative indices of aspects of the situation, and to show the degree of their coherence or non-coherence. But these quantitative indices are merely evidences of an interaction which they do not explain; they are not the dynamic factors of which we are in quest. If we appreciate at all the nature of social causation we shall never expect to find that this factor A, presumptively measured by this quantitative indication *a*, contributes 20 per cent, and so forth. Much ingenuity and still more energy have been lavished on the attempt to reach results which the very nature of the subject-matter precludes. Social phenomena are not, like certain physical phenomena, isolable components of a situation. Social phenomena are aspects of a total non-mechanical consciously upheld system of relationships. Because the system is non-mechanical, the possible aspects are numerous and dissolve into one another, and we select from among them either by convention or because those selected have a preconceived or discovered significance for us. (The grounds of this significance we must presently consider.) Behind every social relationship lie social attitudes and interests, which are not separable forces but type-phases of dynamic personality. And even when we pass from the social relationships themselves and deal with their merely tangible products we still remain outside the region where the quantitative contribution of the combining factors can be assessed. We can say that land, labor, capital, and organization—to take the old categories—are all necessary to produce a steel rail, but the question, how much of it does each produce, remains not only unanswerable, but meaningless. If a number of

factors are alike *necessary* to the production of a result, there can be no quantitative evaluation of their respective contributions. And if this is true of material categories, themselves measurable, and their material products, themselves also measurable, it is *a fortiori* true of the more subtle interactions of personalities, variantly responsive to complex conditions, which determine every social situation.

We cannot interpret social change without reference to the changing attitudes and interests of social beings, and we cannot deal with these attitudes and interests as though they possessed the determinate homogeneous character of physical forces. Here is the stumbling-block over which so many theories fall. To take a crude example, one prominent economic-forecaster has contended that "righteousness is a cause of prosperity". Now it may be hard to find any one statistical index which adequately registers changes in prosperity, but this is a minor point and we may accept as fairly satisfactory the index offered, that of the purchasing power of wages. But 'righteousness' belongs to an entirely different category. It is a term so subjective, so dependent for its meaning on the particular preconceptions of the user, that the attempt to find a satisfactory statistical index is doomed from the start. The index actually offered is the number of 'conversions' recorded by various churches! It would be no easy task to discover what the religious or other significance of this index really was, nor would the discovery, which of course the statistician in question does not attempt, establish any such causal implications. The gap between this kind of ratiocination and a true sociological analysis of the relation between religious and economic phenomena is profound. We may set it in contrast with Max Weber's study of this subject. The latter realizes the complexity of the problem. He sees that there is a direct relation between the practical ethics of a community and the character of its economic system. He offers many evidences of this quite understandable fact. He sees that there is a relation between its practical ethics and its religious beliefs, but also that many factors other than the religious one are involved in the creation of the effective forms of conduct. Nevertheless the religious

system of any group is a characteristic historical phase, with its own typical thought-forms, its own world-view, common to the group as a whole though in varying degrees represented in the concrete attitudes of its individuals. With this religious ideal-type cohere the ideal-types of social conduct and the ideal-types of social institutions. The historical correspondence of religious and economic phenomena are studied by him along these lines. He concludes from certain evidences of the historical priority of particular religious forms that they stimulated the economic systems to which their practical ethics were congenial, in particular that the worldly-ascetic protestant sects prepared the way for capitalism. Guarded and penetrating as is this study of social causation it is yet by no means conclusive. The cohesion of certain religious forms and of certain economic institutions can be adequately shown. Thus the interaction of protestant religious beliefs and of the practical activities characteristic of early capitalism can be demonstrated *within particular historical situations*. But these situations contain so many other elements so variously combined that a clear nexus between the selected factors is exceedingly hard to establish, especially when we find other historical situations, such as that of late nineteenth century Japan, in which one of the two develops in the entire absence of the other.

The data for the study of social causation are the historical concomitants of each particular changing situation. Let us examine first this secure starting-point for all the difficult journeys of social exploration. Every social phenomenon, as we have already seen, is an event belonging to an historical moment. More precisely, it does not endure an instant longer than it is maintained by the contemporary attitudes and activities of social beings. It is a life-expression which must change with the life which it expresses. Not only social relationships themselves but also the modes or formulae in accordance with which they occur, their institutional framework, are subject to this law. Institutions cannot live on like shells within which life is extinct, though of course they can endure to the detriment of the life which still upholds them. We have therefore a continuous perfect concomitance of social forms

and what we shall for the present call social forces. Any change in the latter is at once recorded as a change in the former. But unfortunately the correspondence, though complete, is also complex. The unity of the social structure corresponds to a diversity of social attitudes and interests. These attitudes and interests are not only variant, and variantly influential, they are also in part conflicting as well as in part co-operant—and the social structure is the resultant of them all. To discern how they combine to sustain the structure requires therefore a keen and difficult analysis of each changing situation. We may agree with Hobhouse that there is "a broad correlation between the system of institutions and the mentality behind them".[1] But as the system is the same for many divergent minds, the mentality to which it corresponds is as it were a composite mentality of various levels. Under some conditions the higher levels may be more influential while possibly under others the lower levels may dominate.

Yet since the social structure is always sustained by the mentality of the group and since it is subject to change wherever that mentality changes or finds new modes of expression, there must always be a definite accord between changing social forms and changing attitudes, beliefs, activities. The social structure is a manifestation of mentality. The structural changes involved in the process of social evolution correspond to changes in modes of living and thinking. Taking structural differentiation as the clue to evolution we have already seen that it implies the specialization of individuals and groups and consequently a greater variety and range of social relationships, a wider interdependence of functions or services, a greater economy of effort in the attainment of the ends pursued conjointly, a greater control over environment, and hence a further limitation of natural selection in favor of social selection. With greater economy less energy is needed for the satisfaction of the satiable primary organic needs (unless the advantage of the higher economy is consumed by a proportionate increase in population), and the surplus is available for the satisfaction of other aspects of

[1] Hobhouse, *Social Development*, ch. XII.

human nature. These in turn fall into two classes, between which every society strikes some kind of balance. On the one hand there are the expressions of our like competitive interests, seeking forms of possession, luxury, power, distinction, all relative goods because they are valued by comparison. On the other hand there are the expressions of our common interests, absolute goods in the sense that all can share in them without diminution or apportionment, the cultural or spiritual achievements of the group. Both classes, in different degrees, tend to increase as a higher economy is attained. Again, we have seen that differentiation involves the reciprocal development of individualization and socialization, and that, so long as the differentiation is proceeding, so long, that is, as it has not hardened into a closed authoritative system, it provides increasing opportunities for the social expression of variant personalities.[2]

These, then, are some of the broad concomitants which manifest themselves in the process of social evolution. We see therein the general correspondence of structure and function, of society and mentality. They furnish the background for our study of social causation. They offer a clue which we shall develop in the section which follows, before we proceed to the more concrete situations in which alone, observing the process in operation, we can hope to discover the manner in which the various concomitant aspects are related to one another and together create the specific phenomena of social change.

2. *The Unifying Principle in Social Causation*

Whenever we set about explaining any social phenomenon we are confronted with a bewildering heterogeneous array of conditions on all of which, in some manner or degree, the phenomenon in question seems to depend. We seek, let us say, the causes of crime, or more specifically the reason why in proportion to the number of inhabitants certain crimes are more prevalent in the large city than in other social areas. Poverty alone is not an explanation, for there are many poor who are

[2] The points here summarized are more fully brought out in my *Community*, Bk. III, chh. III–VII.

not addicted to them. Urban life is not an explanation, since it is merely a bracket for many and various conditions of which some at least are only remotely associated with the phenomenon. So, unless we have the naïve mentality which is contented with a catchword or a dogma, we proceed to investigate one factor after another and discover that somehow they are all involved. Perhaps we correlate the phenomenon with irregularity of employment, with the temptations and opportunities presented by near-by affluence, with the conditions which enable criminal groups to organize and acquire leadership, with a system of laws which forbid men to pursue certain pleasures which they are ready to attain by illegal means, with the breakdown of family life, with the disruption of certain moral standards or religious controls, with the laxity or corruption of the police administration, with conditions of congestion and bad housing, with the transplanting of diverse racial groups into a new environment to which they are unadjusted, and so forth. Obviously these conditions are not separable items which together conspire to produce criminality. Obviously also they are in part external or environmental factors and in part, implicitly or explicitly, they are aspects of attitudes or motivations disposing to the crimes in question. These two series of factors stand in the assumed relation of stimulus and response, and we cannot add them together as 'causes' of crime, any more than we can count in general both poverty and the desire to escape it. The crux of the problem is to discover the relation of the attitudes, themselves complex, which are expressed in criminal acts, and the external conditions, also complex, which evoke or at least affect these attitudes. This difficult task is a prerequisite of the establishment of any integration of the numerous alleged causes into an intelligible explanation.

The manner in which this integration may be accomplished will occupy us in the succeeding sections. Even were it achieved the object of our enquiry into causes might still remain unfulfilled. For there are two distinct interests which animate such a quest. One is theoretical, we seek to understand the phenomenon. The other is practical, we seek to

control it. The former is a progressive and continuous quest in which we endeavor to see the phenomenon in its dependence on a total system of conditions; the latter has a definite limited goal in that we want to discover which of these conditions can be changed, modified, or removed in order that the phenomenon itself may be made amenable to change—we are seeking thus to introduce a new factor into the situation. Even a considerable advance in the former quest may not lead to the practical goal of the latter; it may instead reveal more fully the difficulty of control.[3] But on that very account no divorce is possible between the theoretical and the practical interest. We must know how the aspects of a situation are intricately bound together before we can, in the social realm at least, introduce effective agencies of control, for in adding a new factor we are also changing the relation to one another of all the rest. Our natural tendency is to look for one 'responsible' factor and prescribe accordingly. We introduce, say, the new factor of a responsive law, as has been done from the days of Draco to those of Baumes. But in changing the law we are indirectly changing many other things as well, attitudes, interests, opportunities, and unless we understand these correspondent changes our prescription may aggravate rather than mitigate the phenomenon we want to control. To change the law is not to change human nature in the direction of the law. Hence the particular need for caution in those experiments which are not aimed at merely external or accidental conditions but which seek, from above as it were, to alter modes of life, customs, and morals. Deeply rooted conditions cannot be superficially controlled but must be dealt with by methods which penetrate to the same level.

Of this more later. Our first point is that we cannot deal at all with the heterogeneous multiplicity of conditions which underlie every social phenomenon unless we can reduce them to some order. And the initial step in the establishment of a meaningful order is the recognition that these conditions form

[3] A good illustration is furnished by the *Report on the Causes of Crime* of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (2 volumes, Washington, 1931).

the total environment to which, *as a unity*, the social being is responsive. These varied conditions are somehow integrated, as the world to which he responds, by the personality which lives and moves among them. This integration is not a deliberate intellectual process—it is a mental adjustment made in the business of living. The world of experience is selectively determined by the mentality of the individual in accordance with his temperament, his degree of intelligence, his range of contacts, and his past experience. It is the whole situation subjectively realized, not as it stands either in external reality or in the eyes of any other individual. It is the outer world transmuted in the focus of a personality.

For every individual the behavior of his fellows, as perceived and understood by him, is part of this total environment. For the group as a whole there is, however, a common environment of a more limited character, the common conditions under which it lives. If we could accept the hypothesis of a group mind, we might say that it acted similarly as the integrating focus of the various environmental factors, bringing them into a single order of experience. Rejecting this hypothesis, we must think of a number of like and related foci, the individual minds of the members, which by reason of their likeness and their incessant intercommunication respond in similar ways to common conditions and thus provide the world of common experience. But they provide it not merely by expressing it. The synthetic mind is also an active mind which seeks to impress on the total environment a unity more congenial to its interests. Thus for every group, in proportion to its size, solidarity, and degree of control, the environment in all its aspects is a unity of its creation as well as of its experience. What is true of the household for the family is true, in degree, of the city for its inhabitants, of the country for the nation, of the area of civilization for those who dwell therein. This double unity of creation and experience furnishes the reason why every social phenomenon which we single out for purposes of explanation proves to be but one aspect of a great interwoven system, why to understand the aspect we must comprehend the whole.

Moreover, the whole system is a moving equilibrium, so that there is an incessant readjustment of every aspect to every other. To understand the changing aspect, the particular phenomenon in which we are interested, we must understand the changing whole. Social, biological, and physical changes are taking place concurrently, in accordance with their respective laws, but the adjustment of them all to one another within a single system is a social process and is achieved through the synthetic principle of creative experience. We may present this process schematically as follows, taking as our starting-point some specific social change, the transition from the phenomenon a to the phenomenon a':

SCHEMATIC PRESENTATION OF THE PROCESS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

EQUILIBRIUM A	SYNTHETIC PRINCIPLE	EQUILIBRIUM A′
The social phenomenon (a) as an interactive aspect of *the social structure* (b) in its adjustment to *the social heritage* (c) (civilization and culture) on the basis of *biological conditions* (x) (heredity, selection, the biological quality of the population) and *physical conditions* (y) (geography, climate, external nature)	The creative experience of the group	*The social phenomenon* (a') as an interactive aspect of *the social structure* (b') in its adjustment to *the social heritage* (c') on the basis of *biological conditions* (x') and *physical conditions* (y')

Changes occur more rapidly or more slowly in different parts of the system. The change from a to a' may be salient while the change from x to x' may be scarcely noticeable and the change from y to y' may be infinitesimal. The important point is that the whole equilibrium depends on the focal activity of the human mentality. The social structure and the social heritage are its direct creation. One social stage changes into another only as it passes through this focus. Beneath the social structure there are other principles of change, but they

influence the structure only through their effect on the organizing mentality. The biological conditions, though themselves modified by this creative experience, change also independently of it, and these changes of the organism affect the mentality on which the social structure depends. The physical conditions, also modified by it, are again subject to independent laws of change, and these changes, acting directly on the organism, thus indirectly affect the mentality which creates the social structure. Through these mediations all the processes of change that occur within our world have their impact on society, but directly or immediately society is the product of a synthetic mental principle and has neither meaning nor existence apart from it.

We have insisted on this point because from it we can advance to the discovery of an ordered relationship within the array of heterogeneous 'causes' which the first approach to the problem of social causation reveals. The forces which combine to produce a physical phenomenon are unified outside our recognition of them. The unity is objective, and the relations of the determinants are therefore amenable to objective methods of investigation. The precise impact of every determinant on every other is recorded in the physical phenomenon. It is there to be measured to the *n*th degree of precision, if only we can find the way. The forces which combine to produce a social phenomenon are to begin with of a totally different order, since they are all construed as aspects of experience, and they are unified, in producing the phenomenon, only within and through the mentality which experiences them. The unity is subjective, and the relative impacts of the determinants, if indeed we can still think in such physical terms, are made no longer on one another as in the physical process but on the active mentality. From the phenomenon we can infer, in ways presently to be considered, something of the particular significance of each factor. But the significance we thus attach to it as a contributory factor is an entirely different thing from the measurement of physical forces. If we realize this truth we see how vain, in fact how ludicrous, is the project of a behavioristic sociology. Incompetent to deal with the sub-

jectivity of experience the behaviorists would discard it altogether. Seeking to get rid of subjective terms they get rid of the social fact, since it is fact only as created by and known to experience. They fail to perceive the essential difference, from the standpoint of causation, between a paper flying before the wind and a man flying from a pursuing crowd. The paper knows no fear and the wind no hate, but without fear and hate the man would not fly nor the crowd pursue. If we try to reduce fear to its bodily concomitants we merely substitute the concomitants for the reality experienced as fear. We denude the world of meanings for the sake of a theory, itself a false meaning which deprives us of all the rest. We can interpret experience only on the level of experience. Otherwise we leave out either the whole phenomenon to be explained, as in the behavioristic philosophy, or the more intricate significance of the phenomenon in its experienced reality, as when in semi-behavioristic fashion we reduce, with Freud, the complications of the love-emotion to the hidden working of a simple organic appetite.

Nor can we take refuge in an empty parallelism, which deals separately with the succession of physical conditions on the one hand and with the succession of experiences on the other, without presuming any causal relation between them. This method may be practicable in psychological study, though it gives up the problem of causation. It is possible, for example, to follow the organic changes which occur when a man is afraid or hungry, and to set them side by side with the concomitant mental states. But in sociological study this method is not practicable. It would be an idle task to set side by side the changes of the physical environment and the changes in social phenomena. Not only are the two series interdependent, not only are they both so complex that we could never, following this method, discover which environmental condition was 'parallel' to which social manifestation, but also there is a further and more important difference. The social phenomenon, as we have seen, is always a mental response to a complex situation selectively conceived. The secretion of the glands does not enter into consciousness as a condition of the

stimulation or changed mental state which accompanies it. But the poverty of the surroundings and the lack of employment do enter into consciousness as contributory factors of crime. Organic conditions may well predispose individuals to the attitudes which determine that selective conception of the situation which leads to crime. On this ground they are certainly deserving of attention in any adequate study of crime, but this is merely to say that behind the sociological fact there are facts of another nature. The sociological fact has to be studied on its own level. Sociology takes the organic and psychical constitution of men as given, as the subject matter of physiology and psychology. The facts it interprets are facts of relationship; the causation it studies is that which brings these relationships into being, the process in which the social units determine and in turn are determined by the social system. At the level on which this causation exists the external factors do not operate independently of mental processes. They now fall within the world of experience. The outer and the inner are brought, through creative experience, into a single system. They are as meaningless apart from one another as the eye and color, the ear and sound, in short as subject and object.

3. *The Inner and the Outer Order*

Our initial bewildering array of 'causes' fall then into two main categories, the inner and the outer aspects respectively of the total situation within which the phenomenon under investigation occurs. At the sociological level all the factors are elements of experience. A purely physical fact is never, as such, a determinant of a social fact. If more suicides and more crimes against the person occur in summertime, we cannot say that warm weather or longer daylight causes suicides and crimes, as it causes the crops to grow. No more can we say that the automobile is a cause of crimes in the same sense in which we say that it is a cause of accidents. The physical fact is related to the social fact in one or both of two ways, either *through* an intermediary or *as* an intermediary. Either it operates on the organism and thus affects mentality, and

thus the subjective or inner system of desires and motivations, or it presents itself to consciousness as an aspect of the outer world, as a condition to which, thus recognized, the social being adjusts himself or as a means by aid of which he accomplishes his purposes. There is thus a twofold difference between the problem of causality in the social and in the physical sciences. In the first place, in the physical sciences, apart from their social applications, we deal with an outer order alone. In the second place we deal with it *as outer*, as having a purely cognitive relation to our consciousness, as though it inspired no emotions within us and were unassociated with our purposes, following as it does the laws of its own external reality. But for the social sciences the outer is no longer the sheerly physical, but the physical as it enters into our total experience, already infused with significance derived from our own relation to it. In this sense the outer is the counterpart of the inner. It is the countryside as the farmer sees it, as the place of his toil and his recompense, as his home and neighborhood, as a scene of fertility or drought, of peace and storm, of happiness and sorrow. It is the city-block, not as stone and iron and wood and glass, but in its thousand associations merging into the larger environment of widened experience.

Every social phenomenon arises out of the changing adjustment of inner and outer, so understood, so related and harmonized. The total situation in which the phenomenon occurs is a specific integration of the two orders. This whole is not a mechanical structure of parts but a living unity of experience. Hence a change anywhere in the system changes not merely the relationship of every aspect to every other—this might be said of a physical system—it changes also the quality of the aspects. Every social situation has thus a character of uniqueness which cannot be predicated with the same validity of any mechanically constituted structure.

The two orders are as closely bound as thought and brain, but, no less than thought and brain, each is a complex coherent in itself. The inner, viewed as a dynamic system, is a complex of desires, motivations, attitudes. Each desire falls within a

universe of desires which evoke, limit, and supplant one another. Each motivation is a thread of impulse woven and rewoven with others into the strands of desire. Each attitude is a facet of character revealing the determinate direction of desire. And just as the desires of an individual form a system, so do the inter-related desires of the group, especially in the more continuous form of interests sustained by corresponding associations. Again, the outer is a coherent system, not as physical reality but as the environment to which the inner is adjusted. The outer, viewed in its relation to the socially creative principle of the inner, is a complex of means, opportunities, hindrances, the more immediate and the more remote conditions on which the satisfaction of desire, the liberation or the frustration of activity, the quality, mode, and degree of experience, the accommodation and conflict of interests, depend.

Each order is not only coherent, it is specifically coherent in relation to the specific social phenomenon. On the one hand the complex of desires, motivations, attitudes, and interests is so adjusted or balanced that it determines, for the individual or for the group, the particular social response. On the other hand the complex of means, opportunities, and hindrances is so adjusted as to form the particular occasion or series of occasions for this response. Any adequate interpretation must bring out in their respective particularity these two sides of the same social fact. We cannot know the one side unless we know the other also. The defect of most attributions of social causality is either that they are content with general explanations which do not get to grips with the specific character of the situation or that they offer us one side to the comparative neglect of the other. The latter tendency we have illustrated in the preceding chapters. The former calls for some further remarks.

We find, let us say, that the gang is a factor associated with the increase of crime and we want accordingly to explain its development. On the inner side of causation we relate the phenomenon to the desire of youth for adventure and comradeship, perceiving that this desire is balked of outlets in other directions by poverty, lack of training, and urban con-

gestion. But these conditions are all found together in every large city throughout the world, and the high development of the gang seems to belong to a more specific situation. We have so far mentioned merely a general desire and a general set of conditions. To bring the specific phenomenon into being this general desire has to be given particular form by the ethos of the group. We must comprehend the more subtle play of cultural and social influences that permeate the group and constitute the 'spirit of the community' in which the gang arises.[4] Similarly, on the other side, it is not enough to cite the pressure of poverty, congestion, the physical deterioration of the neighborhood, its interstitial character between the industrial area and the better residential areas, and so forth. These conditions may be present in greater or less degree in different cities of the civilized world without involving a greater or less development of the phenomenon. Moreover, they may be equally adduced as an explanation of various other phenomena with which they are also associated, such as illiteracy, ill-health, thriftlessness, drunkenness, drug-addiction, wife desertion, pawnbroking, and no doubt also of the qualities which struggle against these conditions and temptations. We must discover the specific relation of the environment to the specific phenomenon. We must see the union of the outer and the inner, as it specifically bears on our problem of causation, creating specific desires and attitudes on the one side, and specific stimulations, specific opportunities, and specific means on the other.

Thus only shall we get beyond those general explanations which never satisfy us because they never bring us to an *understanding* of the fact. Here again the difference between

[4] The importance of this point is recognized in studies of the gang, such as the work of F. M. Thrasher entitled *The Gang* (Chicago, 1927) and the already mentioned *Report on the Causes of Crime*, Vol. II, ch. IV. It is especially emphasized in the studies of delinquency made by Healy and Bronner, who say in a passage quoted by the authors of the *Report:* "We have been thoroughly persuaded that one of the most important phases of the situation with regard to delinquency anywhere is the spirit of the community, difficult as this may be to define. This spirit is itself evolved from many sources in the life and the cultural history of the community." (*Delinquents and Criminals*, New York, 1926, p. 190.)

physical and social causation appears. In the physical system we never understand the causal nexus, we merely infer it from external evidences. Physical causation, whatever it may signify, lies outside of experience, social causation falls within it. Physical causation is never, for our intelligence, any more than invariable concomitance or sequence. Concomitance and sequence in social phenomena merely suggest that there is a causal nexus to be discovered. In both fields of enquiry we follow for a certain distance the same methods. In both, for example, we seek for correlations, and in both a negative correlation between two phenomena helps to establish a disproof of a particular attributed causal relation between them. When we find, for example, that in a particular city, in the areas where delinquency has been most prevalent, the racial and national composition of the population has almost completely changed without any practical effect on the volume of delinquency, we can rule out as insignificant, for that particular situation, the racial or national factor as between the successive groups in the population.[5] But though a negative correlation denies causality, a positive correlation does not equally affirm it. Even if social conditions admitted the discovery of a perfect positive correlation invariably discovered between two social phenomena or between a social phenomenon and an inner or outer condition, our quest of causation would not be ended, it would merely be defined.

To take a further illustration, we find that a certain inclusive system of phenomena which we designate capitalism has developed under the varied conditions of many different countries, in France and Germany, in England and in South Africa, in Japan and in the United States. The conditions which are present in one situation and absent in another or the conditions which vary without a corresponding variation in the extent of capitalism are obviously less significant for the explanation of its development. We do not thereby rule out the possibility that some of these conditions may in particular situations so combine with others as to determine a particular type of capitalism and even to stimulate, within these situa-

[5] Already cited *Report on the Causes of Crime*, Vol. II, pp. 82–94.

tions, the capitalistic system in general. But we cannot, for example, regard the Christian religion or any of its forms as an essential factor, or the peculiar qualities of this or that race or nationality, or the institutions of monarchical as contrasted with republican government. We seek in the first place for those conditions which are invariably associated with it, and we may perhaps find among these the development of communications, the existence of large markets, the advance of applied science, the presence of certain natural resources, a considerable division of labor both intensive and extensive, the opportunity for free enterprise and for the safeguarding of its fruits, and the dominance of certain forms of cultural interest such as are revealed in the competitive desire for a higher standard of living. We cannot yet set these conditions down as 'causes' of capitalism, but we can regard them as interdependent factors in the larger system to which capitalism belongs. On the other hand, if we find that certain contrasting conditions, such as the prevalence of other-worldly attitudes or the socio-political system of a small isolated economy or a set of mores making for an unlimited increase of population, are negatively correlated with the development of capitalism, we have thereby additional evidence regarding the positive condition on which it depends.

So far we have followed methods common to all the sciences, and we are now left with a considerable group of very diverse factors, all of which are bound up in their changes with the changing system of capitalism. We cannot at this point, as in a physical system, experimentally remove from the complex any one factor, to observe what would happen to the rest, and to the phenomenon under investigation, in its absence. Capitalism, however we define it, is not a separable component of the larger system nor is it itself composed of separable components, as water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen. Yet though we cannot separate in this physical way the correlated factors, we can assign to each its especial significance within the system. We begin by allocating them respectively to the outer or to the inner order. We have suggested that each order is coherent in itself, deriving its cohesion from the creative

experience of the group. But if so, then the various factors must fall into significant relations to one another. They cease to be mere heterogeneous items in a list of causes. Our problem is to reconstruct, as students of society, the experience in which we all in some degree, as members of society, participate. Hard as that problem may be, it is at least not alien to us, for the principle by which we pursue it is a projection on another plane of the principle by which we live.

4. *The Mode in which Causal Factors Combine*

Let us see then if we can, in the light of the previous discussion, reconstruct a situation so as to discover the manner in which the various factors combine in the causation of a social phenomenon, so as to assign to each its place, its relation to the others, its particular significance. To reduce the argument to its essentials, we will take as example a phenomenon of very wide range throughout the whole area of western civilization, the restriction of the size of the family as seen in the decline of the birth-rate. Since this phenomenon has occurred over so wide a range, we can at once eliminate as relatively unimportant many local and group diversities. We are again left, however, with an imposing array of factors. A myriad other changes have been occurring concomitantly with it, and therefore a myriad correlations between the phenomenon and others can be found. But so unguided a search would merely confuse us. We limit our study accordingly to those which seem relevant, which, as already explained, might have an understandable, *and thus a causal*, relation to the phenomenon. On such grounds we adduce, among the outer conditions, higher standards of living, higher costs of rearing children, the 'gainful' employment of women, congestion of living space in cities, the density of the population, the greater mobility of the population, the reduction of the death-rate, and the development of birth-control devices. Among the inner conditions we adduce various cultural considerations, such as the decline of religious authority and of the traditions associated with the patriarchal family, the growth of democratic attitudes reducing class-distinctions and therefore permitting the easier per-

meation to the lower economic groups of influences generated in the higher, the development of a variety of interests outside the family and limiting the degree of devotion to family functions, and so forth. But we have still only a heterogeneous list of factors. We feel that they belong to an intelligible order, and this is what we have to discover.

One preliminary question must first be settled. The social phenomenon we are dealing with is not, strictly, the decline of the birth-rate but the *volitional* limitation of the family. The decline of the birth-rate, as such, might be either a biological or a social fact. If it were the former our search for causes would take an entirely different road and our correlations, if they were significant at all, would have an entirely different significance. We would be concerned, not with the conditions of changing human desires and changing social relationships, but with the conditions of organic changes. We have, however, already given evidences that the phenomenon is mainly a social one.[6] We do not deny the possibility that organic changes leading to biological infertility may be associated with, or occur together with but independently of, social changes. In that event, we would have two problems here, one for the biologist and one for the sociologist, but as the evidence for the voluntary restriction of the family is conclusive, we can leave the other aside and proceed with our study of social causation.[7]

We have then a social phenomenon immediately dependent on a specific volition, the effective will for smaller families. Many social phenomena have a more complicated relation to the volitions of social beings. Some, such as an economic depression, are the unintended or unforeseen results of willed

[6] Ch. XXIII, 3.

[7] The evidences of increasing biological infertility, such as the increased proportion of childless marriages, and the more general considerations which lead some writers to propose a "law of population growth", do not seem conclusive to the author. If, however, it were established that the conditions of modern society, such as the more ample food supply, do induce organic changes affecting fertility, we would have a case where, provided adequate information were obtainable, we could say that the phenomenon was due *in definite proportions* to biological factors on the one hand and to social factors on the other. As between the social factors themselves such a statement, though sometimes made, is meaningless.

activities; many, such as most institutional forms, are the slow results of cumulative willing. Social beings will directly to have smaller families; they will by implication the general form of the family; they do not will at all the law of supply and demand. Our example therefore admits of a simpler analysis, since we have to deal on the inner side with one determinate volition and not with the conjuncture within a situation of many different volitions. The same method of analysis applies in all cases, but we can bring out its nature more clearly by avoiding these complications.

The volition itself is of course no explanation. We want to know why in a particular changing situation men will to have smaller families and why in this situation that will is more effectively realized in adjustment to the total system of their desires. The volition is not in itself a new manifestation of human nature, it finds various expressions on quite primitive levels. What we have to explain is on the one hand its new relation to the attitudes and interests of contemporary society and on the other hand its new relation to the means and conditions of its realization. In doing so we shall see also the close interdependence of these inner and outer aspects.

Let us begin then with those general human desires which, as the prevalence of the phenomenon of family restriction under so many different conditions suggests, actuate, or function as motivations of, the volition. These we cannot know except as inferences from behavior or from the explanations which men offer concerning their behavior. Where the phenomenon is so often repeated there are sufficient clues to leave little doubt as to the character of these desires. Our inference regarding them is supported by our knowledge of human nature and confirmed, in a manner presently to be discussed, by their coherence within an order of intelligible—not necessarily intelligent—conduct. On such grounds we conclude that behind the volition lies the desire to avoid the costs of rearing many children with its concomitant privation at one economic level and reduction of the standard of living at others, to avoid also parental sacrifice or trouble or inconvenience, including the interruption of other interests. This desire or closely

related group of desires is so normal in human nature that we can at once proceed to consider its new relation to the whole system of attitudes and interests.

The cost and trouble of rearing a family are undertaken either as the gradual assumption of the unreckoned consequences of the fulfilment of the sex instinct or as the accepted price of the satisfactions of family life when the consequences are more or less foreseen. In any event, there are needs which explain the initial stage and both satisfactions and responsibilities which explain the later stages in the assumption of the cost and trouble involved. These needs, satisfactions, and responsibilities are also, in some form, universal expressions of human nature—in fact in this case of all the higher types of animal life. But the form changes. The sexual need finds ways of fulfilment which divorce it at will from its reproductive consequences. The satisfactions of raising a family of any given size vary with the economic conditions which determine the cost of upbringing and the economic utility or disutility of the growing children, with the hygienic and other conditions which determine the number who survive, and with the cultural conditions which determine the valuations placed by men and women generally on parenthood and on the various other interests which they must harmonize with the parental interest. In short, the universal desires of human nature associated with offspring are given variant valuation and variant efficiency under the particular conditions, and what we must show is how the conditions, inner and outer, affect the valuation and the efficiency of desire as reflected in the phenomena of change.

Directly affecting the valuation are the cultural trends of the community. The cultural trends, responsive in part to the same external system of change and given a further degree of coherence by the unifying principle already discussed, cooperate on the whole to bring about the higher valuation of certain interests as against others. Thus we find associated in the cultural process the decline of religious authority, the growth of a rationalistic, critical, or calculating spirit for which immediate or imminent costs outweigh the remoter less

tangible values inspired by no longer effective traditions, the greater liberation of the individualistic attitude which is no longer content, in a specialized world, to suppress personal interests and is no longer subject to the same social compulsion to do so, and in particular the evocation under these conditions of a greater independence of women from the folkways which limited their life within the family. These tendencies, once sufficiently established, are reflected in the system of education to which especially the younger members of the community are formally or informally exposed, and they modify in some degree all the institutions of society. Their combined impact on sex relationships has many aspects but it is easy to see that they operate to reduce the size of the family to the point where the current satisfactions of parenthood and family life are a compensation, within the changing order of values, for the sacrifice, cost, or trouble involved. We cannot here deal with the many evidences which show that these trends find expression in attitudes or thought-forms conducive to family restriction. One of the best indications is found in the study of families abruptly transferred from an older social environment to one in which the newer tendencies are active. Of course there are endless variations of individual situations and there are many differences in the way in which, from mere imitation to full recognition of their significance, the trends themselves are followed. The essential point is that these cultural attitudes are coherent and combine in the production of certain definite forms of behavior, of which family restriction is one.

We should distinguish the question of the priority of this or that cultural factor in the pattern of thought which leads to these forms of behavior from their relative significance within the established pattern. The former question is one for historical analysis, and in passing we can merely suggest that the changes which are directly responsive to the conditions of every-day life are liable to precede the changes which are more remote from such influences. Thus changes in religious attitudes are apt to follow the advance of scientific knowledge and practice, or the growth in other directions of a critical

spirit. But many studies of the manner and rate of change of different types of social institutions would need to be made in order to answer at all this difficult question. As to the relative significance of the cultural factors converging on the phenomenon of change, we can assess them in some degree from such indications as the importance attached to the various sanctions of conduct in the older system and in the newer, or again the relative disturbance of the previous habits of life which attends the adoption of this or that new attitude. It will sometimes appear that trends which develop later in time than others, as the trends associated with religion often do, may nevertheless be more decisive influences. But since the various trends are accommodated to one another the attempt to discover quantitative or even precise expressions of their relative influence on a given phenomenon is a vain one. We can see how they cohere within a system of thought, how they reinforce one another, how from different angles they corroborate or check tendencies to act in specific directions, and how together they form the background of the changing valuations which are expressed in the changing phenomenon.

Correspondent to the higher or lower valuations revealed in changing desires is the degree of efficiency in the means available for their realization. A desire is impotent without means and remains undeveloped, while a change of the means affects not only the particular desire which it furthers but also its relation to all other desires. It does not follow that the facilitation of desire increases its intensity—many objects we pursue with more zest because they are difficult to attain. It does not follow that a more ample or efficient provision of means stimulates the greater employment of those means. The greater efficiency of the instruments of destruction does not increase the desire of the nations to make war, the chemist, because of his access to poisons, is not more liable to commit murder than other men. The means must be considered in relation to the whole situation. There are some investigators who regard the decline of the birth-rate as essentially due to the improvement of contraceptive devices. It would be more accurate to say that apart from this development the decline

would not have been so marked or so rapid, but there is no reason to assume that the desire for family restriction did not itself stimulate the process of discovery. As in so many other instances the appropriate means were forthcoming when the desire to use them grew strong enough in the community. The fact that after the trial of Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant in England in 1877 for publishing a new edition of an 'obscene' book on birth control the English birth-rate began its definite decline in 1878, and that after a similar trial in New South Wales in 1888 the birth-rate of that colony showed also a sharp decline in 1889, does not indicate that it was solely the spread of knowledge concerning these devices attending the publicity of the trials which was responsible. Public trials might have occurred at other periods of history without being followed by these results. The conditions, especially the cultural conditions we have been discussing, were already prepared. The trials, with their sudden impact on the public mind, helped to precipitate attitudes which deep-moving forces were fostering.

The immediate means form only one element in the total set of outer circumstances which are harmonized with the cultural trends in giving a higher efficiency to particular desires. Higher valuation of certain objectives often corresponds, as here, with higher efficiency in the achievement of these objectives, but not simply because more efficacious means are available. The other circumstances must conspire with the immediate means. Under conditions where men live near a subsistence level, where they have few chances of enhancing their standard of living, where the weighing of costs and utilities is therefore not an habitual process, it is for the most part only crude necessity, furnished with equally crude means, which dictates the limitation of the family. Where on the other hand there are many and fluctuating standards of living within a society, where the possibility of maintaining and still more of enhancing a present standard depends largely on individual effort or discretion, there the competitive spirit with its calculating methods is strongly liberated and the general human desires for the avoidance of costs which bring no adequate compensation, in terms of current cultural valuations, are more

precisely focussed on particular means for their achievement. We have already seen how these and various other external conditions of modern society are related to the decline of the birth-rate.[8] The immediate means, in short, fit into a whole outer complex of circumstances which in turn is the counterpart of the inner complex of desires and attitudes.

To sum up, we have analyzed the total situation bearing on the restriction of the family into its elements as follows. (1) We begin with a simple express volition motivated by certain universal human desires which within the total situation are given a higher relative urgency or valuation. (2) This higher valuation is explained on the inner side by the cultural trends which in a variety of ways, themselves interdependent, promote it by diminishing adverse sanctions and fostering congenial attitudes. (3) The volition is rendered more effective by the development of express means devised for its achievement. (4) These means are not only dependent on the technological level of the society, they also have a particular dependence on the whole social environment, viewed as a system of opportunities, obstacles, and conditions within which the desires correspondent to the cultural attitudes find play. In other words, (3) and (4) are the foreground and the background respectively of the outer aspects of the phenomenon, in the same manner as (1) and (2) compose the foreground and the background of the inner aspects. In so far as we perceive and understand the adjustment, the inter-relation of the aspects, we have interpreted the phenomenon. On the one side we have the enhancement of valuation in the direction of the social change, on the other the greater conformity of the means and the conditions to the change in valuation.

Here we have a very different picture of social causation from that which presents an array of causes mechanically and separately contributory to a result. It will be seen that the process of explanation demands an intimate and far-reaching knowledge of a total situation as its manifold interactions bear particularly on the phenomenon under investigation. It is true that we approach the problem of causation from various

[8] Ch. XXIII, 3.

points of view and thus attribute special significance to various aspects of it. We may want to know, for example, what factors precipitated an historical moment, a dramatic turn, a culminating point, in a process of change. We then take the rest of the pre-existing situation for granted, and consider how its equilibrium has been altered by particular *events*. Such an event might be a scientific discovery or invention, a war, a *coup d'état*, an organizing genius, a cultural achievement, an agent of publicity, a new evangel or evangelist. Anywhere in the total system the precipitating factors may emerge—when the system is ripe for them. Or again we may approach the problem from a practical point of view, and ask, what aspect of the situation is most susceptible to change, and by what means, in order to bring about a desired result? Then also we are likely to take many aspects for granted. But since the situation is not mechanically constructed the social 'engineer' will make many and grave errors if he views too narrowly his problem. Incessant experiment there must be in a world so changeful and so full of striving and of travail as our own, and the taking of risks is essential to all high enterprise. But the risks are needlessly multiplied if we fail to understand the first principles of social causation. The superficial acceptance of mere symptoms as causes is one of the most familiar misconceptions of social situations. We attribute, for example, social unrest to 'agitators', or the spread of nationalism or communism to propaganda, as though we did not need to explain why 'agitators' succeed or why one form of propaganda is powerful and another falls to the ground. Or, taking the opposite road, we endeavor to learn the secret of causation and of practical control by the mere assiduous collection of 'facts', not perceiving that, as Veblen put it, without the "pioneering and engineering work of guidance, design, and theoretical correlation, the most painstaking collection and canvas of information is irrelevant, incompetent, and impertinent".[9] If we are to combat more successfully the vast wastes of misdirection and the blind results of narrow selfishness and unin-

[9] From the article entitled *The Intellectual Pre-eminence of the Jews in Europe*, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, March, 1919.

telligent struggle we must penetrate further the intricately inwrought process in which they arise. But the applications of sociology lie beyond the scope of this volume.

One corollary from our study of causation may be mentioned in conclusion. The explanation of any social change is never complete, it is always an approximation. Our goal is the revelation of an interactive system as it sustains the various phenomena appearing within it, and that goal is never fully attained. The complex relation of inner to outer, as also of each inner aspect to other inner aspects and of each outer aspect to other outer aspects, demands experience as well as knowledge, insight as well as calculation. The expectancy of a complete explanation and of a complete verification depends on an over-simple mechanical logic, on naïve ideas particularly regarding the nature of induction. We understand things in so far as we know the coherence of their aspects. In this way, for example, we come to understand the character of the persons with whom we are intimately acquainted. In like manner we come to understand the character of a social equilibrium. There is a process of generalization in which we learn to appraise intimately its quality, its type-form, but it is something more than mere induction from particulars. Through experience we project ourselves into the situation, and our success depends on our sympathetic insight, evoked and reinforced by a multitude of partial evidences. The verification of our conclusions consists in the discovery of negative correlations and of *meaningful* positive correlations, in the confirmatory evidences of trained observers and the critical analysis of their observations, and in the consistency of the results with our knowledge of human nature as it expresses itself in a myriad other situations. Because this knowledge is never complete, because the subject of it is so variable, because it is more possible to experience than to demonstrate the coherence of the aspects, our understanding of society is a progressive but never concluded quest.

APPENDIX

NOTES ON FURTHER READING

(The suggestions for further reading given below are not to be regarded as general bibliographies of the various subjects. They are meant simply to guide the reader of this book to certain works which are particularly relevant to the argument presented in the chapters under which they are listed. Some works which are specially suited for this purpose are marked with an asterisk. The place and date of publication are given for convenience and are not necessarily those of the original edition.)

CHAPTER ONE

In the present stage of sociology different authors adopt varying definitions of our essential terms. Many references would therefore be only confusing. The definitions presented by the author are developed also in his other works:

R. M. MacIver, * *Community* (New York, 1929), Bk. I, ch. II
* *Elements of Social Science* (London, 1921), ch. I
The Modern State (Oxford, 1926), chh. I and V

These definitions are followed in the main in

L. T. Hobhouse, * *Social Development* (New York, 1924), ch. II
G. D. H. Cole, *Social Theory* (London, 1923), ch. I
E. Jenks, *The State and the Nation* (New York, 1919), ch. I

CHAPTER TWO

The student may well begin with the famous passages of Aristotle:

Aristotle, * *Politics*, Bk. I, chh. I–II; Bk. IV, chh. I–III

This Greek conception of society was, in his own manner, adopted by

J. J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, especially Bk. I, chh. VI–VIII

and more thoroughly, under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, in

B. Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State* (London, 1920), chh. III–VII

Modern formulations of the relation between individuality and society will be found in many works, including

J. M. Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations* (New York, 1906)
C. H. Cooley, * *Social Organization* (New York, 1929), Pt. I
* *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York, 1922), chh. I–VI
J. Dewey, * *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, 1927)

M. Ginsberg, *The Psychology of Society* (London, 1921)
A. G. A. Balz, *Basis of Social Theory* (New York, 1924), ch. II
W. E. Hocking, *Man and the State* (New Haven, 1926), Pt. III

Other aspects of the argument of the text will be found in my books,

R. M. MacIver, * *Community*, Bk. I, chh. I–II; Bk. II, ch. I; Bk. III, ch. III
* *The Modern State*, chh. V, XVI

A very suggestive study of the relation between compulsion and social development is presented in

E. Durkheim, * *De La Division du Travail Social* (Paris, 1926)

CHAPTER THREE

The initial statement under chapter One applies still more forcibly to the definitions offered in this chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

On the general concept of the community see

R. M. MacIver, *Elements of Social Science*, ch. II

On the nature of the urban community consult

R. E. Park *et al.*, * *The City* (Chicago, 1925)

On communities within communities see, for example,

K. Bercovici, *Around the World in New York* (New York, 1924)

Among studies of different types of community may be mentioned:

J. H. Kolb, *Rural Primary Groups* (Madison, 1921)
E. de S. Brunner, *Village Communities* (New York, 1927)
J. S. Steiner, *The American Community in Action* (New York, 1928)
R. S. and H. M. Lynd, *Middletown* (New York, 1929)
R. D. McKenzie, *The Neighborhood* (Chicago, 1923)

For other works in this field see under chapter Nineteen.

There are many books on nationality and nationalism, but mostly from an historical or political standpoint. See

C. J. H. Hayes, * *Essays on Nationalism* (New York, 1926)
Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York, 1931)
R. M. MacIver, * *The Modern State*, ch. IV, 2

CHAPTER FIVE

The subject of class and caste has been given much more study by European writers than by American, and even of the books available in English many are translations. On the rise and development of modern classes see

K. Bücher, * *Industrial Evolution* (tr. Wickett, New York, 1901), ch. IX
P. E. Fahlbeck, *Die Klassen und die Gesellschaft* (Jena, 1922)

W. Sombart, *Der Moderne Kapitalismus* (3 vols., Munich, 1924–7)

On the trends of modern classes see

P. Sorokin, * *Social Mobility* (New York, 1927)

T. Veblen, * *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York, 1924)

C. C. North, *Social Differentiation* (Chapel Hill, 1926)

A. Bauer, *Les Classes Sociales* (Paris, 1902)

R. Heberle, *Über die Mobilität in den Vereinigten Staaten* (Jena, 1929)

The Marxist class doctrine is expounded in numerous works, including

K. Marx, * *Capital* (see Vol. III, ch. 52)

K. Kautsky, *The Class Struggle* (tr. Bohn, Chicago, 1910)

On the relation of caste to the social structure see

E. Senart, *Caste in India* (tr. Ross, London, 1930)

C. Bouglé, *Essais sur le Régime des Castes* (Paris, 1908)

M. Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* (Tübingen, 1923), Vol. II, pp. 33–133.

CHAPTER SIX

The subject of the crowd is dealt with in various books on social psychology, including

K. Young, * *Social Psychology* (New York, 1930), Pt. V
Source Book for Social Psychology (New York, 1928), chh. XXII–XXIV

L. L. Bernard, *Introduction to Social Psychology* (New York, 1926), chh. XXVIII–XXIX

Reference should also be made to

W. McDougall, * *The Group Mind* (Cambridge, 1920), ch. II

B. Sidis, * *The Psychology of Suggestion* (New York, 1911)

G. Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics* (London, 1914)

There are a number of books specifically devoted to the study of the crowd, including the pioneering work,

G. Le Bon, *The Crowd* (Eng. tr., London, 1920)

Interesting, though somewhat uncritical, treatments are given in

E. D. Martin, *The Behavior of Crowds* (New York, 1920)

W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* (London, 1916)

A study of a single type of crowd is offered in

W. White, *Rope and Faggot* (New York, 1929)

CHAPTER SEVEN

On the early family

E. Westermarck, * *Short History of Marriage* (London, 1926), especially chh. VIII–X
History of Human Marriage (New York, 1922)

and the contrasting account in

R. Briffault, * *The Mothers* (New York, 1927), especially Bk. I, chh. III–VI and X

There are various histories of the family, including

W. Goodsell, *History of the Family* (New York, 1926)

G. E. Howard, *History of Matrimonial Institutions* (Chicago, 1904)

A. W. Calhoun, *Social History of the American Family* (Cleveland, 1917–19)

See also

W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston, 1906), chh. IX–XI

General books on the family include

H. Bosanquet, * *The Family* (London, 1915)

E. B. Reuter and J. R. Runner, *The Family* (source materials) (New York, 1931)

E. R. Groves and W. F. Ogburn, * *American Marriage and Family Relationships* (New York, 1928)

There is a good chapter on the family (ch. XIII) in

F. H. Hankins, * *Introduction to the Study of Society* (New York, 1928)

The problems of the modern family are well stated in

R. Reed, * *The Modern Family* (New York, 1929)

On divorce see

J. P. Lichtenberger, *Divorce* (New York, 1931)

For the pathology of the urban family consult

E. R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization* (Chicago, 1927)

CHAPTER EIGHT

Beginning perhaps with

G. Ratzenhofer, *Die Soziologische Erkenntnis* (Leipzig, 1898)

many sociologists have offered lists of 'interests', though too often the failure to distinguish interests from attitudes has led to the presentation of a confused array of categories. Classifications of interests are to be found in various textbooks, including

E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1930)

E. C. Hayes, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology* (New York, 1929)

C. A. Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects* (New York, 1926)

A more analytic treatment, though with a different terminology, is given in

F. Znaniecki, *The Laws of Social Psychology* (Chicago, 1925)

A somewhat elaborate attempt to show the correspondence between types of wish-tendencies and social relationships is made in

L. von Wiese, *Allgemeine Soziologie* (Munich, 1924), Vol. I

A brief but suggestive study of sects and sectarians is given in

E. Faris, *The Sect and the Sectarian*, in PROCEEDINGS of the American Sociological Society, Vol. XXII

On the subject of conflict and solidarity there is suggestive material in

G. Coyle, * *The Social Process in Organized Groups* (New York, 1930)

G. E. G. Catlin, * *A Study of the Principles of Politics* (New York, 1930), ch. V.

The idea of social solidarity has been developed, with an ethical bent, by a French group, including

L. Bourgeois, *La Solidarité* (Paris, 1924)

C. Bouglé, *Le Solidarisme* (Paris, 1897)

CHAPTER NINE

On the primary group see

C. H. Cooley, * *Social Organization*, Pt. I

G. Coyle, * *The Social Process in Organized Groups*

M. P. Follett, * *The New State* (New York, 1926)

E. C. Lindeman, * *Social Discovery* (New York, 1924)

Much material on the subject is contained in studies of the social life of children, such as

W. I. Thomas and D. Thomas, *The Child in America* (New York, 1928),

in studies of gangs and similar groups, such as

F. M. Thrasher, *The Gang* (Chicago, 1927),

and in some of the more expert 'case-work' studies, such as

A. E. Sheffield, *The Social Case History* (New York, 1920)

CHAPTER TEN

The function of the state as an organ of society is the subject of many interpretations. The point of view of the present author will be found more fully developed in

R. M. MacIver, * *The Modern State*, especially chh. I, V, XVI

Similar viewpoints will be found in

G. D. H. Cole, * *Social Theory*

E. Jenks, *The State and the Nation*

A. D. Lindsay, * *The Essentials of Democracy* (Philadelphia, 1929)

Reference should also be made to

G. E. G. Catlin, *A Study of the Principles of Politics*, ch. VIII

W. W. Willoughby, *An Examination of the Nature of the State* (New York, 1928)

The relation of the state to the economic order is discussed in many works, including

H. Laski, * *The Grammar of Politics* (New Haven, 1925)

F. Delaisi, *Political Myths and Economic Realities* (New York, 1927), especially Pt. IV.

A. F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago, 1908)

The inclusive theory of the state is well represented by

B. Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*,

which is criticized in

L. T. Hobhouse, *The Metaphysical Theory of the State* (New York, 1918)

The class theory of the state is given in

F. Oppenheimer, *The State* (New York, 1922)

N. Lenin, *The State and Revolution* (New York, 1927)

A review of sociological theories of the state will be found in

H. E. Barnes, * *Sociology and Political Theory* (New York, 1924)

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Vast as is the literature of economics peculiarly little has been done on the *sociological* problem of distinguishing and characterizing the type-form of economic organization. See

R. M. MacIver, *The Modern State*, ch. IX

J. R. Commons, *Legal Foundations of Capitalism* (New York, 1924)

G. Simmel, *Soziologie* (Munich, 1923), pp. 213–232

N. J. Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel* (Chicago, 1925), pp. 121 ff.

W. Sombart, *Der Moderne Kapitalismus* (Leipzig, 1902), Vol. II, pp. 423 ff.

article CAPITALISM, *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. III (New York, 1930)

CHAPTER TWELVE

For the more inclusive anthropological treatment of culture see

R. H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology* (New York, 1917)

C. Wissler, *Man and Culture* (New York, 1923)

B. Malinowski, * article CULTURE, *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. IV (New York, 1931)

For the distinction made in the text see

R. M. MacIver, * *The Modern State*, ch. X, 2

A. Weber, * *Prinzipielles zur Kultursoziologie*, ARCHIV FUR SOZIALWISSENSCHAFT UND SOZIALPOLITIK, Vol. XLVII

On the social form and function of the church see

N. Figgis, * *Churches in the Modern State* (New York, 1914), especially App. I

H. A. Miller, * *Races, Nations, and Classes* (Philadelphia, 1924), ch. V

R. M. MacIver, * *The Modern State*, ch. V, 2

H. P. Douglass, *The Church in the Changing City* (New York, 1927)

See also the references under chapter Twenty-two.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

On the subject of social controls pioneer work of importance was done by earlier sociologists, including

W. Bagehot, *Physics and Politics* (London, 1873)

Sir Henry Maine, *Ancient Law* (New York, 1906)

H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology* (3 vols., London, 1891–7)

G. Tarde, *Les Lois d'Imitation* (Paris, 1895)

Modern anthropology has thrown a fuller light on the subject, and special reference should be made to

B. Malinowski, * *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* (New York, 1926)

Sex and Repression in Savage Society (New York, 1927)

An effective survey of the subject is given in

E. A. Ross, * *Social Control* (New York, 1920), especially chh. X–XIX

On the function of ritual and symbolism, reference may be made to

W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, *The Science of Society* (New Haven, 1927), Vol. II, ch. XXXII

The rôle of symbolism is well suggested in

G. Coyle, * *The Social Process in Organized Groups*, ch. VII.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

On the relation of religion and morals see

H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. III, pp. 150 ff.

The views of a French school of sociologists will be found in

E. Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (New York, 1926)

These views are criticized in

C. C. J. Webb, *Group Theories of Religion* (London, 1916)

More comprehensive treatment is given in

M. Weber, * *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, especially Vol. I, translated by T. Parsons as *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*

See also

L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution* (New York, 1923)

For the modern problem of relationship see

A. N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making* (New York, 1926)

C. Bouglé, *The Evolution of Values* (tr. Sellars, New York, 1926)

A good brief review of the subject is given in

F. N. House, * *The Range of Social Theory* (New York, 1929), ch. XIX

On custom and law see

J. Dickinson, * *Social Order and Political Authority*, in the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1929

R. M. MacIver, *The Modern State*, chh. V and VIII

B. Malinowski, * *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*

On custom and fashion,

H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. II, pp. 205 ff.

T. Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*

G. Simmel, in the INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY, 1904, pp. 130–155

W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

In addition to the references given for chapter Four

J. Dewey, * *Human Nature and Conduct*, Pt. I

R. M. MacIver, * *Community*, Bk. III, ch. V

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

While much has been written on the relation of hereditary to environmental factors we still lack adequate interpretations of the problem as a whole. The case for heredity is stated in

S. J. Holmes, *The Trend of the Race* (New York, 1921)

and with less discretion in

P. Popenoe and R. Johnson, *Applied Eugenics* (New York, 1918)

These works contain useful bibliographies for further study of their point of view. Perhaps the outstanding scientific exponent of the claims of heredity has been Karl Pearson—see

K. Pearson *et al.*, *Eugenics Laboratory Lecture Series* (London, 1911-)

The best all-round introduction to the problem by a biologist is

H. S. Jennings, * *The Biological Basis of Human Nature* (New York, 1930), especially chh. V, VII, IX

A number of recent studies, with a good bibliography, will be found in

Twenty-Seventh Yearbook, National Society for the Study of Education (Bloomington, Ill., 1928)

A review and criticism of the hereditarian theories is offered in

P. Sorokin, * *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (New York, 1928), ch. V

F. H. Hankins, * *Introduction to the Study of Society*, chh. VI–VII

Of the works asserting the influence of environment special mention may be made of

F. Boas, * *The Mind of Primitive Man* (New York, 1922)

F. Hertz, *Race and Civilization* (New York, 1928)

With some qualifications a similar viewpoint is put forward in

F. H. Hankins, *The Racial Basis of Civilization* (New York, 1926)

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

The views and researches of the 'geographical school' may be followed in

E. Huntington, * *Civilization and Climate* (New Haven, 1924)

World Power and Evolution (New Haven, 1920)

E. C. Semple, * *Influence of Geographical Environment* (New York, 1911)

American History and its Geographic Conditions (New York, 1904)

E. G. Dexter, *Weather Influences* (New York, 1904)

J. Russell Smith, *North America* (New York, 1925), chh. I–II
H. J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (London, 1919)

A comprehensive analysis will be found in

J. Brunhes, *Human Geography* (Chicago, 1920)

On the relation of land to population the classic is of course

T. R. Malthus, * *Essay on Population* (1883)

Recent works include

E. M. East, *Mankind at the Cross-Roads* (New York, 1923)
A. M. Carr-Saunders, *The Population Problem* (Oxford, 1922)
W. S. Thompson, *Danger Spots in World Civilization* (New York, 1929)

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

The subject of this chapter is broadly discussed in

A. G. A. Balz, * *The Basis of Social Theory*

In more concrete fashion it is dealt with in some textbooks of sociology, particularly

R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, * *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago, 1924), ch. X
C. A. Dawson and W. E. Gettys, *Introduction to Sociology*, (New York, 1929), chh. VIII–XIII

One aspect of it is discussed in

R. M. MacIver, * *Sociology and Social Work* (New York, 1931), ch. II

Of books specially devoted to the subject mention may be made of

R. C. Dexter, *Social Adjustment* (New York, 1927)

It is suggestively dealt with in

G. Wallas, *The Great Society* (New York, 1928), Pt. II
* *Our Social Heritage* (New Haven, 1921), ch. I

The special problems of adjustment are treated in many specific works, among which may be cited, as illustrating very diverse situations,

E. Abbott, * *The Immigrant and the Community* (New York, 1917)
E. B. Reuter, *The American Race Problem* (New York, 1927)
L. Wirth, *The Ghetto* (Chicago, 1928)

CHAPTER NINETEEN

A good basis for the comparison of city and country may be found in the study of the peasant, on which the outstanding sociological work is

W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, * *The Polish Peasant* (5 vols., Boston, 1918)

But no less illuminating are the characterizations given in such novel-studies as

K. Hamsun, * *Growth of the Soil* (New York, 1921)
G. E. Rölvaag, *Giants in the Earth* (New York, 1928)

For the influence of the pioneer economy on North American civilization the classic is

F. J. Turner, * *The Frontier in American History* (New York, 1921)

The transition from pioneer conditions is suggestively treated in

W. H. Wilson, *The Evolution of the Country Community* (New York, 1912)

J. M. Williams, *Our Rural Heritage* (New York, 1925)

A mass of information is contained in

P. Sorokin and C. C. Zimmerman, * *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology* (New York, 1929)

For reasons given in the text it is harder to find comprehensive works dealing with the social life of the city. Outstanding is the monumental co-operative work

C. Booth *et al.*, *Life and Labor of the People of London* (16 vols., London, 1892)

now being brought up to date in *The New Survey of London Life and Labor* (London, 1930–), undertaken by The London School of Economics and Political Science. The German series on the great city (*die Grossstadt*) contains valuable studies, including

G. Simmel, *Die Grossstädte und das Geistesleben* (Dresden, 1903)

Special urban areas and types have been studied by the 'ecological school', including,

N. Anderson, *The Hobo* (Chicago, 1923)

C. R. Shaw, *Delinquency Areas* (Chicago, 1929)

L. Wirth, *The Ghetto*

H. W. Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum* (Chicago, 1929)

There are few 'urban sociologies', but mention should be made of

N. Carpenter, *The Sociology of City Life* (New York, 1931)

N. Anderson and E. C. Lindeman, *Urban Sociology* (New York, 1928)

The social conditions of a relatively small Mid-west American city are well portrayed in

R. S. and H. M. Lynd, * *Middletown*

Certain aspects of the urban environment are sympathetically revealed in

J. Addams, *Twenty Years at Hull House* (New York, 1917)

M. K. Simkhovitch, *The City Worker's World* (New York, 1917)

The possibilities of urban development are nowhere more thoroughly explored than in the various studies of the Regional Survey of New York and its Environs (New York, 1922–). Some of these possibilities are treated with a certain imaginative insight in

P. Geddes, *Cities in Evolution* (London, 1915)

The trends of city growth and the social consequences thereof are discussed in many works. The more pessimistic viewpoint is given in

G. Hansen, *Die Drei Bevölkerungsstufen* (Munich, 1889)

R. Kuczynski, *Der Zug nach der Stadt* (Stuttgart, 1897)

More matter-of-fact is

A. F. Weber, *The Growth of Cities* (New York, 1899)

There is a good selective bibliography in

R. E. Park *et al.*, * *The City* (Chicago, 1925)

CHAPTER TWENTY

There is no adequate literature dealing with the subject of this chapter. Aspects of social changefulness are illustrated in many works, including

A. G. Keller, *Societal Evolution* (New York, 1915)

W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (New York, 1922)

P. Sorokin, *Social Mobility*

The peculiar historical nature of the social structure is well suggested in

H. Freyer, *Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft* (Leipzig, 1930), ch. I, 8 and ch. II, 6

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

On broad social trends see

L. T. Hobhouse, * *Social Development*

R. M. MacIver, * *Community*, Bk. III

E. Durkheim, * *De la Division du Travail Social*

C. L. Morgan, *Emergent Evolution* (New York, 1925)

On the idea of progress and the relation of evolution to progress

T. H. Huxley, * *Evolution and Ethics* (New York, 1929)

J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress* (London, 1920)

A. Niceforo, *Les Indices Numeriques de la Civilisation et du Progres* (Paris, 1921)

W. D. Wallis, *Culture and Progress* (New York, 1930)

A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress* (New York, 1918)

Acute criticisms of various sociological theories of progress may be found in

P. Barth, * *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie* (Leipzig, 1922)

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

Every student of social evolution should be familiar with the social conditions of some primitive peoples. To this end he should read not only general works on anthropology but also some works descriptive of particular societies. Merely as examples of the former we may mention:

F. Boas, *The Social Organization and Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians* (Washington, 1897)

A. W. Hewitt, *Native Tribes of South-East Australia* (London, 1904)

B. Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (London, 1922)

Crime and Custom in Savage Society

B. Spencer and F. J. Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia* (New York, 1899)

Among comparative studies may be recommended:

F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*

V. F. Calverton (ed.), *The Making of Man* (New York, 1931)

L. T. Hobhouse *et. al.*, *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples* (London, 1915)

A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York, 1923)
R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (New York, 1920)
W. H. R. Rivers, *Social Organization* (New York, 1924)
W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, *The Science of Society*
C. Wissler, *Introduction to Social Anthropology* (New York, 1929)

On the subject of origins particularly we may add:

R. H. Lowie, * *Origin of the State* (New York, 1927)
A. M. Tozzer, * *Social Origins and Social Continuities* (New York, 1925)
W. I. Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins* (Boston, 1909)

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

On natural selection the classics are of course

C. Darwin, * *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* (1871)
The Origin of Species (1859)

The difference between natural and social selection was sharply stated in

T. H. Huxley, * *Evolution and Ethics*

and in another form in

C. L. Morgan, * *Habit and Instinct*

Another biologist's view will be found in

J. A. Thomson, *Darwinism and Human Life* (New York, 1917)

Few sociologists have adequately studied the subject, but reference may be made to

A. G. Keller, *Societal Evolution*

Various social aspects of the falling birth-rate are considered in

L. Dublin (ed.), *Population Problems* (Boston, 1926)
R. Kuczynski, *The Balance of Births and Deaths* (New York, 1928)
A. M. Carr-Saunders, *The Population Problem*

A good account of the history of birth control is given in

J. A. Field, *Essays on Population* (Chicago, 1931)

An entirely different view from that given in the text is suggested in

R. Pearl, *The Biology of Population Growth* (New York, 1925)
G. U. Yule, *The Growth of Population and the Factors which Control It*, JOURNAL of the Royal Statistical Society, 1925

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

The determinist school of Karl Marx has many predecessors as well as successors. Of his own works the most significant, from the standpoint of this chapter, are

K. Marx, *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (tr. Stone, New York, 1904)
* *Capital* (1885), Vol. I, Pt. VIII
K. Marx and F. Engels, * *The Communist Manifesto* (1848) (Eng. tr., Chicago, 1913)

For his successors one or two references out of a vast literature must suffice:

K. Kautsky, *The Class Struggle*

A. Loria, *The Economic Foundations of Society* (Eng. tr., London, 1899)

N. Bukharin, *Historical Materialism* (New York, 1928)

Of the numerous interpretations and criticisms of Marxism we must limit reference to a few works:

M. Beer, *Life and Teachings of Karl Marx* (New York, 1924)

A. D. Lindsay, *Karl Marx's Capital* (Oxford, 1925)

E. Halévy, * *La Formation du Radicalisme Philosophique* (Paris, 1901–04)

The chief works of Veblen are:

T. Veblen, * *The Theory of the Leisure Class*

* *The Instinct of Workmanship* (New York, 1922)

Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (New York, 1918)

The Nature of Peace and the Terms of its Perpetuation (New York, 1919)

The Vested Interests and the State of the Industrial Arts (New York, 1920)

The Place of Science in Modern Civilization (New York, 1919)

Characteristic of recent treatments of the technological factor in modern society are

W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*

L. Mumford, *Sticks and Stones* (New York, 1924)

S. Chase, *Men and Machines* (New York, 1929)

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

Hegel's views on the spiritual principle in the evolution of society will be found in

G. W. F. Hegel, * *Philosophy of Right* (tr. Dyde, London, 1896)

The Phenomenology of Mind (tr. Baillie, New York, 1910)

Within the same order, but very different in emphasis, are

A. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea* (tr. Haldane, London, 1909)

H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (tr. A. Mitchell, New York, 1913)

On the subject in general see

M. R. Cohen, * *Reason and Nature* (New York, 1931), Bk. II, especially ch. III

Spengler's views are stated in

O. Spengler, * *The Decline of the West* (tr. Atkinson, New York, 1929), especially Bk. I, ch. I and Bk. II, ch. IV

For the sociological significance of Hegel see

H. Freyer, *Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*, ch. III, 1

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

The problem of causation in sociology hinges on the rela---- -- --- social and the physical sciences in respect of methodology. On this subject see

C. H. Cooley, * *Sociological Theory and Social Research* (New York, 1930)

M. R. Cohen, * *Reason and Nature*, Bk. III, ch. I

W. F. G. Swann *et al.*, *Essays on Research in the Social Sciences* (Washington, 1931)

H. E. Barnes (ed.), *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1925)

T. Abel, *Systematic Sociology in Germany* (New York, 1929)

R. M. MacIver, * *Is Sociology a Natural Science*, PUBLICATION of the American Sociological Society, May, 1931
Sociology, in *A Quarter Century of Learning* (ed. Fox, New York, 1931)

For a vigorous statement of an opposite point of view to that of the last two citations see

R. Bain, *Trends in American Sociological Theory*, being ch. II of Lundberg *et al.*, *Trends in American Sociology* (New York, 1929)

INDEX

Abbott, E., 354 n.
Accommodation, 350 ff., 401–2
Acton, Lord, 69
Actors, fertility rates of, 465, 467
Adaptation, to environment, 308 ff.; distinguished from adjustment, 309; as type of change, 40
Adjustment, social, 309 ff., 349 ff., 401–2
Agricultural revolution, 362
Agriculture, effect on social life of, 364–6
Amana communities, 262, 264
Angell, N., 204 n.
Aristotle, 9, 20, 295
Association, definition of, 12–5; and interest, 152 ff.; cultural, 155; economic, 156, 191, 208 ff.; classification of, 158 ff.; duration of, 165–6; large scale, 182 ff.; political, 191 ff.; differentiation of, 435 ff.
Attitudes, meaning of, 44 ff.; distinguished from interests, 48–50; classification of, 46–7
Augustine, St., 241
Authority, social, 256 ff.
Autonomy, social, 21 ff.

Bagehot, W., 393
Balz, A. G. A., 312 n., 344 n.
Bargaining, distinguished from competition, 216
Barnes, H. E., 423 n.
Beard, C. A., 50–1
Behaviorism, x, 529–30
Bercovici, K., 75 n.
Bias, meaning of, 420 n.
Birth-rate, decline of, 126 ff., 342, 458 ff.; and social evolution, 451 ff.; and social class, 464 ff.; of native and foreign-born in United States, 476; interpretation of falling, 537 ff.
Black, G. D., 366 n.
Blackstone, W., 195
Boas, F., 67 n., 88 n., 319, 431 n.
Bogardus, E. S., 75 n.
Bosanquet, B., 24 n.
Bosanquet, H., 146 n.
Bouglé, C., 267
Bourgeoisie, the, as social class, 88–91
Brailsford, H. N., 204 n., 217 n.
Brearley, H. C., 337 n.
Brentano, L., 269 n.
Briffault, R., 27 n., 115, 116, 118, 432 n.
Bronner, A. F., 534 n.
Brunhes, J., 335
Brunner, E. de S., 353 n.
Bryce, J., 76 n.
Bücher, K., 95 n.
Burgess, E. W., 59 n., 105 n., 350 n., 385, 481 n.
Burke, E., 433
Burks, B. S., 326 n., 327
Burrow, T., 30 n., 284 n.

Calvin, John, 447
Capitalism, 211 ff.; and religion, 449, 522; Marxist theory of, 485 ff.; interpretation of, 535–6
Carey, H. C., 341
Carlyle, T., 259 n.
Carpenter, N., 353 n.
Caste, as social bond, 72; origin of,

84; sentiment of, 87; contrasted with class, 87 ff.; and religion, 89
Catell, J. M., 314
Catholic church, and divorce, 130; institutional character of, 240, 270, 271
Catlin, G. E. G., 94, 198 n.
Catullus, 48
Causation, social, one-sided theories of, 480 ff.; interpretation of, 519 ff.; unifying principle of, 524 ff.
Ceremony, 258–9
Chaddock, R. E., 318 n.
Chapin, F. S., 500 n.
Chase, S., 505 n.
Child, the, in modern family, 134–5; the illegitimate, 141; and state control over family, 147–8
Children, abandoned by society, 27
China, class distinctions in, 92
Christianity, 239, 444 ff.
Church, the, and marriage, 128, 130; as cultural association, 237 ff.; evolution of, 439 ff.; and state, 444 ff.; definition of, 447; and economic order, 449
City, as environment, 311–2; location of, 336; and country, 358 ff.; diversity of, 360; and migration, 361–3; growth of, 376–8; dominance of, 376, 379 ff.
Civilization, spread of, 71–2; distinguished from culture, 225 ff., 348–9; and city life, 378–9; as determinant of society, 480 ff.
Class, social, meaning of, 78; grades of, 79, 80; principle of, 81 ff.; and caste, 83–5; attitudes of, 85 ff.; consciousness, 86; struggle, 87 ff.; Marxist interpretation of, 88–9; and communications, 90; standards of, 93–4; intolerance, 94; and vital statistics, 463 ff.; and luxury, 497–8
Class-system, types of, 91 ff.; and social structure, 91 ff.
Clergymen, fertility rates of, 465, 467
Climate, and social phenomena, 336 ff.
Club, the, 161
Codes, occupational, 219 ff.; and sanctions, 248 ff.; development of, 252–4; customary, 253; legal, 253, 274–6; social supports of, 254 ff.; religious and moral, 266 ff.; customary and legal, 272 ff.; social and individual, 284 ff.; moral, 293; inculcation of, 296–8; conflict of, 270–2, 285, 298–9; application of, 298 ff.; service of, 300
Coercion, social, 35 ff., 76; and the social order, 35 ff., and marriage, 146–9. See also Force
Common, distinguished from the like, 8. See also Interests
Communism, 261 ff.
Community, definition of, 9–12; characterization of, ch. IV; and territory, 57 ff.; and communications, 58; sentiment of, 61 ff., 105 n.
Competition, 214–5; and city life, 370
Condorcet, M. J., 339 n.
Conflict, social, 29 ff.; types of, 73–4; economic, 216–7, 219 ff.; between individual and code, 285, 286, between codes, 270–2, 285, 298–9, 456; and accommodation, 352–4
Conklin, E. G., 321 n.
Consensus, in group decisions, 177 ff.
Convention, 278–9
Cooley, C. H., 172 n.
Co-operation, direct and indirect, 175–6
Country, and city, 358 ff.; com-

munity of life in, 360; characteristics of life in, 363 ff.; birth-rate in, 475–6
Coyle, G., 170 n., 260 n.
Cressman, L. S., 260 n.
Crime, and punishment, 38 ff.; causes of, 524–5
Crowd, the, distinguished from the herd, 97; nature of, 101; types of, 101–2, 103–4; spirit of, 102 ff.; behavior of, 104 ff.; principle of solidarity in, 107–8.
Cultural associations, 155, 187, 225 ff.
Culture, meeting of cultures, 74–6; and class distinctions, 88–90; distinguished from civilization, 225 ff., 348–9; and locality, 334; urban and rural, 374–5; processes of, 503 ff.; spirit of, 514 ff.; and social causation, 540 ff.
Culture area, 59
Custom, distinguished from institution, 16; and law, 253–4, 272 ff.; limitation of, 273–4; and fashion, 278 ff.; and habit, 287 ff.; differentiation of, 435
Cycles, in social phenomena, 511 ff.

Darwin, L., 321 n.
Darwinian theory, 403, 451 ff.
Dawson, C. A., 75 n.
Death-rate, decline of, 126, 458; and social evolution, 453 ff., 457 ff.
De Coulanges, F., 267
Deets, L. E., 263 n.
Delaisi, M., 204 n., 209 n.
Delinquency, 534–5
Demolins, E., 368 n.
Depopulation, 384–6, 456, 461
De Ruggiero, G., 42
Determinism, 236
Development, meaning of, 405
Dewey, J., 186, 271 n., 287 n., 289, 298 n.
Dexter, E. G., 336 n.
Dexter, R. C., 354 n.
Dickinson, J., 274 n.
Difference, as condition of society, 7–8; as disruption, 73
Differentiation, meaning of, 405–6, 421; functional, 431 ff.; process of, 433 ff.
Division of labor, see Specialization
Divorce, 128 ff.; in United States, 130–1; causation of, 131–2; problems of, 143–5
Douglass, H. P., 243 n.
Drachsler, J. H., 353 n.
Drama, social conflict as subject of, 285–6
Dugdale, R. L., 314 n.
Durkheim, E., 28, 253, 337, 338, 368 n.

East, E. M., 341
Ecological approach, 59–60, 355
Economic associations, 208 ff.
Economic classes, 79 ff.
Economic conditions, and family, 115, 117, 123 ff.; and church, 449
Economic conflict, 73, 74
Economic determinism, 485 ff.
Economic method, distinguished from political, 209 ff.
Edin, K. A., 473
Education, as function of state, 200; and habit, 288–9; and social codes, 296–7; and social heritage, 348–9
Edwards family, 314, 320–2
Eldridge, S., 187 n.
Ellis, H., 112, 142 n.
England, class distinctions in, 91; evolution of family in, 121, 122; fertility of marriage in, 463 ff.
Environment, and race, 67, 316 ff.; significance of, 306 ff.; and mode of life, 307–8; adaptation to, 308 ff.; adjustment to, 309 ff.,

349 ff., 505–7; as changed by man, 310–2; and heredity, 313 ff., 328–30, 397–8; attempts to measure influence of, 323 ff.; physical, 331 ff., 395–6; inner and outer aspects of, 344 ff.; selective character of, 350; changes of, 394 ff.; technological, 395–6; as determinant of social process, 481 ff.
Estabrook, A. H., 314 n.
Etiquette, 287–9
Evolution, see Social Evolution

Faguet, E., 223
Family, as association, 13; nature of, 109 ff.; stages of individual, 111–2; common characteristics of, 112–3; varieties of, 113; origin of, 113 ff.; early forms of, 114 ff.; matriarchal, 115–6, 118–9; patriarchal, 116, 119 ff.; functions of, 117, 133 ff.; joint, 119–20; evolution of, 121, 122 ff.; and the Industrial Revolution, 123–4, 133; public aid to, 125; changing functions of, 124–6; institutional changes of, 126 ff.; instability of, 129 ff., 138 ff.; present situation of, 137 ff.; state control of, 145 ff.; interests of, 156; and country life, 367–8; and city life, 368–9; size of, see Fertility
Farmers, as social class, 80–1
Fascism, 36
Fashion, and state control, 202 n.; sanction of, 251; nature of, 278 ff.; and custom, 278, 281, 283
Federative principle, 185 ff.
Fertility, and social class, 463 ff.; and mode of life, 468 ff.; conditions determining, 538 ff.
Fetishism, 441
Feudalism, class-system of, 83, 89
Field, J. A., 462 n.
Fishberg, M., 354 n.
Follett, M. P., 178, 179 n., 187 n.
Force, function of, 36 ff.; and creative personality, 42; in state, 194, 201–2; and law, 251–2. See also Coercion
Fouillée, A., 21
Fox, D. R., 439 n.
Frazer, J. G., 432 n.
Freeman, F. N., 326 n.
Freud, S., 105

Galton, F., 313, 316, 323
Gang, the, explanation of, 533–4
Geography, and community, 59; as social determinant, 331 ff.; changing dependence on, 335–6; and social causation, 355
Gesell, A., 324 n.
Gettys, W. E., 75 n.
Giddings, F. H., 7
Gilfillan, S. C., 333
Ginsberg, M., 36 n., 410 n.
Goddard, H. H., 314 n.
Godwin, W., 339 n., 340
Goldenweiser, H., 10, 423 n., 428 n., 429, 443 n.
Goodsell, W., 121, 122 n., 125 n.
Gras, N. S. B., 57
Gray, J. C., 276 n.
Greene, E., 448 n.
Gregariousness, 97 ff.
Group, the primary, 172 ff.
Group-mind, the, 22, 105
Groves, E., 130 n., 145 n., 477 n.
Gumplowicz, L., 425 n., 451 n.

Habit, and custom, 287 ff.; nature of, 288 ff.; and social institutions, 493 ff.
Hall, F. S., 150 n.
Hankins, F. H., 67 n., 318 n.
Hansen, G., 369
Hart, H., 411 n.
Hartland, E. S., 118 n.
Hauser, Caspar, 27–8

Healy, W., 554 n.
Heberle, R., 80 n.
Hegel, G. W. F., 488–9, 507 ff.
Herd-spirit, the, 98–100, 108
Heredity, and environment, 313 ff., 328–30; and mental tests, 316–8; and race, 316 ff.; mechanism of, 320–1; as condition of social change, 397–8
Hertz, F., 67 n., 319 n.
Hindu Society, caste-system of, 83–5, 92
Hindus, M., 92 n.
Hobbes, T., 19, 24, 38, 252, 433
Hobhouse, L. T., 36 n., 409–11, 523 n.
Hocking, W. E., 22, 97
Home, the, 136–7
Howard, G. E., 432 n.
Human nature, dogma of, 500–1
Huntington, E., 336 n., 381, 382 n., 395 n.
Huxley, T. H., 267, 340, 453 n.

Immigrant groups, 74–5, 328–9
Incorporation, significance of, 213–4
India, caste in, 72; British rule in, 76
Indian Statutory Commission, Report of the, 83
Individualism, 20
Individuality, meaning of, 20 ff.; and society, 24 ff.; and personality, 26 n.; and civilization, 33; and the herd-spirit, 100; and large-scale association, 184 ff.
Industrialism, social effects of, 123 ff., 481 ff.
Industrial Revolution, and the family, 123 ff.; and social change, 495 ff.
Inner, the, and the outer, in social science, 345, 481, 531 ff.
Institutions, definition of, 15–7; as source of social restriction, 32; formation of, 435–6; demarcation of, 442 ff.
Integration, as group process, 178 ff.
Interdependence, national, 204; economic, 217–8
Interests, like and common, 8, 155 ff.; distinguished from attitudes, 48–9; and associations, 152 ff.; classification of, 158 ff.; duration of, 165–6; conflict of, 167 ff.; as affected by association, 173 ff.; political and economic, 191; economic, 208 ff.; technical and occupational, 220 ff.
Intermarriage, and caste, 83
International relations, 38, 71–2, 203 ff.

James, W., 290, 291 n.
Jewish race, 66, 67
Johnson, R., 316
Jones, W. H. S., 395 n.
Juke family, 314, 320–2
Justice, as function of state, 198–9
Juvenal, 231 n.

Keller, A. G., 455, 456 n.
Kidd, B., 24, 267
Kinship, as social bond, 7, 64; in primitive society, 114 ff., 429, 431
Kolb, J. H., 60, 379 n.
Krabbe, H., 256 n.
Kroeber, A. L., 283 n., 441 n.
Kropotkin, P., 341
Kuczynski, R., 385 n., 460 n.

Laboring classes, fertility of, 468 ff.
Lapouge, V. de, 478–9
Lasker, B., 45
Laski, H., 202 n.
Law, political, 251–2; and custom, 252–4, 272 ff.; constitutional, 277
Leadership, 153, 169, 256–7

Le Bon, G., 107
Lehmann, H. C., 322 n., 326 n.
Le Play, F., 59, 137, 368 n.
Leroy-Beaulieu, P., 341
Lévy-Bruhl, L., 439
Lewis, C., 195 n.
Lewisohn, L., 353 n.
Liberty, in society, 20 ff.; and law, 29; condition of, 41–2; and large-scale association, 184 ff.
Like, the, distinguished from the common, 8
Likeness, as condition of society, 7–8
Lindeman, E. C., 243 n., 354 n.
Lippert, J., 432
Lippmann, W., 136 n.
Locality, and community, 10, 57 ff.; as basis of organization, 185 ff.; and culture, 334
Lowie, R. H., 61, 62, 84 n., 114 n., 116, 427
Lubbock, J., 432 n.
Lucretius, 418
Luther, Martin, 447
Lynd, R. S., and H. M., 356 n., 474

MacIver, R. M., 26 n., 123, 142 n., 146, 155 n., 162 n., 181 n., 210, 272 n., 277 n., 312 n., 426, 427, 440, 448, 512, 524
MacKenzie, W. L., 360 n.
Magic, and religion, 237, 271, 441–2
Maine, Sir H., 76, 183, 252, 393
Malinowski, B., 36, 114 n., 118, 249, 253, 254, 271, 301 n.
Malthus, T. R., 339, 340, 341, 342
Marriage, 110, 127–8, 145 ff.; state-control of, 145 ff.; fertility of, 125 ff.; 463 ff.; change in ceremony, 127–8; legal age of, 150
Martin, E. D., 104, 105 n.
Marx, K., 88 ff., 485 ff., 497
Matriarchate, the, 115, 116, 118
Maunier, E., 120, 251
McDougall, W., 21 n., 105 n., 106
McKenzie, R. D., 59 n.
Mead, M., 76 n.
Means, and ends, 542–4
Measurement, in sociology, x; of hereditary qualities, 316 ff., 323 ff.
Mechanization, 190, 233, 481 ff., 505
Medical profession, 167–8
Method, in sociology, vii–x, 520–1, 529 ff., 537 ff.
Michels, R., 169 n.
Migration, from country to city, 377, 380–2
Mill, J. S., 24, 30, 202 n., 414, 415
Miller, H. A., 75 n., 243 n.
Mob, the, 104
Mobility, social, 80, 87; and divorce, 131–2
Monroe, Paul, 236 n.
Morals, and mores, 251; and religion, 266 ff.; codes of, 268 ff.; nature of, 301–2
Mores, definition of, 17–18; and morals, 207
Morgan, C. L., 454
Motivation, meaning of, 50; and sanctions, 250
Mowrer, E. R., 132 n.
Müller, H. J., 325
Müller-Lyer, F., 144, 430 n.
Mumford, L., 287

Nationalism, forms of, 68–9; perils of, 69 ff.
Nationality, as community sentiment, 65 ff.; and race, 65, 66–7; definition of, 66; characteristics of, 67–8
Nature, socialization of, 344
Negro, the, and mental tests, 316–8
Neighborhood, definition of, 60; and modern city, 186
Newman, H. H., 325
Nordhoff, C., 261, 263, 264

Obedience, motives of, 249 ff.
Occupation, as index of hereditary quality, 314–6
Occupational associations, 218 ff.
Odum, H. W., 59 n.
Officialism, 223
Ogburn, W. F., 111 n., 130 n., 145 n., 230 n., 312, 475, 477, 500
Oppenheimer, F., 14, 62, 66, 424, 425
Order, function of state, 197–8
Organic analogy, 21–3, 404, 514 ff.
Origins, social, problem of, 116, 423 ff.

Pareto, V., 51
Park, R. E., 59 n., 74, 75, 105 n., 354 n., 371, 385, 481 n.
Parrington, V., 96 n., 411 n.
Patriarchate, the, 115, 118, 120 ff.
Patriotism, 68
Pearson, K., 313, 314 n., 319
Peasant, the, 81
Perfectionists, the, 262, 264
Phillips, J. C., 477 n.
Pigou, A. C., 413 n.
Pitt-Rivers, F., 352 n.
Plato, 21, 73 n., 220
Political Associations, 191 ff.
Pollock, F., 273
Popenoe, P., 316
Population, and land, 339 ff.; changes in composition of, 460
Potlach, the, 88
Primitive peoples, as affected by civilization, 75–6; mentality of, 439, 440
Professions, associations of, 167–8; social selection in, 464 ff.
Progress, see Social Progress
Proletariat, the, as social class, 88–91
Prostitution, 140
Protestantism, growth of, 447–8; and capitalism, 449
Psychological tests, and heredity, 316 ff.
Psychology, and sociology, 43
Public opinion, 273, 297–8
Punishment, and crime, 38 ff.
Pupin, M. I., 353

Race, and nation, 65–7; and class, 82; and hereditary qualities, 316 ff.
Racialism, 73–4
Ratzenhofer, G., 451 n.
Ratzel, F., 308, 343
Reason, and social evolution, 507 ff.
Reed, Ruth, 141 n.
Reformation, the, 446–7
Religion, nature of, 237, 241–2; and morality, 242, 266 ff.; sanctions of, 266; and magic, 237, 271, 441–2; evolution of, 440 ff.; institutionalization of, 442 ff.; and capitalism, 449, 522; as social determinant, 521–2
Religious conflict, 74
Rhythm, in social phenomena, 511–2
Richmond, M., 150 n.
Rignano, E., 310 n.
Ritual, 257–9, 441–2
Rivers, W. H. R., 116 n.
Robinson, J. H., 50, 51
Romantic love, 132, 144–5
Ross, E. A., 90 n., 259 n.
Rousseau, J. J., 73, 74, 122, 139, 181 n., 433
Russell, B., 132 n., 151
Russia, Soviet, 36, 82, 92, 125

Sanction, social, 38–9, 249 ff.
Selection, natural, 450 ff.; in society, 453 ff.; social, 457 ff.
Semple, E. C., 336 n., 343 n.
Sex, and the family, 112, 114 ff.; instinct, 117, 135–6; changing attitude to, 140; control of in communistic groups, 263–4

Shaw, C. R., 355 n.
Sheffield, A. D., 187 n.
Sidis, B., 99 n., 100
Simkhovitch, M. K., 186
Simkhovitch, V. G., 333 n., 395 n.
Simmel, G., 165 n., 256 n.
Smith, Adam, 8, 214, 215, 369
Smith, Robertson, 119
Social change, rapidity of, 390 ff.; nature of, 391–2; conditions of, 393 ff.; ways of, 399 ff.; scheme of, 528; see also Social Evolution
Social controls, 249 ff., 458 ff.
Social distance, 78
Social evolution, meaning of, 400, 402 ff., 437; and progress, 400–1; criteria of, 409–11; reality of, 423 ff.; process of, 433 ff.; as key to understanding of change, 437 ff.; and economic conditions, 485 ff.; and technological conditions, 492 ff.; and ideal principles, 507 ff.; as cyclical, 511 ff.
Social heritage, the, 21, 226, 228, 344 ff., 397–8, 454
Social process, in primary groups, 175 ff.; significance of, 390 ff., 400
Social progress, and social evolution, 400–1, 406 ff.; as subject of sociological study, 416 ff.
Social relationship, as adjustment of attitudes, 45
Social science, nature and problems of, vii–x, 3–4, 407 ff., 417 ff.
Society, definition of, x, 5–9; nature of, 19 ff.; as organism, 22, 23; and individuality, 24 ff.
Sociology, nature of, 3–4; and psychology, 43
Solidarity, social, 30 ff., 179 ff., 255
Sombart, W., 94
Sorokin, P., 81 n., 314 n., 333 n., 360 n., 366 n., 380 n., 383 n., 385, 386 n., 423 n., 452 n., 511 n.
Sovereignty, 195
Soviet, see Russia
Specialization, in city compared with country, 365–6, 370, 371; forms of, 405–6; process of, 433 ff.
Spencer, H., 22, 141, 267, 280
Spengler, O., 312, 369, 383, 384, 512 ff.
Spykman, N. J., 256 n.
State, contrasted with community, 13–4, 201; and family, 123, 125, 129 ff., 145 ff.; and locality, 188; nature of, 191 ff.; and society, 192 ff.; functions of, 195 ff.; and order, 197–8; and justice, 198–9; and conservation, 199; and education, 190; and voluntary associations, 201; limits of, 201–2; and international society, 203 ff.; origins of, 424 ff.; and church, 444 ff.
Status, and class, 79; and family, 138; and contract, 183
Sterilization, laws regarding, 151
Struggle for existence, 451 ff.
Suicide, and climate, 337–8
Sumner, W. G., 17, 456
Sutherland, E. H., 353 n.
Symbolism, social, 259–60

Tacitus, 281
Tarde, G., 282
Tawney, R. H., 239 n., 269 n., 446 n.
Technical interests, 221
Technological conditions, and social evolution, 492 ff.
Thomas, D. S., 150 n., 490 n.
Thomas, W. I., 150 n., 368 n., 412 n.
Thompson, W. S., 341, 474 n.
Thorndike, E. L., 324
Thrasher, F. M., 534 n.
Thucydides, 73 n.
Thurstone, L. L., 45 n.

Tönnies, F., 267, 452 n.
Totemism, survivals of, 429
Turner, F. J., 492
Twins, difference between, 323 ff.

United States, class distinctions in, 91, 95–6; evolution of family in, 121; divorce in, 129 ff.; communistic societies in, 261 ff.; immigrant in, 74, 351; fertility of classes in, 474 ff.
Urwick, E. J., 147
Utopian communities, 261 ff.
Utopias, types of, 287

Valuation, in social science, 407 ff., 417 ff.; as condition of social change, 539 ff.
Veblen, T., 88, 214, 493 ff., 545
Virgil, 234 n.
Visher, S. S., 314, 315 n.

Wallas, G., 311, 312, 344, 347, 348
War, 37–8, 203, 205–7
Wealth, as class determinant, 82–3
Weber, A. F., 381 n., 385
Weber, Alfred, 225 n.
Weber, Max, 84, 268, 269, 417, 449, 504, 521
Webster, H., 431
Weill, B. C., 321 n.
Westermarck, E., 115–6, 432 n.
Wheeler, G., 410 n.
White, R., 185 n.
White, W. A., 40 n.
Winship, A. E., 314 n.
Wissler, C., 59
Witty, P. A., 322 n., 326 n.
Wollstonecraft, Mary, 122, 139
Women, status of in primitive society, 115 ff.; in patriarchal family, 120–1; changing status of, 123 ff., 127, 139; economic occupation of, 124 ff.; and city life, 373–4
Woods, F. A., 314, 316

Yerkes, R. M., 314 n., 316
Y.M.C.A., the, 159–60

Zimmerman, C. C., 81 n., 360 n., 366 n., 380 n., 381 n., 383 n., 385, 386 n.
Znaniecki, F., 368 n., 412 n.