THE BOOK WAS DRENCHED

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_162946

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 204 T944E Accession No. 17276

Author Turner J. E.

Title Essentials in the development of religion 1936

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below.

LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHY

As may be seen from the original programme printed in Erdmann's *History of Philosophy* under the date 1890, the Library of Philosophy was designed as a contribution to the History of Modern Philosophy under the heads: first of different Schools of Thought—Sensationalist, Realist, Idealist, Intuitivist; secondly of different Subjects—Psychology, Ethics, Aesthetics, Political Philosophy, Theology. While much had been done in England in tracing the course of evolution in nature, history, economics, morals and religion, little had been done in tracing the development of thought on these subjects. Yet "the evolution of opinion is part of the whole evolution."

By the co-operation of different writers in carrying out this plan it was hoped that a thoroughness and completeness of treatment, otherwise unattainable, might be secured. It was believed also that from writers mainly British and American fuller consideration of English Philosophy than it had hitherto received might be looked for. In the earlier series of books containing, among others, Bosanquet's *History of Æsthetic*, Pfleiderer's *Rational Theology since Kant*, Albee's *History of English Utilitarianism*, Bonar's *Philosophy and Political Economy*, Brett's *History of Psychology*, Ritchie's *Natural Rights*, these objects were to a large extent effected.

In the meantime original work of a high order was being produced both in England and America by such writers as Bradley, Stout, Bertrand Russell, Baldwin, Urban, Montague and others, and a new interest in foreign works, German,

French and Italian, which had either become classical or were attracting public attention, had developed. The scope of the Library thus became extended into something more international, and it is entering on the fifth decade of its existence in the hope that it may contribute in this highest field of thought to that Intellectual Co-operation which is one of the most significant objects of the League of Nations and kindred organizations.

GENERAL EDITOR

May 1, 1930

LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHY

GENERAL EDITOR:

PROFESSOR J. H. MUIRHEAD, LL.D.

ANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY By Prof. G. F. Stout. *Two Vols.* 5*th Impression.*

ATTENTION By Prof. W. B. Pillsbury. 2*nd Impression.*

HISTORY OF ÆSTHETIC By B. Bosanquet. 5*th Impression.* 4*th Edition.*

HISTORY OF ENGLISH UTILITARIANISM By Prof. E. Albee.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY By J. E. Erdmann.

Vol. I. ANCIENT AND MEDIÆVAL. 5*th Impression.*
Vol. II. MODERN. 6*th Impression.*
Vol. III. SINCE HEGEL. 7*th Impression.*

HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY By Prof. G. S. Brett.

Vol. I. ANCIENT AND PATRISTIC.
Vol. II. MEDIÆVAL AND EARLY MODERN PERIOD.
Vol. III. MODERN PSYCHOLOGY.

MATTER AND MEMORY By Henri Bergson. *Translated by N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer.* 4*th Impression.*

NATURAL RIGHTS By D. G. Ritchie. 3*rd Edition.*

PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY By Dr. J. Bonar. 4*th Impression.*

DEVELOPMENT OF THEOLOGY SINCE KANT By O. Pfleiderer.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND By G. W. F. Hegel. *Translated by Dr. J. B. Baillie.* 2*nd Edition.*

TIME AND FREE WILL By Prof. Henri Bergson. *Translated by F. L. Pogson.* 5*th Impression.*

VALUATION: THE THEORY OF VALUE By Prof. W. M. Urban.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE By Prof. G. M. Stratton. 2*nd Edition.*

THE GREAT PROBLEMS By Bernardino Varisco. *Translated by Prof. R. C. Lodge.*

KNOW THYSELF By Bernardino Varisco. *Translated by Dr. Guglielmo Salvadori.*

ELEMENTS OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY By W. Wundt. *Translated by Prof. Edward L. Schaub.* 3*rd Impression.*

ELEMENTS OF CONSTRUCTIVE PHILOSOPHY By Prof. J. S. Mackenzie. 2*nd Impression.*

SOCIAL PURPOSE By Dr. H. J. W. Hetherington and Prof. J. H. Muirhead. 2*nd Impression.*

LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHY—*contd.*

INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY By Bertrand Russell, F.R.S. *3rd Impression.*

GOD AND PERSONALITY (GIFFORD LECTURES) By Prof. Clement C. J. Webb. (Part I.) *2nd Impression.*

DIVINE PERSONALITY AND HUMAN LIFE (GIFFORD LECTURES) By Prof. Clement C. J. Webb. (Part II.) *2nd Impression.*

MODERN PHILOSOPHY By Guido de Ruggiero. *Translated by A. Howard Hannay and R. G. Collingwood.*

THE ANALYSIS OF MIND By Bertrand Russell, F.R.S. *3rd Impression.*

DIALOGUES ON METAPHYSICS By Nicolas Malebranche. *Translated by Morris Ginsberg.*

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY By Prof. S. Radhakrishnan. *2nd Edition. Two Vols.*

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH PHILOSOPHY Edited by Prof. J. H. Muirhead. *Two Vols.*

THE WAYS OF KNOWING: OR, THE METHODS OF PHILOSOPHY By Prof. W. P. Montague. *2nd Impression.*

A THEORY OF DIRECT REALISM; AND THE RELATION OF REALISM TO IDEALISM By J. E. Turner.

THE GOOD WILL: A STUDY IN THE COHERENCE THEORY OF GOODNESS By H. J. PATON.

FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF LIFE: AN ESSAY ON CITIZENSHIP AS PURSUIT OF VALUES By Prof. J. S. Mackenzie.

THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD: METAPHYSICS AND VALUE By Prof. W. M. Urban.

CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY Edited by Prof. George P. Adams and Prof. Wm. Pepperell Montague. *Two Vols.*

HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC *Translated by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers. Two Vols.*

IDENTITY AND REALITY By Emile Meyerson. *Translated by Kate Loewenberg.*

MORAL SENSE By James Bonar.

COLERIDGE AS PHILOSOPHER By Prof. J. H. Muirhead.

IDEAS: GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE PHENOMENOLOGY By Edmund Husserl. *Translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson.*

THE PLATONIC TRADITION IN ANGLO-SAXON PHILOSOPHY By Prof. J. H. Muirhead.

ETHICS By Nicolai Hartmann. *Translated by Stanton Coit. Three Vols.*

Library of Philosophy

EDITED BY J. H. MUIRHEAD, LL.D.

ESSENTIALS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

PERSONALITY AND REALITY

"Many will judge that he makes good his claim to establish the existence of a Supreme Self in the universe."—*Expository Times*

THE NATURE OF DEITY

"No student of the philosophy of religion ought to miss reading Dr. Turner's contributions. He has been steadily building up a reputation as a clear thinker with a charm of style."—PROFESSOR MAURICE RELTON in *Theology*

A THEORY OF DIRECT REALISM

"The book gives much the most appreciative account of Hegelian idealism from the realist point of view that we have seen."—*Times Literary Supplement*

THE PHILOSOPHIC BASIS OF MORAL OBLIGATION

"An able and thoroughly readable volume, which certainly deserves consideration on the part of moral philosophers."—DR. HICKS in *The Hibbert Journal*

AN EXAMINATION OF WILLIAM JAMES' PHILOSOPHY

"An admirable epitome of James' view . . . something of James' own charm of style."—*New Witness*

THE REVELATION OF DEITY

"Dr. Turner has won the reputation of being one of the ablest apologists for theism at present writing in England."—*Saturday Review*

ESSENTIALS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION

A PHILOSOPHIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY

by

J. E. TURNER

M.A., PH.D.

Reader in Philosophy in the University of Liverpool

LONDON

GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD

MUSEUM STREET

FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1934

All rights reserved

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
UNWIN BROTHERS LTD., WOKING

To

G. H. T.

AND

J. W. T.

PREFACE

THIS volume was begun several years ago, but it proved advisable to defer publication in order to allow *Personality and Reality* and its successors to appear. The interval, however, has been extremely useful in enabling other recent developments of great interest to be considered, particularly the controversies about Mechanism and Indeterminacy.

Not in these spheres only, but everywhere alike, the rapid accumulation of widely contrasted data is making it increasingly difficult for the modern mind to see the wood because of the trees. Principles that have long been firmly held seem to be invalidated, while at the same time few can as yet be discerned that will take their place permanently. This is true of even the physical sciences; much more therefore in the realm of spiritual experience, of knowledge and art, morals and religion. Thus the very wealth of the current literature concerned with the psychology of religion tends to divert attention from what must after all constitute its fundamental bases; while on the other hand many writers on the philosophy of religion have given only meagre consideration to the purely psychological aspects of their subject-matter. The following chapters have been written, therefore, with the conviction that the psychological analysis of all phases of religious experience, even those which may be accounted the highest, is capable of yielding results of inestimable importance which could be attained in no other way. The appeal to psychology (in other words) has now become absolutely indispensable, and I make no apology for unreservedly adopting it. But it is equally true, as is indeed becoming more and more clearly recognized, that even the most thorough psychological scrutiny is far from exhausting the subject. It can, in fact, do no more than prepare the way for submitting its main

problems to a survey which must be, in essence, philosophical; and the principles here advocated appear to myself to follow logically from established results in psychology.

To restrict ourselves to the latter alone, however, as so many thinkers maintain that we should do, is plainly to commit ourselves to a seriously inadequate treatment of what is, in any case, one of the most prominent spheres of human experience. If anyone denies this contention in its application to religion, then he must face the question: Is he prepared to take up precisely the same standpoint with regard to art, and again in all its manifestations without exception? Now no one, I believe, would contend that psychology can ever say the last word about aesthetic experience, or can indeed do more than provide an indispensable introduction to its fuller consideration. But in this particular respect art stands on exactly the same footing as religion; in both cases alike the ultimate issues of value and validity demand philosophic discussion, such as that recently accorded to aesthetics by Gentile.

The implications of current psychological data, in short, require systematization more insistently than do those of any other science. For as Haldane has observed, "psychology is about as much more complex than biology as biology than physics."[1] It is of course impossible for any single volume—indeed for any single writer—to deal exhaustively with so vast a field. All that I have attempted to do is to bring some of its fundamental aspects into clearer light by rescuing them, to some degree, from the obscuring mass of details; and if I have succeeded in presenting a preliminary synoptic survey of the territory which still awaits exploration I shall have achieved my purpose.

As on previous occasions, I am deeply indebted to Dr. J. H. Muirhead, as the Editor of the Series, for many

[1] *Possible Worlds*, p. 184.

valuable suggestions; to my wife also for her patient assistance throughout; and last, but in no sense least, to the Publishers for their interest and carefulness.

J. E. TURNER

THE UNIVERSITY,
LIVERPOOL
May 1933

CONTENTS

		PAGE
	PREFACE	13
I.	INTRODUCTION. PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY	19
	1. Standpoint and Method: 19	
	2. Interrelations: 23	
	3. Knowledge, Science and Philosophy: 25	
	4. Application to Religion: 27	
II.	WHAT IS RELIGION?	29
	1. Difficulties of Definition: 29	
	2. A Comprehensive Definition: 32	
	3. The Evolution of Experience: 35	
	4. The Continuity of Experience: 37	
III.	EVERYMAN AND HIS UNIVERSE	45
	1. Irreligion: 45	
	2. Religion as Responsive: 51	
	3. Universe and universe: 53	
	4. Life and universe: 54	
	5. Imperativeness and Harmony: 57	
	6. Complexity of Religion: 61	
	7. Progressive Rationalization: 63	
IV.	MODERN DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION	67
	1. Religion as Specific: 67	
	2. Deissmann, Frazer and Spencer: 68	
	3. Martineau, Galloway, McTaggart, Caird and others: 70	
V.	EXPERIENCE AS SENSUOUS AND AS SUPERSENSUOUS (1)	76
	1. Contrasts Between These Aspects: 76	
	2. Thought and Imagination: 80	
	3. Development of Experience and of Religion: 83	
VI.	EXPERIENCE AS SENSUOUS AND AS SUPERSENSUOUS (2)	87
	1. Characteristics of Ideas: 87	
	2. Their Development and Functions: 89	
	3. Objectivity and Subjectivity: 91	
	4. Abstractness and Formality: 92	
	5. The Control Exercised by Thought: 94	
	6. Instinct and Religion: 96	

Contents

PAGE

VII. MAN'S EXPERIENCE AS PSYCHOLOGICAL AND AS MORAL 107

1. Ideas and the Moral Sense: 107
2. The Differentiation of the Moral Sense: 109
3. Transition from Psychological Aspects to Moral: 111
4. Ideation and Volition: 114
5. Will, Freedom and Determination: 117

VIII. FURTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF MORAL EXPERIENCE 120

1. "Emergence" of the Moral Constitution: 120
2. The Conceptual Control of Behaviour: 122
3. Action and Reason: 123
4. "Emergence" of the Moral Self: 124
5. "Emergence" of the Good: 126
6. Emotion, Subjectivity and Objectivity: 128

IX. THE SELF AS A MORAL BEING 130

1. The Self as a System: 130
2. System and Mechanism: 132
3. System and Plasticity: 135
4. Reality and Selfhood: 136
5. Thought and Personality: 137
6. Personality and Universe: 138
7. Selfhood and Evolution: 139
8. The Supreme Moral Ideal: 143

X. THE CRITERIA OF THE GOOD 146

1. Pragmatism: 146
2. Universality: 148
3. Continuity: 149
4. Permanence: 152
5. Inexhaustibility: 153
6. Fatalism and Freedom: 154

XI. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MORAL SELF 157

1. Self, Will and Reason: 157
2. Freedom and the Claim of the Universe: 159
3. The Expansion of Selfhood: 161
4. Self and Universe: 164
5. Subject and Object: 165

XII. THE RELATION BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL 168

1. The Reality of Evil: 168
2. Relativity and Absoluteness: 170
3. Evil and the Universe: 172
4. The Final Criterion: 175

PAGE

XIII. IMMORTALITY 179
1. Continuity and Permanence: 179
2. Selfhood as Real and Potential: 180
3. Selfhood and Value: 184
4. Reality, Time and Transformation: 187
5. Absorption in the Absolute: 190
6. Reward and Punishment: 192
7. Acts and Consequences: 196

XIV. THE SUPREMACY OF RELIGION 200
1. Embryonic Religion: 200
2. Progressive Refinement: 201
3. The Place of Emotion: 204
4. The Influence of Philosophy: 205
5. Philosophy and Religion: 207
6. The Further Development of Religion: 210

XV. KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH 214
1. Content and Expression: 214
2. The Continuity Between Faith and Knowledge: 215
3. Content and Certainty: 217
4. Certainty, Knowledge and Faith: 219
5. The Basis of Faith: 222
6. The Distinction Between Faith and Knowledge: 227
7. This Distinction is Never Absolute: 229
8. The Criterion of Certainty: 234
9. The Transcendence of Knowledge: 237

XVI. AUTHORITY, TRADITION AND THE NUMINOUS 243
1. Aspects of the Problem of Authority: 243
2. Subjectivity, Abstraction and Theory: 245
3. Authority and Theory: 248
4. Authority and Objectivity: 251
5. Types of Tradition: 256
6. Revelation and the Numinous: 259

XVII. DIVINE PERSONALITY 266
1. Recent Discussion: 266
2. Mechanism, Life and Evolution: 271
3. The Potentialities of Selfhood: 276
4. Emotion, Reason and Reality: 278
5. Man, Reality and God: 282

XVIII. THE UNIVERSE: ALIEN, INDIFFERENT OR FRIENDLY? 291
1. Philosophic Pessimism: 291
2. Evil and the Heart's Desire: 294
3. The Survival of Ideals: 297
4. Reality and Perfection: 300

INDEX 305

ESSENTIALS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION

I

INTRODUCTION. PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

1. I INTEND to discuss certain aspects of the study of religion which hitherto, I believe, have been insufficiently emphasized, with the result that much too restricted a standpoint has often been adopted from which to investigate a realm of phenomena that is quite as extensive (to say the least) as the sphere of science or of art. And while I shall insist upon the profound differences between the psychological point of view and the philosophic, I shall make no absolute distinction between them, although my own standpoint throughout is predominantly philosophical. These differences are of course too obvious to be completely disregarded; for, in many respects, psychology has now become a pure and independent science, while philosophy must still retain its specific claim to evaluate the entirety of experience and the whole of reality. But in dealing with such all-inclusive regions of human experience as aesthetics, or thought or religion, it is permissible—if not indeed necessary—to unify our separate methods of approach as much as possible, although this unification must be rigorously guarded from degenerating into confusion. With this indispensable proviso, we shall compensate to some degree that rapidly growing tendency to specialization which so seriously deflects the advance of modern thought; for this advance must always be regarded as essentially one in spite of its increasing diversity.

If, then, it has become a poetic commonplace that the "flower in the crannied wall" is eloquent of the Universe, still it is one of those rare commonplaces which cannot be ignored.[1] But it must also be observed that its truest and fullest interpretation, as indeed Tennyson himself has taught us, can spring only from complete knowledge; and this means that we must, quite literally,

> *understand*
> What you are, root and all, and all in all.

The mystic, in other words, is all the better for being a competent botanist, if only he will remain a mystic—if his mysticism ceases to be merely misty and becomes genuinely mysterious. And this principle becomes incalculably more significant when we turn from the living flower to the living mind of man. This likewise, but to a far higher degree, is eloquent of the ultimate nature of Reality; only, just because its implications are so much deeper, psychology must be so much the more difficult and obscure. Philosophy therefore, one of whose primary aims is to envisage the Universe intellectually or rationally, just as mysticism claims to apprehend the Whole intuitionally, must come to depend more and more upon the established conclusions of scientific research. These conclusions it must seek to criticize and interpret, to interrelate and codify, and thus to carry forward still further that synthesis which each science itself incessantly strives to complete within its own domain, but which it never can complete fully and finally simply because it must remain predominantly specialized instead of becoming universally comprehensive. For philosophy is never an artificial nor superfluous culture, indulged in merely as a matter of taste or idiosyncrasy of temperament. It is

[1] As in my *Revelation of Deity*, "Universe" denotes the Whole of Being, while "universe" is restricted to limited spheres of existence—*e.g.* the material or physical world.

rather the culmination of the irresistible tendency of thought to complete itself systematically, to gain an internal harmony sufficiently self-conscious to withstand all criticism, and to utilize even every contradiction as a means to its own continuous growth. It should be obvious, therefore, that science and philosophy, far from being foreign to each other, spring from one common root and obey one common law. They supplement each other, and stand or fall—advance or retreat—together. If indeed the Universe were finite, they would in the end merge completely into each other and so become identical; and it is just because Reality is infinite and inexhaustible that they must remain ever distinct in their actual functions while one in their essential nature, seeking to comprehend the one World each in its own specific way. We may thus modify Kant's famous aphorism, and say that apart from philosophy science remains blind, while philosophy without science is empty: science blind to the deepest meaning and highest value of its own facts; philosophy condemned to weave fanciful and vain abstractions.

In one sense therefore philosophy must regulate its own pace by that of science and occupy the rear in the march of knowledge, while in another sense it anticipates science as the vanguard. The painfully familiar criticisms of philosophy, on the one hand as belated—as doing nothing more than repeat, in general and abstract terms, what science has already expressed in exact detail—and on the other as indulging in groundless speculation, are thus as foolish as would be the reproaches of the main body of an army to the forces in its rear for lagging behind and covering the ground over again, or to its pioneers because they are uncertain of their route. Nor can the scientist stigmatize the great historic philosophic systems as outworn and fallacious without laying himself open to too obvious a *tu quoque*.

My own endeavour, in the concluding chapters of an earlier volume, to apply these principles to the interpreta-

tion of the philosophic significance of the physical universe, was described by an able critic as betraying "a grovelling idolatry of science."[1] From any less responsible quarter, so ridiculous an objection would deserve no notice; but since it may indicate the persistence of the long-standing suspicion of scientific methods and results, it must be replied that such an attitude augurs ill for the future of philosophy. For it threatens to commit philosophy to the ignominious position previously occupied by theology—I do not say by religion—of maintaining a steadily losing fight against scientific conclusions. It should be needless to say that I have never suggested these conclusions being uncritically accepted; that would indeed be "grovelling idolatry." On the contrary it is one essential function of philosophy to criticize them, not however in any hostile spirit, but rather in exactly the same way that it confronts the leading principles of every other realm of thought—of aesthetics or economics or ethics—and attempts to incorporate them all within its own wider sphere. To regard "science" as an intellectual bogey, or as a body of theories either already exploded or just about to explode, is surely far too crude a Victorianism which recalls the popular objections to the "Absolute," and invites Bradley's well known rejoinder that the critic has abandoned common-sense.[2] There is of course not the least doubt that all current scientific conclusions must receive material qualification, both from within and from external sources. But to assume in advance that this implies the disproof and rejection of these results is plainly unjustifiable; for here as elsewhere such incessant criticism often ensures confirmation. But however this may be, it remains true that "systematic coherence is expressed most adequately and explicitly in the system of reasoned knowledge which we call a science

[1] Laird, *Mind*, vol. xxxv, p. 108.

[2] *Cf.* p. 179 below.

or a branch of philosophy. . . . The typical embodiments of the ideal (of knowledge) must be sought . . . in the organized whole of a science";[1] and it is impossible to dissociate this "organized whole" from its specific contents. It is then from this fundamentally critical standpoint, and in no spirit of "grovelling idolatry" of "science" or any other culture, that the following analysis has been undertaken. "For it is time," as Montague has insisted, "that we in philosophy should go back to Nature, no matter how steep the path or how hard we fall."[2]

2. If all this is true with regard to science in general, it is especially true in its bearing on the relation between philosophy and psychology. For as I have just observed, philosophy is the product of a certain specific type of mental activity; it is the result of the mind's manipulation of its raw material in a certain distinctive way. This activity therefore, simply because it is thus specific and distinctive, must necessarily reveal something of the essential nature of mind itself. For whatever mind may prove to be, it is certainly not an entity nor substance wholly separate from the course and outcome of its working; it is on the contrary always immanent in these. This principle is only very inadequately expressed by regarding "mind" as a collective or general name for psychical phenomena which are themselves, just as they occur, the sole realities. Certainly this is one of the meanings of "mind"; but it is neither paramount

[1] Joachim, *The Nature of Truth*, pp. 68, 72; and *cf.* footnotes. Similarly, "The peculiar work of philosophy—a reinterpretation of the results of science by other higher categories." (Caird, *Hegel*, p. 173.) Philosophy "does not in the least neglect the empirical facts contained in the several sciences, but recognizes and adopts them." (Hegel, *Logic*, p. 16.)

[2] *Philosophical Review*, vol. 33, p. 170; *cf.* Northrop, *The Monist*, vol. 35, p. 1; Reichenbach, *Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre, Einleitung*; Mackenzie, *Mind*, vol. xxxvi, p. 36.

nor exhaustive. It simply revives Hume's familiar and shallow atomism, whose patent incompleteness it attempts to overcome by the elementary logical methods of generality and classification.[1] For all phenomena without exception, whether material or psychical or social, are undoubtedly "real"; they are existents or events, and it is only from them, to begin with, that the ultimate nature of Reality can ever be ascertained. But while investigations must begin with these, it soon becomes obvious that no existents, and no group nor class of existents, are ever self-explanatory. They can be properly understood only in the light of their relations to others; and if we are to avoid an infinite regress, this ultimately means in the light of their relation to that Whole of which they are parts or aspects, and which must therefore be—since they themselves are admittedly real—the ultimate Reality. This principle, however, is no purely philosophical one—if indeed there ever are any such "purely" philosophic conclusions; much less is it a mere metaphysical presupposition. It is rather the working basis of science, especially from the evolutionary standpoint in all its applications. Somehow—and the "how" forms one of our most difficult philosophic problems—the past survives in and moulds the present and the future.[2] Every physical change thus involves a transformation of energy which is determined by, and which itself determines, the distribution of *all* energy. Every vital process, again, is at once responsive and originating, just as every outstanding historic event is plainly seen to summarize and express the past while it also shapes the future. In every case alike, therefore, the

[1] I do not deny the value of these methods in their proper place, provided they are not held to be final and ultimate; *cf.* Bosanquet on "The Russell Mind," *The Nature of Mind*, chap. iii; and *Personality and Reality*, chap. iii: "The Basis of the Unity of Selfhood."

[2] *Cf.* the discussion of Time in Bosanquet's *Meeting of Extremes*, and *Mind*, vol. xxii, p. 493, vol. xxiii, p. 91; also *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. xx, p. 151, "Change and the Whole," and *Theory of Direct Realism*, chap. 18.

facts or phenomena, so far as they are taken just as they present themselves, prove to be manifestations of some Reality which transcends them all, at the same time that it expresses itself in and through them all: Matter, Energy, Life, Beauty, Society, Mind. All these terms certainly have a general or collective meaning; but they equally denote concrete realities which dominate the phenomenal changes —ordered systems to which all these units contribute in their degree. This principle is most readily grasped perhaps in its bearing upon social theory. A nation, for example, is something much more than the mere totality of its members. Each of these, in the first place, belongs to a group of some kind—trade union, political party, club, church or family —which makes him such as he is, and on which he exerts a reciprocal influence; and perhaps the most important of all modern sociological problems concerns the relation of the State, not only to individuals, but further to these smaller combinations. Do these make the State, or does the State make them?[1] Which is the most fundamental? Which constitutes the ultimate source of authority? Upon these questions turns the future history of civilized society, simply because the State itself and its included associations are real entities, not mere generalities, fictions nor abstractions.

3. One of the creations of mind, as thus interpreted, is philosophy; and since psychology investigates, *inter alia*, the detailed structure and function of the human mind, its intimate connection with philosophy is obvious. For using the term rather loosely, we may say that the individual mind "knows" the world. The exact *science* of knowledge therefore—epistemology[2]—must bear closely on the philo-

[1] Home Rule agitations, and the controversy about State rights in America and Dominion status in the Empire, are modern cases in point.

[2] It is not sufficiently recognized that epistemology is a science; knowing is as natural as breathing. Recent *Erkenntnisstheorie* is of cardinal importance.

sophic *formulation* of knowledge. What we know and what we believe must conform to the laws of knowing, although at the same time these laws are themselves determined by the content known and by its expansion; here as always content and law influence each other throughout. A correct epistemology, further, demands an accurate psychology; and thus "psychology is of peculiar importance to philosophy . . . owing to the unique subject-matter of psychology, we shall go hopelessly wrong if we omit it."[1]

But it may be said that so far as this is true, there can be no difference whatever between philosophy and science. For science is equally a form of knowledge; but no science (except epistemology) concerns itself specifically with the nature of knowledge as such; it simply investigates its own special subject-matter and is satisfied if the results are accurate and self-consistent. This however at once implies that every science *is* interested in the character of knowledge, only it is so interested indirectly and implicitly. For its indispensable accuracy and self-consistency are, obviously, logical characteristics. Science, in other words, must be essentially logical, even if we may not say further that science, in principle, tends always to become increasingly mathematical; and logic, once again, is most closely related to epistemology and psychology. Here again the contrast between science and philosophy is largely a matter of degree. The first is an expression of specialized knowledge, the second of universal[2]—the first is limited, the second comprehensive; and these latter characteristics necessitate a closer relation between philosophy and psychology than between philosophy and the majority of the other sciences. These meet the governing logical demands of their own special provinces unconsciously and pragmatically, just as the average citizen unreflectively obeys the law without

[1] Broad, *Scientific Thought*, p. 25.

[2] In the logical sense, not the spatial.

concerning himself about its minutiae; while philosophy, on the other hand, resembles a jurist whose task it is to codify a nation's legal system throughout.

We may easily carry this analogy still further. For just as any individual may, if he pleases, undertake the requisite legal study, so every science might quite justifiably examine its own logical foundations. This is, as a matter of fact, now being attempted to an increasing degree; and the results are often as surprising as they are illuminating. The work of Pearson and Mach, of Russell and Whitehead upon the principles of mathematics, of Peano and Dedekind in symbolic logic, and of the scientific relativists on the nature of time and space, all springs from the paramount necessity of securely establishing the grounds that are common to each and every science alike. In its spirit and method, again, this rapidly expanding present-day tendency is philosophical rather than strictly scientific. It is rapidly coming to recognize that it has no boundaries, that to solve one problem is but to raise another still more fundamental, and finally that no satisfactory solution whatever is possible without an extreme degree of precision and technicality;[1] while this again, fortunately, is gradually modifying the character of philosophy in the direction of greater exactitude and definiteness.

4. There is thus arising a happy *rapprochement* between science and philosophy that promises to be increasingly fruitful. Philosophy is becoming more scientific in its methods at the same time that science grows increasingly philosophic in its attitude; and, as I have already observed, if the Universe[2] were finite their convergence would ultimately develop into identity. If it be argued that relativity physics now regards the universe as being literally finite, it must

[1] The further analogy here to legal phraseology is obvious.

[2] *Cf. ante n.* p. 20.

be pointed out that this refers only to the physical universe. The term "Universe" itself, however, denotes far more than the material world. It includes the realm of the immaterial, of feeling and thought, art and religion. Rating these even at their lowest, they exist, and are therefore "real" in some sense; and even if they be but transient, still they are, while they last, products of the universal process and endowed therefore with some measure of its own reality. The problem of the true character of these immaterial realities has of course still to be considered. But the enquiry will be found to embrace other outstanding phases of man's experience; and we shall find that one of their most fundamental and significant characteristics is their capacity for a limitless expansion—for an inexhaustible self-transcendence which implies the literal infinity of the Universe, when this term, released from its unhappy modern restriction to the sphere of matter and energy alone, regains its original meaning of wholeness and unity.

In what follows, therefore, I shall combine the philosophic point of view with the scientific, and more particularly with the psychological, without attempting to draw any hard and fast distinction between them; endeavouring by this method to discover the true place and function of religion within man's experience taken as a whole. For only thus can our problems receive any satisfactory solution. Religion certainly possesses a unique character—it is *sui generis*. But it is none the less a radical mistake to regard it as isolable from the entire mass of experience. On the contrary it is from, or within, this general mass that religion emerges in precisely the same way, and in obedience to the same general law, as science and art. The difference between them is never a matter of principle, but only of details, vitally important though these details are; and their nature and interrelations will form the subject of the succeeding chapters.

II

WHAT IS RELIGION?

1. In what way, then, is religion *sui generis*? Wherein consists its "unique character"?

Now any general definition is practically certain to be at once criticized or repudiated by the fervent supporters of every specific form of religious belief. *Theirs* is the true or real religion, while all others are inadequate or false, or at best are only relatively true, because they are adapted to some restricted level of mental and social development. Such attitudes, certainly, are not without logical justification; even dogmatism is preferable to indifference camouflaged as impartiality; and in most of us there is some tendency to adopt the frank standpoint of that honest cleric, Parson Thwackum. "When I mention religion," he confessed, "I mean the Christian religion; and not only the Christian religion, but the Protestant religion; and not only the Protestant religion, but the Church of England." Nevertheless the prevailing variety of types of religious experience, and the long course of their multifarious changes, alike imply a single, persistent and all-inclusive mode of consciousness, the slow development of which has assumed these many widely divergent forms which yet share a common nature. Thus in formulating any comprehensive definition of religion the fundamental difficulty at once arises of expressing this character, at the same moment unique and universal, so as to exhibit it as including and determining all its incessant variations: the perennial problem, in short, of the One and the many. Here again we confront the infinity and complexity of the Universe which thought endeavours to apprehend. For while the word "Universe" signifies, as I have just maintained, wholeness

and unity, these must never be confused with mere homogeneity and uniformity which, taken in any literal sense, do not exist anywhere; at best they are always only relative. The unity of Reality arises out of its differences, and hence its wholeness is throughout necessarily heterogeneous. A nebula is as complex, in its own characteristic way, as a developed solar system; similarly the mind of primitive man, though it may unquestionably by comparison be termed "simple," is nonetheless sufficiently complex on its own level, to such a degree indeed that its workings often baffle the scrutiny of civilized observers. "The savage relies on the same logical principles, the same method of trial and error, as does the civilized man . . . there is a fair coherency of meaning in primitive religion despite the bewildering incoherency of its forms."[1] In both cases alike therefore the contrasts are due to the presence not merely —if at all—of simpler factors, but of constituents whose nature and mode of operation are as yet unfamiliar. The fundamental elements of the Universe are few and changeless—Space, Time, Matter, Mind; but their combinations are infinite both in number and in variety. Their ultimate permanence sustains the eternal unity, their incessant interplay its exhaustless creativeness.[2]

It is, then, only in the light of these governing principles that the general character of religion can be properly understood. Like the capacity for thought and the sense of beauty, religion too is inherent in human nature *as* human—that is to say as essentially distinct from the entire range of animal experience; although at the same time humanity, in all its aspects without exception, is the out-

[1] Marett, in *Psychology and the Sciences*, p. 50. Similarly "child logic is a subject of infinite complexity." (Piaget, *The Thought of the Child*, p. xix.)

[2] I may refer to a detailed consideration of this subject in "The General Nature of the Conditions which Determine Development," *The Monist*, vol. xxxi, p. 367.

come of a continuous evolution from the lower level. Man, therefore, is *inherently* rational, aesthetic, moral—and also religious. "A finite self-conscious life without religion," as Bosanquet has observed, "is hardly to be found." Similarly Malinowski: "there are no peoples however primitive without religion."[1]

Now these indelibly ingrained characteristics, still further, are never independent of one another, but are simply the principal aspects progressively assumed by the human mind owing to the unceasing operation of one single activity or process. In other words, their unbroken advance to their mature forms is due throughout, from beginning to end, to the parallel development of the *ideational capacity*—that is to the power of forming ideas or concepts. This means that while these main aspects of experience are definitely and unmistakably distinguishable from each other, they are at the same moment inseparable. Their influence is reciprocal and uninterrupted, in precisely the same way that all the phases of consciousness are simultaneously sensitive, volitional and cognitive, so that each phase represents nothing more than the varying predominance of these ever present features within the complex current of mental life.[2] If we choose to place them in any order of priority we may most accurately select the capacity for thought as being foundational, and religion as final. But since this principle is so often misunderstood, it must be added that it is true only in the sense that the formation of ideas is the indispensable *foundation* for the highest levels

[1] *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 236. *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 21; *cf.* Temple, *Christus Veritas*, p. 39. "The capacity for religion is a general property of the human mind" (Huxley, *What Dare I Think?* p. 193; *cf.* p. 199); *cf.* also below p. 98 on instinct; Marett, *Faith, Hope and Charity in Primitive Religion*, p. 38; Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, vol. i, pp. 5, 6; Dawson, *The Age of the Gods*, pp. 22, 26.

[2] The first two are more technically described as affective and conative.

of mind. It must not be taken to imply that thought, as such, is ever transcended or eliminated, and still less that thought ever becomes exclusive and dominant. I intend to adopt neither an abstract and barren "intellectualism" on the one hand, nor any impenetrable mysticism on the other; and far less, it may be advisable to add, any extreme type of behaviourism, in spite of the undeniable value of behaviouristic technique in research.[1]

So far as the normal mind is concerned, it preserves its essential wholeness throughout the experience alike of the individual and the race; its complexity must therefore always be regarded in the light of a governing and controlling unity which incessantly reveals its complete nature in and through this complexity, exactly as every great nation expresses itself simultaneously in its art, its literature, its social and foreign policy.

2. Everywhere throughout conscious experience, therefore, there exists a real wholeness of character—a true unity of nature;[2] and we obtain the most adequate and at the same time most comprehensive definition of religion, I believe, by regarding it as the response or attitude of humanity, when this response is taken as being an *explicit unity* or real whole, to the Universe, likewise taken as a whole. In both cases equally, that is to say, the emphasis must be laid upon *wholeness*. If we further include within "humanity" both the individual and certain social groups of various kinds, ranging from the family to the nation, the comprehensiveness of this definition is qualified by an equally

[1] With this kind of "intellectualism" must be combined shallow "rationalism," in terms of which, most unfortunately, reason is too often interpreted and condemned. But I trust that the real character of reason, and incidentally of logic, will be apparent from my treatment of the whole subject.

[2] On the other hand, any infraction of this unity gives rise to some form of mental disorder or disease.

indispensable definiteness, which must still be governed however by the ultimate criterion of wholeness. Is the man (we must ask) at any moment and in any way acting as an organic whole? Is he more or less explicitly expressing his *whole* nature in some manner or other, in his attitude and relation to his universe? Or again, is the group which incorporates him similarly expressing his whole character, so far as this is at all possible while he remains in association with his fellows? If so, he—or his social group—is "religious"; the individual and the collective attitudes then constitute "religion," alike subjectively and objectively.

But if, as I have just argued, the human mind *always* acts as a whole—if consciousness is always cognitive, affective and conative simultaneously—it seems impossible thus to differentiate religion definitely from the rest of experience. To a certain extent this is undeniably true, and at the same time highly significant. For as these considerations plainly imply, religion always does influence and colour the entire life, whose general character and ultimate tendency are at once the result, and the expression, of its own religious basis; these all change together, while each unceasingly modifies the others. This however means nothing more than that the fundamental wholeness of the mind is both highly complex and continuously developing. In other words, mind is never a static core or nucleus that somehow affects conscious elements external to itself; nor, again, is it a finally complete and unalterable structure, although it must certainly possess a definite and systematic, and therefore more or less permanent, nature. But in exactly the same manner that the body, while itself obviously a whole, responds to environmental changes now in one specific way and again in another—actively or passively, aggressively or defensively, as circumstances demand—so the mind rarely expresses its *total* being, explicitly and as such, in its intercourse with its world. On the contrary, as I have already observed, willing,

feeling and knowing are its principal distinctive aspects, each of which predominates alternately as the current of experience flows on; but this incessantly varying predominance, since it is neither exclusion nor suppression, at once implies that consciousness, regarded from a slightly different point of view, must be simultaneously cognitive, affective and conational throughout. In other words, it is impossible to know anything whatever without at the same moment both feeling and willing; the two latter activities, however, here remain subordinate, forming a subconscious but ever present background as it were against which the predominant intellectual operations are carried on. Similarly the aesthetic temperament can never feel deeply and keenly on any elevated plane without some degree of knowledge and will entering into the entire mental state. In every case of arduous artistic creation, criticism and appreciation, this is obvious; but it is always true to some degree; and this applies equally, *mutatis mutandis*, to practical willing, and *a fortiori* to conduct in its relations to thought and emotion. Thus there can never exist either "pure" knowing, "pure" feeling or "pure" willing and acting in any absolute forms; and Bradley's familiar insistence on the primacy of feeling must therefore be conjoined to his emphasis on its ideational transcendence,[1] just as Ward's treatment of conation is balanced by his principle of continuous differentiation.[2] The mind's environment, like that of the body, incessantly acts in endlessly different ways; its responses therefore, if they are to be adequate, must vary correspondingly. This delicately adjusted responsiveness itself constitutes all mental development; it is a growth or expansion which is never finally completed, though it may be interrupted by disease

[1] *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 175, 227, *n.* 1; *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 300, 301.

[2] *Cf.* "The distinction between thought and conation is surely superficial." (Bosanquet, *The Nature of Mind*, p. 66.)

or death. Memories, habits, tendencies, temperament—these and countless other traits are either always being newly formed or to some degree modified. The wholeness of mind therefore (to repeat) has a unique character; for it is the wholeness not of a mechanical and static structure, but on the contrary of a living system or organism; it must be at once "highly complex and continuously developing."

3. But this development, further, is an actual evolution in the full sense of this term. It is not merely an expansion, but also an advance—an uninterrupted raising of level, or type, which finally produces contrasts so profound that the tracing out of the underlying continuity becomes exceedingly difficult. For the purpose of our present enquiry the primary advance is that already referred to in the first section of this chapter: the appearance of thought as the basal or foundational attribute of the human mind. Now this brings about, as a perfectly natural consequence, the gradual subordination of that more primitive factor which is dominant throughout all animal experience—instinct. Here however, as before, subordination must not be taken to mean elimination; on the contrary, instincts still survive within human consciousness, while at the same time the rudiments of thought are undoubtedly discernible throughout the animal kingdom. "So far as his instincts and emotions are concerned," asserts Elliot Smith, "there is little essential difference between Man and the Apes. But in virtue of his enormously heightened powers of discrimination and his ability to profit by experience, Man has learned to control his instincts and the expression of his emotions to a greater degree than the rest of the Mammals . . . there has been no far-reaching and progressive modification of the instincts and emotions since Man came into existence, beyond the acquisition of the necessary innate power of using the more complex cerebral apparatus which he has

to employ."[1] Nonetheless are we dealing in the one case with vestiges, and in the other with rudiments; with the automatism and comparative fixity of instinct as compared with the illimitable freedom of reason.[2]

This vitally important contrast arises therefore from that distinctive "ideational capacity of the human mind" (already referred to earlier in the present chapter) which forms the psychical basis of all inherent human attributes; in other terms, it depends on man's ability in the first place to form ideas, and in the second to connect these into trains of thought which, in their turn, expand into systems of knowledge and belief. To consider the full psychological details of this process is here unnecessary;[3] it is quite sufficient to indicate the nature of its profound influence on the characteristic wholeness of mind. For it finally enables this wholeness to become *explicit and articulate* instead of being merely implicit, and thus to be steadily transformed into the deliberate expressions of man's realized consciousness of himself and his World, rather than remain simply the unreflective activity of his mind.

For while (as I have already insisted) mind always, and at each of its levels, operates as a whole, still it is obvious that both in instinct and in man's ordinary daily life only one main aspect is at any given time apparent: some

[1] *The Evolution of Man*, p. 64; *cf.* Graham Kerr: "one of the greatest steps in man's mental development . . . his comparative emancipation from the dominance of instinct, and the substitution therefor of actions in response to reasoning." (*Evolution*, p. 226.) "Has the savage any rational outlook, any rational mastery of his surroundings? . . . Every primitive community is in possession of a considerable store of knowledge, based on experience and fashioned by reason." (Malinowski, *op. cit.*, p. 28, with the instances in the pages following; *cf.* p. 90 below.)

[2] "Freedom" however must be taken to mean always "self-determination." For the fuller treatment of this subject I may refer to *The Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation*, cc. 9–11, together with an article on "Causal Determination" in *Philosophy*, vol. v, p. 545.

[3] But *cf.* p. 177 below.

seasonal phase of instinct, for example, or only one of the intellectual, emotional, or volitional forms of human experience, while all the associated factors manifest themselves only by qualifying in some way or other this dominant feature; this is therefore *explicit*, while the others remain merely implicit, though nonetheless potent. But even here, in spite of this marked similarity between ordinary unreflective human experience and animal instinct, the presence of the ideational or thought elements produces in the former a completely new type of mental process, wherein experience of the past and expectation of the future both operate as factors of which the individual is himself more or less fully conscious. In instinct, on the other hand —and this may be true also of the Unconscious[1]—the influence of the past, fundamentally important though it always is, affects primarily if not altogether the associated nerve and brain mechanisms rather than the mind itself, while the future is similarly effective only as the biological purposiveness or consummation of the entire natural process, of which the animal itself remains almost completely unaware.

Thus far then, despite the unceasing increase of complexity and the associated advances in type, there is plainly visible throughout the long development an unbroken continuity; and when this is traced still further, it is found to connect the levels of everyday practical experience with that still higher mode which constitutes "religion," when taken in its most comprehensive meaning of explicit wholeness of response; and this again has already been described as "influencing the entire life, whose character and tendency are the expression of its religious basis."[2]

4. Not only in actual daily practice then is religion inseparably linked with the entirety of experience, but it

[1] *Cf.* further on this point pp. 160, 161, below.

[2] *Ante*, p. 33.

is, in itself and as such, one of the principal results due to the continuous expansion of that basic ideational activity which we have just seen to be characteristic of human mentality, as distinct from that of animals. This expansion, further, necessarily results in a more perfect systematization of the entire content of experience, which at once implies that religion can be in no way *absolutely* separate and different from the rest of experience. The characteristic distinctiveness which it undoubtedly possesses must therefore be based on that thoroughgoing continuity which sustains the unity of the entire psychic development, despite its infinite variety. Religion, in short, never arises from any *breach* of this fundamental continuity, but rather from the progressive *reorganization* of the total content of experience, in such a way that its original implicitness becomes transformed into complete explicitude. Thus continuity and wholeness are seen to be ultimately one and the same, so that we are dealing once more with aspects—with differently emphasized presentations—of the same real entity. Instead therefore of only one of the three main types of consciousness being explicit—either the affective, the conational or the cognitive alone—while the other two remain merely implicit, in all distinctively religious experience these three modes become explicit *simultaneously*, though in endlessly different ways, so as to constitute the response of the individual or social mind to its total universe.

This "continuous expansion" and "more perfect systematization," which are due to the influence of thought, no matter how rudimentary this may be to begin with, operate in the first place upon the varied content of ordinary daily experience;[1] and it is obvious that the resultant

[1] It is instructive to note here that Philosophy originates in precisely the same way. "Philosophy should understand," observes Hegel, "that its content is no other than *actuality* . . . the inward and outward world of consciousness. At first we become aware of these contents in Experience." (*Logic*, sect. 6.)

changes may follow the separate lines of the already established principal tendencies of that experience—that is as either cognitive, emotional or active—so that there then develops either the intellectual and scientific temperament, or the artistic, or the so-called "practical"; and in each case, further, there is (in principle) no limitation to this progress; its restriction or cessation is due always to ignorance and weakness.[1]

But just as there exist no other obstacles to these *specific* directions of the advance of mind, so there is nothing which prevents its expansion and systematization becoming general and all-inclusive, in such a way that the individual or the social group becomes *explicitly* aware of the general content of the mind as this is intellective, emotional and practical at one and the same moment. This explicit awareness is undeniably a difficult—and therefore a rare—achievement; and simply because it demands strenuous effort, and absorbs energy in all directions simultaneously, it can seldom attain any markedly high level. Nevertheless it occurs, and indeed must occur, as a factor in human experience which is fully as indispensable as either thought or art or moral purpose; so that according to the definition that I have adopted, and as the response to the influences of the total environment, it constitutes religion in any one of its protean forms, which thus proves to be inherently human; "man is *inherently* rational and aesthetic, moral and religious."[2]

But in saying that the individual or group thus becomes "explicitly aware," I do not mean "deliberately aware." Rather is the religious attitude adopted at first unthinkingly, as a more or less uncontrollable and even automatic response to some impressive stimulus from without. This, however, does not exclude the possibility, as experience proceeds, of some fully purposive realization at stated times and on suitable occasions; but even this too often takes the merely

[1] *Cf.* p. 77 below.

[2] *Ante* p. 31.

negative form of the exclusion of all disturbing moods and influences, so as to enable the desired totality to arise spontaneously. This spontaneity is indeed an additional fundamental characteristic of the situation, since it proves that the resultant explicit entirety of the mind is always a reaction to an external influence, rather than a purely volitional activity from within. The "explicit awareness" with which we are here concerned is therefore more truly regarded as a manifestation of the whole mind, as such, which literally *forces* itself upon the experient, rather than as the fruit of an introspective search on his part deliberately undertaken. The mind is then both affected as a whole, and responds as a whole; so that the essential difference between this form of its wholeness, and that which we have already found always operating throughout the entire range of non-religious experience, is that all the principal modes of consciousness—the cognitive, volitional and the aesthetic—here express themselves in the main equally and together, instead of as, respectively, predominating or subordinate. Every mode alike thus becomes explicit instead of implicit, so that the ultimate result is an always *explicit*—but once again not necessarily a deliberate—wholeness.

I have just remarked that the attainment of this attitude is always a matter of difficulty and effort. This is because it is obviously a thoroughgoing departure from the fixed temperamental course of daily life—a radical transformation of the entire ordinary course of experience brought about by means of a profound reorientation of its principal constituents. It is inevitable therefore that the already definitely formed trend of personality will frequently continue to determine, to some degree, that unique responsiveness of the whole mind which I have called religion; and this temperamental influence will then take one of two main forms. The resultant religious experience will either fall into line with and resemble the secular personality, or it will

markedly contrast with this;[1] and in both cases alike there will remain, despite the essential entirety of the subjective attitude, some degree of predominance of the earlier outstanding conational, emotional or intellective aspects as the case may be. Only, notwithstanding this relative preponderance, the other elements will still express themselves explicitly, though now less intensely. Religion may thus be itself intellectual, or aesthetic, or "practical" and institutional. It may either carry the everyday type of personality forward on to the religious plane, or there may be a more or less thoroughgoing reaction from the daily course of life, relief from this being sought by subordinating its main characteristics, and emphasizing in their stead those forms of experience that are habitually repressed or neglected.

Finally, it is fundamentally important to observe anew that my insistence that the ideational activity of the human mind is basal implies only that it *is* basal, and therefore—for that very reason—neither exclusive, nor even always dominant. Ideation, in other words, underlies all the higher forms of human experience equally. Its development primarily differentiates the human from the animal mind and yields the instrument, as it were, which enables the former to attain all its highest achievements. So far as knowledge itself is concerned this principle is immediately obvious; but it is not sufficiently recognized, I believe, that it is equally true of *all* the advanced levels of our experience—of art, morality and religion alike.[2] It at once follows, therefore, that I do not intend to maintain that religion is ever completely or even predominantly intellectual, although the latter condition may occur in some quite exceptional instances; while at the same time, in pursuing its own

[1] But I have already insisted that there is no *absolute* separation between religious and secular—rather an indestructible continuity and reciprocal influence.

[2] On the extreme force of savage custom and tradition *cf.* p. 110 below.

natural expansion, thought must gain an increasingly prominent place in the future forms of religious experience. The capacity for ideation, in short, lies at the root of that unceasing growth and advancing systematization of mind which enables it to assume the *explicit wholeness* of expression which constitutes religion. Religion therefore must always be essentially comprehensive and never exclusively intellectual, still less "intellectualistic."[1]

To such a degree is this the case, indeed, that religion always presents itself in actuality as a complete and penetrative interfusion of its different elements or aspects. Thus it is never a mere mosaic, but rather a true whole wherein the various operative factors can be discerned only by deliberate analysis. This may be undertaken either by the individual himself or by an external observer; and here the danger at once arises that such a dissection may involve destruction. But this disaster is by no means inevitable; capable analysis, like every other modern device, need be dreaded only when wielded by the incompetent. The pure ray of intellect may be compared to the heat of the sun; sometimes powerful enough to produce an arid waste, but equally able to sustain life if only the proper conditions are observed. And here, as indeed in many of the other principal tracts of experience, the indispensable condition is the maintenance of the original unity, despite the extreme diversity which investigation so often reveals. For even more truly than in the case of the body, the mind is a living organism which presents various aspects rather than contains different parts. It is but to repeat the substance of the present chapter to say that in ordinary experience some of these aspects remain implicitly subordinate to one predominating feature —knowing, feeling or willing respectively, as the prevailing conditions determine—which culminates in knowledge, in art or in practice. But on those comparatively rare occasions

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 31.

when all these forms of mental activity become explicitly manifested, only at the same moment to be inextricably fused together into a completely unified experience, some mode of religion arises and persists so long as this unity is unimpaired.

I hope that it will not be considered hypercritical to add that "knowledge" has a much more specific meaning than what is implied in Otto's description of "knowing" as being originally "non-rational." "The religious feeling," his Translator observes, "properly involves a unique kind of apprehension, *sui generis* . . . a genuine knowing or awareness, though, in contrast to that knowing which can express itself in concepts, it may be termed non-rational . . . a development which works itself out purely in the sphere of the non-rational . . . the numinous issues from the deepest foundation of cognitive apprehension that the soul possesses . . . in the numinous we have to deal with purely *a priori* cognitive elements . . . a pure reason in the profoundest sense, which must be distinguished from the pure theoretical reason of Kant."[1] The analysis of the primal contents of human experience is undeniably difficult; but Otto's use of "cognitive" and "reason" appears to result in a serious confusion of the main psychological categories, so that "non-rational knowing" approaches self-contradiction as closely as "insensitive feeling" would do. This impression is confirmed by his subsequent reference to "mere feeling" as distinct from "belief," so that what "the primitive religious consciousness first apprehends is in origin not something rational, but something non-rational, an object to which the mind responds in a unique way with the special feeling-reflexes"; "on the lowest and earliest level of the religion of primitive man, the numinous consciousness is but an inchoate stirring of the feelings"; and when he also insists on the one hand that "it is essential

[1] *The Idea of the Holy*, pp. xiv, xv, 114, 117, 118.

to every theistic conception of God, that it precisely characterizes Deity" in a manner that only reason, in its usual sense, can pursue, while on the other hand "mysticism is the stressing to a very high degree, indeed the overstressing, of the non-rational or supra-rational, elements,"[1] it seems to be quite impossible to postulate any "genuine knowing" that is literally "non-rational" at any stage of experience whatever.

[1] *The Idea of the Holy*, pp. 1, 113, 26, 22.

III

EVERYMAN AND HIS UNIVERSE

1. THE term "religion" has thus been given its most comprehensive meaning, consonant both with the combined philosophic and psychological standpoint which I have adopted, and the far-reaching extent and diversity of the phenomena that call for examination. For the scope of philosophy must always be universal, while an adequate psychology must survey the whole of conscious life. Further, all the distinctive aspects of the highest forms of reality have appropriate and familiar names—Truth, Beauty, Goodness: the last of these being most accurately employed to denote ideals of character and conduct. But we also require a name for our *simultaneous* apprehension or contemplation of these entities—for our consciousness of the beautiful and true and good at one and the same moment, no matter what specific level this experience may attain—low or high as the case may be. Exactly as the simplest axioms of geometry and the most abstruse mathematics of relativity are alike "knowledge," and as a child's tenderness and a nation's sacrifice are similarly "good," so are all the infinitely various forms of the response of mind in its totality included under the word "religion"; and in this sense truth and goodness, beauty and religion, are inherent in human experience as human. "The religious consciousness, at least in an implicit form, is necessarily present throughout finite self-conscious life."[1]

This does not mean, of course, that these elements, fundamental though they are, can never be suppressed nor eradi-

[1] Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 25. "No man is so poor as not to have a religion." (*What Religion Is*, p. vii.)

cated. Difficult though this is, it is always possible; nonetheless is it a radical mutilation or distortion of humanity. For there can be no such thing as "irreligion," if this means the complete absence of religion. What is ordinarily called such is really only one specific form of religion, provided that it is an attitude explicitly adopted and not the result of mere apathy. "We may assert that atheism and materialism are necessarily religions of a kind . . . they owe their form to an essentially religious dissatisfaction with existing solutions." "An atheistic theology, or a theology of simple nescience, is still a theology, though it may be a poor one." "T. H. Huxley was, by Justin Martyr's standard, a worthy Christian; this confidence in an orderly universe expresses the message which earliest Christianity had for the world . . . the essence was there; Huxley, as clearly as Dante, recognized a Power in whose will is our peace."[1] The absence of almost all religious experience undoubtedly occurs on a very large scale. But this is a privative or negative condition, like complete ignorance or the total lack of the sense of beauty. In all these instances alike, some hostile influence has prevented the natural development of the mind. The operative causes may be individual or social, congenital or external, artificial or inevitable; nonetheless is the result an approach to brutishness which, taken in its proper sense, means non-humanity. The "irreligious" or "non-religious" therefore, like the inhuman, is one special and active form which may be assumed on due occasion by the experience of mankind, and is so called simply because it conflicts with the ruling religious systems of the day. Exactly in the same way inhumanity is relative to current moral and social standards; thus even the rites of Moloch worship and all the cruelties of human sacrifice and persecution were, in their own time,

[1] R. G. Collingwood, *Religion and Philosophy*, p. 19. A. E. Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*, vol. i, p. 6. G. C. Coulton, *The Realist*, vol. ii, p. 350; *cf.* p. 69 below.

regarded by the majority as essentially accordant with human nature.

I have already observed that this simultaneous activity of all man's mental activities is necessarily a matter of difficulty and effort, and is usually coloured by the predominant temperamental trend of personality. On the other hand, it is fatally easy both to neglect the separate subordinate aspects of personality and to disregard their collective cultivation; the naturally phlegmatic man, for example, may passively overlook every appeal to his emotional sensitivity, just as the non-intellectual type may dislike learning. But in all these cases the general result is the same —the undue domination of the mind's wholeness of action by the preponderant tendency; the inevitable result being that religion betrays a manifest lack of some of its most valuable elements. But the consequences may easily become far more serious than this; for such persistent apathy may ultimately involve an atrophy which more or less affects the entire personality. It is as dangerous to defy the mind's demand for wholeness as the body's; in both cases alike the result is that the perfection of function, which always requires a structural completeness, tends to become impossible; once again the mental level recedes from the specifically human standard and approaches the animal and literally non-religious type.

Or instead of mere neglect there may exist what seems at first sight to be a *deliberate* attempt to suppress all developmental tendencies, except that particular form which the individual cultivates and which he allows to absorb all his energy; and at first sight such an attitude appears equally to imply the final eradication of religion. But it is necessary sharply to distinguish between these two cases. The first, being the consequence of sheer apathy, is a real stultification or mutilation of the mind, which to that degree becomes non-human. The second is totally different, simply because

instead of resulting from mere inertia it is deliberate and even onerous. It necessitates therefore a prolonged effort by the mind as a whole, and apart from this it could never be accomplished. We have here in fact not the suppression, but merely the specializing and limitation, of mental capacity in some specific direction in the interests of one of its particular forms. If however this specialization is to be carried to any noteworthy degree, once again the mind must operate as a whole. Firmly sustained volition, extensive knowledge, and a strong emotional attachment to the objects desired or the ideals pursued are all requisite, even if these factors operate to some degree by exclusion and rejection, so that much that would appeal to a more normal person or a still higher individuality is ignored. The consequent narrowness of outlook thus becomes compensated by a real strength of character whose basis may rightly be regarded, in my own sense of the term, as being essentially religious.

It may still be felt, however, that so wide a meaning of "religion" at once deprives it of all definiteness and value, since to suggest that even "irreligion" is really one type of religion, and to maintain that humanity, as such, is *inherently* religious, seem to imply that even the basest of men must be regarded as possessing their own distinctive form of religion; or indeed that they are entitled to appeal to this "religion" as an adequate protection from criticism and punishment. Every criminal, it may be contended in other words, must be credited with a "religion"; and this, again, must be accorded the same respect and consideration that is yielded to that of a saint.

Such conclusions at once appear ridiculous; and yet there are certain aspects of the situation, even when expressed in this extreme form, which upon analysis support my general position, and may therefore serve to make this somewhat clearer. In the first place, the definition of religion as consisting in the *explicit wholeness* of response must be recalled.

With this in mind, we do actually find that even the most hardened criminals, once the true entirety of their experience becomes clearly realized by themselves, frequently exhibit what, in my opinion, must be regarded as a type of religion, however crude and unrefined this may be. It is, indeed, precisely because the normal and the ideal wholeness of their own experience never has been explicitly realized as it demands—because, that is to say, their lives have run in too fatally narrow a groove—that they remain wicked and base; and once again, the causes of this condition are many and various; environment, heredity, apathy, absence of moral self-discipline, all play their part. But they all alike contribute to the one result—the mutilation of a normal human experience; and hence, to that degree, to the destruction of its natural wholeness and entirety. On the other hand, once let this "natural entirety" make itself more explicitly manifested within the consciousness of the individual, and then, no matter how base he may have become, his "universe," hitherto so fatally narrow and confined, at once begins to transform itself and to arouse within him a responsive religion. Whether the change is gradual or sudden is simply a matter of the operative conditions in each instance.

Fortunately this theoretical analysis finds ample confirmation in the observation of a writer who had had the best opportunities for actual contact with people of this kind in a London police court. "In the ordinary common fellow," writes J. A. R. Cairns, "thriftless, godless, passionate, there are streaks of whiteness and generosity that make him a hero in adversity"; and with reference to one particularly striking case he comments, "in response to a glorious impulse she went to penal servitude."[1] Such instances surely constitute the crucial problems alike for ethical theory and the philosophy of religion; and it appears to me that we can satisfactorily explain this paradoxical combination of the

[1] *The Loom of the Law*, p. 43.

"godless" and the "hero" only by contrasting the tragically narrow "universe" of the criminal with the momentarily widened "world" of the hero, and by correlating these to the response which they excite in his attitude and behaviour; while to refuse to describe his nobler attitude as "religious" is to deprive this term of its deepest significance by confining it to some foolishly conventional meaning. It must be remembered, too, that no hard and fast distinction can be drawn between certain criminal practices and those of some primitive religions—the slaughter of the widows and slaves of a chief, for instance, or human sacrifice as a religious rite. Once again it is man's "universe" that has expanded, this time in its social, rather than in its individual, aspects; for however defective it may be, criminal law always aims at being the definite expression of a vaguer national sentiment which is, at bottom, essentially religious.

It is in fact possible to carry this point of view still farther, so as to include persons who deliberately defend a career that is patently immoral, if not criminal—a man like Cellini, for example, who ostensibly gloried in his vice and wrong-doing; just as, in another direction, we find theoretic anarchists who openly advocate violence and social revolution. Now so far as any such attitude is deliberately adopted and explicitly and systematically supported—so far, that is to say, as the person concerned is appealing to some definite intellectual or emotional grounds upon which he is prepared to act at any cost to himself—then I believe we must regard his entire standpoint as his own particular religion, no matter how much this differs from that of his fellows. Here again we may confidently appeal to history, and recall how often the criminals of one age have become the saints of later generations. But when, on the other hand, we find a person thus defending a career that is patently immoral, we may safely suspect a deliberate suppression of his real opinions for some ends of his own; and so far as this sus-

picion is well grounded, it is at once obvious that our definition of religion itself prevents our applying the term to hypocrisy of this kind. On the contrary, we are perfectly justified in inflicting any punishment that has the sanction of law. But whenever situations arise analogous to those of conscientious objectors to war, then the profound and widespread perplexity as to legal procedure itself indicates our extreme reluctance to interfere with genuinely religious sentiments, no matter how inconvenient their social consequences may be; and again the sole ultimate test is the sincerity of the individuals concerned. But from the analytical point of view, this "sincerity" consists in the explicit realization of *all* the aspects of experience, together with the readiness to carry these into practice no matter what the result may be.

2. We find here indeed only a few instances of the many extreme forms which may be assumed by the development of this general tendency; and the nature of these more unusual types indicates another feature of our definition of the highest importance, which has already been emphasized as the essentially *responsive* character of all religious experience.[1] For while always active, this experience is primarily *re*active. Further, its wholeness corresponds to the wholeness of that external stimulus which arouses and sustains it. In other words, religion springs always from the reaction of humanity to the Universe; or more precisely, in the first instance to *a* universe—that of the individual or society concerned. There is thus in every case a dual entirety—a wholeness both external and internal, as inseparably and most intimately correlated aspects of one highly complex unity. Man sums up or focuses all that to himself seems most real and valuable; he realizes within his own consciousness all that is for him ultimate and fundamental; and then he

[1] *Ante*, p. 39.

moulds the content which thus finally emerges—or, more truly, this content moulds itself as it arises—into a more or less unified system which, no matter how simple he strives to make it, always presents some degree of complexity. It thus becomes, in short, a "universe"—*his* universe, the inclusive sphere which not merely underlies and encloses the narrower world of his ordinary everyday life, but which at certain moments invades that familiar existence so as to transform it, thereby making it something to be perhaps feared, perhaps loved—either friendly and desirable, or hostile and repugnant. But in any case its influence remains persistent even though it is only intermittently realized. It is dominant even while it remains unrecognized; man remains always more or less dimly aware of its existence even while he forgets its specific character, so that he is in the main subconscious of it rather than explicitly conscious.

In other words, what is usually called "Life" is always only a part of our fully real world.[1] Its actual confines remain ever undetermined, so that at any moment it may incalculably expand so as to disclose the truly basal factors and ultimate motive forces which give to "Life" its typical character in the eyes of our neighbours and even of our ordinary selves. But it is a psychological commonplace that Life is incessantly moulded by influences that are subconscious or (it may be) unconscious,[2] and sensitive always to any adequate stimulus from without. Further, this infraconscious level is most intimately linked with all the feeling elements in fully conscious life, since it has in the main arisen out of the hard stress and strain of earlier emotional experience, thereby acquiring its often fierce intensity. Its upheavals must therefore profoundly disturb and per-

[1] We mortals cross the ocean of this world
Each in his average cabin of a life.
BROWNING, *Bishop Blougram's Apology.*

[2] *Cf.* pp. 160, 161 below.

manently affect the character of ordinary life; although this must not be understood to mean that the final shaping of personality is due to the Subconscious and Unconscious alone or even predominantly. Any such view, widely current as it has come to be, is in my opinion radically false; but with this aspect of our enquiry I shall deal at a later stage.[1] Here I wish to emphasize, in the case of every human being, the ceaseless influence of a "universe" which extends far beyond the content of his usual experience and affects all sides and elements of his ordinary personality; it is indeed this essential inclusiveness and pervasiveness that constitute it into a "universe."

3. Still further, that inherent characteristic of human experience which has already so frequently been referred to—man's power of forming mental images and ideas and constructing from these his inner world of thought—his "ideational capacity" in short[2]—enables him to realize, with an ever varying degree of fullness, the actuality and nature of this enfolding universe. In this way it steadily becomes increasingly real to himself; fully as actual as his familiar everyday world, if not indeed more real, even though its reality mystifies him and raises those baffling problems which, as soon as he begins to speculate, he attemps to simplify and solve in all kinds of ways. Myths and cosmologies, fables and folklore, elaborated and cherished by one generation only to be discarded by its successors, all alike express man's unified consciousness of that "universe" to whose unceasing pressure upon his life and spirit he responds in his religion.

It is of course *his* "universe," not *the* Universe; but this remains true always, even for the most up-to-date modernism and the latest science. *The* Universe is inexhaustible, and man's protozoan mind can never grasp more than a small

[1] *Cf.* previous note.

[2] *Cf. ante*, p. 36.

fraction of it. "Think of the sun as something less than a single speck of dust in a vast city, of the earth as less than a millionth part of such a speck, and we have a vivid picture of the relation of our home in space to the rest of the universe."[1] These relatively infinitesimal parts, nevertheless, show themselves to be aspects of one inclusive Whole; and thus, though all alike incomplete and fragmentary, they supplement each other so that they continually expand without limitation, driven onward by the internal force of even their own mutual contradictions and our errors. The ultimate springs of progress, at every stage of intelligence and in all directions of advance without exception, remain in principle the same, swiftly and radically revolutionizing the most recent phases of modern scientific theory in exactly the same way that the crudest of ancient primitive superstitions were elevated and refined; the differences between these two spheres, fundamentally important though they are, are differences only of detail and not of intrinsic nature. Inward discrepancy and mutual opposition, ever varying in their application but always one in form, lie at the root of every step of mental progress alike; and the "conflict between science and religion," far from being a typically nineteenth-century struggle, is rather ten times nineteen centuries old. Only "modern" science is actually modern. Science itself, like its apparent foe but true ally religion, is as old as the human mind. But religion, once again, is in essence man's total response to his *entire* realized universe; science, on the other hand, is the outcome of his specifically *intellective* attitude to those aspects of this universe which fall within the scope of his rational understanding. Always the whole is greater than its part—not simply in extent but, more truly, in ceaseless influence and stimulus.

4. Exactly similar—but again in principle—is the action

[1] Jeans, *The Universe Around Us*, p. 90.

of each individual's "universe" upon his daily life. For this is lived always under the sway of his intermittent realization of that whole of Reality which, whenever it is completely realized, arouses his distinctively religious moods. However seldom it may occur, it is this explicit realization which ultimately moulds his ordinary life and makes that just what it is, to such a degree that every return to the normal level is but a reaction from the profounder influence. This truth has been immortalized in *Bishop Blougram's Apology*; and it is vitally important to observe that one of the characters regards himself as not ostensibly religious but sceptical, finally secure in his secular attitude, proof against accepted belief and outworn superstition alike.

> And now what are we? unbelievers both,
> Calm and complete, determinately fixed
> Today, tomorrow, and for ever, pray?
> . . . . .
> Just when we are safest, there's a sunset-touch,
> A fancy from a flower-bell, some one's death,
> A chorus-ending from Euripides,—
> And that's enough for fifty hopes and fears
> As old and new at once as Nature's self,
> To rap and knock and enter in our soul.
> . . . . .
> Once feel about, and soon or late you hit
> Some sense, in which it might be, after all,
> Why not, "The Way, the Truth, the Life"?

This emotional upheaval of personality, thus invaded from some ever present surrounding sphere, is in the first place inescapable, and often depends, further, on the most trivial occurrences; its effects may nevertheless be overwhelming. But the experience, familiar enough to the modern spirit with its own peculiar sensitivity and responsiveness, is really universal and always arouses therefore an adequate reaction; and this reaction, when ultimately systematized in explicit

knowledge, feeling and action simultaneously, constitutes religion.

It is this indeed that gives all genuine religion its irresistibly binding character—its imperative and final sway over conduct and belief. It is true that the basis of this power is often to a high degree external, so that it is felt by us as an oppressive influence which inhibits our natural tendencies and desires, and is yielded to only under the pressure of social convention or personal authority. But here, quite obviously, there is a marked absence of that *totality* of response which is always essential to religion as such; for the individual's actual behaviour and ostensible attitude are plainly opposed to his emotional disposition and even, it may be, to his intellectual convictions. The result is then either an apathetic or hypocritical acquiescence in the enforced ruling system, or a continuous subconscious protest, more or less violent according to circumstances, against its dominance; in both cases alike, however, "religion" plainly becomes a misnomer for such attitudes of mind. But when on the other hand the individual himself realizes, at once intellectively and emotionally, the complete nature of his own "universe," and when further this full realization becomes freely expressed in his will and behaviour, then it is again obvious that he has submitted himself to the influence of this "universe" and accepted it, voluntarily and unresistingly, as the determinant of his conduct and the ideal of his purposes and desires. It is precisely this *total* attitude that constitutes his religion; and at this stage of our enquiry it is essential to note that this totality is all that we require. We are not at present concerned, that is, with the purity or truth or morality of religion, but only with its psychological nature as *completeness of response*, and as the *simultaneous* activity—or more precisely *re*activity—of the volitional, sensitive and cognitive elements in the individual or social mind. Further, in being reactive, it is predominantly spontaneous; and this spontaneity really

implies that the objective Universe, as the primary stimulus, is here expressing itself in and through its direct influence upon the mind, rather than that the individual is himself coolly and critically surveying his entire world, and then responding to it in whatever way he considers most adequate. Man is at first mainly passive, though never completely so; for he is primarily affected on the *feeling* side of his nature, over which he has, to begin with, little power of control.[1] Only as the level of mind advances does man's expanding intellectual capacity enable him to criticize his emotional impulses, uncoordinated and irresistible as these too often are; while their systematic subordination to reason occurs only after a prolonged further evolution, culminating in the reflective attitude of the philosopher and the analytical atmosphere of modern science.[2]

5. It is here therefore (to repeat) that we find the ultimate basis of the characteristic binding force of religion. The stimulus and influence, at first external to the individual himself, finally operate within his experience and as it were internalize themselves there; and thus the mind becomes continuous with its universe and develops in unceasing response to it. So far then as this relation is recognized for what it is and accepted as the ruling principle of life, so far does religion acquire an imperative sway over the whole of thought and action. But this fundamental harmony must be a real harmony. It must, that is, be both free[3] and reciprocal. The response and reaction of the self to its universe must form its own intrinsic life, never merely a helpless submission to an external despotism. Thus there arises, in the first place, the free acceptance of the relation in question; but this relation must further become explicitly recognized as possess-

[1] *Cf.* Marett on religion and emotion, p. 204.
[2] *Cf.* further p. 90 below.
[3] As to freedom, *cf. ante* p. 36 *n.*

ing an essentially and inherently authoritative aspect, determined throughout by an irrefragable law. We have here indeed but one cardinal instance of the more general problem of the connection between authority and freedom, or between the Universe and the individual; a problem which can never be solved by endeavouring to deny or repudiate an absolute authority of some kind or other. So far as religion is concerned, however, its true authority springs from its very nature as being the response of the whole individual to his "universe"; which, again, is likewise a whole—the whole of Reality as he apprehends it. Only it is an authority that is exercised, not simply from without, but also and more truly from within; for the individual thus makes himself, so far as he can, the very expression of his "universe." His whole life then becomes the manifestation of its hidden influence upon his spirit; his conduct is determined by what he regards as its imperative demands, while his thought is the effort he makes to understand these claims more clearly.[1]

It is inevitable, however, that this ultimate harmony can be attained only with effort and difficulty. For the influence upon the individual of his universe is in reality the pressure of the Infinite upon the finite; it may indeed be described as the unceasing tendency, or even struggle, of the Whole to manifest its complete nature within the painfully narrow limits of the finite mind. In a certain sense therefore this mind remains always condemned to those errors and illusions which cannot but arise from the profound contrast between its achieved knowledge and the ever wider truth which has still to be attained. But it is also obvious, from this point of view, that error is such only because it is taken, in itself and just as it stands, to be final truth. In principle, error is partial truth which is for any reason regarded as being complete truth; but this by no means implies that error is nothing but incomplete truth. Its erroneousness, that is to say, lies not

[1] *Cf.* Chapter XVI.

so much in its own detailed character as in our failure to perceive its actual relation to fuller knowledge; and error becomes "absolute" only insofar as it contradicts, either directly or by implication, some great comprehensive body of fact. If on the other hand an assertion is recognized as being merely an approximation to final accuracy, while at the same time it is supported by already established truth, it may then be accepted as true, with the proviso that its character will inevitably be transformed to some degree and in some direction by the attainment of further knowledge.[1] For we are here again concerned with the nature of a "whole" which, if it is really such, manifests itself in all its constituent elements without exception. As the whole becomes more fully developed, therefore, all these elements maintain their places within an ever expanding system. From being isolated they become interconnected; instead of remaining independent they sink into subordination to something wider than themselves. They must therefore assume new aspects as fresh light falls upon them both from their associated factors and from the whole as such; thus a reorientation occurs which presents each unit under a new aspect. It is important to observe further that this general principle is fully as consistent with the retention of any given constituent as with its rejection; only, in being thus retained, its character becomes deepened and enriched by its inclusion within the developing whole; as, *e.g.*, any simple word or phrase is transformed by the genius of the poet who weaves it, just as it stands, into lyric or sonnet.[2] And as in art, so in science; for the establishment of every great theory intensifies the significance of all the facts which it includes and on which it reposes. Darwin's evolutionary principle, the Daltonian and the modern views of the atom, Newton's theory of gravitation and Einstein's

[1] *Cf.* further below, p. 79.

[2] *Cf.* the familiar commonplace "Too late," as it appears in Christina Rossetti's "The Prince's Progress."

modification of this, all alike illustrate the profound change which comes over established, but isolated, facts as soon as these are comprehended within their relevant system.

All this holds true to a still higher degree throughout religious experience. For since, by definition, this experience includes all the main aspects of consciousness as explicit, it must obviously be much more complex than either science or art, each of which, despite its now enormous range, presents throughout a definite homogeneity of type. In the continuous expansion of the "universe" of religion, therefore, the incessant interaction occurs always between elements that are markedly contrasted one with another, so that their resultant transformation must be still more profound and striking;[1] and for the same reason it must proceed more slowly simply because it is so much more intricate and difficult. Thus the "universe" or microcosm of the individual always merges at its fluctuating boundaries into the Universe of Reality, identifying itself more and more with this as its development continues; while, corresponding to this with a more or less strict parallelism, there occur those revolutionary changes in the response of the whole mind, individual and social, which have raised religion from the level of ancient superstition to that of modern and more rational types.

Now it is in virtue of this indestructible continuity between every individual experience and the Whole of Reality that religion proves itself to be inherent and spontaneous in human nature. It is impossible completely to eradicate it except by ceasing to be human; although to criticize or to protest against some particular religious system is not only possible but often obligatory. But this attitude only requires to be carried forward in its legitimate degree—it needs only to become positively constructive rather than negatively critical —to attain of itself the status of a new type of religion, as is indeed sufficiently evident throughout history; and precisely

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 42 on the fusion characteristic of religion.

the same is true of the individual. Only sheer apathy can save him from the insistent pressure upon his spirit of the environing Whole; he is incessantly pursued by "The Hound of Heaven." His every response reveals a new demand if he but remains sufficiently sensitive to its influences. The search for knowledge, devotion to art, the struggle to achieve high moral purposes, all alike resolve themselves, the farther they proceed, into a more intimate contact with an ever widening sphere, which slowly changes its character simply by rendering itself more and more complete. Every environment, no matter how definite and exclusive it may be at first, contains this inherent capacity to expand into a true "universe" with which the individual's continued intercourse—his uninterrupted reaction to its pressure upon and within his experience—inevitably becomes transformed and so creates a religion.

6. From the psychological standpoint, then, it is essential to regard religion as a mode of experience whose complexity is of a still higher order than that of aesthetics or science or practice.[1] For this complexity arises not simply from the intricacy of detail but also, as combined with this, from the interfusion of the most profoundly contrasted forms of consciousness—thought, knowledge, emotion, conduct and will; forms which are so widely disparate that their only common characteristic is (in the first instance) that of falling within the mental life of one and the same finite individual. This inner life, as I have already observed, is itself constituted by the simultaneous activity of all these diverse modes; religion arises from their combined manifestation as explicit, while

[1] This is of course a general principle, and the comparison must be made between forms of experience that are approximately on the same level. It is as illogical to contrast the religion of a simple peasant with the knowledge of an Einstein as to compare the experience of a Paul or an Emerson with the attainments of an average undergraduate.

during all other stages of experience only one of these main elements becomes explicit, the others, though still operative, then remaining implicit only.

It must follow therefore that the various types of religious experience cannot differ among themselves in the mere presence or absence of any of these explicit forms, since (by definition) they are always present simultaneously; and the evolution of religion, from its first beginning to its highest levels, is determined throughout by one and the same factor —that is by the expansion of that ideational capacity of the mind which we have already found to be the basis of its character as the realized wholeness of experience.[1] This ideational capacity in itself, regarded as one distinguishable aspect of the entirety of mind, develops ultimately into thought, with all its products in the scientific and other departments of knowledge; and as such it demarcates the human mind, as absolutely as is possible consistently with a real continuity, from animal mentality. But since the mind remains always a unity, it is impossible for thought itself to advance without producing a radical transformation of the character of its allied aspects—of action and emotion; and it is thus more accurate to describe the evolution of distinctively human experience not as the development of rationality as such, but rather as the advancing rationalization of man's experience regarded always and essentially as a whole.[2] The growing power of thought results therefore not only in the increase and the systematization of knowledge, but equally in the elevation of crude feeling into refined art, and the moralizing of behaviour in accordance with specific ethical ideals; while these changes themselves inevitably exert a reciprocal influence upon the entire content of

[1] *Ante* pp. 36, 41.

[2] In this sense, of course, the use of "rationalization" must not be confused with its applications in current psychological hypotheses of the "Unconscious"; *cf.* p. 64.

thought.[1] And what is true of these distinctive modes of consciousness is also true of experience taken in that explicit wholeness which constitutes religion; so that the evolution of religion is similarly determined by the progressive rationalization of experience, when this is regarded as an explicit whole which exhibits feeling and practical activity as fully as it exhibits thought and all its intellective products.

7. This progressive rationalizing, however, never results in the disappearance of any of the distinctive characteristics of either art, conduct or religion; on the contrary, it develops these more and more fully, so that their actual nature becomes displayed more distinctly and completely. For, as I have remarked already, in each instance alike the advance always involves a heightened complexity—an increase in the volume of constituent details together with a greater intricacy in their interrelations; and this process occurs, not in the sphere of matter with its continuously existing entities, but in the transient elements of conscious life. It would therefore be totally impossible apart from a correlatively high order of ideation, which alone enables the requisite psychical content to persist, and to attain the necessary degree of systematization. It is this general advance in organization that is really meant by rationalization, and not any mere translation of originally non-intellective phases of experience into intellectual terms, as in appreciative criticism or sympathetic exposition. On the contrary, the evolutionary rationalizing of art, for example, consists simply and purely in the progressive development of art as such, not in its transformation into the non-aesthetic; it is just the *modus operandi* by which this elevation brings itself about. For the entire process is essentially spontaneous and autonomous; it is throughout the *self-directed* advance

[1] For the more general principles that are here involved I may refer to *The Monist*, vol. xxxi, p. 367: "The Nature of the Conditions which Determine Development."

of conscious life. Thus art, in being rationalized, not only always retains its essential nature, but still further, art more and more fully becomes what it really is; it attains its ideal form ever more completely, even while at the same time it becomes more intimately unified with all the other aspects of experience taken in its proper entirety. All this becomes quite obvious as soon as we adequately realize the extreme intricacy of fine detail and the exquisite delicacy of balance and adjustment in all great artistic creations. Apart from a keen, capacious and retentive intellect all these indispensable features are quite impossible, although such an intellect must be of a highly specialized type with its own peculiar responsiveness and sensitivity.

But since this is true of all great achievements equally, it cannot affect the governing principle involved. For the growth of an outstanding personality in any of the practical spheres of life—in statesmanship or administration or law—is likewise strictly analogous to the attainment of artistic excellence. In all such instances we find the same multiplicity of complex detail, the same sensitiveness to changing circumstances, the same native ability to mould this massive intricacy in accord with great ends. Now it is always in this far-reaching and inclusive sense that the term "rationalization" must be employed;[1] it implies the acquirement of the specific and systematic character which is intimately relevant to the general conditions qualifying the actual situation. It is, further, often possible quite apart from any complicated form of verbal expression, although this, at least, may simplify it and so make it more definite and precise; while the dependence of social intercourse on verbal expression is obvious.

It is extremely difficult to surmise the means whereby the rudimentary reason of primitive man—or perhaps of some still lower and semi-human being—first broke the rigid bonds

[1] *Cf. n.* 2, p. 62.

of instinct. All that we seem sure of is that the earliest types of religion were dominated by those passions and impulses, both evil and good, which descended to mankind from his long animal ancestry. During the twilight dawn of human mentality Nature gradually became vaguely envisaged as a realm partly terrifying and inimical, partly friendly and controllable, and imagined as governed by beings whose inevitably anthropomorphic attributes were either crude and indefinite, or positive distortions of humanity. But the less hazardous subsistence which man's slowly increasing skill enabled him to wring from sea and soil implied, according to his simple logic, some beneficent deities among his countless gods; rulers of spring and harvest, of favouring winds and victory in battle; and intimately connected with these beliefs and their results in practice was the almost universal conviction that life was prolonged into some kind of future existence.[1]

To explore the multitudinous details of early religion is, however, unnecessary. All we need observe is that to describe this as "superstition" is by no means to destroy its character as one genuine form of religion, no matter how elementary, nor even how debased, it may have been. For this was the only way in which the mind, scarcely released as yet from the fetters of instinct, could "rationalize" the whole of its experience; and the crude inner world of man's belief and practice reflected his newly discovered objective "universe." All the subsequent developments of "universe," practice and belief, as I have argued throughout, maintained the closest possible reciprocal connection. The steadily widening knowledge and control of Nature incessantly modified the emotional and practical attitude of both individual and community. But however erroneous its earliest conclusions, and however

[1] In this connection there arises the curious problem of the prevalence of myths analogous to the creation and deluge stories in *Genesis* among widely separated primitive peoples.

inadequate and non-formal its methods, the "simple logic" at work was nonetheless a "logic," concealing the germs of every later system. In other terms, man's reactions ceased to be merely instinctive and became more and more intellectual, although of course in the simplest possible way. But this simplicity must not blind us to the fact that the primary types of rationalization had begun to operate efficiently, thus inaugurating the indestructible influence which has elevated all human experience, including religion, to its present level.

IV

MODERN DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION

1. It was inevitable therefore, as human experience became more and more complex—as the expansion of its content necessitated an increasing diversity of form—that the manifestations of its wholeness, strictly as such, should become a matter of constantly greater difficulty; and the inevitable consequence was that religion finally came to appear to be merely one of the aspects of a many-sided experience, rather than what it actually is—the expression of that experience as a whole; this tendency being further accelerated by the advancing specialization of all social functions. Specific "religion" thus became restricted to the priestly order, and was supposed to concern the ordinary man only incidentally; while at the same time this contrast was intensified by the necessities of cultus which, conformably to the heightening intricacy of life, demanded definite, and therefore to some degree artificial, ceremonial instead of purely spontaneous utterance. When, as so often happened, this quite justifiable definiteness degenerated into a mechanical rigidity, whose sole defence was its own traditional and too frequently mysterious invariability, then the life of the spirit was stifled, though never quite extinguished, by that very ritual which it had itself originally inspired. At best, religion finally became departmental instead of comprehensive; and some of its current definitions appear to suffer from the failure adequately to appreciate this essentially *all-inclusive* character. Hence they express only its latest forms of manifestation rather than its fundamental nature, and are applicable therefore merely to modern religion, or to some of its most distinctive types, instead of to all religion as such.

2 (*a*). "Religion," according to Deissmann—one of the foremost living theologians alike in intellect and spirituality —"is inner life. It brings forth a rich life in history; it inspires and directs the will; it enriches culture. . . . But both building and destruction are traceable back to the inner life of certain individual persons. Inner life deals finally with religion; it is a living and moving in God . . . always a communion of man with his God."[1] But this description is obviously at once too indefinite, too narrow and too specialized. Religion is certainly "inner life." But science is so equally; and it also "brings forth a rich life, inspires the will and enriches culture"—results which are, further, "traceable back to individual persons." There is nothing in Deissmann's account of religion therefore which differentiates it from either knowledge or art; while to regard it as "a living in God . . . a communion of man with his God," excludes every type except monotheism, and tends to limit even this to Christianity. Thus Deissmann's standpoint is that of the highest and most recent of all religions only, and is therefore valueless as a general definition; and although I do not suggest that he has himself advanced it as such, still it is much too characteristic of current opinion to be allowed to pass without criticism.

(*b*). At first sight, what may be called the anthropological standpoint seems to be in striking contrast with this; and yet it also exhibits similar defects. We may select Frazer's definition—"a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life."[2] Just as Deissmann excluded polytheism, Frazer seems to exclude monotheism; his "powers" are both pluralistic and impersonal, so that undue prominence is here given to the more primitive forms of religion, while the distinctively ethical attitude which seeks

[1] *The Religion of Jesus*, p. 43.
[2] *The Golden Bough*, vol. i, p. 222, 3rd. ed.

to transcend propitiation is altogether ignored. So too is the Stoic philosophy of submission to those "powers," either natural or supernatural, which it is useless to endeavour to conciliate because their action is necessary and invariable; while insofar as agnosticism is adopted as an ultimate point of view, it itself becomes a religion,[1] which likewise denies all possibility of propitiating what is absolutely unknowable and inconceivable.

(*c*). This view of agnosticism as itself being one form of religion is fully justified by Spencer's treatment of the problem. "In this belief in an Absolute that transcends not only human knowledge but human conception lies the only possible reconciliation of Science and Religion . . . the view must indirectly affect us in all our relations . . . must influence our ideas of right and wrong, and therefore modify our conduct . . . it is alike our highest wisdom and our highest duty to regard that through which all things exist as The Unknowable."[2] Any such standpoint as this plainly has both subjective and objective aspects, while its very phrases are identical with those of every "religion" in the ordinarily accepted sense of the term. "Highest wisdom, highest duty, influence our ideas of right and wrong, modify our conduct"—nothing more could be claimed by the most positive and dogmatic of theological systems. Agnosticism, as thus expressed, is clearly much more than a merely negative viewpoint; it constitutes a philosophy and an ethics—or still more truly, a religion; and even though its more specifically scientific exponents emphasized its colourless neutrality, still Spencer himself elaborated its true basal implications into a coherent system.

Both Spencer's analysis and Frazer's anthropological position, indeed, support the definition of religion already adopted. For each alike plainly involves simultaneously

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 46.

[2] *First Principles* (6th ed.), pp. xi, 19, 97.

interacting emotional, cognitive and practical factors. Faith and conduct are inseparably connected with positive knowledge, so that the final attitude of the modern thinker in the one case, and of his primitive ancestor in the other, is the resultant of their unified influence. By Spencer this is stated quite explicitly; but it is equally implied by Frazer. For the "conciliation" is directed towards "powers which are *believed* to direct the course of Nature"; it is, further, prompted by the deep emotions inevitably aroused by the control of these powers over "human life"; while the belief itself rests upon man's knowledge—admittedly inadequate though it is—of his inner and outer world or "universe." We have in short, in both cases alike, a fundamentally *unitary* attitude —the manifestation of that explicit wholeness of experience, though at two very widely different levels, which has here been advanced as constituting the essential feature in all religion.

3 (*d*). Contrasted with the too negative agnosticism of Spencer is the somewhat too positively intellectualist standpoint of Martineau, in his well-known presentation of religion as a "belief in a Divine Mind and Will ruling the Universe and holding Moral relations with mankind."[1] Here again all forms except monotheism are specifically excluded, together with beliefs in an impersonal deity and a pantheistic basis of Reality; while from the point of view of philosophy, the concepts of "Divine Mind" and "Universe" are among the highest that human thought can attain; nor can it be held that these alone are ultimate, in the sense that all others are merely inadequate approximations to them.

(*e*). If then the definition of religion is expanded to include a deity whose nature is in no sense whatever personal, and if this principle is further taken to imply that genuinely moral relations can subsist between individual persons only,

[1] *Study of Religion*, vol. i, p. 1.

whether human or superhuman, it becomes impossible to insist upon the attitude of worship as essential to religion, as is done *e.g.* in Galloway's analysis of the subject. Here we find the essence of the situation presented as "man's faith in a power beyond himself whereby he seeks to satisfy emotional needs and gain stability of life, and which he expresses in acts of worship and service."[1] The agnostic, however, may likewise assert that his philosophy affords him, at least, "stability of life," just as the positivist insists on the service of Humanity, and not of any "power beyond" this, as the supreme ideal; and it seems quite impossible to regard these attitudes as non-religious if they are reflectively adopted and sincerely advocated. But certainly faith in the one case, and perhaps worship in the other, would be held to be impossible or unnecessary. In fact, the agnostic standpoint may itself be rendered more positive, so as to become the ground of that direct defiance of the universal process which has been expressed by Russell in his widely known "Free Man's Worship,"[2] and in Henley's equally familiar "Invictus."

> It matters not how strait the gate,
> How charged with punishments the scroll,
> I am the master of my fate:
> I am the captain of my soul.

(*f*). The most adequate definitions seem to me to be the following. That of McTaggart: "an emotion resting on a conviction of a harmony between ourselves and the universe."[3] This however lays too great an emphasis on emotion, so that predominance is assigned to a somewhat vague feeling rather than to the definite wholeness, as such, of experience; and on the other hand, as we have just seen, the emotion need not arise from a "conviction of harmony," since it may

[1] *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 184; *cf.* A. E. Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*, vol. i, p. 31: "Where there is nothing to adore, there is no religion." *Space, Time and Deity*, vol. ii, book iv, cc. ii, iii.

[2] *Mysticism and Logic*, chap. iii. [3] *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 3.

equally readily spring from a recognition of the hostility of the world, while exactly the same powerful, though undefined, feeling of some degree of disharmony must lie at the root of that desire for "conciliation" stressed by Frazer.[1] This preponderance of emotion, again, is in a measure an accidental feature, which cannot therefore be fundamental; it may even depend merely on the temperament or mood of the group or individual. But if, on the other hand, the word "conviction" actually implies an ultimately intellective basis for the emotional aspects of the entire experience, whether this basis is "intellectual" in the narrower sense, or "intuitive" as expressing the more unreflective and pragmatic interpretation of life, and if further the final influence upon conduct is taken into account, then McTaggart's definition, particularly in its reference to man and the Universe, accords very closely with my own.

(*g*). This is still more the case with that of Edward Caird. "A man's religion, if it is sincere, is that consciousness in which he takes up a definite attitude to the world, and gathers to a focus all the meaning of his life."[2] At the same time it is, I believe, somewhat too subjective, unless "consciousness" is to be interpreted here in a much wider sense than is usual. I have myself employed "response"[3] rather than "consciousness," as including both the subjective and objective aspects of experience—its active, outward tendency as well as that inner and receptive phase which is generally described as "consciousness." Similarly, the latter part of the present definition applies rather to the higher forms of religion than to any of its simpler manifestations. It applies (in other words) to a fully developed individuality, capable of becoming explicitly conscious of its own selfhood as distinct alike from other selves and from its natural environment. But in all its earlier evolutionary stages human

[1] *Ante* p. 68.
[2] *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. i, p. 81.
[3] Or "attitude"; *ante* p. 32.

experience appears to *express itself* as a complex whole spontaneously or "instinctively," rather than to be deliberately brought to a "focus" by the individual. This is more especially the case in the religion of primitive social groups, characterized as it is by such spontaneity and "instinctiveness" or "intuition." It is an automatic activity of the spirit, very much in the same way that heart-beat is a self-maintaining bodily function; and it possesses, to begin with, just as little explicit "meaning" as our strongly emotional responses usually have. It is true, of course, that it is always capable of yielding meaning to subsequent reflection; and these later and more complex thought processes, as I have repeatedly insisted, bring about fundamentally important changes in the entire situation. For they lead, in the first place, to the development of self-conscious individuality as such—of the real "person" or "self," whether this is considered from the psychological or the social point of view; and, in the second place, to those highest forms of religious experience which exhibit that "definite attitude" and "focus" emphasized by Caird.

But the essential characteristic of wholeness is more definitely emphasized by Julian Huxley. "A developed religion should be a relation of the personality as a whole to the rest of the universe . . . one which is so organized that it helps to unify the diverse human faculties . . . the experience of the universe as affecting human life and therefore as invested with sanctity is the proper object of religion . . . religion can concern the whole personality on the one hand, and the rest of the universe on the other."[1]

Quite similarly, Alexander: "The religious appetite or emotion depends upon the whole make-up or constitution

[1] *Religion Without Revelation*, pp. 331, 339, 342, 372. "Religion is concerned with a complex emotional attitude of personality towards the universe." *What Dare I Think?* p. 142. Perhaps "emotional" is overstressed here.

of the mind and body, and is the response of it to the whole of reality";[1] and Wallace: "Religion is a faith or a theory which gives unity to the facts of life ... (the) dominant conviction of the meaning of reality."[2] Hegel also: "In religion man places himself in a relation to this centre in which all other relations concentrate themselves."[3] On the other hand, it seems difficult to reconcile Whitehead's agreement with these views with his insistence on "solitariness." "Rational religion," he states in the first place, "is the wider conscious reaction of men to the universe in which they find themselves"; but almost immediately he adds, "religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness ... the origin of rational religion is solitariness" as a fundamental feature.[4] I think that these assertions can be harmonized only by regarding the individual's solitariness as one of the most important and effective of all possible conditions for bringing him into contact with his environing Universe, both objectively and subjectively. For "solitariness" can never be absolute; even to be alone with oneself is to lay oneself open to Browning's "hopes and fears, As old and new at once as Nature's self"; and then religion, as Whitehead appears to maintain, depends very largely if not completely on our reactions to these subtle influences. Elsewhere Whitehead holds that "religion is directed to the end of stretching individual interest beyond its self-defeating particularity."[5] Now so far as one's solitude is in any way made absolute, it tends to become identical with this "particularity"; on the

[1] *Space, Time and Deity*, vol. ii, p. 377.

[2] *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, p. 27.

[3] *The Philosophy of Religion*, vol. i, p. 2; *cf.* from the psychological standpoint: "religious experience arises so far as the individual is facing the totality of existence ... a mental attitude towards the whole universe." Brown, *Mind and Personality*, p. 298; *cf. Science and Personality*, chap. i.

[4] *Religion in the Making*, pp. 31, 48.

[5] *Process and Reality*, p. 21.

other hand, the process of "stretching," at which religion aims, has in principle no limits whatever, so that its ultimate result must be to bring the individual into increasingly closer and wider contact with Reality. Solitariness, then, must never be confused with utter isolation. On the contrary, as Bosanquet has urged, "we are saved from isolation by giving ourselves to something which we cannot help holding supreme. Be a whole or join a whole. This *is* religion."[1] Once more the emphasis falls on wholeness and unity, on centrality and concentration.

[1] *What Religion Is*, pp. 6, 12; *cf.* pp. 25, 79, and his insistence on the "social consciousness" in relation to religion. (*Value and Destiny*, p. 240.)

V

EXPERIENCE AS SENSUOUS AND AS SUPERSENSUOUS (1)

1. THUS we have found that the phases of experience are variations within a persisting whole,[1] while experience becomes specifically religious to the degree that its principal responsive factors all become explicit simultaneously. The *development* of religion must consist, therefore, in the progressive transformation of this explicit wholeness. Further, this process is always a *self*-transformation, in the sense that it arises from the interaction of the constituent elements themselves and not from any external influences, except in so far as these operate as stimuli exciting the internal response. Again, since experience is *always* an unbroken continuity, this development of religion must proceed *pari passu* with the advance of each of its main aspects regarded specifically as such; so that wider knowledge, more refined art and improved social economy must all affect profoundly and permanently the plastic and reactive content of religion.

But while experience must thus be viewed in the light of its essential attributes of wholeness and continuity, there must also be considered the fundamental contrast between its sensuous and its non-sensuous forms—a contrast whose implications are in the present connection of vital importance. For the first of these two phases, from the very nature of its ruling conditions, must always remain restricted within relatively very narrow confines. It depends upon the activity of the sensory organs and areas, taken of course in cooperation with their associated nervous and cerebral

[1] The technical aspects of the subject have recently become prominent in *Gestalt* psychology.

structures; and the responsive capacity of these, at its widest, must be comparatively small, since it can never extend beyond the material realm.[1] The range of non-sensuous experience—that is of imagination, "intuition" and thought —is on the other hand virtually infinite. For not only do these mental activities reproduce the primary sensuous elements on innumerable occasions transformed into imagery and ideas, but they also overcome the inherent transience of the contents of sense by maintaining the revived and transfigured factors within consciousness for fairly lengthy periods. But far more important than even these results is the fact that abstraction and synthesis, analysis and free constructive imagination, generalizing and classification, incessantly create that illimitable realm of thought and knowledge which is the unique possession of the human mind, as contrasted with the almost completely sensuous level of animal perception, instinct and behaviour. "Even in the most intelligent of birds or mammals," as Huxley observes, "the power of image-formation is very probably absent, and the power of concept-formation certainly so." On the contrary, as he continues, "there is no theoretical obstacle to be seen at present to an increase of human powers in range of comprehension, intensity of feeling, or brilliance of intuition."[2]

The sensuous and the supersensuous forms of man's consciousness are thus at once fundamentally different and yet inseparably connected. The first is the *sine qua non*

[1] This term is taken throughout to include energy, force, the aether and all such non-mental existents in general, simply for the sake of brevity and with no reference to current controversies in physics.

[2] *Essays of a Biologist*, pp. 81, 55: "Man is unique among organisms in his power of speech and conceptual thought"; "a Humanism that is also scientific sees man endowed with infinite powers of control should he care to exercise them." (*What Dare I Think?* pp. 114, 150.) "We must deny personality to animals. They are in the main creatures of impulse." (Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, p. 388.)

of the second, which in its turn discovers, interprets, and evaluates the true character of its own sensuous basis; a principle abundantly emphasized by Bradley in his insistence on the omnipresent function of Feeling within experience, and equally prominent in the earlier philosophies of Hume, Locke and Kant. To the absolutely fundamental importance of this free and virtually inexhaustible ideational capacity of the human mind, inseparable as it is from imagination, I have already repeatedly referred.[1] But it must now be further observed that its freedom, though inherent, is never unrestrained and capricious, since it is always the natural consequence of progressively transcending the narrow limits of all sense-experience, as such. The sphere of operation of the supersensuous thus becomes immeasurably wider; nonetheless its development within its own realm is determined throughout by laws that are fully as necessary as are those of the material world. So far as the phenomena of mind constitute the subject-matter of psychology this should be obvious, since otherwise the investigation could never become scientific. But it is equally true with regard to the advance of thought and of constructive imagination in themselves—that is in the course of their progress and in the nature of their characteristic contents. For the ultimate object of human thought, like that of sense-perception, is the real world; and with the same real world imagination is equally concerned, although its distinctive methods present a contrast with the fixed character of perception that is markedly different from the contrast between perception and thought.[2] The fundamental continuity of consciousness, in fact, springs not only from the singleness of the individual or experient, but at the same moment from the unity

[1] *Ante* pp. 31, 36.

[2] The arguments for this general position may be found in the volumes on Logic by Hegel, Bradley and Bosanquet, together with the Commentaries by McTaggart and Baillie.

of his object. All the various modes of experience deal with the correlative aspects of the one real world. Each of these modes—perception, will, imagination and thought—comes into contact with this world in its own specific way and at a different level, and penetrates its being and nature more or less profoundly according to its peculiar capacity. But all the principles of thought, both its basal postulates and its most firmly established conclusions, are ultimately dictated by the constitution of objective Reality. Thought, in other words, is logical, valid or true to the degree in which it expresses the character of real being; or still more accurately, to the degree in which objective Reality itself manifests its own nature more and more fully in that intricate conceptual system which forms the highest stage of human reason. Actual thinking, of course, is too frequently illogical and its results erroneous; nonetheless it is a radical misapprehension of its essential character to regard error as being an inherent and irremovable feature.[1] Rather the contrary; error pertains, not to reason in itself, but merely to the finitude of the individual thinking mind which, in endeavouring to attain truth, is always handicapped by its own limitations, exactly as the bodily organs, owing to the very conditions of their activity, often yield hallucinations. But the incessant tendency, alike in perception and in thought, is to remove in the one case illusion and in the other falsity; and this can be done only by permitting the real Universe to enter into human experience as fully as possible, so as to reveal itself therein ever more and more adequately in accordance with the relevant modes of consciousness. The persistence of illusion and error, on the other hand, ultimately defeats the essential purpose of perception and thought; their function first becomes

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 59; also the previous note. "Truth is the form which reality assumes when expressed through ideas in particular minds." (Bosanquet, *Implication and Linear Inference*, p. 148.)

defective and finally ceases altogether. In the case of perception, at least, this result is obvious.

2. The freedom of thought, therefore, is far from being absolute; it is "free" simply as contrasted with the much narrower limits of sense-experience; and the same principle holds true of imagination. For imagination, at its highest levels, is also concerned with the real Universe; but while thought maintains its direct frontal attack on the nature of objective Reality, imagination carries out incessant flank operations, hovering like light cavalry in the distance, and advancing or retreating at its own discretion. This connection between imagination and Reality is always most intimate, and is of a dual character. In the first place, all the raw material which imagination weaves into its own unique creations is drawn from the content of sense and idea; and these, as we have just seen, arise ultimately from Reality. In the second place, all the finest products of imagination are interpretations of Reality; and they enrich it still further simply because they are its interpretations. The artist certainly appears, at first sight, to enjoy greater liberty than does the pure thinker; but this is due only to his permitting the intricate nature of the real world to express itself in his work far more completely and more variously than does the logician. Obviously the latter excludes much more, and pays heavily for this exclusion in the aridity of his results. But though the artist retains much that the pure thinker finds irrelevant to his immediate and narrower purpose, still his process of selection is similarly governed throughout by an equally rigid, though much more delicate, "logic" of its own. It is this, indeed, that constitutes the supreme difficulty of all great art. For this arises not as is so often believed from mere caprice—else might anyone be artist—but from the very rare capacity clearly to perceive the profound "logic" of the beautiful

amidst the bewildering wealth of its content.[1] This content, still further, always imperatively demands its proper form, and the artist must rigorously obey the law which determines that form, by controlling its entire development in such a way that it can comprehend and adequately express all its intricate detail, the final result being always some fuller revelation of the true nature of the world. Not only do we then feel more deeply, but we also understand more clearly, even though we may have learnt that complete apprehension is for ever impossible; and thus art, like thought, has brought us closer to the real nature of things, and enabled us better to "understand all in all."

There is then no *fundamental* difference in principle beween thinking and imagination. An intricate mathematical theory is as rich in its detail as any great picture or symphony, while its discovery may be the result of an intuition as sudden as the vision of painter or composer; the experience of the mathematical genius, Hamilton, is perhaps the classical instance. Nor does it wholly lack, for those who can appreciate it, a certain curious beauty of its own. In both cases alike, in short, profoundly contrasted though they are, we find "Reality manifesting its own nature more and more fully" within, and by means of, the individual mind, which thus becomes to some degree the instrument or mouthpiece of the Universe—a truth expressed by the worker's frequent recognition that his finest results are achieved subconsciously or even unconsciously; and the

[1] "Beethoven was the human instrument through which a vast musical design realized itself in all its marvellous logic. The supremely logical musical faculty was functioning all the time." (Newman, *The Unconscious Beethoven*, pp. 120, 148.) Similarly, Wagner "had the sense of a far-sweeping logic of form . . . the very essence of form—the spontaneous shaping of an idea by itself, for itself, into the lines and colours most natural to it." (Newman, *Wagner*, p. 221.)

artist can never create just what he pleases, any more than the logician can think just as he chooses.[1]

The outstanding difference between the great poet and his feebler comrade in arms is familiar: the latter singing because he wants to, the other because he must—the eternal contrast between mere ambition and genuine inspiration. But this has already been said, once for all, by one who felt the experience immediately.

> Ye know why the forms are fair, ye hear how the tale is told;
> It is all triumphant art, but art in obedience to laws,
> Painter and poet are proud in the artist-list enrolled:—
> But here is the finger of God, a flash of the will that can,
> Existent behind all laws, that made them, and, lo, they are!
> And I know not if, save in this, such gift be allowed to man,
> That out of three sounds he frame, not a fourth sound, but a star.

Imaginative creation, in short, is subject throughout to imperative law, which shapes the entire process and result in such a way that the farther the activity is carried the more clearly is its immanent governing principle revealed. That is why all the greatest works of art are unalterable; for they are, as they stand, final and complete expressions of the law which controlled their entire development. It is equally true, of course, that this law is never itself visible; it cannot be read off from the object of aesthetic experience in the same way that a scientific conclusion is grasped as soon as it is studied. The governing and impelling principle, as such, remains ever hidden, so that we see never itself but only some manifestation of its activity. The detached observer, therefore, looking on, as he must do, from the

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 78. N. R. Campbell carries this argument even further: "Nothing could be more absurd than to attempt to distinguish between science and art. Science is the noblest of the arts. Science, like art, seeks to obtain aesthetic satisfaction through the perceptions of the senses." (*Physics, The Elements*, p. 228.)

outside, is at a double disadvantage; for he neither feels the powerful subjective influence that carries the artist onwards nor apprehends the autocratic objective law that incessantly directs his effort; and hence the common superstition that art is the region of mere accident or happy choice.

3. Imagination and thought, then, are both concerned with the one real Universe. Each grasps and interprets this in its own distinctive way, yet each fails to comprehend it completely; for its success is obtained only at severe cost. As we have already seen, thought must begin by the method of rejection; it must first retain only that little which it can at any given moment apprehend, and then rebuild from these partial achievements its fuller intellectual constructions—either special scientific theories or comprehensive philosophical systems. Now all this can be done only in the supersensuous sphere of ideas. Ideas therefore, from the very conditions of their formation, are at first abstract, and thus apparently artificial and unreal, although it must be remembered that it is always possible to trace their interconnections with actual events, and so restore their own type of reality.[1] Aesthetic experience, on the other hand, is primarily sensuous, and is on that account always subject to those limitations which we have already found to characterize this mode of consciousness.[2] Extremely rich in detail, it is restricted in extent; while its fullness of sensuous content can be adequately appreciated only if it is felt as a whole, instead of being dissociated into separate fragments; though here again it is clear that critical reflection may heighten artistic enjoyment, whenever the mind is capable of com-

[1] This is true even of mathematics, since this "takes its rise in some practical need, then develops on its own account, and in so doing becomes a still more powerful aid in control over the forces of the world." (Rice, *Outline of Modern Knowledge*, p. 198.)

[2] *Ante* p. 76.

bining these contrasted modes of consciousness into one complex unity. We must remember that Wordsworth regarded imagination as "reason in her most exalted mood."

Ultimately and on the whole, therefore, the fullest, most extensive, and at the same time most stable and permanent development of experience depends in all cases alike on the attainment of more or less definite ideas (or concepts) that can be progressively systematized into the structure of thought and knowledge; and this is always and essentially true of religion. Its specific character or dominant type, at any given stage, is insensibly but none the less penetratingly determined by the influence of the leading ideas which the individual forms about himself, his world or "universe," and their mutual relations;[1] while every advance to some higher level—which (to repeat) is always a process of *self*-transformation[2]—is ultimately due to the gradual change which these ideas undergo as the entire concrete content of personal and social experience steadily enlarges. If this content itself remains constant, which actually can very rarely happen, there naturally follows a fixity of the type of religion; while war and migration, commercial prosperity or the reverse, with their subtle effects on national life and culture, all entail some qualification of the religious attitude of the individual or social unit.

At this point I may again emphasize my exclusion of "intellectualism."[3] Yet although "a religion that appeals only to the intellect must always be lacking in warmth and living power, a religion that makes intellectual assumptions incurs intellectual obligations, and cannot admit the claim that incoherence and self-contradiction are proofs of the highest truth. Intellectual progress in a religion means

[1] "Ideas," not as yet ideals; but all ideals rest upon ideas; *cf.* p. 95 below. Jung maintains that some of the highest ideas originate within the Unconscious.

[2] *Ante* p. 76.

[3] *Ante* pp. 32, 41.

progress towards harmony and coherence in its assumptions."[1] As regards "the outlook of early man," for example, "his concept of deity must follow his separatist concepts of nature."[2] The general principle involved here is best expressed in Hegel's words: "A philosophy without heart and a faith without intellect are abstractions from the true life of knowledge and faith. The man whom philosophy leaves cold, and the man whom real faith does not illuminate, may be assured that the fault lies in them, not in knowledge and faith. The former is still an alien to philosophy, the latter an alien to faith."[3]

In general, however, the radical changes thus demanded cannot but proceed gradually and with difficulty. For since religion is always the unity of experience in its explicit wholeness, to alter it throughout its entire extent must under any conditions be an arduous matter. For it is never merely a case of incidental modification. There must always be maintained a stable balance of experience as a whole—some degree of harmony between its multitudinous aspects and elements, together with more or less permanent responsiveness to the "universe" in which the life of the person or group is passed, incessantly changing though this ever is. In this connection the profound contrasts between the sensuous and the supersensuous factors of consciousness must again be considered. We have already noticed the incalculably wider range of the latter;[4] but against this there must now be placed an equally significant characteristic—that is its marked lack of vividness, due to the radical elimination of sensuous elements, as compared with the keenness and intensity of the firmly established life of emotion and action. For this second attribute, "marked lack of vividness," most seriously retards the control of conduct and personality by what are, from the psychological stand-

[1] Farnell, *The Attributes of God*, pp. 279, 280.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 121.
[3] *The Logic of Hegel* (Wallace), p. xxvi.
[4] *Ante* p. 78.

point, the most feebly felt of all the constituents of experience, the more especially when these seek to dominate practices long regarded as inviolable, and impregnably maintained by authoritative traditions.

The actual character of this ultimate source of all the progressive changes in religious experience is still further concealed by the psychological nature of the earliest formed concepts themselves. For these arise, to begin with, as mere images that are most intimately connected with current practices and thoroughly saturated with a multitude of associated emotions. At this rudimentary stage, therefore, it is extremely difficult to discern their actual function and character, which only become clearly distinguishable to the degree that the place of this crudely concrete imagery is taken, as experience becomes increasingly differentiated, by more "abstract" and in this sense "purer" ideas. The subsequent development of these into the body of science and general knowledge has already been referred to; it now remains to consider the source of the far-reaching influence of these psychologically feeble factors within that whole of experience which constitutes "religion," and the main tendencies which are thereby given to its entire later development.

VI

EXPERIENCE AS SENSUOUS AND AS SUPERSENSUOUS (2)

1. We have just seen that the earliest stages in the formation of supersensuous ideas are governed by conditions which inevitably make these elements of experience psychologically feeble and unimpressive. For they are at first intimately associated, as imagery, with sensuous elements which are—again from their very nature as sensuous—always most keenly and vividly experienced; and although, in the course of later development, these sensuous attributes steadily disappear and give way to the supersensuous "purity" of the idea proper, still this further change unavoidably carries with it a marked loss of the primal intensity and vividness. How is it, then, that mental factors in themselves so weak should ultimately acquire their invisible but inescapable dominance over the whole of human life?

The explanation of this apparent paradox lies in what is best called the *logical* character of all ideational content, as distinguished from its *psychological* nature. This distinction however must never be regarded as more than a distinction of aspect or function; it implies no separation nor duality. The psychological idea or concept, that is to say, is not one thing and the logical concept quite another; the idea is always one, only it may be regarded from either the logical or the psychological point of view, or—still more adequately—from these two standpoints combined. For psychology deals with ideas, as with all other constituents of consciousness, descriptively; it considers their specific attributes both directly and comparatively. But it is obviously essential to discover not only what sort of a

mental entity an idea *is*, but also what it *does*—what functions it performs within consciousness, its status and activity within the entire structure of experience. These attributes constitute the *logical* aspect of concepts; and the contrast between logic and psychology is clearly parallel to that between physiology and anatomy, although the term logic has here a somewhat wider meaning than is usual.

At the same time, of course, it is precisely the psychological characters of the idea that enable it to carry out its logical activities, just as the anatomical structure of every bodily organ underlies its physiological function. Now from this wider standpoint that very lack of intensity, keenness or vividness, which has repeatedly been referred to, is much more than compensated for by the all-important purposes which this feebleness itself enables ideas to fulfil. "The most lively thought," as Hume affirms with his usual picturesqueness, "is still inferior to the dullest sensation. . . . Our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colours which it employs are faint and dull in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed."[1] But in the first place, this very "faintness" enables an idea to be regarded much more coolly and dispassionately than almost any of the sensuous elements of experience. "A man in a fit of anger" (as Hume continues) "is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion"; while with this possibility of detaching our ideas from ourselves and our own immediate interests, as it were, there are also connected the ease with which ideas may be repeatedly aroused in the mind, and their comparative persistence as contrasted with the inherent

[1] *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, sect. ii. Incidentally, Hume's description of thought as "a faithful mirror" is clearly analogous to my earlier account of the relation between thought and reality, *ante* p. 78. At the same time no "copying" or "correspondence" theory is finally adequate here.

transience of all sensuous factors which, though intense while they exist, generally last for only a short time.

2. Still further, in thus becoming "faint and dull" ideas steadily gain in their definiteness and clearness, just as a map or sketch is simpler, and therefore at first sight easier to grasp, than is a finished landscape. On this particular point, however, Hume's psychology seems to be erroneous. "All ideas," he asserts, "especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and obscure; the mind has but a slender hold of them; they are apt to be confounded with other resembling ideas. . . . On the contrary, all sensations are strong and vivid; nor is it easy to fall into any error or mistake with regard to them."[1] But this can be true only of those types of the human mind that are so low as to approach the animal level. For we do frequently fall into serious confusion as to the actual character of our sensational experience as such, and can avoid this only by a constant, though automatic, criticism of its ever changing content which depends upon our use of ideas which are themselves comparatively clear, definite and persistent, and are capable further of being minutely examined, if only in memory, without that absorption or agitation which (as Hume himself remarks) usually accompanies sensuous experience. For it must here be remembered that the human mind has lost the patent advantages of that unceasing control to which animal life is subjected by instinct. Animal consciousness rises scarcely at all above the level of sense-perception; but its whole course is so rigidly determined by its definite instinctive tendencies that disastrous errors are nevertheless successfully avoided. In human experience, on the other hand, this indispensable regulative function is automatically performed by the innumerable ideational factors which enter into and qualify everyday life, although,

[1] *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, sect. ii, end.

owing to their low intensity as compared with that of sense content proper, their presence and control are discernible only by careful introspection. Their influence may however be more clearly appreciated if we consider how *quasi*-scientific and "intellectual" ordinary civilized life is rapidly becoming, as regards both our interpretation of Nature and our unthinking use of very complicated and delicate mechanisms of all kinds.

The mind of man has thus been released to a marked degree from the benignant but inflexible despotism of instinct, and is endowed in its place with the capacities of free imagination, ideation and thought. As Freud has observed, "we have no other means of controlling our instincts than our intelligence. The human intellect is weak in comparison with human instincts. The voice of the intellect is soft, but it does not rest until it has gained a hearing. Ultimately, after endlessly repeated rebuffs, it succeeds."[1] Concepts are certainly "faint and obscure," as Hume maintained, and are also readily isolated from the rest of experience. But, just because of all this, they can be modified almost without limit, until finally they become clear, definite and stable, much in the same way that the potter's clay acquires its persistent form in some delicate and fragile vase. We discover here then the first vitally important consequence of their "faintness"; but this has a still more momentous result. For it enables ideas to become gradually dissociated, in a sense, from the personality of the individual who forms them. They are "his" rather than "himself"; while his sensuous experiences on the other hand, his sensations and emotions, constitute his most intimate self, although we shall find that this is actually only the lowest stage of true selfhood. But during these earliest stages in the development of individuality, this progressive separation between the self and its ideas confers upon the latter an objectivity that quickly becomes invaluable. For ideas

[1] *The Future of an Illusion*, pp. 83, 93; *cf. ante* p. 36.

finally acquire a status and reality in their own right, which are almost totally independent of the personal experience of the single individual himself; and thus there arise the conceptual spheres of truth and knowledge, science, ethics and law, which the individual finally comes to regard as independently existing beyond the control of his own mind—rather, indeed, as the dominant forces to which his own mind must always submit—legal enactments, scientific principles and moral imperatives.

3. This interrelation is one form of the familiar and perplexing antithesis between "objectivity" and "subjectivity." For the material or "natural" world also is objective as compared with the inner realm of consciousness; while in another sense ideas themselves are subjective, since they actually exist only within the individual mind which "has" them. This contrast, however, turns again on that vital distinction between the psychological and the logical points of view which has already been discussed at the beginning of the present chapter. Psychologically, in short, an idea is undeniably subjective; but it is nonetheless *logically* objective, although this logical objectivity must never be confused with the material or physical objectivity of the perceived external world.[1] Nevertheless it is a kind of objectivity which becomes perfectly familiar to the modern mind at a very early stage—as soon, in fact, as the schoolboy recognizes that the elementary truths of his arithmetic and geometry possess an unimpeachable validity which is quite independent of his own thinking, even though the thinking process must go on in his own mind if he is to comprehend them; and the child's subconscious acceptance of their intellectual necessity rapidly expands into the civilized adult's attitude towards the science and morality of his day

[1] For a fuller discussion of these points I may refer to my *Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation*, pp. 140, 161, 223.

and the law of his country. Intangible, "naturally faint and obscure" (to repeat Hume's words), as these are, and amenable though he feels them to be to criticism or amendment, they still possess an indefeasible reality and exert an irresistible influence of their own which he never dreams of questioning in principle, much as he may desire to modify it in detail. For whatever qualifications he adopts are themselves dependent upon, and would be wholly impossible apart from, the prior existence of the scientific, ethical or constitutional system which he is endeavouring to alter; to this all his modifications are subordinate, and within it they become ultimately absorbed as essential elements. And no matter how abstract or technical science and law may become, still it is perfectly obvious not only that they have the closest possible connection with ordinary life and practice, but that the extent and value of their influence depend on this very technicality and precision. It is always possible, of course, to exaggerate this into useless pedantry. But everyone who is familiar with legal and parliamentary affairs, for example, will recognize the vital importance of exact phraseology. The principle which rules there is wholly identical with that which determines the formulae of mathematics or the terminology of the more practical sciences; and we have in the recent striking developments of the scientific Theory of Relativity, the Quantum Theory and Wave Mechanics, outstanding instances of the intimate relation that always exists, in principle, between the most refined abstractions of pure thought and the content of concrete experience; for the conclusions of these theories have revolutionized our views as to the nature of the entire physical universe.[1]

4. The "abstractness" of ideas, therefore, which is so often adversely criticized, really aims at attaining exacti-

[1] *Cf.* p. 83, *n.* 1.

tude, precision, accuracy; and their formality, disliked and misunderstood though it generally is, is absolutely indispensable if thought is to make any satisfactory progress in its attempt to comprehend the baffling complexity of the world. For it is only during the last few centuries that the actual intricacy of the Universe has been discovered. Our ancestors regarded their world as comparatively simple, and as capable of being grasped and fully explained by means of a few grand but elementary conceptions. It was reserved for the physical sciences, with their extensive reactions upon biology and even economic theory, to destroy this viewpoint once for all and to reveal the true composite nature of Reality, which can be intellectively apprehended only through thought-systems that are equally complex; just as, once again, the social structure of every great nation demands an intricate and highly technical body of law.

It is at once obvious that our sensuous perceptual experience, with all its vividness and intensity, is quite incompetent to undertake this task of adequately understanding our world. For it takes the environment, never as it actually is, but simply as it comes in its original confused intricacy, in exactly the same way that our daily intercourse with our fellows proceeds without explicit reference to its underlying legal aspects. It is then the very abstractness of all ideas—their detachment from ordinary experience and their capacity for being isolated from sensuous consciousness—that enables them to become the raw materials for theoretical speculation, exactly as the rigid procedure and antiquated precedents of a court of law enable involved claims to be equitably adjusted.

The concept or idea, in other words, is thus refined out from our cruder sensuous consciousness as its essence or extract. It represents the elementary constituents of this consciousness; and it is just because it has been thus drawn out and isolated that it is possible for it to become a valu-

able unit in the later work of intellectual reconstruction. For it is obvious that every simple concept, thus regarded as a detached element of consciousness, must be in itself fragmentary and therefore incomplete; it is so, indeed, from the very conditions of its origin. Every idea, therefore, has as it were "ragged edges," due to its having been first of all torn out from the substance of ordinary life; but when further reflection has neatly trimmed these careless outlines, the concept resembles an accurately adjusted cogwheel that can be fitted into its due place in an intricate machine.

5. Ideas then—in more technical language—are from the first and inherently relational. They all have possibilities of connection with other ideas; to these they refer, implying them somewhat as a solitary bone reveals the structure of the entire skeleton to an expert anatomist. An isolated idea, further, is as unnatural as a single bone; as the proper place of the latter is within an organism, so the proper place of an idea is within some body of thought or knowledge or belief. Every idea seeks its correlated ideas as inevitably as a compass needle turns to the Poles. It is indeed this inherent and irresistible tendency of all concepts to constitute an organized intellectual system that gives thought its real impetus. For thinking is never forced and artificial; the circulation of ideas in the mind is just as natural as the circulation of blood in the body; and both processes conduce to incessant growth. The ultimate result is the characteristic "objectivity" of truth previously referred to, which thus springs from its very abstractness; although this objectivity is still further strengthened by all social intercourse, with its opportunities for comparing and correcting individual conceptions, in such a way that finally a common system of knowledge and belief arises and persists as a standard wherewith to test mere personal impressions.[1]

[1] I may refer to Stout's discussion of "Common Sense" in *Mind and Matter*.

Experience as Sensuous and as Supersensuous

Contrasted with this invaluable logical objectivity is the essential subjectivity of very much of our sensuous experience, rich though this is in detail and intimate in its character. Yet to be effective this experience must be largely personal. It can never in itself be shared with our fellows, although it can of course be communicated to them so that each recognizes that all are alike impressed by the same feeling or emotion. But if, still further, human emotions are to be effectively controlled, if they are to be directed towards any high ideals, they can be so regulated only by the influence of ideas. For psychologically, and so far as its origin is concerned, every ideal is also an idea.[1] As such it was first of all detached—"abstracted"—from ordinary experience; and it is only in so far as it is brought back once again into close touch with conduct and purpose that it can be made to serve as an ideal.[2] I have already pointed out that the intensely emotional and passional life of the animal kingdom is undeviatingly directed towards Nature's own ends by an autocratic instinct which the animal obeys unresistingly, unconscious in the main of the purpose which its actions fulfil in the long developmental process. Within human experience, on the contrary (as I have previously observed), this automatic instinctive regulation has been lost, and the serious dangers attending its disappearance are too often totally unrecognized. For effective control of man's passion and desire, emotion and conduct remains as indispensable as ever if racial disaster is to be avoided. But since instinct has been transcended, this necessary regulation can come only from the incessant influence of thought or reason upon the whole of life; and it is when consciousness, thus penetrated and permeated to some degree by thought, expresses itself explicitly in its entirety that religion comes into being in some form or another.

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 84, *n.* 1.

[2] *Cf.* again as to mathematical conceptions, *ante* p. 83, *n.* 1.

But in the light of Freud's contrast between the feebleness of reason and the strength of instinct, referred to in an earlier section,[1] it is clear that thought is one of the latest, and therefore the most delicate and most easily deranged, products of the long evolution of consciousnesss. It may be compared to a weak sapling or seedling, only just holding its own in its strenuous struggle for existence with the ancient and deeply rooted forest giants that represent all the non-rational, or pre-rational, factors of man's complex mind. This psychical aspect of the situation must, again, be connected with the familiar facts of the development of the higher—and similarly much more intricate—centres and functions of the brain. From any such point of view as this, we can readily understand that reason is easily uprooted when contrasted with the almost ineradicable instinctive elements that have enjoyed undisputed control for countless ages. The contest resembles that between a feather-weight boxer and a heavy-weight champion; and the significant fact, however paradoxical it may seem at first sight, is that the light-weight has won. The psychological explanation of this victory is complicated and technical. It must be sufficient to remark that all the features already cited—the flexibility, adaptability and delicacy—that characterize rationality on an ever increasing scale, in comparison with the rigidity of the non-rational elements, contain the secret which explains the final result.

6. It is plainly impossible therefore that the evolution of religion, as such, can have been due in any important degree to the influence of instinct alone. Recent developments in psychology have created this widespread impression, which has however no grounds in the actual facts. If it is maintained that religion arises in response to an "instinctive" need for it, then it is obvious that exactly the same is true

[1] *Ante* p. 90.

of art, morals and knowledge. The principle is thus universal, and may be appealed to in order to account for the rise of all the higher capacities of the mind without exception. But it explains none of the phenomena whatever; it simply means that religion and its allies are inherent in humanity, as I have already argued. Here in fact, as so frequently in current discussion, the term "instinct" is wrongly used; for although such phrases as "instinctive preference" or "instinctive dislike" are quite legitimate in ordinary intercourse, they are nevertheless incorrect scientifically and simply confuse the issue from the outset. From the strictly psychological point of view the main characteristics of instincts proper are five: (1) their hereditary transmission to all members of the group or species; (2) the impossibility of their becoming modified to any radical degree by individual experience; (3) their activity apart from such experience frequently during the earliest stages of existence; (4) their definiteness of function, which might almost be described as automatic, throughout the group which possesses them; and (5) their independence of the higher activities of reason or thought. This last feature is plainly only another form of the predominance of instinct in all animals as compared with its subordination in human consciousness, since its control is there superseded by that of rationality.[1]

It is of course undeniable that even in man's experience instinct wields an extremely powerful influence,[2] particularly during its primitive stages alike in the individual and in the race. But this again must not be taken to mean that the evolution of the human mind, as distinctively human, is due predominantly to instincts. It is, on the contrary, the outcome of the interplay between the non-rational elements and the

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 77.

[2] *Cf.* "Instinct: Natural and Supernatural," *The Personalist*, vol. xiv, p. 5.

rational in such a way that, normally, the former become more and more subordinated to the latter, in the manner which we have already found Freud insisting upon.

Now when we apply these conclusions to the evolution of religion it becomes clear, in the first place, that whatever the actual influence of instinct may be, it must be most powerful in *primitive* religion, simply because at that stage none of the higher mental faculties has become markedly developed. If then we suppose—simply for argument's sake—that instinct (in its strictly scientific sense as already described) accounts for almost all distinctively religious experience, we still have to explain why religion assumes, at so early a stage in mental evolution, such a dominant and outstanding form as it does among primitive peoples. For it would plainly be far more in accord with evolutionary principles that these earliest phases should be feeble and indefinite, and also be in some way anticipated in the animal world; whereas, on the contrary, not only is religion altogether absent in animals, but it is one of the most powerful of all factors in the life of savage communities. But among savages, at the same time, the instincts attain a degree of intensity almost equal to that of animals. Why then does instinct remain, on the animal level, instinct and nothing more, while on the primitive human level, when it is still almost as powerful as before, it manifests itself quite distinctively as religion? The only possible explanation is that the *primary* characteristics of all religions, as apart from the secondary, are due to some mental factor which, whatever else it may be, is certainly non-instinctive.

But since it is impossible to explain even primitive religion in terms of instinct alone, it becomes still more illogical to attribute to the same source its later developments, which on the contrary unmistakably exhibit the influence of a steadily advancing degree of rationality; and

the facts of the entire situation plainly show that the power of instinct, far from being so fundamental as I have just supposed it to be, must from the very nature of the ruling conditions be so slight as to be almost negligible. For every instinct has been seen to possess a definite function which must be fulfilled practically universally, since otherwise the animal or even the species perishes. But as soon as this specific purpose has been achieved, the instinct ceases to operate until the requisite conditions recur; and in this respect it must again be observed that in animals the successive phases of even the most imperious and irresistible instincts remain subject to the despotic control of Nature. Outside its own limited sphere therefore instinct can exert no appreciable direct effects whatever. As Huxley points out, we must "rid ourselves of the notion that there exists a religious instinct in man. There is no such instinct . . . such as the comb-building instinct of a hive-bee or the mating instinct of a peacock."[1] Now so far as instincts are inherited by man from his animal ancestry, they must be transmitted in accordance with the foregoing conditions, while at the same time they steadily diminish in number and importance. Certainly James maintained that "no other mammal shows so large an array" as does humanity.[2] But this statement is, to say the least, highly debatable. Many behaviourists, for example, would agree with Watson in holding that "we are now almost at the point of throwing away the word instinct";[3] and even a competent opponent of behaviourism asserts that "there are no such things as unchangeable instincts in human nature; the notion that instincts are inborn must be abandoned."[4] Similarly McDougall: "I propose to avoid the use of the term instinct in defining the

[1] *What Dare I Think?* p. 199.
[2] *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii, p. 441.
[3] *Behaviourism*, p. 17; *cf.* pp. 94, 110.
[4] Fox, *The Mind and its Body*, p. 4.

constitution of man . . . This does not imply any radical change of view";[1] and perhaps the most acceptable current description of instinctive tendencies in human life is that offered by Drever.[2]

Thus it again becomes obvious that all the *higher* stages of religion must owe their essential features to something quite other than instinct. The development of mind above the animal level, in fact, is primarily the development of rationality.[3] This of course does not mean that reason becomes the sole, nor even the most prominent, aspect of mind, but simply that it becomes more and more the determining factor, even though it may always remain "the power behind the throne." In other words, experience becomes increasingly rational not in any *exclusive* way, for this is never the case even in scientific or philosophic minds; rather it becomes ever more rationalized[4] in a comprehensive sense, so that all its main constituents alike—emotion, art, belief, conduct, religion—while each remaining precisely what it is, come at the same time more and more under the control of an immanent reason which permeates and profoundly modifies them all.

It follows therefore that no matter how powerful instinct may be—and I have conceded the utmost in this respect—it also, like every other mental factor, becomes increasingly amenable to the influence of reason. This is true not only of that process of sublimation which the theory of the Unconscious has made familiar, but equally in the various instincts becoming explicitly recognized for what they are and accorded their proper function within experience as a whole. Supremely difficult though this process of evaluation

[1] *The Energies of Men*, p. 78.

[2] *Instinct in Man*, p. 169.

[3] *Cf.* Elliot Smith's excellent detailed discussion of this subject in his *Evolution of Man*, and contrast the affiliation of Bergsonian "intuition" to instinct.

[4] Not however in the sense of current psychoanalytic theory.

is, still it characterizes the entire advance of civilization without, however, necessitating any complete eradication of instinct. For this is indeed impossible; to attempt to crush natural instincts is to invite disaster. Our aim must be not their destruction but their proper control; and in this respect we must take due account of the response which invariably arises to the teaching of great reformers in spite of their opposition to current belief and practice—a further disproof, if one is still required, of the *quasi*-Bergsonian theory that religion, at any rate in its highest forms, is the direct outcome of instinct.

Approaching the subject from the historical standpoint once again, and without insisting here upon the absolute value and permanence of religion, it is undeniable that this has played a fundamental part in deliberately restraining and modifying the activity of purely natural instincts, even if we admit that this tendency has often been carried too far. Nor has there arisen any equally efficient agency in this respect, whatever the future may have in store. Historically then, religion has assumed to a marked extent the regulative function which is held in the animal world by natural selection; so that to attribute its development to instinct is as logical as to assert that instinct accounts for natural selection.

These general considerations are peculiarly applicable to sex instinct, which has recently acquired exceptional importance in this connection. In the light of all the facts, however, it is probably the most unfortunate instance that could have been selected. There exist no grounds whatever for asserting any direct and specific connection between sex phenomena and the development of religion. All that can be affirmed is a contingent relation between the two—that is the frequently simultaneous manifestation of two groups of phenomena whose close association is due simply to the expansion of the entire personality. They are connected

together in the same way that the increase in the girth of a tree is simultaneous with its budding; neither of these two processes is the cause of the other; and it is equally illogical to find the origin of religion mainly, not to say exclusively, in sex.

The term "sex" is here best employed in its restricted pre-Freudian meaning, since much of its more extended significance has obviously no bearing on the present problem. In this sense then the outstanding characteristic of sex instinct is that (under normal conditions) it finds its own natural satisfaction, and this much more readily in primitive than in civilized societies, in spite of the rigorous regulations of taboo and religion. At these early social stages, therefore, this instinct achieves its specific purpose and becomes temporarily dormant. How then can it in any way constitute the foundation of something so profoundly contrasted with itself as is religion? There is not the slightest reason to suppose that an activity which thus successfully attains its own end can become diverted towards an end that is totally different, so that to regard instinct as an adequate basis for primitive religion is to suppose that it transcends its own nature in an altogether impossible way. But if it is thus incapable of explaining the *origins* of religion, it can obviously have still less influence upon any of its highest forms.

Precisely the same conclusions emerge from the detailed aspects of this situation. The familiar association between religious and sexual development during adolescence is plainly analogous (to repeat) to the budding and thickening of a tree, with the fundamental difference that their combination is far from being so universal as these biological processes are. But whenever they do occur together they are nothing more than the simultaneous but profoundly diverse manifestations of the expanding personality. Their actual independence, still further, is proved by the persistence or

even the advance of religious experience long after sex proclivities have ceased to function. Similarly with regard to chastity. Its high valuation, far from being associated with religion in general, is restricted to a few of its higher types; and this indicates the influence, not of sex upon religion, but of the evolution of rationality in such a way that the regulation of sex assumes its place within that of conduct as a whole. Its suppression becomes paramount only in a small minority of cases—an attitude that is due to its own intensity rather than to any *inherent* connection between sex and religion.

In the same way as with adolescence, the frequent connection between religion and sexual licence indicates nothing more than a widespread excitement of the entire nervous and emotional system, which expresses itself in these markedly diverse ways simultaneously without affording the slightest evidence that the latter determines the nature of the former. This is indeed disproved by many other facts of equal importance. The savage and barbarian rites of purification, the exclusion of women from many of their religious ceremonies, their often extremely strict laws concerning marriage and divorce, can clearly be no more attributed to the operation of sex instinct itself than the motion of the moon can be regarded as the effect of the tides. Nor again, unless we give the word a quite unjustifiably wide meaning, can the many ancient types of worship of the Great Mother be brought within the scope of sex; while exactly the same is true of ancestor worship. It is true that religious ceremonies were frequently associated with sexual licence. But so they were with feasting and music, with sacrifices and self-mutilation; so that there is just as much ground for sex being accepted as foundational as there is for eating. To this it need be added only that many relations between the sexes, as in training children, are not "sexual relations" in the proper sense, while Jung and other eminent

psychologists have severely criticized the whole Freudian standpoint.[1]

So far again as its nature and development are concerned the connection between religion and sublimation or perversion, which is so frequently emphasized, is practically negligible. For in the majority of instances perversion is sheer vice and nothing more, with no more reference to religion than to politics. Even when it is undeniably associated with religious experience, this experience in some form or other preceded the perversion itself and merely provided this with a ready means of expressing itself. The actual fact is that perversion occasionally exhibits a religious aspect, not that all religion has an instinctive basis.

Similarly with regard to sublimation. Repression of sexual instinct frequently results in some marked form of artistic, moral or religious activity. But it is absurd to suggest that either instinct or sex lies at the basis of all art. Must we accept all poets and painters, musicians and sculptors, as the victims of defeated impulses? Yet a theory that would be instantly laughed out of court if applied to aesthetic experience has been widely accepted as one explanation of mystic and religious phenomena. But to attribute these in the main to sublimation is obviously to violate that fundamental canon of scientific logic which forbids generalization from exceptional instances; and the facts show the connection to be even less important than it is in the case of art. It is in short essentially contingent—the natural outcome of the incessant development of mind in many different forms simultaneously, and in no degree causal nor basal; once again we must appeal not to any type of instinct but to reason.

Finally, with respect to the "objectivity of truth" discussed

[1] "Freudian sexuality—an unscientific and logically unjustifiable extension of a concept over an area of facts beyond the applicability of the terminology." (*Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, p. 340.)

in Section 5, it should be obvious that the innate tendency of thought towards unceasing growth and self-completion must in the long run remove the defects due to its original abstractness. For as regards the foundation, or central core, of intellectual experience, the isolated concepts derived from sense-perception, as the raw materials of thinking, weave themselves into an increasingly complex structure which ultimately becomes as rich in its content as are the familiar objects of life, even while this higher content still retains the coldness and peculiar objectivity of logical truth.[1] This inherent movement of thought towards an ever greater fullness presents a dual aspect. In the first place there is the advance to wider truth purely as such—to more precise concepts together with newly acquired knowledge; while as this proceeds it steadily loses its primal abstract character, and seeks to fuse as intimately as possible with the main stream of sensuous experience from which it first arose.[2] For normal consciousness never really loses its fundamental unity; despite its advancing differentiation it remains one and whole, religion then being its explicit manifestation *as* this whole. But it is only necessary to consider first the infinity of detail within modern science, both in its departmental and its inclusive phases, and secondly the incessant transforming influence which science exerts upon our daily life, to recognize both the actual concreteness of the later and higher stages of thought, when thus regarded as a whole, and also its inseparability from the rest of experience, in refining culture and emotion and directing practice towards always nobler ideals. The current fervent objections that scientific research is too often devoted to destructive

[1] This may be readily realized by considering the vast detailed range of modern mathematics, and still more of science as a whole, while the degree of further expansion in these respects is quite inconceivable; and a parallel, though less rapid, advance goes on in law, ethics and philosophy.

[2] *Cf.* again p. 83, *n.* 1.

methods and agencies are altogether beside the point. Without for one moment defending the use of such diabolical contrivances, it is sufficient to point out that the effective protection of society against their successful use itself depends on scientific discovery alone, while few have been more emphatic in their condemnation than have many leading scientists. But what is still more important is the obvious fact that the very protests referred to are themselves the expressions of reason in its finest form, profoundly influencing "culture and emotion" and advocating "always nobler ideals."

VII

MAN'S EXPERIENCE AS PSYCHOLOGICAL AND AS MORAL

1. In principle, then, human experience is characterized throughout by that inherent and unique capacity for an unceasing advance in its development which is due to its release from the dominance of instinct, with its consequent power of individual self-control and self-direction centring in the ideational thought-structures which the intellectual activity of the mind itself creates. Animal instinct, of course, also pursues its own evolutionary path; but this always remains responsive only to the world of Nature, never attaining to that realm of pure (or "abstract") ideas which is the native home of the human spirit; whose "environment" therefore, despite the essential continuity that links it with its animal origin, finally comes to be of a totally different character—spiritual instead of material, although at the same time this supersensuous sphere remains always subject to its own inflexible laws.

The fundamental basis of this further advance, to repeat the substance of earlier chapters, lies in the complex system of ideas which the human mind itself originates and employs. It is extremely important to notice, however, that this conceptual system must never be looked upon as *exclusively* intellectual. It is, on the contrary, always far wider than the content of "thought" or "science" or "logic," in the usual, and unhappily much too narrow, sense of these terms; and these cultures themselves, taken purely as such, are merely one-sided offshoots from the main course of development, despite their rapidly increasing importance in modern life. The ultimate goal of the evolution of consciousness is always a greater wholeness or completeness, a balanced growth of

all the mind's powers and parts, in their due proportions, which is attained individually only by the highest genius, but which is approximated to more and more by the spirit of the race.

It is in accordance with this principle that I have suggested at the commencement of this volume that "man is inherently rational and aesthetic, moral and religious," and further that in the order of logical priority "thought is foundational and religion final."[1] I mean by this (first) that the specifically moral sense—the recognition of the inexpugnable distinction between right and wrong and the consciousness of ethical ideals—is wholly impossible apart from a basis which is formed by ideas; and (secondly and conversely) that every rational being must *necessarily* be also a moral being—must create and apply some moral principles and must act in accord with some dominant moral standards. These assertions quite obviously imply each other. Morality and moral experience are totally impossible apart from a foundation in rationality,[2] while this ultimately necessitates that conduct is in some way or other moral. In other words, the connection between thought or reason on the one hand, and the governing moral principles on the other, is never merely accidental, but always essential and necessary; it is not only *de facto*, but also and still more truly *de jure*. In a certain sense we may look upon the moral consciousness in itself as a further stage in the evolution of mind which follows naturally—and here "naturally" means necessarily—upon the primary advance from animal instinct to human reason. But this position must be qualified by the recognition that this psychical development always takes place as a

[1] *Ante* p. 31, together with intellectualism; also pp. 41, 84.

[2] *Cf.* "Only a rational being has a will." (Watson, *The Philosophy of Kant Explained*, p. 317.) "Will is reasoned impulse." (Wallace, *Prolegomena to Hegel's Logic*, p. 186.) "A judgment of value" (which implies an idea of value) "may be said to be by itself the sufficient cause of a direct act of will." (Johnson, *Logic*, Part 3, chap. 8.)

whole. There does not first occur the laying down of an extensive purely intellectual foundation, and then the construction upon this of a separate moral character. The generation of rational ideas and the formation of a distinctively moral code rather proceed *pari passu*, and in the main quite unreflectively and pragmatically; and thus conduct and thought incessantly react upon each other, every step forward taken by the one necessarily involving a responsive advance by the other, just as both legs act together in walking. We thus perceive once more the indestructible and essential unity of experience. Now when we develop this point of view still further, so as to bring in the insuppressible emotional elements, we finally obtain that explicit entirety which constitutes religion, and are reminded of Arnold's well-known definition of this as being "morality touched by emotion." The terms "moral" and "morality" must however be employed here in their deepest significance, not in the narrow popular sense which restricts them to some connection with the most important sections of the Decalogue; their meaning should rather correspond to that of the more theoretical terms "ethics" and "ethical."[1]

2. It is equally obvious that, regarded from this standpoint, the moral sense itself passes through a long process of increasing differentiation, in precisely the same way that pure thought becomes more and more clearly distinguished from crude imagery. At first the moral sense was the almost completely unreflective and pragmatic outcome of the ruling conditions of primitive society; and from the harsh nature of that environment it acquired a power of control which almost equalled that of earlier animal instinct. Most intimately linked with intense emotions, and to be disregarded only at great risk, the moral code thus became from the first characterized by that inviolable sacredness

[1] *Cf. The Revelation of Deity*, pp. 88, 97.

which, throughout the history of the race, has been at once a curse and a blessing; sometimes the firm bulwark against licence, and again the most serious obstacle in the path of reform; a menace and a safeguard at one and the same time.

It is a commonplace that at this early stage morality, law, thought and religion, all welded together by the fires of emotion, are barely distinguishable from each other. "Many untutored savages would no more break an apparently irrational tribal taboo than would any of my readers commit a cold-blooded murder," observes Huxley; and "though custom is their only king, they are as loyal to it as if it had the executioner at its elbow. Relentless taboos claim his life in forfeit if, however involuntarily, he violates the letter of their prescriptions. To break a taboo is to contract an infectious disease—a leprosy; and the leper must be banned as a danger to the herd."[1] Psychologically these facts are significant because they plainly exhibit the perennial entirety of all concrete experience from the beginning, as it actually exists and quite apart from theoretical abstraction and analysis. Here this inherent wholeness is of the simplest and lowest order precisely because all its various elements lack their specific characteristics. Human life, however, has always been an exceptionally powerful factor in its reactive influence upon its own environment, incessantly modifying this so as to render it increasingly favourable, and thus enabling cool reflection more and more freely to operate upon the entire area of experience until thought, finally released from the tense grip of emotion and the heavy fetters of imagery, began to elaborate its independent speculative criticism of all current practices and accepted beliefs.

But our own familiarity with this fully developed distinctiveness of the main elements of experience must not blind us to the truth that human conduct has from the outset

[1] *What Dare I Think?* p. 209; Marett, *Faith, Hope and Charity in Primitive Religion*, pp. 52, 58, 119; *cf. Psychology and the Sciences*, p. 39.

been governed by factors which are, psychologically, ideas. Certainly these were at first crude, imaginative, pragmatic, traditional, authoritative; yet nonetheless ideas. Memories of past pains and pleasures, expectations of future happiness, simple plans for gaining simple ends—these were the "concepts" of the childhood of the race; not as yet the cold products of impassive reflection, but still hot from the flame of passions scarcely less violent than those of animals. And here another fundamentally important characteristic of ideas must be taken into account—that is their essential capacity for becoming organized into systems[1] and thus related to one another more and more definitely and permanently, so as finally to become persistent factors in all experience; although this does not mean that they ever become absolutely rigid and unalterable. Rather always the contrary; for an equally essential attribute of all imagery and concepts is that high degree of plasticity which, as we have seen already, distinguishes it from the natural rigidity of instinct.

3. From the purely psychological standpoint, then, the features of importance which must be noticed here are (first) the slow growth of the simplest ideas in the mind of primitive man, and (secondly) the self-organization of these into increasingly complex intellective systems, which then persist more or less unchanged throughout individual and racial experience. Thus factors naturally arise which are (*a*) ideational in character and (*b*) persistent in function. This bare leading principle is of course subject to many obvious qualifications. The primary thought systems are crude and simple, and their unchangeableness is never absolute but merely relative to the incessant flux of feeling and sensation; further, the individual himself, at this stage, can scarcely distinguish them either from the vivid emotions

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 94.

with which they are saturated, or from his practical activities which they unreflectively control. The entire mental development, in short, is thus far as natural and automatic as is the growth of the body; the one is no more "moral" than is the other. But nonetheless it forms the indispensable basis for the fully developed and truly moral constitution of human nature; and our next problem thus becomes that of the distinction between, or the transition from, these strictly *psychological* aspects of experience to its specifically *moral* form.

Once again it must be noted that we are here concerned with *different aspects* of one and the same body of phenomena, never with two separate groups that are merely contingently associated. The situation is therefore obviously parallel to that already discussed in connection with the relations between psychology and logic;[1] and this once more implies an essential unbroken continuity. In other words (to repeat), reason or thought is not one thing and morality quite another; but moral conduct, in the first place, is action that is directed and controlled by ideas.[2] If it is objected that these determinant factors must be *ideals*, or even specifically *moral* ideas, this does not alter the primary fact that they are ideas. It simply indicates that our theory requires still further elaboration; and just as the earliest forms of human (or semi-human) intellective experience were of the most rudimentary character, so this primitive experience was not at first "moral" in any fully developed sense, but was rather, as moral, equally rudimentary. It was wholly impossible, at such a low level, that either the agent or his conduct should be "moral," if we give this term its typical modern significance. Nevertheless

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 87.

[2] *Cf. ante* pp. 84, 95, 108. "A standard of values demands conceptual thought. Even the highest animals have only the barest rudiment of such possibilities." (Huxley, *What Dare I Think?* p. 151.)

it was only insofar as man's activities came to be effectively determined by concepts, crude though these were, instead of by instinct, that he developed into a moral being; exactly as he became a rational being to the degree that his perceptual experience expanded into systems of interpretative ideas, instead of reposing on the earlier merely instinctive basis of animal consciousness.

This controlling function of rational ideas is best compared to that of the automatic steering gear of a great liner, provided we remember that this delicate and complex mechanism originated from the simplest of rudders. Comparatively very feeble as contrasted with the boat's mighty driving engines, and rarely visible to the traveller, modern steering and stabilizing appliances offer the closest parallel to the silent and scarcely realized influence of reason, psychologically feeble though it is, upon the powerful enginery of passions and emotions. Needless to add that the captain who scraps his steering gear invites disaster; and the more technical aspects of the situation, regarded from the evolutionary viewpoint, have been already dealt with.[1]

In the complete evolution of human experience, then, its characteristic ideational content finally comes to fulfil a double function. In the first place, it so interprets and incessantly amplifies sense-perception as to construct the vast theoretical systems of modern science and knowledge in general. But this in itself, as I have already pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, is only one side of the whole development. For in the second place, this same ideal content becomes also and increasingly directive of action; herein lies the essence of the distinctively moral aspects of human nature. For all the successive stages in the agelong and arduous evolution of morality depend firstly on the continuous development of the directive concepts purely

[1] *Ante* pp. 90, 96.

as such; and secondly on the maintenance throughout this development of the closest possible connection between these ideas and action. Once again this general principle suggests many further qualifications of itself. At some point, in the first place, the elaboration of ideas will itself have become so intricate as to necessitate a body of purely ethical theory that is *formally* quite distinct from practice, and carries with it always the dangerous possibility of their almost absolute separation. Their union, on the other hand, may become either predominantly intellectual or predominantly emotional; the regulation of conduct by ideas may then be either deliberate and systematic,[1] or unreflectively habitual; while any consideration of the endless more detailed variations would go far beyond that analysis of fundamental points to which I propose here to restrict my treatment. I need only remark further that what I have said about ideas and conduct is equally true of ideas and art. Aesthetic ideals, in this particular respect, rank parallel to moral ideals; for art is simply one unique form of practice, and its separation from daily life in all its aspects, as this becomes more and more refined, is rapidly disappearing. The artistic "conscience," again, is frequently quite as drastic and imperative in its demands as is the moral; and thus the whole of experience is traversed by inter-connecting strands which may remain implicit though nonetheless real, or may manifest themselves explicitly in some form of religion.

4. We advance then beyond the purely psychological aspects of these directive factors in human experience when we consider no longer their strictly ideational character, but the nature of their inseverable connection with action.

[1] It is instructive to note that this occurs both in distinctively "religious" systems, such as the Puritan and Jesuit, and in "non-religious" ethical systems. I have already insisted on the falsity of this distinction in itself in Chapter III.

As to the actual ground of this intimate relationship, in the first place, there is no difficulty, for it arises quite naturally from the very conditions of the situation. Obviously the earliest formed ideas must be those of the practical means to the practical ends of life; for only through these, once the control of instinct has disappeared, can any important or long-deferred purposes be fulfilled. The unity of ideas and action is thus neither artificial nor incomprehensible, but always inherent; and it is only at some later stage that the primary conceptual content becomes still further complicated by additional ideas of possible or alternative actions, which are then rejected or adopted at will.

But this higher development at once introduces new and crucial factors into the situation. For the alternative possible courses of action, occasionally many in number, thus presented simultaneously[1] to the consciousness of the individual as (it may be) widely contrasted ideas, plainly necessitate selection on his part. He is now compelled to compare and deliberate, and thus to postpone action while he ponders all its ideal possibilities; until finally he chooses some one course, out of all those thus pictured by his mind, which seems to him, under all the circumstances, the most desirable or favourable; and the profound contrast between this type of behaviour and that which is merely the outcome of unvarying and mechanical habit or instinct is patent.

For we are dealing now with volition—with freely willed or voluntary action; and it is clear from what precedes that this, like morality, is indissolubly, associated with the presence of ideas. That is why morality is essentially a matter of will—of the good or bad will; or, conversely, why voluntary activity is always—in principle, and provided that it is not merely trivial—moral; for morality and will both alike

[1] Or practically simultaneously. If it is insisted that they are cognized in succession, this does not affect the practical issue here.

and equally rest upon a foundation of rationality, apart from which neither could possibly exist.

The usual popular conception of the will as being a quite separate faculty or organ of personality is thus seriously inadequate. It is undeniable that willing is a distinct phase of human experience; but this does not mean that at some given moment an independent entity—"the will"—suddenly appears upon the scene and decides the issue or determines the action. This may be called the "keystone theory" of the will; for it is, as it were, brought into action only at the final stage, just as the keystone of an arch is produced and fitted into its place in order to complete the structure after all the preliminary labour has reached its climax; and this view found support in the now discredited "faculty psychology" of last century, with its apparently sharp disjunction of the wholeness of experience into the separate "faculties" of feeling, knowing and willing. Volition, on the contrary, is essentially continuous with consciousness as a whole, and is further, as I have just argued, inseparably connected with reason. It is, indeed, perhaps best defined as reason expressing or manifesting itself in action—as active rationality[1]—if by "action" we mean the practical engagements of our daily life; this is however really too narrow a meaning, for thought itself is always intensely active. But whenever, out of a number of concepts of possible courses of conduct that have been reflectively compared together, one becomes finally selected as the determinant of action, then the intimate relation between reason and practical activity becomes obvious. Now it is just this relation that constitutes willing or volition. The idea thus chosen at once becomes, to use my earlier illustration, the "steering gear" of some bodily activity, and in this way actualizes itself; and here it is important to notice further that the more accurately conduct conforms

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 108, *n.*; "will is reasoned impulse."

to its governing scheme of ideas—provided of course that this itself has been adequately thought out—so much the more successfully is the will realized. A "powerful will" therefore always implies an able intellect of some type or other; everyone who has achieved his purpose in life—apart of course from happy accidents—owes his success to his clear and vivid conceptions of both the ends of his action and the necessary means thereto. Without these desire, no matter how strong, and mere determination, no matter how stubborn, are of little value; for the indispensable directing and stabilizing guidance of reason has been lost, and the force of emotion then expends itself uselessly in that sheer obstinacy which is, unfortunately, generally described as a "strong will."

5. It follows still further from this that the will must be essentially and inherently free. For the very conditions of its entire development make it impossible that it should be anything other than free; the term "free-will," indeed, is a mere redundancy, like "four-angled square" or "three-sided triangle." A genuinely willed act—the actual carrying out or realization of the will—always follows upon and is determined by some idea, which has itself been selected by the individual out of a group of ideas of different possible courses of action; and this process of selection depends on comparison and reflection, prolonged or not as the case may be. The final choice then occurs in one of two ways, according as it is due mainly to the subjective, emotional or temperamental elements in the agent's own personality, or mainly to the objective, logical form and relations of the conflicting ideas. Either consciously, subconsciously, or it may even be altogether unconsciously, these two contrasted factors—subjective and objective, emotional and logical—almost always operate simultaneously, so that the final outcome is the resultant of their joint action. In both cases alike, however,

the agent is genuinely free in the sense—the only true sense of the word "free"—that his action is finally determined by himself.[1] For to say that his act is due to his own temperament, or bias or prejudice, is plainly to say that it arises from his own character, which really means from his own self as this is constituted at the given moment; although it is equally undeniable that every act of itself alters that constitution, so as to produce a changed—and occasionally a profoundly changed—individuality, which is however, provided abnormality is precluded, equally free so far as its future acts are concerned. Even if we add that the individual ought not to yield to his temperament, this simply means that he ought to be a different kind of man, and this in the sense that he ought to offset his temperament by his reason. This may be true; but it does not alter the fundamental fact that his action, such as it is, is in the end determined by himself—is *self*-determined and therefore free.[2]

It may however be argued on the other hand, that if, escaping from the sway of prejudice, or habit or bias, he yields instead to the purely logical force of the finally accepted idea,[3] still he is once again compelled to act by an influence that is outside or beyond himself, so that he

[1] I may again refer to *The Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation*, p. 119, and to *Philosophy*, vol. v, p. 545: "Causal Determination." It should also be observed that the scientific Principle of Uncertainty does not invalidate this argument, as is too frequently supposed. To say the least, "the laws of probability provide something which is equivalent to a strict causal determinism." (Jeans, *Nature*, vol. 128, p. 701.) But I believe we may go still further than this with regard to Causation. "We may hope in the near future to be enabled to make a causal description of physics in space and time." (Gaviola, *Nature*, vol. 123, p. 604; *cf.* the fuller discussion of this question, pp. 224 ff. below.)

[2] It is instructive here to recall the widespread adoption of "self-determination" as equivalent to national freedom during the Great War.

[3] Such a case can be theoretical only, because, as has just been observed, emotional factors always exert some influence however slight.

cannot in such a case be truly free. He is now simply the helpless victim of a *logical determinism* which is really as inflexible as any mechanical determinism; only it is more subtle and therefore much more difficult to detect. This objection seems at first sight extremely forcible, and is indeed, in my opinion, the weightiest that has been advanced by the deterministic opponents of personal freedom. For its statement of the facts of the situation is absolutely correct; action, under these circumstances, is undoubtedly determined by the superior rationality of the idea which ultimately directs it. But we must now ask still further—By whom is this superior rationality itself ascertained and determined? Who is the sole and final judge? And the only answer is that it is the individual himself who decides which, out of all the proffered alternatives present to his consciousness, appears to himself to be the most logical and reasonable, a task that is often extremely difficult. This fundamental principle is altogether unaffected by the fact that his own judgment may actually be erroneous, or may have been influenced by persuasion and advice. For it still remains true that he, and he alone, *finally* settles between the claims to logicality of all the rival concepts, and so permits only one of these to realize itself by moulding his action. Once again, therefore, his act is ultimately determined by himself; it is, in short, *self*-determined or free.

Thus volition, morality and freedom all alike find their common basis in rationality; but there remain still further elements of the fully developed moral situation whose consideration will occupy the succeeding chapter.

VIII

FURTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF MORAL EXPERIENCE

1. THE unceasing and drastic regulation of the impulses and desires of animals by instinct plainly implies that these always require some form of control, without which they must inevitably be harmful. As the "steering gear" of Nature, instinct thus ensures that the satisfaction of all desires is in the main beneficial; and we have already observed that even the strongest of these have their seasonal phases. Animal behaviour is in this way determined *externally* as it were, by a power which, while it certainly operates within the animal consciousness, does so as an agency of Nature rather than of the individual organism itself; and the result is closely parallel to the regulation of a highly complex mechanical system by purely physical forces—of the intricate planetary motion of the earth, *e.g.*, or of the solar system as a whole. We have seen that in human experience, on the other hand, these regulative functions of instinct have been replaced by those of reason, thought, ideation; and this at once involves, as I have just endeavoured to show, the progressive self-determination—and therefore the increasingly free determination—of conduct by the individual himself. It is true that in so doing he remains always subject to the "laws of thought" or principles of reason, even though he repeatedly violates these either through ignorance or deliberately; for whenever he does so he pays in the end a heavy penalty. But both the final selection of what seems to him to be the most reasonable course of action, and the practical realization of this conceptual scheme,[1] are issues

[1] It does not affect the principle involved here if this also appeals to him emotionally as pleasant or satisfactory; this is simply one argu-

that must always be determined by himself alone; once again therefore his choice and conduct are essentially free. Finally, the term "conceptual" is always a matter of degree; but if we consider a physician treating an obscure disease scientifically, or a statesman preparing an intricate economic policy, the extent to which "pure concepts" must be systematically employed becomes patent.

Behaviour, still further, must be adaptive from the very beginning to an environment which is rapidly becoming more and more complicated; and this again imperatively necessitates the continuous development of adequately complex ideational schemes, which are then retained as the more or less persistent governing factors of activity, either as deliberate or as habitual. But this mental evolution is inevitably slow, and would indeed be due at first very largely to primitive man's recollection of the painful consequences of failure to adapt himself to his environment; while we have previously found that, from the purely psychological standpoint, the intensity of ideas themselves is very feeble—"faint and dull"—as compared with the strength of the emotions that are now being gradually released from the automatic sway of instinct. Conflict between these powerful but unregulated passions and the steadily developing rational capacity was therefore inevitable; and man became a distinctively *moral* being, or "emerged" with a specifically moral nature or constitution, in the first place to the degree that his behaviour became deliberately[1] controlled by conceptual schemes of action which were rationally elaborated and volitionally actualized.

ment for—or against—its adoption. Of course his own efforts may be hindered or defeated by external opposing factors; nevertheless his efforts still remain free, even though they fail to realize their proper object; his freedom, in other words, is limited but not destroyed—a fact much too often ignored.

[1] That is, again, freely; the subsequent transition from deliberation to unreflective habit makes no difference to the principle.

2. We have here once again a perfectly general principle that requires, like its predecessors, countless more detailed qualifications. In the first place, the rationality involved was originally of so low an order that it would hardly be regarded as such by the developed reason of civilized man; yet it is manifested equally during the early years of every child; and it is nonetheless genuinely rational for being rudimentary. Nor, again, does this growing dominance of reason imply the inevitable exclusion of the emotional factors, as such; it simply means their due incorporation, as invaluable and necessary elements, within the developing ideal scheme itself.[1] This again always obeys its own inherent tendency towards more complete systematization—towards the subordination of some of its constituent ideas to others that are recognized as of supreme importance—relatively, of course, to the circumstances of each actual case; while it also retains that characteristic plasticity of all conception which enables it to become readily and adequately responsive to the constantly changing environment.[2] Finally, just as the earliest forms of rationality were extremely primitive, so the earliest degree of freedom was very low.[3] The conduct of every individual was in the main dictated by tribal tradition and religion;[4] and yet even these rigidly fixed customs must obviously first of all have originated in deliberate selection on the part of some savage "medicine man," barbarian priest or prophet, with a touch of genius, while their modification always demanded a certain degree of individual critical ability.

But apart from anthropological and historical details, and from the point of view of strictly ethical theory, a still more important consideration arises here. This is the apparent absence, as yet, of any characteristics in the entire

[1] But obviously in an ideal or imaginative form.
[2] *Cf. ante* p. 177.
[3] Again the analogy in childhood is patent.
[4] *Cf. ante* p. 110.

situation that can be accepted as genuinely and specifically *moral*. Our only definite principle, so far, is the increasingly deliberate regulation of behaviour by some conceptual scheme or other; and although such a scheme would originally be almost completely determined by accepted customs which were themselves regarded as morally good, still this is not sufficient to establish the validity of any theoretic ethical principle, as such. On the contrary, it appears to imply that the moral character is really the outcome of the entire set of conditions, and pertains to action only in so far as action is one factor in this whole situation. The "genuinely and specifically moral" nature of the act, in other words, lies not in its mere deliberate accordance with any ideational plan *as* ideational, but rather in its conformity to a principle which is in itself good quite apart from its conceptual character. Thus something more is necessary—whatever that "something" may be—than the volitional activity which carries out and realizes some selected idea.

3. Now this contention, in the end, is undoubtedly true. But it nevertheless applies only to an advanced stage of moral development; and our own familiarity with such a high level must not be allowed to betray us into the fallacy of expecting to find all its characteristics patently manifested at its first origins. Here, as always, there must exist unimpaired continuity; and this implies that morality, like reason, is to begin with rudimentary, and only gradually therefore to become definitely distinguished from its precedent non-moral conditions. The essential "emergent" transition—to recapitulate—is from purely instinctive behaviour to specifically moral conduct; and this can only occur by means of the gradual evolution of ideation. The first beginnings of morality, therefore, are to be found in the primitive relations between reason and action, here con-

sidered apart from the specific details of the controlling conceptual scheme; although at the same time it necessarily follows that as this scheme grows in complexity—as it becomes at once more intricate and more definite, so as to form a higher type of ideational system—the situation, taken as a whole, must gradually acquire a fresh character. For both the individual and the social group are in this way brought into contact with an environment of an ever wider range and higher grade; and thus the moral constitution of humanity, which remains essentially reactive at every stage alike, continuously acquires new and often quite unprecedented characteristics, until it finally attains the advanced level of present-day civilization.

This becomes equally clear if we admit, for argument's sake, that morality really consists in something further than the mere conformity between action and idea—if, that is, the governing idea must also be itself a *moral* ideal. As I have already observed, this is undeniably true of the later stages of moral evolution. But nonetheless must this "moral ideal" itself arise first of all as an idea among an extensive group of rival ideas; and it is precisely its final selection to be the sole, and therefore exclusive, guide of action that converts it into an "ideal." In short, our analysis of an extremely complicated situation must here be carried to those very earliest stages which not only preceded the appearance of religion or custom or tradition but, still further, formed the very basis of all these; so that even if it be these latter that confer upon acts and motives their truly moral status, still they themselves originate from ideas as such. It is, therefore, only in the primitive connections established between rudimentary ideas and activity that we can discern the first germs of morality.

4. Another important feature must now be noted. I have already referred to the ever present difficulty attending

the regulation of keenly felt passions by feebly experienced ideas. But it is equally true that this ideational control always involves inward struggle and effort even if the dominant ends are those of mere pleasure and self-gratification; much more therefore when they become altruistic. For even the former plainly necessitate some degree of systematic subordination—the choice of stable pleasures rather than transient, the pursuit of future permanent advantages to the exclusion of immediate but minor benefits; so that once again the conflict inevitably arises between vivid presentative emotional demands and faint representative rational considerations; and it is in this battle that the "genuinely and specifically moral" individual wins his spurs. For he himself is now called upon to decide those crucial practical issues which in the case of animals are automatically settled in advance by kindly Nature; and it is here that we must find one further essential principle of morality at every stage of its development—not only, that is to say, in the character of the ideals which appeal to us, important though this always is, but also in the response which we ourselves make to these, and in the personal character that is in this way slowly created. This "character" or individuality—this complex amalgam of tastes, habits and similar factors—then becomes, as the determinist insists, the ultimate controlling agency of future action. But again it must be remembered that this agency has always itself to some degree chosen its dominating concepts, and that it does this more and more as its development proceeds. Its modification, in short, is essentially a *self*-modification that steadily increases as time goes on; and this, as I have already argued, is the basis of its freedom.

We begin, then, with a personality that is distinctively rational, simply because the mind's content has become ideational, no matter (to start with) to how slight a degree;

and this forms the basis of a still fuller evolution which once again presents a dual character—that of the *moral ideal* on the one hand, and of the *moral self* on the other. The self is moral, in the first place, because it is free; in other terms, to the extent that its responses to its self-selected ideals are self-determined; and in the second place, because these regulative ideals themselves are felt to be good, noble, true. For this, in practice, is the usual meaning of "ideal"; but it must now be noticed that this is a matter of practice and not of any logical necessity, since deliberate evil equally demands its own specific type of ideals, which, regarded from the purely intellectual standpoint, often attain a high level, as in the case of skilful fraud or unscrupulous diplomacy. There arises at this stage therefore a double problem —first that of the advance from the mere ideal to the *moral* ideal, or from the psychological idea, as idea, to the "good" as the end of conduct; and further, of the parallel transformation of the rational into the moral self; and I may repeat that these questions must here be considered in their earliest phases. For we moderns live in what may be called a moral world or moral atmosphere; we are trained from the outset, that is, to accept certain standards that are already regarded as good; and to a certain extent therefore the moral personality is now moulded artificially from without rather than self-created from within. But obviously there must once have been a stage prior to all this—a long past time when ideas were not only selected for realization but were also distinguished as "morally good," whatever that may have meant; we cannot, in other words, ascribe this dawning or "emerging" moral consciousness to any prior tradition, superstition, or religion, since these were themselves the final outcome of that very consciousness.

5. It is true to say, of course, that every selected idea always was so selected because it appeared to be in one way

or another "good." But this simply raises anew the problem of the protean changes in the meaning of this difficult term; and the fundamental cause of this progressive transformation of its significance is to be found in the uninterrupted expansion of the conceptual content of the mind. I have already emphasized the inherent capacity of this content for self-systematization on an ever widening scale, and stressed its eternally "ragged edges" and the consequent necessity to round these off, as it were, so as to attain a complete finality which lies, however, always beyond our grasp.[1] This is its specifically psychological aspect; but the equally fundamental principle of the continuity of consciousness must now be recognized. For this continuity of all experience compels us to relate the purely ideational content to the emotional side of experience. From the very first experience "feels" pleasant or unpleasant, "feels" satisfactory or the reverse, "feels" "good" or "bad," that is, in the most primitive sense of these terms;[2] and if we remember that this essential connection persists throughout the entire course of later experience, it becomes obvious that the character of "the good" must of necessity change *pari passu* with the unceasing evolution of the ideational determinants of action. The individual, the tribe, the nation, the race, each alike is thus brought into contact with an ever widening and increasingly complex environment. His "world" or "universe" incessantly changes; his purposes and values therefore, which are always responsively adaptive to this "world," must themselves change correspondingly; and it is this incessant advance that constitutes, at bottom, the source of the variations in the significance of "the good." The term must be interpreted always in the light of the wholeness of consciousness as at once inseparably conceptual, emotional and volitional.

[1] *Ante* pp. 94, 95.

[2] Bradley's treatment of feeling will be at once recalled.

6. Now this introduction of the emotional elements may seem at first sight to imply the conversion of the ethical ideal into a matter of mere subjectivity. It is what, in some way or other, *appears* to be good; the final judgment therefore arises from the consciousness of the individual or group concerned; and in this way all genuine objectivity seems to have been sacrificed. Such an interpretation, however, altogether misrepresents the actual relation between subjectivity and objectivity. For these categories are never mutually exclusive, but rather always supplementary. Each really involves the other and is itself quite impossible without it; for no matter how subjective and personal our experience may be, it is always nevertheless responsive ultimately to something truly objective. The essential objectivity of concepts has already been sufficiently emphasized in discussing the distinction between their psychological and logical aspects;[1] here it need only be added that the more developed the ideal construction becomes the higher is the degree of its objectivity. For this very development itself constitutes the mind's profounder grasp of its "universe"; or, perhaps even more truly, it is the progressive self-manifestation of the Universe to or within the human mind. Psychologically, it is true, ideas themselves are always subjective; they obviously must be so if they are to become elements in a mind at all; and this inescapable subjectivity is a perennial source of serious error and illusion. These defects, however, steadily diminish as the ideal scheme continues to develop itself normally, so that its progressive attainment of fuller truth and stabler self-consistency inevitably brings with it that dominant objectivity to which the subjective emotional experience is always a response. Patently true as this principle is in science and law, it is equally applicable to the conceptual moral code, with the proviso however that this, when taken in its due entirety,

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 91.

is still more complex. That is why ethical theory persistently lags behind scientific or even legal, and why there still remain deep conflicts of moral opinion between person and person, between race and race. The really crucial difficulty is that logical objectivity is here very far from having been attained; and in its absence the appeal can be made only to those keenly felt emotions which these issues must always arouse simply because they so vitally concern the welfare of mankind, while "vitally" must too often mean egocentrically.

Within experience therefore objectivity and subjectivity are from their very nature always inseparable. The problem of their relation is thus always one of emphasis; but the predominance of objectivity does not signify that the subjective response is wholly passive. It is, on the contrary, the activity of an essentially free individuality—the self-determined outcome of deliberate reflection. This represents, of course, an ideal that in finite human nature is never attained. Our emotions are still much too powerful for our conduct always to conform absolutely to our idea of any objective good of a high order; but this does not impair the validity of the principle. It is not my intention, however, to discuss this question in detail. The problem of "the good" is ultimately a problem of Value, and the relation of both categories to objectivity is the same. I may here therefore merely refer to my consideration of the basis of the objectivity of Value in my previous volume on *Moral Obligation*, and pass, in the next chapter, to the nature of the moral self.

IX

THE SELF AS A MORAL BEING

1. THE development of the moral ideal, then, is paralleled by the evolution of the moral self. But the term "moral self" is really almost as redundant as "conscious self"; for the contention that "man is inherently rational and moral"[1] at once implies that the self or personality is, as such, a moral entity, exactly as, for Aristotle, it was a social entity; and this will become more obvious as we proceed.

For psychology, therefore, the self is essentially a system—a psychical system, or system of psychical existents, whatever more than this it may be as considered from some different standpoint; "on the subjective side it consists in psychical powers and dispositions which are highly complex."[2] Thus regarded, even animals might be called "selves"; nevertheless the usual restriction of this term to human personality is thoroughly justified so long as the continuity between human and animal experience is sufficiently recognized.[3] This view of selfhood, further, means that it is a complex *structure*, and therefore not an absolutely simple—in the sense of structureless—entity, existing as some sort of core or nucleus within or behind the experiential reality. It is possible indeed that the familiar classical philosophic arguments for the immortality of the soul which were based upon its "simplicity" meant, not that the soul possessed no elements or parts, but merely that its constituents could not exist except as within the total structure—that apart from this they could possess no independent real being; it is, in other words, impossible

[1] *Ante* p. 31.

[2] Kemp Smith, *Idealist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 153; *cf.* Bosanquet's "Complex of Psychical Matter," p. 137.

[3] *Cf. ante* p. 136.

to conceive of a completely isolated emotion or volition, or even of the "psychic factors" recently suggested by Broad.[1]

But to say that the self is a system is not to claim for it any unique character in the Universe. For every real, without exception, is a system of some sort or other; the physical universe, so far as it has yet been investigated, exhibits everywhere a thoroughgoing systematic nature from proton to star. The true uniqueness of selfhood, therefore, lies not in its being systematic, but rather in the *specific kind* of system that it constitutes.[2] But before considering this in detail it may be noted that the concept of system is the only concept that reconciles Hume's well-known account of the self with the deeper view of its permanence. Hume emphasized the transience of all the contents of experience —a fact that is, of course, patent to introspection; and if that were all that could be said of selfhood his sceptical conclusion would logically follow. But this insistence on the undeniable change in all the elements of experience must be balanced by the still more significant truth that, so long as these elements persist, they constitute a definite system; and, here as always, the system is much more important than its separate constituents. It is dominant, while they are all subordinate; for as so many psychologists have insisted recently, it is the system, acting in its entirety, that determines both the internal relations of the factors among themselves and their external relations to the environment —that is their entry into, and their departure from, their containing whole. Every living organism is an obvious instance of this principle if we consider the constant intake and output of matter and energy, although the process goes on, of course, in intimate relations with the environment; while still more definite cases of the same type of control

[1] *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, p. 535.

[2] On this point *cf.* pp. 133, 138, below; and on the universality of system, *Personality and Reality*, chap. i.

are those of the loss and regain of electrons by atoms, and the regulation of immigration by the United States Government. Not only in consciousness therefore, but universally, the specific constituents of a system incessantly change; and so far Hume's argument is irrefutable. Nonetheless does the system in itself—apart that is from its own characteristic development—remain what it is—the atom, the river, the nation and, equally, personality. Once again the matter is wholly one of emphasis; and while psychological analysis must certainly consider the fleeting elements of conscious experience *as* elements, this procedure alone is quite inadequate to explain the true nature of the self. It must therefore be supplemented by a synthetic standpoint, which is equally scientific and more truly philosophical; and whatever may be thought of Kant's theory of human experience, it is undoubtedly true insofar as it attempts to outline that systematic—and in that sense persistent—character of selfhood which had been ignored by Hume.

2. It is impossible here to do full justice to this old problem of the Many and the One. But it is only by regarding the One as a complex system—as interconnected and structural throughout its whole being—that we can appreciate the truth of Shelley's line:

> The One remains, the many change and pass.

The One, in other words, is never a mere unit but always a unity; it is not one element among a host of others, but the all-comprehensive Whole that holds these together in its unrelaxing grasp; and it is a unity, further, which is all the greater because of the infinite diversity of its constituents.

We have now to consider therefore the question already raised: what specific *kind* of a system the self is; and here we must carefully guard against the common impression

that all systems are necessarily fixed and static. Most unfortunately this is, I believe, the general view—it is the inevitable result of our familiarity with modern machinery. For this obviously must possess a perfectly definite and unalterable structure; a machine which shed its parts as an atom occasionally loses an electron, or which received casual additions as a nation accepts immigrants, would be of little use. Hence there has arisen the prevalent belief that *every* system, as such, must be unalterable and mechanical —an attitude also expressed in the instinctive distrust of the introduction of "system" into education or government. Under the prevailing conditions this is quite natural; but still it must be remembered that every machine is really dynamic, so that its indispensable static structure implies never the absence of movement but simply its precise regulation. Still further—paradoxical though this may seem at first sight—the real aim of all modern mechanism is a plastic machine—one, that is to say, plastic not in its detailed construction but in its reactions to external stimuli—a fixed structure which is at the same time capable of varying responsiveness to varying physical impulses. In some few instances this end has already been successfully attained —in the familiar steam-governor and its analogous electrical regulators, in thermostats and traffic controls, together with gyroscopic machinery and its recent application to self-stabilizing and self-steering ships. This will undoubtedly form the next great advance in mechanical progress—the invention of intricate appliances that are not merely automatic to a very high degree, but are also self-regulating in accord with incessant and irregular changes in the driving forces.[1]

[1] The following description of the electric equipment at Burnt Oak may be interesting. "No engineer will watch the machinery from inside the building. The actual operation will be controlled at Golders Green. Here will be performed the only manual job; everything else

At first sight this discussion of machinery may seem far removed from the problem of the nature of selfhood; and yet our very phraseology has already introduced several considerations that are in the highest degree suggestive and illuminating. "Reactions to external stimuli," "responsiveness," "self-regulating and self-steering"—all these terms are plainly more applicable to life and consciousness than to material mechanisms; and their frequent use really implies that there can be no absolute contrast between these various categories, but that they shade off imperceptibly into one another. For on the one hand all modern machinery, in its extreme delicacy of structure and high precision of adjustment,[1] is approaching more and more closely to the essential characters of vital organization; while on the other hand microscopic research increasingly reveals the complicated living mechanisms which underlie the phenomena of metabolism and cell division, reproduction and heredity. "In some ways a living creature is like a machine in being an arrangement for changing matter and energy from one form to another and in its more or less automatic smoothness."[2] Thus in the first instance we perceive that systems, as systems, may be at once mechanical and yet increasingly plastic, while in the other the essential plasticity of all vital processes must possess a highly complex mechanical basis upon which its successful functioning absolutely depends.

will be automatic. It is so delicately balanced that should any single part of the equipment fail, the substation will immediately shut down without the intervention of any human element." But next century this installation will probably form part of a museum of antiquities. Already New York has a vast and practically altogether automatic power station, while in Paris the time can be obtained automatically by telephone from the Observatory clock.

[1] The best known instances are wireless contrivances, which are however relatively elementary.

[2] J. A. Thomson, *Purpose in Evolution*, p. 9. The terms "biomechanism," "mechanism of reproduction and heredity," are frequently and literally employed by many biologists and biochemists.

Mechanism and plasticity, therefore, are the very reverse of being antithetic to each other, as they are usually believed to be.[1]

3. It is thus perfectly legitimate to call the self a system, provided we add that its inherent plasticity—its capacity for incessant modification, both when stimulated from without and as directed from within—is immeasurably higher than that of any mechanical or vital organization. This is true equally as regards its detailed psychological nature and its general range of comprehensiveness. In the first place, that very transience of the constituent elements of personality—of sensations, feelings and desires—on which Hume based his arguments, incalculably increases its innate capacity for unceasing development. For it obviously permits a continuous sifting, as it were, of these factors—the substitution of new ones for old, which thus disappear and so relieve the self of what would in time become a heavy burden. This sifting process is most easily perceived in the formation of memory content. Doubtless much is forgotten that might well be preserved, but on the other hand the retention of all our experiences without exception would quickly throw an impossible strain upon the intellect.[2] But what is true of memory applies equally to all other mental elements; so that instead of comprising material entities, which often persist long after they have lost their original value, mind is made up of immaterial existents whose very disappearance, once their function has been performed, enables a system of a much higher order than the physical to come into being, and to pursue a long course of develop-

[1] *Cf.* Chapter XVII for a fuller discussion of the whole question of Mechanism; also *The Revelation of Deity*, chap. iii: "Art, Mechanism and Creation."

[2] This refers to ordinary memory, not to any subconscious or "Unconscious" processes which may retain what appears to have been lost.

ment which may conceivably be ended only by the destruction of its physical basis in the living body.

4. This is the *psychological* aspect of the problem of selfhood; and when we turn to what, in the light of my earlier distinction,[1] may be called its *logical* aspect, we find that this essential plasticity of mind-systems becomes still more prominent. For (as I have already maintained) consciousness is always, in principle, consciousness of objective Reality; this is true equally of animal and human experience. But that the levels or modes of Reality apprehended in these two cases differ almost absolutely from one another is patent to the most cursory observation;[2] and this contrast is due, ultimately, to man's capacity for thought. For in principle, and increasingly as knowledge and science advance (though never in final actuality), thought comprehends the real nature of the Universe; and this, still further, is because the Universe itself manifests or expresses its own character in human thought. Reality may almost be conceived as exerting a constant pressure upon man's mind, and as uttering itself through that mind, somewhat as a great lake in the hills makes a small fountain play in a distant village. Similarly it is Reality that in the end, and so far as thought is valid, directs each finite mind's course and moulds its developing structure; and it is obvious that when this controlling process is carried far enough, Reality and the content of our thought—the object of our knowledge—must become increasingly identical with each other. When we survey modern science in its entirety this principle becomes clear. For science expresses, though certainly only partially, the structure of the Universe as it really is; and it is, again, the real nature of the Universe that has always constituted

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 87.

[2] It must here be remembered that both Reality and experience are essentially continuous.

the ultimate test of error, the standard of scientific theory, the criterion of its truth.[1] To say that these are determined by the "laws of thought" is only to express this principle in another way; for these laws are in the end themselves determined by the nature of real being, although their extremely abstract form inevitably creates the common impression that they exist only in an artificial sphere of their own; once again, however, it is a case of the lake and the distant fountain. This remains true, I believe, in spite of the current contentions that science is merely symbolic, or schematic or even illusory. There are already indications of a reaction from this attitude, which seems to me only a passing phase of modern speculation.

5. "Thought" then (to quote Bosanquet's final volume) "is the self-assertion of reality according to its characteristic laws within a complex of psychical matter which may be called a mind. The laws of logic are the expression of central characters of reality. The fundamental act of mind is that self-assertion of the object by which, through the mind and by means of its psychical matter, it asserts and constructs itself, and controls the mental behaviour" (processes). But our study of the nature of morality and religion demands that we go beyond this merely intellectual aspect of the subject, invaluable though it undoubtedly is.[2] So far as we have gone hitherto, then, we may say that human thought reflects the Universe as a dewdrop reflects the sun. As Hartmann affirms, "man is the mirror of Being and of the world."[3] But this content of thought must now be regarded, not simply in its isolation as a purely intellectual product, or

[1] *Cf.* p. 171, *n.*

[2] *Three Chapters on the Nature of Mind*, pp. 72, 64, 58. The Preface shows that the author himself intended to do this.

[3] *Ethics*, vol. i, p. 37. Only, as I have maintained throughout, it does much more than this: it grasps or comprehends the Universe; still the illustration is sufficiently adequate here.

as the content of knowledge, but as being at the same time an active element within the entire and still more complex dynamic personality, and therefore as a powerful factor in controlling its behaviour. In taking up this wider point of view, however, we must guard against the introduction of a radically false determinism. The self must not be regarded as some kind of mechanical arrangement, activated by a separate intellectual contrivance like an internal clockwork which may at any time be removed and still leave the self essentially what it was before. Rather are personality and thought one and the same, or identical in the sense that to destroy one is to destroy the other;[1] and this at once implies, in accordance with my earlier arguments, that personality, in being thus controlled by reason, is always *self*-determined and therefore free.[2] Thus a real determination must always be retained, only not here as external but as internal—as *self*-determination; these two apparently opposed types of determination—external and internal—really merging into one another by imperceptible degrees as the complexity of systematic organization advances.[3]

6. In the light of all these considerations the self must now be regarded as a psychical system which in the first place apprehends the real Universe in and through thought, and in the second freely acts in response to its apprehension of the Universe. This is of course a description of the ideal of selfhood, not of any actual individual, unless we choose to look upon some outstanding genius as the fulfilment of this ideal. To do so is, indeed, not only legitimate but necessary, since it emphasizes the patent fact that ordinary selfhood never attains its highest possible level, never realizes its own

[1] *Cf.* the reference to the "simplicity" of the self, *ante* p. 130.

[2] *Cf. ante* p. 125.

[3] *Cf. The Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation*, cc. x, xi, for a detailed analysis of this transition.

true potentialities, never fully expresses its actual capacity. It is here then that we discover the unique characteristics of personality for which we are searching[1]—first in its free active responsiveness (in principle) to the whole Universe, and secondly in its inexhaustible power of transcending itself—of incessantly advancing beyond every level that it actually attains; this second attribute being an obvious consequence of the first, since it is really the infinity of the Universe that necessitates an unending advance on the part of the individual mind towards both complete comprehension and fully adequate reaction.[2]

It may here be objected that no reference has yet been made to the emotional elements in personality. But while these are equally indispensable, their introduction does not affect the validity of the principles I have just endeavoured to express; on the contrary, the emotions afford a further instance of their truth. For even our deepest emotions, purely in themselves alone, reveal nothing of the actual *nature* of their stimulus or object; it is always through thought that we realize that these subjective feelings are aroused by some aspects or other of real being—by its beauty, its sublimity, its mystery. Emotion thus indicates the existence of its stimulus, but never its fully real character.[3] Similarly animals are incapable of experiencing the finest emotions for exactly the same reason that they have no real will—that is because they lack developed rationality. Living always on the perceptual plane, their behaviour is almost completely instinctive, their feelings, in the main, simple and coarse; and this raises two further considerations that seem to me of fundamental importance.

7. Selfhood, in the first place, is the final stage and most complex type of the entire terrestrial evolutionary process.

[1] This problem arose *ante* p. 131.

[2] *Cf. ante* p. 77.

[3] *Cf.* pp. 245, 279.

"Man, with his scale of values, is the culmination of this trend."[1] This is true not only from the point of view of time—of the temporal order of events—but also in the sense that all the preceding stages constituted the indispensable conditions, or formed the necessary means, for the ultimate appearance of personality. Surveying this advance as a whole it is true to say, simply as a *résumé* of all the facts, that selfhood is its final outcome—its end or purpose, though we need not as yet say its conscious purpose; the inevitable tendency of all the prior conditioning factors has been to bring selfhood into being. As McDougall contends, "mind, intelligence, purpose, and memory have played the essential rôle. It is impossible to point to any clear instance of evolutionary progress of which this can be denied." Similarly for Thomson, "the outstanding fact about organic evolution is the increasing dominance of mind"; and Huxley once more: "The evolution of life may be considered as preeminently an improvement of the status of mind in the universe, subordinating more and more of the other activities of reality to the power of the mind." To Jeans, again "mind no longer appears as an accidental intruder into the realm of matter, rather the creator and governor." There is therefore ample evidence for Tennant's conclusion that "personality is the key to the universe; it is our highest interpretative concept."[2] Further, it is only by means of the specific constitution of personality—only in and through its triadic nature as at once rational, emotive and volitional —that a system which is freely responsive to the Universe can exist. "Man alone carries in himself a higher law, whereby he creates in the world, or from Non-Being brings

[1] Huxley, *What Dare I Think?* p. 264.

[2] *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution*, p. 139. *The System of Animate Nature*, p. 400. *The Mind*, pp. 49, 50. *The Mysterious Universe*, p. 148. *Philosophical Theology*, vol. i, p. 127; *cf.* the final chapters of my *Theory of Direct Realism*.

forth into Being."[1] I do not mean by this that if selves have been evolved on Mars or Venus, or elsewhere in Space-Time, they must resemble human beings in every respect; some of us could suggest a few improvements. But on the other hand, if they are to be at all reactive to the environing Universe, and at the same time to be self-determinative, then they must possess sense-organs of some kind or other[2] which are the basis of some sort of feeling and understanding, although "types of mental mechanism are possible which would make our grasp of complex situations appear pitiful in its limitations."[3] Among all the infinitely various systems therefore that characterize the Universe, it is only that type of system which in some way or other conforms to the nature of selfhood that is both capable of apprehending the Universe in its entirety and of freely reacting to it as thus apprehended. But the Universe, further, is essentially dynamic; science reveals it as exhibiting inherent developmental tendencies—definite lines of advance from low forms of organization to higher; from matter to life, from life to consciousness, from sentience to selfhood of continuously expanding complexity and rising status;[4] and it is only as this conception of the Universe becomes more fully and clearly realized that human thought attains some degree of finality, and human knowledge some measure of completeness.

The indestructible tendency of thought, as such, towards an incessant expansion has already been repeatedly insisted upon in earlier chapters; for, in spite of its innate capacity

[1] Hartmann, *Ethics*, vol. i, p. 243.

[2] They might *e.g.* be sensitive to ethereal vibrations of different frequencies from those which stimulate human organs, or to magnetic or gravitational impulses. For still more general biological possibilities *cf.* Needham, *The Great Amphibium*, p. 79.

[3] Huxley, *Essays of a Biologist*, p. 50; *cf.* Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 301.

[4] *Cf. Personality and Reality*, cc. v, vi, on "The Dominance of Selfhood."

for self-organization, the entire conceptual schema always has "ragged edges." Nonetheless a genuine finality can be attained if it is based upon principles instead of upon mere details—if, in other words, our innumerable concepts are not merely multiplied but, further, become subordinated to certain ruling principles or categories which dominate, and therefore "explain," the entire system. There is nothing in the least peculiar about this procedure, for it is simply the ruling method of all modern science and culture. Not only are facts and theories endlessly increased in their number and definiteness, but they are at the same time incorporated within more and more comprehensive concepts which unify, and thus "explain," the overwhelming mass of detail. Relativity in physics, evolution in biology, the democratic tendency in history, the spiritualizing of religion, are all products of this indestructible trend of the human mind towards self-completion; and it is only by carrying this unceasing process still further—by discovering some concept that is *all*-inclusive and supreme—that this ideal can be in any measure attained.

It will, of course, always remain impossible to achieve this ideal in its full actuality, simply because (to repeat) the infinity of the Universe is inexhaustible. But the desired all-comprehensive principle must be found in the apprehension first of the dynamic tendency of the world towards ever higher forms of being, and secondly of man's own relation to the Universe as thus conceived. Even the highly abstract scientific theory of relativity to which I have just referred falls within the scope of this ultimate concept, insofar as it presents the physical world as a finite, and therefore also as a definite, whole, despite its unimaginable extension in Space-Time; while organic evolution and its allied instances are still more clearly implicated. Thus the human mind finally envisages the Universe, in spite of its infinite complexity, as truly one—as a unity or whole of

Reality from which this mind has itself originated and within which it plays its own part.

8. Still further, we are not concerned here with this ultimate Idea simply as an *intellectual* concept—as the final result of the diverse *rational* activities of the mind. Once more we must recognize the essential continuity of experience—the fact that rationality is but one aspect of complete personality, and is inseparable therefore from feeling and volition; for the very comprehensiveness of a concept—the wide range of its content—at once implies that it must transcend its pure rationality so as to permeate and influence experience as a whole. This is most readily appreciated when we consider the powerful appeal of all great poetry. In every fine poem there is enshrined a profound idea;[1] but this so deeply and directly affects the emotions that its strictly intellective character is immediately merged with the beauty of its expression, to such a degree that the total effect is scarcely recognized as possessing any markedly rational attributes at all; competent sympathetic analysis will, however, always disclose it. But this vivifying principle of fine poetry is really of universal application; and we must now consider its application to the problem of the transition from the psychological idea to the moral ideal, and also—as parallel with this—from the rational to the moral self.[2] This fundamentally important advance is now seen to be the inevitable consequence of the incessant self-expansion of the ideational content of the mind. For from the very first, as we have found already, ideas are most intimately connected with action.[3] But the ultimate development of this conceptual content is in principle always in the direction of that all-

[1] "In poetry the representation must be full of thought." (Hegel, *Aesthetic*, Introduction, chap. iii.) "A poet should express the emotion of all the ages and the thought of his own." (F. E. Hardy, *The Later Years of Thomas Hardy*, p. 188.)

[2] *Ante* p. 126. [3] *Ante* p. 115.

comprehensive and objective Idea which I have just outlined—that is of the dynamic evolution of the Universe, and of its relation to the self; so that this concept finally becomes dominant both intellectually—in the sphere of science and general knowledge—and practically—in its bearing upon conduct.[1] But this latter practical aspect, with which we are at this point more directly concerned, further constitutes it a specifically *moral* ideal, as distinguished from its inseparable character of *rational* idea. We are dealing throughout, that is to say, with one and the same mass of experiential content; but we are regarding this first as purely intellective —and then it is the all-comprehensive *Idea*; secondly as essentially related to action—and then it becomes the supreme *moral ideal.* There are thus not two separate goals of experience but only one, although this has at the same time an inherently dual character as being both rational and moral.

We reach exactly the same result when we trace the development of what are usually called "moral ideals" strictly as such. We may here assume that almost from the very beginning these ideals must transcend the merely egoistic standpoint so as to be, in some measure at least, altruistic; and then it is clear that the interests of the family become subordinated successively to those of the tribe, of the nation and of humanity in general; or if we turn from the purely ethical to the religious point of view, we may add the fulfilment of some universal or divine will and purpose. Restricting ourselves here however to the specifically moral issue, it is obvious that the interests of the race can thus be regarded as being in general superior to those of the individual only insofar as the furtherance of racial welfare is recognized to be more in accord with the whole course of universal development than is that of any mere individual. The truth of this ethical principle seems indisputable; but

[1] *Cf.* p. 256, *n.* 2.

it is plainly identical in substance, though not in its form, with that ultimate intellectual Idea which I have just maintained to be also the dominant moral ideal. Ethically, therefore, and disregarding for the moment the distinctively religious aspects of the situation, all "moral" ideals alike derive their "moral" character from their identity—more or less complete as the case may be—with the ultimate principle that the supreme determinant of action and the final end of conduct are constituted by the furtherance of the dynamic development of the Universe.

Now the nature of this supreme moral ideal must be reflected in the nature of the moral self. I have maintained that man becomes a distinctively moral being, in the first instance, "to the degree that his behaviour is deliberately controlled by conceptual schemes of action."[1] But it is further plainly necessary that these regulative rational schemes must themselves come to possess a specific moral character, which is ultimately of the form outlined at the conclusion of the preceding paragraph. Thus man becomes "good" to the extent that he deliberately and freely adopts the furtherance of universal development, in any of its definite modes, as the final end of his conduct, and "evil" if he deliberately chooses to ignore or defeat this development, either positively by subordinating altruistic acts to egoistic, or negatively by limiting his action to egoistic purposes alone, good though these may in themselves be; this general principle, like all others equally general, being subject to the qualifications dictated by the peculiar conditions of any exceptional cases.

Finally, no discussion of ethical issues can be adequate which omits all reference to the element of obligation, or the absolute necessity of duty. But as I have already treated this problem in an earlier volume I may dismiss it here with a mere reference to the conclusions therein advanced.

[1] *Ante* p. 121.

X

THE CRITERIA OF THE GOOD

1. THE presentation of the supreme moral ideal as consisting in the furtherance of the unceasing dynamic development of the Universe, and of the good self as the personality which recognizes and freely pursues this ideal, is of so general a character as to be, from the point of view of practice, almost useless. It therefore requires to be supplemented by the consideration of those definite criteria which enable us to discover the main direction of this universal development, and to select modes of conduct that best subserve it. Apart from these criteria little is gained by expressing this principle in terms of value—by saying that duty demands the maintenance and continuous increase of all the types of value that already inhere in the Universe. Once again we need to know more precisely what it is that augments, and what diminishes, these existent values; while since values are plastic and dynamic, this is plainly but another form of the question as to what advances, and what retards, universal development. The idea of value, as such, is inseparable from what I have already called "the all-comprehensive and objective Idea" or "dominant concept."

The first and most obvious criterion then is that of continuous success—the application of the principles and methods of Pragmatism. But while these must be unhesitatingly accepted so far as they carry us, it must yet be insisted upon that they are neither so easily applied as seems often to be assumed, nor free from their own theoretical difficulties. The question—Precisely what is "success"?—is sufficiently familiar; and it becomes still further complicated when we ask how long "success" must continue

before it satisfactorily establishes its claims upon our acceptance. To insist in this way on the element of continuity, indeed, is in the end to merge the distinctively pragmatic criterion in the more general principle of the maintenance of universal evolution. For all policies and methods which thus justify themselves by persisting for very long periods, especially if they overcome the formidable obstacles which are in that case certain to arise, thereby clearly show themselves to be actual phases of that evolution; and thus "success" ultimately resolves itself into the *non*-pragmatic criteria of continuity and persistence. The discussion of the further problem of the ground of all successful practice—of the reason why, assuming that a method proves its value by "working," it does "work" in this way—is of too theoretical a character to be undertaken here.[1]

Our modern world, in short, has become much too complex for Pragmatism to have any very high value so far as our most important problems are concerned. Its test of "success" can be usefully applied only to what are relatively unimportant issues. For the final outcome of all really vital courses of action demands so long a time in which to manifest itself that, to the individual, the criterion can be of but the slightest use; while if, after a prolonged trial, his methods result in failure he has often little opportunity to vary the experiment; *ars longa, vita brevis*; and a lifework devoted to education or to social reform cannot be repeated. Most often our "success" must be judged by a later generation that is sufficiently interested in our problems only to ridicule our attempts at their solution.

In this connection the value of firm personal conviction as to the goodness of a course of action may be considered. Apart from some degree of knowledge and of intellectual capacity, which at once imply the acceptance of criteria

[1] I may refer to my *Examination of William James's Philosophy*, chap. ii.

specifically rational, the perils of enthusiasm, not to say fanaticism, seem on the whole to balance its advantages. On the other hand, the continued persistence of such an attitude, even if it rests only on an emotional basis, once again indicates some degree of connection with certain phases of world evolution, particularly if there is adequate responsiveness to complex changing conditions; and here arise the many problems of authority and tradition in religion and government.

2. To be completely satisfactory, then, both "successful working" and the subjective feeling of moral satisfaction must possess some objective grounds; and one of the most obvious of these is found in the *universality* of any "good." If our social arrangements, our individual, national and international purposes, increase the well-being of large groups of people, and if this continues for a generation or two, again we may be fairly certain that our course of action accords more or less with the trend of universal evolution. It is true that in that case we are ourselves shaping this tendency and therefore, it would seem at first sight, are ourselves creating the final criterion. But this does not invalidate the principle; for we can do nothing whatever except upon the basis of previous development, by utilizing means that are already in existence, thus directing the universal tendency only by obeying it; while in the long run this tendency itself defeats all human purposes whenever conflict arises.

"The greatest happiness of the greatest number," therefore, might serve as a practical criterion if only we could be sure what "happiness" means when the whole race is concerned, and if it were recognized further that this end imperatively demands some sacrifice of individual happiness. Ethical theory must on this point adopt the general scientific method of incessant modification and expansion so as to

include not merely all cases but equally all exceptions, showing these to be really instances of some yet more inclusive principle; and the high complexity of moral experience makes this task far more difficult than is the solution of any purely scientific issue. We must accept Bosanquet's dictum that "Happiness" is "primarily the name of a problem."[1]

3. Intimately allied with the attribute of universality is that of *continuity*. This means that we are justified in assuming that all action which carries still further the already ascertained course of world evolution is therefore good. This criterion also is extremely difficult to apply in practice, since it plainly demands an extensive knowledge of the facts of science and history together with a profound understanding of their true implications; once again emotion may prove to be totally misleading. We can however trace quite clearly the main lines of the universal advance—from matter to life and mind, from savagery to culture and art, from fetishism to spirituality. Truth, Beauty, Knowledge, Social Order, and Religion—these have unceasingly grown "from more to more"; and we may therefore count it "good" to increase these in every possible form, and "evil" to destroy or retard them in any degree whatever. On the other hand it involves the inversion of our fundamental principle if we argue that these great ends must be subserved because they themselves are "good," or because they in themselves have "value," and themselves constitute therefore final and absolute criteria. For though this is indisputably true, still it is only partially true. These supreme realities certainly make to all of us, each in his own way, a direct and irresistible appeal; but this is primarily emotional, and it need be nonetheless powerful when it finds a rational basis. This basis lies in the fact that they are all alike aspects of the Universe—the highest results revealed

[1] *Science and Philosophy*, p. 201.

to man of its long evolutionary process. Great as they themselves are, they find in the Universe in which they inhere, and from which they spring, a ground still more fundamental than themselves. It is therefore impossible, ultimately, to regard them as "good" in themselves, or as possessing "value" in themselves, simply because "in themselves" they do not really exist; they exist only as attributes or aspects of the all-inclusive Whole. Apart from this Whole they become mere abstractions, although they are such splendid abstractions that, even when taken solely "in themselves," they at once command man's instinctive admiration and reverence; but this again is because the human mind is itself the outcome of world evolution and enjoys therefore a natural fellowship with these great fundamental entities. Still the real ground of their own value always transcends themselves; for nothing can generate value "in itself" except the Universe or Whole of being; while as generating or creating, this is more truly conceived as the ultimate *ground* of value rather than as *having* value. For value, as such, is essentially relative; its nature lies always in contributoriness or supplementation, and always implies therefore some wider basis than whatever has any given value; the ground of its value, that is, must be found beyond itself. But it is obviously impossible ever to go beyond or outside the Universe; there can be nothing which the Whole can supplement, or to which it can contribute; it cannot therefore be said to possess value, while, on the other hand, it must be the sole ultimate ground of all values.[1]

It is only a further extension of this point of view to maintain that the conservation of value is "good" because it continues the course of the universal advance; and in this sense continuity becomes one criterion of right action.[2]

[1] *Cf.* further *The Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation*, chap. xx.

[2] "The past history of living matter gives us a partial clue, a direction *which we must obey* if we do not wish to falsify the destiny of life." (Huxley, *What Dare I Think?* p. 265; my italics.)

But quite apart from this view of the nature of value as always contributory to the evolution of the Whole it is inevitable that even the "good" should on certain occasions itself become to some degree "evil"—if, that is, we isolate any unquestioned "value" and then pursue it to the exclusion of all else. Thus all knowledge is good and valuable; and yet to seek knowledge, and knowledge alone, leads to the patent evils of pure intellectualism. In precisely the same way the fallacy of "art for art's sake" lies in the sheer impossibility of severing art from the rest of experience and of Reality; for so far as this is done art ceases to be art in any true sense of the term. Similarly with asceticism and other forms of self-sacrifice or self-discipline. Cultivated for themselves alone all these "goods" rapidly become evil and corrupt, simply because in themselves—lacking their essential connection with still greater ends, and ultimately, indeed, with the Whole—they speedily lose all their value; while it is clear that the trend of the present argument implies that religion itself consists in the explicit realization of the wholeness of experience.

From a slightly different point of view it is, indeed, only continuity, regarded as the basis of progress, that can justify, or even demand, sacrifice—the sacrifice of the lower to the higher. For we have seen that every stage in evolution at once becomes the means of further advance—matter as the basis of life, sentience as the raw material of rationality, and this in its turn an indispensable factor in selfhood; and it is but a further application of the same principle to regard the individual as (in general) subordinate to the family or nation, and this again as of less importance than humanity. Here however the danger once more arises of reducing our principal concepts to bare abstractions, and so depriving them of all practical applicability; to speak of "humanity" *e.g.* in so vague a way that it becomes impossible to assign to the word any definite significance. But this difficulty is

never essential; it is due simply to the enormous complexity of the phenomena with which we are attempting to deal; and it is (in principle) always possible to give concrete content to our terms, so that in this case "humanity" would gain a meaning as definite, in any given context, as that of "family." Once again we must note the inevitable tendency of all modern theory—ethical principles included—to become scientific, or even mathematical, in the sense of being as definite and precise as possible; for it is these characteristics, not mere quantitativeness alone, that are peculiar to mathematics and its allied branches of enquiry.[1]

4. Closely connected with continuity, but perhaps more definite in its character, is the quality of permanence. I have already emphasized the inherent tendency of every developing system to organize itself—to "crystallize," as it were, and so to acquire definite form; and with this definiteness there must obviously arise some degree of permanence. Thus in surveying the long course of previous development, we may justifiably select its most *persistent* features as being those which most clearly indicate its final ends and purposes, and as being therefore good; since these obviously constitute the fundamental elements in the vast structure of the Whole, and just for that reason they are to be accepted as of supreme value. For it must be remembered throughout this discussion that we are precluded from first of all forming our concept of the "good," and then proceeding to ask if the Universe or—what amounts to the same thing—if any of its most prominent characteristics conform to this concept and are therefore good. On all subordinate issues this standpoint is perfectly legitimate; but it plainly *assumes* the "goodness"

[1] *Cf.* again *ante* pp. 21, 22. "The Leibnizian conception of mathematics, not the general science of magnitude but of form, not the science of quantity but of quality." (Cassirer, *Substance and Function*, p. 92; *cf.* Costello, *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. xxv, p. 439.)

of its accepted standards. Our ultimate argument must therefore take the opposite direction, since we are then concerned with the logically prior question of the nature of the good in itself; and this must be sought, once again, in the character of Reality as a whole. Here its essentially dynamic activity must be taken into consideration—that fierce incessant conflict between powerful opposing tendencies in the course of which much is destroyed and completely disappears. Whatever therefore survives in this age-long struggle, whatever stands all tests, survives all crises, and so acquires permanence, thereby proclaims itself of high value, and its conservation may reasonably be accepted as the end of human conduct.[1]

5. Such permanent definiteness of structure however, no matter what degree it may attain, can never exhaust the infinity of the Universe. Rather does it always become the firm basis of the unending further advance; and thus *inexhaustibility* becomes another criterion of the good—a criterion that is, plainly, intimately allied with universality. Those purposes and ideals, in other words, that prove themselves capable of illimitable expansion, while at the same time retaining their indispensable definite concreteness, are to be regarded as good; while those that quickly realize their highest levels of finality are either not so good, or are positively bad. For it is the plain converse of the preceding argument to hold that whatever rapidly exhausts itself, and still further whatever stultifies itself, is therefore evil—whether evil relatively or absolutely is a minor point which turns on the standard applied in each selected instance. Thus to "defeat" or "stultify itself," however, really means to be defeated by all the ultimate tendencies of universal develop-

[1] This conclusion, at first sight, may seem identical with the acceptance of the pragmatic criterion of "success." Permanence, however, is a much more definite character than "success" and so more fundamental.

ment, which in this way proves itself afresh to be the *final* criterion of the good.

While therefore ideals that are narrow and limited are not necessarily evil, still they can attain to but a low standard of value, and can at best be good only to individuals or small social groups and under conditions of relatively minor importance. It is clear that if they are still pursued beyond the sphere of their applicability they must rapidly lose their continuity with the main streams of progress; and this isolation of even such fine ideals as art and knowledge we have already seen to involve an inevitable corruption. Thus the search for beauty, and for beauty alone, becomes first sensuous and finally sensual; while ascetic discipline, in the opposite direction, carries the risks of self-centredness and hardness of character; and this is equally true, in its own way, of social policy that is predominantly materialistic, whether commercially or communistically, or, again, of purely theoretic knowledge so far as this can at all sever itself from all practical considerations.

6. It may here be objected that there is involved in this view of our whole subject a trait of fatalism, of necessity, of "absolutism" in the bad sense of this term; and it is of fundamental importance to perceive the real element of truth in this contention. It must be recognized, to begin with, that it is never we who create, *de novo* or *ex nihilo*, the ultimate criterion of the good. That is, plainly, impossible; at the most we can but apprehend this and more or less definitely formulate it.[1] But it itself must be finally determined by the nature of the Universe; and we cannot escape from this conclusion by holding that it is the manifestation or expression of the divine will; for that is merely one way of describing this nature of Reality, while on the other hand certain forms of this religious belief at once introduce an

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 141, *n.* 1: "a higher law."

absolute necessity of their own. The character of the good, in short, must under any conceivable conditions whatever rest upon the character of Reality, since even if it were first of all constituted by the human mind, still that mind is itself the outcome of universal development. And in so far as this development is systematic—though at the same time infinite and inexhaustible—it must be characterized by necessity—by *its own* necessity, which in the long run proves to be paramount and irresistible. At first sight, it may be, this principle appears to be wholly identical with a fatalism repugnant to every healthy human instinct; and if the necessity of the Universe were merely mechanical, and therefore completely external to ourselves, this impression would undeniably be well founded. But the real truth is the precise contrary; for as I have argued throughout, the final results—the highest levels and types—of universal evolution are conscious personalities that are essentially free in the sense of being self-determined; and this attribute of freedom, still further, is capable of illimitably wider expansion. It indicates the fundamental tendency of all future development of personality, in the direction of the fuller rational and aesthetic apprehension of the Universe inseparably allied with an ever profounder emotional responsiveness, which together culminate in the free choice of universal purposes and the conservation of universal values.[1] Thus the fatalistic necessity of external and "merely mechanical" determination is seen to *transform itself*, by slow degrees as systematic organization gradually increases in its complexity, into that self-determination which is the only real form of freedom.[2] Such freedom is exemplified, though on a relatively small scale, in the unswerving submission of every genius to the profound yet autocratic

[1] *Cf. ante* pp. 77, 140; p. 295 below.

[2] I have considered this principle in fuller detail in chaps. 9–12 of *The Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation.*

laws of his own art, and again in the willing sacrifice by every great moral personality of his own interests to the imperative dictates of duty and the good. Certainly we are all limited and confined, and, it would seem at first sight, in every direction alike; to emphasize this exclusively is sufficiently easy, and inevitably leads to "fatalism" in its worst form. Nevertheless we are also always free, if we but seek and follow out the paths of universal progress. For human souls are like sailors upon the waters of a great river: only when they turn towards the open sea, and chart their course by sun and star, can they escape shipwreck and sail on for ever.

XI

THE EVOLUTION OF THE MORAL SELF

1. THE self, then, is a psychical system "which apprehends (in principle) the nature of the Universe, and freely acts in response to this apprehension";[1] and further, it acquires its "good" moral nature in so far as (in the first place) it freely regulates its behaviour in accord with its own conceptual schemata, and (secondly) to the degree that this behaviour itself conforms to the main trends of that universal development whose criteria were considered in the preceding chapter.

Now every system, as such, is organized; organization is indeed the very meaning of the term "system"; and the specific organization of selfhood expresses itself in the formation of *dominant* ideal schemes of conduct, either evil or good, which thus constitute the persistent determinants of the correlated modes of action. The various methods of the development of these paramount features of personality are of subordinate importance, except in the measure in which they are due to the free volition of the individual. For insofar as they spring from any other factors—from heredity, nationality, temperament, imitation, or the Unconscious—from all causes, in short, lying more or less beyond voluntary control—so far they determine moral character only indirectly, simply because they are instances of what is in effect external determination, rather than of that internal self-determination which is the essential attribute of the free moral self. Similarly irrelevant to my main argument here are the different types of personality which thus arise, since they all come without much dis-

[1] *Ante* p. 138.

crimination within the scope of the general considerations I wish to discuss.

Morality then is essentially a matter of will or volition; only it must here be remembered that volition is as inseparably connected with reason as are the two poles of a magnet with each other, or electricity with magnetism in modern physical theory.[1] In this connection I have already emphasized the inherent natural intensity of the emotional stimuli to action—of instinct, passion, desire, appetite—as compared with the weakness of all the primary combinations of ideas. The inevitable result of this contrast is that these early ideational combinations tend to be concerned with egoistic bodily pleasures and benefits, except insofar as these are suppressed by that necessity for social cooperation which is due to the severe life conditions of all primitive societies;[2] a conflict which repeats itself, again, during the early years of every child. "The young child, if morally neglected, manifests his animal propensities without restraint and grows selfish and self-indulgent. Not having learned to subordinate his propensities or instincts to social requirements, his natural trend is not altruistic";[3] nor, it may be added, is it egoistic on any high plane. But here again, so far as the distinctively moral issue is concerned, we must consider not these "animal propensities or instincts" in themselves, but rather the type of volition which results from their predominance; and this type has two obvious characteristics. In the first place it is directed towards ends of a relatively low moral standard, and secondly, it controls forces of very high psychological intensity. It is, in short, a morally "bad" will; and it is so naturally and inevitably, because of the very conditions of its origin. Further, this

[1] *Ante* p. 116. [2] *Cf. ante* p. 110.

[3] Hollander, *The Psychology of Misconduct*, p. 35. Freud's contrast between the "Pleasure Principle" and the "Reality Principle" may also be referred to.

inherent original character can be altered only by the persistent influence of ideas—or ideals, if this term is here preferred—which belong to a higher moral category; and this, again because of the nature of the conflicting factors themselves, must always be a matter of extreme difficulty.

This constitutes the psychology both of "temptation" and of "original sin." For these must be interpreted, not merely in terms of the purely natural—and therefore non-moral—emotional and instinctive tendencies themselves, but rather always in terms of will. Temptation then consists in that incessant conflict between the lower and the higher forms of will, which bears upon its surface all the marks of the fierce intensity of the lower form associated with the psychological feebleness, which can be counterbalanced only by its logical power, of the higher; while "original sin" may be taken to denote the natural and inevitable monopolizing of all the early forms of volition by purposes which, while legitimate enough from certain standpoints and at certain periods of evolution, must nevertheless become evil as soon as they retard or oppose its later advance to ever higher levels.[1]

2. This consideration introduces a still further complexity into the nature of all moral judgments. For these are concerned with acts and agents that are essentially free, and which may therefore claim to possess some degree of true independence in their relation to the entire trend of universal development; they are never merely passively merged in this, that is, in the same way as the mechanical forces of Nature and sub-human organisms. But the development of the Whole, as such, must still be accorded an absolute supremacy which is the real basis of all the demands of duty, whether these are presented in the form of the Kantian

[1] *Cf.* p. 284.

categorical imperative or in any other.[1] From this specific standpoint then, which I take to be the only legitimate one if we choose to carry our argument to its logical conclusion, the individual must be regarded as good, or as evil, according as his whole life results in the furtherance, or the hindrance, of universal evolution, irrespective of the detailed conditions that have determined this result. In practice, obviously, this is the point of view which is always actually adopted whenever discipline of any kind—either military or scholastic or social—has to be rigidly enforced;[2] and its sole ultimate ground is that, in thus maintaining the interests of any given social group as against those of its individual members, we are really concerned with systems that to some degree approximate to, and share in the nature of, the Whole as such. But on the other hand the essential freedom and relative independence of the individual make their own persistent demands upon our theory; and when we thus take up his own cause, as it were against the absolute claim of the Universe, our judgments must rest not on the final results only of his actions, but also on all the conditions that have controlled his striving; and this again is ordinarily done as soon as the considerations of pure discipline have been satisfied—as, for example, in the administration of justice. In this respect, however, some current theories of the Unconscious have been carried to quite unjustifiable lengths.[3] For morality, it must be repeated, is fundamentally a matter of the will; and will at once involves freedom and, therefore, the conscious choice of alternatives.

Apart from choice and freedom there exist only impulses

[1] For the grounds of this position *cf. The Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation.*

[2] The same considerations obviously arise in matters of literary and artistic criticism, when some standard or value has to be maintained in opposition to individual taste or idiosyncrasy.

[3] A. Adler dispenses with Repression and the Unconscious in its Freudian sense. (Wolf, *Outline of Modern Knowledge*, p. 358.)

and tendencies, not volition; the Unconscious therefore, as presented in these theories, and apart from their truth or falsity, is to be included among the first of these. Its effects upon character and action, then, can exempt us from moral responsibility only while it literally is "unconscious," in the sense at least that it is uncontrollable by the conscious self. But if the individual becomes either directly or indirectly cognisant of its influence, then, in deciding his course of conduct, he is bound to take this influence into account, to the best of his ability; and it is of course altogether erroneous to assume that every Unconscious factor is necessarily evil; Jung regards it as the soil wherein our finest ideas germinate. If again, while fully aware of its existence, a person finds that he is powerless to modify its tendencies, then it at once takes its place among the many other conditions of experience that are unalterable by himself, and for which therefore he ceases to be morally responsible. At the same time he must always remain amenable to that higher standard of judgment which refers to the Whole as such; so that his personality, like his health, may be bad, although he himself cannot be blamed for this. Under these circumstances, obviously, our attitude towards him can no more be punitive than that of a tactful doctor towards a patient whom he nevertheless is determined to cure at any cost to his feelings.

3. The essential organization of the self, as being one specific type of system, which has been already referred to at the outset of this chapter, has further fundamentally important implications. I have maintained throughout the preceding chapters that the Whole is infinite in the sense of being inexhaustible. It must follow therefore that the nearer the character of any system approaches to that of the Whole —that is, the more complex it becomes and the higher the level it attains—the greater must become that capacity for

still further self-development which constitutes its inherent potentiality; although at the same time every finite system must always be considered in its relations to its entire environment, so that taken purely "in itself" its native potentiality sinks to nothing; no finite system whatever, in other words, can be regarded as isolated from all others. Finitude therefore implies that its potentiality—its capacity for self-development—is the natural tendency of every system to acquire finally that definite constitution which is naturally characteristic of its type or species, as occurs *e.g.* in a crystal or a plant. In precisely the same way then does selfhood, despite its immensely higher potentiality, always tend to assume a more or less fixed form in every individual personality. Certain definite ideals of action are selected, certain specific lines of conduct embarked upon, relevant emotional reactions are set up and a correspondent intellectual attitude adopted, which taken all together constitute a self-response to some limited social and natural environment. Now the specially important result at this point is that the high intensity of these organized feelings, the logical coherence of the associated ideas, but above all the intimate relation of the self to its environment, must make not only any radical alteration of such a personality, but even any further marked development in the main directions hitherto followed, exceedingly difficult; although "a fancy from a flower-bell, someone's death," may still have their miraculous effect. Only in individuals of the highest and rarest type do we find any really uninterrupted expansion of moral character and of artistic genius, and even they quickly find their level or fall into a groove; so that to perceive these on any adequately extensive scale we must turn to the slow evolution of the human race in its entirety.

Yet it is only in these rare instances, and not in the painfully narrow range of the average man, that the essen-

tial nature of mind actually becomes manifested. For always in principle, though seldom to any marked degree in practice, mind increasingly apprehends *the Universe*[1]—grasps and responds to the ultimate nature of Reality itself; although as I have just remarked, it becomes possible clearly to discern this progress only by appreciating the profound contrasts between the earliest phases of mental evolution and its latest forms, or again betweeen the characteristics of infancy and of some outstanding genius. But it is the implication of this truth, rather than the mere fact itself, that must here be emphasized: which is that the self, in this advance to ever higher and higher stages which can have no conceivable limits (since the Universe with which it thus comes into wider yet closer relation is itself infinite) does not cease to be a self. On the contrary, it more and more becomes a self in the truest and fullest meaning of that term; in other words, personality becomes more and more adequately realized the farther this perfectly natural development proceeds. For in every direction alike its essential characteristics are retained, although in ever higher forms —in the greater rational coherence of the slowly expanding conceptual schema, in the increased refinement and profundity of the emotions, and in the more accurate adjustment of conduct to ideal purposes. It may serve to make this somewhat abstract principle more concrete if we contrast the relation of the modern astronomer to the unimaginable immensities of the physical universe with that of the "medicine man" and the ancient astrologer. Obviously, from the intellectual standpoint, the former is a "personality more adequately realized" than his predecessor. Equally clearly, the astronomer of the distant future will transcend his fellow of today, but without ceasing to be a self.

[1] *Cf.* again *ante* p. 78.

4. It is true, of course, that in this way the type of selfhood gradually changes to such a marked degree that it is most difficult at first sight to include its lowest and its highest forms within one and the same category. But there is here nothing peculiar, for a precisely analogous problem arises with regard to life and many physical existents. Only an accurate comparative study of all the existent types can reveal the underlying connections; and in all such cases it is not the simplest, but rather the most highly developed and most complex forms, that most clearly exhibit the relevant categorial attributes. Similarly the essential nature of mind or personality becomes more and more truly revealed the further it advances; and while it must always present the complexity of reason fused with will and emotion, still these its distinct aspects increasingly interpenetrate and permeate each other, so that the self thus acquires an ever deeper and more stable unity; its more intricate content being then more closely knit together so as to form, despite its superficially augmented variety, a more genuine whole.

Selfhood, then, must be regarded always in its relation to the Universe, which is (in principle) its proper environment. It is of course equally necessary, at least as a preliminary, to study the self from within as it were—to investigate all the details of its inner constitution and present these as the results of psychological analysis. But it is still more essential to approach the self from without—that is from the standpoint of the Universe—and to note its implications in their reference thereto. Perhaps a simple illustration will make this principle clearer. We may (for example) ask two inseparably allied questions about a magnetic needle: first, what is its physical constitution? and secondly, to what does it point? And just as the compass, in responding to the forces of the entire planet, invariably indicates the North Star, so the self, in freely reacting to superphysical

universal agencies, always directs us beyond itself and its own inner character to the Whole which environs and affects it. Thus it is both the highest type of organism and the potential basis of an incessant self-expansion which, while elevating and so altering its specific content and internal relations, still leaves its fundamental nature unaffected.

5. Finite personality therefore must always be regarded in the light not only of its limitations, which are but the inevitable consequences of its own earlier evolution, but equally of its inherent potentiality; and from this standpoint it at once becomes an outstanding index of all future development and, so far as man is capable of apprehending it, of the nature of the Whole.

It follows still further that as evolving personality attains its higher levels, the entire *content* of its experience becomes more and more identical with objective Reality.[1] This is obvious whenever we compare the perceptual consciousness of animals, or the primitive sentience of infancy, with adult human mentality; or, on the latter plane itself, the standpoint of the average individual with that of genius either as artistic, intellectual or religious. The word "experience," however, raises the supremely difficult problem of the subject-object relation; and by "subject" we mean that persistent psychical system of interfused, yet distinct, intellectual schemata, characteristic emotional reactions and definitely directed activities which we have already seen to constitute a self. Over against this "subject" there is the incessantly changing complex of things, processes and aesthetic qualities which are generalized under the term "object"; and the relation between this persistent "subject" and fluctuating "object" then constitutes "experience," with its correlatives "subject of experience" and "object of experience"; although this is still further complicated by

[1] For other aspects of this principle *cf. ante* pp. 79, 136.

the capacity of the subject to transform, in introspection, part of its own being into one kind of object, and also to become an object, in its turn, to other selves.

The subject-object relation is thus essential to every form of finite self. But it is at the same time obvious that the character and development of the subject are determined throughout, in principle, by the object, even when, as is the case with subjects of an advanced type, these themselves dominate the situation; for even then their activity is in some measure responsive to, and in that degree dependent on, the object at any given moment. Further, the very progress of the self implies that its responses become more precise and adequate, that it lies less at the mercy, as it were, of the objective content, and so becomes the better able to incorporate this within its own purposes. There is thus brought about a slowly advancing identity of subject and object, even while these remain all the more distinctly marked off from each other. Their identity, that is, is never a case of their mutual fusion into a common indistinguishable mass, but is rather due to the heightened character of that experiential relation in virtue of which they are held apart. The identity, in other words, is never an identity of *substance*, but always of *function*. It may be compared to the relation between man and woman in an ideal marriage. Here again there ensues a functional, and not substantial, identity; neither of the two turns into the other, but each on the contrary becomes all the more himself and herself; and yet this independent individual development remains throughout reciprocally controlled, and is, like the resultant unity, all the more effective on that account.

To say therefore that the evolution of selfhood always implies the growing identity of the entire content of experience with Reality means (further) that the subject of experience becomes increasingly involved in this identity —which is, once more, an identity of dynamic function, not

of static substance. But at this point there must be taken into account those principles of permanence, continuity and inexhaustibility which were discussed in the preceding chapter; for these, I have suggested, constitute the ultimate criteria of the good as universal development. To be morally good, therefore, the self must both discover these fundamental attributes and freely adopt them as the basal determinants of its own conduct and character; and the appearance here of the words "must" and "freely" introduce afresh those elements of necessity and freedom, as both alike inseparable conditions of the entire situation, whose analysis concluded that chapter; while at the same time the question of the unceasing evolution of selfhood, and the introduction here of continuity and permanence, are obviously connected with the problem of immortality. But before considering this subject I shall undertake an analysis of the relations between good and evil.

XII

THE RELATION BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL

1. The evolution of the moral self is closely connected with the relations between the evil and the good. I have argued that conduct is good in so far as it furthers the course of universal development, in consonance with the criteria discussed in Chapter X. Similarly, persons are good to the degree that they voluntarily pursue this ideal, with the proviso that their actions, as distinguished from their character and motives, must always remain amenable to some objective standard even if they themselves refuse to acknowledge it as their own, as was the case *e.g.* in the attitude of conscientious objectors towards public opinion and legislation during the War. I am not here, however, concerned with the question as to which party was right in this or any analogous case. For the fundamental issue lies in the insistence on the maintenance of some *objective* standard to which all subjective convictions and beliefs alike must be referred. The nature of this standard, and the degree to which individual attitudes conform to it, must always remain matter for controversy. I have already presented my own position at sufficient length, and can do no more than emphasize the objectivity of the ultimate criterion.

In the light of this criterion, then, moral evil becomes the endeavour to resist and defeat the diverse yet unified tendencies of universal evolution; or, to a less degree, mere neglect actively to advance these tendencies. Such neglect, however, passive though it appears to be at first sight, can never remain passive for long. For the self, being both real and systematic, is essentially dynamic; a completely inactive self therefore is a contradiction in terms.[1]

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 130 on the "moral self."

Continued indifference towards the good must rapidly develop into positive antagonism, mitigated though this may be by the apathetic character of the individual concerned, which can only be regarded as passive or neutral by comparison with some definitely active evil.

From this point of view, then, moral evil is unquestionably real. Its essential nature lies not in the mere absence of good; nor again is it incomplete good, nor "good in the wrong place"; and its reality remains totally unaffected by the fact that what is evil under certain conditions is good under others—by the relativity of good and evil, as this is often called. All these positions rest on sheer confusion and misapprehension of the meaning of the terms employed. Certainly the absence of good, in circumstances under which it ought to exist, is evil; but this is obviously something more than mere absence, since there must be some active influences at work opposing its development; otherwise it could not be said that it "ought to exist." Similarly an imperfect good takes on the aspect of evil whenever a higher good is actually possible but remains unattained; and this is but another phase of its absence under conditions which demand its presence; it is wholly different therefore from *mere* incompleteness. For if this point of view is adopted as final, every good without exception is obviously incomplete and therefore—if this argument be valid—evil. For every good without exception can be expanded and transcended; but to identify this with evil, by defining the latter as "incomplete good," is altogether illogical. Partial good *is* partial good, and not evil; every existent good, further, is partial; but it is not such imperfect good, as such, that is evil, but rather the failure to replace it by some possible higher form.[1]

The fact is that "good" and "evil" denote phenomena

[1] Exactly the same principle applies to Error. *Cf.* Bosanquet, *Logic*, vol. i, p. 383.

so extremely complex that it is impossible to apply the terms finally and definitely apart from a careful analysis of each separate situation as it arises. This difficulty may be regrettable, but it remains insuperable; and it is foolish to expect to employ the words with the same facility as square and circular, or white and black. These latter obviously describe entities of the simplest kind; whereas ethical concepts, on the contrary, concern the most complex of all reals—the reactions of evolving selves towards the Universe. Our difficulties therefore arise from the inherent complexity of our subject-matter; and although it is undoubtedly perfectly natural to say that a certain action is good, and another bad, in precisely the same way that we describe one figure as square and another as circular, still this can occur only when the situation has been somehow simplified in advance, and then generally recognized as amenable to certain current standards whose actual complexity is for the moment ignored. But whenever an exhaustive analysis of all the relevant conditions becomes necessary, as *e.g.* in a court of law or the discussion of national policy, then the underlying complexity of the phenomena at once becomes manifest, being expressed in every jury's difficulty in arriving at a clear verdict, and every political party's opposition to the policy of its rivals; with equal sincerity one regards as good what another takes to be bad.

2. As in other instances which have already been considered, however, there is nothing here that is peculiar to ethical principles. For precisely similar problems arise in the sphere of art, where what is beautiful to one observer is ugly to another; while even in geometry, where our concepts seem to have been defined with absolute rigour, the theorems of parallelism vary in accordance with the hypothesis of the nature of space. It is quite true therefore to say that all our concepts and judgments alike must be

relative to certain standards; there undoubtedly exists, in other words, a "Reign of Relativity," to adopt the title of Haldane's well-known volume. But both this truth itself, and the confusion which marks our actual opinions and attitudes, are far from implying that there is no final objective criterion, and that relativity therefore must remain our last word in these important matters. On the contrary, they bear witness to the fact that absolute standards of some kind or other do actually exist. Our confusion arises then not from their unreality, but simply from the baffling difficulty of ascertaining the exact nature of their infinitely complex structure; and in the long run our controversies serve to reveal this structure more and more fully to our comprehension, although by painfully slow degrees. "It is a common mistake," observes Eddington, "to suppose that Einstein's theory of relativity asserts that everything is relative. Actually it says, There are absolute things in the world but you must look deeply for them." Similarly Planck: "The concept of relativity is based on a more fundamental absolute than the erroneously assumed absolute which it has supplanted. The relativist concept must necessarily have the concept of the absolute as its foundation."[1] To take one of the simplest instances, the nature of space is undoubtedly of some definite character, although this cannot yet be finally ascertained and may indeed always remain undiscoverable;[2] nonetheless is this nature in itself definite, while further investigation may, and probably will, place the facts beyond doubt; and similarly, it may be, with the character of life and of consciousness.

Exactly the same principle holds true of the good, although its discussion is far more difficult, simply because its application is immeasurably more complex. There always exist a really objective criterion and basis of the good

[1] *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 23. *Where is Science Going?* pp. 194, 196; *cf.* p. 197. [2] *Cf. The Expanding Universe* (Eddington).

—my own suggestion being that these lie in the nature of the Universe; and the relativity which we must undoubtedly take into account then arises from the inevitably partial and differing conceptions of this Reality which are the best we can at present obtain. On the other hand it can scarcely be denied that our incessant controversies, when they are surveyed from a sufficiently broad standpoint and on a sufficiently large scale, are gradually yielding a deeper insight into the nature of these ultimate and objective criteria—intellectually in the discoveries of science, aesthetically in the refinement of culture, and practically in the advance, so slow as to be almost imperceptible, of social, political and international ideals. But we must recognize, still further, that we are dealing with selves within the Universe, which are not only extremely complex, but which are incessantly developing; and this at once implies that the conditions which govern the phenomena and determine our problems are continually changing. It follows therefore that even our truest concepts and highest ideals must remain always relative; but this signifies not their worthlessness and invalidity, but rather their steadily increasing participation in the nature of the infinite Whole.

3. Insofar then as evil is the resistance to, or the neglect of, this universal evolution, it is a positive reality, and as such therefore not to be confused with the mere absence of the good, nor again with its incompleteness nor any of its supposedly obverse aspects. Evil always has its own systematic nature and its own definite dominant ideals, each of which is one form of its ultimate ideal—resistance to the course of universal development. But before the term can be applied—before our final judgment can be given on the goodness or the evil of any given situation—its complexity (to repeat) must be effectively analysed so that its various aspects may be correctly distinguished; and unless this

difficult task is properly accomplished the result can only be a greater or less confusion. Every intricate legal enquiry is a patent instance of this; for legal procedure, at bottom, is simply the attempt to give due precision and importance to a complex mass of principles which are really moral, because they rest on considerations of public policy and national welfare;[1] and we may—for argument's sake—make the largest allowance for all defects of legal pedantry and precedent without invalidating the truth of this principle.

In the specifically ethical sphere, then, motives and consequences, agents and conduct, ideals and the methods of their realization, must all be carefully distinguished from one another. Some of these may be evil while their associated factors are good; but this patent fact, no matter how involved it may render our final verdict and attitude, does not imply the relativity, much less the universality, of the evil taken in itself. An evil motive, *as* a motive, is nonetheless evil because it brings about, deliberately or unconsciously, a good result; and our estimate of the agent's character must depend on whether we regard motives alone, or consequences alone, or both taken in conjunction, as the factors which should be taken into account. In all ethical speculation the same rule must be adopted as is applied in scientific investigation —the precise conditions of the situation must be determined and agreed upon as definitely as is possible before any discussion of the problem begins. Very often, of course, this cannot be done satisfactorily to all the parties concerned; and the same is obviously true of every legal dispute; nonetheless is the principle more or less clearly discerned, and its application would prevent any attempt to form a hasty estimate of a highly complex situation and to describe it summarily as good or evil.

[1] This becomes obvious in the judgments delivered by the Courts of Appeal and the House of Lords, and still more in the legislation which these occasionally necessitate.

Evil then is real, first because it always has a definite organization and structure, but secondly and more fundamentally, because it is essentially active and dynamic. It is *resistance* to, or *conflict* with, the evolution of the Universe; while so far as the self, as such, is concerned, it is *deliberate* resistance or conflict; it is, in other words, once again a matter of will. When the conditions are thus described it becomes possible to select some of them which, as isolated from the others and viewed apart from the whole, appear to share in the character of the good. It is this fact that really causes evil to be looked upon as being, at bottom, a form of good—as incomplete good, or "good in the wrong place." We have already found instances of this partial analysis in the good results of actions springing from bad motives, and the sincerity of persons who commit what are subsequently seen to be obvious wrongs. But it is still better exemplified in the familiar insistence on the principle that every end and every action must appear desirable in some way or other, otherwise it would not be pursued nor committed at all. In other words, no matter how evil an act may be, it must still seem good to the agent, or he would never be inclined to do it; hence, it is concluded, evil is really a kind of good—"good in the wrong place."

But the fallacy of this contention is obvious. It really consists in isolating one factor in the whole highly complex situation—that is the patent desirability of the actual end in view—and then employing this isolated and subordinate character as the ultimate basis of our final judgment about the general nature of evil, or at least as an indispensable factor in forming that judgment. It is therefore both an argument from the particular to the general, and an ignoring of the relative importance and weight of the various conditions; and it is extremely significant that a similar standpoint is never taken up in problems of knowledge and aesthetics. No one would maintain that because a single

assertion or inference in a fallacious proof was logical, therefore the final conclusion was true, or was some form of truth; nor that if a part of a symphony appeared beautiful to the composer, therefore the entire work must be beautiful, or some form of beauty; and one can only conjecture that this argument is often adopted in ethics because the complexity of the phenomena has baffled the logical insight of the enquirer.

4. The issue plainly turns on the nature of the final criterion. If this is to be the judgment of the agent alone, and if, again, his judgment is to rest on desirability, then the only possible conclusion is that the good is whatever, at any given moment, seems good to the individual concerned; and then, since not only all hope of mutual agreement at once disappears, but equally all permanence in the successive judgments of the agent himself, our use of "good" and "evil" becomes thoroughly relative and subjective, and all our objectivity vanishes completely. But not in ethics alone; for we must apply this conclusion universally; and then the true is what seems to be true, and the beautiful what seems beautiful, to each separate individual at different times and under different circumstances, and this with no limitation whatever of their diversity and mutual opposition.

So ridiculous a standpoint has no more validity in ethics than in any other sphere of experience; and when we turn from mere desirability[1] to any of the wider criteria that are generally adopted it is only necessary to apply these to the act itself, or to the character of the agent, taken in their entirety, to perceive that these may possess a nature that is positively, and never merely negatively, evil, insofar as their definite nature contradicts the equally definite nature of our criterion, whatever that happens to be. For again it

[1] *Cf.* on "Desire, Reason and Value" in fuller detail *The Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation,* chap. xiii.

must be remembered that we are dealing here not with static entities which may be passively compared with each other, but with essentially dynamic factors which actively oppose one another; and when thus interpreted in the light of its specific ideals, its distinctive organization and its essential activity, evil must be described as positive, concrete, real.

On the other hand evil is always directed against a higher form of Reality than itself—that is against the good, which, as finding its basis in the nature of Reality, must itself be the supreme real; while against the course of universal evolution—simply because it *is* universal—no evil whatever can maintain itself permanently. On the contrary, the more it expands and asserts itself—that is to say, the more evil it becomes—the more must it involve itself in self-contradictions and confusion, because it thus comes into ever wider and closer contact with the main tendencies of universal development—organic, intellectual or social as the case may be; and the final stage of such a conflict must be its utter annihilation. The persistent attempts, throughout the history of science, to modify theories in themselves invalid so as to incorporate them within the entire content of knowledge, are familiar examples, the point being that their own fuller explication itself involves their ultimate disproof and final rejection. Similarly with slavery and (it may be) prohibition in the United States; and all such instances reveal the real meaning of evolution when it is considered, as it ought to be, on the widest possible scale—the *self*-stultification of every activity that hinders or opposes the continuous advance that has actually occurred and still continues.

On the other hand, the fact that evil always possesses a definitely organized constitution implies that its further development raises this constitution to an ever higher level of reality. So far therefore as any of its main elements can

be theoretically isolated and considered alone, they undoubtedly possess value. If, for example, we compare—but again on a wide scale—some of the characteristic social evils and crimes of civilization with the cruder wrongs of earlier societies, we find that the former manifest a far greater complexity and—in a certain sense—a higher refinement and subtlety. They make greater demands on intellectual capacity and the genius for organization; and when thus regarded in their full nature they exhibit that expansion and development of evil which has already been referred to. But as soon as we isolate some of the main factors of this complex situation, we at once perceive that purely in themselves they enjoy a high value; the financial ability of a successful speculator or of a large scale swindler, the military and political genius of an unscrupulous conqueror, even the high mechanical skill of many clever criminals—all these, taken simply as such and independently of their associated factors, are undeniably valuable and even good; and this again is often considered to be sufficient justification for the description of evil as "a form of good," or as "good in the wrong place." But (to repeat) this is just as logical—or illogical—as to describe error and falsity as a form of truth because, in a difficult but finally fallacious proof, some assertions are beyond dispute; or an ugly picture as beautiful because some lines are exactly straight or circular. Such isolation of secondary features obviously ignores or even contradicts the real essence of the whole situation—that is the fact that their dynamic activity has been subordinated to a tendency which opposes the universal tendency; and when we employ this dominant characteristic as our criterion, once again the positive nature of evil is unmistakable.

But although evil is thus finally self-stultified its active opposition cannot but have its own marked influence on the course of universal development, which then becomes

modified, or diverted or deflected, always in such a way as effectively to annihilate evil; and thus evil itself becomes a means or instrument of the development of good. But this in no degree detracts from its positive character as evil; in no sense are we ever justified in regarding it as a "form of good." For the supremacy of the good under these conditions actually springs wholly from its own nature and power, and in no degree from the nature of evil. Evil itself is not here converted nor transformed into good; it is simply destroyed by the activity of the expanding good. But whenever, on the other hand, a bad self deliberately abandons evil, and exerts its capabilities and gifts in the service of the good, then once again its earlier experiences must have a powerful influence upon its new development, no matter how keenly this influence is deplored. It is only in some such sense as this that we may justifiably speak of the "transformation of evil," or its "absorption" into some higher good. Evil is always a cause, and often a highly efficient cause. As such, it must ultimately have its due effect upon the trend of the evolution of the Whole which is the supreme Reality, and which ever directs itself so as

Out of our evil still to bring forth good.

XIII

IMMORTALITY

1. We found at the conclusion of Chapter XI that immortality must be considered in the light of the concepts of continuity and permanence. Too often, however, these attributes are taken merely as such—as vague abstractions having little concrete meaning beyond their connection with Time and its many patent difficulties. It must on the contrary be clearly recognized that permanence and continuity always involve inherent value, while value (still further) finds its ultimate basis in the nature of Reality. They are, therefore, attributes of definite structural characters of the Universe; they are qualities of the stable elements of its omnipresent organization, without which it could be only a chaos. These structural elements may be identified with the Eternal Ideas of Plato, provided they are not given an impossible transcendence isolating them from the world of actual experience, but are interpreted in all the detail revealed by modern knowledge. These Ideas, or forms or principles, must also be regarded as essentially dynamic; and this implies a self-development which demands neither the ultimate destruction of the structural elements nor—what really comes to the same thing—their absorption into a featureless "Absolute"—that ghostly creation of a shallow criticism that has completely failed to grasp the fundamentals of classical Idealism. For as Collingwood has remarked, "the formless and empty Absolute perished long ago in the fire of Hegel's sarcasm"; and similarly Bradley: "certain critics, in order to grapple more effectively with the Absolute, apparently think it well to begin by divesting themselves of everything like ordinary Common Sense."[1] On the con-

[1] *Religion and Philosophy*, p. 116; *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 249, *n.* I may refer further to my *Examination of James's Philosophy*, chap. v,

trary, genuine self-development consists in acquiring an ever greater definiteness even while this becomes incessantly more and more complex; and it is difficult to understand why this principle should present any obscurity, since it operates in the growth of every organism and the expansion of every society. In all such instances, as I have already pointed out, there undeniably occurs a profound transformation;[1] nevertheless it always remains possible to trace that underlying continuity of successive phases which is the very meaning of the term "evolution." The "great world engine improves itself as it goes along . . . this is the conception we must form of organic evolution"; "the process of building up more and more diverse and complex structures."[2]

2. If now we consider selfhood from the standpoint not of its finite limitations but of its potentiality, and if (further) it is regarded as never a "simple" structureless nucleus or centre but rather in its full complexity, it presents a definite degree of permanence and continuity, and therefore of value. But again it must be emphasized that the problem is to be approached not from the side of the finite self but from that of the Universe; while persistence is never the correlate of mere existence, but only of intrinsic value.

One or two familiar preliminary difficulties may be very briefly dismissed; for it is happily needless to refute the nineteenth-century theory that conscious experience is epiphenomenal; even the most extreme behaviourists scarcely go so far as this. Even if the self is not immortal, it is at least real while it lasts, provided it is looked upon

and *Basis of Moral Obligation*, pp. 228 *et sqq.* "James' remarks are the veriest travesties of the spirit of British idealism." (Leighton, *Phil. Review*, vol. 32, p. 628.)

[1] *Ante* p. 165; also below p. 189.

[2] Lotka, *Physical Biology*, p. 335. Lewis, *The Anatomy of Science*, p. 159.

as an organized system instead of a Humian sequence of transient psychical atoms. As such a system, further, it is legitimate to regard its apparently indispensable bodily basis as being part, if not the whole, of the natural means of its own production. This view accords with the general principle that each stage of development provides the instrument of the next advance; and although the actual transition from the material to the psychical still remains an insoluble problem, it is nevertheless impossible to rule out *a priori* the existence of psychical systems independent of organic structure, once the reality of these systems has been accepted. Psychical research may of course ultimately establish their independent existence by irrefutable evidence; it is indeed frequently argued that this has already been achieved. I prefer however to regard the issue as *sub judice* and to appeal to purely philosophic considerations.

But in asserting that selves are real, I do not mean that they are the only forms of reality, as McTaggart has maintained: "All that exists is spiritual . . . the only substances are selves, parts of selves, or groups of selves or parts of selves. We can only explain matter in terms of a conscious self, and to talk of matter existing without consciousness is absurd. Matter is so far from being the sole reality, of which the self is only an activity, that, taken by itself, it is not a reality at all."[1] The acceptance of this principle would reduce our difficulties appreciably, for it would relieve us from the necessity of considering the relation between mind and body, so far as the latter is in any way an independent reality, since "matter is simply our illegitimate inference from events in men's minds."[2]

It is impossible to discuss here, however, the many questions which centre on the reality of the material world. It

[1] *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 251; *Some Dogmas of Religion*, pp. 99, 100.

[2] *Some Dogmas of Religion*, pp. 99, 100.

must be sufficient to say that I regard matter as possessing a reality which is completely independent of human selfhood; it is not part of any human self, nor is it in any degree an "illegitimate inference from events in men's minds." Philosophically, this forms the realist standpoint; but at the same time, with McTaggart, I regard the Universe as fundamentally spiritual. For to say that matter is real independently of human selfhood still leaves untouched the problem of its relation to a supreme or divine self.[1] I need add only that it is unnecessary to appeal to any Berkeleyan principles, whether these are called subjectivism or idealism. The physical universe and finite mind thus become two independent types or forms of reality, neither of which can be theoretically transformed into the other, although the patent facts of their intimate interaction remain inexplicable with the knowledge now at our command.[2] This is true even in the light of the new theories of the electrical constitution of matter and energy; for electrons are no more mental nor spiritual than the "billiard ball" atom; they are simply far more intricate in structure.

In principle, then, personality possesses the inherent capacity for comprehending, in its knowledge, the ultimate nature of Reality, although always only partially and never exhaustively; and this not in any merely abstract intellectual way, but so as to become a dynamic element in the development of the Universe, free either to advance this or to retard it at its own pleasure. Its systematic structure, again, carries with it the perils of that stagnation which must always attend definite characteristics, as is apparent in the general tendency towards ossification in all institutions as such; while from a more technical point of view, the self is replete with Bradleyan contradictions. But it is

[1] I have discussed this subject in *Personality and Reality*.

[2] Myers' discussion of the subject in *The Absurdity of Any Mind-Body Relation* appears to me to involve a serious confusion of categories.

essential to note that none of these difficulties is fundamental—not even the last—since it is precisely the continued advance in self-development—the rise towards ever higher and more systematic organization—that in itself constitutes the resolution of these internal contradictions. Now it is this potentiality, and not the limitations of its finite forms, that is the true characteristic of selfhood. At the same time, of course, selfhood is not an abstraction separate from actual persons; it is always the concrete universal that realizes itself only in and through these, and realizes itself increasingly by means of their uninterrupted evolution.

It is not in itself inconceivable, therefore, that the self, in being continuous, persistent, valuable and real, may exist independently of its bodily basis, even if for this there must be substituted some other kind of "body"—spiritual or astral for example. For it is plainly evident that in the union of body and mind it is the latter that is rapidly gaining predominance, while the former—presumably in all its possible forms—is but the instrument wherewith mind influences the physical world; and if there actually exists between matter and thought some kind of Cartesian dualism, then some form of body-mind combination would seem to be always a necessity of the situation.[1] Further, the almost absolute contrasts between the material and the psychical constitute another weighty argument for the independent existence of the self. For it suggests that personality is a real entity of a wholly different order from its physical basis, so that the essential conditions of its existence lie in the sphere of the super-physical and cannot be fundamentally influenced therefore by any physical changes whatever.

All such considerations are however of minor importance. For granting the possibility of persistence, it is still from the

[1] Similarly as regards Spinoza's insistence on Extension, *Ethics*, Part II, Prop. II.

side of the Universe that the question must be ultimately considered; and we have seen that the characteristic responsive relation between self and Universe means that the self, in virtue of its triune nature,[1] must apprehend ideals of conduct of such a kind that its freely determined reactions thereto must either assist, or must delay, the course of universal evolution; for even the most active opposition can merely delay it, since to persist in such a conflict finally involves destruction; nothing can withstand the dynamic of the Universe. Deliberate hostility to this, again, is moral evil and may result in complete self-stultification; whilst on the other hand its furtherance is in itself the higher development of the good personality; so that what appears at first sight to be self-sacrifice is, more truly understood, the very making of the better self. Thus the advance of the self becomes in its degree identical with that of the Universe and is merged therein; nevertheless the self still retains its own individuality, though on an ever higher plane. From the very nature of all these ruling conditions therefore self-defeat and self-destruction are absolutely impossible. Rather does the individual thus become an integral factor of the universal dynamic, while at the same time realizing more and more of its own infinite potentiality by being increasingly purified from the internal contradictions that characterize every finite system as finite; these various developments all proceeding *pari passu.*

3. It is no valid objection to this principle to urge that any given personality is too trivial and insignificant to be thus regarded as an integral unit in the whole. For Reality, in the end, is constituted throughout by "insignificant" elements—by cosmic rays and photons, protons and electrons, atoms and molecules, infinitesimal changes and transitory

[1] That is as knowing, feeling and willing.

events. Now none of these is indispensable;[1] the influence of each, in fact, extends over the entire universe. "Each object," asserts Whitehead, "is in some sense ingredient throughout nature. . . . An electric charge is everywhere. The modification of the electro-magnetic field at every point of space at each instant owing to the past history of each electron is another way of stating the same fact;"[2] and, it may be added, a strikingly emphatic way, vividly presenting both the importance of every factor in the physical world and the incalculable intricacy of its interconnections. But there is no reason whatever for excluding the super-physical world from the operation of this principle; so that again it is at least conceivable that the self, as a complex psychic system, may survive the cessation of the functions of its bodily basis and instrument. Once more the issue turns on the *value* of the self, not simply on its nature; and on its value as a means towards the continued furtherance of universal development in accordance with all its previous phases, though on an always higher plane. Herein lies the essential contrast between a simple entity like an electron, or even a stable atom or molecule, and a highly complex systematic structure such as is the self; for the former possesses little, if indeed any, potentiality for self-development, except in so far as it becomes incorporated, without any inner change, within some reality wider than itself; while on the other hand the essential nature of personality lies in its capacity for endless expansion by comprehending

[1] *Cf.* further p. 292.

[2] *The Concept of Nature*, pp. 145, 146. "Ingredient" is a technical term meaning effective or causative; *cf.* Francis Thompson's well-known *Mistress of Vision*:

> Thou canst not stir a flower
> Without troubling of a star.

Jeans has expressed the same principle in terms of the baby's toy and the galaxy, in his *Universe Around Us*.

within its transforming self more and more of reality. The self, in other words, is essentially a *dominant* real.[1]

It may be argued, however, that the progress of the Universe would be equally well subserved by the total disappearance of any given finite individuals and the production of others. But the latter must either be like their predecessors, or unlike them. In the first case nothing whatever is gained by substitution, while there is no *prima facie* reason to suppose that any such groundless and costly process should occur; on the contrary what we actually find is self-development always brought about by unbroken *continuity*. In the case of dissimilar substitutes, again, the differences must be essential and not trivial, since merely minor changes would fall within the range of a continuous transformation. But the production of radically different beings, though certainly a gain, need not necessarily involve the destruction of selves as we know them, since the extent of the contrast would itself prevent the new types making any sufficient contribution to the new order, because they would lack some of the characteristics of their predecessors; while this suggestion once more ignores the principle, which is obviously so widely operative, that differences of degree must of themselves become differences of kind if they are only carried far enough.[2] If therefore the finite self is neither unreal nor insignificant the other arguments against its persistence have little ground. Once more the finite self must be regarded as necessarily a moral self, which means that it is inherently capable of freely becoming a more and more efficient agent in maintaining the evo-

[1] *Cf.* again *Personality and Reality*, cc. v, vi: "The Self as a Dominant Real."

[2] *Cf.* Whitehead: "The difference between a living organism and the inorganic environment is only a question of degree; but it is a difference of degree which makes all the difference—in effect, it is a difference of quality." (*Process and Reality*, p. 252.)

lution of the Whole.[1] This is the sole ultimate implication and basis of "morality," when this term is given its truest significance instead of being narrowly limited to petty issues of practical life; a standpoint which is as logical as it is to confine "poetry" to the poet's corner of a country newspaper, or "politics" to the affairs of a Central-American junta.

4. Finally, the objection is sometimes advanced that persistence after corporeal death need not mean immortality. On this point all the arguments that I have already put forward are just as applicable to every later stage in the existence of the self as they are to its human life. But here a much profounder and more difficult problem arises—that of the nature and status of Time. For persistence, whether temporary or eternal, obviously involves temporal concepts;[2] but if the ultimate nature of Reality is such that Time, being merely one appearance among other appearances, is not one of its essential attributes—if it be that "our weakness somehow shapes the shadow, Time"—then immortality loses its temporal character altogether, doubtless to assume a higher. But what this higher form may be is almost inconceivable, since all finite experience is itself temporal and is incapable of ever completely transcending this limitation—if it is a limitation. Yet the continued expansion of experience, even in the form in which we possess it, undeniably seems to assign to Time a status declining in its importance and validity. For every moment of any highly developed type of human experience is able, by means of memory, imagination and thought, to comprehend within itself a vast range of successive events, and thus to

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 140, *n.* 2.

[2] It may be, indeed, spatio-temporal, if space and time must always form a continuum, as some phases of current scientific theory appear to necessitate; this again raises the question of some kind of "body" for the self.

transcend the passage of Time itself so as to become in some way increasingly timeless. Perhaps this is due to the "shadow" giving place to "substance"; but in any case there arises a mass, or whole, of content that remains unchanging and therefore "simultaneous" throughout, although with reference to systems other than itself its character still remains temporal; and so, pursuing this suggestion so far as it will carry us, it becomes at least less inconceivable that the Whole, and also immortality as existence within the Whole, are literally timeless; beyond this its nature must remain

Unfelt, unseen, unimaged, all unknown.[1]

It may further be pointed out, however, that these super-physical finite types of real being must be, in principle, of the form of selves, however much they differ from human personality in their detailed content; in fact such a contrast is actually implied as the inevitable result of all self-development, with its ultimate transformation (already referred to) of differences of degree into differences of kind. So far, therefore, as this is true the persistence of selves would seem to be a less costly and uneconomical process than destruction and substitution.

But at the same time it must be clearly recognized that this unending self-development involves such far-reaching and thorough changes in the evolving personality as to constitute a veritable transformation; so that if it were

[1] A. H. Clough, "The Music of the World and of the Soul." In science the concept of a simultaneous whole appears to be perfectly logical: "a universe of determinate relations may be surveyed as a great whole in which past, present and future are one." (Cunningham, *Nature*, vol. 106, p. 786.) *Cf.* Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 250, *n.* 1: "If there is to be no supreme spiritual Power which is above chance and change, our own spiritual interests surely are not safeguarded. But, with any such Power, it seems to me nonsense to talk of the absolute reality of time"; here we must note the term "absolute"; for time, like every other existent, has its own relative reality. *Cf. ante* p. 24, *n.* 2.

possible to compare the final stages with the earlier the former would be unrecognizable. But this again is nothing new; for it is only our familiarity with the phenomena that prevents our seeing the same principle at work in the case of the embryonic, and the adult, forms of every organic structure, whether this is a living body or a developing nation; and just as the nation not only remains a nation throughout the entire developmental process, but (still further) becomes a nation in an ever truer and fuller sense of that term, so the transformed self is always a truer and fuller self; it realizes more completely the inherent potentialities of selfhood and so approaches more closely its highest possible level, while every achievement reveals still richer potentialities and brings them as it were within range. The self thus becomes increasingly identical with the whole of Reality, even while its own expansion, taken together with that of countless others, continuously modifies that whole itself and so renders impossible the attainment of any *absolute* identity. For we must remember that the whole of being is not a static and finished system—a "block universe"—which may be gradually approximated to. It is rather the unity formed by its own eternally evolving elements; and it is these, therefore, that of themselves prevent any given element from ever becoming absolutely one with the whole. An illustration may make this point clearer: if a multimillionaire were to decide to seize all the wealth in the world, he would find his attempt defeated by the incessant production of additional wealth brought about by his own financial and commercial necessities; certainly he himself might become still richer, but he could never monopolize all the world's riches. Similarly the good self, although it becomes more and more one with the whole, can never become absolutely identical with it. On the contrary, it would continue to manifest its own distinctive attributes increasingly, in the same way that every great

nationality, even while it grows more closely united with others, continues to develop its characteristic qualities. In this respect it is of the highest significance that one of the most important "distinctive attributes" is that of dominance over the environment, equally in the case of the individual and the social group.

5. In the light of these considerations such phrases as the "absorption" of the self in the Absolute, or its radical "transformation," by no means imply the final destruction or disappearance of personality. On the contrary, they may be taken to denote its unceasing higher self-development; indeed many of Bradley's observations support this contention. For he maintained in the first place, but in a wider sense than my own, some form of identity between the finite self and the Whole:[1] "My finite centre from the first and throughout is one thing directly with the all-embracing Universe . . . the most intimate feeling and the simplest experience of a pleasure or pain is experienced by the whole Universe. . . . That foundation and agency from and by which my self is generated, and through which alone it persists, is one thing with the whole Universe." It is impossible to express identity more completely and finally; but nonetheless "my self may rightly be called a *necessary* and even an *indispensable* element in the world. . . . And when I hear, for instance, that in the Absolute all personal interests are destroyed, I think I understand on the contrary how this is the only way and the only power in and by which

[1] The mode of this identity however is here immaterial; it is the implications of identity as such that are important. Even the word "absorption" need cause little difficulty here. It is often said that a person is "absorbed" in his work, or duty, or study, or his children; but this need not mean that he is destroyed. On the contrary, it frequently means that he is thereby realizing his own highest nature most effectively; and I can find no reason for refusing to follow this usage in Idealist philosophy. *Cf.* Muirhead, *The Platonic Tradition*, p. 440.

such interests are really safe."[1] The finite self, therefore, is "necessary" or "indispensable"; and if this is true of its human form, it must equally, in view of Bradley's insistence on the principle of self-development, hold of all its future phases, even though these, too, are all finite.

With this standpoint Bosanquet's later position is in complete agreement. He likewise insists upon the continuity between the self and the Universe. "The soul or self" (in the first place) "has an apparent individuality and a certain seeming persistence in time. Yet it has no barrier of division against the absolute, with which it is continuous." But (secondly) "this continuity does not bar private pre-existence or survival."[2] If therefore we give due weight to the thoroughgoing transformation which constitutes the unceasing evolution of the self, we may accept this author's protest against too restricted an interpretation of its nature.

Recognizing, to begin with, that "the annihilation of the positive and concrete self" is not imperatively demanded by his general theory, he proceeds to insist on the impossibility of limiting selfhood to "formal distinctness, numerical identity, the identity with myself as a bodily being." These attributes constitute "the formal and exclusive self"; and over against this must be placed the supreme end of all existence—"the eternal reality of the Absolute as that realization of our self which we instinctively demand and desire."[3] This principle, once again, cannot be repudiated; but at the same time it follows from the foregoing considerations that the self, from its very nature, can never be merely "formal and exclusive." Certainly it is often thus regarded; and it may even become such by deteriorating. Narrowness, egotism, pharisaism, pomposity—all these are marks of the "formal and exclusive self"; that is, however, of the self

[1] *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 247–9; my italics; *cf. ante* p. 188 *n.*

[2] *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 130 and note.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 287, 288.

that is defeating its true purposes and so progressively degrading itself. It is in truth ceasing to be a self, in the proper sense, at all; like many organisms it is pursuing the path to parasitism and ultimate destruction. Personality, in other words, is essentially concrete and (as it evolves) more and more inclusive. This is simply an alternative expression of the principle of the increasing dominance of the self which I have maintained elsewhere;[1] and thus we may advance beyond the merely negative position that "it is impossible to deny that there may be future gradations of experience continuous with our finite selves," to the more positive view that some increasingly timeless form of individual immortality is the logical corollary of the relation of selfhood to the Universe.

The further connection between this standpoint and the problem of the reality of a supreme personality which, being supreme, is therefore divine and perhaps in some sense absolute, is obvious; but the question of the relation between selfhood and Deity is altogether too large to be embarked upon at this stage of what is only intended to be a very general survey of religion, apart from any detailed discussion of its specific types.[2] It might, indeed, detract from whatever merits the foregoing discussion may possess. For it may be that the really important matter, after all, is not so much whether a religion is of a low or a high type in any final sense, but whether it is of the highest possible character relatively to the actual stage of development of the individual or society.

6. These considerations, still further, provide the best standpoint from which to approach the question of "future rewards and punishments" of life and character; and they seem to emphasize the familiar principle that, so far as "reward" enters into the situation at all, virtue is its own

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 186, *n.* 1.

[2] *Cf. ante* p. 182, *n.* 1.

reward; or, with Spinoza, "Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself." But the terms punishment and reward must first be purified from their current mechanical and arbitrary significance. They must be regarded, that is, as simply the perfectly natural consequences of certain given conditions—as the inevitable effects of precedent causes. It must at the same time however be clearly recognized that the cause-effect relation operates here not in the physical sphere but in a *moral* world; and the difference that this change in the conditions makes is generally radically misunderstood. For the sphere of moral action is, always and essentially, the sphere of freedom; and it is therefore often felt to be altogether impossible for true freedom to exist in a causally governed Universe. Causation is then identified with a fatalistic and external mechanism—that is with the antithesis of genuine freedom; and it is quite naturally sought to exclude its operation from the realm of personality and moral action.[1]

The real state of the case is, however, altogether different from this. As I have argued at greater length elsewhere, the Universe is characterized throughout by determination;[2] but the modes of this determination vary according to the type of organization at any given stage. Wherever organization is comparatively simple, as it is in the physical or material world, there the action of the constituents upon one another must be mechanical. For each remains external to all the others, and influences them therefore externally or from without; and this, in principle, is what is meant by purely physical causation. It is a further obvious logical consequence of this relative simplicity of all physical structure that the connections between the various factors are easily discerned, as is, for example, the case in physical phenomena when compared with vital or psy-

[1] *Cf. e.g.* A. E. Taylor, "The Freedom of Man," *Contemporary British Philosophy* (Second Series).

[2] *Cf. ante* p. 118, *n.* 1.

chical;[1] and this again means that the ruling causal relations can be quickly discovered, and also clearly expressed by mathematical calculations or closely analogous formulae.

It must be noted further that one of the most important aspects of evolution, in all its various modes, consists in the gradual advance in complexity of organization. Now this in its turn necessarily involves a slow yet profound change in the *mode* of determination. To repeat, determination always persists; it never ceases, never gives place to some "indetermination," as is contended *e.g.* by Bergson. But the continuous increase in complexity has two inevitable consequences of fundamental importance. In the first place the omnipresent determination becomes transformed, though by infinitesimal degrees, from the "external" or mechanical type characterizing the simple structures of the physical world to that "internal" type which is found operating within all the more complex living organisms. During the further course of evolution towards still higher grades of complexity, this internal determination finally becomes "*self*-determination" in the true sense of that term; while as the recent course of international politics has clearly shown, "self-determination" is synonymous with liberty or freedom. Freedom therefore, so far from being antithetic to universal determination, is really identical with

[1] It must be emphasized that the difficulties are here essentially relative to the governing conditions. I do not mean to assert that investigation in physics is easy; the infinitesimal magnitudes of the processes and entities in themselves present enormous difficulties. But waiving this consideration, it is obvious that the structure of organic bodies, and the course of biological processes, are far more complex, and therefore more difficult to analyse and explain, than purely physical and chemical processes. "Psychology is about as much more complex than biology as biology than physics." (Haldane, *Possible Worlds*, p. 184.) "The simplest problems of all are those of the mathematician. His materials—number, space and time—are uniform in behaviour; he can isolate his problems from all outside interference." (Sidgwick, *Science*, vol. 73, p. 270); *cf.* Planck's discussion of these points in *Where is Science Going?*

its highest possible form as *self*-determination; and this introduces the second necessary result of the continuous advance in complexity. For since determination is one with causation, it follows that even self-determination, or freedom, is also always causative. Only that extreme intricacy of all self-determining processes, which is the natural consequence of their complexity of structure, inevitably renders the discovery of their detailed causal interconnections a matter of the greatest difficulty, and often indeed, with the resources at our disposal, a matter of impossibility. But this is merely a practical obstacle which is rapidly being overcome in the spheres of biochemistry, biology and psychology as successfully as in the sphere of physics. It cannot therefore invalidate the principle that causation operates, and under proper conditions may be accurately observed, in all the phenomena of personality and of conduct. For it is becoming increasingly clear that this principle must form the basis of all efforts at educational advancement and social reform; since it is obviously only insofar as we can anticipate the results—*i.e.* the "effects"—of our efforts (which thus become "causes") that we can arrange our plans for action. Once more it must be pointed out that it is simply the extreme complexity of the ruling conditions, not any inherent impossibility of the existence of causal agencies, that makes our ethical and social theories so ineffective and thereby condemns us to pursue "hit or miss" methods that are disastrously expensive and disappointing. But when the historian enquires into the causes of the Great War and the sociologist analyses the causes that determine some abnormality in the individual or group, they are obviously, inevitably and logically adopting exactly the same mode of procedure as the astronomer or the chemist; only they are applying this method to problems infinitely more complex.[1]

[1] *Cf.* the quotations from Gaviola and Jeans, *ante* p. 118, *n.* 1.

7. All this implies, then, that the consequences of any given course of conduct are its natural effects in precisely the same sense that the melting of wax is the effect of heating it. Whenever we trace these consequences beyond the personality of the agent himself this becomes obvious. The social results of honesty or intoxication, for example, are simply the effects of certain definite causes, which as such, and insofar as their highly complex nature permits, are capable of observation and regulation. But it must be repeated that moral action is essentially free action; it is the action of the individual himself, or in other words it is self-determined—determined from within. To a certain degree this is universally true, even in the physical world; for "action and reaction," according to the familiar Newtonian law, "are always equal." But all physical structures, again owing to their relative simplicity and consequent rigidity, possess scarcely any capacity for self-development; they remain on the whole what they were at the beginning—although, again, never absolutely so. Living organisms on the other hand plainly manifest a fairly high power of self-development; while in moral personality self-development has become inherent and uninterrupted. The consequences of every moral act, therefore, must be both external and internal. They influence the outer environment, but they also, and in a far more important sense, influence the agent himself and so modify his nature, or his "moral character" in the ordinary and rather superficial sense of that term; but if we use it as the equivalent of personality we apprehend its true meaning much more adequately.

The individual, in short, produces effects upon himself in and through his own action; every deliberate act makes him a better, or a worse, individual; and it does this, in a certain very real sense, unalterably. For it is rarely possible to obliterate entirely the external consequences of any deed; but it is practically, if not indeed literally, impossible to

destroy its internal consequences—its effects upon the character and personality of the doer. It is true that remorse and repentance have their due place; but these themselves always betray some fundamental change in the nature of the moral agent, while at the same time they carry this change still further.

Every moral act thus brings with it its inevitable and natural consequences or effects, advantageous or detrimental as the case may be; which depends on the standard that is adopted. Industry and thrift, for example, bring their "reward" if wealth be our criterion; but if the result is miserliness they are surely "punished"; and to multiply such instances is superfluous. Once more we must fall back on the ultimate criterion of "the good" as being the process of universal development, of "good action" as what contributes to this process, and of the "good self" as voluntarily pursuing this at all cost and sacrifice; and this effort itself initiates that further development and advance of personality which may continue, in principle, infinitely. But this incessant expansion occurs in a *conscious* personality, which is always capable therefore—again in principle and excluding the limitations due to its finiteness—of apprehending and fully realizing this slow self-transformation; and whether this is regarded as "reward" or as "punishment" turns, once more, on the actual criterion applied either by the agent himself or by external observers. In the light of an inadequate or false comprehension of the ultimate criterion of good these natural consequences—"effects"—cannot but appear either as "penalties" or "punishments" irrationally inflicted, as were all the sacrifices demanded by the War, or as "rewards," as in the case of the splendid results of war profiteering. But it requires only a simple revival of our final criteria to alter our whole point of view; and the further application of this general standpoint to any "future life" appears to me to be too obvious to require detailed discussion.

"Virtue" must cease to be regarded, as it too frequently is, as an abstraction, as the attribute of a personality aloof from the world and immersed in the contemplation of either his own or the divine excellence. It must rather be interpreted as the concrete characteristic of moral individuality that has voluntarily made itself one with the unending advance, and which thus, in its own infinite self-expansion, reaps "virtue" as its own reward.

This is plainly only another description of the individual as "an integral factor of the universal dynamic, realizing more and more of its own potentiality," and thus producing "effects upon himself through his own action."[1] In this manner are saint and hero created. Now it seems most significant that what are unreservedly acknowledged to be the finest saintliness and the noblest heroism are achieved by the voluntary sacrifice of life for some high cause. Whatever deprecatory allowances we may choose to make for fanaticism and impulse, for misjudgment and bigotry, it will always be true that the deliberate acceptance of death for the sake of principle, in the spirit of Socrates—to select one from countless instances—is the greatest conceivable achievement of finite selfhood; on the other hand, to evade this crucial test is to impair, if not indeed to destroy, a whole life's attainments. The individual must certainly have been a *potential* hero always; nevertheless it is death, accepted and perhaps welcomed in this way, that sets the final seal of actuality on what was previously no more than a fine possibility.

Under such conditions, then, it is death that creates the hero or the saint in the most literal sense. Death actualizes what had hitherto been merely potential, so that lifelong effort and passionate desire find their supreme culmination, and selfhood attains the highest level open to it in the given circumstances, whatever detailed form these may take.

[1] Pp. 184, 196.

Now if death completely destroys personality, then the baffling paradox arises that precisely what creates the hero, or the saint, at the very same moment eliminates them absolutely; the splendid laurels are conferred only to be straightway taken away, so that the whole process of self-realization becomes a deceptive mockery. As though a great sculptor or painter, in giving the delicate finishing touches to some creation of his genius, some child of his spirit, should thereby reduce the labour of years to shapeless fragments. Must not we judge an artist who would act thus deliberately to be insane? and can we pass the same verdict upon the Universe?

XIV

THE SUPREMACY OF RELIGION

1. RELIGION, like the Absolute, may safely be trusted to look after itself, our immediate task being to see that conditions allow it a fair opportunity to do so. I have therefore attemped no more than an expression of the character of religion as universal, in the belief that each of its many diverse forms has true value for those who sincerely profess it, just as every language serves in its measure the purposes of life. But this no more implies that the values of these various types are equal than that all languages are equally valuable. On the contrary, the fundamental principle of the continuous advance in value must again be maintained.

But with this we return to my initial principle that humanity is inherently religious in precisely the same sense that it is inherently rational and moral.[1] Its innate reason, I suppose, would be unquestioningly admitted except by critics prepared to postulate the complete irrationality of their own arguments and conclusions. Similarly its moral character in some form or other; and once again we are not concerned here with the precise details. But that religion is an equally inherent characteristic of human nature is frequently denied, except in the sense of its being an ingrained illusion that is gradually discarded with the development of intellect.[2] This standpoint however seems to be valid only when the term religion is given altogether too narrow a meaning. For it is certainly true that error and illusion are universal elements in primitive religion, and that the advance of mind itself consists in their removal. But this is equally true of *all* the primitive forms and products of human mentality without exception—of early knowledge and art, ethics and philo-

[1] *Ante* p. 31. [2] *Cf.* Freud, *The Future of an Illusion.*

sophy—and by no means, therefore, peculiar to primitive religion. Nor does the evolution of the mind necessarily imply the final disappearance of religion any more than it does that of its allied cultures. For just as the only real corrective of crude art is a finer art, or of a faulty philosophy a more rational system of thought, so the sole remedy for a low type of religion is a higher type; while to contend that this continuous elevation of religion must end in its ultimate eradication is to argue that emptying the bath necessitates the loss of the baby; and what if the child is an infant Hercules?

Such an argument can be supported only by an altogether illogical identification of the essentials of religion with certain features which, though universally present in its original forms, are nevertheless incompatible with its higher types; a standpoint that is comparable to confusing the structural characters of the embryonic organism with the distinctive qualities of the adult. We must similarly recognize the necessary existence of embryonic religions, and also that the inevitable transformation of their crude attributes involves not the destruction of religion but rather its fuller development, exactly as in the case of the self within whose experience religion holds its place.

2. There are however three further considerations which cannot but appear, at first sight, to confirm this familiar adverse contention. The first is the fact that the progressive refinement of early religion is largely due to the rise of markedly contrasted forms and products of mental activity —of knowledge, science, philosophy, instinctive humanitarianism and even of art. The germs of these, of course, are all present from the beginning; but at that primary stage, as I have observed before, they are almost completely merged with, or dominated by, the well-developed and definite traits of contemporary religion. Primitive man, in other words, is—in his own way, of course—predominantly re-

ligious; his religion, such as it is, is also his ethics, his philosophy and his art; and the reason for this is plain. It is due simply to the highly emotional and passional character of primary human consciousness, closely akin as this still is to its animal origins, which must therefore continue to saturate, or even to swamp, the germinating rationality of the self; and this rationality, still further, finally gains control only after prolonged and intense mental conflict. It is therefore perfectly natural that this contest should at first sight present itself as existing between the rational, moral and aesthetic qualities of the mind on the one hand and its essentially religious aspects on the other, and that the increasing dominance of the former must thus seem to imply the ultimate disappearance of the latter. But any such antithesis is radically illogical. For the opposition is really not between the intellectual and the *religious* forms of experience, but rather between the rational and the *passional* or emotional;[1] only the latter, appearing as they always do at first in an intensely developed degree, inevitably give to primitive religion a character which must appear hostile to the later emerging non-emotional types of experience.

In order to give the standpoint that I am here criticizing its greatest possible force, I have thus far purposely connected art with science and philosophy; but it would obviously be more logical to unite art with religion, on the ground of their common emotional nature. If we now do this, it becomes possible to perceive that the influence of the evolving reason upon primitive religion is identical with its effect upon

[1] These may quite rightly be denoted by the word "feeling" in its technical psychological sense. But against this there are two practical objections which must carry weight in any non-technical consideration of the situation such as the above is intended to be. The first is the ambiguity of the term "feeling" in general usage; and the second is the comparative feebleness of the feelings in modern experience. I wish to emphasize here the extremely high intensity of "feeling" experience in all primitive mentality; its contrast with a civilized consciousness is patent.

primitive art; and this influence, patently, is not destruction but refinement, elevation, purification. It is necessary, of course, to give the term "reason" here its widest and deepest meaning as denoting the entire body of interconnected ideas or concepts—or, if preferred, ideals—together with the ever expanding volume of knowledge, and also the insight or "intuition" into the nature of Reality which such knowledge yields. From this standpoint, "reason" includes much more than the purely abstract and formal methods and results of logic, mathematics and the mathematical sciences, which are in fact, when rightly regarded, but sub-sections of reason. We may therefore, with Wordsworth, identify "reason in her most exalted mood" with imagination; for as Bosanquet has observed, "intuition, so far from being illogical, is the essential feature of the higher form of inference."[1] What actually occurs, then, is that the conflict just referred to, between the natural cruder emotions on the one hand and rationality on the other, ultimately results in the permeation of the former by reason. In ordinary everyday experience this seems obvious; and it is equally true, though certainly not so easily perceived, in all great art, where the inherent conceptual aspects of the mental activity lie concealed behind its much more prominent and vivid sensuous character. Quite similarly primitive religion became more and more permeated and saturated by reason—again, it must be remembered, in its widest significance; not destroyed therefore but transformed, in the sense of being purified and elevated.[2]

[1] *Implication and Linear Inference*, p. 94; *cf. The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 55; also, "The inner order and harmony whose name is reason" (Muirhead, *The Platonic Tradition*, p. 255); and Emmet, *Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism*, p. 239. This meaning of "intuition" plainly differs fundamentally from that assigned to the term by Bergson.

[2] "Speculative philosophy guards our higher intuitions from base alliances. Direct religious intuitions are in danger of allying themselves with lower practices and emotions." (Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 30)

3. The second point to be considered is that mentioned in the last footnote—the comparative weakness of all the emotional feelings in civilized experience. For their native strength is here seldom exhibited except when we revert to more primitive levels of behaviour, while the unrestrained expression of even their highest types frequently leads to distress. These conditions have inevitably had their due effect upon religion, which in all its early forms is necessarily extremely emotional; religion therefore, like its associated cruder feelings, has now become "a dog with a bad name." And yet it is not improbable that we moderns are somewhat over-intellectualized in the sense that the narrower and more specialized types of rationality have now acquired too great a dominance over our minds, so that we have become rather *too* logical, too scientific, too cool and detached. I am referring now only to attitudes and general tendencies, not to the detailed content of modern knowledge and philosophy, of which in themselves it is impossible ever to have too much. The modern mind has thus become badly balanced, without its due proportion and true perspective.[1] There is, however, no inherent necessity for thus weakening the emotions. On the contrary it is ideally possible to intensify passion at the same time that it is kept under proper control; just as it is possible to heighten steam-pressure or electric current voltage, always provided they are duly regulated. It must never be forgotten, therefore, that "religion is a matter of full-blooded emotion. Religious experience is always hot. Gone cold it has gone out."[2] Once again, what is really required is not the enervation of the emotional factors of personality, but rather their elevation—their fuller development, if only they remain directed towards high ends and purposes; or become "sublimated," to adopt a valuable

[1] *Cf.* p. 252.

[2] Marett, *Faith, Hope and Charity in Primitive Religion*, pp. 162, 15; *cf. ante* p. 57.

term from psychotherapy. This, in consonance with my entire argument, can be brought about only by the influence of a profound reason; and the recent pleas that have been frequently advanced for the freer play of impulse and instinct are perfectly legitimate, except insofar as they lose sight of the imperative necessity for incessant rational direction and guidance.[1]

4. A third source of the prevailing confusion on this subject lies in the close reciprocity that has hitherto existed between religion and philosophy—a relationship in itself natural and indestructible simply because of the connection between theology and religious experience, But for the purpose of my argument, and not because I believe it to be true, I shall here concede that the further advance of philosophy necessitates the vanishing of all religion; and then, surveying their past common history, I shall try to show that my purely dialectical concession finds no warrant in this history itself, whatever other grounds it may possess. For philosophy is simply the attempt to give rational expression to the whole of experience, though at the same time philosophy is itself an element in that experience;[2] it is what James happily called "the obstinate attempt to think clearly." The content of religion, therefore, being that with which man has been from the first intimately familiar, has always furnished abundant subject-matter for philosophic speculation. But it is a commonplace that the track of philosophic thought is thickly strewn with the skeletons of dead systems—this being, indeed, one frequent argument against the value of all philosophy; although, curiously enough, the existence of similarly antiquated

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 112.

[2] In order to exclude any subjectivist interpretation of this view I may add that all experience is in one way or another the experience of objective reality. On this principle *cf. ante* pp. 78, 137, 165.

scientific and political theories is conveniently ignored, and never advanced as a reason for the cessation of all science and all politics. And yet this argument is carried still further; for it is pointed out that all philosophic attempts to present religious principles have failed—an assertion that is, admittedly, to some degree quite true; and from this it is inferred that these principles themselves are either false or unintelligible, and therefore wholly valueless.[1] But such a conclusion is surely patently fallacious; for whatever failure there has been is due, not to religion itself, but rather to the philosophy that has sought to interpret it; and the alternative is at least conceivable that this perennial lack of success arises from the extreme complexity of all the phenomena, and the consequent inability of systematic thought to comprehend and present them. For the conditions are (in principle) precisely the same with regard to science and social theory. There exists as yet no satisfactory philosophy of these matters, simply because the task of constructing a thoroughly coherent rational system is at present completely beyond the power of the human intellect. Yet no one would argue that scientific phenomena are therefore unreal or social experience fallacious; again it is clearly recognized that their theoretical difficulties are too great to be completely solved by any current philosophy. But the same conclusion, obviously, is perfectly logical when applied to religion; and to maintain that this is valueless, because it has never yet been given fully rational form, is simply to impute the incapacity of thought to religion; the truth being that religion is so extremely complex as to defy—at present at least—every attempt at final intellective formulation.

This widely spread but quite fallacious attitude is never-

[1] This contention is very far from being so "modern" as it often takes itself to be. Hegel deplored "the same old opposition and contradiction which had already made its appearance among the Greeks." (*The Philosophy of Religion*, vol. i, p. 20.)

theless perfectly natural. For it springs from the intense and instinctive desire for a simple explanation of things—from the demand, in short, for a clear and simple philosophy. Humanity can ever say—

> Then to the rolling Heav'n itself I cried,
> Asking, "What Lamp had Destiny to guide
> Her little Children stumbling in the Dark?"
> And—"A blind Understanding!" Heav'n replied.

Man is very slow in learning the lesson that

> Earth could not answer, nor the Seas that mourn
> In flowing Purple, of their Lord forlorn;
> Nor Heav'n, with those Eternal Signs revealed
> And hidden by the Sleeve of Night and Morn.

A simple philosophy, in short, is an absolute impossiblity; "we must not expect simple answers to far-reaching questions";[1] the Universe is far too complex to provide them. It will ever merit Jeans' description, "The Mysterious Universe"; although, happily, this does not exclude that simple faith which satisfies the childlike heart. Against all this it must also be pointed out that, despite the constant war of its schools, there has been real progress in philosophy.[2] To deny this is merely to confess profound ignorance of its long history; although, once more, the intricacy of its fields of enquiry too frequently precludes the clarity that characterizes many of the conclusions of modern science.

5. To say however that no fully adequate philosophic expression of religious experience has ever yet been formulated does not mean that such an expression is inherently impossible, and that religious truth therefore must be accepted on the ground of its incomprehensibility. Nor are we committed, in another direction, to the Mansellian

[1] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 484.
[2] *Cf.* Muirhead, *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy.*

position that if religious principles can be understood, they cannot be true. I believe, on the contrary, that a religion which is inherently incapable of being philosophically presented can have but little value, although the profoundest depths of religious experience must ever outrange the sounding-line of human thought. But it must again be noted that religion is by no means peculiar in this respect; for it is equally true that neither in philosophy, science nor art can such finality ever be attained; and the reason for this is throughout one and the same. It lies in the impossibility of finite experience ever exhausting the infinity of the Universe; but it is altogether erroneous to regard this as excluding an expanding approximation of rational experience which, so far as it carries us, and so far further as it purges itself from self-contradictions and so becomes internally coherent, is real and valid.

I conclude therefore that the higher development of man's rational capacities by no means necessitates the ultimate disappearance of distinctively religious experience, provided this maintains an adequate temperature, although it inevitably effects a radical change in its character; but only—to repeat—in the same sense that it has similarly transformed the character of art. Once more we must recognize the fundamental fact of the indestructible *continuity* of consciousness throughout its entire range and evolution; and this in itself implies the more and more thorough permeation of each of its main aspects by all the others.

Regarded as a fact therefore, and quite apart from its truth as a general principle, this growing interfusion seems plainly visible in the history of culture—in the union between religion, art and thought in the great civilizations of the past as in the days of scholasticism and the *renaissance*. It is also quite true to say that in more modern times this primal unity appears to have been destroyed, and to have given place to that "conflict between religion and science," or

between religion and philosophy, which was so familiar to the thinkers of last century. This modern development, however, was due to the extremely rapid development of science itself, at a rate to which the older and more slowly moving cultures completely failed to accommodate themselves. The complex structure of the Universe suddenly presented itself to humanity under quite new aspects, demanding fresh methods of investigation and yielding a totally novel standpoint; and the final result could not but appear as a complete break with the past and the creation of an independent sphere of knowledge.

The consequent antagonisms were therefore wholly natural, and they indicate another most important feature of the present situation. For the extreme complexity that has now become characteristic of all modern experience can never be abolished, at least so far as its detail is concerned; and this plainly constitutes a very serious obstacle to the further advance of mind, since its instinctive desire for wholeness—for completeness of experience—remains always ineradicable, while the satisfaction of this innate desire has now become, and must ever remain, most difficult to attain. For a time, it may be, it will seem to be found in still higher specialization—in a deeper absorption in purely scientific investigation, or in artistic creation; and I should be the last to question the incalculable value of these and their allied activities. But it is surely already becoming evident—sometimes painfully so—that the ultimate result of these tendencies is but an unhealthy limitation of the personality, due to the steady atrophy of faculties equally indispensable with those that happen to be fully developed.

It is of course possible that I have exaggerated these difficulties of the modern situation. Complexity is always relative; and it may well be that the rise of Greek philosophy and the European *renaissance* fully anticipated our present-day dilemma. Each age best knows where the shoe pinches;

and if we may judge from the contemporary conflicts and martyrdoms, the misfit must have been felt very keenly. Nevertheless the remedy remains ever the same. The intricacy of modern experience—which reflects, it must be remembered, the complex structure of Reality—must be accepted as it stands, and neither evaded in scientific specialization nor eviscerated in philosophic abstraction. Nothing remains, therefore, but to seek the underlying principles of its fundamental harmony and coherence; and these, again, must proceed from experience itself in its wholeness, and not from the mere consciousness of any one individual—not even, it may be added, from his Unconscious; for they are inherent in the nature of Reality itself, and cannot be found in any impossible "experience" that is not somehow one with that Reality.

6. Finally, the expression of this inherent wholeness of experience will assume varying forms concordant with the main tendencies of the concrete content of man's life; it will therefore be emotional in great art, rational in a comprehensive philosophy, exhaustive in religion, and practical in conduct that conforms, as it best may, with this rigorous discipline. But apart from some type of religion—which must, in principle, be the highest that can under any given conditions be achieved—morality must always lack some essential part of its fullest development; it may be fine as far as it goes, but it will nevertheless remain somehow circumscribed and limited. What particular form religion must assume is, here, irrelevant, although from a different standpoint the question becomes of paramount importance.[1] In the present connection however my general definition will suffice—the responsiveness of man, as a whole, to his "universe," also in its wholeness; both man and "universe," further,

[1] *Cf.* Chapter XVI.

being infinitely self-developing, and so always self-transcending. For until this response is achieved man can be adequately conscious neither of himself nor of his world; either his individuality remains only partially developed, or it is inadequately coordinated. To some of the profounder elements of his own personality, as to the true nature of the world, he is thus blind and deaf; both his ethical theory and his practical code must therefore remain below their highest attainable level, until they are allowed to develop their deeper inherent significance and underlying implications, and to systematize these in some form of religion.

We must therefore guard against the deceptive impression that the incessant changes occurring within religion itself indicate either its essential instability or its gradual evanescence. At the very least such change is symptomatic of life, even if occasionally this life becomes feverish; it bears repeating that "religious experience is always hot." Still more truly, the change is something more than change—it is development; a development which is at bottom one with the evolution of life and mind, equally stamped as these are in all their manifestations with fluctuation, with rise and fall, appearance and disappearance, fruition and decay. Man will always cultivate each of his faculties independently; but this very independence itself demands, as it increases, an intimate reciprocity of all human capacities. Always, too, man must seek to unify these—to bring them all to one central focus of expression which can, however, no longer enjoy the childlike simplicity of earlier religions, but must reflect to the full the heightening complexity of civilized experience. And in this connection "civilized" implies the activity of the profoundest rationality, neither philosophically abstract nor scientifically pedantic, but rather instinct with the passion of great art and inspired by the imperatives of duty; intent not simply on the material amenities of life, but seeking these only as the instruments of

unceasing spiritual expansion; the rationality, in short, of the deepest thinkers, who are at the same time the finest poets and seers.

Such an endeavour, although since it is pursued within an infinite Universe it can never attain finality, can also never be futile. But it will always be attended by a recurrent dissatisfaction, as each new generation discovers the inadequacy of already established forms and replaces these by its own creations, which in its turn it naïvely assumes to be final. All this however is only the incessant life movement which is so frequently misinterpreted as instability; and the onward march of the human spirit must traverse many a hard-fought battlefield. Yet it tends always to one goal and follows the same star—hidden though this sometimes is by the clouds of doubt and despair—to that unitary expression of its reaction to its "universe," with which it seeks to maintain an unbroken contact on all sides of its diverse nature.

It should now be evident that this self-expression cannot become complete unless it is unified, nor again be properly unified unless it is complete. Whatever specific forms it then assumes—and the essential concreteness of its highest types will always demand some adequately definite form—must remain subordinate to the conservation of the wholeness of its content. So far as this becomes impaired, religion, in its truest sense, diminishes in value; and for this the cultivation of no restricted faculty can ever compensate. Neither the most ardent mysticism, while it is divorced from action, nor again the strictest moral life, if it is devoid of passionate (though not necessarily effusive) devotion—for here the stillest waters are ever the deepest—can maintain themselves permanently. Inevitably they become contaminated by self-generated and ultimately fatal disease, yielding beautiful but fragile hothouse blooms in the one instance, and in the other a repellent aridity which quickly passes into sheer pharisaism. Theoretically a "pure" morality is invaluable.

In actual life however it is on the same level of unreality as its allied abstractions, "pure" thought or "pure" science or "pure" logic; and just as the greatest poets have been the greatest thinkers so, in the history of the race, the greatest mystics have been the greatest doers.

XV

KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH

1. THE advance of the human mind beyond the animal level has been seen to consist, to a profoundly important degree, in the progressive development of the capacity for ideation and thought. At the same time, the principle of the continuity of experience implies that thought never ceases to permeate and influence the other main aspects of mind, so that these become fused into a true, though highly diversified, unity. It is at least possible, therefore, if not indeed necessary, that this *entire* experiential content should be given some articulate form of expression. Nevertheless, all the primary, or what is perhaps best called the pre-articulate, experience persists, even though it comes to be perceived in the new light of its articulate expression.[1] But it is never completely abolished nor destroyed. It continues to be what it was, although it increasingly presents markedly fresh aspects; while the "articulate expression" assumes any one of many widely diverse modes, ranging from the wordless rhythm of music to the cabalistic symbols of modern logic.[2] The continuity of consciousness, however, is manifested in the insensible shading off of each of these types of expression into others, although between the extremer forms themselves the contrasts appear to be almost absolute. But the slow and subtle developments of speech and grammar plainly exhibit the unbroken transition from a primitive mental content

[1] "Beethoven's search for his themes is merely the attempt to give definite visible shape to something already active and potent, though invisible and only dimly sensed." (Newman, *The Unconscious Beethoven*, p. 121; *cf.* pp. 127, 137, 151.) The writer cites the familiar analogue from Pascal. "By the continual living activity of its non-rational elements a religion is guarded from passing into rationalism." (Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 146.)

[2] *Cf.* p. 246.

almost animal in its intensity and lack of definiteness to the crystal-like precision of present-day science and law. Many people, again, still feel music to be a universal language, while on the other hand every fine picture, sculpture and building must be minutely exact throughout; and the same unity between keen emotions and precise definiteness of expression is the very soul of all great poetry,[1] as Coleridge maintained in his famous dictum that "no man was ever a great poet without being at the same time a profound philosopher." Thus the actual mode of expression, in brief, must always be relevant both to the mind's concrete content and the conditions governing the whole situation. On the other hand the uninterrupted advance of thought, *as* thought, means that more and more of this content may be given intellective or rational expression. Naturally this result is most easily seen in the case of art; and the value of competent criticism, as one obvious form of this "intellective expression," in enhancing the appreciation of poetry, music, painting and the drama is daily becoming more manifest. Every advance in science is an additional example of precisely the same principle, although we have become so familiar with this particular type of the expansion of knowledge that we remain blind to its true significance. For all scientific terminology—taken in its widest possible sense—is simply the most definite expression attainable of the character both of Reality and of experience, which must be given this articulate form in order to be intelligible; although this does not mean that art cannot also interpret the actual nature of the world in its own unique way.

2. Now since this tendency of the mind to confer upon

[1] It is perhaps best exemplified in Milton, in this particular respect the most technically artistic of all English poets; also, I think, in French poetry generally as compared with English. Hardy's delicate word artistry is another case in point; *cf. ante* p. 81, *n.*

both its object and its own content[1] some form of articulate expression is universal, it must include religion within its scope. The history of philosophy shows that this has always occurred in the past; and if the argument of the preceding chapter is sound the same connection between religious experience and its philosophic formulation must continue in the future.[2] I have however no intention of discussing any given philosophy of religion, but desire merely to investigate here the general basis underlying all such philosophies alike, with particular reference to the relation between knowledge and faith.

These two attitudes are usually contrasted with, or even opposed to, each other in far too great a degree. There is of course a vitally important difference between them; nonetheless are they inseparably connected in such a way that from one to the other there is an unbroken transition, so that whether the final attitude adopted is to be called faith or knowledge depends entirely on the conditions of each case; and when these conditions change there follows, necessarily, a correlative change from faith to knowledge, or, it may occasionally be, *vice versa*. This essential difference between faith and knowledge is expressed in the familiar phrases "I believe" and "I know"; and the contrast obviously applies to far more than religious experience itself, since it arises repeatedly in ordinary life and is emphasized by people who are as devoid of such experience as it is ever

[1] In view of my earlier arguments it must be recalled here that there is no absolute separation between content and object. On the contrary they tend always towards identity.

[2] "We asked whether the religious consciousness is only to be had through philosophy. The answer seems plain. Philosophy depends on the religious consciousness; the religious consciousness does not depend on philosophy. . . . The religious consciousness stands on its own foundation, and needs no support from philosophical theory, except by disengaging its essentials." (Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 229–32; *cf.* Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, vol. iii, pp. 148, 366; Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 449, 453.)

possible for human beings to be. They would say *e.g.* "I *believe* so-and-so will win the Derby this year," and "I *know* so-and-so won it last year"; and here it must be noticed that common beliefs of this kind are often inseparably associated with keenly felt emotions. It is altogether insufficient, therefore, to refer the difference between religious faith and knowledge to the presence of emotion in the first and its absence from the second. Galloway appears to have overemphasized this feature of the situation. "The developing religious consciousness," he remarks, "is distinguished from sheer matter-of-fact belief by its strongly emotional tone, and also by a reference to something more than is directly given."[1] But both "strongly emotional tone" and "reference to something more than is directly given" are obvious characters of the common belief just cited, together with countless other beliefs similar to this; so that although they undoubtedly serve as indications of the depth and reality of religious experience in itself, still they cannot be accepted as absolute criteria definitely distinguishing faith, as such, from knowledge, again as such; while even the knowledge of the Derby winner usually arouses deep emotions too.

3. But despite the difference between these two experiences that are thus expressed in "I believe" and "I know," there is this marked resemblance between them—they are both revealed in judgments, propositions or sentences;[2] or, in other words, both knowledge and faith alike can assume some degree of definite articulate form, intelligible either to the experient alone or to others as well as himself. In the case of knowledge this development is obviously indispensable; it is impossible to say simply "I know" and

[1] *The Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 302, 303; if "matter-of-fact belief" expressly excludes emotion the statement is tautologous.

[2] Any technical logical distinction between these is here immaterial.

nothing whatever more; "to know" is to be able to say, more or less fully and precisely, what it is that one knows. And while it may be, on certain occasions, possible to say "I believe" and then stop altogether, this is highly exceptional. Most generally these words also precede an intelligible utterance of certain content—facts, principles, ideals, truths—which might either, did the conditions permit, be preceded just as it stands by "I know," or would require merely a formal and not a substantial modification for this purpose. This I take to be true of the creeds and confessions of many modern churches, especially in their references to historical and biographical facts; and even where the use of these is dispensed with for any reason—and here of course I am discussing neither the value of creeds nor of their explicit adoption and enforcement—still it is possible, and often usual, to present the content of belief in such a way that it might—again if circumstances justified this step—be said to be not merely believed but known. It is possible indeed that some would go farther even than this, and would say that, for themselves, they actually knew this, that and the other, rather than believed it as the majority of their fellows did.

This last attitude is highly suggestive, for it closely resembles the everyday distinction that is drawn between belief and knowledge. We say that we know something to the degree that we are certain of it; and at that point, wherever it may arise, where we find our certainty beginning to cease, we say we believe; while in legal evidence this distinction frequently assumes paramount importance. So far as practice is concerned, of course, this change may make no actual difference; for we are often prepared to act according to our beliefs quite as definitely and assuredly as we are upon our knowledge. In fact, since belief is frequently connected with matters of more importance than is knowledge, this feeling of practical assurance is corre-

spondingly greater too; and at bottom this attitude amounts to saying that we will act *as though we were certain* of our grounds for such action, although at the same time we recognize that we are not, and cannot at the moment be, thus certain. This may be called the application of the Kantian "as if" to daily life; and if the terminology is considered helpful the distinction in question may be called that between "practical" certainty and "theoretical." This distinction, however, is by no means so marked as these terms suggest; for the "practical" attitude is generally found to rest on a more or less vague feeling or conviction, desire, or even some further belief, that the content of the belief is really capable, in principle and as apart from our ignorance, of being given theoretic substantiation. At the moment this requisite support is unattainable; but the "practical" standpoint is most generally adopted *in lieu* of this, and not in *opposition* to it as is so generally supposed. On the contrary, whenever definite reasons arise for regarding any belief as theoretically invalid, then this belief—apart from emotional attachment to it or, too frequently, from sheer obstinacy—is considerably weakened; while when the disproof is actually provided, it is abandoned.

4. All these considerations may be summed up in the principle that knowledge, as such, is superior to faith or belief, as such, in the sense that on all occasions when the content of the first conflicts directly with that of the second, it is the latter that must give way. Perhaps an alternative statement of this position will be still more readily accepted, provided it is recognized that this involves no change in the principle. Belief or faith, then, is regarded as being *equivalent* to theoretic certainty;[1] it is acted upon because it takes the place of this; it is abandoned whenever certainty is irrefutably shown to be lacking; and it is felt further,

[1] *Cf.* however p. 221, *n.* 2.

though it may be subconsciously, that completer knowledge would actually establish the requisite certainty. In this connection it is perhaps not so generally known as it should be that Roman Catholic dogma is held to be thus capable of rational proof; for as Dean Inge has pointed out, "a papal decree of 1855 declares that rational conclusions can prove with certainty the existence of God, the spiritual nature of the soul, and the freedom of the will;"[1] and although, further, "faith is above reason, there can never be any real disagreement between faith and reason . . . not only can faith and reason never contradict one another, but they mutually aid one another, for right reason proves the foundations of faith."[2] I am not here discussing the merits of this specific standpoint, but simply illustrating the general principle that faith is held, either explicitly or implicitly, to be equivalent to theoretic certainty, if not indeed to some still higher form—*e.g.* revealed or divine—but nevertheless also certainty. The development of Descartes' philosophy in its relation to Scholasticism and to Scholastic theology provides another example of the same fundamental situation.

It is, however, undoubtedly somewhat difficult to perceive this underlying equivalence between faith and theoretical certainty. For in the generality of cases the entire mass of experience concerned remains so crude and ill defined, so near the "primary and pre-articulate" level discussed in Section 1, that it is almost impossible either to express the content or belief with due precision, or to advance its actual grounds, or to present the kind of certainty which it is presumed to possess. And yet, despite this lack of exact formulation, the faith is felt to be so precious and so effective that these deficiencies scarcely detract from its value; "perhaps the noblest," indeed, "abjure their own ease not

[1] *Faith and its Psychology*, p. 178.

[2] H. B. Coxon, *Roman Catholicism*, pp. 27, 28; condensed, but formally authoritative.

rationally but impulsively."[1] It is not at all surprising therefore that religious belief should be so commonly regarded as, if not actually antithetic to reason and knowledge, at least vitally different from them; and since, as I have just said, faith is so indispensable and intimate, it is perfectly natural that its distinctive attribute should then be held to be some form or other of value. To knowledge, on the other hand, our attitude is inevitably cooler and more detached, since it is attained largely through dispassionate thought, while its very precision and accuracy seem to forbid all emotional responsiveness. "The objects of faith," continues Galloway, "are primarily values. . . . Faith embraces facts and their relations only in so far as they are involved in the values, and are necessary to support them. . . . Faith is an act of the person, who affirms the religious values to be essential to his own soul and to the meaning of the world."[2] All this of course is undeniably true; but it places altogether too great an emphasis on the element of value, not *as* value, but as being the fundamental characteristic of faith. Here it may not be superfluous to observe that "value" (or "values") is a mere abstraction, which, taken purely in itself, exists nowhere; what really exists is always some object or system or situation that possesses value. A precisely similar issue arises in connection with the ethical theory of pleasure; for "pleasure" is likewise an unreal abstraction, so that what we actually find is some experience or thing which possesses or yields pleasure.[3] This however is a subordinate point; the important question here concerns the relation between value, in this concrete sense of the term, and faith. This relation is far from being unique and peculiar, as it is so often taken to be; although from the actual

[1] A.C. Benson, *Thy Rod and Thy Staff*, p. 79.

[2] *Op cit.*, p. 330; *cf.* the familiar distinction between belief in theories or principles, and faith or trust in persons.

[3] *Cf.* again "pure" thought or "pure" logic, as similar abstractions.

conditions of our ordinary experience it must inevitably present that aspect, as I have already observed, to the unreflective mind. On the contrary value, in some form or another, is an indispensable factor throughout the *whole* of experience, providing it, in all its widely differing forms, with many of its ultimate criteria. In all the economic activities of social life, in every department of art, in knowledge and science, even in pleasure and recreation, value, in some specific form or another, is an inherent element. Certainly religious values, as religious, are peculiar or indeed unique; but this is not because they are values, but because they are religious.

5. Neither in value therefore, nor in "emotional tone," can we find the essential attributes of faith or belief as distinct from knowledge. We have found on the other hand that faith claims some kind or degree of certainty, although it need not necessarily make this claim explicitly and articulately.[1] On the contrary its certainty is most generally felt instinctively, unquestioningly, and emotionally. But it is also equally true that some real foundation for this certainty—some justification for this attitude—is always recognized; apart from this we have nothing more than sheer credulity. What that foundation actually is depends on the conditions of any given case; it may be training or authority, environment or tradition; more generally and fundamentally, it lies in the nature of the object of the total experience. That object however, it must once again be emphasized, need not be exclusively religious; for human beings, national causes, ethical and artistic ideals, all arouse faith in precisely the same way and to the same intense degree. The scientist steadily augments his ascertained

[1] *Ante* p. 219; *cf.* Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, pp. 326, 327: "If my will is not identified with that which I hold for fact, I have not faith in it . . . a doubt about the fact weakens faith."

facts. But with these, as such, he never remains contented. As soon as possible he employs them as a basis for constructive theory, *e.g.* of heredity, relativity, or evolution. Now in all these theories he more or less firmly believes; the known irresistibly impels the mind onwards to some belief or other. The connection between belief, or faith, and knowledge is thus most intimate, is even indestructible, in spite of many beliefs being discarded because they show themselves to be unreliable; which means, at bottom, illogical. But in all these diverse instances alike, and equally in the case of religion, the actual process of apprehension, in and through which the character of the object of faith has been grasped, rapidly falls into the background of consciousness, simply because it becomes completely overshadowed by the pressing demands for future action. Once certainty has in any way been reached—once faith has somehow become firmly implanted—the methods by which it has been thus attained rapidly become of only secondary importance, the individual's whole interest being concentrated instead on the consequences of the attitude that has been adopted; and the same result occurs in ordinary and quite familiar knowledge, where once again the grounds of knowing are forgotten simply because attention has become absorbed in the further issues of the situation. But in all such cases alike the actual bases of faith remain only in the background—they rarely disappear completely; and hence it follows that whenever faith is challenged, and whenever it is found to require strengthening anew, some more or less explicit and accurate formulation of its sources —political, intellectual, pragmatic or religious—is always available and is therefore appealed to. As Otto affirms, "only on such terms is Belief possible in contrast to mere feeling."[1]

At this stage a further fundamental problem arises. We

[1] *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 1.

have seen that faith claims certainty of some kind; but what is this certainty? Ultimately it consists in an indubitable consciousness of Reality in some form or another; it is the certainty that the object, or the relation, or the entire situation which forms the object of faith, is *real*—really exists.[1] On the other hand, faith is concerned not so much with the detailed *nature* of this reality (or real existence) as with the bare *fact* of reality; often, indeed, its nature is felt and maintained to be altogether beyond the possibility of comprehension—the nature of the Absolute or of Deity, *e.g.*, but, equally, that of some ethical principle or national ideal, as when "the good" is held to be indefinable or the freedom of the will to be unintelligible. Again therefore we must note that these characteristics are never exclusively confined to religion, but that in all types of belief alike some form of real existence is held to be a matter of certainty, even if this certainty is only "practical."

It may be objected, however, that the scientific Principle of Indeterminacy (or Inexactitude or Uncertainty) has destroyed the basis of all certainty, and this even in physics, whose indubiety ranks next to that of mathematics. But although many scientists have themselves endorsed this opinion, it is quite mistaken when expressed in this blunt and exaggerated way. All that the Principle in question actually implies is that, when physics deals with extremely minute and delicate phenomena, the very conditions governing the situations under investigation prevent the attainment of absolutely accurate results, upon which alone prediction and causal connection can be founded. This consideration is undeniably of the highest significance and value. But it by no means involves the complete removal of the basis of all certainty and the substitution of varying degrees of probability. Against this widespread but seriously

[1] "Here is the starting-point: in this profound human sense of an over-plus of reality." (Underhill, *Man and the Supernatural*, p. 6.)

erroneous impression several arguments must be advanced. In the first place, even if certainty had actually vanished as is supposed, this would hold only of those extremely minute processes referred to. There would still remain statistical certainty, which is quite unimpeachable so far as other phenomena are concerned, and which may, if we choose, be identified with "practical" certainty. "The laws of probability provide something equivalent to a strict causal determinism."[1] Again, it cannot be too clearly recognized that the mathematical Theory of Probability is itself absolutely certain, so that Probability ultimately rests upon certainty; and if this seems paradoxical, the contradiction is quite superficial and should disappear if, instead of "Theory of Probability," we employ the more accurate term "Theorems."

For the moment, therefore, "the precise meaning and significance of the new principle are in the melting-pot. Einstein and others regard it as a merely temporary asylum of ignorance, and expect an early restoration of the principles of rigorous causality within the domain of science."[2] In this connection causality should imply "that every detailed occurrence can be correlated with its antecedents in a perfectly definite manner, exemplifying general principles."[3] But we may advance beyond this dubious position. For the uncertainty that has arisen cannot straightway be attributed to Nature, and much less can Nature be regarded as exhibiting inexactitude, indeterminism, or some type of freedom in its minutest phenomena. On the contrary, here as always the uncertainty affects only our knowledge; and the further fact that this defect can under no conditions be removed makes no difference whatever. Once again to

[1] Jeans, *Nature*, vol. 128, p. 701.

[2] Wolf, *Outline of Modern Knowledge*, pp. 590, 591; *cf.* L. Hill, *The Philosophy of a Biologist*, p. 85; *Science Progress*, vol. xxvii, p. 552.

[3] Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 15.

quote Jeans, "the appeal of the new physics to probabilities may merely cloak its ignorance of the true mechanism of nature." Similarly Thomson: "The Uncertainty Relation represents perhaps the limit of attainable knowledge on the side of the very minute."[1] There is no justification therefore for transferring the inescapable dubiety to Nature, nor for rejecting all earlier views on Causation and Mechanism, any more than for a short-sighted umpire, who cannot tell exactly what has happened, arguing that the laws of the game have been permanently suspended. At the utmost, the "Uncertainty" in question is confined to specific groups or types of the most minute phenomena; it is in any case far from being universal. "A strict causal determination governs certain quantities; it is only the demand for a complete four-coordinate description that brings about an inevitable inexactitude."[2] We may thus continue to survey

[1] *The Mysterious Universe*, p. 22; *The Atom*, p. 194; *cf.* Darwin: "How does the Uncertainty Principle help to free us from the bonds of determinism? I cannot see that physical theory provides any new loophole." (*New Conceptions of Matter*, pp. 101, 102.) Also Dirac, *Quantum Mechanics*, p. 4, and Ferguson, *Nature*, vol. 130, p. 720: "scientific methodology is as deterministic, in the philosophic sense, as ever it was."

[2] Whyte, *Critique of Physics*, p. 78; *cf.* Needham, *The Great Amphibium*, p. 81: "the regularities in quantum processes seem to be definite regularities and no more to be infringed than the regularities of gross mechanics." More technically, "the wave function or probability function is completely determined for all places and times by the initial conditions and the boundary conditions. The world picture in quantum physics is governed by the same rigorous determinism which rules classical physics. The standpoint even of modern physics does not prevent us from achieving a strictly causal view." (Planck, *Proc. Physical Soc.*, vol. 44, pp. 534, 539.) "Causal law is involved in the determination of ψ; the conditions at a given instant completely determine the conditions at the next instant." (Ruark and Urey, *Atoms, Molecules and Quanta*, p. 617.) "The uncertainty principle refers to the degree of indeterminateness in the possible present knowledge of the simultaneous values of various quantities with which the quantum theory deals; it does not restrict the exactness of a position measurement alone or a velocity measurement alone." (Heisenberg, *Principles of the Quantum Theory*, p. 20.) "The product of the uncertainties of position and momen-

Nature as the realm of precise order, law, causation or structure, whichever term we prefer, and to regard certainty as the foundation equally of knowledge and of belief.[1]

6. We are now in a position to indicate the clue to the distinction, and at the same time to the real relation, between faith and knowledge. To say that we know is to say that we are certain; as with Locke, "to know and to be certain is the same thing."[2] What is thus known, still further, can be expressed in such a way that the grounds of our certainty are all explicitly presented in a form that is held, by those accepting such knowledge, to be beyond disproof; finally the content known, in principle and in accord with my earlier argument, is always some aspect or other of real existence.

Now we have just found this last feature to be the fundamental characteristic of faith; while I have also maintained that belief "is capable, in principle and apart from our ignorance, of being given theoretic substantiation."[3] Knowledge and faith therefore share two essential attributes in common—firstly, apprehension of real existence, and secondly, capacity for explicit formulation. These two characters are essential; and it is in them, and in them alone, that we can discern the actual relation that holds between knowledge and belief. All other aspects, important though they undoubtedly are, are nevertheless secondary to these two fundamentals—either intensity of emotional tone, "directness" or "intuitiveness" of comprehension, value,

tum cannot be brought below a value equal to the quantum " (Darwin, *New Conceptions of Matter*, p. 89); the quantum itself being an absolute constant; *cf.* the more general discussion in Planck's *Where is Science Going?*

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 118, *n.* 1.

[2] *Works*, iv, 145; Kant's distinction between the Pure Reason and the Practical is somewhat analogous.

[3] *Ante* p. 219.

practical applicability, and mystery or mysticism. In regard to all these the contrast between believing and knowing is often extreme; but to insist upon this contrast alone is to make the understanding of the relation in question quite impossible.

What follows applies therefore to *all* kinds of belief and faith as such, and is thus true of its highest or most specific religious forms equally with its more ordinary types. For what really distinguishes these from one another is to be found neither in the *mode* of belief, the emotions, nor the conduct aroused, but in the various *objects* of belief; for, obviously, belief in an Absolute, or immortality or God, must inevitably arouse responses vitally different from those based on a belief that a certain horse will win the Derby. Yet both beliefs, simply as such, are in one and the same relation to knowledge; and it is this universal relation that first of all demands investigation.

The general nature of their relation is comparatively simple; on the other hand, the infinite variety of the circumstances that arise, together with the frequent complexity of any given situation, make it extremely difficult to bring all possible cases within one inclusive statement. The issue turns finally, however, always on the degree to which the grounds of certainty—an attribute common, it must be remembered, to both types of experience—can be *explicitly* presented by the persons concerned as being *beyond disproof.* When this presentation is regarded as complete and final, then the person in question may rightly regard himself as knowing; while insofar as such finality and completeness are for any reasons beyond attainment his attitude is one no longer of knowledge in any true and proper sense, but of belief or faith. This principle is prior to all estimates or problems of value, as such; although it goes without saying that countless beliefs are of incalculably higher value than many quite irrefutable intellectual conclusions.

7. Thus the ultimate difference between knowing and believing, consistently with the indestructible continuity of all experience, becomes a difference of degree. The distinction between them is never absolute; each of these mental attitudes shades off imperceptibly therefore into the other, while its correct name in any given instance depends on the nature of the subject-matter on the one hand, and on the individual experient on the other. When, to begin with, the content is in itself extensive, part of it may be known and the rest believed. The individual concerned, again, may quite rightly regard himself as knowing, even while others, equally correctly, regard him as only justified in believing. The question here, that is to say, is not one of error in the use of the term "know," but of standpoint—of the interpretation of the ruling conditions of the given case; and hence the individual himself may change his own view and come to recognize that his supposed knowledge is not really such, but that his attitude, if still maintained, is one of faith. So far then as the issue turns on the individual as apart from the content, it depends in the end upon what is taken to constitute an adequate presentment of proof—or of disproof, if the negative rather than the positive standpoint is preferred. On this point there is obviously occasion for endless differences of opinion, so that a person may justifiably accept as a satisfactory proof, and therefore regard the relevant content as known, what others would deny to be proof, with the result that they would regard the proper attitude to be faith; or alternatively, again, the individual himself may change his own opinion as time goes on. Discussions between members of a jury or a cabinet, scientific experts or the college of cardinals will serve as instances.

Any fully adequate analysis of all these problems thus necessitates a discussion of the nature of proof, and this in its turn an examination of the entire structure of knowledge.

Here however it will be sufficient to review only the main features of the situation, beginning with the distinction between the perceptual basis of proof on the one hand and its inferential, rational or demonstrative basis on the other. But this again is not an absolute distinction; for even in direct perception there is always an element of inference, while this in its turn must appeal to some origin in data that are somehow perceived. These intricate points belong however to a complete epistemology and may be disregarded in my condensed survey of the phenomena.

Perception then is universally accepted as satisfactory evidence of real existence such as is capable of apprehension by means of human sense-organs; the occasional occurrence of illusions and hallucinations is of course familiar, but is excluded in the case of persistent (or repeated) perception common to many observers under similar conditions, especially when these can be scientifically controlled. Whenever therefore an individual enjoys an experience that is, to himself, identical with or comparable to sense-perception—when, that is, it is either persistent or is consistently repeated, and when all forms of self-deception seem to him impossible—then the existence of the apprehended content must be regarded by him as indubitably real. For otherwise the deliverances of all his perceptual experience become questionable; and his conclusion becomes still more justifiable when other observers recount experiences like his own. He may then say that he knows—not believes—that the perceived entities really exist. He may even maintain this attitude when his own experience is extremely unusual or even unique, since its intensity, vividness, definiteness and clearness may compensate for the lack of objective confirmation or perceptive universality. Whether others agree with his standpoint obviously depends on the value they attach to such commonly shared objectivity as compared

with the intensity of the individual experience,[1] whether they themselves share this or not. If other persons, again, regard the original experience as veridical they also may legitimately claim to know rather than to believe; and this raises the many problems centring on tradition and authority. Each of these, however, must be considered on its merits, and it is impossible ever to attain any agreement in perfectly general terms in advance, except of course the proverbial agreement to differ. But on the other hand there can be no absolute denial, again in advance and in general terms, of such claims to know. For the issues turn on purely theoretic considerations: on the validity of individual experiences whose conditions approach those of ordinary sense-perception, and the logical value accorded to objectivity in the sense of universal observation. Here tolerance must be our rule—the recognition that some may quite legitimately accept and value as knowledge what others must regard as mere belief, if not indeed as opinion or —still worse—illusion. I need add only that these remarks are quite general, in the sense that they include both specifically religious cases and non-religious, such as belief in telepathy or spiritualism, and the acceptance of the results of delicate scientific experiments and observations.

Precisely the same principles must be applied when we turn from the perceptual aspects of belief to the more intellective or rational. Here the sole difference is a purely practical one, arising from the inevitable advance of the human mind to higher levels of rationality. As I have argued already, this change cannot but affect the whole nature of religious experience. The advance in question, of course, is slow and tortuous; but it is none the less vitally important; for by "intellective" I mean not simply the activity of

[1] I exclude considerations of sincerity and trustworthiness, and assume here that all the experients concerned are above reproach in these respects; otherwise, plainly, the case is not worth consideration.

"pure reason" but rather the profound influence exerted by increased rationality on the whole mind—equally on the entire range of the emotions and on practice.[1] This view implies not the slightest depreciation of more primitive forms of experience, including earlier types of religion; all these have their own high value and demand recognition rather than contempt. But at the same time religion fulfils one of its own most characteristic functions by continuously evolving in accord with the general expansion of the human mind. It must therefore incessantly seek to give its distinctive truths an ever more consistently rational form and basis, although there immediately arises the dangerous tendency to substitute abstract rational accuracy for the concrete validity of the primary experience; and not the least important problem is that of the definite delimitation of the frontier between knowledge and faith. Yet no specific religious system whatever is entitled to regard any portion of its own content as being absolutely unique, and for this reason call it "faith." I do not wish to deny the reality of such unique forms of experience, in themselves; but to describe them exclusively as "faith" is to misuse this term completely; at the very least faith is thus rendered antithetic to knowledge, even while it also claims that certainty which is the essence of knowledge.

Perhaps the best known writer who has committed himself to this false antithesis was William James. "Faith uses a logic," he maintained, "altogether different from Reason's logic." Here, however, "Reason" is drastically confined to "the strict sense of a faculty of inference," while a parallel limitation affects "religious experience, narrowly so-called." Finally, "we use our feelings, our good-will, in judging where the greater probability lies"; so that under these conditions "Reason must conclude for irreligion." "Reason, working in abstraction from specifically

[1] *Cf.* on these points *ante* p. 215.

religious experiences, will always omit something, and fail to reach completely adequate conclusions."[1]

Now all this quite clearly takes for granted that those who uphold principles opposed to those of James either have no feelings or good-will, or that they ignore and suppress them. But it is obvious that these emotional and volitional factors are just as intense and influential in those whose conclusions differ from James's as they were in his own case. It is quite unjustifiable, therefore, to assume that "feelings" and "good-will" must inevitably lead to only one specific standpoint, which its supporter then proceeds to dignify as "faith," or "religious experience," to the total exclusion of all that departs therefrom. This is nothing more than "Parson Thwackum" in the guise of a philosopher. With reference to the more technical aspect of James's position, I have sufficiently stressed the impossibility of distinguishing between two radically contrasted types of logic, one pertaining to "Faith" and the other to "Reason," unless we give the term "logic" some quite illegitimate meaning which distorts the entire issue from the commencement. On the contrary, in principle logic is essentially one, although the spheres of its application vary profoundly. As we have already found, one of the ablest of modern critics discovers a genuine logic in the finest music and its composers.[2]

Equally misleading is James's reduction of reason to nothing more than "a faculty of inference," vitally important though this always is. What we are actually concerned with, once again, is "the profound influence exerted by increased rationality on the whole mind"; and this at once implies that we can never select—and much less can we isolate—"feelings" and "good-will" as the *ultimate* criteria of decision, no matter how high their value may be as contributory determinants. Still worse is it to suggest, however inno-

[1] *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. xxiv, pp. 197 ff.
[2] *Ante* p. 81, *n.*

cently, that our own good-will and feelings are to be trusted, and to stigmatize all opposed views, even if attained by "Reason's logic," as "irreligion." This is to forget that "trained and sterling feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things, of their essential relationships and real characters."[1]

The primary experience, then, which is so often described as unique or as *a priori*, is most accurately regarded as one of the necessary grounds of faith, but never as faith in itself; and its specific character can be ascertained only from the first-hand description of persons who have enjoyed it—the mystics of all ages and of every creed. Their own accounts of it, of course, must be subject to competent but sympathetic criticism—the surest test of its authenticity and value; and so far as it is direct or immediate it clearly belongs to the *quasi*-perceptual type which has just been dealt with. Whenever it goes beyond this to seek some form of articulate expression, then it becomes "faith" or "belief" in the true sense of these terms; and its difference from knowledge, as I have already argued, is essentially one of degree.

8. But we must still go one step further and ask—Degree of what? The only reply, I believe, is the degree in which the articulate expression adopted falls short of that certainty which characterizes actual knowledge. The certainty of knowledge, again, lies ultimately in its coherence or harmony with Reality—with the nature of real being. Here two points are of fundamental importance. "Real being," in the first place, is never vague, formless, abstract,[2] but rather fully

[1] Wallace, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, p. 213; *cf.* "the man whom philosophy leaves cold, and the man whom real faith does not illuminate, may be assured that the fault lies in them, not in knowledge and faith. The former is still an alien to philosophy, the latter an alien to faith." (Wallace, *The Logic of Hegel*, p. xxvi.)

[2] As my general philosophic standpoint is Hegelian, I may say that for Hegel "Being" is the most abstract of all categories. The difference,

concrete and definitely systematic, as modern knowledge increasingly discovers it to be.[1] The coherence of knowledge with this concrete Reality, again, asssumes many forms—correspondence, reflection, representation, and their analogues. But the more knowledge expands the more do all these interrelations become transformed into internal harmony and self-coherence; only, since this self-expansion of knowledge means its advancing oneness with Reality, this harmony and coherence must never be regarded as pertaining exclusively to knowledge in itself, but as still more truly the attributes of Reality; so that, ultimately, the certainty of knowledge becomes that systematic interconnection which is the hall-mark of real being.

It is of course supremely difficult to perceive this "systematic interconnection"—so difficult that it has been again and again denied; and yet the more we know of the Universe the more clearly and vividly do we discern its deep-seated unity. Art, science, history, religion, all declare it:

> There's a divinity that shapes our ends
> Rough-hew them how we will.
>
> All which thy child's mistake
> Fancies as lost, I have stored for thee at home.
>
> The One remains, the many change and pass;
> Heaven's light for ever shines, Earth's shadows fly.
>
> All things work together for good.

So say those who have felt most deeply; but to feel thus is also to think most profoundly, so that the totality of

however, is largely one of translation and terminology; and as Wallace has said, "Being conveys much more to an English reader than (Hegel) meant." (*The Logic of Hegel*, Proleg., p. 301, *n.*). It is quite permissible here therefore to use the term in our own sense, which is equivalent to Hegel's "actuality."

[1] *Cf. Personality and Reality*, chap. i: "The General Attributes of Reality."

experience may be summed up in a tragedy, a poem, even in a single line.[1]

The ultimate criterion of certainty, therefore, is coherence —internal harmony—self-consistency; or in negative terms, non-contradiction. So far as we attain this, we know; and here it becomes fundamentally important to observe that in the more abstract sciences—in mathematics, logic, and the allied subdivisions of science—these characteristics of certainty are patent to the competent intelligence. But to describe a science as abstract means that it lacks to some marked degree the concreteness of actual being; while the more science deals with this in itself and in its full complexity, the more difficult does it become accurately to present its systematic interrelations, simply because, as in the case of the Uncertainty Principle, the requisite preliminary complete analysis of the phenomena cannot be satisfactorily performed. But this difficulty is merely practical, and must not be taken to imply an impossibility inherent in the nature of the Universe or of mind.[2] The unceasing tendency of knowledge and thought is always towards a fuller measure of internal self-coherence which cannot, however, be attained apart from a thorough analytic treatment of the whole field of investigation; but this analysis, obviously, must remain always within limits that are extremely narrow relatively to the infinite complexity of Reality.

Thus the deepest problems must ever defy our analysis, and, consequently, must always transcend our knowledge properly so called; and it is of course possible to accept this position and to decline to venture beyond the actual boundaries of the known. Agnosticism however, like every other intellective attitude, must be self-consistent; but it is

[1] *Cf.* p. 143.

[2] To say—what is quite true—that the nature of Reality is ultimately incomprehensible is not scientific but philosophical. No finite mind can grasp the infinite; but an infinite spirit would be, in a certain sense, one with infinite being. *Cf.* further *The Personalist*, vol. vii, p. 99.

impossible even for a Crusoe to apply agnosticism to the whole of life. It is obvious that in actual practice the most effective way of increasing and expanding knowledge is to transcend its temporary limits—to experiment, anticipate, infer, postulate, theorize, speculate; only, always with a view to higher consistency and greater self-coherence; and the results of this subtle intellectual activity rapidly assume some kind of systematic structure which may, in principle, at any moment acquire the certainty of actual knowledge.[1] But they cannot constitute knowledge, in its proper sense, until this certainty has been achieved; and if we choose to regard the systematic expression of our thought, so far as it has gone, as being final (either theoretically or practically), our attitude is one of belief or faith, not of knowledge. Nevertheless it remains always closely akin to knowledge, and may indeed almost be said to be one with it in principle. The *firmness* of our belief, again, is similarly one of degree, and may be due to any one of a great variety of causes—to training, tradition, authority, temperament, intellectual conviction or emotional impression. We may either hold belief loosely, as a mere speculation, or we may accept it wholeheartedly as the dominant influence of practical life. When we do so we may even make it our religion; but this attitude of faith or belief, considered simply *as* an attitude or response, is not uniquely religious. It remains the same whether it centres on the being of God or only on the winner of the Derby; the *essentials* of religion, in other words, lie not in the mere exercise of "faith," but rather in the individual's entire "universe" and in his total response thereto.

9. I have just observed that "in actual practice" knowledge may be transcended in many different ways—by

[1] Einstein's and Planck's recent researches are outstanding examples of this; but they are of course not unique; *cf. ante* p. 223.

hypothesis and theory, inference and speculation. But we must now go still further than this; for all knowledge not only *may* be transcended, but it always actually demands further expansion and advance, while this necessity arises from the very nature of knowledge itself.

For in considering the character of rationality we found that all ideas are inherently relational; each "seeks its correlated ideas as inevitably as a compass needle turns to the Poles"; and thus "the real impetus of thought" springs from the "inherent tendency of all concepts to constitute an organized intellectual system."[1] This organized system, again, gradually acquires certainty, as the result either of perceptual experience or of conceptual development in abstract thinking; and finally, in acquiring this certainty it becomes the content and the expression of knowledge as such. This slow formation of knowledge (in the strict sense of the term) within the entire mass of experience may clearly be compared to the formation of a crystal in a fluid matrix, or of a glacier from the soft snowflakes. The same essential contrast exists in both cases—between the final and definite structure of the crystal itself on the one hand and the indefiniteness of the surrounding liquid or overlying snow on the other; while at the same time both the chemical constitution and the unceasing growth of the crystal obviously imply its unbroken continuity with the magma from which it originated. In the case of knowledge this progressive development of certainty gives first of all the more abstract sciences of logic and mathematics, in which the basal principles are almost, even if not completely, beyond disproof; while throughout the more concrete sciences, as again in history, economics, ethics and their allies, the degree of certainty is always much lower.[2]

[1] *Ante* pp. 94, 95.

[2] *Cf.* Einstein's "ideal of the theoretical physicist, highest purity, clarity and certainty." (Whyte, *Critique of Physics*, p. 175.) "We see

This marked contrast is readily explicable by the conditions of the entire situation. For just as the crystal arises from, and exists within, its surrounding matrix, so the high degree of certainty of abstract science, together with its low degree elsewhere, exists within the enormous mass of relatively unorganized and uncertain ordinary experience. Even the most abstract sciences do not enjoy certainty throughout their whole extent. On the contrary, mathematics—and to a less degree logic—is replete with tentative and suggestive principles, with theories and hypotheses, which still require testing and final confirmation; and this, again, can only be attained by formulating additional tentative theories.[1] In this manner each abstract science slowly enlarges its own boundaries; and the result of this continuous process is of fundamental importance in its bearing upon the present enquiry. For it means that the science in question steadily loses its bare and empty abstractness and becomes more and more concrete; in other words, it becomes more and more identical with, and more and more capable of systematizing, explaining and predicting the course of everyday practical experience. Instances of this are many and patent: the application of astronomy to navigation, mathematics to engineering,[2] chemistry to medicine, Mendelism to agriculture, physics to wireless communication, are but a few out of a fast increasing multitude; and we merely express the converse of the same principle by saying that ordinary experience is in this way rapidly becoming scientifically organized, even in the spheres of economics and governmental administration generally.

science moving towards a hypothesis which will cover all known facts with complete accuracy—if indeed it has not already attained such a goal. As our knowledge increases, the probability gradually changes into a certainty." (Jeans, *The New Background of Science*, pp. 55, 224.) Similarly Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, pp. 96, 97.

[1] The search for valid unified field theories in relativity physics is one prominent instance.

[2] *Cf. ante* p. 83, *n.* 1.

But these considerations, despite their obvious importance, are after all merely secondary. The fundamental point here is that all these simultaneous processes are never merely contingent, but inevitable and necessary. They arise from the very nature of knowledge—which means however, in the light of what I have just said, from the very conditions of all experience itself; and this implies that knowledge and certainty can never be isolated from suggestiveness, tentativeness, theory and speculation, always duly controlled, it should now be superfluous to add, by the logical demands of the entire situation so far as these can be discovered; and in this particular respect there must always remain room for elasticity and freedom of individual opinion. For that relatively restricted content of experience which, in virtue of its certainty, constitutes human knowledge has actually arisen—again like a crystal—through the interconnection of concepts each of which is partial and fragmentary, and demands therefore completion from some source outside itself—either from the content of perception or from some other concept.[1]

Thus the very nature of those concepts which form our knowledge necessitates that we incessantly go beyond ourselves, and so transcend our knowledge; while in carrying out this necessary process the character of experience inevitably changes. For we gradually pass beyond the sphere of certainty, and can no longer, therefore, be said to "know." But this does not mean that our experience is completely unorganized and lacks all definiteness. On the contrary, its definiteness may be very clearly marked, as it always is, for example, in every logical scientific theory, or sound historic suggestion or well-planned economic experiment. Only, none of these is *certain*—none is, in the strict sense of the term, knowledge; their very names—theory, suggestion, experiment—show this to be the case.

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 94: "every idea has ragged edges."

And yet we not only *do* act upon these, but still further, we *must* act upon them, if life is to be carried on. This intellective attitude, then, upon which our activity is based, is faith or belief; and it has always a dual aspect. It may, in the first instance, be almost purely intellectual, as in the precise formulation of some scientific or economic theory; or this intellectuality may be combined with practice, as when the same theory is made the basis of experiments and investigation.[1] Thus if we choose to do so we may usefully distinguish between intellectual belief and practical belief (or faith). The essential point, in any case, is to recognize the fundamental continuity between these two attitudes, and not to commit the radical error of attempting to sever one from the other, and thus to isolate faith from some wholly imaginary hostile reason, knowledge or certainty.

But if all this is true of each separate subdivision of human life and experience—of science, history, politics—it is obviously equally true of experience in its entirety. Once again, thus to envisage experience in its wholeness is the most difficult of tasks; nevertheless for the reflective mind it remains not only possible, but on due occasion it becomes even necessary. It demands the summation of all our knowledge, the systematic organization of all that we regard, in every sphere of consciousness, as possessing certainty. In this way the individual, each for himself, realizes his own "universe"; and then further, in accordance with all that has already been said, this knowledge demands its own transcendence. Because of its very nature as knowledge, the individual must advance beyond its narrow boundaries, even while he must at the same time retain it as his sole and indispensable basis of security, apart from which he cannot advance permanently at all. Now in so doing he commits himself to religious faith. It is faith, because it is an attitude of life, at once active and reflective, that transcends his

[1] *Cf.* Bosanquet, *The Nature of Mind*, pp. 66 *et seq.*

knowledge, even while it rests upon this knowledge. It is specifically religious because it is his attitude, not to any subordinate element whatever in his world, but to his "universe" in its wholeness. Finally, it may be rendered comparatively definite and coherent, insofar as it reposes upon a firm foundation of certain knowledge; and thus religion is never necessarily condemned to remain nothing more than "Faith as vague as all unsweet."

These results are in strict accord with the earlier definitions of religion. The conclusion is, admittedly, a perfectly general conclusion, simply because I have restricted myself to a general consideration of religion. But merely in being thus general, it remains applicable to all forms of religion alike; and thus it constitutes the basis, in my own opinion, for the more detailed discussion of any given religious system in particular. The form which this assumes must always depend on a combination of highly diverse conditions: upon the entire experience of each person individually—his knowledge of history, of science, and of his fellows; his valuation of tradition and authority; of emotion and feeling, perception and reasoning; but this, again, does not invalidate the basal principle that man's religion is his responsive attitude, in its entirety, to his "universe" as a whole.

XVI

AUTHORITY, TRADITION AND THE NUMINOUS

1. We find, then, that knowledge has two distinctive characteristics—in the first place certainty, and in the second an inevitable and unceasing self-transcendence. Between these there seems at first sight to be some degree of contradiction; for certainty implies finality and fixity, which in their turn seem to exclude any continuous expansion; and this is always a serious obstacle to intellectual progress, since we instinctively value and demand finality because of the mental satisfaction, the sense of accomplishment and repose, which it invariably yields. Not in the sphere of knowledge alone therefore, but universally—in politics and industry just as in morals and religion—the irresistible forward drive of the mind is too often resented, for the simple reason that it appears to threaten the precious stability thus far enjoyed. This paradox is of course wholly superficial, since to say that knowledge must transcend itself really means that certainty must transcend itself, even though in so doing its content must be more or less radically transformed. But both the resultant changes and the strenuous mental effort they involve must be naturally distasteful to the human spirit so long as this continues to seek a finality never to be disturbed. Desirable as this seems, it is forbidden by the very conditions of our experience. The mind is committed—or if we prefer, condemned—to an endless pursuit of an Ultimate which lies ever beyond our grasp if not beyond our reach, but of which we can always secure partial insights that must be incessantly supplemented and mutually adjusted.

The terms "mental satisfaction" and "sense of accom-

plishment," again, clearly involve feeling and emotion, while the practical aspects of knowledge are inseparable from will, purpose and conduct; but this is only a further instance of the principle that experience is always affective, cognitive and volitional simultaneously. Familiar as this is, however, it presents a new and important feature when we perceive that our feeling of conviction, or our sense of certainty, is at the same moment the feeling of a compulsion which profoundly influences our activities. In more technical terms our certainty—or certitude—is far more than purely intellectual. Undeniably there are many occasions when truths or principles seem to be merely abstract and remote, or even foreign; and to view them in this way is frequently advantageous, since it ensures freedom from the deceptive stresses of emotion alone. Generally, however, certainty is not coolly apprehended but is at the same moment keenly felt, and (to repeat) felt as compulsive; and this immediately raises two grave difficulties.

For since feeling is subjective it seems to follow that the compulsion is equally subjective in the sense that it can arise only from within, even if, with Kant, we ascribe it to the mind's own constitution. Secondly, the feeling of conviction, taken as a feeling, is too often profoundly misleading, and this in the ratio of its intensity. On these two grounds of error and subjectivity, therefore, it would appear that such compulsion should be suspected and even resisted, unless we choose to regard it as a sort of instinct to be obeyed as implicitly as animal instinct, or accept the subjective origin as itself ultimate and sufficient, as is so frequently done with respect to some types of mysticism and intuition.

On the other hand, whenever these attitudes prove to be unsatisfactory, the difficulties attending the sense of compulsion expand into the problem of the source and character of that authority with which compulsion is inseparably

associated, and for which it is, in a sense, merely another name. Thus in all its important aspects authority too is simultaneously intellective, practical and emotional, while it also exhibits ineradicable subjective features. At the same time it is equally keenly felt that authority must, in principle, be free from all error, with its resultant misdirection of behaviour. For even though this is an ideal that can never be fully realized, still error is always fatal to authority, as such, in the sense that it immediately impairs its force and may finally destroy it completely. And with this we seem committed afresh to all the defects of feeling and subjectivity, until we remember that as soon as any given authority is overthrown, man straightway proceeds to erect another which he hopes, and indeed often finds, to be more satisfactory and, therefore, more stable and permanent; this tendency, while perhaps best exemplified in politics and history, being obviously operative universally.

The general problem of authority, therefore, presents four main aspects. The perils of subjectivity must be clearly realized and overcome; error, at least in principle, must be removed; the influence of authority upon conduct, both individual and collective, must be unquestionable, and thus in the end coercive; finally, these results must hold of all human experience, not merely of any given type exclusively, such as *e.g.* government, morals or religion.

2. With regard to subjectivity, it will be sufficient to recall the degree to which objectivity has been emphasized throughout the preceding chapters. Even in the simplest forms of sense or of awareness, it is always the objectively real world that is somehow or other felt; and this is equally true of all emotional reactions, which in their own characteristic way are responsive to, and determined by, objective stimuli and conditions. Unquestionably the subjective may become exaggerated, as when the compulsion that is felt

is perverted into some abnormal obsession, or when mystic communion is made exclusively individual; this however plainly affords no ground for holding that subjectivity always predominates.

Thus even when the utmost concessions are made as regards the subjectivity of feeling and sense, some objective source and content are always concerned; and as soon as such bare awareness is transcended—again granting that it is ever actually experienced—the influence of the objective factors becomes quite undeniable. But it is never so much this fact itself that is important, as the method by which the advance occurs and acquires its permanence. For this is always due, once again, to the expanding permeation of the entire field of consciousness by reason. The primal and vaguely sensed content,[1] which can scarcely be styled "object," is more and more definitely perceived and comprehended; properties and attributes, qualities and relations, are discriminated as such, even if at the same time these become increasingly abstract and conceptual, until finally the evolution of thought, reason and knowledge assumes its own distinctive form.

In its entirety, of course, this situation is incalculably complex. Practice, purpose and will all provide their typical and invaluable criteria, which may then be given some systematic formulation as Pragmatism; feelings and emotions continue to play their insuppressible rôles; individual activity is merged in collective effort on ever wider scales. But all these features, vital though they are, do not affect the cardinal principles, already insisted upon, that will is inseparable from reason, which as "will" passes over from its own supposedly "abstract" sphere into "concrete" action; that every "systematic formulation" of Pragmatism must itself be one product of the selfsame reason; while

[1] *Cf.* p. 139 on emotion, and pp. 214, 215, on "pre-articulate experience."

emotion and feeling can escape the crudities of animal and savage mentality only by becoming permeated by some one or other of the protean forms of reason; this being equally true, *mutatis mutandis*, of conduct both individual and social.[1]

In the long run, then, this may be described as the progressive elimination of error, provided that "error" applies alike to abstract and concrete, to precept and practice; since to separate these, and still more to oppose them to each other, is to generate the final and fatal error of false abstraction. The essential point is that with each advance of mind, the "practical" increasingly expresses and in its own turn creates pure theory; practice incorporates, even while it also modifies, precept. Simultaneously, though in profoundly different ways and in wholly different directions, all fine emotions, elevated feelings and noble deeds are influenced by aesthetic and ethical principles that are in essence reasonable, and which reason alone can discern and formulate in any finally satisfactory form. Here again the root difficulty is simply the old one that springs from the widespread misconception that "pure theory" is necessarily remote from actualities. There are of course numberless occasions on which this seems to be the case, while research unquestionably gains incalculably by isolating its formal results into "pure" mathematics, "pure" ethics or economics or what not; nevertheless these always maintain their connection with the relevant type of concrete experience.[2]

But to insist on such difficulties and cherish these distorted views is simply to adopt the obstinate attitude of the country clodhopper to meteorology, of the "practical" farmer to agricultural theory and Mendelism, or of the equally "practical" politician to "doctrinaire" economics.

[1] *Cf.* Taylor's "dim and vague contact . . . where we can detect no clear and definite outlines." (*The Faith of a Moralist*, vol. ii, p. 213.)

[2] *Cf. ante* p. 83.

To object that these spheres of theory and their allies are painfully defective is to forget that they are as yet only in their infancy, while the same attitude to earlier physics and chemistry would have set back the material side of civilization by at least a century. Quite similarly, the inability of the "practical" mind to grasp theoretical principles is really intellectual blindness; and though this should no more be condemned than deafness to the beauty of music, it should never be accepted as normal, much less as desirable. Even the indifference of the skilled artist to aesthetic theory, temperamental and insurmountable though it may be, must be frankly regarded as a far-reaching limitation of mental capacity. In all cases alike, therefore, we must conclude that the familiar objections can be advanced, never against theory as theory, but only against defective and erroneous theory.

3. But whenever the development of theory escapes these imperfections, as (in principle) it always aims at doing, the combined objectivity, compulsiveness and authority which experience originally reveals continue to operate without intermission. In fact their influence becomes unceasingly intensified and their claims and status ever more secure, as the intellective elements advance beyond their primal feebleness to attain their higher and really distinctive levels. We must here recall that awareness and sense, emotion and feeling, are always "responsive to and determined by *objective* stimuli and conditions." Further, certainty itself is "keenly *felt*, and felt as compulsive."[1] The widespread opinion to the contrary is the result of two factors which bring about a radical misunderstanding of the actual situation. In the first place, we are usually so intent on practical issues that we completely ignore their indispensable theoretical bases; we simply take these for

[1] *Ante* pp. 245, 244.

granted to such an extent that we forget, or even deny, their existence, exactly as we scarcely ever consider the physiology of breathing or exercise. And from this it inevitably follows that whenever we do attend to theory as such, it seems at first sight to have little direct connection with conduct and to be therefore abstract, especially when it assumes technical, and above all mathematical, form. In other words, since theory is very effectively concealed, though never absent, in all familiar affairs, it must appear as a strange or even hostile intruder whenever it forces itself on our attention. Against this attitude, however, it should be sufficient to point to the steadily increasing importance of all types of "abstract theory" in all civilized societies.

To the trained expert in any given department, on the contrary, his "abstract" principles, so far of course as they are actually valid, are never merely formally true and nothing more, but are (to repeat) *felt* to be true, and with this to be compulsive and authoritative to such a degree that to reject them is the acme of folly. Outside his own peculiar province, on the other hand, too frequently he becomes the "clodhopper" and views other specialists' theories with aloofness, amusement or even suspicion; the attitude of scientists and philosophers to one another has provided an instance almost proverbial. But in principle, and apart from these unfortunate defects of human nature, the authority which is perennially asserting itself is never introduced, never generated for the first time, by formal theory. On the contrary, some degree and kind of felt compulsion is present from the commencement, in whatever way the mind comes into contact with objective Reality. This and this alone is the *ultimate* source and ground of every one of the infinitely diverse types of compulsiveness, from the irresistible pressure of natural demands at the foot of the scale to the equally insuppressible "hunger and thirst after righteousness" and knowledge at its summit.

This remains true if, with Oman, we distinguish the natural from the supernatural; "in the end the validity of religion depends upon the reality . . . the existence of the Supernatural."[1]

But we must at the same time remember that, to begin with, all merely "felt compulsion" suffers from the serious defects of obscurity and indefiniteness, and this too frequently in proportion to its very intensity. It may then create nothing better than "awe" in the sense of "the shuddering of the creature before the overwhelming and basilisk-like fascination of fearsome mystery";[2] and Otto appears to regard this mental state as an inescapable and necessary "moment of a completer experience," in which "we come upon something inherently wholly other, whose kind and character are incommensurable with our own, and before which we therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill and numb."[3] If this were all, the inevitable consequences would be aversion rather than fascination, and agnosticism; and such a result can be avoided only by being revealed, in its true guise, to dawning reason. Certainly it is often an advantage to blunt the keenness of the primal feelings; still this is at best merely a temporary phase, since in the experience of every expert the original forcibleness revives with undiminished vigour. This in itself is a vitally important factor; but it is not the only one. For it becomes intimately fused with that invaluable clarity and finality which reason alone can confer, and to which it alone can give articulate and explicit expression, no matter how formal these may in the end have to be made.

It at once follows, therefore, that to resent authority simply because it is associated with some type of so-called

[1] *The Natural and the Supernatural*, p. 71.

[2] Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 309; *cf.* p. 307; "the experience of rich but confused contact." (Taylor, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 221.)

[3] *The Idea of the Holy*, pp. 28, 32.

"abstract" theory is fatally to misunderstand the situation. Quite similarly, to accept any authority solely on the ground that it is keenly felt, or is inseparable from intense emotion, is only a reversion to the mental level of the child, the savage or the "clodhopper." The function of reason is not to enforce any wholly arbitrary and foreign claims of its own upon the rest of experience, like an invader subduing a rebellious country or a presumptuous intruder into circles to which he has no *entrée*. On the contrary, its real task is first to discern, and next to remove, the "obscurity and indefiniteness" wherewith all "felt compulsion" conceals its own character. In so doing, reason reveals the actual source, the governing conditions and the constitutive interrelations of each and every type of authority without exception. Only in this way can the demands of objective Reality acquire that imperativeness and permanence which are the inherent prerogatives of genuine authority, alike in the spheres of intellect and art, of practice, morals and religion.[1]

4. This, then, holds true universally. As experience reaches its higher levels, objectivity and authority progressively disclose their two inseparable aspects. On the one hand they are felt, sometimes emotionally, sometimes sensuously; on the other, they are intellectually apprehended. The situation as a whole is extremely intricate and shows innumerable delicate gradations. The ideal conditions would consist in an undisturbed, but not therefore static, balance between these two attitudes; and impossible though this actually is, still it is always instinctively pursued and more fully achieved, in spite of the too frequent overstressing of either aspect at the expense of the other. In countless instances, again, this faulty emphasis involves

[1] *Cf.* Oman on "the sense of the holy," and "objective reverence," *op. cit.*, p. 308.

that contrast, or even conflict, which is so misleading, with its strident claim for a monopoly of authority for either reason or feeling exclusively; the inevitable result being that the ideal balance gives place to some radical distortion due to limitations of individual or group mentality.[1]

Even under the most favourable conditions it is very difficult to maintain this ideal balance, for Reality is infinite, and presents its exhaustless demands in many ways. Sometimes therefore emotion makes the most adequate response and leaps far ahead of thought and practice; or again one of these may pursue its own line of development independently so that feeling becomes, simply by contrast, crude and outworn; and the consequent mischievous abnormalities persist until a fresh equilibrium is established. But exactly as the steering gear of a great liner, fighting its way through fierce storms, must act effectively without interruption, and this all the more as the tumult increases, so reason must exercise its silent but irresistible guidance no matter how far it may be temporarily outrun by its impetuous allies. The resultant defective knowledge must amplify and correct itself by any method whatever that is adequate to the crisis of the day or the age. This, in its turn, involves the analytical survey, the critical and, whenever necessary, the adverse estimate which, unfortunately but inevitably, offends temperaments to which it is foreign. "What is held to be sacred most requires independent thought to make sure that it truly is of such value."[2]

The contest must nonetheless continue until stable equilibrium is regained, only in due course to be transformed by some further volcanic eruption of the human spirit. But quite clearly, "stable equilibrium" always demands effective authority of one sort or another, its detailed features being dictated by the ruling conditions precisely as the liner's stabilizing mechanism is determined by weight and size,

[1] *Cf.* p. 204.

[2] Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

course and materials, or the constitution of a nation by history and race. Now it is obvious that the stabilizer's control is never impaired, but is on the contrary increased, by every change which adapts it more adequately to new requirements; while for an inventor or manufacturer to insist that any given type is final and perfect is sheer stupidity. If, however, exactly the same attitude is adopted to a country's constitution, then "sheer stupidity" too easily assumes the mask of tradition or sentiment. For it is hard to learn that, in every intricate situation, "stable equilibrium" is never static and rigid, but is inseparable from unceasing development; and since it ever retains its effective authority, this also must be extremely plastic and must continually evolve, as even the written constitution of the United States has insensibly, but nonetheless profoundly, changed during the last few decades. Too often man's insistent demand for finality and certainty becomes almost irresistible, seeking satisfaction now through despotism and again through revolution, whether political or religious, scientific or theological, makes no difference in principle. In itself, undeniably, this demand is healthy and natural; but since it arises from unfathomable spiritual potentialities, realizing themselves in an infinite Universe, the longed for finality must always lie at the foot of the rainbow.

All these issues are, however, so important and difficult that I may be able to make my own position clearer by commenting briefly on Taylor's discussion of authority in *The Faith of a Moralist.* Here he insists on the necessity for "a genuine *fundamentum* on which positive religion can build," since "without the element of the baffling there is no worship." The term "baffling" seems to denote "this element of refractoriness to complete intellectual analysis"; further, this "element" is "the stamp of objectivity," while "the function of authority is to insist upon (its) reality and omnipresence in religion, as in all our contact with the

objectively real"; and thus authority finds "the way of escape from the agnosticism which is the despair of the intellect."[1] Finally, these features must be associated with the "dim and vague contact, rich but confused," and the absence of "clear and definite outlines," already referred to.

This standpoint seems to me to limit the "function of authority" far too drastically. For as I have previously urged, authority is never primarily integrated with, and much less restricted to, "baffling refractoriness." It is on the contrary equally clamant and imperative in all valid intellectual principles, no matter how "abstract" these may be, while it is in fact this inherent authoritativeness that rescues the intellect from agnostic despair by introducing clarity instead of vagueness, and this without necessarily diminnishing the richness of experience as a whole. In discussing the close parallel provided by sense-experience, Taylor emphasizes this point by observing that "the so-called 'infallibility' of sense in respect of its proper sensible is never a sufficient guarantee that a specific experience involving sense is simply veridical." In other words, sense-experience must become thoroughly permeated by, or at least intimately combined with, reason before its own deliverances can be accepted as valid; and if "in the end . . . it is the intellect, with its deductions and analyses, which has to submit,"[2] still it yields always to sense-perceptions saturated through and through by thought, and never to "the testimony of sense" purely as such, as is best seen in the finality enjoyed by all the most skilful scientific observation and experiment. Similarly as regards "experiences in the way of sensation for which we can give no justification beyond the fact that they are there"; this "fact" alone is no safeguard against hallucination and illusion.[3] It at once follows

[1] Vol. ii, pp. 207, 208, 213. [2] Pp. 218, 215.

[3] "Have any blinkers upon the human mind been drawn so close or any fetter upon human enterprise been so heavy as the sense of the holy?" (Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 307; *cf.* p. 308.)

therefore, as Taylor himself admits, that "in the case of contact with the supernatural, the reality and authoritativeness of the given as given does not guarantee the infallibility of the individual declarations based upon immediate contact." The merely "given," then, is self-validating neither in sense nor in religion, no matter how forcible and intense it may become. It must always be supplemented and confirmed by types of experience other than the "given" in this sense of the term, so that it is only when "we find that the deliverances steadily tend to integrate themselves into a coherent system . . . pervaded by definite principles . . . we may say we have truly objective morality . . . of obligation and authority"; and this is equally true of theology.[1] But as I have already maintained, every "coherent system pervaded by definite principles" is the product of reason, as inseparably associated, needless to repeat, with the givenness, immediacy and direct contact which, purely of themselves, can never yield any finally satisfactory criteria. This remains impossible even when several individuals are concerned, since if we regard authority as "the self-assertion of the reality of an experience which contains more than any individual experient has succeeded in analysing out and extricating for himself,"[2] it is obvious that the essentially rational methods of comparison and correlation must be employed before unanimity can be attained in any respect whatever. If then we adopt Taylor's description of "the rightful and sole function of human intellect" as the "rationalization of the given, (which) can never be carried out to the point of resolving the whole content of the given into completely analysed connections," we must nonetheless regard the unresolved remainder as being of the same texture as what has already been comprehended, however transcendent its detailed

[1] Pp. 214, 225, 241; *cf.* p. 232: "coordinating the contents of experiences of contact with God into a coherent system." [2] P. 214.

content may be. This seems to be implied by the later contention that there cannot be "one truth of physical science, another of moral science, and a third of divinity, all incompatible with one another and irrelevant to one another."[1] In other terms, the "baffling" and "refractory" are never the absolutely impenetrable, but are on the contrary the eternal challenge of the Universe to the spirit of man as at once practical, emotional and rational.

5. Recent developments seem to have placed it beyond doubt that every attempt to attain "stable equilibrium," with its inseparably associated "effective authority," must fail if it does not accord ample recognition to the contrasted functions of feeling and will, practice and reason, tradition and adaptation. Actually, of course, these often find themselves in violent opposition. But it is a fatal error to conclude that there exists any *inherent* tendency to internecine conflict; we might just as well regard heart and brain as struggling against each other, instead of harmoniously cooperating as they do, and this all the better because of their very differences. Biology should teach us that every highly developed organism must possess a complexity that involves the utmost variety consistent with reciprocal functioning.[2]

Thus the perennial problem is one of the "balance of power," not of course in the calamitous sense of recent diplomacy, but rather as exhibited by any well-organized business, which plainly reproduces the delicately counterpoised activities of every vigorous organism. Now these can proceed only within a structure that is to a marked degree permanent and unchanging, such as the vertebrate skeleton or the tree-trunk, with their innumerable parallels through-

[1] Pp. 348, 399; *cf.* p 411 on "the evaluation of a surd."

[2] "The two sides of the organism require a reconciliation in which emotional experiences illustrate a conceptual justification, and conceptual experiences find an emotional illustration." (Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 21.)

out the realm of life. These may well be called biological "traditions," transmitted to countless generations for the excellent reason that they have stood the age-long tests of the severest natural selection; and precisely the same principle rules in the sphere of knowledge. Here there must be intellectual traditions, ranging from the elementary multiplication table to the intricate principles of formal logic, inseparable as these all are from their applications in concrete science and culture. To dispense with these is impossible, even while they must incessantly be expanded; but this, again, always confers on them an increasingly absolute character.[1] Similarly as regards national traditions, despite the greater difficulties they present owing to the intricacy of the governing conditions. Even granting that many such traditions are defective, still the verdict of history is clear; the worst are ruthlessly eradicated by a rigorous "historical selection," together with the communities which refuse to abandon them for finer ideals.

The same principles, therefore, must hold of religion, except for the further difficulty that at every stage alike, and when taken at its best, religion is the most comprehensive and for that reason the most complex type of experience. At the same moment, since reason assumes an ever more influential rôle, the irrefragable claims of "intellectual traditions" steadily become more and more explicit. It follows that religion demands traditions of higher value and stability than any others, while the necessities of the situation in themselves place the gravest obstacles in the path of their attainment. Just as the "biological tradition" of the vertebrate skeleton, with its highly effective yet adaptable functions, could appear only after millennia of selective struggle, so it would seem that a parallel process must attend the evolution of religious traditions. This is

[1] "The language of Newton and Maxwell will remain the language of physicists for all time." (Bohr, *Nature*, vol. 128, p. 692.)

however no ground for abandoning the search for them, any more than in the case of the rival theories of heredity or relativity. For in spite of all such perennial disagreements, the cardinal principle remains firm that traditions of the finest attainable character, at any given stage, are indispensable alike for uninterrupted stability and for further progress. This is plainly an ideal, all the harder to achieve because of man's passionate devotion to the standards of his own age, undeniably noble as this always is in itself despite its resultant almost ineradicable conservatism. If we recall the value and necessity of what I have called "biological" and "intellectual traditions," and if at the same time we exorcise the vestiges of "Parson Thwackum" that most of us retain, it should be clear that the serious defects of human nature cannot be charged against tradition in itself and strictly as such; while if we choose to define "dogma," with Whitehead, as "the precise enunciation of a general truth, divested so far as possible from particular exemplification" the term becomes quite justifiable, and "a condition for vivid realization, effectiveness, width of scope, and survival."[1]

The authority rightfully claimed by all tradition, therefore, must spring from that objectivity of the Universe, already discussed in Section 2 of this chapter, which manifests itself in all the main aspects of man's experience. The real and undying function of tradition is to conserve this objectivity in its most stable form suitable to any given epoch, provided always that it remains capable of being deepened and expanded and of assuming the most unmistakable and explicit modes of expression.[2] For this objectivity of Reality exercises a directly and keenly felt compulsiveness which

[1] *Religion in the Making*, pp. 111, 112; *cf.* p. 47.

[2] "When new discoveries have revealed an essential limitation of ideas, we have been rewarded by a wider view and a greater power of correlating phenomena which might have appeared as contradictory." (Bohr, *Nature*, vol. 131, p. 422.)

can never be evaded; although it must be rendered as intelligible as possible before it can be communicated to others, and in this way systematized on any worthy scale. When we remember that the steady advance of our intellectual experience is due to these allied features—to compulsiveness or necessity, to the utmost possible degree of explicit formulation, with its resultant communicability and organization, to authority and even tradition—we should the more readily appreciate their exactly similar rôle in religion, especially when its content takes on doctrinal and theological form. Thus the ultimate test of religious tradition is exceptionally severe. Does it adequately grasp, conserve express and expand the objectivity of the Real, and bring its inherent and inescapable compulsion to bear, fully yet proportionately and relevantly, upon all sides of life and experience? alike in precept and practice, ritual and conduct, emotion and endeavour, and throughout the entire realms of art and knowledge, morals and belief? Only in some such terms as these can the survival value, or the pragmatic validity, of any type of tradition be finally manifested.

6. These conclusions plainly apply with special force to revelation. For all revealed content, whether intuitional or intellectual, emotional or mandatory, presents itself as at once objective, direct, compulsive, complete and final. This claim may be tacit or explicit; and even when the source, or object, is in any way transcendent, it can never be so in such a manner as absolutely to elude the responsive mind. Further, since the inherent compulsion must imply the highest degree of impressiveness, the coolness and discursiveness of intellective experience render this the least adequate type of all, particularly at the more primitive levels of mentality. Equally clearly, training and education, temperament and mood, even heredity and race, all play

their intricate parts in conditioning responsiveness. What is absolutely self-validating to one mind may therefore be negligible to another. So far as emotion and feeling are concerned, and perhaps also intuition, all their profoundly contrasted modes, aroused as they are in equally contrasted situations, have the common characteristics of irresistibly overwhelming the experient while they persist, of creating ineffaceable memories, and of the relatively formless massiveness pertaining to all affective experiences when they attain sufficient intensity.

These are of course the psychological aspects of "numinous" experiences; and while, *prima facie*, they gain by repetition, they also maintain their influence by imaginative recall however placid this may become. But although psychology must duly stress the subjective features of this situation, it is obvious that the governing conditions compel the uncritical experient—and even the psychologist himself whenever, like Hume, he forgets his science and his laboratory—to regard the content or source as sheerly objective, and this (once again) in proportion to his incapacity for self-analysis. Hence arise the familiar and formidable difficulties attending all revelation, heightened as these must become by every advance in numinousness, which at once seems to exclude all possibility of subjective deception and doubt. Nevertheless the profound contrasts between their contents, as apprehended by different persons at different times and places, still more their mutual contradictions despite their impressiveness, combined with their occasional evanescence, their too frequent invalidity and, above all, their inescapable subjective aspects, prevent them being, in and of themselves as thus far considered, any finally adequate ground and criterion of religion. Nor, except as regards intensity, which itself is always a matter of degree, is there anything whatever that is unique, and in that sense ultimate, about these characteristics, since they

can be paralleled in sensation and perception, in non-religious emotions, in hallucination, and even by whatever mystifies the primitive intelligence of the savage and the credulous. Drugs are often used sometimes for good, but also sometimes for bad ends; while signs and omens are specifically addressed to the intellect as well as to emotion.

But we must not therefore conclude that the numinous has but little value. On the contrary, its value is incontestable and incalculable. For only the numinous can ensure that impressiveness and compulsiveness, that indubiety arising from the consciousness of immediate contact with objective Reality, which are always so essential throughout the whole of experience — in intellectual necessity and moral imperativeness, in artistic ecstasy and, above all, in the finest types of religion as "a matter of full-blooded emotion."[1] Thus the genuinely numinous is always as self-validating as the blinding brilliance of tropical sunlight; and once this cardinal principle is conceded the crucial problem plainly becomes, not to establish the actuality and objectivity of the numinous, but rather to discover the criteria of its genuineness—to distinguish the true from the false exactly as we distinguish between the real sun and its deceptively close reflection in some calm stream. Further, so long as the indubitably numinous retains its non-rational character, it can never provide the whole of the desired criteria, but only the primal content—the "raw material" as it were—to which these criteria must be applied.

This, once again, is no unique situation. It finds the closest parallels in the "raw material" of feeling and sensation which form the basis, or the background, of all our experience.[2] And once the numinous has thus been accepted

[1] *Ante* p. 204.

[2] "Everything is in sensation (feeling); everything that emerges in conscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation." (Wallace, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, p. 176.) *Cf.* Bradley's insistence on Feeling.

as actual or genuine, and in one way or another veridical, the criteria and guarantees that are absent from the non-rational sphere must be sought and found within the rational. We must turn to reason in its profoundest sense, not merely in the form of logical schemata or "bloodless categories" inhabiting what Hegel happily called "the realm of shades." For while these are always as indispensable as the vertebrate skeleton, to which—in its rightful place—they may quite justly be compared, they can never form the living tissues, and still less the animating spirit, of the mind. Finally, thus to seek for "criteria and guarantees" plainly implies not the rejection of the numinous, but on the contrary its absolute validation, exactly as a House of Lords judgment, with all its formality and technicality, sets the final seal on some vital and keenly cherished constitutional principle.

Nor, again, does such an appeal to reason introduce any alien intruder. For in many of the most unimpeachable numinous experiences something of the rational is operative almost from the very beginning, although its presence is concealed by the intensity of the emotional content. But on all occasions when moral injunctions are received, particularly when they are explicit and somewhat complicated, it is clear that some kind of rational expression is indispensable if they are to be at all intelligible and effective; and this is equally true whenever the revelation takes on the form of specific utterance, no matter how obcure and mystical this may be. Its most typical and expressive form, in fact, is often taken to be the "still, small *voice.*" Still more does this hold of the meditative recall which almost invariably follows the primary experience, especially when this assumes a self-critical character which may just as readily endorse the original content as undermine it, and also when it is memorized as accurately as possible—never an easy task if ambiguity and error are to be rigorously excluded. Finally, the high value attached to what has thus been revealed

impels its recipients to secure some permanent record, which in its turn becomes the basis of exposition and communication to others. In all these diverse ways, then, reason shows itself to be no foreign invader of realms never its own, but rather as a citizen exercising inalienable rights, which steadily gain in authority as religion advances beyond its earlier levels.

It is quite undeniable, nonetheless, that although the numinous is in this manner conserved and ever more securely validated, it is also radically transformed. More accurately, perhaps, the attitude adopted thereto is drastically changed; but this after all really means that the primal numinous is perceived under totally fresh lights and from new angles, so that its constitutive elements are appreciated in truer interrelations and perspectives, just as some mountain mass, approached first in night's dim mystery, reveals its unseen beauties in the radiance of the morn. But exactly as the contrasts between starry night and sunlit day fall within the one realm of nature, so the cool illumination of reason is inseparably allied with the intensest flames of emotion.

It is, indeed, one of the most unimpeachable guarantees of the genuinely numinous that it finds due place for each of these profoundly diverse aspects and avenues of approach; and conversely, of course, that the false numinous presents features, and at the same time arouses emotions, which can no better withstand the light of reason than the garish gauds of the theatre can bear the day. But feeling and emotion alone can never enable the crucial distinction to be drawn between the truly numinous and its deceptive rivals, since both too often stimulate reactions that are, while they last, equally powerful and sincere. The conduct to which each incites certainly provides an excellent touchstone; but this in its own way endorses the value of reason, since practice can never be completely isolated from theory.

But while this validation of the numinous, or if it is preferred, of revelation, is unceasingly progressive, it is also inexhaustible, simply because the objectivity of the real and its modes of contact with the finite mind are inexhaustible. It follows that the deliverances of reason, taken in their entirety, can never be absolutely final, although they approximate ever more closely to a finality which rests on some such stable "skeletal" basis as that previously referred to, capable as it always remains of further expansion. The human spirit is thus committed to a threefold advance along the avenues of emotion, conduct and reason, in accord with the description of religion as involving the whole of experience. Each of these maintains its own distinctive character, even while it becomes more inextricably interwoven with the others; and the increasingly complex resultant whole retains an unbroken continuity throughout its infinite extent, although any selected stage must appear to present very little resemblance to its germinal predecessors. But in this, again, religion is by no means unique, since exactly the same must be said, *mutatis mutandis*, of art and practice, of historic and social evolution, whenever we compare phases sufficiently remote from one another in time. Nor, plainly, is reason itself immune from such radical transformation. For as its expansion proceeds, its internal structure assumes quite new forms, resulting not only from the addition of fresh elements, but also from the influence which these exert upon the entire mass of earlier content.[1] More technically, reason ceases to be mainly discursive and analytical, and becomes increasingly constructive, thus creating an intellectual system possessing greater stability as well as higher intricacy; the whole, as it were, becomes more and more closely interwoven. But it has always been difficult to describe those later stages of thought and knowledge. Provided, however, the word "intuition" is given its truest meaning, it is perhaps

[1] *Cf.* the illustration of the formation of a glacier, p. 238.

the most suitable term to use, in spite of its unfortunate ambiguity. Again to cite Bosanquet, "intuition or insight means looking at an object intrinsically systematic and distinct, and discerning its constitutive terms and relations."[1] This brings out all the essential features quite unmistakably —insight into objectivity, system, distinctiveness, internal structure and external connections, marked by stability, coherence, and above all the possibility of infinite evolution. If then infallibility is ever attainable, it can be only under these drastic conditions.

For these are the attributes of the genuinely numinous, and to them its irresistible influence is always due. Primarily however, and so far as feeling is concerned, they are sensed simultaneously in their massiveness like brilliant sunlight by the unprotected eye; and, again like the sun's attraction, they arouse deep and powerful waves of emotion which in their turn determine conduct. But how often the resultant action has been chaotic and calamitous the history of religion itself abundantly declares; and thus the numinous of one age and race has been rejected by another, always in favour of some contrasted type wherein the old authority is vested anew, until a fresh irruption from the fathomless deep thrusts itself to the ever troubled surface.

But needless to say, this is not all. For just as sunlight can be analysed into those spectral hues which are the purest forms of light itself, so the numinous must be passed through the prism of reason, however defective this may be to begin with; while, again like the light, the numinous retains its intrinsic qualities and force unimpaired throughout the whole process. With the more penetrating insight thus attained, into his own nature and his relations to the Universe and Deity, and in no other way, man may pursue his mysterious course with the faith and confidence springing from an ever clearer vision.

[1] *Cf.* p. 203.

XVII

DIVINE PERSONALITY

1. ALTHOUGH I have been concerned throughout with religion as such, rather than with any one of its many specific forms, the issues raised in recent controversy have been so vital and interesting that I may be allowed to indicate the conclusions that seem to me to be most justifiable. This will necessitate no lengthy discussion, because the general position, already adopted in my previous books, appears to have received definite and weighty support since they were published. This is especially true with respect to the cardinal principle, upon which many of the others depend, of the actuality[1] of the Supreme Self, or Supreme Personality, whom for brevity's sake I shall now call Deity or God. After giving careful consideration to the objections directed against this "general position," as well as against my own arguments in its favour, I feel no doubt whatever that not only have no fatal difficulties as yet been raised, but that on the contrary the standpoint has gained substantial endorsement.

These objections and difficulties, in the main, spring from the misunderstanding of the implications of some recent developments in scientific theory; and although the consequent misinterpretation is to a large extent natural and plausible, it is none the less profoundly mistaken. This is so, to begin with, as regards the reality of Mechanism in the physical universe. This reality I have maintained, and have argued that its combined automatism and evolution logically justify the conclusion that the Supreme Self actually exists.

[1] Or "real existence"; the only difficulty arises from the different meanings of "existence" in modern philosophy; but I wish to avoid technicalities as far as possible.

But in this connection, it ought to be needless to say, "logically" means neither mathematically nor, in any abstract sense, formally; and it is most unfortunate that "logically" is far too frequently given this narrow significance, correct enough though it is in any relevant instances.[1] It should surely be obvious that since we are not dealing with a mathematical problem, mathematical methods and results are not to be expected; and this is equally true of "formally," except insofar as all detailed arguments must conform throughout to the formal principles of logic. There still remains, however, the much more substantial difficulty that the very existence of mechanism seems to have been repeatedly denied by writers as eminent as Smuts and Millikan, Jeans, Tennant and Eddington. "The very basis of mechanism," asserts the first, "is undermined"; although this categorical statement is materially qualified in the form that "the older mechanistic conception of nature, as consisting of fixed material particles, mechanically interacting with each other . . . is now being modified."[2]

Now while it is unquestionable that "the older mechanistic conception is being modified," it is nonetheless quite illogical to conclude that no mechanisms whatever exist in the natural world. For a mechanism, in the familiar sense of any ordinary machine, is one thing and the "mechanistic conception," with its allied theory and explanations, quite another; so that to identify these is fatally confusing. Dynamos and wireless sets, for example, cannot be entirely explained in terms of theoretical mechanics alone, but they are nevertheless mechanisms; they are "collections of parts which cooperate to produce a single result or set of results."[3]

[1] *Cf. ante* p. 81, *n.*

[2] *The Scientific World Picture of To-day*, pp. 10, 11; *The Mysterious Universe* (Jeans) and *The Nature of the Physical World* (Eddington) are sufficiently well known.

[3] Hallett, *Aeternitas*, p. 196; *cf.* Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, pp. 123, 124.

Quite similarly star clusters and the rotating galaxy, the solar system, each planet with its satellites and equally in itself, are large scale or macroscopic mechanisms, just as literally as dynamos are. But this may be admitted, while the rejection of mechanism is then applied to the ultra-microscopic constituents of the physical world—to "the basis of mechanism," to repeat Smuts' phrase. There is no good ground, however, for this alternative contention, since the very terms which denote the new theories—Quantum Mechanics and Wave Mechanics—themselves show that "mechanics" is still retained in a way that is much more than merely formal; and although the entire situation is somewhat complicated, the main issues are not difficult to grasp. The essential point is that, so far as pure mathematics itself is concerned, the idea of mechanism, as such, is quite superfluous. As the recent rapid expansions of scientific theory have clearly shown, the mathematician can proceed without this idea most successfully, except of course that many of his specific problems are set for him by the functioning of mechanisms themselves. But once these data have been provided for his investigation, the mathematician selects the quantitative aspects of the processes and phenomena and concerns himself with these alone,[1] so as to throw a flood of light over the whole field of microscopic physics. But it is clear that this selection is a definite restriction, by way of abstraction, of the entire field of enquiry; and it by no means follows, as has been far too hastily supposed, that simply because mathematics dispenses with mechanism this concept can therefore be completely discarded. No one would argue, I suppose, that because many of the character-

[1] Or mainly with these, since mathematics is never purely quantitative, as is so often supposed. It is "not the general science of magnitude but of form, not the science of quantity but of quality." (Cassirer, *Substance and Function*, p. 92.) In other words, it is the science of groups and order, the applications to quantity being merely incidental; *cf.* Costello, *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. xxv, p. 439.

istics of the solar system can be expressed mathematically, therefore this system is in no sense a mechanism, or that no mechanical principles of any kind whatever must be employed in its description. On the contrary, "in the vastnesses of cosmic space the laws of matter, radiation and thermodynamics hold sway with uninfringed accuracy"; so that while "Newtonian mechanics needs modification, this does not detract from its value in astronomy."[1] This being so, it is a simple transition to pass from sun to crystal oscillators, molecules, vibrating atoms, electrons and protons, and to retain throughout the concept of mechanism as always indispensable, no matter to what extent it must be modified in the light of new discoveries.[2]

In other words, all that is implied by these recent advances is the rejection of what Smuts calls the "older mechanistic conception" of levers and cogwheels, pulls and pushes, jellies and vortices, employed last century. But this, it must again be emphasized, by no means necessitates the discarding of the idea of mechanism completely except—to repeat—so far as pure mathematics is concerned. What has actually happened is extremely significant, since it consists in the substitution, for the "older conception," of the far more intricate Wave Mechanics and Quantum Mechanics of to-day, soon to be superseded by the yet more complex Mechanics of to-morrow. As Lodge has recently maintained, "it is one thing to say that mechanism is not a complete explanation; it is quite another to sweep it all away and say that there is no mechanism at all. Machinery there must be; mechanism of some kind." Similarly Needham: "on the physical side mechanistic conceptions are perfectly ade-

[1] E. A. Milne, *Science Progress*, vol. 25, p. 49; Thomson, *Wave Mechanics*, p. 12.

[2] "Electrons are like trains whose movements take place on fixed tracks and are controlled by time-tables. . . . Any selected kind of atom is a tiny broadcasting station." (Andrade, *The Mechanism of Nature*, pp. 153, 156.)

quate."[1] Thus the actual results of recent discovery necessitate (*a*) the retention of the general concept of mechanism,[2] and (*b*) the realization that Nature's mechanisms are far more complex and delicate than had previously been supposed; so much more so, indeed, that man's imagination, which has hitherto proved fairly adequate in their representation, is now completely baffled, and must therefore hand over its functions to mathematics.

But the further consequences of this new situation are still more significant. For so far as (*a*) is concerned, I believe that the basis of my argument for the real existence of Deity is still quite logical; while with respect to (*b*) I may observe that my earlier contention, that the status of the Supreme Intelligence must be correlated to, and estimated by, the complexity of the world mechanism, becomes all the more forcible as our insight into this complexity steadily increases; and in this regard there is as yet no indication that any final limits are within view; rather, indeed, the contrary. Again, the fact that imagination must abdicate in favour of mathematics, not (to repeat) because mechanisms are non-existent but because they are too intricate, precise and

[1] *Philosophy*, vol. vii, pp. 139, 145; *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 250.

[2] The more technical features of the questions may interest some readers. "Any sort of behaviour can be imitated by a mechanical system, provided it is only complicated enough. Poincaré showed that it is always possible to find a mechanistic explanation of any phenomenon." (Bridgman, *The Logic of Modern Physics*, pp. 190, 49.) "The organism in every cross-section is a precise mechanism; the Real is in some minor and abstract sense a mechanism." (Hallett, *Aeternitas*, pp. 205, 223.) "De Broglie's idea has been invaluable not only as the basis of a new theory of the atom, but also as the basis of an entirely new theory of mechanics." (Davisson, *Science*, vol. 71, p. 652.) "There is a difference of degree rather than of kind between the adoption of a mechanical model and the development of a mathematical theory." (Langmuir, *Science*, vol. 70, p. 390.) "Physics has given us a mechanism of atomic linkage." (Sidgwick, *Science*, vol. 73, p. 276.) "Because of water the whole earth forms one tremendous thermostat." (Needham, *The Sceptical Biologist*, p. 214.)

delicate for imagination to envisage, simply means that ideas (or concepts) must be employed instead of mere imagery, since mathematical expressions alone are adequate for current description and explanation; and this in turn illustrates the increasing value and dominance of reason,[1] which alone can provide the requisite ideas, in accordance with the general standpoint adopted in my previous chapters.

2. With the real existence of world mechanisms I associated the principle of world evolution, and this also has received equally weighty endorsement. One of the most eminent of living physicists asserts "that the universe must be in a state of continuous evolution has been shown to be necessary, and has been mathematically described";[2] while Eddington observes that "it was one process of evolution sweeping across the primordial matter which caused it to form itself into stars."[3] And although evolution is usually associated with vital phenomena, a few recent quotations may not be superfluous. To begin with, organic evolution is intimately correlated to mechanism in Lotka's reference to "a great world engine . . . it accomplishes one very remarkable thing: it improves itself as it goes along; this is the conception we must form of organic evolution."[4]

[1] This remains true even if mathematics has recently claimed an exaggerated predominance; for mathematics is after all not the only form which reason assumes. But already a reaction has set in. "The attitude of the physicist to-day is changing toward mathematical theory. As a whole, he takes it far less seriously, recognizes that it contains less of reality and more of a purely suggestive character than he had realized." (Bridgman, *Science*, vol. 71, p. 21; *cf.* Perrine, p. 416.) "I agree with Dr. Whitehead when he says there can be no true physical science which looks first to mathematics for its conceptual model; and with Bacon's dictum that the best results are obtained when we begin with physics and end with mathematics." (J. J. Thomson, *Tendencies of Recent Physics*, p. 18.)

[2] W. de Sitter, *Scientia*, vol. 49, p. 8.

[3] *Nature*, vol. 111, p. 18.

[4] *Physical Biology*, p. 335.

Similarly Fairfield Osborn: "Both bio-chemical and bio-physical evolution is along continuously adaptive and creative lines."[1] Incidentally, it should be emphasized that the widespread opinion that the physical universe is steadily approaching the condition of totally unavailable energy degradation, or "heat-death," has been rejected by several competent scientific writers. "There is no evidence," affirms G. N. Lewis, "for the hypothesis of continual degradation. Astronomy seems to show no cosmic running down; that the universe actually is running down obtains no support from thermodynamics"; "it is certainly not necessary," agrees Macmillan, "to regard the physical universe as a mechanism which is running down."[2] "The pessimistic conclusions of Jeans and others as to an inevitable heat-death for the universe must be viewed with doubt."[3] In more general terms, therefore, we are still justified in believing that "Nature is not growing old, but is ever rising from the ashes of its past in immortal vigour."[4] "Space-time finds its natural completion in organic evolution"; "organic evolution is the crowning phase, may be, of cosmic evolution."[5] The philosophical implications of this view are well expressed by Janet and Inge: "That which is precisely most worthy of God is to have made a Nature which creates itself"; "only a cosmos which seems to be sufficient to itself can be conceived of as having been created by God."[6] Whitehead, again, has suggested the alternative possibility that "the universe shows us two aspects: on one side it is physically wasting, on the other

[1] *Science*, vol. 73, p. 549.

[2] *The Anatomy of Science*, p. 142; *Science*, vol. 71, p. 571; *Scientia*, vol. 33, p. 112. [3] E. A. Milne, *Nature*, vol. 130, p. 508.

[4] Porter, *Science*, vol. 69, p. 547. "Cosmic time has no arrow of an entropic sort." (Sellars, *Philosophical Review*, vol. 41, p. 518.)

[5] Smuts, *The Scientific World Picture of To-day*, p. 8; Allen, *Nature*, vol. 123, p. 841.

[6] Quoted by J. A. Thomson in *Purpose in Evolution*, p. 23.

side it is spiritually ascending";[1] and there may be sufficient grounds for the current hypotheses as to atomic reconstruction in the remote depths of interstellar space to substantiate these interpretations.

Mechanism, still further, is most closely concerned in all organic processes; and although this need not imply the reduction of life to the physico-chemical level, it obviously strengthens the objections already urged by Lodge and others against the abandonment of mechanical principles. "Anything that concerns the material side of life is an atomic question," observes Andrade;[2] "the organism consists of machines within machines; the inner machine is the nucleus."[3] Additional technical references may be relegated to a footnote, but the following statements by J. A. Thomson and Whitehead, while certainly somewhat qualified, are sufficiently significant without further comment. "In some ways a living creature is like a machine which man has contrived with a purpose . . . it is like a machine in being an arrangement for changing matter and energy from one form to another and in its more or less automatic smoothness."[4] "In a sense, the difference between a living organism and the inorganic environment is only a question of degree; but it is a difference of degree which makes all the difference—in effect, it is a difference of quality."[5] But even if we supplement these views by the hypothesis that "we cannot hope to understand the phenomena presented by living protoplasm without taking account of the imperceptible factor that makes the difference between protoplasm living and protoplasm dead,"[6] it still remains undeniable that actual mechanisms are indispensable for the occurrence of vital changes. And if we choose to go

[1] *Religion in the Making*, p. 144. [2] *The Mechanism of Nature*, p. 169.
[3] Conklin, in Russell's *Development and Heredity*, p. 267.
[4] *Purpose in Evolution*, p. 9. [5] *Process and Reality*, p. 252.
[6] McDougall, *Modern Materialism*, p. 95; *cf.* p. 104 for Bousfield's suggestions.

further, and accept Donnan's contention that "the elementary phenomena of life are *deterministic*, (they) can be exactly measured and expressed in the form of precise mathematical equations,"[1] the issues of causation and indeterminacy, dealt with in a previous chapter, reappear in a fresh connection.[2] From a different viewpoint Crile's "autosynthetic cells," composed of brain extracts, proteins and mineral salts, closely simulate many life processes and have been kept active for ten weeks by adding proteins to the cultures.[3]

Thus we find abundant confirmation for the general standpoint, adopted in my previous volumes, that living processes, including those in nervous and brain tissues, depend very largely, even if we may not say completely, on the extreme complexity and delicacy of protoplasmic constitution, and this in turn on the subtle precision and delicacy of organic mechanisms; *e.g.* "the inconceivably delicate and minute hereditary mechanism" referred to by Fairfield Osborn.[4] "We are forced," as Hogben maintains,

[1] *Nature*, vol. 122, p. 513.

[2] *Ante* p. 224; I append more technical considerations: "There is no limit to the extent to which the mechanisms of life can be elucidated with the aid of physical methods and concepts." (Hogben, *The Nature of Living Matter*, p. 94; A. V. Hill.) "Since its processes are so regular—its development from the germ is repeated so exactly—it seems clear that the organism must be mechanistic in its constitution and operation in precisely the same sense as any other regularly repeated physical process or cycle is mechanistic." (Lillie, *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. xxiii, p. 677.) The terms "biomechanism" and "biophysics" are being more and more frequently employed. "The word mechanism applied to living organisms has always aroused protest, but it is extremely difficult to find another word which so exactly describes the orderliness and organization throughout nature. If there was no kind of mechanism . . . existence would be a mockery and there would be no life at all as we know it." (Hurst, *The Mechanism of Creative Evolution*, p. 303; *cf.* p. 304.)

[3] *Nature*, vol. 127, p. 141. "Alum crystals afford an analogy with the processes of metabolism and reproduction which go on in living cells." (L. Hill, *The Philosophy of a Biologist*, p. 24.)

[4] *Science*, vol. 73, p. 548.

"to consider the order of complexity of the living system maintained in dynamical equilibrium with its surroundings as the essential feature which distinguishes it from non-living things."[1] Here "order of complexity" recalls Whitehead's "difference of degree"; or in more general terms, we must regard "the organic as being an extrapolation from the inorganic, a more complicated product of the same fundamental laws."[2]

Nor is the human brain any exception to this principle. "The cerebral cortex is a unique sort of a machine and it does unique things. It is the most complicated single mechanism known in our natural cosmos. Mechanism and organism are not in conflict, and organism is still mechanism."[3] "The human individual is in certain important respects the most complicated bit of machinery in existence," observes Huxley. But lest it be hastily assumed that all scientists who take up this position are crude materialists, it must be noticed that the same writer insists with equal emphasis that man "is a spiritual being."[4] It is undeniably difficult thus to associate life, mind and spirituality with material mechanisms, no matter how "inconceivably delicate and minute" these may be; yet we seem compelled to admit that Lotze's anticipation of the modern viewpoint has been amply substantiated by recent research: "how absolutely universal is the extent, and at the same time how completely subordinate the significance of the mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world."[5]

[1] *The Nature of Living Matter*, p. 108. "The nervous system does not owe its physiological mystery to a new form of energy, but to the circumstance that modes of energy displayed in the non-living world occur in colloidal electrolytic structures of great chemical complexity." (Gotch, in Needham's *The Sceptical Biologist*, p. 210.)

[2] Needham, *The Great Amphibium*, p. 119.

[3] Herrick, *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. xxvi, pp. 595, 592.

[4] *What Dare I Think?* pp. 45, 46.

[5] *Microcosmos*, vol. i, p. xvi.

3. Now to describe man as "a spiritual being" is simply to say that personality is spiritual; and in my earlier quotations from Huxley's and other writers' references to the unlimited possibilities of the development of human personality we find, I believe, valuable support for the principle of continuity throughout all the levels of selfhood to its culmination in the Supreme Self or Deity.[1] I fully admit the extreme difficulties involved in this view. On the other hand, we must avoid exaggerating these obstacles; and it seems to myself that when we clearly realize the vast range of the contrast between the microscopic unicellular germ and the genius of a Shakespeare or Plato—a contrast concealed from us by its sheer familiarity—it is quite logical to regard the further potentialities of personality, in itself and as such, as quite well grounded in the facts at our disposal. Of course we must always postulate proper conditions for the further development of selfhood. But on this point also, when we envisage those inexpressibly complex and delicate adjustments between organism and environment whereby all life is maintained,[2] it is impossible to exclude, *a priori*, the existence of analogous conditions favouring the continuance of personality, which is admittedly the highest type of mental life known to us, especially when we contemplate the mysterious character of space-time, matter and energy.

Equally must we insist that the transcendence of man's selfhood by the Supreme Self infinitely outranges the contrast between Shakespeare and the germ cell, so that the finest concepts of the divine nature ever formed by our minds are faint and dim. "They are but broken lights": almost a commonplace of religion too frequently ignored.

[1] *Ante* p. 140. It need hardly be added that Huxley himself rejects the concept of divine personality.

[2] L. J. Henderson, *The Fitness of the Environment*, and *The Order of Nature*.

But precisely the same is true of the child struggling with the multiplication table on the one hand and an Einstein on the other; there is therefore no more necessity to conclude, from all the known facts, that the Supreme Experience must be non-personal than that an Einsteinian intellect is non-personal because it so incalculably exceeds the infant's capacity; the proper logical conclusion is that it is super-infantile, which is plainly quite a different matter. In spite of this, however, the unbroken continuity of nature and origin remains obvious; still further, the highly developed personality can, if it chooses, bridge the profound chasm and bring itself down to the lower level.

I should therefore like to emphasize what I take to be the cardinal feature in my previous quotation from Huxley: "the status of mind in the universe, *subordinating more and more* of the other activities of reality to the power of the mind." For it is here that we find one of the most significant of all the attributes of selfhood: its capacity of acquiring an ever expanding dominance over its environment. Writing "as a biologist," Needham observes that "we are only at the very threshold of an undreamed-of control over living things, including ourselves"; similarly Hobhouse from the philosophical standpoint: "There seems to be no theoretical limit to the plasticity of human purpose. No range is too vast, no consideration too remote, no correlation too complex to affect our action if occasion calls. We are nowhere finally stopped." And once more Huxley contemplates "man endowed with infinite powers of control should he care to exercise them."[1] The famous aphorism of Pascal is too well

[1] *The Great Amphibium*, p. 14. *Proc. Aristotelian Soc.*, vol. xviii, p. 476. *What Dare I Think?* p. 150. Technically, of course, the issue can be made one of definition, so that a transcendent self may quite legitimately be defined as supra-personal. Provided that the essence of personality is thereby conserved, and not completely eliminated, no objection can be offered; it plainly has the advantage of stressing the contrasts emphasized throughout my own discussion.

known to need citing, but a recent variant is extremely impressive: "The greatest marvel in creation is not the universe of stars, nor the universe of atoms, but the insatiably curious and dynamic spirit of man, always straining forward to hear the revelations of the universe."[1]

Thus we are amply justified, I believe, in accepting the two following conclusions: (*a*) The *concept* of a Supreme Personality cannot be excluded *a priori*; on the contrary it finds firm grounds in the established facts concerning personality as such; and this remains true however far we choose to carry the principle of transcendence. (*b*) The real existence, in the first place, of Nature's mechanisms, and in the second place, of evolutionary processes, constitutes an incontestable proof of the *actuality* of the Supreme Self or Deity.

4. So much for the scientific and philosophic aspects of the subject; its bearing upon religious experience is equally important. For as I have insisted throughout, whatever conclusions about the Universe or Deity may be adopted, the emotional response which these unfailingly arouse must always have the highest value and exert the strongest influence; and any mind which can contemplate the Whole, as modern knowledge reveals it, without being deeply stirred and without some share, at least, of the reaction of the old Hebrew poet and of one of the greatest of modern thinkers, must be seriously lacking in one way or another. Now it is in this respect, once again, that man's intellect enjoys its outstanding significance. For it alone enables man to obtain any clear, accurate and, to some degree, complete and final insight into the actual constitution of Reality; it alone yields any penetrating and wide-ranging vision into the true nature of Being. In simpler terms, his intellect alone can give man *comprehension* or *understanding* of the

[1] Persico, *Scientia*, vol. 49, Supplement, p. 40.

Universe, whereby he can ascertain its cardinal structural features in their proper interrelations, including, it must not be forgotten, his own relations to the environing and sustaining Whole.[1]

It is of course the most facile of objections to decry this contention as merely barren "intellectualism," "rationalism" or "panlogism"; or, again, to accuse the intellect of distorting the Real or of providing, in the end, nothing more than symbolism. But since I have already dealt with these criticisms either directly or by implication, it will be sufficient to add that, although they undeniably stress important features demanding weighty consideration, they lose all their force when it is recognized: (*a*) that reason can never be isolated from the rest of experience; (*b*) that while thought is largely abstract and analytical, its final and most valuable results are always concrete and constructive; (*c*) that the "hunger and thirst after knowledge" is as ineradicable from the racial mind as the "hunger and thirst after righteousness"; (*d*) that apart from the deep and clear insight of reason, the most intense emotions remain obscure, unreliable, and therefore largely valueless alike in themselves and in their influence on conduct, while at the same time the objects, or the stimuli, of emotion are only blindly felt, instead of becoming definitely discerned as they demand to be. This is always so, no matter how "numinous" the stimuli may be;[2] in fact, merely to recognize and designate them as numinous, or as incomprehensible or divine, itself necessitates the activity of reason under the guise of comparison and contrast. It is perhaps easier, however, to realize the bearing of these considerations on art and the gradual development of aesthetic responsiveness. We need then only recall the incalculable value of competent criticism, whether hostile or appreciative, and remember that such "competent criticism" is essentially reasonable, not to say occasionally

[1] *Cf.* p. 265 on "intuition."

[2] *Cf.* pp. 139, 250–5.

even "intellectualist" or "rationalist," to perceive that all emotion without exception, including therefore its distinctively religious types, must be approached from exactly the same point of view.

This is most concisely expressed by saying that the function of reason, or the purpose of the intellect, is to comprehend Reality. Scientifically for example, the human mind, feeble and limited as it unquestionably is, comprehends the abysmal entirety of the space-time continuum on the one hand, and the hidden recesses of the atom on the other; nor should we allow our increasing familiarity with this situation to blind us to its real marvel, since it is plainly only the prelude to an ever expanding insight into the nature of life and mind. Now the word "prehensile" reminds us that to com-"prehend" or ap-"prehend" is to grasp. In other terms, the intellect is the "prehensile organ" of the human spirit, wherewith man literally "grasps" the Universe exactly as his hand grasps a tool; "intellectual grasp" is a familiar expression, while "prehension" has been given an analogous technical application by Whitehead in *Process and Reality*; quite similarly the German term for idea or concept, *Begriff*, is obviously and significantly akin to "grip." Finally, that to "grasp" and comprehend in this way is at the same time to control has long ago found utterance in the proverb "knowledge is power."

Quite clearly, still further, the comprehending mind must enjoy a definitely higher status than whatever it thus understands and controls; and this holds true equally of all that mind creates. It may be objected that man's mind will never comprehend Nature exhaustively; nevertheless the natural world, at every level below the human, lacks the distinctively human capacity of understanding, and in this way also it manifests its own inferior rank. Now with reference to religion this conclusion is of paramount importance. For it at once implies that there can never arise any genuine

communion nor true reciprocity between man's spirit on the one hand and the infra-human world on the other. Undeniably enjoyment and appreciation, marvel and admiration, even terror, awe and the sense of the sublime, or even of the sacred and the holy, are aroused. But under the given conditions, all these are Poles remote from mutual communion on any equal footing; and it is most significant that whatever actual communion does arise can be attained only in and through the personification of Nature, either implicitly or explicitly, either crudely in primitive polytheism or poetically and mystically in Wordsworthian rapture. But reason, especially as scientific, sternly reproves and ruthlessly banishes this pleasing self-deception; and it has become a commonplace that man's response to a universe of electrons and radiation, of irrefragable causality even if tinctured by indeterminacy, to say nothing of equations and mathematical symbols, despite its unfathomed marvel, can never enjoy reciprocity.

But all this remains similarly true when man confronts no longer the natural world but the Universe in its wholeness, so long as every aspect of personality is excluded. This does not mean of course that the Universe, envisaged thus, is like the realm of nature in being inferior to the comprehending human mind. On the contrary man is overwhelmingly awed by an inexpressible transcendence, an eternally insoluble mystery; and I have already insisted that this attitude can, and indeed should, form the basis of a religion at once impressive and profound. What exact type this assumes is a question more of temperament than of formal importance. It may be pantheism, impersonal absolutism,[1] Oriental nihilism or inarticulate mysticism. It matters not;

[1] From which I have previously distinguished Hegelian absolutism, we may compare Bosanquet: "The Absolute is simply the high-water mark of fluctuations in experience, of which, in general, we are daily and normally aware." (*Principle of Individuality*, p. 378; *cf.* p. 255.)

between Reality so conceived and man genuine communion is no more possible than with the blindest mechanism ever proclaimed, except insofar as a totally illegitimate *quasi*-personification is surreptitiously introduced. In each case alike the human spirit becomes an alien; and only a pathetic self-deception can conceal this conclusion, frankly accepted and stoically confronted as it frequently is by clearer intellects. Still further, each advance in the age-long evolution of man, as an essentially personal being, intensifies both his alienation from the impersonal Whole and his realization of his actual situation; for just as crude mythologies have been discarded, so must the finest mystic rapture steadily wither away beneath the cold illumination of expanding reason.

5. I do not for a moment suggest that these considerations, taken purely in themselves, yield any ground for the principle of divine selfhood. This still remains as I have always presented it—an issue for logical argument; and in so far as this is felt to be inadequate the principle must be qualified or rejected. Here I simply wish to state, as clearly as possible, the inevitable consequence of any such adverse attitude—that is the complete destruction of all foundation for communion, or reciprocity, between man and Universe; while on the other hand the actual existence of Deity who is, in any conceivable way, personal, radically transforms the situation.[1] It may bear repeating that the term "personal Deity" must be given no repellently narrow meaning; it must always be so interpreted as practically to transform it, thereby straining to the utmost the combined powers of imagination and conception. But in the light of the widely accepted views previously adduced as to the future evolution

[1] "What is meant by the Personality of God as a religious doctrine is the possibility of personal intercourse." (Webb, *The Relation between God and Man*, p. 220.)

of the human mind, it should be obvious that these capacities will steadily become more adequate to their stupendous task. In other words, human personality will gradually approximate, though always asymptotically and from an inexpressibly remote distance, more nearly to the divine level; and this plainly implies that direct communion between man and Deity may become ever fuller, deeper and richer.

But divine selfhood involves a conclusion of even greater value and significance. For not only may man strain ever upwards, but Deity, as essentially personal, can descend to meet and sustain the human effort; and this at every stage alike, no matter how primitive and imperfect man's own approach may be. It has never been sufficiently realized, I believe, that this capacity of effecting contact with far lower forms is an inherent characteristic of selfhood, but of no other conceivable type of Being; and it demands the cooperation of every attribute—of knowledge and sympathy, of feeling and will—which the individual possesses. The essence of this state of affairs is patent even in human experience, in spite of its triviality and limitations. For if he so chooses and decides, the genius, whether a Plato or Jesus, a Shakespeare or Darwin, a Dante or Einstein, can bring himself down to the level of the little child, and establish a genuine reciprocity which is satisfactory to the child at least; and the finer and nobler the self, the more successfully can this formidable task be performed; which means that the deeper the original chasm between the two types of individual, the more adequately can it be bridged, but only from the side of the higher self.

The applications of this cardinal principle to the relation between man and God, and therefore to the future development of religion, are plain. I need add only that the complete exclusion of personality from the divine nature destroys all these possibilities immediately and finally. For between the

personal and the impersonal, provided this be literally and absolutely such, there must exist an impenetrable barrier. And this not merely as regards a realm of Nature wholly mechanical, but almost equally with respect to the animal world, since apart from some degree of *quasi*-personality there is only the slightest scope for reciprocity; in this connection domestication is, at bottom, a step towards humanizing—that is towards "personifying"—animals.

Nor again does divine personality necessarily preclude the numinous and the profound reactions which it arouses. Provided that transcendence is adequately emphasized, the infinitely transcendent Self is fully as numinous as any impersonal Reality, and indeed more so. For let us, to begin with, regard the impersonal Universe as being unutterably numinous; let us raise this quality to the highest conceivable power and thus conserve it to the utmost, as modern knowledge amply justifies our doing. Even so we must at once recognize that it is the essential attribute of Deity, as personal, to control and dominate such a Universe, and thereby to manifest an incalculably higher degree of numinousness. But once again, with impersonal Deity this dominance becomes impossible, since it is, *ex hypothesi*, inseparable from selfhood. The divine status falls back, therefore, to that of the impersonal Universe; no matter how inexpressibly elevated this may be, a descent is inevitable. Thus the concept of personality alone permits this final advance to what may now be called super-transcendence, since this concept alone implies the indispensable quality of dominance.

This introduces another crucial aspect of the subject which has been given unusual prominence in recent discussion, in which one of the most remarkable features, to my mind, is the renewed importance attached to moral guiltiness. I shall cite two thinkers whose significance is all the greater in the present connection, because they both agree in rejecting theism. The first is Huxley: "I believe that sin exists,

and the sense of sin . . . we all fall short, not merely of perfection but of our reasonable possibilities . . . the root of the desire to escape from self is the desire to be rid of the burden of sin. . . . Sin and the sense of sin will always be with us";[1] and his protests against exaggeration, over-emphasis and other equally important points do not affect the essential feature—the insistence on the actuality of sin, however this in itself may be defined. The second writer is Hartmann, who, approaching the subject almost exclusively from the ethical standpoint, places a yet more unmistakable emphasis on moral guilt, both as such and also as inseparable from freedom and responsibility. For Hartmann, then, guilt is "imperative, inevitable, real and felt to be real, like a fate"; and again, in spite of his nontheistic viewpoint, this is no arbitrary and mysterious invasion of human experience from without. On the contrary, it is a declaration springing from "the depth of human nature" with "drastic expression and inner necessity." Finally and yet more significantly, guilt is not merely inescapable as a fact, but man ought never to seek to evade it. It is absolutely essential to the integrity of his moral being to recognize and accept his undeniable guilt, so that to repudiate it, or even to minimize it, involves the sacrifice of "his own autonomous personality."[2]

I believe that all this speaks so eloquently for itself that little comment is required. It appears to me that in spite of Huxley's qualifications of his own position, Hartmann simply carries his basal postulates to their perfectly logical conclusion. For the higher we elevate our standard of values, the more serious becomes our falling "short of our reasonable possibilities," since the very nerve of all progress lies in maintaining and advancing our valuational criteria. Now this "falling short" assumes innumerable forms—instinctive,

[1] *Religion Without Revelation*, pp. 365, 366, 287–9.
[2] *Ethics*, vol. iii, pp. 172–4.

habitual, unconscious, subconscious, imitative or what not; and each is of vital importance alike for practical morality and ethical theory. But when all these types of failure have received adequate consideration, there still remains the most important of all—that of *voluntary* defection, whether or not we choose to call this "sin"; it is the deliberate and open-eyed betrayal and violation of ideals, rejection of fine standards, and consequent destruction of the corresponding values. In spite of the old and difficult problem of the relation between virtue and knowledge, it has become almost a commonplace of moral theory that wrongdoing, primarily and essentially, concerns the will. It is, to repeat, voluntary, deliberate, open-eyed; and of this, as Hartmann insists, everyone is in some way and to some degree guilty. These brute facts of experience need neither exaggeration nor overemphasis; while to close our eyes and pretend that they do not exist is merely calamitous self-deception which, in the end, intensifies the original evil.

Now when we pass from the psychological and ethical aspects of this situation to its wider philosophic implications, two vitally important conclusions follow. It will be universally admitted, I believe, that there are certain offences so gross and unpardonable that they place the criminal absolutely "outside the pale," at least until completely adequate compensation has been rendered. The betrayal of trust and friendship, of country and lover; deliberate and colossal swindling such as has occurred in recent years; murder; even cheating at cards and gratuitous affronts to etiquette, are all cases in point. They are, once again, "voluntary, deliberate, open-eyed," and may also be long continued; the indispensable "adequate compensation" is always extremely difficult and often quite impossible; and even when it has been effected there frequently persists an ineffaceable taint and memory, sometimes for generations and centuries, which no forgiveness nor charity can

remove: the ineradicable brand of the traitor, the murderer, the forger.[1] These again are "brute facts," dominating law and social intercourse in all civilized communities; and they imply that all such offences result in a vitiation of the personality of the wrongdoer so permanent and indestructible that neither contrition nor pardon can ever efface it. The "substance" of the self then resembles the tissues of a hopeless drug addict in being incurably toxic; that is why guilt is "real like a fate."[2]

It is then no exaggeration, but mere elementary psychology, to add (with Hartmann and Huxley) that this is true of everyone, in some way and to some degree. Now the permanent vitiation of selfhood must prevent the successful attainment of whatever ideals are selected and pursued. In this respect the individual becomes as helpless as a confirmed drug addict who endeavours to regain perfect health, or a self-mutilated athlete who tries to lower a record; all such effort is self-stultified in advance. But it will further be admitted, I think, that man at his best has ever sought, and ever will seek, to remove this fatal vitiation of his being, alike in the case of himself and his fellows; for this no sacrifice is too costly, as the evolution of moral codes and the history of religion superabundantly prove.

The psychological analysis of this irresistible impulse, or "instinct," cannot here be attempted; but it must be observed that if it is in any sense irrational, and therefore unjustifiable, it is so in precisely the same way that the parallel, and equally unthinking and instantaneous, impulse to cleanse the body from foulness, and purify the organism

[1] "A past misdeed, a past stain on honour, often a mere past piece of social *gaucherie* . . . a living and uneffaceable reality." (Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*, vol. i, p. 86; *cf.* pp. 174, 179.)

[2] *Cf.* Marett on "leprosy," *ante* p. 110; "wrenches the whole nature of the soul out of gear." (Bosanquet, *Value and Destiny*, p. 215; *cf.* Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 192, 207.)

as a whole, is irrational and unjustified. The two attitudes stand and fall together, so that to condemn one is to condemn the other also. Here all that is necessary is to carry the parallel farther by adding that physical defilement sets up a barrier, which easily becomes permanent as with the ancient exclusion of blood guilt from the Eleusinian mysteries, the ostracism of leprosy and similar diseases, between the individual and his social environment. Exactly so is it with the spiritual vitiation of selfhood, except that the ultimate environment becomes the Universe, or Reality, or Deity, in accordance with whatever specific type of religion is concerned; or the entire situation may, as with Hartmann for example, be expressed in terms of objective and dominating values. But in all cases alike the essential point is that insofar as religion introduces the numinous, this must assume the additional, or at least the intensified, character of alienation or even hostility, which now forms the objective correlate of man's subjective sense of guilt; and both are equally permanent. Stoicism may envisage the Universe as indifferent, or its active enmity and unrelenting vengeance may be vividly depicted as Nemesis and Fate. But these are merely different modes of manifesting the terror and despair which tend, in greater or less degree, to submerge that awe that is inherent in the consciousness of the numinous as such. And once again these "brute facts" of moral and religious experience are sufficient in themselves; theoretical justification becomes unnecessary, and overemphasis negligible.

The bearing of this on the contrast between an impersonal Universe, or transpersonal Absolute, on the one hand, and personal Deity on the other, should be clear. As regards the first, both the vitiation of the self and the barrier thereby erected between it and Reality become permanent and irremovable, precisely as they do in the case of every convicted criminal and the purely impersonal law of the

community; and whether this is coldly indifferent or actively hostile is of little practical moment. The brand, the taint, the guilt, are ineradicable. As Hartmann insists, Fate or Karma or Nemesis is inexorable; and humanity's agelong and passionate search for purification is foredoomed as illusion and self-deception, tragic, amusing or pathetic as we choose.[1]

But if Deity is personal, in any such manner as I have tried to indicate, the entire moral, spiritual and religious situation is radically changed; and once more we find an illuminating analogue in social intercourse. Quite rightly. law must remain always impersonal, and this dread attribute must likewise veil the humanity of all its administrators—judge, warder, executioner.[2] With one sole exception, however. For the sovereign, and he alone, retains the rigorously guarded and rarely used prerogative of pardon, to be exercised only under carefully restricted conditions, after arduous consideration, and with due regard to adequate compensation, either direct or vicarious. Thus, and thus only, may the personality of the sovereign power, as representing the collective selfhood of the state, transcend the impersonality of the state's own law. Thus also, I believe, as regards religion and the moral experience from which it can never be separated. The numinous must be retained in its fullest intensity and its unfathomable depth. Good, Right, Value, must be sustained and vindicated. Evil must be destroyed. Yet, at the same time, man's passion for purity, his longing for cleansing from the foul taint of guilt, can enjoy its proper satisfaction only through the initiative of Deity whose attribute is infinitely transcendent personality. If then we combine the rational, the ethical and the religious grounds for this principle,

[1] "A man cannot receive the power to rise above his present moral level from his own inherent strength." (Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 229.)

[2] *Cf.* Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, pp. 36, 208–11.

and clearly realize their cumulative force, we may anticipate its steadily expanding dominance over the future spiritual experience of the race.[1]

[1] "A religion without a personal god has not yet been found to be a living and enduring force." (Farnell, *The Attributes of God*, p. 63.) "Whatever more the Absolute may be than a unity or society of persons, it cannot be less." (Muirhead, *The Platonic Tradition*, p. 263.)

XVIII

THE UNIVERSE: ALIEN, INDIFFERENT OR FRIENDLY?

1. HARDY's genius has distilled the essence of pessimism into five short lines:

> Then we looked closelier at Time,
> And saw his ghostly arms revolving
> To sweep off woeful things with prime,
> Things sinister with things sublime
> Alike dissolving.

A variant of the yet more incisive Shakespearean despair:

> As flies to wanton boys are we to the gods;
> They kill us for their sport.

To many minds the cosmology of modern science is only the chaotic world of the mad Lear, expanded to the dimensions of a universe wherein man is no more than "an insignificant parasite produced by one of the satellites of one of millions of stars in one of millions of galaxies":[1] a description undeniably endorsed by the space-time scale of astrophysics which seems, at first sight, to afford ample justification for the conclusions familiar to all readers of Russell: "that man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that the whole temple of man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the débris of a universe in ruins."[2]

But even were this all that can be said, still the little-

[1] Huxley, *What Dare I Think?* p. 122.

[2] *Mysticism and Logic*, pp. 47, 48. "The Supreme Mover, the Prime Force, must be either limited in power, unknowing, or cruel—which is obvious enough, and has been for centuries." (F. E. Hardy, *The Later Years of Thomas Hardy*, p. 58; *cf.* p. 183 on Pessimism, and pp. 215–18.)

ness of man, as of his immediate environment, the entire solar system, itself provides the gauge of that sublimity of the physical universe which, as I have already observed, should arouse the profound emotion of every sensitive temperament. But the term "space-time scale" at once implies that we may—or indeed must, if relativity has any force—choose whatever other standards appear to be relevant; so that when we discover that "the radius of the first hydrogen orbit, about a two-hundred-millionth of a centimetre, has a better claim than any other to be the ultimate footrule of the world,"[1] we must as consistent relativists associate this infinitesimal unit with the astronomical parsec of nineteen million million miles.

In other words, we must refuse to succumb to the almost irresistible temptation to argue that, simply because anything is small, it is therefore trivial and unimportant. Conclusive as this hasty logic often is, it is not always so. For Darwin's "footrule of the world" is paralleled by the unimaginable minuteness of Planck's Constant with its twenty-six decimal places, and yet this lies "at the root of world-structure."[2] When, still further, we realize that radiation becomes increasingly penetrative as its wave-length decreases, so that the cosmic rays, being the minutest of all, easily travel through many feet of lead, we may learn to appreciate at its true value the same physicist's dictum that "the great scientist is the one who recognizes that what seems a petty detail is really of fundamental importance":[3] a principle, needless to add, that is equally vital to all fine art. Similarly, again, throughout biology; just as Planck's

[1] C. G. Darwin, *New Conceptions of Matter*, p. 119.

[2] Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 189.

[3] *New Conceptions of Matter*, p. 6. "If we want to understand the fundamental nature of things, it is to small-scale phenomena that we must turn our attention." (Jeans, *The Mysterious Universe*, p. 44; *cf.* p. 143.) "The astronomically large can be studied by means of the submicroscopically small." (Milne, *Science Progress*, vol. 25, p. 49.)

Constant is "at the root of world structure," so the minuteness of chromosomes and genes is always of "fundamental importance," since it is "at the root of" the difference between the 10,000-million celled cerebral cortex of a genius and that of an imbecile.

Thus the question ultimately resolves itself into one of scale or relativity; so that while, astrophysically, man is an "insignificant parasite," he is also (as Huxley himself immediately adds) a "spiritual being"; and when we adopt the time standard alone the same writer insists that "man, with his scale of values, is the culmination of (the evolutionary) trend."[1] We must employ, therefore, not the astronomer's scale of dimensions alone, but at the same time a "scale of values." Now to call man a "spiritual being" means that he is not merely a conscious, but yet more essentially a reasoning being; and it is the very immensities of space and time, first revealed in their true guise by recent science, which provide one of the most impressive of all the possible criteria we can use. For we need only to remember that man's reason has spanned the abysses of cosmic space and the multitudinous lightyears of cosmic time; has unriddled the secrets of the remote swiftly receding galaxies and even plumbed, it may be, the depths of the past to the creative origin of the whole; and has, in the opposite direction, penetrated to the innermost recesses of the atomic nucleus; to perceive that, measured no longer by the dimensional scale but by the "scale of values," the mind of the "insignificant parasite" occupies a higher status and possesses a higher rank than the physical universe which, spatio-temporally, dwarfs him into nothingness.[2] Thus the insight of Pascal has been amply substantiated; "by space

[1] *What Dare I Think?* p. 264.

[2] "We do not believe that man, as such, is beset with any necessary inferiority in face of any power or phenomena in the universe." (Bosanquet, *Science and Philosophy*, p. 377; *cf.* p. 378.)

the universe encompasses me and swallows me as an atom, by thought I encompass it. Man is but a reed, but a reed which thinks. Were the universe to crush him, man would still be nobler than what has slain him, because he knows that he dies. The universe knows nothing."

> The lightning is his slave; heaven's utmost deep
> Gives up her stars, and like a flock of sheep
> They pass before his eye, are numbered, and roll on!
> The tempest is his steed, he strides the air;
> And the abyss shouts from her depth laid bare,
> Heaven, hast thou secrets? Man unveils me; I have none.

2. Thus we obtain the same result as that already stressed in the discussion of personality. To say the least, "Mind is not to be explained away as a mere epiphenomenon,"[1] but is on the contrary "organic to the Universe"; it is from this principle, therefore, that the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest must receive their final interpretation. But we have already found man's reason to be inseparable from his will and feeling and also, just as obviously, from their concrete products—that is the ideas constituting knowledge and thought, and the ideals and purposes which direct and dominate conduct. It at once follows, therefore, that these too are indissolubly "organic to the Universe." Now the character and value of ideals plainly vary within the widest possible limits, while far too many must be condemned as undeniably evil. Does not this imply that evil is itself "organic" to the Whole? I believe that it does; but as I have previously dealt with this difficult problem in *The Nature of Deity*, it must suffice to refer to this earlier treatment of a question which, crucial as it is, is not so intractable as it is usually taken to be.

Here I should like to add that even if we concede that the existence of evil ideals and personalities cannot be satis-

[1] Huxley, *Essays of a Biologist*, p. 71.

factorily accounted for, there still remain three further facts which the supposed inexplicability of evil must not tempt us to ignore. The first is that, to a great degree, evil is itself a matter of relativity, although it is never relative and nothing more. I mean that very much that, at any given stage, must be regarded as bad was not so bad under earlier conditions, or indeed may have served some positively good end as judged by those conditions. This leads to the second point: the progressive, though never easy, realization of good, temporally the prelude to its far distant triumph. But without insisting on the latter aspect of the situation, to say that "the remarkable and important fact for man is to find, in spite of the widespread degeneration to be seen in evolution, that the direction in which (man) desires to go coincides with the main direction of organic evolution,"[1] plainly implies the "progressive realization of good," so that no matter how heavy an emphasis may be placed on evil, it is steadily being minimized, if not eradicated altogether.[2] Finally, then, it is quite illogical to select worthless ideals alone as being organic to the Whole and take these as our sole criterion. However significant these may be, the actuality, and still more the expansion, of the good are immeasurably more significant. If for example I were to conduct a Martian visitor through the convict prisons and asylums, the hospitals and slums, of Europe and tell him that the inmates were human beings living under human conditions, my statements, while undeniably true so far as they went, would obviously be fatally one-sided; I should be libelling not humanity alone, but also, by implication, the Universe to which man is organic. Yet this seems to

[1] Huxley, *The Monist*, vol. 33, p. 379.

[2] "To accept the view that equally vicious things will take the place of present evils, if these are attacked and overcome, would lull to sleep all sense of responsibility, and beget an indifference hostile to both morality and religion." (Everett, *Philosophical Review*, vol. 32, p. 146.)

be the attitude often chosen by thinkers whose motives are perhaps best left in charitable obscurity.

To evaluate the artistic creations of any great genius in such a manner would at once be condemned as intolerable. We do not exclude the finest of his dramas in forming our estimate of Shakespeare, nor concentrate on his most pedestrian poetry in the case of Wordsworth; so that while due account must certainly be taken of every work and every phase, it is always the highest achievements that are the most significant. Similarly, then, as regards the Universe; not degeneration and evil, but rather the "increasing purpose" and value, yield the most reliable ultimate criteria. Whenever therefore we echo the yearning so keenly expressed in *Omar*—

> Ah Love! could thou and I with Fate conspire
> To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire,
> Would not we shatter it to bits—and then
> Remould it nearer to the Heart's Desire?

we must ask ourselves, What is the origin of our "heart's desire"? Even if we are egotistic enough to claim that we alone created it, and also to assert that it will satisfy all our fellows, still insofar as the Universe produced ourselves it also had some share in generating our desires, noble and splendid as these invariably are. If so, then plainly the "scheme of things" cannot really be so "sorry" as we imagined it to be. The actual truth is, of course, that the Whole is not merely the source of all high purposes, but it is also their final and stern criterion, so that their success and value depend absolutely on their accord with what Huxley calls "the main direction of evolution." Needless to repeat that this does not reduce man to the status of a mere passive instrument whereby his "heart's desire" is realized; on the contrary, he must always actively participate in its attainment. Too often, in fact, our hasty impulse to "shatter

to bits" would destroy the source of all our inspirations, the ground of their validity and the guarantee of their triumph, so that for man to act thus is simply to foul his own nest.

> The one Spirit's plastic stress
> Sweeps through the dull dense world, compelling there,
> All new successions to the forms they wear;
> Torturing th' unwilling dross that checks its flight
> To its own likeness, as each mass they bear;
> And bursting in its beauty and its might
> From trees and beasts and men into the Heaven's light.

So sang one who in his own day was accounted an atheist; and to the degree that man is creative, he is the sole means by which any given end can be attained; so that without the brain and mind of the actual individual, of Plato or Shakespeare or Beethoven, their philosophy, drama and music would never have arisen. This general principle holds even if we assume that something yet finer might have appeared; and it implies that every individual, and similarly humanity as a whole, have a place and function that are indispensable and unique so far as the value of what they produce is concerned, while absolutely to deny this value is once again to foul man's own nest.[1] Nor can one plead one's own obscurity; the cackle of the geese saved the Capitol.

3. Taken in their entirety, then, ideals and purposes are never static but plastic, although their permanence depends on the "skeletal" core, or foundation, previously referred to in Chapter XVI. Their realization is always gradual and progressive, in ultimate accord with the "main direction of evolution"; and this in its turn is attained by the mutual readjustment of contrasted, and often of conflicting, principles which always proceeds in knowledge

[1] *Cf.* Hartmann, *Ethics*, vol. i, pp. 37, 38.

and art, in practice and belief, so as to achieve new possibilities at higher and yet higher stages without end. This involves two further difficulties often regarded as fatal—the absence of all finality, and the relativity of all ends and values without exception.

But in the light of the foregoing considerations these features are inevitable and should therefore be anticipated; they are in fact implied by that unceasing and radical transformation of the whole content of experience which has throughout been emphasized. When we realize that all permanent progress consists in an ever closer approach to an ideal perfection, the lack of finality is seen to be a merely superficial obstacle which detracts no whit from the value of art and knowledge, limited though these must always be. The desire for finality is only the expression of weakness and inertia against which every vigorous mind protests. Similarly, too, with respect to relativity, since this must always be regarded from the viewpoint of perfection. In other words, the incessant change so often deplored is actually an incessant advance, again with due allowance for occasional arrest and degeneration. To say that "relativity is universal" is really to say that relativity is absolute—a patent self-contradiction; and it is in any case a statement that finds no support in current science, as it is generally supposed to do. On the contrary, as Planck has recently observed, "the line of progress has been from the relative to the absolute. This feature has been remarkably characteristic of physical science during the past hundred years. We are always struggling from the relative to the absolute."[1] This holds equally true of all racial experience when this is surveyed, as it plainly demands to be, from its dawn to its far distant culmination.

[1] *Where Is Science Going?* pp. 170, 200; *cf.* de Sitter: "The theory of relativity is intended to remove entirely the relative and exhibit the pure absolute." (*Nature*, vol. 131, p. 488.)

We are therefore fully justified in regarding the Whole as "not merely the source of all high purposes," but also as eternally sustaining their completer realization by bringing them into ever closer accord with its own "final and stern criterion." This at once implies that the process must throughout be strenuous, and increasingly so as sensitiveness evolves. So far therefore as all conscious beings are concerned, every departure from the "main direction," and every failure to meet the "stern criterion," must bring suffering and unhappiness in their train as perfectly natural consequences, the specific form these assume depending always on the given conditions in each case; while to stress these facts alone is clearly to forget that exactly the same conditions, operating in the reverse direction, are the sources of pleasure and happiness.

If, once again, our visitor from Mars should conclude from the multitude of police and armed forces, of judges and prison-warders, of laws and regulations and penalties, that the soveriegn was a harsh oppressor of all his subjects, he would plainly be misinterpreting their actual purposes. Repellent though they undeniably are, their real aim is the creation of a finer social order whose progressive attainment is changing their own functions and character, so that in the ideal state they would be superfluous. Now when we generalize this analogy, it implies that the familiar struggle for existence, or for survival, has been transferred from the world of organisms to the higher realm of ideals; and to say that, in the long run, the fittest ideals survive is only to say that the finest and noblest, those which most adequately fulfil the severe demands of the Whole, emerge as the dominating factors of all human experience. But until we contemplate the evolution of man in its entirety, it is undeniably difficult to appreciate this principle properly. We are ourselves so deeply immersed in the fierce strife of modern ideals, industrial and international, intellectual

and aesthetic, ethical and religious, and what is still worse, each of us is, and indeed in a sense must be, so firmly convinced that *our* ideals deserve to survive, that it is practically impossible to survey the welter with the impartial gaze of the historian and philosopher. Such passionate devotion, partial though it always is, is in fact one of the very conditions of all progress, since it alone can assure that each and every ideal will secure its chance to acquit itself most effectively, so that it will succumb, if it ever must do so, only to an ideal higher than itself.

4. We are surely entitled to conclude that the Universe is something far more than the merely neutral arena wherein this contest and its resultant evolution go on. Certainly the physical world might be so regarded—that is as the vast stage on which the drama proceeds. But this is simply the first impression aroused by the cold expanses of space and the silent aeons of time. These are however no more than the abstract and schematic outlines of Reality. To say this is not to deny their actuality, since they are indispensable factors of the Whole. But to overemphasize them is like focussing attention on the dimensions or weight of a fine picture or statue. Relevant though these must always be, they are never the essentials. The Universe, then, is the very reverse of being simply neutral; for to hold that man is organic to the Whole implies that the Whole is organic to man, so that their interrelation is reciprocal. While, therefore, "Nature's ways may be more automatic than rational, they have after all resulted in man, in whom reason has become articulate"[1]—in man as pursuing and creating the finest ideals possible at any given stage in his history. And if, once again, astronomy seems to show that conditions resembling those of human life and aspiration are exceptional, this itself may add to their value exactly

[1] J. A. Thomson, *Purpose in Evolution*, p. 29.

as the rarity of diamonds makes them all the more precious.

Even in the realm of nature therefore, as Whitehead observes, "there is some tendency upwards, in a contrary direction to the aspect of physical decay"; a tendency that is unmistakably definite rather than erratic, and perhaps best described by the same thinker as "a threefold urge: to live: to live well: to live better;"[1] or in J. A. Thomson's words, "the universal urge of life—the urge for more, more food, more light, more love, more life."[2] Now "to live better" plainly implies far more than the attainment of bodily and material satisfactions. These also, in their most permanent forms, are but the prelude to the ever higher and more spiritual modes of life; and when we survey the entire advance, as manifested in all its multitudinous types, it is most fittingly regarded as an unceasing tendency towards perfection.

Too often, unfortunately, the term "perfection" is taken to be a sheer exaggeration. But some ideal of perfection is always the goal towards which every great artist strives; and even while he must confess that he can never fully achieve it, it nevertheless remains the dominant impulse of his finest aesthetic experience; and similarly with all genius in whatever sphere it operates. The biologist, again, discovers perfection in structure and organism. "When you see dolphins swimming," observes J. H. Bradley, "you see perfection"; and the "brain of man is the perfection of all that was good in its predecessors."[3] From the more inclusive standpoint of philosophy Bosanquet maintains that although "we cannot describe perfection," it is essentially definable as "the harmony of all being," and therefore as "stable and secure," and also as attainable, under certain condi-

[1] *The Function of Reason*, pp. 72, 5.
[2] *Purpose in Evolution*, p. 9.
[3] *Parade of the Living*, pp. 51, 270.

tions, by even the finite self.[1] In exactly the same sense F. H. Bradley accepted "the reality of a perfection, by identifying himself with which, through faith, the individual could find himself justified and at peace."[2] Thus the "character of the perfect or ideal mind is implicit even in the imperfections of mind as we know it."[3] We are therefore quite justified in asserting that a "tendency towards perfection" is manifested, even if never achieved, in and through the evolutionary process.

It is in fact the very nature of the supreme end and final goal that necessitates the stern struggle of the unbroken advance. Only the lowest and most transient values can ever be easily attained; while for athlete and artist alike, and for both sportsman and saint, struggle is not simply the means whereby the splendid prize is won, but is the sole method of creating the noblest personality. As J. H. Bradley observes, this principle governs the entire realm of life. "Hardships sterilize the weak and vitalize the strong. Unless organisms are kicked into activity by a hostile environment they get nowhere. No great evolutionary advance has ever come under an easy environment";[4] and thus man himself "emerged from the ape grade probably during the hard circumstances at the beginning of the Great Ice Age."[5] Browning's familiar lines fully anticipated the unanimous declaration of modern biology:

> Then, welcome each rebuff
> That turns earth's smoothness rough,
> Each sting that bids nor sit nor stand but go.

---

[1] *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 194, 229; *cf. The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 215.

[2] Muirhead, *The Platonic Tradition*, p. 229; *cf.* pp. 245, 248; *cf.* Hallett, *Aeternitas*, p. 151: "the human mind is capable of a certain perfection"; p. 232: "Reality and perfection are one and the same."

[3] R. G. Collingwood, *Religion and Philosophy*, p. 124.

[4] *Parade of the Living*, pp, 100, 257, 258.

[5] Woodward, *Nature*, vol. 127, p. 747.

It is always of course fatally easy to find, in the natural consequences of our own folly, proof of "the malevolence of the Deity";[1] but far keener and saner is the insight of the great German mystic who teaches that, under proper conditions, pain and loss raise man nearest to perfection, and of the modern philosopher who maintains that suffering "on its finer side is an element to be woven immortally into the rhythm of mortal things."[2]

Thus a very large number of facts, drawn from the most diverse sources, forbids our regarding the Whole as no more than a "neutral arena." On the contrary, all its ordered activities, alike on the vastest imaginable scale and in the minutest and most precise detail, are directed towards the progressive eradication of evil; and this, again, is simply the negative aspect of the unceasing approach to perfection. So long as this is maintained, no method seems too drastic; tragedy and suffering, catastrophe and elimination, are at one and the same moment the consequence of some violation of cosmic order and the means whereby a yet higher level of perfection is achieved. It is then no merely empty metaphor to say that the Universe is friendly to every form of perfection, no matter how trivial at first sight this may seem to be, and equally to every process that makes perfection possible and brings it into being; the exhaustless beauties of inorganic nature and of the realm of life; unknown heroisms and silent self-sacrifice; every desire and effort for whatever is good and beautiful and true; all these are eternally sustained by the dynamic force of Reality, and all that opposes them is in the end destroyed. But the entire sphere of activity is so immeasurable, its interrelations so complex, fruition so slow and tortuous, that man's feeble vision can too seldom pierce the mists that veil the battlefields so that he may survey the campaign

[1] Lafourcade, *Swinburne*, p. 183.
[2] Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, p. 140.

as a whole. He is himself indeed one of the contending battalions, carried here and there by what must seem to him the caprice of some malicious "Immanent Will" or inscrutable "Spirit of the Years."

> Ever unconscious!
> An automatic sense
> Unweeting why or whence.

But almost irresistible though such an impression must too often be, it is only the natural result of too limited an outlook and too shallow an interpretation, confusing some transient backwash with the ocean's tide and taking the wrong side of the tapestry to be its splendid scheme. Especially when his own ends are defeated, when some costly surrender is demanded from himself, must it be almost impossible for man to perceive that this forms perhaps the only discipline whereby the diamond of selfhood can be given its highest beauty and value. And yet nature and history, life and thought, unite in proclaiming that it is no blind faith, offspring of dead hope and wild despair, that believes

> All which I took from thee I did but take,
> Not for thy harms,
> But just that thou might'st seek it in My arms.
> All which thy child's mistake
> Fancies as lost, I have stored for thee at home.

INDEX

Absolute, Absolutism, 154, 171, 179, 190 f., 281, 288 f., 298
Abstract, Abstraction, 92 f., 105, 239
Agnosticism, 69, 236 f., 250, 254
Alexander, S., 73 f.
Art, 14, 64, 80 f., 114, 151, 202 f., 215, 279 f.
Atheism, 46
Atomism, 24
Authority, 58, 244 f.

Beethoven, 81, 214
Behaviourism, 32, 99, 180
Bergson, 194, 203
Bosanquet, B., 24, 31, 34, 45, 75, 79, 130, 137, 149, 169, 191, 203, 216, 241, 265, 281, 289, 293, 301 f.
Bradley, F. H., 22, 34, 78, 141, 179, 188, 190 f., 216, 222, 261, 302
Bradley, J. H., 301 f.
Broad, C. D., 26, 131
Browning, 52, 55, 74, 82

Caird, E., 23, 72 f.
Causation, 118, 193, 225 f., 274, 281
Certainty, 218 f., 222 f., 227 f., 236 f., 243 f.
Choice, 117, 121, 125; *cf.* Selection
Coherence, 235 f., 255
Collingwood, R. G., 46, 179, 302
Communion, 281 f.
Concepts, *cf.* Ideas
Consciousness, 33 f., 78 f., 208
Continuity, 38, 60, 76 f., 112, 123, 127, 143, 147 f., 179, 186, 191, 208, 214, 229, 264, 277

Darwin, C. G., 226, 292
Deissmann, 68
Deity, 192, 266 f., 276 f., 282 f., 288 f.
Determination, 120 f., 138, 157, 193; *cf.* Self-Determination
Determinism, 119, 125, 138, 225, 274
Dogma, 258
Dominance, 186, 192, 284
Duty, 145, 159 f.

Eddington, A. S., 171, 267, 271, 292
Emotion, 109 f., 113, 117, 121 f., 127 f., 139, 143, 158, 163, 202 f., 217, 244 f., 252, 261 f., 278 f., 292; *cf.* Feeling
Error, 58 f., 79, 128, 169, 245 f.
Evil, 126, 149 f., 153 f., 160, 168 f., 294 f., 303
Evolution, 35, 62, 98, 113, 144, 147 f., 160, 163, 166 f., 172 f., 176, 194, 211, 266 f., 271 f., 293, 299 f.
Experience, 165 f., 214; *cf.* Consciousness

Faith, 214 f.
Farnell, L., 85, 290
Fatalism, 154, 285, 289
Feeling, 43, 78, 202, 234, 244 f., 261, 294; *cf.* Emotion
Finite, 58, 165
Frazer, J. G., 68 f.
Freedom, 36, 58, 78 f., 90, 117, 120, 125 f., 138, 155 f., 159 f., 193 f.; *cf.* Self-Determination
Freud, S., 90, 96 f., 102 f., 158, 200, 239; *cf.* Unconscious

Galloway, G., 71, 217, 221
God, 266 f.; *cf.* Deity

Good, 126 f., 145 f., 157 f., 160, 168 f., 197, 295
Guilt, 284 f.

Happiness, 148 f.
Hardy, T., 143, 215, 291, 304
Hartmann, N., 137 f., 285 f., 297
Hegel, 23, 31, 38, 74, 85, 143, 179, 206, 216, 234 f., 262, 281
Hume, 24, 78, 88 f., 135, 260
Huxley, J., 31, 73, 77, 99, 110 f., 140 f., 150, 275 f., 284 f., 291 f., 294 f.
Huxley, T. H., 46

Ideals, 95, 112 f., 124 f., 130, 142 f., 146, 159, 203, 286, 294, 297 f.
Ideas, 31, 36, 77, 83 f., 86 f., 89, 92 f., 105 f., 111, 115 f., 124 f., 128, 142 f., 146, 159, 179, 203, 238, 271, 294
Ideation, 31, 36 f., 41 f., 53, 62, 90, 107, 113, 120 f., 125, 143, 214 f.
Imagination, 77 f., 90, 270 f.
Immortality, 179 f.
Imperative, 56 f., 160
Indeterminacy, 224 f., 274 f.; *cf.* Uncertainty
Indetermination, 194, 225
Individual, Individuality, 58, 151, 160
Inexhaustibility, 153 f.
Infinite, 58, 142
Inge, R., 220, 272
Instinct, 35 f., 65, 89 f., 95 f., 101 f., 107, 115, 120
Intellectualism, 32, 42, 151, 279 f.
Intuition, 77, 203, 264 f.

James, W., 99, 205, 232 f.
Jeans, J., 54, 118, 140, 207, 225 f., 239, 267, 272, 292
Jung, C. G., 84, 103 f., 161; *cf.* Unconscious

Kant, 21, 43, 78, 108, 132, 160, 219, 227, 244
Knowledge, 20, 26, 43, 113, 235, 240

Life, 53, 134, 140, 196, 273
Locke, 78, 227
Lodge, O., 269, 273
Logic, 26, 66, 80 f., 87 f., 91, 112, 119, 128, 136, 221, 232 f., 238 f., 262, 267, 282
Lotze, 275

Malinowski, B., 31, 36
Marett, R. R., 30 f., 57, 110, 204, 287
Martineau, J., 70
Mathematics, 26 f., 92, 105, 238, 267 f.
McDougall, W., 99 f., 140, 273
McTaggart, J. M. E., 71 f., 181 f.
Mechanism, 133 f., 193 f., 226, 266 f., 270 f., 278
Memory, 135, 140
Mind, 23 f., 33 f., 40 f., 47, 70 f., 74, 137, 140, 182, 211, 277
Moral Ideal, 124 f., 130 f., 143 f., 146
Moral Self, 126, 143 f., 168 f.
Moral Sense, 108 f.
Morality, 108 f., 112, 121 f., 125, 158
Muirhead, J. H., 190, 203, 207, 290, 302
Mysticism, 20, 32, 44

Nature, 65, 95, 99, 107, 120, 125, 159, 225 f., 267, 270 f., 278 f., 284, 300 f.
Needham, J., 141, 226, 269 f., 275 f.
Newman, E., 81, 214
Numinous, 260 f., 279, 284, 288

Object, Objectivity, 91, 94 f., 104 f., 128 f., 165, 168, 245 f., 248 f., 251 f., 258 f., 264
Oman, J., 250 f., 254
Omar, 207, 296
Organization, 157, 161 f., 193 f.
Otto, R., 43 f., 214, 223, 250

"Parson Thwackum," 29, 233, 258
Pascal, 214, 277 f., 293 f.
Perfection, 298 f.
Permanence, 152 f., 179 f.
Personality, 74, 130, 138, 146, 155 f., 163 f., 182, 190 f., 266 f., 276, 282, 289, 294 f.; *cf.* Selfhood
Pessimism, 291 f., 304
Philosophy, 19 f., 23 f., 27 f., 85, 205, 216
Physics, 27 f., 82, 257, 268, 298
Planck, M., 171, 194, 226, 237, 292, 298
Plasticity, 134 f.
Plato, 179
Potentiality, 162, 165, 180 f., 189, 276 f.
Pragmatism, 146 f., 246
Probability, 225; *cf.* Indeterminacy, Uncertainty
Proof, 229 f.
Psychology, 13 f., 19 f., 23 f., 45, 87 f., 91, 97, 111 f., 127, 130 f., 135 f., 194, 260 f.
Punishment, 192 f., 197
Purpose, 140, 297 f.

Quantum, 226, 268

Rationality, 62 f., 97 f., 103, 108, 119 f., 143, 231 f., 238
Reality, 20 f., 24 f., 30, 55, 58 f., 79 f., 93, 136, 143, 153, 163 f., 172, 176, 179 f., 187, 210, 215, 224, 235, 278 f., 282 f., 288, 300
Reason, 36, 95, 100, 108, 112 f., 116, 120 f., 203, 220 f., 232 f., 246, 250 f., 254 f., 262 f., 279 f.
Relativity, 27 f., 169 f., 175, 292 f., 298 f.
Response, Responsiveness, 32 f., 37, 39 f., 51, 61, 72, 210 f., 278, 281
Revelation, 259 f.
Reward, 197
Russell, B., 24, 27, 71, 291 f.

Sacrifice, 156, 184, 198, 287
Science, 21 f., 26 f., 54, 136, 215, 236 f., 266 f., 280, 291 f., 298
Selection, 115 f., 124 f.; *cf.* Choice
Self, 126, 130, 143, 157, 161 f., 168 f., 189, 266 f., 276 f.
Self-Determination, 118 f., 129, 138, 155 f., 194 f.; *cf.* Freedom
Selfhood, 136, 139 f., 162 f., 180 f., 276 f., 283; *cf.* Personality
Sex, 101 f.
Sin, 159, 284 f.
Smith, Elliot, 35, 100
Socrates, 198
Space-Time, 142, 187, 272, 276, 280, 291 f., 300; *cf.* Time
Spencer, H., 69 f.
Stout, G. F., 77, 94
Subject, Subjectivity, 91, 95, 128 f., 139, 165, 244 f.
System, 130 f., 141

Taylor, A. E., 46, 71, 193, 247, 253 f., 287 f.
Thompson, Francis, 185, 304
Thomson, G. P., 226, 269
Thomson, J. A., 134, 140, 273, 300 f.
Thought, 35, 62 f., 77 f., 80, 93 f., 105, 112, 120 f., 136 f., 141 f., 214 f., 279
Time, 24, 179, 187; *cf.* Space-Time
Tradition, 41, 257 f.
Transcendence, 139, 237 f., 243 f., 276 f., 281, 284

Transformation, 188 f., 263 f.
Truth, 23, 58 f., 79, 91, 104 f.

Uncertainty, 118, 224, 236; *cf.* Indeterminacy
Unconscious, 37, 53, 62, 84, 100, 135, 157 f.; *cf.* Freud, Jung
Universality, 148 f., 153
Universe, 20 f., 28 f., 32, 51 f., 57, 60, 79 f., 93, 128, 131, 136 f., 146, 150 f., 157 f., 163, 170 f., 179 f., 184, 190 f., 199, 207 f., 258, 278 f., 284, 288, 294, 300
universe, 27 f., 49, 51 f., 56 f., 60 f., 65, 127 f., 131, 182, 210 f., 241 f., 266, 272, 277, 281, 292 f.

Value, 129, 146, 149, 177 f., 185, 221 f., 228, 261, 278, 285 f., 293
Virtue, 192 f., 198
Volition, 115 f., 158; *cf.* Will

Wallace, W., 74, 85, 108, 234, 261
Ward, J., 34
Watson, J., 99
Webb, C. C. J., 282
Whitehead, A. N., 27, 74, 185 f., 203, 207, 225, 256 f., 267 f., 271 f., 280, 301 f.
Whole, 40 f., 54, 58 f., 105, 132, 150 f., 159 f., 165, 188 f., 278 f., 282, 294 f., 300 f.
Wholeness, 32 f., 35 f., 47 f., 51, 67 f., 76, 107 f., 127, 151, 210, 241 f., 281
Will, 115 f., 158, 174, 285, 294; *cf.* Volition
Wordsworth, 84, 203, 281
Worship, 71

GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD
LONDON: 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C.1
CAPE TOWN: 73 ST. GEORGE'S STREET
SYDNEY, N.S.W.: WYNYARD SQUARE
TORONTO: 91 WELLINGTON STREET, WEST
WELLINGTON, N.Z.: 8 KINGS CRESCENT, LOWER HUTT

Life Beyond Death

In the Beliefs of Mankind

by JAMES THAYER ADDISON

La. Cr. 8*vo.* 8*s.* 6*d.*

What happens to the soul after death? This book is a review of all the important beliefs regarding the after-life which have been held and are held by the various tribes, peoples and religions of the past and present. Written from the point of view of the historian, it makes no attempt to discuss the truths of beliefs or to plead or to argue. One-third of the book reviews the rudimentary beliefs held by savages or by the ignorant masses in the higher civilizations; while the rest of the book discusses beliefs originated or encouraged by the higher religions as Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam.

"An excellently constructed and succinctly written piece of work."—*Inquirer*

The Death of Materialism

by W. WHATELY CARINGTON
(WHATELY SMITH)

Demy 8*vo.* 10*s.*

"An unusual and thought-provoking book. . . . The kind of book that will find an honoured place on the shelves of those who desire to weld into a coherent whole those hitherto antithetic fragments of experience which some (including the author) prefer to call Rational and Mystical rather than Scientific and Religious."—*Western Daily Press*

New Psychology and Religious Experience

by T. HYWEL HUGHES

Demy 8*vo.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

This is an attempt to meet the challenge to Religious Faith from the New Psychology as represented by Behaviourism and Psycho-analysis. Whilst appreciative of the contribution made by the New Psychology to psychological theory, it examines its basal assumptions and combats its main theories in their bearing on Religion. Its aim is apologetic, seeking to establish the reality of Religious Experience on philosophical and psychological grounds, and it ranges in its treatment from the question of the Instincts in Religion, through the problem of Religious Consciousness and the various aspects of Religious Experience, to the question of the treatment given by the Psychologists to Christianity and the Christian facts.

"Luminous and profoundly interesting. . . . The strength and appeal of the book, however, is in Dr. Hughes's own constructive thought, unless the unexpected happens we are unlikely to see it surpassed for a long time to come."
—*British Weekly*

Modern Tendencies in World Religions

by CHARLES SAMUEL BRADEN

La. Cr. 8*vo.* 10*s.*

Dr. Braden has written an interesting study on what is going on at the present time in the various religions under the influence of the "acids of modernity" —science, industrialism and the interpenetration of Asiatic by Western culture. The importance of such a study is evident when one recognizes the enormous changes which have taken place in China and Turkey within the last few years. The author takes up in detail different religions, such as Hinduism, Mohammedanism, Shintoism, Buddhism. There is also an interesting chapter on Russian Communism and religion.

The Essence of Plato's Philosophy

by CONSTANTINE RITTER

TRANSLATED BY PROF. ALLES

Demy 8vo. 16*s.*

The author of this outstanding volume has gained a world-wide reputation as an authority on Plato, to whose life and philosophy he has devoted his career. Professor Ritter enjoys the distinction of being the only thinker specially mentioned in Professor A. E. Taylor's Dedication to his own well-known work in this field. The entire translation has been undertaken with the view to presenting Professor Ritter's original conclusions clearly and concisely, so that all readers who are interested in the subject can follow the development of the themes dealt with. The philosophy of Plato is not merely one of the greatest and earliest systems in the long history of thought, but it will ever retain its deep influence on all speculation on knowledge and ethics, on social ideals and international organization. Some acquaintance with platonic theories is indispensable to every student of modern philosophy.

"A truly remarkable book . . . we cannot too highly commend both the original work of Professor Ritter and the excellent translation of Professor Alles."—*Education*

The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Aquinas

by R. L. PATTERSON

Medium 8vo. 21*s.*

This is a fresh treatment from a strictly philosophical point of view of St. Thomas Aquinas's conception of God. It is founded on a thorough acquaintance with the original texts and the work of recent scholars. Confining himself to the main subject of Aquinas's idea of God, the author is able to do justice by ample quotations to the details of the great doctor's doctrine, and also to indicate its central place in mediaeval theology and its perennial interest for the history of thought.

"Dr. Patterson's study of the 'Angelic Doctor' is the most important which has appeared in England for some time past. . . . It deserves careful study on the part of all who are interested in the philosophy and the theology of the Middle Ages."—*Methodist Recorder*

The Life of Jesus

by MAURICE GOGUEL

TRANSLATED BY OLIVE WYON

Medium 8vo. 25*s.*

This important historical book by the Director of Studies in Primitive Christianity and the New Testament at the *École des Hautes Études* is a scholarly, reverent and critical work, based upon a long, detailed and profound study of the sources of the Gospel story, both Christian and non-Christian. Written in the full light of the most recent criticism, this new *Vie de Jésus* is an illuminating and timely work, admirably conceived and executed.

"A most impressive piece of work, a real contribution to New Testament scholarship."—*Liverpool Post and Mercury*

Christianity is Pacifism

by W. ROBINSON

Cr. 8vo. *Cloth 4s. 6d., Paper 2s. 6d.*

A book which discusses the relationship of the Christian ethic to war. It shows that the Old Testament, with its different stages of moral and religious development, cannot be an authority for us to-day. The Christian appeal must be to Jesus Christ—what He *did* and what He *said*. Jesus was no law-giver. He enunciated fundamental principles, and inculcated a new spirit—the spirit of pacifism and disinterested self-giving. It is this spirit which makes war irrational, devilish and positively unthinkable for the Christian. The book claims that this is the "ripe time" to deal with war. It is a challenge to the Church to be really Christian.

"Short and comprehensive . . . scholarly and provocative of thought."—*Church Times*

The Heart of the Bible

by J. B. THOMSON DAVIES

Demy 8vo. *In Three Volumes, with Maps* *5s. each*

"Mrs. Thomson Davies, by placing the matter of the Old Testament in its right historical order and setting, has rendered a valuable service. . . . The volume leaves us with a deepened sense of the majesty of Hebrew literature, the elemental force of Hebrew religion, and the abiding value of the Old Testament as witness to the Living God."—L. P. JACKS in the *Observer*

Outlines of Teaching Sermons for a Second Year

edited by the Rev. C. E. HUDSON and a Clerical Sub-Committee

Cr. 8vo. *Cloth 3s. 6d., Paper 2s.*

This is the second volume of

OUTLINES OF TEACHING SERMONS FOR A YEAR

Second Edition *Cloth 3s. 6d., Paper 2s.*

which was edited by the same committee.

"I am very glad to have the opportunity of commending these Outlines."—*Archbishop of York*

The History of the Anglo-Catholic Revival from 1845

by Canon W. J. SPARROW-SIMPSON, D.D.

La. Cr. 8vo. *8s. 6d.*

"This book is one both to read and to keep. It is admirably written and arranged; it is never bitter or unfair."—*Church Times*

"Real value as a work of reference."—*The Times*

"Well arranged history and exposition of the movement which seems irresistible."—*Scotsman*

All prices are net

LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD