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DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALISM
IN EUROPE

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DEMOCRACY
AND NATIONALISM
IN EUROPE

BY

HENRY L. STIMSON

PRINCETON

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P R E F A C E

THE lectures which form the substance of this volume were delivered on April 9, 10, 11 and 12, 1934, at Princeton University on the Stafford Little Foundation. Their frank purpose is, by an examination of the historical background, somewhat to offset the pessimism, not to say panic, which we hear so commonly expressed as to recent occurrences in Central Europe.

My thanks are due to friends in the Department of State for valuable assistance; to the Librarian of Congress and the Director of the Council on Foreign Relations for kindly aid and guidance in research; and finally to my friend Mr. Elihu Root for reading the manuscript and, out of his abundant experience, giving me his comment and criticism.

A partial bibliography is attached as an appendix.

— I L L S .

DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALISM IN EUROPE

CHAPTER I

FIFTEEN years ago our men were returning victorious from the Great War. We were flushed with the enthusiasm of success. We had been called out to save the world. Our President had told us that it was a war to make the world safe for democracy. That old world had seemed a pretty good world and well worth jiving. For centuries our race had been witnessing a gradual growth in individual freedom and justice and our own nation had been a leader in the establishment of the representative system of democracy upon which those rights rested. In the war we felt that we had been fighting against the forces of violence and despotism. Whatever the original causes of the war, by the time we entered it the issues which had developed along the western front, as those issues were defined to us by our President, were "to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles."

After the great victory it seemed as if it would be a comparatively easy matter to make secure

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these objects for which we had fought. The original path had been cleared. The great enemies, violence and autocracy, had now been overthrown. All that remained to be done was to build up a more peaceful and better world upon the principles to which our country was already devoted.

Now, fifteen years afterwards, these hopes seem to have crumbled into ashes in our hands. The miseries of an unparalleled economic depression have enveloped the earth. Instead of peace we see violence all around us. Instead of law and stability, revolution and change have swept over most of the nations. Instead of the spread of democracy, we are confronted by a reversion from democracy to arbitrary forms of government by several of the most powerful nations of the earth. Instead of the "concert of purpose and of action . . . amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world," which Mr. Wilson foresaw, we seem to see everywhere about us a spirit of the most extreme and selfish nationalism which cuts at the very foundation of what he and we were fighting for.

In a condition of despondency it is usually helpful to try to get a long perspective of events. Discouragement usually comes from too close a view of difficulties. My object here therefore will be to try to analyze the situation with which we are confronted and to view it as far as possible against the broad background of the past. Let us

try thus to get a fair view of what has happened in the world and then appraise the possibilities that lie before us. Of course in such a confused situation one must go slowly and speak with moderation. No one can prophesy with certainty, but we may be able to find some rational grounds for encouragement and, even if these are only partial, it will be worth while to avoid the gloomy and pessimistic prophecies to which so many have given utterance.

I should like first to call your attention briefly to the real nature of nationalism, so-called, as it has been developing in the nation-states of Europe up to the time of the close of the Great War. We shall then consider the difficult problems which were thrown upon the people of these states by what men call the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century and by the effects of the Great War and of the peace treaties which followed it. Then we shall take up the progress which has been made by these European states, both politically and economically, since the war. And then we shall try to make a general appraisal of the present situation and the prospects for the future.

There is often much heat in the discussion about the comparative merits of nationalism and internationalism. But there is not always as much care and accuracy in the determination of the meaning of the words which are thus used. We know that Europe today is full of separate states built on

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a so-called nationalistic basis by which we mean that each of these states is composed of peoples who are fairly well united in language, race, culture, traditions and other collective attributes. We do not often take the trouble to follow the long evolution or the different causes by which such a union has been produced. Still less do we weigh the influences for good or evil of the resulting organization. We rather take it for granted that a state and its boundaries should correspond with a "nationality" and we do not realize how long it took before such correspondence was realized or how many of these nationalized states really date back no earlier than to the end of the Great War.

Those among us who distrust the feeling of nationalism as a wholly evil force do not appreciate the part which it played in the betterment of the condition of the individual man since it first began to manifest itself in the Middle Ages. Nor do they appreciate what it did later on for the development of what we call democracy or popular government. It began with the efforts of the common man to have a written language for his vernacular in which he could communicate freely with other common people instead of being dependent for his knowledge and his communication upon the Latin and Greek of a few scholars and priests. It was stimulated when poets began to write in the vulgar tongue of their native lands instead of in the classics. Thus it was early stimulated by Chaucer and Dante and later by Shake-

spere and Cervantes. The feeling of nationalism was advanced by the invention of that great liberator of the human mind, the printing press. It was a revolt against universalism of authority from above. It sought to lessen the secular authority of the medieval Roman Church which had preserved many of the universalistic traditions of the ancient Roman Empire.

But it was not at first associated with any movement for self-government within the state. On the contrary, autocratic monarchy was at first an important influence in stimulating national consciousness. In early times the king was the symbol of national unity and independence. Strong ambitious rulers in England, France, Spain, Portugal, and Scandinavia greatly developed the spirit of nationalism in their respective countries. Many of these rulers used the patriotism of their subjects to buttress their own position against the power of the Papacy from above and to repress the power of their feudal vassals, dukes, counts, and barons beneath. A feeling of nationalism among the common people in those times was not inconsistent with a desire for the protecting hand of a strong monarchy to shield them from other forms of tyranny or disturbance.

Nevertheless as nationalism developed, the human units in communities grew to feel a stronger and stronger sense of their own rights in respect to their government and later in the seventeenth century when Englishmen in the Puritan Revolution began vigorously to assert

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these rights against King Charles himself and when the results of their efforts began to be written about in France by Montesquieu and others, the assertion of nationalism soon became closely entwined with the assertion of democracy or the right to self-government. The French Revolution vindicated the right of individuals not only to determine their form of domestic government but also to choose the state to which they would prefer to belong. It thus laid down the right of popular government and the right of national self-determination. And it was the leaders of the French Revolution in their battles for popular government who at the same time developed some very effective engines of modern nationalism. I refer to such measures as a compulsory national language, compulsory national elementary education, a national army based on conscription and a journalism designed to be read by the masses of the whole people. Each of these measures was proposed by leaders of the French Revolution. Thus the French Revolution produced a tremendous stimulation in the feeling of nationality as well as in the desire for popular government.

Thereafter in Europe the growth of nationalism usually went hand in hand with the growth of popular government. In the 1820's the Greek leaders, when they were struggling to throw off the power of Turkish misrule, appealed to their compatriots in the name of the historic national spirit of Greece. A little later the Poles in their

unsuccessful attempt to throw off the autocratic rule of Russia buttressed their cause with an appeal to the ancient spirit of Polish nationality. A little later yet Garibaldi, Mazzini, and Cavour each in their different ways relied upon the aspirations of the Italians for a reunited Italy in their battle against the power of the Austrians in the north and the despotism of the Bourbons in Naples. In all these cases the invocation of the spirit of a national past was used to lend power to the revolutionary sentiment of liberty as against alien arbitrary government. Each of these causes was carried forward by the popular conviction that a national people has a right to rule itself.

On the other hand, in Germany national union was achieved by an entirely different path. It was achieved by a militarist and autocratic king after his chancellor, Bismarck, had overridden the representatives of the people in the Prussian House of Deputies in order to obtain a larger army.¹ The German Empire after it was created still forcibly retained within its boundaries discordant minorities of Poles, Danes, and Alsatians.

When we reach the time of the outbreak of the Great War, we find that for a century past, as a result of successive revolutionary nationalistic wars, the continent of Europe had been developing a group of this comparatively new form of

¹ See Henderson's *A Short History of Germany*, Vol. II, pp. 382 ff.

nation-states. Usually there was an accompanying growth in the direction of free institutions of government. In some cases, such as Greece, Belgium, and Italy, these states took the form of constitutional monarchies. France herself, whence perhaps the chief inspiration had come, was a republic. At the same time there remained in Europe the four autocratic empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey. Within these empires, impelled by the development which had been going on around them, other national groups of peoples, Poles, Serbs, Czechs, Finns, Rumanians and many others, were fairly seething in their efforts to accomplish the political freedom which they saw successful elsewhere. Towards the end of the World War and after the collapse of Russia, the alignment of the two sides had become more and more clearly an alignment between the liberal ideals of the western democracies on the one hand and the autocratic ideals of Germany, Austria, and Turkey on the other. The military power of the latter was being more and more threatened by the revolutionary efforts of the national groups which they had been holding under suppression.

Under such circumstances the result of the war and the victory of the western allies with the aid of America was to tear the lid off this bubbling pot of suppressed nationalism and to realize the long sought ambition of a number of new nation-states. The long evolution in nationality in Europe which had begun with the decline of the

international political authority of the Papacy; which had at first represented the strivings of the common man to better the conditions of himself and his group; which had later merged into the battle for popular government as well as self-determination of government, had finally been successfully accomplished. The peace treaties after the Great War set their seal upon this transformation.

We in America have imbibed some rather erroneous ideas as to the relation of the peace treaties to this great national transformation. There has been painted for us a picture of four elderly statesmen in a private room at Paris moulding a new Europe out of materials which were as putty in their hands and, incidentally, making a rather bad mess of it. So far as the establishment of these new nationalities and, in general, of their boundaries was concerned, no more incorrect picture could be painted. The conference at Versailles did not meet until the 18th of January, 1919. Long before that date the National Committee of the Czechoslovak People was in substantial possession of the Czechoslovak territory at Prague. The Polish Regency Council was in Warsaw declaring for a free Poland. The Yugoslavs were in possession of Yugoslavia; the Greeks, of their new territory in Macedonia; and the Rumanians, of Bessarabia. Each of these peoples had a military organization which had been fighting for its nationality and was ready to fight further if neces-

sary. The German Austrians and the Magyar Hungarians had already dissolved the bonds of the dual monarchy. The new nation-states were thus in substantial possession of the territory which they claimed and it would have taken much more than the pen and ink of a peace treaty to dislodge them.

It is true that the precise delimitation of boundaries remained to be accomplished. It is also true that in a few important particulars and in many more comparatively unimportant ones, the national boundaries as finally laid down in the peace treaties have received vigorous criticism. In such a situation, however, these underlying and indisputable facts should be remembered: First, in some regions of Europe the geographical features and the hodge-podge of races make any frontier which may be proposed racially unfair to somebody. Second, in general the map of Europe as settled by the peace treaties is a marked advance so far as racial homogeneity is concerned over the pre-war map of Europe. Third, this settlement is far more in line with liberal ideals than would have been the settlement proposed in the map of *Mittel Europa* by the Germans and Austrians when they hoped and expected to be victorious.² As a consequence I think it is fair to say that by the war and peace settlement the nations of Europe had made a very long stride forward toward the culmination of the evolution

² See Bulgarian Manifesto, October 1915; Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, March 1918; Treaty of Bucharest, May 1918.

in nationalism which for so many centuries had been gradually developing. Those nations had reorganized their boundaries on a basis of common race, language, and culture. And that readjustment had been accomplished with a proportion of error and injustice which in the light of its very great difficulty was extremely small.

Furthermore the result of the war had been to increase the number of sovereign states in Europe from twenty-two to twenty-nine.⁸ It had also increased the size and population of most of the smaller states in comparison to the great powers. One great power, Austria-Hungary, had disappeared entirely. Germany and Russia had also lost territory and population. Before the War there had been only one of the smaller states, Spain, which had a population of more

³ *Pre-War States of Europe*

Portugal	Sweden	Greece
Spain	Germany	Bulgaria
France	Switzerland	Rumania
England	Italy	Russia
Belgium	Austria-Hungary	Turkey
Holland	Albania	Luxemburg
Denmark	Montenegro	
Norway	Serbia	

Post-War States of Europe

Portugal	Germany	Rumania
Spain	Switzerland	Turkey
France	Italy	Poland
England	Austria	Lithuania
Irish Free State	Hungary	Estonia
Belgium	Albania	Latvia
Holland	Czechoslovakia	Finland
Denmark	Jugoslavia	Russia
Norway	Greece	
Sweden	Bulgaria	Luxemburg

than ten millions. After the war there were five of these secondary states with a population between ten and thirty millions—Spain, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. There had also been a marked increase in population of some of the states which were still smaller. The changes in Europe therefore represented not only a reorganization on the lines of nationality but a readjustment in size tending to greater uniformity between the small and the great powers.

And largely as a result of the war there had also come an important change in the character of the domestic governments of most of the Central European states. Throughout Europe there was immediately following the war a great swing towards free parliamentary institutions. The old autocratic dynasties in each of the four great empires disappeared. Germany and Austria became republics; likewise Poland, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; even Turkey became a republic in form. In Russia the autocracy of the Czar, after a brief attempt at republicanism, was succeeded by the autocracy of the Communist party.

The reorganization in Germany was very significant. That country remained the largest and economically the strongest and most influential nation of Central Europe.⁴ When the rule of the

⁴ In these pages I refer to that portion of the European continent lying east of the Rhine and west of Russia, as Central Europe.

Kaiser was suddenly overthrown, the preponderance of power was thrown into the hands of the Socialist party and a reorganization of the state on Socialist lines might well have been expected. But instead the republican constitution of Germany was based on democratic principles. It recognized rights of freedom for the individual as against the state similar to those recognized in the constitutions of the English-speaking nations. It provided for freedom of the person, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of worship, freedom of association and those individual liberties which autocracies and dictatorships everywhere, whether dynastic, proletarian or fascist, have found it necessary to suppress. It also recognized the economic freedom of the individual and the right of private property. The constitutions of most of the newly formed republics of Central Europe followed similar lines of liberalism. Most of them adopted the parliamentary system. In choosing these methods of popular government these new republics were choosing systems with which hardly any of them had had any real experience and systems which history has shown to be slow and difficult to be mastered. Nevertheless their action was significant as a confirmation of the long process of similar development in government which for so many centuries had been taking place in other parts of the world. It indicated the direction which the law of progress was taking in matters of human government.

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Each of these changes which I have pointed out was in the direction of what we might call the responsible government of Europe, meaning by that term government which was more likely to be responsive to the interests of the beneficiaries chiefly concerned, the peoples inhabiting that continent. Each nation being composed of a population better united in language, race and culture than formerly, the government thereof was more likely in its action and policy to be more representative of the wishes of the inhabitants. Secondly, this result was further favored by the fact that most of the countries had now embraced these systems of popular government. Finally the fact that in Europe as a whole the group of nations was better balanced in size than before the war tended to check and prevent extremes in domination by the large powers over the small—the giants over the pygmies. It tended to produce a continent with a family of nations which in the long run would favor compromise and moderation in policy representing the interests of the entire group of nations rather than extreme policies dictated by the large powers at the expense of the others. This last result was also furthered by the fact that autocratic and dynastic government in the large powers had disappeared.

We have now reached a point where we can begin to envisage and appraise the political problem in foreign relations which was presented to this reorganized Europe at the close of the Great

War. In the course of the evolution of mankind and largely by the efforts of the individual to better his condition in freedom and in self-government, there had been created in this compact little continent of Europe, occupied almost entirely by the Caucasian race, this group of separate nations. They differed from each other in language, traditions, and culture, but as a whole they stood out sharply in race and institutions from the population of the great Asiatic and African continents behind them. During past centuries they had been engaged in many wars, sometimes in almost continual war. But in former times those wars had been mainly dynastic, originating in causes in which the individual inhabitants had little or no concern. The fighting also had been of a kind appropriate to dynastic Wars, namely fighting by professional armies raised and trained by dynastic rulers for their own purposes. In this fighting the civilian populations were comparatively little concerned.

With the passage of the centuries, however, and even before the Great War, as the masses of the people had learned to eliminate or control their autocratic rulers, i.e. as democracy succeeded autocracy, their wars had gradually tended to cease to be dynastic and to become more national. The fighting also had tended to become national in that the people of the country took a greater interest in the cause or purpose of the war, assumed a greater part in the fighting and bore a more general part in the suffering. In par-

ticular, for over a century a very large proportion of the wars of Europe had been caused by the efforts of various national groups to throw off an alien yoke and establish for themselves an independent government. They were wars to promote the evolution of nationality.

Now at last these states had reached the apparent logical goal towards which their development had been tending; their dynasties had been abolished; the separate states had acquired democratic organizations in which the rights of the individual were recognized; they had also each achieved more nearly the separate unity in nationality, language and culture for which during so many years they had been striving. Undoubtedly there would be many causes left for quarrels and controversies between them. But at least a solution had been reached of the main underlying cause of most of the wars of the past century and that solution had been arrived at mainly by the efforts of the different groups themselves and had not been imposed upon them by authority from above. These nation-states might hereafter quarrel about questions of their respective boundaries. Some of them might even attempt forcibly to obtain dominion over others, but such quarrels would be very different in nature and in lack of excuse or justification from the nationalistic wars through which they had been working their way in the past.

The political problem before them thus was fairly clear in its essential character. There was

no idea of going further and erecting upon these foundations in Europe a superstructure in the shape of a super-sovereignty. None of these nations wanted that. It would be abhorrent to everything for which they had been working and fighting in the past to try to mould together into some cosmopolitan civilization the national differences of culture, language and tradition which still separated them and in which they took such pride. What they needed was simply to learn to live together in the close confines of Europe without tearing each other to pieces in needless wars arising out of unsolved quarrels. The only political internationalism that they needed was to learn international good behavior in a community made up of national states. This would have for its primary purpose the avoidance or solution of controversies with each other. Europe had just been passing through the most destructive war in history, in which its whole civilization had been threatened. This fact lent impressive reality to their problem.

In pointing out that the proper program for the solution of the national relations of these states was indicated by the history of the evolution which had produced them, I do not for a moment mean to imply that there were not great difficulties in its way. On the contrary, those difficulties were gigantic. This task of developing a nation-state had not been a parlor game. The mere effort of tearing themselves loose from the powerful dynasties that had so long controlled them, in

itself had left scars and etils of the deepest character. The methods which are necessary in a revolutionary struggle for existence against a powerful despotism are not those likely to produce sweet reasonableness in the subsequent international behavior of a group of free young nations.

Again nationalistic spirit was made especially acrimonious in Europe by the long series of fierce historic animosities which have been developed by the successive racial invasions of the European continent ever since the dawn of history. When we think that almost every one of those conquests has left today somewhere in Europe its hereditary imprint upon men who are now neighbors, we cannot overestimate the prejudices and the hostilities which are crowded into that land; the Gaul followed by the Teuton, by the Goth, by the Tartar, by the Moslem, all have left their mark and those marks have been lasting.⁵

Finally the mere development of a national spirit in itself has a tendency to beget grave evils. These have been pointed out many times by many students and writers and it is unnecessary to dwell at length on them here. It tends to produce a spirit of exclusiveness and narrow-mindedness by making the nation feel that they are a chosen and peculiar people and thus gives to them an intolerance towards other nations and peoples outside their own borders. By this it tends to

⁵ For example, until at least 1914 every male inhabitant of Montenegro periodically wore mourning on account of their defeat by Turks at the battle of Kossovo in 1389.

make difficult those necessary adjustments and compromises with other nations which often must be made in the life of this world of ours. Again it tends to make its people over-docile to their chosen leaders. If a leader appeals to them in the cause of national patriotism, they are inclined to follow him unquestioningly into any extreme. It thus tends to prevent the people from producing those great critics of government upon whom safety from disaster so often depends; men like John Hampden who helped to save the soul of England in 1626; men like Lovejoy, Wendell Phillips or Garrison who helped to save the soul of this country in slavery times; men who do not fear to stand up for a truth even if it makes them unpleasant to all about them. Again nationalism tends to produce false patriotism and focus undue attention upon war and militarism. It thus aids in subverting that most essential principle of our own system of government which makes the military leader subordinate to the civil government of the state. By these last tendencies nationalism, if unchecked and uncontrolled, may even subvert and destroy the spirit of democracy which has grown up by its side.

Thus I do not for a moment seek to disguise or conceal the difficulty of the road which at the end of the Great War lay before Europe and the new states which composed it. What I am trying to do here is to see whether these peoples were travelling on any definite road whatever and, if

possible, what the direction of that road was. If these states at the close of the war were at the culmination of a long growth in nationality and in the elementals of popular government, then we can pretty safely judge that they had behind them a much greater momentum in their progress than if they had taken up these measures of government simply by chance or accident. If they had that momentum, they were less likely to be permanently deflected by the future obstacles which lay across their path. Such setbacks as they might receive in their progress were more likely to be transitory and not permanent. Therefore if you are inclined to believe with me that these nation-states at the close of the Great War had reached a definite point of success in a long struggle in which for decades and centuries they had been very gradually developing the elemental rights of individual freedom as well as nationalistic government; if you are also inclined to agree that in this process there had also been developed a continental situation in Europe which was less likely than before to be permanently unbalanced by the dynastic ambitions or desires of a few great powers and one in which the main group of smaller states would have a larger influence than they possessed before; if you agree with me in these matters, I think you will also concur with me that their position and that of Europe was likely to be more stable and its overthrow by unforeseen dangers less likely to be permanent than if it had been a mere product

of chance and not of evolution. I think you will agree with me that there is a greater presumption of their eventual success over temporary difficulties than if they did not have behind them this momentum. For if there are certain laws of history in this world under which man is following a definite and evolutionary course; if there is a law of continuity; if there is a law of constantly increasing democracy or of recognition of the right of freedom for the individual; if there is a law of moral progress under which moral influences in human affairs are gradually becoming stronger and more widely extended as compared with material influences; and if these nations were following a course defined by such laws, then we may reasonably assume a greater amount of hope and optimism even in these hours when the skies seem to be darkest around us.

CHAPTER II

THE preceding pages have traced the political evolution of the modern nation-state in Europe during the centuries since those medieval times in which it had its roots. It was at first very slow. It represented the gropings of the common man for better communication with his fellows and for freedom from the authority and formalism of world-wide empire. Later it became connected with the struggle for political freedom within the boundaries of separate states. And finally, under the impulses of the nineteenth century and culminating in the changes of the Great War, this nationalism combined with democracy became the predominant form of organized government in Europe.

When we considered the needs of this new group of nation-states in respect to their foreign relations, the problem seemed fairly clear and simple in its outline. It was in short that these various states, differing in language, culture, traditions and other domestic peculiarities, should work out a system by which they could live together in the crowded continent of Europe without tearing each other to pieces in wars arising out of their controversies. Their long struggle for independent nationality having reached its logical conclusion in their present organization, the natural goal of the future would be to pre-

serve the fruits thus won without jeopardizing them in unsolved quarrels. This was the simple outline of the political evolution and its goal.

Into the path of this long slow evolution of human rights and obligations, which had been progressing at this leisurely pace for centuries, there was suddenly projected during the nineteenth century the mightiest and most revolutionary material change that has ever befallen the human race. This was the change which was produced when man by the aid of steam and electricity learned to tap the immense reservoirs of power which nature had stored for him on this planet. Until that moment the chief source of man's physical power in the world had been his own bodily strength. He had tamed a few animals to work for him; to a very modest extent he had harnessed the uncertain breezes and the flow of running water to his needs. But from the dawn of history the unit power of man's productivity had scarcely changed and it was limited by the strength of the body of man himself.

Throughout the world the masses of mankind lived in a separation which could be broken only by slow uncertain sea voyages or by slow and dangerous land travel. Their commerce consisted of the very limited articles which man was then able to produce. Furthermore the population of almost every country, comprising all but a very few privileged citizens, lived in a struggle for subsistence which was harsh and never-ending. A fav-

ored few were able to acquire wealth and a certain amount of comfort, which even our modern laboring classes would now consider extremely limited. And, of course, even in those hard ages, the mind of man had shown its capacity for expression in those highest forms of happiness which are represented in literature, art, philosophy and religion. In those directions man had touched heights never since surpassed. But the masses of the people, speaking generally, had no comforts and were engaged in a lifelong struggle for necessities. Population was restricted by this narrow margin of existence. The pressure for subsistence was the chief law which determined the size and character of all human societies. The law of Malthus was a grim reality.

Now almost within a couple of generations the power of man was enormously increased. His ability to produce the necessities and the comforts of life was expanded many thousandfold. His power to communicate with every part of the world became instantaneous. He became able to transport himself and the enormous quantity of goods which he could now produce to nearly every habitable portion of the earth and to do it with marvellous rapidity. On the one hand, man's power suddenly became gigantic. On the other, the world suddenly became extremely small.

Out of these changes came in the latter part of the nineteenth century that revolutionary transformation in Europe and in North America which we call industrialization. Factories were

built to which by swift transport raw materials were brought from far distant sources. These supplies were then turned into manufactured goods which were then sold to distant customers. By this combination of the new power and the new transportation much larger populations could be supported on a much higher standard of life and comfort than could have eked out an existence on the products of the soil under the old conditions.

In Central Europe Germany became the leader in the industrialization of that portion of the continent. Half a century before she had been a mere group of semi-independent and mutually antagonistic states, small in size, dependent upon local agriculture and of little economic importance. In 1870 when she finally achieved her political union she had a population of only forty million. Less than fifty years later, at the time of the outbreak of the World War, she had become one of the three great industrial nations of the world, united, strong and prosperous. Her population had increased to nearly seventy million. In the race for industrial leadership she had left France behind and was passing England. She had transformed herself into a great complicated machine dependent for its working on many delicate factors both inside of Europe and without. She was drawing her supplies, including a large proportion of her food, from across the seas. She was selling her products to customers throughout the world. Her

great merchant fleet was rapidly expanding. Her foreign trade was exceeded in Europe only by that of Great Britain. Her investments from the profits of her industry covered the world.

Around Germany as a pivot was grouped the economic system of most of the rest of the European continent. She was the best customer of no less than seven European countries and the largest source of supply of ten.¹ She was the center of the industrial web which extended into every part of the continent east of the Rhine and upon which Central Europe was supporting in increasing comfort a population far greater than for centuries before had been able to exist upon the land itself.

Such a revolutionary transformation of the economic life of the European continent was bound to produce many and fundamental changes in the political and social life of the nations which composed it. These changes were numerous and varied. Those to which your special attention should be called were its effects upon the feeling of nationality and upon the dangers of war.

i "Germany was the best customer of Russia, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria-Hungary; she was the second best customer of Great Britain, Sweden, and Denmark; and the third best customer of France. She was the largest source of supply to Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria; and the second largest source of supply to Great Britain, Belgium, and France." *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, by J. M. Keynes, p. 17,

The first effect of these sudden improvements in manufacture and communication was to accelerate and strengthen the feeling of nationality in the states of Europe. The original developments of the railroads and of the telegraph lines were within state boundaries. The grouping together of large populations in cities caused by industrialization provided an easy opportunity for mass appeal and influence, and the advance in methods of journalism and propaganda was quickly seized upon as an opportunity for exciting national feeling.

Yet it was evident that the ultimate effect of these changes might be very different. The scope of production and consumption eventually led across the frontiers of the individual states. The sources of raw material upon which they depended became world-wide. The markets for their manufactures also became world-wide. Credit and banking became increasingly international. So did organized news service. Even the demand for and supply of labor tended to become international. The speed and facility of intercommunication was constantly growing and nationalities throughout Europe became more and more closely linked by railways, steamships, motor cars, aircraft, postal service, telegraph and telephone. Intellectual movements in one country tended to ramify into another and the efforts and achievements of science, religion and humanitarian activities more and more transcended state lines. These were all forces which tended to tie the nations of

the world in a closer mutual dependence. In the long run they also worked in the direction of a better knowledge of each other and consequently a better mutual understanding.

True, there were some counter tendencies. These began to make their effects felt even before the Great War. The importance of overseas sources of supplies to be found in the less civilized portions of the world had produced a race for colonies and spheres of influence which were producing sources of irritation between the nations. Germany and others were beginning to clamor for a larger place in the sun.

Also the great increase in man's productivity and the rapidly increasing richness of reward for the joint efforts of capital and labor, under the existing system of *laissez faire* had gone mainly to capital. This was beginning to produce domestic problems within the various nations. The masses of the population acting through government were seeking to have a larger share of these rewards. Both the laborer and the consumer were at an initial disadvantage compared with the capitalist in this distribution. The very growth in size of the units of business also had a tendency towards monopoly of production in various products and thus increased this disadvantage. There was an increasing demand that government should intervene to correct these evils. This change tended to put a much greater burden upon the state and thus to increase the problems of all the governments of Europe.

The change, however, which was to prove most immediately important was that the civilization of Europe had become very much more fragile in its relation to war than had been the case before this great transformation. A large population had been produced which was no longer supported from the land of Europe. That continent and most of the nations within it were no longer economically self-sufficient. A great system of delicate machinery had been constructed with arteries of supply and distribution stretching out not only between the nations of that continent but far out into the world beyond, and upon the safe and continuous working of this system a large part of the population of the continent was dependent for its daily bread. At the same time, those wonderful inventions which during peace were ministering to life and comfort, when set in reverse could work with equal effectiveness for death and destruction. Larger armies than ever before could be more rapidly mobilized, supported and hurled against an enemy. More powerful artillery could reach their targets at greater distances. Airplanes could hurl destructive bombs and deadly gases upon congested cities with more appalling effect.

Therefore just as the long evolution in the nationality and democracy of the European states was ripening into fruition and they were confronted with the necessity of adjusting the problem of their international relations with each other, the industrial revolution had wrought a

complete transformation in the character and vital importance of this problem. The people of Europe were upon the threshold of a promised land of material wealth and comfort such as they had never known. They faced a bright vista of health and welfare and happiness for the masses of their population which, when contrasted with their condition during the many centuries preceding, seemed like a millennium. But their enjoyment of it was predicated upon the fulfilment of certain conditions. They must solve those domestic problems of social justice and fairness of economic distribution upon which a continuance of the partnership between capital and labor depended; their peoples must continue to have a sufficient friendly intercourse in commerce and trade with other peoples to support the structure of industrialization which had been erected within each state; and finally, of very first importance, their governments must learn to solve their international quarrels without a resort to war which might destroy the whole complicated structure.

But in 1914 war came, the first great European war since this industrial transformation had taken place. It came largely from causes which we hope and believe have now been either eliminated or greatly reduced, namely from the rivalry of autocratic dynastic powers, and the agitation of large national groups still held under suppression by foreign arbitrary rule. But whatever the cause, the war came and no man living was in a position to know from experience what it would

be like. The forecasts which were early made showed this ignorance. Promptly it became terrific and destructive beyond all comparison with former wars. Gradually the interlocking web of industrial connections dragged nation after nation into this maelstrom not only in Europe but in other parts of the world until at the close twenty-eight nations were at war. Day after day the organization, the skill and power, which had previously been producing wealth and comfort all over the world, was transformed into a gigantic engine for destroying life, property and wealth at a rate of destructiveness which had never been witnessed before and which was constantly increasing.

Even on land war was incomparably more destructive to life and property than it had been before. But at sea the application of the blockade to industrialized Central Europe produced destructive effects upon human life and health, as well as upon the modern instrumentalities of civilization which were even more widely spread. Great populations which had come into existence in reliance upon foreign sources of supply were now cut off from those supplies. A large portion of a continent was brought to the verge of starvation.

When the war ended not only was the civilization of Central Europe shaken and tottering but the whole world had suffered an economic dislocation. Even now fifteen years afterward na-

tions situated in the Western Hemisphere like ourselves, far distant from the actual conflict, are still rolling in the trough of the waves created by that storm. We can now see what a terrific responsibility rested upon the men who framed the peace treaties. But we can also see how impossible it was for even the wisest of them to foresee the full measure of that responsibility. In what I may say here as to the shortcomings of the peace treaties I have no intention of asserting that a different course was humanly possible at the time this course was taken. The situation which the statesmen of the victor nations faced was novel and unparalleled. In view of the rapidity with which in half a century the industrial revolution had transformed the world, it is not at all surprising that its full effects were not appreciated. It is still less surprising that in those first few months following the Armistice when the guns had just ceased firing and when the world was still full of war psychology and bitterness, these men were not in a position adequately to devise the generous and farsighted measures of readjustment which alone might have any chance of restoring a shattered world. And even if they could have foreseen the measures which should be taken, it was a very different and much less possible thing to put such measures into effect in the mental atmosphere of the world which then existed.

In his address to the Senate on January 22, 1917, just before America entered the war,

President Wilson showed that he appreciated the dangers of a harsh treaty of peace imposed by force upon a beaten enemy. In that address he pointed out that "only a peace between equals can last, only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit." Yet when the time came, even he signed the Treaty of Versailles and certainly that treaty did not follow these lines.

With our present knowledge not only of what then existed but of what has since taken place, we are only just beginning to see how important it was in the interests of the whole world, including victors and vanquished alike, that there should have been a prompt recuperation of those countries where the chief destruction had taken place and where whole populations were weak and dependant for lack of food and employment. We can now begin to see the outline of the problem which confronted them. Before the war the peoples of Europe had been living in conditions which assumed and required freedom for their trade. Populations had been built up which had been supported only in that way. Within the great areas of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires such freedom of trade had existed and even across their boundaries commerce passed with very considerable freedom. Germany had been the best customer of Russia and of Austria-Hungary and she had been also the largest source of supply to both those empires. The result of the war was now dividing these empires

into a new group of states organized on national and democratic lines, but the population of these states would still continue to be dependent for their subsistence on a continuance of such international trade. The new lines of national boundaries which were springing up would make that problem of foreign trade much harder than it had been before the war, and the restlessness and discontent which were sure to be produced by starvation and unemployment would make it harder still.

Germany had been the center of the old economic system and even after the war she remained the largest and economically the most powerful nation in Central Europe. She had thrown off her autocratic government and had adopted the liberal constitution of Weimar which has been mentioned above. We can now see how much the success of the new organization of Europe depended upon Germany's wholehearted acceptance of the new regime.

We can also now see how far the steps actually taken were likely to fall short of producing the desired result of a wholehearted acceptance of the Peace Treaty by a contented Germany. Take first the economic steps of the settlement. Confronted with a situation where the population of a continent was close to starvation and where the only feasible way to restore it to self-support was to set on foot again the organization by which alone it had lived, this restoration was de-

laid and additional burdens were laid upon the tottering Central Powers by their victors. Even after the Armistice had stopped hostilities, the naval blockade of Central Europe was nevertheless continued for seven months and when it was finally lifted the vitality and hope of the continent had been that much further reduced.

The life of Germany depended in large part upon her trade in commodities which she manufactured. She imported raw supplies and exported finished products. Her sources of supply were in part her colonies which even before the war had seemed to her insufficient for her development. Her trade also depended on her coal mines and her means of transport by land and sea. By the peace settlement all her colonies were taken from her; her merchant marine was seized; five thousand locomotives and one hundred fifty thousand cars were removed from her railways; she lost many of her principal coal mines in Silesia and in the Saar basin and she was also compelled to mine and deliver to her former enemies large stocks of additional coal. On top of this there was imposed the burden of an impossibly large and undetermined amount of reparation payments.

These economic penalties alone were more drastic and severe than any recorded in modern history against a defeated nation. In the light of the condition of the populations upon which their burden fell, they were even more severe.

In addition to these economic penalties there were also inserted into the settlement certain punitive clauses of a political and military character. The victorious powers felt sincerely that they had been fighting to save the world from the dangers and excesses of a brutal German militarism and that their sacrifices would be without avail unless steps were taken to protect the world in the future against a repetition of such a danger. These punitive clauses were intended to furnish this security. They proposed to punish Germany on account of her past conduct and by disarming her attempted to render her impotent to do them harm in the future. By these clauses Germany was forced to accept the responsibility of having brought on the war. The treaty proposed that the German Kaiser should be criminally tried for "a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties." A large number of German military officers were to be similarly tried as war criminals. Germany was forced to demilitarize her western boundaries to a depth of fifty kilometers east of the Rhine, leaving it denuded of fortresses and troops. She was compelled to abandon her system of compulsory military service and to maintain an army of no more than one hundred thousand men. All her guns, rifles and other munitions beyond those required for this small force were either handed over to the Allies or destroyed under a special allied commission which had full power to see that these terms were carried out. Her fleet was surrendered

and she was forbidden to maintain any military or naval air force or submarines.

I have the fullest sympathy with the feeling of the Allies as to the character of the German military system which had existed before the war and of the dangers of such a system to the rest of the world. The essence of that system was that in autocratic Germany the military power and its chiefs had been in fact superior to the civil government and to the representatives of the people. The conduct of Bismarck in defying the Prussian House of Deputies when they objected to his increase of the army had abundantly proved this. It was a system which so long as it existed was a danger to every liberal government in the world. But the return of such a system could not be prevented by the mere physical disarmament of Germany in 1919. No forcible disarmament of a powerful virile nation can be permanently effective unless the whole world is ready and willing to sit on guard and forcibly insist on its continuance—which of course is an impossibility.

On the contrary, the best hope of providing against a repetition of German militarism was to support those elements of the German people who sympathized with the liberal views of the rest of the world in condemning it. And unless such a spirit against militarism could be inculcated in Germany itself, there was great danger that harsh and humiliating steps in the Peace Treaty instead of being a protection against a renewal of such dangers would be a mere provocation of

them. These steps reduced Germany to a position of defenselessness in the middle of a ring of powers who still maintained their armaments on as large or larger scale than before the war. Just so long as that contrast existed, there was no hope of inculcating in Germany a willingness to remain disarmed herself. The sight of armed neighbors around her could be infallibly counted on sooner or later to put in power in Germany men who would insist upon Germany returning to her old armed condition. So when the allied statesmen insisted upon disarming Germany, they faced the inexorable condition that they should also disarm themselves.²

After the lapse of fifteen years we are now in a position to form some judgment as to the effect upon the German people of these economic and military penalties imposed by the peace settlement. A republican government had come into power in Germany in 1919 under the liberal constitution of Weimar. It made a creditable struggle to carry the nation through a period of almost inconceivable difficulty. It suppressed the Spartacist movement which tried to throw Germany into Communism. It declined to be led into ex-

² Furthermore there was an express implication in the Treaty itself that Germany's disarmament would be followed by the disarmament of the victorious nations. Part V of the Treaty of Versailles reads as follows:

"In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval, and air clauses which follow. . . ."

tremist positions in any direction. Although composed largely of members of the Socialist party, it declined to create a completely new social order and remained essentially democratic. It did not oppose with violence the efforts of Germany's conquerors to make her pay impossible amounts of reparations. In Gustav Stresemann it eventually produced a statesman of courage and far-sighted vision. Under him Germany spontaneously initiated in 1925 the most encouraging step which has been taken in the foreign relations of Europe since the war—the treaties of Locarno. In these treaties Germany voluntarily guaranteed to preserve its boundaries with France and with Belgium and as an earnest of her spirit joined the League of Nations.

This moderate republican government throughout its career was being constantly assailed by groups of radicals and reactionaries, communists and monarchists, who each in their different ways wished to take more aggressive and violent steps. It is possible for us now to see how the severe punitive and economic conditions of the peace settlement played into the hands of these extremists. The German people were told that they had not been defeated in the war; that they had been deceived into laying down their arms in reliance upon a program of settlement which their enemies thereafter had not carried out. They were told that the humiliating provisions of the treaty had been accepted by a weak and treasonable republican government after

Germany's enemies had taken possession of the Rhine, after her fleet had been surrendered and after the blockade had been continued to the point of utter exhaustion. However warped and untrue such assertions, it is not difficult now to see how they were eventually driven home into the minds of a hungry and unemployed population. For a long time the republican government succeeded in defeating the attempts made upon it by its enemies. Adolph Hitler, one of the most persistent of these enemies, failed in several attempts at revolution and was not successful until after ten years of struggle. But finally after a few years of prosperity, based upon the unstable support of borrowed money, the great depression of 1930 came and unemployment and misery returned. Then the humiliating tokens of the peace settlement, still surrounding them in the shape of their own military weakness and the military strength of their still armed neighbor countries, lent the final necessary impulse which led to the organized demand for the revision of the Treaty of Versailles and the overthrow of the republican government which had consented to it.

It is true that many of these severe provisions of the peace settlement were afterwards revised or abandoned. Prosecution of the Kaiser was given up; the Rhineland was completely evacuated in 1930, nearly five years before the final limit set by the Treaty of Versailles; France in 1932 consented to a settlement of reparations

which was most generous in its reductions; the time for the election to decide the ownership of the Saar Valley is almost here. It is also true that the republican government of Germany, instead of meeting such concessions by the Allies with a reciprocal spirit of appreciation which might have created on both sides an atmosphere of reconciliation, met each one with insistent demands for further concessions and thus perpetuated in the minds of the Allies the conviction that Germany was ungrateful and would never accept any settlement except by force. As one can now see, the whole process was a vicious circle in which reconciliation was prevented by errors on both sides. But I think it is conservative to say that had Germany been earlier restored to wholesome business activity so that her children could be fed and her men put to work; and had they not been constantly in sight of the tokens of their national humiliation, a very different result might have eventuated in the long struggle of the republican government.

In short, the discouraging situation which seems to be setting back the clock in Germany today does not come from unavoidable causes. On the contrary, for more than a decade the spirit of individual freedom under the republican popular government was in power in Germany under the most trying conditions and against the most difficult obstacles. That government was only overthrown under the pressure of

economic hardship. Does that necessarily mean that the opportunity for free constitutional government in Germany is lost forever? Does it mean that the international goodwill which Gustav Stresemann represented can never be restored? I do not think that such a discouraging conclusion must be accepted.

Furthermore, from the beginning it has been abundantly clear that the popular strength which has been gradually accumulating behind the Hitler movement was in the nature of a protest—a protest against the hardships and injustice which the German people felt they had suffered. It did not represent a constructive program of economic recovery. The constructive steps upon which the future prosperity of Germany in fact depends still remain to be taken and they are steps which require the cooperation of the other nations of Europe. It will be only by the cooperation of a number of other states that Germany's trade inside and outside of Europe can be built up, that her people can be reemployed and that her material welfare can eventually return. This of itself offers a fairly safe guarantee against unrestrained violence against her neighbors on the part of Germany. It tends to insure that there will be necessarily an opportunity for further thought and reflection. The protest has been uttered. The constructive work remains to be done and in the interval required for the doing of it, the moderate elements of Germany may have an

opportunity to make their voices heard and their influence felt.

The chances of success for any such future work of construction can perhaps be appraised if we examine the efforts which have already been made in that direction throughout Europe as well as the machinery which has been gradually developed during the past fifteen years looking towards such cooperative action. In the following pages we will examine these efforts and that machinery.

CHAPTER III

LET us now examine the steps which have taken place, both politically and economically, towards the reconstruction of Europe since the war as well as the international machinery which has been devised for that purpose. Our main object will be to see whether the general trend of this post-war development has been in the right direction as well as whether it has accomplished any results which offer a hopeful augury for the future.

The organization which was devised in the peace treaties of 1919 to regulate the future international relations of these European states was the Covenant of the League of Nations. That Covenant was not limited to Europe. It was intended to become universal. But it was devised by the statesmen of the nations which had been fighting in Europe and evidently with the problems of that continent immediately in view. Its work since the war has been chiefly concerned with European problems and in these pages we also are chiefly concerned with its success or failure in Europe.

This Covenant was initiated by the American delegation headed by President Wilson. He took the principal part in framing it and securing its insertion into the peace treaties. It was his principal contribution to those treaties. He relied

upon it to become a means of remedying the errors or injustices which might creep into the peace settlement. Its adoption is a monument to his memory. It was the first time that any such provision had been introduced into the peace treaties settling a great war. It proposed to provide in these treaties of 1919 permanent machinery for the avoidance of future wars. It did not attempt to create a super-state in the world but instead provided for a system of organized cooperation between states which still remained sovereign. Membership in it was voluntary and any member might withdraw after due notice if it desired. In these particulars it conformed closely to the requirements of that evolution of the nation-states in Europe which has been traced in the first chapter. It allowed full freedom and opportunity for the maintenance of their divergent nationalisms, cultures and traditions, and its principal purpose was to avoid the possibility of future war between them which would be so dangerous and disastrous to their industrialized civilization.

The growth and development of such a novel organization necessarily involved experimentation. The experience of the past fifteen years is demonstrating the lines of its most effective endeavor and is showing both what can and what cannot be accomplished. For example, the League has been criticized by some observers for its failure to use in the work of war prevention the drastic powers of non-intercourse given to it in its con-

stitution. Experience, however, has shown that all nations are most reluctant to resort to such sanctions and certainly would not do so in any given case unless the public opinion of the world was practically unanimous in supporting it. It thus shows that a first step in developing the machinery of war prevention is to promote the growth and organization of an intelligent public opinion of the world. This to a high degree the League is doing today.

The development of cooperative machinery among the nations of the world is in its infancy. The main thing to be sure of at such a time is that this new machinery shall develop along sound lines even if it develops slowly. This the League has done and, in my opinion, the really surprising thing is that the points of valid criticism should prove so few and that its growth under all the circumstances which it has faced should have been so steady, so satisfactory and so fruitful.

For not only did this new experiment in the conduct of international relations face one of the stormiest post-war periods which had ever confronted Europe but on the very threshold of its career and at the time when it most needed prestige and encouragement the League met a staggering blow. Forty-five sovereign states were scheduled in the peace treaties to become the original members of the League. These included the victorious allied and associated powers which had signed the treaty and some thirteen neutral

states. All of these forty-five original states ratified the Covenant and became members with one exception. That exception was the United States, the rich and powerful state whose president had proposed the League, and the one whose moral influence was counted on to assist in the work of rendering effective the machinery upon which fell the responsibility for stabilizing the shattered and broken world. The psychological effect of such a defection upon the subsequent work of the League can hardly be overestimated.

Concurrently with this blow another blow fell upon the organization of which the League was a part, and this second blow also greatly increased the difficulties of its subsequent work. One of the fundamental problems which faced the statesmen at the peace conference was to provide for the future security of France and Belgium against invasion from the east. Ever since the dawn of history the peoples who occupied those lands had been subjected at periodic intervals to attacks from their warlike neighbors in that quarter. The great invasions which had finally overthrown the civilization of the Roman Empire had come from across the Rhine. Even in modern times no century had passed without destructive wars between France and Germany. France, who had by such a narrow margin preserved her sovereignty and her people by the victory of the last war, was quite naturally unwilling to lay down her arms and accept the assurance of the new regime of peace unless some additional and at least tempo-

rary assurance should be given to her providing for her safety until the effectiveness of that regime should be demonstrated.

The historical importance of such security was reenforced by the predominating position in size which the German population had recently acquired through the industrialization of Europe. In 1870 France and Germany had been substantially equal in their populations. Since then Germany had gained an additional population of nearly thirty million people while France had remained practically stationary. The danger on the east was accentuated by this present disparity of strength.

Therefore the original settlements at the Versailles Conference provided not only for a worldwide League of Nations but they also provided by separate undertakings that the United States and Great Britain should each immediately come to the assistance of France in case of unprovoked attack by Germany. This plan immediately failed. The United States not only declined to join the League of Nations but both she and Great Britain failed to ratify the proposed treaties of guarantee.

This result has materially affected the entire subsequent development of the machinery of peace. France's efforts to secure in some other way the security on which she had relied have complicated all the subsequent cooperative efforts at war prevention in Europe. It has led France to make outside alliances with Poland and the Lit-

tie Entente. It has entered into the discussions of every conference on disarmament which has taken place, and has been one of the most difficult obstacles which has delayed the work of the present General Disarmament Conference at Geneva. We should not forget this sequence of cause and effect when we are sometimes impatient with France in her disinclination to lay down her arms.

I shall not discuss at length the issue as to whether the United States should have joined the League of Nations. I shall only state briefly my own views which have been confirmed by my experience in the State Department. The work of the League of Nations has been primarily and chiefly concerned with matters pertaining to the nations of Europe. It would be no more wise now than at the time of Washington's Farewell Address for our government to entangle itself in what might be called the local politics of that continent. But on the other hand America is now, even more than a hundred and fifty years ago, vitally concerned in the general question of the maintenance of world peace. She has become a great world power and her commerce extends to every portion of the globe. The commerce and intercommunication of the world have each become infinitely magnified by the great industrial reorganization of the nineteenth century. A serious war in any part of the globe is now much more likely than it was then to spread and drag in other nations. For all of these reasons we are interested

in having a right to partake in the discussions of the other nations of the world with a view to preventing such a possible catastrophe. This is not a matter of altruism on our part but of our own vital interest.

The Covenant of the League, particularly in Article X I, provides machinery by which any member nation can immediately and as a matter of right call into existence such a discussion in case of emergency. Sir Edward Grey, the then British Foreign Minister, is reported to have expressed his opinion that, if such machinery had existed during those fateful days of 1914 when he was endeavoring to persuade the great powers of the continent to go slowly and to consult with each other about the impending disaster, the war might have been prevented.

In 1919 when the Covenant was before the Senate, it would have been legally quite possible for the United States to join the League and yet by appropriate reservations to avoid being entangled in any of the local politics of Europe or making any other commitments which her own statesmen deemed it unwise to assume. To my regret this course was not taken. In default of such a joinder it was the policy of Mr. Hoover's administration, of which I was a part, to confer with the officers of the League and to cooperate with them with such moral support as we could give in each single case as it arose where there seemed to us to be involved a direct interest of the United States or where there was a major danger to the peace

of the world. We had no absolute right to participate in the machinery of consultation provided for in the League since we were not a member, but on such occasions as arose we found the officials of the League very ready to welcome our cooperation.

In spite of the handicaps which I have recited, the progress of the League and its gradual growth in influence and prestige have been encouraging. Its main development has been along the line of effective mutual consultation and conciliation in cases of threatening controversies. In this it has made a very real contribution to the peace of the world—particularly the European world. Formerly such efforts at conciliation by any neutral power were haphazard and risky. It was nobody's business to make them and the effort was very likely to be resented by one of the disputants. But now under the League Covenant the machinery exists; the nations have agreed that it must be used; the Council is bound to take up the task if any member of the League asks it; and the mere announcement that it has been asked and is about to take it up has often put a damper on quarrels and belligerency. This power has been invoked in many cases, principally controversies in Europe and usually of a rather minor character. In the great majority of the cases the efforts at conciliation have been successful. It has been invoked only once in a case where one of the great powers of the world was immediately and

vitaly concerned, that being the case of Japan in Manchuria. This was a case arising in a very difficult and distant part of the world and at a time when the world was preoccupied with the misery of the great depression. The recommendations of the League have not been accepted by Japan but the League's efforts resulted in the creation with the consent of Japan of the distinguished Lytton Commission for the purpose of investigating the controversy between Japan and China and reporting its conclusions. The Commission consisted of prominent and experienced citizens of the five great powers of the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Germany. It returned a report unanimously adverse to Japan on the two vital points of controversy in Manchuria and this report was afterward approved at a meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations by all of the nations voting except Japan. In no other case in world history has one of the great powers of the world been arraigned at the bar of public opinion and received what amounted to an adverse judgment by virtually all of the other powers. It was the machinery of the League which made this possible, and this result illustrates the progress which has been made in the development by the League of the organization of world public opinion.

In Europe today the meetings of the Council of the League and of the Assembly have become the forum at which the controversies between the

nations of Europe when they approach a condition of tension are commonly brought up for discussion between the members concerned. If a foreign minister of one European power finds that a question has arisen of importance and difficulty with another such power, he no longer is compelled to approach it through the intermediate channels afforded by the embassies of the two countries. He can meet on very short notice the foreign minister of the other country at one of the League meetings in Geneva and personally talk it over with him. If it reaches a stage where it either touches other nations or concerns the general welfare of Europe, he can consult in Geneva with the representatives of those other nations at one of the regular meetings of the League. And all of this is regular, routine and customary. Such meetings no longer excite the agitation of the press. They no longer make an international incident. No other nation has a right to object. It is a new and great safety valve in the conduct of the tangled affairs of that crowded group of European nations. It is entirely a development since the Great War and it is full of augury of hope for the peaceful settlement of the controversies of its members in the future. It is so useful that, no matter what situations may seem to be arising in the present months of excitement and no matter how many nations under the influence of that excitement may give the required notice that two years from now they will withdraw from the League, I personally have no serious doubt as to

the continuance of this machinery of the League. It has proved its usefulness and practical European statesmen are not likely to give it up.

The League of Nations has also been a useful instrument for initiating other practical peace machinery. For years the establishment of a world court had been proposed, discussed and hoped for. The very first year of the League's existence in 1920 it took the steps which resided in the creation of such a court. Thereby an effective instrument for the final settlement of certain classes of important controversies between the nations has been put to work. Many international quarrels arise out of questions which are justiciable in their character. Examples of such cases are those involving the interpretation of a treaty, a question of international law, the establishment of the truth in a case of disputed facts; or the question of the extent of damages incurred or the nature of reparation to be made for a breach of international duty. Any such controversy can be submitted to the World Court and be decided by a trained body of jurists, removed from active participation in politics and confining their attention to the work of law. In the years since its creation that Court has already established its worth as a most valuable instrument in settling differences of that nature in Europe. Its growth in public esteem has been so great that forty-two of the nations of the world after this demonstration of its efficiency have now voluntarily signed

the additional optional clause in the Court's charter which makes its jurisdiction compulsory in regard to themselves. Among these forty-two nations are included Great Britain and all the Dominions, France, Germany, and Italy.¹ This means that instead of remaining free to decline to allow the Court to take jurisdiction over them on any case without their express consent, these nations have each as to itself covenanted that they may be compulsorily sued and brought to the bar of the Court in the classes of cases covered by their undertaking. This is one of the most encouraging indications of a growth in confidence on the part of the nations of Europe towards this new instrumentality of peace. And yet in the hurry and pressure of the last few years practically no attention has been paid to it by the public press in this country.

In 1925 came what was perhaps the most encouraging step since the close of the war. Ger-

¹ The forty-two nations adopting the optional clause were:

Abyssinia	Finland	Norway
Union of South Africa	France	Panama
Albania	Germany	Paraguay
Australia	Greece	Persia
Austria	Haiti	Peru
Belgium	Hungary	Portugal
Brazil	India	Rumania
United Kingdom	Irish Free State	Salvador
Bulgaria	Italy	Siam
Canada	Latvia	Spain
Colombia	Lithuania	Sweden
Denmark	Luxemburg	Switzerland
Dominican Republic	Netherlands	Uruguay
Estonia	New Zealand	Yugoslavia

many had passed through her disastrous period of inflation and was in the beginning of her temporary respite from economic disaster. Under the guidance of her republican Foreign Minister, Gustav Stresemann, she asked to be admitted to the League of Nations. She also spontaneously offered to guarantee the settlement of her western frontier between herself and France and Belgium which had been made in the Peace Treaty of Versailles. She thus voluntarily acquiesced in the cession to France of Alsace and Lorraine. As a result of her initiative the treaties of Locarno were executed. The integrity of the frontier between Germany, France, and Belgium was recognized and guaranteed not only by those three powers but by Great Britain and Italy who undertook to come to the assistance of the aggrieved power in case of violation of that frontier. These treaties did not guarantee the eastern boundaries of Germany, namely those between her and Poland and Czechoslovakia, but she entered into treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia to arbitrate disputes as to those boundaries. The Locarno treaties should have greatly alleviated the legitimate anxiety of France on the subject of her security. The voluntary offer of Germany represented the spirit of republican Germany at its best. And fortunately that security still remains today. For even in the uncertainties and anxieties brought on by the great depression and the advent of the Hitler government in Germany, the guarantee of the western boundary by Great Britain has been re-

affirmed by the British government in formal statements of its ministers in the House of Commons made last November*² The importance of this is manifest. Even if irresponsible autocracy should spread again over the whole of Central Europe, that line may remain as it did during the last year of the Great War, a final protective barrier for the civilization of the liberal Western Powers.

The most serious failure of the post-war steps taken towards peace and security in the continent of Europe has been in respect to disarmament. There the steps of causation have followed each other with the grim sequence of a Greek tragedy. The conclusion of the peace treaties in 1919 left Germany disarmed and helpless, surrounded by a group of her former enemies who still retained their arms with only an implied covenant to reduce them. No time limit was set for such reduction. Then came the disappointment of France as to her security which removed any inclination on her part to disarm. Preparatory conferences were called by the League of Nations, some seven in number. These made comparatively little progress. The long years dragged past with Germany restless under the constant irritation of her own status of inequality until finally the miseries of the new economic depression put fuel in the hands of those extremists who sought to over-

² See Hansard, November 7, 1933, Debate in House of Commons, pp. 42-59.

throw the foundations laid by the German Republic.

I am glad to say that in this cause of disarmament our own country had done its part thoroughly and well. Our own army had been demobilized immediately after the war until our land forces were reduced to a size per capita of our population of not much more than half the land forces allowed to Germany. Our distance from all our European neighbors rendered our air forces of no menace to any of them. So there remained only our navy. In that at the close of the war we had in existence or under construction a fleet which would have been by far the largest and most powerful in the world. We called the Washington Conference in 1921 and voluntarily gave up that preponderance. In that treaty, supplemented by the London Treaty of 1930 which was also called on our initiative, we succeeded in getting an agreement which limited the fleets of the three great naval powers of the world and put them upon a fair relative basis to each other.

But by doing this we deprived ourselves of all except moral influence upon the cause of further disarmament of the land forces of Europe. In the Great Disarmament Conference which was finally called in 1932 America stood as a power which had nothing further to give by way of bargaining for further disarmament. We had already done it.

The cause of further disarmament in Europe thereafter depended upon the solution of political questions which lay solely within the domain of

European policies and although steps have been taken at one time or another to hew away the obstacles which closed its path, they were either not sufficient or were not taken in time. The great depression came; the dam broke in Europe and the flood tide of bitterness and resentment and nationalistic distrust broke forth and spread over the land and made the task very much more difficult.

CHAPTER IV

WHEN we turn to the progress made by Europe since the war in the solution of its economic problems, we find at the threshold a very sharp difference from the progress made in the establishment of its political machinery. Politically the war and the peace treaties had assisted the promotion of an evolution which had been proceeding for centuries. The future steps therefore had a powerful popular momentum behind them. Economically on the other hand the effect of the war had been wholly destructive and devastating. The entire pre-war organization of Central Europe had been smashed. The immense interlocking system of trade upon which it rested had been destroyed. The separate states engaged in the war had spent their resources in the work of destruction; they were bankrupt and in many places starving. Instead of a promotion of past progress, there had been economically an immense setback. Laborious economic foundations had to be replaced before even beginning the new work of economic organization. Throughout the entire fifteen years since the war a major part of the economic efforts in Europe have been either rescue parties to save nations from actual starvation or emergent attempts to restore elementary economic foundations. The main constructive work of establishing

the international economic relations of that continent still lies before us.

I may illustrate these problems by an example from our own history which is illustrative both from its similarities and also from its sharp contrasts. At the close of our own Revolutionary War in 1781, our thirteen American states faced in a much minor degree some of these economic problems which faced the European states in 1919. Like them the American states were war-torn, impoverished and in a desperately bad economic condition. But they had not reached either the age or the stage of industrialism with its dangers and fragility. They were not starving like Europe from the burden of a population larger than the land would bear. They had the further advantage of being homogeneous in race and language and of being bound together by the common traditions of a victorious war. Yet even with these enormous advantages, during the seven years which followed the cessation of hostilities in 1781 they drifted rapidly into discord and anarchy. They began to develop separatist national feeling and even drifted towards actual hostilities one with another. My own state of New York began to erect tariff barriers against Connecticut and against New Jersey and soon a farmer from New Jersey who wished to deliver a boat-load of vegetables from Paulus Hook to Cortlandt Street had to enter his cargo with all the formalities of customs that would have applied

had he come from Europe. Monetary troubles were rife in no less than eleven of the thirteen states, and inflation in some of them became disastrous to commerce and business. In Massachusetts the anarchy culminated in a little war—Shay's Rebellion.¹

In this somewhat parallel condition of a shattered economy due to a long and impoverishing war, the thirteen American states found their remedy in two fundamental economic reforms. They adopted a system of no tariffs and free trade between all of the thirteen states and they established a stable and uniform currency throughout their territory. The necessity of these reforms was the chief impelling cause which induced these thirteen little jealous sovereignties to frame and ratify the federal constitution.

Speaking generally, I think we may say that the restoration of the economic prosperity of Central Europe depended largely upon the measure of success with which it could adopt similar financial and economic reforms. It depended on how successfully the various nations could stabilize the currencies which measured their commercial operations and how successfully they could keep down the tariff's and other barriers which blocked the exchange of their goods. Using this rough American measuring rod, I think we can sum up

¹ For an account of this period, see *The Critical Period of American History*, by John Fiske, chapter entitled "Drifting into Anarchy."

the economic progress which has been made in Europe as follows:

The men of Europe attacked with vigor and intelligence the financial problem of stabilizing their currencies and with the aid of the League of Nations achieved an early and surprising success. Incidentally they developed skill and technique in making use of the services of experts in these novel and technical problems with which the average statesman everywhere is apt to be uninformed. They thus were enabled to free themselves largely from nationalistic and political bias in their work. When three of the weaker nations, Austria, Hungary, and Estonia, collapsed under their financial difficulties shortly after the war, the League of Nations was able to rescue them and set them upon their feet again with balanced budgets and restored currencies. The experience thus gained was applied to the larger and much more difficult problem of Germany when its currency collapsed in 1924 and enabled the Dawes Commission to work out a plan under which Germany became temporarily rehabilitated. In the cases of Greece and Bulgaria a million and a half refugees were repatriated and restored to a self-supporting condition in their new homes. The financial operations necessary for each of these five cases of Austria, Hungary, Estonia, Greece, and Bulgaria, were carried through by the League of Nations on a self-sustaining basis and

by 1926 the currency situation of Europe was substantially set in order.²

On the other hand, in the deeper and more fundamental problem of reducing trade obstacles and restoring commercial relations, no such progress was made. The new states of Europe created by the war had received no effective assistance in this direction in the peace treaties. The records of the peace conferences do not indicate that the vital importance of such assistance was appreciated by the victorious powers. The provisions to facilitate trade which found their way into the treaties were temporary, feeble and produced no actual effect.⁸ The new nations were left to work out this vital problem amid all the confusion of conflicting nationalistic ambitions which inevitably grew up to thwart their collective action.

It was nearly a decade before the underlying importance of such measures of economic restoration began to force itself insistently through the fog of politics upon the attention of the leaders of Europe. But after the treaties of Locarno had

2 See report of League of Nations, Information Section, entitled *Economic and Financial Organization*, January 1928.

s As a matter of fact the victorious powers insisted upon inserting into the treaties "most favored nation clauses" giving to each of them the benefit of any concessions granted to any other state by Germany, Austria or Hungary, and only waived these clauses for very brief periods and to very limited extents. The mere existence of such clauses necessarily tended to prevent reciprocal arrangements looking to trade recovery between the new states.

Treaty of Versailles, Art. 264, 265, 266.

Treaty of St. Germain, Art. 217, 218, 219, 220, 222.

Treaty of Trianon, Art. 200, 201, 202, 203, 205.

tended to restore confidence and Germany had joined the League of Nations, matters began to move. In 1927 a world economic conference of specialists and experts attacked the question of trade barriers with a considerable amount of common purpose. Two years later at the 1929 meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations, M. Briand of France dramatically brought forward his suggestion for European economic solidarity involving among other things collective action looking towards a freer exchange of goods between the European states.⁴ In this he was supported by Gustav Stresemann only a few weeks before the latter's death. But before the resulting discussions had done more than to bring to the surface the inevitable difficulties inherent in any such movement, the great depression of 1930 had arrived and Germany and Austria were brought almost immediately again to the brink of financial collapse. Their largest banks began to totter and a cry for help went out to the world in the spring of 1931. Mr. Hoover's moratorium and the work of the London Monetary Conference in July of that year gained a temporary respite for Germany in the payment of her public and private debts and saved her from immediate financial collapse. But they could not save the trade which continued to decline not only in Germany but throughout Central Europe. With this fall of trade, budgets became unbalanced and thereupon

⁴ M. Briand's proposition has become commonly known as the proposed United States of Europe.

tariffs were raised even further. It was a vicious circle. The more trade collapsed, the more steps were taken in the shape of higher tariffs and other trade restrictions to prevent the only remedy—trade restoration. European commerce became divided into almost watertight compartments. The more trade declined, the greater became the unemployment and political discontent. With this political restlessness came an increase in the feeling of bitter nationalism, thus adding political obstacles to the already existing economic barriers to friendly commerce.

That roughly is the picture of the economic situation which has confronted Europe ever since. The choice before her nations today is simple in its stark outline: Either they must find a way of restoring their foreign trade or they must find some other way of taking care of an unemployed surplus population. The difficulties of the latter amount to practical impossibility. Their land is insufficient for support; immigration is no longer open to them; the gates of the new world have been closed. From this difficult economic dilemma, coupled in the case of Germany with the bitterness arising from the peace treaties which I have already discussed, has come the appearance of political chaos in Europe during the last two years.

Great reforms often spring from necessity. Man rarely fails to find a solution when a situation gets bad enough to compel it. And so at this

very time when the economic situation in Central Europe seemed to have reached a deadlock which was rapidly producing political chaos, a bright spot has appeared on the horizon which may be an omen of better times. That has been in a most unexpected quarter. For many years we have been accustomed to regard the Balkans as the danger spot in Europe—the powder barrel from which at any time an explosion might occur. Indeed it was an explosion from that quarter which initiated the catastrophe of the Great War. For five hundred years the Balkans have been the seat of the most bitter racial and religious hostilities out of which violence and war have become traditional. Among them all the implacable hostility between the Greeks and the Turks has been the most conspicuous.

Within the past six years a revolutionary change in those relations has occurred. Turkey and Greece have reached a political and an economic understanding pointing towards results unique among the nations of Europe. With it has been developed a policy of goodwill and cooperation that has astonished a skeptical world. This has not been accidental. Its foundation has been laid by that same development of nationality which was so stimulated by the influence of the Great War. Prior to that war the Ottoman Empire was a decadent theocracy. The Sultan Caliph of Turkey was the religious head of Islam. As such he formerly exercised both secular and religious authority over a wide empire in Europe, Asia, and

Africa. Although with the passage of time his territory had shrunk and many of his dominions had been taken away, the theory of his double authority persisted. The essence of the Islamic system was the identification of civil with religious control.

The Great War ended that system. The Caliphate disappeared. The spirit of western nationalism destroyed the universal authority of Islam just as in earlier times it had destroyed the universal authority of the Medieval Papacy. Turkey acquired a new and vigorous secular government in the form of a republic. That government in 1920 voluntarily renounced all authority over its former dependencies in Syria, Iraq, and Arabia. It announced that it would no longer seek to control territories where the Turkish population was not predominant, but that it would continue to insist upon holding those lands which were the Turks' real home and where they were the main population. It then proceeded to make good its title to its home country in Anatolia by driving the Greeks into the sea at Smyrna. Thereafter, under the supervision of the League of Nations, the refugee Greeks of Anatolia and the refugee Turks of Eastern Thrace were transported to and repatriated within the boundaries of their respective countries. This redistribution of populations on a nationalistic basis paved the way for a complete readjustment of relations between Turkey and Greece. It removed age-long sources of mutual irritation. Their success is a monument

to two strong statesmen, Venizelos the Greek and Kemal the Turk, who engineered the reconciliation. In 1930, only eight years after the bloody disaster in Smyrna, Mr. Venizelos had the courage to go to Ankara, the capital of Turkey, there to sign with the new Turkish republican government a treaty of amity, conciliation and arbitration. Last September a non-aggression pact was executed between the two countries which mutually guaranteed their common frontiers. During the period beginning with last June a series of commercial pacts have been negotiated between the countries looking to an eventual division of their trade upon economic grounds. The two governments are agreeing in substance to divide exports so as to avoid destructive competition with each other. Industries inclined to develop in one country are being abandoned by the other and each will avoid setting up an industry already under development in the other. The movement as yet is in its early stages and limited in the number of products involved but negotiations have been announced as under way to establish a practically complete plan of cooperation between the two nations not only in respect to their trade with each other but also as to their trade with outside nations. It is a sharp reversal of the rush into economic isolation which has spread over Central and Eastern Europe since the war, and careful observers believe that it

may well be an effective example for a similar movement throughout the other Balkan states.⁶

When we remember the former conditions prevailing in the Balkans and particularly in the old Ottoman Empire; the isolation from all modern progress and ignorance of all economic principles; the corruption and the fatalistic inertia; this new development takes on a significance far beyond the size and wealth of the two countries involved. It indicates the power of the influences for progress which are going on in this part of Europe. When the ferment of modernism has been able to revolutionize Turkey in such a beneficial manner, we may look with hopefulness for the appearance of its results elsewhere.

& On January 9, 1934, an economic conference of the Little Entente states, comprising Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Rumania, took place at Prague. At this conference the subject of increasing the trade between those three states by means of reciprocal commercial concessions was taken up and is now under way to be carried on in further meetings between the same states. Still later, in April 1934, the representatives of Italy, Austria, and Hungary met at Rome for the similar purpose of establishing reciprocal trade relations between those three countries.

CHAPTER V

W E CAN now begin to summarize our conclusions from the historical facts which we have been examining. The rush of events has been so rapid; they have taken place in so many theaters of action, some of them distant and not under our immediate observation, that the general impression in this country has been confused and chaotic. It is for that reason that I have been attempting to analyze them with a view to discovering what was basic, and to segregate the elements which were fundamental and controlling. In this way I have hoped to get a long-distance view which would be more accurate than our immediate impressions. I believe now that encouraging landmarks begin to stand out among the discouraging confusion and that from these landmarks we can get a better forecast of the future. Let us see what they are:

First: This modern reorganization of the European states which took place after the Great War is no accidental consequence of the immediate kaleidoscope of events in Europe. It is no freak result of the war nor of the personal decisions of a few men of the day. It is the logical culmination of a human movement covering at least seven centuries of human effort. It has behind it the momentum of the prayers, the struggles, the sacrifices and the deaths of millions of men stretching over many ages.

Second: It is the product of two forces which for several centuries have accompanied and supported each other. One is the urge for a nationalistic grouping in a single state, of men related by ties of race, language, common culture, and traditions; the other, the desire of these same men for that freedom of choice, life, and action in respect to their government, which we call democracy.

Third: This reorganization in Europe has been similar to and largely inspired by the corresponding development in Great Britain which had begun a little earlier, had been carried on more rapidly and thoroughly owing to more favorable surroundings, and had reached its fruition among the English-speaking countries both in the old and the new world considerably earlier than it did on the European continent. The evolution in Europe was very directly and largely influenced by that development of nationality and of free institutions which, beginning in England when the English barons wrung from King John the rights which they asserted in the Great Charter, and running down through those other landmarks of English constitutional history, the Statute of Treasons, the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus Act, and the Bill of Rights, had leapt across the Atlantic and reannounced itself in the American Declaration of Independence and the American Bill of Rights. This union of nationality and democracy attempted in the new states of Europe in 1919 was to a large extent the direct child of the system which by the middle of the

nineteenth century had securely entrenched itself in the fundamental law of all those self-governing and English-speaking nations which are now embraced in the United States of America and the British Commonwealth of free nations.

We can also now see more clearly the underlying reasons and causes which have produced the present chaos in this new European reorganization. Making all necessary allowances for the imperfections of human nature, the conflict of racial antagonisms and of human ambitions, there seem to be two deep underlying occurrences which have been the impelling causes out of which this chaos has come.

One of these was the great industrial revolution of the nineteenth century; the other, the destructiveness of the Great War, so infinitely magnified by the first. The first was in the nature of a condition. It completely transformed Europe, increasing its population, and making its very existence dependent on the fragile lines of communication stretching between the states of Europe and between that continent and the outside world. The impact upon this condition of the destruction caused by the war not only produced results which were more disturbing and more lasting than in any catastrophe with which mankind had yet been acquainted, but it presented a post-war problem of reconstruction so infinitely more complicated that even the wisest and most experienced of men stood like ignorant children

in the face of it. This was the problem, this was the task, which since 1919 has confronted the new national states of Europe at the very moment when they had reached the goal of their past struggles and the starting-point of their new life on the road which under so much easier conditions we had travelled before them.

The general tendency of this is to lead to hopeful presumptions. It disposes of many narrow prejudices which we have frequently heard voiced in this country. Europe is not falling to pieces today, like a house built of cards, merely from the unstable character of the material of which it is built. Mankind in Europe is not engaged upon a game of destruction just because he is incapable of anything higher; too self-destructive ever to hope to be the creator of a permanent and well ordered civilization. The European mind is not a perverse instrumentality incapable of rising to those goals of individual freedom and restrained self-government which we believe to be within the grasp of the men of our own nationality.

The people of Europe have been struggling to apply to their own governments the general underlying rights of freedom upon which we of the English-speaking nations rely and which we trust; but they have been doing this under infinitely more difficult conditions than we have ever faced either in the protected British Isles or upon the favored soil of a new continent. And the very fact that they are trying to apply rights which for

seven centuries have been shaping themselves gradually and slowly both in our own more protected environment and in their infinitely more disturbed continent, should be an assurance to us of the general correctness and the permanent character of the principles upon which those rights are founded. It should reassure us also in the confident hope that ultimately their effort to apply those principles will be successful. Of course there may and probably will be differences in the method and extent in which these principles of freedom in respect to government will be applied by them and by us—just as there have been differences in our two systems of domestic law during the past centuries. But at least it should show us that the evils and chaos through which they are now fighting their way are the transient obstacles thrown across their path by conditions of unparalleled difficulty and novelty. It should confirm us both in our faith in our own political principles and also in our confidence in the ultimate success of these our comrades on the same journey. It should show us that there is no reason in what we see in the conditions of Europe today to change our faith in the principles of action and growth and progress on the road on which we have been so long proceeding. It should not only reassure us as to what will ultimately happen to Europe but it should also clarify our minds and restore our faith in our own struggles today with some of the post-war consequences

and problems which lie about us on this side of the Atlantic.

This survey of history I think should help to answer some of the questions we hear anxiously asked today: Is not democracy played out? Is it not steadily showing itself more incompetent to deal with the problems of today? What is the relation of nationalism to democracy? Will not nationalism ultimately destroy democracy and replace it with arbitrary government?

The real issue as I see it is not an issue of nationalism against democracy. It is an issue of nationalism *and* democracy against the problems imposed by the industrial revolution and the possibility of war.

There are of course additional difficulties thrown upon democracy by nationalism. As I have already pointed out, the growth of the spirit of nationalism contains the dangers of excesses which may make the conduct of a democratic government more difficult, particularly in its relation to the outside world. But the long history of the association of nationalism with democracy which has antedated both the Great War and the industrial revolution has not indicated any real reason to believe that the former would destroy the latter—that nationalism would destroy democracy. On the contrary, this history shows that democracy grew up and forced itself upon an earlier nationalism as a growth which was at least as strong and potent as its predecessor. In the early ages nationalism was for a long time asso-

ciated with autocratic monarchy until later the insistent desire of mankind to rule its own destinies and secure individual rights took possession of the old partnership and ousted the former partner, autocracy.

So as I see these problems, they can be better stated: First, can a nationalized democracy solve the new and weighty problems which have been imposed upon government by the industrial revolution; and second, can a nationalized democracy working in harmony with other democracies of the same kind curb their quarrels so that the combined civilizations which they have formed may be saved from suicide by war?

I believe there is no reason for thoughtful Americans to be pessimistic about the ultimate successful solution of either of these problems.

I believe that our modern nationalized democracies can and will solve the problems imposed by the new order of the industrial revolution without a surrender of any of the essentials of freedom. Anyone must recognize that the age of steam and electricity has imposed immense new burdens upon government. That is elementary. The dependence of mass populations upon distant sources for its food and other supplies; the great accumulations of capital with the inherent dangers and evils of monopoly; the difficulties of specialized labor to protect itself in bargaining with capital; all of these features and many others in

the new world produced by these new powers have brought problems requiring more efficient methods of government and much greater use of government.

But this is very different from saying that these new conditions require that the individual should give up his essential rights. The essence of our system of democracy for which we have been fighting during these long centuries, has been the freedom of the individual as against the tyranny of government and equality of rights among individuals. The essential test of man's security in that freedom and in that equality lies ultimately in the underlying conception of his relation to his government. Does that government exist for him as was announced in our Declaration of Independence? Does it exist in order to secure individual rights which are superior to government? Can the individual man standing on his own right make secure his freedom by means of free speech, free discussion, a free press, and in the last resort by the invocation of the aid of an independent judiciary? Or, on the other hand, do all his rights come from his government and does his security depend solely upon the privileges which that government sees fit to grant to him? These are the two essential conceptions of individual rights which have been fighting in this world during the past thousand years. They met on the battle front in the recent war and the issue was decided in favor of our system. We shall

not reverse that decision. Certainly no English-speaking nation will.

We shall devise modification of our machinery so as to make our division of the rich rewards of modern industrial civilization more fair and equal, but we shall do this not by the abandonment of the underlying rights and equality of any individual but rather by a fulfilment of them. Those rights and the charters which represent them will continue to be as they always have been, the touchstone by which we judge the success of our various instrumentalities of government.

I also believe that we have controlling reason to anticipate that eventually the disturbed European nations will follow in general a similar course. Democracy is necessarily having a much harder struggle there than here. Their populations are not so well grounded in the practice of its elementary steps. To them it is a much more recent acquisition. Many of them have been until very lately habituated to centuries of submission to autocratic rule. As we all know, self-government is the most difficult of all the political arts. The price of liberty is not only eternal vigilance but organized self-control. The people of these disturbed states of Europe have not been habituated by long training to recognize at once those first steps of encroachment on individual liberty which must be sternly checked and repressed. They have not yet had time to become as skilful as our forefathers were in recognizing the water-

shed between freedom and despotism, **nor** as quick and stubborn in resenting the first false step across that line.

Then too the need for efficiency in government during the past fifteen years has been more immediate and peremptory in the disturbed states of Europe than on this side of the Atlantic. Democratic government in such states has appeared as inefficient and not yet able to cope with the new economic problems suddenly thrust upon it. The post-war economic problems have been much more critical and compelling in Europe than over here. There has therefore been a much greater temptation in those states to abandon temporarily at least the slower moving and less effective methods of parliamentary democracy and to substitute for them the quicker and more efficient methods of an arbitrary dictatorship. I think that most of the cases where parliamentarianism has lapsed into autocracy since the war have represented efforts to solve a transient combination of economic problems which seemed too difficult for the present methods of democracy. The situation seemed to be getting out of hand. The discussions necessary to hear all sides seemed too slow and ineffective, and autocracy was resorted to. But just as we shall solve these economic problems in our less difficult surroundings, so we have every reason to hope that eventually these other nations will solve them under their more difficult conditions. Autocracy cannot survive without a suppression of free

speech. You will notice that in every case in Europe where an autocrat or a dictator has been substituted for the previous republican government, a censorship has immediately followed. In this stage of the world that cannot permanently last. Mankind has had already too long acquaintance with the right of free speech, and the modern instruments of free communication are too effective for him permanently to remain helpless in this respect. Government propaganda is a new development which has complicated the situation but its results also are necessarily transient and in any population capable of meeting the other conditions and requirements of modern life, free speech cannot permanently be denied.

I think therefore we are safe in forecasting that the tide which has been running so steadily in Europe towards individual freedom and the popular forms of government will not permanently be checked by these economic post-war difficulties which it has met. When the miseries consequent upon the war pass and as means are found of restoring trade and bettering employment conditions, autocratic government will probably gradually shrivel of its own volition. Otherwise it will be forcibly overthrown in the future just as it has always been overthrown in the past.

Of course this includes a belief that the nationalistic democracies will find a method of overcoming the tariff barriers which have grown up

between them and of developing their foreign trade with each other. This is a problem not only in Europe but to a lesser degree in America. In Europe it involves the very existence of their surplus population. Here it involves the continuance in their present occupation of large numbers of our farmers as well as the revival to full measure of our former prosperity. Tariff making has been one of the weakest spots of democratic government, particularly of our own congressional government. But there is no just ground for thinking that the evils and weaknesses of this particular function of congressional government cannot be remedied without surrendering our age-long rights as freemen. The present art of log-rolling for tariff favors is hardly to be classed as one of the bulwarks of our constitutional liberties. I believe the problem will be solved both here and in Europe without any such catastrophe, and possibly the present movement which is taking place in the far off Balkans may afford a very interesting laboratory experiment as to the method of its solution.

Taking up now my second main question, I believe that we may also anticipate that the nation-states of Europe will meet with a constantly increasing measure of success in their efforts to curb war.

I of course do not say that war may not come. No one can honestly say that. War may come in so many ways, some of them accidental and un-

expected, that no one can forecast its entire prevention. But we can say this: First, like the problem of recovery it is one where it has been so clearly demonstrated that self-preservation demands a solution, that such a solution probably will be found. The industrial revolution has made the control of war imperative in Europe. All of the many and bright comforts brought within the reach of man by that revolution depend upon such control. And in the recent Great War this lesson has been brought home to every member of the population in the most personal and compulsory manner.

In the second place, Europe's realization of the importance of war prevention has been shown by the development of the League of Nations. This machinery represents a long step in advance of any previous method of war regulation or prevention. It is still in its infancy but it is being developed upon correct principles. It is proceeding in the right direction and we have every reason to hope that it will ripen into an ever increasing measure of efficiency.

In the third place, dynastic wars in Europe are no longer possible. Modern wars are national. They are supported by and suffered by the general population to a more general extent than before the fruition of nationalism and democracy. That is one of the reasons for hoping that their causes will be under better control in the future. It is another reason militating against a perma-

ment return to autocracy. Autocracy has never been a successful preventive of war.

In these pages we are trying to get what is the long-distance view. We are trying to forecast ultimate trends and goals, always recognizing that there are certain to be disappointments and disastrous setbacks before those goals are reached. This is certainly true of the efforts to control war. We shall meet serious setbacks. We shall be many times disappointed. But I am confident that in the end the trend will be successful and the goal will be reached.

It has been rather the fashion in some circles in this country, mainly journalistic, to discredit the League of Nations, to belittle its accomplishments and to treat its efforts with cynicism. This is in part the unfortunate result of the political controversy fifteen years ago as to whether we should join it.

But such an attitude is in the highest degree shortsighted. The League of Nations represents the deliberate and mature effort of the statesmen of Europe to save their continent and incidentally the rest of the world, from the perils of a modern war. If it can be brought home to our intelligence in no other way that we are vitally concerned in the success of such an effort, our experience in the great depression which we are suffering today should have done this. Although the last war resulted in a victory in which our part was comparatively easy; although it involved

comparatively little direct suffering for us; although its result was to vindicate and to establish throughout the earth principles of freedom upon which our whole life and government is founded, yet the worldwide dislocations which that war produced in economic civilization have been so disastrous to our wealth and comfort and the livelihood of many of our fellows, that we regard the last four years as one of the great crises of American history. Do we need any further lesson of the far-reaching indirect effects of war? Do we need any clearer evidence that our welfare even in far off America is so closely interwoven with the welfare of Europe that they cannot suffer without bringing suffering upon us? By the inventions of the past century their civilization is entwined with ours as never before and that connection is certain to develop in increasing measure. By origin and race, by similarity of industrial development and by trend towards the free institutions of government, they are our closest kin in a world composed of far greater numbers of races different from ours. The influence of the white race upon that vast aggregation in the rest of the world has been great, but its leadership and moral prestige suffered greatly during the last war, and it will suffer worse in the future if we fail to control our future wars. In all of those senses the problem which the people of Europe are working out today is one of our problems. Lack of sympathy and cynicism of attitude towards their efforts is inexcusable. The United

States is in its ultimate resources the world's most powerful nation today. It is the nation most safely protected from outside aggression by its geographical position. Its people have taken historic pride in their championship of peace and justice. We are the people, therefore, who can most easily and safely give sympathy, encouragement and help to the world in its vital struggle to protect our common civilization against war. On the other hand, should we refuse to assume even that measure of responsibility, should we insist upon our government retiring into isolation and turning its back upon all efforts for peace in other portions of the world, we must face the fact that the peace machinery will be infinitely weakened and that mankind will be periodically faced with wars which may be as disastrous to us and to our own civilization as to that of the rest of the world.

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