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War, Sadism and Pacifism

by Edward Glover

THE DANGERS OF BEING HUMAN

THE TECHNIQUE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

AN INVESTIGATION OF THE TECHNIQUE OF
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS
with MARJORIE BRIERLEY

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FEAR AND COURAGE

THE DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT
OF DELINQUENCY

DAVID EDER :
MEMOIRS OF A MODERN PIONEER
(with J. B. HOBMAN and others)

War, Sadism and Pacifism

*Further Essays on
Group Psychology and War*

by

Edward Glover
M.D.

LONDON

George Allen and Unwin Ltd

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P R E F A C E

THE first of these essays was originally delivered as a lecture to the Federation of League of Nation's Societies in Geneva in 1931. Together with the essays on Masochism, War Prevention and War Research it was published in 1933 under the title *War, Sadism and Pacifism*. By the time the second impression of this book was exhausted, Britain was already engaged in the Second World War, and it seemed desirable to review the original argument in the light of this latter event. As, however, the principles on which the argument was based had not altered, I decided to reproduce the original essays as Part I of an extended series. The ten additional chapters are concerned for the most part with clinical and sociological researches on the causes of war and on methods of war-prevention.

Although in the interval between 1933 and 1938 there was, as we can now see clearly in retrospect, ample occasion for the social psychologist to study the proximate causes of war, it was not until the Munich Crisis that opportunity arose for direct psycho-pathological investigation of pre-war reactions in this country. Unfortunately there was little time to organize elaborate researches, but with the co-operation of a number of psycho-analytical colleagues and using the Questionnaire method I was able to collect some interesting observations. These when examined proved to have an important bearing on the problem of war. The Chapter entitled "Preamble to War" is based on a more technical paper published in the *International Journal of Psycho-analysis* under the title "Notes on the Psychological Effects of War Conditions on the Civilian Population."¹

But although the amount of pre-war psychological investigation was absurdly small, it is only fair to add that once the war

broke out a good deal of attention, at first rather alarmist in nature, was paid by psychologists to the possibility of outbreaks of war-neuroses. During the first six months of the 'phoney war,' a certain number of general and clinical observations were made on mental casualties occurring in the Navy and Merchant Service, on the mental disorders of Army recruits and on the reactions of civilians to war-time conditions. In 1940, at a Conference of the British Psychological Society at Birmingham, a symposium was held "On the So-called 'War-Neuroses'." The essay entitled "The Return of War-Neuroses" (Chapter VI) was originally contributed to this symposium. Although rather technical in approach (I have tried to soften some of the uncouthness of technical presentation) I have decided to publish it in this series. In my view the understanding of war-neuroses is essential to the understanding of war. An allusion to the absence of serious war-strain will be understood by reference to the date of the Conference. At that time the Blitz had not yet begun.

Needless to say we shall have to wait for some years before we can be certain of extracting reliable information from the mass of war-statistics now being compiled in different fields of psychological work. In any case I am not too optimistic as to the results of these further researches. War-time psychological work is of necessity superficial; hence even elaborate post-war investigations of war-time material cannot be particularly reliable. It requires the most rigorous self-restraint not to read *post hoc* theories into *ad hoc* investigations. Indeed we may have to wait for yet another cycle of war to come round before we embark on really fruitful and compendious schemes of research. Until these are set on foot we must make shift with more speculative conclusions.

EDWARD GLOVER.

Xmas, 1945.

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. . . You are interested, I know, in the prevention of War, not in our theories. . . . Yet I would like to dwell a little longer on this Destructive Instinct which is seldom given the attention that its importance warrants. With the least of speculative efforts we are led to conclude that this Instinct functions in every living being, striving to work its ruin and reduce life to its primal state of inert matter. Indeed, it might well be called the "death-instinct"; whereas the Erotic¹ Instincts vouch for the struggle to live on. The death-instinct becomes an impulse to destruction when, with the aid of certain organs, it directs its action outwards, against external objects. The living being, that is to say, defends its own existence by destroying foreign bodies. But in one of its activities, the death-instinct is operative *within* the living being and we have sought to trace back a number of normal and pathological phenomena to this *introversion* of the destructive instinct. . . . Obviously when this internal tendency operates on too large a scale, it is no trivial matter, rather a positively morbid state of things; whereas the diversion of the destructive impulse towards the external world must have beneficial effects. Here is then the biological justification for all those vile, pernicious propensities which we now are combating. We can but own that they are really more akin to nature than this our stand against them, which, in fact, remains to be accounted for.

SIGMUND FREUD.

¹ In the meaning Plato gives to *Eros* in his *Symposium*.

"WHY WAR?" Albert Einstein—Sigmund Freud.
International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation,
League of Nations: 1933. Pp. 44-46. (London:

• George Allen & Unwin Ltd.)

CHAPTER I

War, Sadism and Pacifism

WHEN a medical psychologist is found wandering in the territories of peace organization, he may fairly be asked why he has crossed the frontier of his own science and whether he can justify his claim to be given a somewhat lengthy hearing. The psychologist for his part is prepared to meet this demand for credentials. He has in fact two sound reasons to advance in proof of *bona fides*. In the first place, peace propaganda is part of the applied science of sociology and although the psychologist is more accustomed to talk in terms of 'group psychology,' he may reasonably claim that the phenomena of war and the reaction-phenomena of peace come within his province. The second reason is one of legitimate curiosity, an affair one might almost say of medical diagnosis. In the speeches of various exalted personages the activities of the League of Nations are referred to as a crusade, and an ex-Prime Minister of Great Britain has said that this crusade must be founded on faith. Now it would appear that the immediate aim of peace propaganda, the abolition of war, is one that would be accepted by the average thoughtful person without question : yet not only is it necessary for a band of enthusiasts to maintain the most assiduous peace propaganda, but there can be little doubt that the success of their efforts hangs at times in the balance. As the memory of the last great 'war to end war' dims, the incentive of common people to prevent the next outbreak loses energy, continuity and direction.

The natural comment would appear to be that the war

impulses of the race are responsible for this state of affairs, but to be content with this view is to betray the traditions of scientific method. When an organ is found partly diseased, the physician's task is not merely to diagnose the disease but to discover why the healthy parts of the organ have not succeeded in counterbalancing the disturbance by a hypertrophy of function. Following this plan, we must inquire why the natural post-war incentive to pacifism loses its driving force so quickly and whether there is not some fundamental flaw or intrinsic weakness in the strategy of the peace crusade.

Before embarking on a systematic review of these problems let me offer you, after the manner of patent medicine vendors, a sample conclusion together with a sample illustration of the psychologist's approach to the subject. A typical conclusion is the following : *a large part of the energy that drives a peace organization has precisely the same source as the energy that lets loose war*. In more technical language, the impulses of aggression towards external persons, if turned in on the self (i.e., short circuited) end by checking the aggression they set out to promote. Now let me add a rider to this proposition. *Owing to the fundamental identity between some of the impulses promoting peace and the impulses giving rise to war, pacifist measures tend to be uncertain in action*. Under conditions of stress, they may even expose their aggressive origin. And now a therapeutic recommendation : *the tendency to instability in peace activities can be overcome most successfully and rapidly by directing attention to the identity of impulses concerned in war and peace*.

As to methods of observation, some are highly technical, others of the most elementary nature. For example, in collecting the psychic reactions of soldiers to war experience, it has been noted that as opposed to situations arousing horror or repugnance, there are many occasions when, given the safety of the observer, a degree of fascination can be detected. Many soldiers have recorded the curious satisfaction evoked by observing a direct hit on some isolated house, when the whole building disappears

in a cloud of dust and smoke. But any objective observer of the nursery activities of children can cap this observation with another. When a child has laboriously and joyfully built a house of bricks, he will frequently scatter it with one sweep of his fist. And the psychologist comparing these observations will suggest that there is a psychic identity between them. He may even be so pessimistic as to say that for peace propaganda to be successful, it must begin like charity at home, *i.e.*, in the nursery. Whether accurate or not, this view is not by any means original. The Battle of Waterloo, it was alleged, was won on the playing-fields of Eton. Psychology is only following this lead by suggesting that it was planned in a Corsican nursery.

.

The first systematic step in investigating the relations of war and peace is to make a list of the instincts or impulses concerned. Here we encounter two difficulties, first, that there are differences of opinion regarding the classification of human impulses, and second, that the collection of available material has so far been carried out in a very perfunctory way. Now whatever classification you adopt, whether you accept the common tripartite grouping, *viz.*, sexual, self-preservatory and group instincts, or prefer the more elaborate groupings of descriptive psychology in which a dozen or more instincts may be specified, there is one practical test by means of which all classifications can be valued. It is a sound principle that any impulse, disturbance of which causes mental conflict or disorder, is of extreme significance to the individual. And investigations carried out by psychoanalysts on neuroses and several forms of insanity have shown that behind these illnesses are to be discovered serious disorders of the sexual impulse (taken in the broadest sense) and serious disturbances of the mechanisms controlling aggressive or destructive impulses. These facts correspond with a classification of instincts into two main groups, *viz.*, appetitive and reactive. Broadly speaking, the human mind begins to crack

when it is unable in some way or another to master its destructive impulses, its sexual impulses or any important fusion of destructive and sexual impulses.

Adopting this classification, the first step in investigation is comparatively simple : it is obvious that war impulses can be identified with the impulses of destruction. This is, however, a very inadequate view. Study of the history of war necessitates a more comprehensive grouping : according to this the impulses concerned in war are those of destruction (of animate and inanimate objects), acquisitiveness (mostly but not exclusively directed towards inanimate objects) and sexual aggression (chiefly directed towards animate objects), Murder, Rapine or Pillage, Lust. This too is inadequate. Together with the loosening of primitive impulse goes a heightening of certain counter-reactions, usually extolled as amongst the noble virtues—devotion to ideals, courageous self-sacrifice and comradeship, strenuous feats of intellectual and physical prowess and endurance. And so on. This is better but it is still utterly inadequate. *The fact is that no serious attempt has been made to catalogue and classify the instinctual phenomena of war.* Gifted amateurs have attempted the task but as a rule they start their war novels or autobiography with strong subjective bias, never with completely objective psychological criteria. And here one feels tempted to anticipate a later discussion of practical measures by putting a test question : How many millions are spent by the League of Nations or at the instigation of the League on psychological research into the nature of war impulses ? How many psychological institutions are working day and night in different countries to fathom the riddles of human conflict either individual or social ? ¹

¹ Since writing this I have been sufficiently interested to make some tentative inquiries on the point. With the assistance of Lothian Small (International Federation of League of Nations Societies) I have ascertained the following curious facts. Not a penny is spent by the League on immediate investigation of war phenomena. And although some international foundations finance general sociological investiga-

In the absence of broader statistical investigations one is thrown back on more sparse records, *i.e.*, individual examination of combatants, finally on discoveries as to the nature of instinct in infants and primitive savages. Even the most superficial examination of the experience of soldiers shows that in addition to the loosening of destructive impulse in general, *a certain amount of impulse life of a bizarre nature tends to break through under war conditions.* How is one to explain, for example, the impulse of a certain private—in peace-time a conventional solicitor—who seized every safe opportunity of slipping over the top in order to draw the teeth of dead enemies lying in No Man's Land? An unusual case admittedly, but evidence that there existed in that person independent drives tending towards violence and mutilation and trophy hunting. There is in fact a psychic identity between his atavistic impulses and the ceremonial war activities of head-hunters in Borneo, to say nothing of the one time scalping rituals of American Indians. Pursue this matter of psychic identity and you will arrive at the conclusion that the souvenir collection of *Pickelhauben* has its roots in the same impulses: that when old maids on holiday tear up roots of violets to plant in their front gardens as mementos, there is here too an echo of Saturnalian impulse. However that may be, classification of the available data shows that under war conditions, in addition to the usual laudable impulses permanently sanctioned by society and in addition to the temporarily sanctioned impulses of killing and destruction, one meets with numerous impulses unsanctioned even by the War Office. A first group includes actions or impulses in which the destruction of the enemy as such is less important to the individual soldier than some particularly recondite aim or bizarre variety of

tions, not one country in the world spends a sou on investigating the psychological phenomena and motivation of war. On the other hand, hundreds of thousands of pounds are available for research on cancer, leprosy, measles, foot-and-mouth disease, wheat rust, the boll weevil, the death-watch beetle, and sundry vegetable saprophytes. A curious example of the uneven functioning of self-preservative impulse!

destruction (*e.g.*, mutilation) : a second includes those destructive activities in which a manifest element of sexual gratification enters (*e.g.*, sexual mutilation) : and the third comprises impulses manifestly sexual in nature but of an unusual character (*e.g.*, the so-called sexual perversions). These groupings become all the more significant when we realize that a large part of the child's early energies are devoted to mastering almost identical impulses.

Now there is a point of major importance concerning the development of primitive destructive impulse. It can be shown that whereas on some occasions the impulses of aggression, destruction and mastery can subserve the purposes of self-preservation (as in suckling) and whereas on others they can heighten or advance love interests (as in passionate caressing), in all individuals a stage of development occurs in which the infliction of some sort of pain becomes an aim in itself. *In this respect man is almost unique amongst the animals.* A good deal of confirmation of this fact can be obtained by the study of the sadistic perversions of adults where sexual gratification depends mainly on the infliction of pain on the love object. The 'Ripper' crimes of which so much has been heard recently represent an exaggerated form of this activity. In short, *war provides perhaps the most dramatic piece of evidence that destructive impulses can be completely divorced from biological aims and pursue individual ends.*

It is high time to link up this train of thought with more practical considerations. The problem of war and peace is not a self-contained problem. The pacifist is not concerned merely with the avoidance of situations of war : he has to deal not only with a group of manifest destructive impulses, but with a complex of 'mixed' impulses of an archaic sort. The majority of these archaic impulses are no longer manifest in adult life, *i.e.*, they are in the technical sense *unconscious*. And these unconscious impulses exist in a perpetually active state in the mind of *every* individual. For convenience in future reference, we will call the most important mixtures of impulse, *viz.* :

fusion of destructive and love impulses, by the name of sadism when they are directed towards external objects and masochism when they are directed towards the self.¹ A certain amount of sadism may be recognized in consciousness as an element of both sexual and social life, but the most intense sadistic interests remain under ordinary circumstances unconscious. Hence we cannot classify the phenomena of war until we have taken an exact measure of the *unconscious* forces of sadism and of the equally *unconscious* methods of mastering, inhibiting, sidetracking, concealing or remaining unaware of these forces.²

¹ As we shall see when examining the nature of Masochism (p. 38), the terms sadism and masochism have acquired a broader meaning in the course of time. They no longer apply solely to the linking of destructive impulse with *manifest* erotic impulse. Some writers indeed have developed the rather slipshod habit of using the term sadism when they mean simply impulses of aggression, mastery and destruction. There is no doubt some justification for this usage because it is rare to find aggressive impulses unmixed with some form of love impulse. But theoretically at any rate it is important to regard the aggressive impulses as having independent origin and to confine the term sadism to those aggressive impulses which are linked *either consciously or unconsciously* with some love component. By so doing the term will be found applicable to the great majority of situations where gratification is obtained from acts of physical or psychical injury, humiliation, etc.

² A recent experience has convinced me that one cannot emphasize too frequently or emphatically the fact that these sadistic impulses are for the greatest part *unconscious*. When I submitted these essays for criticism to a prominent English pacifist, he pointed out that the people most responsible for bringing Great Britain into the war showed no sign of sadistic or pugnacious impulse during the crisis. Did not Asquith sit with tears running down his cheeks when he decided that war was inevitable? Was not Grey unable to sleep for about three weeks, going over every step he had taken, considering what mistakes he had made or what he could possibly have done to avoid the disaster? Was it not possible that Bethmann-Hollweg felt much the same?

Precisely! But even if, for the sake of argument, we agree to the very questionable proposition, viz.: that Asquith or Grey were responsible agents rather than puppets manipulated by forces infinitely stronger than themselves, we cannot allow the evidence of sleepless nights or of tears coursing down ageing cheeks to prejudice the observer in favour of conscious motivations. If Asquith, Grey and Bethmann-Hollweg are to be held responsible in this sense we are bound all the more to inquire into their unconscious states of mind before, during and after the crisis, in other words into their general psychic dispositions as well as their conscious attitudes. Unless the reader is prepared to consider the existence of dynamic unconscious forces, the whole argument of these essays must appear so much moonshine.

To turn for a moment to peace propaganda. If the conventional solicitor whom I described as a trophy hunter were a Branch Secretary of a Peace Organization, would you feel quite easy in your minds as to the reliability or efficiency of his propaganda? Would you like to think of such an individual in a more responsible position as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, for example, or Ambassador in a foreign capital? Remember that in all probability but for the stimulus of war his sadistic tendencies would have remained unconscious. Indeed, if he is still alive it is quite possible that he has forgotten the whole series of episodes and is now a zealous protagonist of peace. Even so, would you depend on him in a sudden international crisis with the balance swaying between war and peace?

.

Here we approach the second line of investigation. If you ask why it is that any individual can be unaware of the existence of powerful impulses, the answer is surely that this must be due to an even more powerful controlling mechanism. Repression, to use the technical term, is the greatest and in a limited sense the most secure of all the mechanisms that inhibit instinct. The result of successful repression is that we have not the slightest *idea* of the existence of an impulse and no physical discomfort or mental tension (*i.e. affect*), owing to frustration of the unknown impulse. The description of this mechanism is a highly technical matter into which I cannot hope to enter here, except to say that it involves withdrawal of psychic energy from a subterranean overcharged psychic circuit together with reinforcement of energy in any circuit of ideas which insulates the danger zone. I will only add that although essentially a system of flight, repression has justified itself biologically as much as, if not more than, any other form of flight from danger. By its help primitive impulse has been sufficiently weakened to permit of the residue being dealt with by what we called civilized reactions. Repression is a gigantic self-deception of which the

self is unaware. Biologically speaking, as James Glover once said, it is the father of lies. But like all mechanisms it is justified only by success. *The dangers of repression are the dangers of unsuccessful repression.* Should the idea representing the impulse threaten to break through into consciousness any disaster may follow: the mind, shying from the scent of danger like a frightened horse, may stampede or kick the shafts to pieces. Even if the idea is safely locked away, should the tension of an unknown but frustrated impulse be experienced, any disaster may follow, e.g. a vicarious object may be made to function as a lightning conductor. But if the repressed idea can be made conscious and if at the same time the emotional tension can be traced to its source, the individual and society are safe. For the moment at any rate a breathing-space has been gained and in that breathing-space the processes of conscious reflection and judgment have time to operate.

The phenomena of 'war-mongering' provide an apt illustration of the dangers and uncertainties of faulty repression. In its most official form war-mongering is simply the aggressive aspect of international diplomacy but, of course, it is concealed to a large extent by the manifestly pacific nature of much diplomatic activity. The man in the street has not the same reason to cover his bellicose imaginings. And in the ordinary way preoccupation with international rights and wrongs is a useful substitute activity, a vicarious discharge of emotional tension, the original source of which is infantile sadism. *During actual crises, however, this vicarious discharge may bias the person towards war or peace.* You will observe that we cannot immediately predict in what direction the balance will swing. Knowledge of many other factors is necessary for any such prognostication. The fact remains, however, that the bias is dictated by individual unconscious needs and not by rational considerations of social necessity.

But the danger of unsuccessful repression is not simply that

primitive sadism is liable to be loosened in inappropriate directions. *Faulty repression can itself engender irrational hate.* Experimental proof of this fact can be obtained from the analysis of neurotic individuals. Analyse a neurotic symptom and you discover that huge quantities of anxiety and guilt must be discharged before the symptom disappears. Soon you begin to realize that the symptom represents a spontaneous attempt to master anxiety. In most cases, of course, an unsuccessful attempt. Many neurotic symptoms are in fact called 'anxiety states.' Others again are called 'phobias,' implying that excessive fear has been displaced from an unknown to a known idea or situation (fears of domestic animals, of knives, of being buried alive, of closed spaces, of thunder, and so forth). In both cases repression has been faulty, an affect due to unconscious impulses has penetrated to consciousness, the original idea alone remaining repressed. The most significant observation is, however, that prior to the discharge of anxiety of unknown origin, an otherwise amiable patient not only develops attitudes of intense hostility and dislike, but *hastens to direct this hostility at the nearest available object.* In most cases it is directed at the analyst, who, whatever his failings, has done nothing to justify this sudden change in personal feeling. Anxiety breeds hate ; hate arouses anxiety ; both together portend destruction.

Corroborative material is not difficult to collect. Beginning with comparative psychology ; it is well known that quite timid animals when driven into a corner will attack in the face of hopeless odds. And now an observation from child psychology ; when a child is anxious, it is liable to break into tantrums. A frightened child is an anxious child. A naughty child is a terrified and guilty child. An aggressive and destructive child is panic-stricken with guilt and anxiety. Here we have an illuminating side-light on the problem of hostility. *Not only is hate an indication of aggressive tendencies, it can be used as a protection against inner anxiety.* The child is driven into a corner by an implacable enemy, namely, the intolerable tension of its own

primitive urges. These not only cannot be gratified, but feed on frustration; frustration induces anxiety; anxiety is the enemy of peace of mind; hence when breaking-point is reached, the child behaves like a timid animal and bites.

One is tempted to pause here and draw facile parallels from the affairs of nations: to say, for example, that a bellicose nation is an anxious nation, or that the duty of ambassadors stationed in a war-mongering country is to discover and allay all sources of group anxiety in that country. But until the relations of individual to group psychology have been discussed, the temptation must be put aside. To return to our child who is hunted into a corner by the implacability of his own impulses, it has been said that he will turn and bite. But when he turns there is no enemy to be seen. *The instinctual enemy is internal and unknown.* What then happens is dictated by the logic of events. Experience has taught him that the external world bears hardly on children, that it frustrates, interferes, punishes and generally causes psychic and physical pain. In short, the external world behaves like an enemy. Biased by this experience the child comes out of his corner and goes hunting. The nearest external object, animate or inanimate, is his quarry: as soon as he sights one, preferably an animate object, he charges like a wounded buffalo. The roars of these panic-stricken creatures are to be heard in the nursery walks of every public park in Europe, and at this moment in Geneva there are doubtless many nurses or parents rubbing their shins or picking up the fragments of broken toys after the heat of battle. Now here we see the climax to what is called a *projection*. Projection implies a psychic displacement; *an attempt to convert an inner (psychic) stimulus into an outer (reality) stimulus, an inner enemy into an outer enemy.* It is one of the oldest of mental mechanisms, it serves a useful purpose in emergencies, but its retention as an adult mechanism is one of the greatest dangers to existing civilization. *And it operates with especial vigour in most group relations.* When an idea infringes some socially accepted code, it is usually directed

outwards in the form of a disparagement. For the conventional Briton, Paris is a 'gay' city, not London; and of course he is not himself 'gay.' During war-time this process is even more patent. It is always the enemy who is accused of shelling Red Cross Units or raping in subjugated territories, or castrating and crucifying wounded, or boiling up his own dead for candle grease.

At this point anthropological speculations help to broaden our outlook. Somewhere half-way between nursery wars and the wars of nations come the tribal wars of primitive races. Study of these phenomena goes far to suggest that in the course of human development the element of projection plays a decisive part in the waging of war. To begin with we know from the animistic systems of the savage, that he has peopled the external world with evil spirits, *a projection of the primitive impulses he has such difficulty in mastering*: and he believes himself to be in constant danger of attack from these dangerous and malevolent beings. The little child, of course, does practically the same. We know too that head-hunting activities are essentially ceremonial systems closely connected with the same animistic view of the universe. So it is a short step to suggest that tribal war in general is not merely an economic or self-preservatory necessity. It serves to divert outward impulses which, left unsatisfied, are potentially sources of familial or tribal disintegration. *We can vaguely apprehend in this externalization of conflict a phase of biological adaptation.* A pessimistic view you will say, but not really so. After all, even if the Chinaman did burn down his house to get roast pig, accumulation of experience and reflection led to more appropriate methods of culinary adaptation.¹

¹ Volumes could be written on this one aspect of war-problems. Apart from the primitive forms of projection I have described, the mechanism can be traced through various stages of development. For example, in the case of the male child, a final form is concerned almost exclusively with the projection of hostility due to excessive rivalry with other family males (father, brother, etc.). During this period also the

It has been said that projection is an archaic type of mental mechanism, that in adult affairs it may be a dangerous mechanism, but that is not all. *Like most emergency mechanisms it is not well adapted to deal with constant pressure of instinct.* A hungry man may begin by assuring his table companions that it is they who are hungry, but if the meal is unduly delayed he is bound to admit in the long run that he is himself hungry. What is more, if he tries to stave off pangs of hunger by eating the table-cloth, he will soon perceive some essential lack of gratification. It is true that other impulses (e.g., some forms of love impulse) can be frustrated for a longer period, but in the long run some deception or artificial aid is necessary for their control. Repression as we have seen is an improvement on projection but it too has a serious drawback: it is not invariably successful. When these and other primitive mechanisms fail we are faced with an instinctual crisis.

.

Here we make a discovery of fundamental importance; a discovery that sheds light not only on problems of war and peace, but on the whole process of civilization. *In the face of this instinctual impasse the psychic apparatus grows a new organ.* It accomplishes a masterpiece of adaptation. And it accomplishes this adaptation with the most admirable economy. It uses up the energies which, if left to accumulate, throw a strain on all mental and physical function.

boy attempts to deal with his hostility by forging love-bonds with the same family males or their nearest substitutes. Hence in adult society the stability of male groups depends mainly on two factors, (a) sublimated homosexuality (friendship, social ties, etc.) and (b) the capacity to project hostility on less important males. This mixture is essentially unstable or incompatible. The outbreak of war, affording as it does a (socially justifiable) outlet for hostility towards males (the enemy, invaders, etc.), reinforces very strongly the friendly bonds between males in any one country. Nothing unites men so closely as a 'good' war. Pacifists who regard Nationalism as the main cause of war should not overlook these vital sexual factors in nationalist feeling.

The story is briefly as follows : The newborn child sets out on its endless journey through infancy equipped with primitive love capacities and primitive reactive tendencies (which we may loosely call primitive hates). *Both primitive loves and primitive hates are of their nature destined to perpetual frustration.* After all the infant can neither swallow its mother whole in an access of love, nor tear her to shreds in an access of hate. It is only on battlefields that people can be blown to bits deliberately and with the manifest approval of some of the onlookers. The great majority of the infant's primitive impulses are incapable of satisfaction in reality. The immediate consequences are (a) that the child's relation to the first external objects, the parents, is a mixture of love and hate, and (b) that the unsatisfied and unsatisfiable instinct-drives towards these objects give rise to a dangerous state of explosive tension.

On the other hand, the parents, by reason of their actual protective functions, qualify for love and admiration ; and the child gradually learns to model itself both consciously and unconsciously on family patterns. It is not enough to say that the child's mind acquires a permanent stamp : the process can best be described as a kind of psychic swallowing or mental absorption. The parents are psychically swallowed during life as in certain primitive tribes they are physically swallowed by their children after death. *An active parental institution is thus erected in the child's mind ; and this functions in the absence of real parents.* At the same time there is no concealing the fact that the parents do actually frustrate the wishes of the child and are in any case held responsible for every frustration. As has been said the hate engendered by painful frustration is so primitive that it could not be satisfied even if the parents were ready to co-operate in their own destruction, which is far from being the case. This impotent hate is first dealt with by projection. It is projected by the child on to the parents. In consequence the latter are now endowed with more menacing qualities than they actually possess. The infantile edition of primitive animism is

produced. The world is full of dangerous parental figures or their substitutes. Still the process of psychic absorption or identification goes on : it is indeed accelerated by frustration. The result now is that there develops in the child's mind alongside of the friendly system of modellings or identifications a more oppressive series. The child psychically swallows bad, menacing parents as well as good. This sinister doppelganger represents the exaggerated (projected) severity of the parents. At this stage the new parental institution in the child's mind is predominantly unfriendly towards the child's ego.

We have seen that the child's primitive energies directed in vain towards real parental objects are inevitably frustrated and turned back. And this reflux threatens not only stagnation but explosion. When, however, these good and bad psychic identifications have been set up in the child's mind the excess can be used to some purpose. The friendly modellings absorb hopeless love and sinister modellings employ hopeless hate in a useful way. *Hate-energy is to a large extent used up in self-scrutiny and inhibition.* In short these identifications are built into a new mental system, part of which exercises an aggressive function. It scrutinizes impulse with severity and ends by inhibiting or thwarting from within almost all primitive instinct. *The energy used for this purpose is the individual's primal sadism now inturned.* In other words, this new psychic organ or scrutinizing system (sometimes called the Super-ego or Primitive Unconscious Conscience), uses up a large part though not all of the thwarted aggression.

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It is a triumph of adaptation, and the first fruits of the victory are decrease of anxiety, increased capacity to love and increased love reward from environment. True, the system has drawbacks. Like most primitive adaptations, it tends towards excessive function : it may even go so far as to paralyse instinctual life altogether. But in the main it works. And it works on a

principle frequently exploited by both administrators and diplomats, namely, divide and govern. When the primitive ego says, 'slay your enemies,' the unconscious mentor says not only, 'if you do, I shan't love you any more,' but quite unpromisingly, 'if you slay them, I will slay you.' And the result is inaction. This is probably the situation of the average individual who is not openly bellicose but not active in the promotion of peace. When the unconscious mentor says further 'unless you love your enemies I will slay you,' we are approaching one of the motivations of peace propaganda. I do not say of all peace propaganda, because I cannot pretend to deal with more than a few outstanding factors.

Now I have described this mastering of external aggression by a system of division and distribution through the self as a masterpiece of adaptation. And on the whole the description is just. But given certain unfavourable circumstances the mechanism can be defeated. Suppose, for example, that the ordinary person, not actively warlike but not actively peace-loving, is fired by some ideal, *e.g.*, love of his country. Suppose further that he is exhorted by the representatives of social law and order to rise in defence of his fatherland, or pursue a crusade, or take part in a 'war to end war,' the chances are that his inhibiting mechanism will give way under the strain of social sanction, and the full sweep of his aggression will once more turn outwards. But not on this occasion towards his old enemies of nursery times; he will now assure us that much as he hates war, he must gird up his loins and go forth to fight the Afghans, or Basutos or Chinese or Dutch or English or French or Germans¹—or whatever appointed object is indicated to him in the first place by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of his own country.²

¹ But not, of course, Afghan or Basuto women. Students who proceed on the light-hearted assumption that the problem is essentially an economic or political problem would do well to consider some of the more patently sexual factors in war (see also pp. 20, 88, 187-193).

² See also Appendix on research, p. 96.

Now let us suppose that by some means or another he became familiar with his old nursery mechanisms, freed himself from the strain of his undigested and regurgitant sadism, and realized the essential mental pathology of war. It is just conceivable that his behaviour in a crisis would be of a different order. When the pundits of Downing Street and Wilhelmstrasse, the oracles of Turkistan and the medicine men of Fiji solemnly declared that war was inevitable, he would instantly diagnose the situation, appoint a commission of psychotherapists with full power to clap his own Foreign Secretary into a mental nursing home and get in touch with the Diplomatic Lunacy Commission of the alleged hostile country.

During the recent war the common soldiers of every combatant country had some glimmering of this possibility. But they could not see far enough. They were biased by their own predilection for settling a dispute by fighting. They used to say in effect: Why not hustle the Kaiser and Sir Edward Grey and Poincaré on to the village green, thrust cudgels in their hands and let them settle the matter by the thickness of their own skulls? You see after all the old zest for cock-fighting had not died out in them. With a little less bias they might have visualized in place of the village green the quiet consulting-room of a sanatorium, in place of the quarter-staves a gentle but persistent mental exploration of the poisoned wells of hidden sadism. But their own fundamental combativeness blinded them to this vision. Nevertheless, they obviously had some glimmering of a profound psychological truth. They realized that a world war is simply an extension of a family affair; that the Kaiser and Sir Edward Grey and Poincaré are merely Tom, Dick and Harry on the village green, or little Tommy, young Master Dick and brother Harry in the back garden, or three unbaptized turkey cocks swelling their wattles in the nursery.

The issue at stake here is an important psychological issue. Are the impulses of a group capable of classification in terms of

individual psychology? There is considerable difference of opinion on the point. Some hold that group impulses belong to a special herd-instinct, others that they are simply displacements from an earlier series of family relations. But it seems to me, speaking for the moment as a partisan, that the application of individual psychology to group manifestations sheds more light on certain social phenomena than does the mere assumption of a herd instinct. For example, it is easy to say that the individual is amenable to exhortation to 'join up' because the Prime Minister or Horatio Bottomley represents the leader of the herd. But the individual psychologist, whilst not denying the importance of the leader as a father or mother substitute, is not satisfied until he has laid bare in the situation of conflict between two countries *all* the threads of infantile conflict. Thus it is impossible to assess the recruiting value of mob-appeals made in the summer of 1914 and afterwards without some understanding of these simple baby phantasies which lie hidden in the 'unconscious' of every human being. Tearing up 'scraps of paper,' 'violating' an 'innocent little country,' defending the 'mother' country, however much they may refer to current realities are but echoes of baby phantasies in which the 'good' mother or child is defended against the sinister (mostly sexual) designs of the phantasied 'bad' father. Actually this is a comparatively 'tame' unconscious phantasy of a three-year-old, but it will serve to point a general conclusion, viz.: that *if the individual psychic situation were not already well prepared and all the unconscious justifications for war established, the factor of leadership would not of itself prove decisive.*¹ It is a well-known fact that even persons who can be hypnotized with ease may remain refractory to any hypnotic suggestion of an anti-social nature. Natural as the tendency may be, any attempt on the part of the man in the street to foist sole responsibility for war on the Ruling Powers is a piece of unconscious hypocrisy. It is a tendency exploited in a more crass manner by certain

¹ See footnote, p. 15 (2).

neurotic types who preserve a rankling hatred for their parents on the ground that the latter 'were to blame' for all their misfortunes.

Even so, the individual psychologist believes that if we regard the spell of leadership as the result, not so much of an uncharted herd instinct but as the repetition of an old emotional state of rapport between the helpless infant and its all-powerful parents, we can not only begin to understand war-fevers and maffickings, but begin to consider possible lines of war prevention. Already the social sense of the community has led to some practical steps in the proper direction. It is no longer likely in a democratic country that the offices of state can be held by any manifestly insane person. And it requires only a little imagination to foresee a time when the presence in office of any pathological character-type or manifest neurotic or even borderline lunatic¹ will be considered as dangerous to the community as a typhoid carrier or cholera suspect in a dairy farm. Consider the happy-go-lucky methods of political advancement. Any megalomaniac who is not openly certifiable, but whose eccentricity and egocentricity have left a trail of destruction from the nursery floor to the hustings may, for all we know to the contrary, be firmly established as Secretary for the Admiralty, at a time when graver heads are at their wits' end to tackle some international complication. As the late C. E. Montague said at the close of one of his *ex-parte* peace tracts: 'we must beware in good time of these young boys, and fiery elderly men piping in Thessaly.'

Yet even in the circles of peace the tradition dies hard. How many reformed hotheads have been elected representatives to the Council of the League of Nations? This surely is a matter that merits investigation. So crude indeed are the methods of choosing representatives that even the haphazard and fallible laws of physiognomy would be a better guide. Not to put too fine a point on it, if no psychological means of

¹ A borderline lunatic is more likely to go undetected than a manifestly neurotic person.

investigation were possible, I would rather have a war conference from which all turkey-cock types were excluded and a peace conference purged of all lean-jowled enthusiasts with dilated pupils, than groups chosen by political administrations.

For it has to be remembered that the peace fanatic too is a danger to peace. It was one of the lessons of the late war that when a minister who had fought for peace put his hand to the sword, he became with the sincerest intentions the most resolute and implacable enemy. Sir Edward Grey is alleged to have said on August 3, 1914, when his efforts to maintain peace were finally frustrated, 'Yes, we must now be grim.' The lesson is an old one. Given the opportunity the temperance reformer seeks to rule with a rod of iron, *i.e.*, intemperately. Some countries punish crimes of personal violence by even more violent and infinitely more deliberate flogging. The Inquisition burned and tortured in the name of God. It is an old lesson seldom learned. All that psychology has done is to uncover the mechanism involved. The peace fanatic, by which I do not mean a peaceable person or indeed a peace seeker, defends himself against a strong unconscious sadistic interest by means of a violent conscious counter-interest: and the result is precarious. Tip the balance with a moral conviction of the justness of his cause and heads may fall in the basket to satisfy his arrears of frustration. There is, doubtless, a place for the fanatic: he may usefully employ his fevered energies in stirring the consciences of more lethargic mortals. But he should rarely be allowed the freedom of the executive Council Chamber.

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A few moments ago I made the fantastic suggestion that barring other methods of approach one might exclude psychopathic types from office by a crude sort of examination. And it is true that following the example of most Public Services, we could with advantage apply some elementary precautions of this sort. But it has to be admitted that there is no security in a system of

exclusion. To put it crudely, so long as the humblest civil servant is an unconscious sadist or suffers from unconscious guilt, the country is not safe from war. The strength of any peace movement is the strength of its weakest link. In any case it would be a retrograde step to depend exclusively on measures of inhibition. Modern psychological research has shown that the only radical method of dealing with a difficulty is complete investigation, not increased inhibition. If you imprison a kleptomaniac you have lost an opportunity of discovering what kleptomania really is. But if you talk to the kleptomaniac and investigate his case fully, you will find to your surprise that the secret of his condition is infantile anxiety and remorse. You will be still more astonished to discover that whilst you are investigating his state, the maniac is mastering his mania. *Solvitur comprehendendo*. A motto that might well serve the purpose of peace organizations. Bias in favour of peace by inhibition—by making pacts, treaties, disarmament agreements or by establishing international sanctions—is natural, but it puts the cart before the horse. It is the dynamic impulse that matters, not the technique or mode of gratifying the impulse. Provided you have no active impulse, the concrete means of gratification, one might say the weapons of gratification, can be quite safely used as parlour ornaments. And in fact after wars are ended many combatant countries proceed to cumber their public parks with the more elephantine instruments of battle. Trophy worship admittedly : but also a sign that the storm of primitive impulse has for the time being blown over.

To those who have the strength of their psychological convictions, *the first effective step towards abolishing war must be the most complete investigation and individual understanding of the nature of sadistic impulses, their original form, strength and depth, the history of their modification and inhibition. This will entail equally complete understanding of the defence-mechanisms whereby we succeed in remaining unaware of our sadistic urges.*

I have endeavoured to give a rough outline of the most important *primary* defences responsible for the uncertainty of peace operations, and must content myself here with a single example of *secondary* defence, one which nevertheless acts as a perpetual stumbling-block to objective investigation.

Man has exploited rational processes of thought to such a remarkable extent that it is only natural to believe they can never be used for irrational ends. Yet a considerable amount of rational thinking is used precisely for this purpose. On an enormous number of occasions we argue and formulate and discuss our own motivations, for no other purpose than to obscure a primitive urge which may have been incompletely hidden by more automatic defence mechanisms. This veneering process goes by the name of rationalization. Perhaps the most remarkable example of twentieth-century rationalization became current during the autumn of 1914, viz., that the European War was a 'war to end war.'

So when we begin the huge task of tracing human sadism, we must be prepared to resist any attempts to sidetrack essential data on whatever plea. Thus when we start by including the popgun activities of children, the field sports of grown-ups, the chess or bridge of social clubs, the debates and arguments of dialectic societies, or the internecine wars of æsthetic schools, we must be ready to ignore the rational protests of lovers of competitive sport. When we trace the history of human punishment from the first sharp looks, words, or blows dealt out in the nursery, down to the flogging and pillories of English public schools and prisons, or the tortures legally sanctioned in China, or the sanctified cannibalism of primitive tribes, we must resist all sociological argumentation which would divorce such phenomena from the phenomena of war. And when we inquire into the history of masochism, into the ascetic practices of religious sects in all countries, into the spirit animating reform propaganda of whatever sort, we must not be intimidated either by the indignant protests or by the reasoned objections of those

who would say : this or that has nothing to do with war. Only when the results of such psychological surveys are as familiar to us as our own shadows may we hope to proceed with the more difficult task of estimating our own individual sadistic charges. And only when we can measure our own charges of aggression and defensive hate can we expect the problem of war to become a mere academic or scientific issue.

In short, *it is difficult to escape the conclusion that there is a fundamental flaw in the technique of peace propaganda : or at the least a vital misdirection of energy.* For all practical purposes the supporters of peace can be classified in two groups. There are those who, no matter how much they may appeal to economic arguments, are driven by motives of an ethical nature. In the last resort they may be said to fall back on categorical imperatives of the type familiar to us as the Ten Commandments. There are others again who, despite some degree of lip service to ethics, are driven by some inner reaction to the phenomena of waste and destruction. For them the ethical absolute has become an economic aphorism : it does not pay to kill. To one war is anathema : for the other war is an irritating orgy of disintegration. A third and completely different approach is the approach through medical psychology : war is a manifestation of conflict between human impulses, an attempt to solve some difficulty, some problem. A mass insanity if you like, provided you remember that insanity is simply a dramatic attempt to deal with individual conflict, *a curative process* initiated in the hope of preventing disruption, but *ending in hopeless disintegration.*

In the view of the medical psychologist, any attempt to fix attention on ethical and economic considerations to the neglect of deeper psychological factors is not only a misdirection of energy but an obstacle to any real progress. If the psychologist were sufficiently ill-advised to propound a proverbial philosophy he would doubtless be tempted to some such formulations as these : if you would avoid war prepare for peace : peace has its strains no less intense than war : take care of your own

aggression and the aggression of nations will take care of itself. And if he were compelled to crystallize in one formulation the experience of applied individual psychology, to suggest in a phrase what panacea psychology has to offer a war-ridden species, it would probably take the form of a new sixth commandment: *Know thine own (unconscious) sadism.*

A Postscript on Masochism

A POLYTECHNIC chemistry professor lecturing on the complex structure of an apparently simple substance is concerned primarily with the need for effective exposition. Provided his hearers can understand him, he need not stop to inquire whether in the process any of them have been overcome with scepticism or nauseated or inspired with religious enthusiasm. When, for example, the sophisticated first-year student is informed that common salt is compounded of solid sodium and chlorine gas, it is extremely improbable that he will even gape, much less rise to protest that it is an infamous lie. Quite otherwise with lectures on 'unconscious' psychology. No sooner does the professional exponent pass from a general description of unconscious mental structure to specify unconscious content (as for example highly charged sadistic phantasies) than many of his hearers get into a state either of irritated objection or of overwarm acquiescence. In other words, a lecture on the 'unconscious' is to some extent a psychological blow; aimed primarily at the intellect it almost invariably lands 'low' in the emotions.

It is therefore a specially instructive experiment to live under 'Summer School' conditions and observe personally the delayed reaction to an 'unconscious' lecture stimulus. The substance of the previous chapter was given as a lecture to a League of Nations International Summer School in Geneva. The audience was a typical cultivated post-graduate audience with, one may assume, conscious interest in the abolition of war and in the foundation of permanent peace relations between nations. One may assume further a certain amount of conscious goodwill

(receptivity) towards the ideas advanced during the lecture courses. To this essentially pacifist audience I had enunciated certain subversive doctrines. Taking the bull by the horns I had declared that they were wasting a good deal of their energies ; that if they wanted to promote peace they should start by searching their own hearts. And knowing that from the conscious point of view their hearts would, on inspection, be found bubbling over with good intentions, I had described the part played universally by primitive sadism in the regulation of unconscious affairs.

The immediate result was apparently as satisfactory as one could wish. Take an audience of young enthusiastic reformers, slightly exalted by the stimulus of foreign travel, pack them one bright sunny morning into an academic class room within a stone's throw of the Lake of Geneva, treat them with the most subversive of ideas and what is the response ? Like the wily iguana of the poem who ended a mortal combat by swallowing his opponent whole, a great number of these guileless tacticians swallowed the argument, lock, stock and barrel. This sudden and successful application of a defensive manoeuvre is always liable to take one's breath away. One talks of forces dynamic enough to make or wreck civilization and the nearest human containers of these catastrophic forces murmur applause !

But within a few days I had an opportunity of observing the backward swing of the pendulum or, to keep to the metaphor, the rapid disgorgement of almost completely undigested ideas. The occasion was a lecture by an economist of international repute. With the assistance of a lantern-screen and some ingeniously contrived slides, he proceeded to uncover dispassionately not simply the economic advantages and disadvantages of war policy but the economic factors which when cumbered with nationalist restrictions prepare the ground for the outbreak of war. So convincing and realistic an approach sapped the confidence of my psychological proselytes. With an embarrassed air of apologetic conflict one of the students button-

holed me afterwards: Was it not possible I had exaggerated the psychological factor? Might it not be simply a primitive unconscious contribution which when added to more important and realistic self-preservative or predatory impulses gave rise to a slight degree of bias in favour of war? Was there not in this subsequent lecture a complete justification for the concentration of energy on international economic factors?

The suggestion that self-preservative impulses can be saddled with the greater part of war responsibility is simple and appealing. By contrast with the unconscious motivations described in the foregoing chapter it is almost praiseworthy. It is, however, one of those alluring suggestions which are effective only so long as they are not examined too closely. Admittedly it would be inconsistent to suggest at one moment that impulse is a dynamic factor in war and then to deny the importance of self-preservative impulses; all the more so that we have described hostility as to some extent a reaction to real or imagined danger. But to advance self-preservative impulses as the sole or major factor in war immediately involves us in difficulties. If it can be shown not only that economic (self-preservative) factors are liable to lead to war, but that war, despite some possible immediate advantages, leads to economic disaster all round, then some other important factor is necessary to explain why a country should cut off its own nose to spite an enemy's face. In fact the more we examine the concept of self-preservative impulse, the more obvious it becomes that even if this impulse is primary and unmixed—which is by no means certain—it functions in a remarkably uneven way. It would be easy to adduce examples of this faulty function of the self-preservative impulses,¹ but it is perhaps simpler to begin by considering the meaning of the phrase used above: to cut off one's nose to spite one's face. Put in more technical terms, this implies that however unreasonable it may seem to the onlooker a certain intensity of hate, sadism and aggression can

¹ See, for example, footnote Chapter I, p. 12.

be satisfied by self-injury. When the onlooker protests that such conduct is unreasonable, he is biased by his own trust (or distrust) in his own self-preservative impulses. In the case of persons ready to mutilate their own noses, these impulses are obviously in a state of partial suspense.

With these reflections in mind the only reply I could offer my summer student was in effect an apology. I had to admit that after all my presentation of the psychological aspects of war was much too one-sided ; that too much space had been devoted to the history of unconscious sadism, to the neglect of a group of apparently antithetical factors. Short of reconstructing the whole presentation the only remedy was and is to add a post-script on the history of masochism, on the aggressive function of self-injury and on self-punishment.

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The most convenient starting-point for an investigation of masochism is—as the name itself suggests—a study of the common masochistic sexual perversions. Although the exact incidence of these perversions has never been accurately estimated, their main clinical features and variations have been established. These are described in numerous textbooks on the subject. In a typical masochistic perversion the main condition of sexual gratification is that the love-object should inflict on the subject a degree of physical or psychic pain or injury, *i.e.*, the love impulse has become fused with a markedly aggressive component. Having established this definition it is difficult to exclude from the masochistic group individuals who obtain sexual gratification by inflicting a degree of psychic or physical pain *on themselves*. The difference is that in the second case there is apparently only one person involved : the state is reflexive rather than passive. But if sexual self-flagellation is masochistic, how are we to define ritual self-flagellation which is not associated with conscious sexual need or gratification ? ‘ Conscious ’ psychology points here to one conclusion. Since

these ostensibly religious practices are regarded as expiatory, mortifying or punitive in nature, it may be inferred that self-punishment and masochism have at least one element in common, viz., self-injury.

Having formed this conclusion, the 'conscious' psychologist is bound to examine all available behaviouristic and introspective data. In so doing he will discover that from infancy to old age an infinite number of masochistic, self-injuring and expiatory mechanisms are in constant operation. In the infant he will observe not only manifest erotic practices involving a technique of pain-infliction either by the self or by an external object, but a number of curious self-injuring habits (head bangings, etc), which are frequently but erroneously regarded as accidental. On the way to adolescent and adult investigation, he will doubtless pause to consider the significance of child suicide. In adolescent and adult fields, he will soon be overwhelmed by a mass of observations, all going to show that apart from sexual masochism, degrees of psychic or physical injury (either reflexive or passive) are a constant feature of human life. He can begin if he likes with a study of apparently awkward or absent-minded individuals who constantly endure minor injuries. Or he can start with more dramatic manifestations, the suicide rate, the 'avoidable mortality' rate, the 'careless accident' rate, and so forth. Soon he will be compelled to pay attention to individuals who appear to live under conditions of constant psychic humiliation and misery: to those who constantly lose or squander their money with all the usual disagreeable consequences of this manœuvre: to those whose marriage becomes and remains a form of torture: to the miserable army of melancholiacs who devote their lives to self-humiliation and often inflict on themselves the penalty of death: to their even more numerous camp followers—the social Gummidges who combine a constant appearance of martyrdom with a comparatively good digestion, to say nothing of the martyrdom they inflict on their friends and relations.

Stimulated by these last psychopathological observations he may study the unestimated but certainly enormous incidence of psycho-neuroses, only to discover that self-punishment of one sort or another is an invariable characteristic of these maladaptations. He may even, undeterred by religious, ethical or social sanctions, consider the associated phenomena of penance, philanthropy and altruism. But whichever way he looks he is bound to arrive at the conclusion, that *however strong the egoistic self-preserved impulses may appear, they are to some extent nullified by opposing impulses*. He may even suspect that these opposing impulses can serve as a check on the more aggrandizing forms of self-preservation, in other words that they can perform a constabular or inhibitory function the destructive element of which at times quite obviously outruns the constable, and ends in injury of the self.

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But beyond formulating these general conclusions, and possibly suggesting that the original narrow adult sexual connotation of the word masochism may be much too narrow, the 'conscious' psychologist has little to say of an enlightening nature. Indeed until the discovery of unconscious mental systems and content, the academic psychologist not without a certain amount of relief simply turned his back on the whole problem. We are therefore justified in calling in the 'psychologist of the unconscious' to continue the thread. For convenience in presentation we may consider the contributions of psycho-analysis to this subject under three headings.

(a) MASOCHISM.—The first discoveries were in part phenomenological and in part the result of analysis. It was shown that the adult perversion was merely one manifestation of a universal tendency, that the early instincts of *every* child included a component of 'erotogenic' masochism (meaning that the gratification of this component had some erotic pleasure tone). The next discovery was that in the building up of an

erotogenic masochistic system, the element of erotogenic sadism played its part. A sadistic impulse turned towards an object, when so modified that the object is induced to behave sadistically towards the subject, constitutes in fact a masochistic situation. And it was assumed and confirmed by observation that a transitional form existed when the child behaved sadistically to itself, a reflexive form of sado-masochism.

These rather confusing discoveries were made more comprehensible some years later. As the result of further research into the problem of instinct, the conclusion was arrived at that every child starts out with both destructive and love impulses. It is probable that from the very beginning these impulses exist in varying degrees of fusion. A certain amount of fused impulse (destructive and erotic) is turned outwards towards objects. That is *true primary sadism*. A certain amount of fused impulse remains bound in the individual. That is *true primary masochism*. Now it will be readily understood that the amount of sadistic gratification permitted the small child is minimal. Hence whatever degree of primary sadism cannot be gratified 'without' must seek to be bound 'within,' *i.e.*, on the self. Therefore sadism when frustrated and turned back tends to reinforce masochism. This additional contribution to masochism is called *secondary masochism*.

(b) SELF - PUNISHMENT AND UNCONSCIOUS 'NEED FOR PUNISHMENT.'—In the course of ordinary phenomenological work, psycho-analysts showed that self-injury mechanisms in some form were universal. Examination of unconscious motivations resulted in two significant discoveries. *In the first place these self-injuries are a form of self-punishment.* In other words a form of 'unconscious' guilt exists in all individuals which for practical purposes can be called the 'need for punishment.' The second point was that *although in conscious levels this self-injury apparently loses its connection with an erotogenic sado-masochism, the connection still exists in the unconscious.* An important

conclusion : because it means that self-injury or punishment can be strongly reinforced by unconscious drives toward erotic masochistic satisfaction. The same findings were discovered to be valid for situations where the individual is injured or humiliated *by others*. Although there is no conscious element of sexual experience, this situation remains unconsciously a true masochistic one. And it satisfies the '*unconscious need for punishment by others*.' Applying these findings to conscious psychology it was considered justifiable to broaden the term masochism. The person who is apparently injured by circumstances or who gets into constant hot water is no longer regarded as a victim of circumstances or as dogged by Fate : unless he can bring convincing proof of the accidental and unavoidable nature of the injuries he is regarded as a '*moral masochist*.'¹

(c) UNCONSCIOUS SPLITTING OF THE PERSONALITY (IDENTIFICATION) AND THE DISTRIBUTION AND CONTROL OF SADO-MASOCHISTIC ENERGIES.—A general outline of these processes and mechanisms has already been given in the first chapter,² but a few words of recapitulation and elaboration may help to draw the various threads together. It has been described how owing to the inevitable frustration of early hate and love, an infantile instinctual crisis is precipitated : how at the same time the child builds up psychic systems based on real and imaginary relations to real and imaginary parents. The imaginary elements, particularly the sinister imaginings about 'dangerous' parents, are contributed by the projection on the parents of the child's frustrated instinct, particularly frustrated destructive and sadistic instinct. The child then builds up a composite psychic system, partly 'good and worthy of love, partly bad and hating. The good part absorbs frustrated love ; the hating part absorbs frustrated sadism. This psychic system by scrutinizing and inhibiting primitive impulse permits the absorption of surplus (frustrated) love and hate. If primitive impulse is inhibited

¹ See footnote, p. 15.

² See p. 21 *et seq.*

after scrutiny, a part of the ego is 'being good' and can be loved by the other part. On the other hand the activity of scrutinizing and inhibiting uses up some of the severity of the hating part.

Now to round off the story. *The states of tension which exist between these mental systems*, these good and bad parts of the mind, these scrutinizing and scrutinized elements, these hating and hated psychic institutions, *give rise to the unconscious guilt which has been described as 'need for punishment.'* Secondly, the sadism turned back from objects not only reinforces the severity (sadism) of the scrutinizing part, it reinforces the readiness for punishment (masochism) of the scrutinized part. When most of the reflected sadism is poured into the scrutinizing institution, the result is an over-inhibited individual: when most of the reflected sadism reinforces the masochism of the scrutinized part, the result is a moral masochist. And a moral masochist, although apparently free and active in many respects, may be depended on to turn the cheek to misfortune, even if this manœuvre necessitates joining the Foreign Legion.

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Applying these formulations to the problems of war and pacifism we are once more confronted with the difficulty described in the first chapter: Are the findings of individual psychology applicable to group situations? And as before I shall adopt the partisan view that they are applicable. In the meantime it would be politic to deal with less controversial aspects and indicate what part masochistic factors play in individual problems, *e.g.*, the problem of the pacifist or professional soldier or recruited civilian.

We have seen that the unconscious sadism of the pacifist is absorbed by the activity of his unconscious conscience. This implacable instrument points sternly in the direction of 'peace'; hence the maintenance of pacifist activities is to some extent a guarantee of 'peace of mind.' Naturally he too gets some outlet

for a modified type of aggression, as in the vigour of his propaganda or strength of his hostility to war and war-mongering. The professional soldier using the same energies and faculties has arrived at a different solution of his problems. The 'private' for example, fortified by a series of real and symbolic sanctions granted by the King, His Ministers, His Lords and Commons, His Army Acts, His Commissioned Officers and their substitutes down to the Lance-corporal has at the same time fortified and justified the sadism of his unconscious mentor or super-ego. Like the butcher and the hangman he seeks a professional outlet for his destructive tendencies, secure in the conviction that he is only doing his duty, *i.e.*, serving or preserving his King and Country. And in return his sadism is licensed by the War Office. He receives a Baccalaureate from the Royal College of Soldiers and Sailors with the condition attached that he must not practice except under Martial Law. Incidentally we may note that a somewhat similar argument could be advanced by the surgeon, the chiropodist, and, although sometimes with less justification, by the barber.

With the civilian recruit the psychic situation is otherwise. As a pre-war civilian he is something of a dark horse. Assuredly he has the same instincts to contend with and the same mechanisms for defending against them. But he has not adopted the ingenious device unconsciously favoured by both pacifist and regular soldier; *he does not make a profession of his instinctual defence systems*. For this reason and also because of the vast numerical superiority of the group, we may select the 'undeclared' type in order to study the influence of unconscious masochism. At the same time one must admit that within the compass of a short essay it is impossible to do justice to the multiplicity of types such a group is bound to include.

It has been said that in regard to war interests the average civilian is a dark horse. But of course a preliminary inspection of his accessible mental content might give us some clues. And here we find that many of our social and ethical conventions

and restrictions, however useful they may be in other directions, almost completely vitiate the results of any such inspection. The ordinary individual under ordinary circumstances refuses point blank to reveal his innermost conscious thoughts. Even under the average experimental conditions (such as filling in a psychological questionnaire) he is inclined either consciously to lie and prevaricate or unconsciously to forget (which is the unconscious form of lying). Nevertheless we may be certain that a survey of the conscious content of reasonably objective witnesses would enable us to separate out various sub-groups. We would doubtless distinguish those bluff downright types who behind a respectable façade preserve the attitude of the Jingoistic schoolboy to the propaganda of the Navy League. Proud of the expansive area of red splotches representing the British Empire and annoyed by the size of the battleships representing the naval strength of the Other Powers, he makes no bones of a few phantasies of war and annexation. When the Great War was over nothing would satisfy him short of the occupation of Berlin, and the wholesale cession of territory to the victors. At the very least, he argued, France should hold to the left bank of the Rhine in perpetuity. At the other end of the series we would find types who on the basis of some cast-iron principle are ready to become the conscientious objectors of the next war : or again, those who favour a policy of passive non-resistance, believing that the only way to defeat aggression is to permit the aggressing armies to reach their military objective without firing a shot even if this involves a prolonged foreign occupation.

But soon we would exhaust the sub-groups* of those who *conceal* from the world a well-defined conscious attitude to war and pacifism. *Others apparently have no opinions on these matters at all.* Their apparent neutrality is the end result of a special defence ; and naturally in times of peace the defence works. Study their attitudes in other matters, however, and we may hazard a guess as to their tendencies in a war crisis. Individuals

who suffer from what the Germans call *schadenfreude* — a tendency to gloat in secret over the misfortunes of others—very often of people to whom they are attached and to whom they may *behave* quite irreproachably—will be liable to thrill with satisfaction when they read of the Sino-Japanese War. That Shanghai or Jehol should be devastated or run with blood does not inhibit the interest: on the contrary these possibilities act as specific stimuli. On the other hand individuals who are so sensitive to ideas of injury that they would not ‘hurt a fly,’ or who are inclined to impoverish their resources by compulsive and indiscriminate ‘giving,’ who cannot pass a beggar in the street without a propitiatory offering of alms, seems likely to read of Manchurian bloodshed with a sense of pity or horror. Follow up these contrasting tendencies and we will soon be busy distinguishing deaf people who always use their deafness in an offensive way, from less sadistic sufferers, who merely pester their friends with their infirmity, or again from the masochistic deaf who make no effort to compensate reasonably for their deficiency but sink back into egotistic martyrdom.

In studying and differentiating these types we find that even consciously it is easier to recognize the sadist than the masochist, *and we suspect that the apparently completely neutral person is possibly an unconscious sado-masochist.* This enables us to formulate one general principle concerning the effect of unconscious masochism, viz.: that in addition to making any situation in which the self may be injured (in this case, war) more attractive, its effect is to obscure the existence of positive sadism. The unconscious masochist is indeed one of the darkest of horses.

Perhaps the most striking illustration of the confusion introduced by this factor is the case of the ordinary man who without any warning commits suicide. His friends know of no reason for this action, his affairs are in good order, no observable change has occurred in his emotional milieu, his doctor testifies that he was in good health and without any obvious signs of melancholia. So the coroner directs that a verdict should be

brought in ot suicide 'during temporary insanity.' But anyone who has analysed a suicidal type knows that behind the apparently solid crust of normality a splitting of personality takes place which goes down into the very roots of mental life. It is as if two persons both white hot with rage were engaged in a silent struggle with the energies so equally balanced that no movement could be detected. Reinforce the sadism of one of the unconscious combatants and the resulting advantage in battle is apparent to the onlooker as a bad fit of depression or melancholia. Reinforce suddenly the masochism of the other unconscious combatant and next day we read in our newspaper that someone has 'committed suicide.'

To repeat this in more technical language: the primitive and mostly unconscious ego drawing energies from a reservoir of primitive impulse is held in check by the primitive super-ego or Primitive Unconscious Conscience, which although modelled on real and imaginary parental patterns, nevertheless *draws its energies* from the *same* inner reservoir. Any sudden freeing of destructive energies which at the same time reinforces the sadism of one component and the masochism of the other ends in death. *From this point of view a system which brings real external objects into the quarrel is in a sense an advance.* To have a real external enemy to attack or to have an external enemy whose attacks can conceivably be defended against successfully is a tempting solution. Suicide as well as being a self-punishment by death is a murder in self-defence, a murder of an internal enemy: it is also at the deepest masochistic level an erotic (love) gratification. *A situation of war brings the external world into an internal conflict.* Under war conditions external enemies can be punished, they can be murdered in self-defence: on the other hand the punishment (murder) of the self by the enemy is not inevitable. One may merely be mutilated, possibly go scot-free. Moreover, one's friends or fellow-soldiers can be murdered, mutilated or at any rate 'put through it,' by the enemy, always a tempting solution for those whose unconscious attitudes to

their friends is tinged with sadism. All these unconscious situations are at the same time bound together and compensated for by possibilities of love display. In general this takes the sublimated form of love of King, Home, Country and Ideals, or again of friendly, helpful and self-sacrificing association with one's Brothers in Arms: but the more primitive aspects of camp life are in many cases not without their attraction. Thus even in its reinforcement of more positive and friendly aspects of life, war puts a premium on masochism. The line between conscious altruism and what has been called 'moral masochism' is hard to draw.

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In these formulations we have once again passed from the individual to the group aspects of masochism. As I have said this is a controversial subject, hence any opinions I express must be regarded as *ex parte*. I shall content myself with stating that the individual mechanisms I have described are responsible for (or adequately account for) most of the group phenomena. Admittedly they tend to operate in a cruder way in the groups. Whether this is due solely to the factor of reinforcement or not, group manifestations have a more dramatic quality than most individual manifestations. The charge of the Light Brigade is still a legend to those who have long forgotten the exploit of Findlater at Dargai. With regard to those elements which appear to be more specially of a group nature, viz., the welding of individual impulses in a common group aim or under a common leader or ideal, it can only be said that the origin of such elements must be considered first and foremost from an infantile angle, i.e., from the point of view of the Infantile Family Group. And here again we have to note that at every stage of the formation and disintegration of the Infantile Family Group the element of masochism plays a part complementary to that of sadism. In one sense of course there is no such thing as individual psychology, and obviously the youngest infant is but one of a group of two—mother and child. The youngest children who

have been analysed up to now all showed without exception a splitting of their mind into at least two parts, a 'mother-part' and a 'self-part.' By the time this smallest group is extended to include other family figures (father, brother, sister) infantile conflict over primitive impulse has reached its height. Later post-infantile (school, adolescent or adult) group formations, no matter how simple or elaborate their organization, are, from the point of view of primitive impulse, extensions of those earlier infantile groups. *Whatever problems in unconscious masochism have been left unsolved in these earliest phases can be worked over again and again in the playgrounds of later mental life.* The unconscious mind is not primarily concerned with end products : its immediate concern is with relief of tension at whatever cost and by whatever means. Its masochistic trends can be represented as well by defeat at the hands of a friend on the village bowling green, as by a dream of being shelled from the opposite bank of a river or by actually volunteering for the losing side in a Great War. Left to itself Consciousness has little or no say which path will ultimately be chosen.

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Allowing for many errors of omission, the foregoing argument is the psycho-analyst's reply to those who justify a *concentration* of pacifist energies on economic (self-preservative) factors. The trouble about self-preservative impulses is that neither in the individual nor in the group can they be depended upon to perform their function. And this apart altogether from the fact that under certain circumstances group necessity may as the conscript knows to his cost allow no room at all for the expansion of individual self-preservation. An important cause of faulty function is in most instances reinforcement* of unconscious masochism. However much you may preach to nationalists that it does not pay to cut off one's nose to spite someone else's face, the lesson cannot be learned so long as unconscious masochism remains an unknown and unmeasured quantity.

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In formulating these conclusions I have abstained from using data which cannot be confirmed by anyone using adequate methods of direct investigation. Naturally in conjecturing the immediate post-natal states of infantile mental life we must employ certain working hypotheses, but otherwise the argument is based on established fact. It is only fair to say, however, that much evidence of an extremely suggestive kind can be gathered from indirect sources. In particular the modern school of psycho-analytical anthropology has done sound pioneer work in tracing the ramifications of human guilt and sado-masochism. Starting with the most primitive organizations of savage tribes, they have followed the development of tribal law and custom, of language and literature, of sciences, religion and art, of altruism and crime, from the earliest known beginnings down to the complex structure of western civilization. And always they have arrived at the same conclusion, that the forces of civilization however primitive or advanced owe their original impetus to a primary sense of guilt and the need for its expiation. Stimulated by the discovery that equally primitive layers of organization can be uncovered in every infant, they have postulated a primal origin for this sense of guilt corresponding to the primal origins of infantile guilt. In brief they hold that in course of establishing an incest barrier, man was compelled to come to terms with his hate as well as with his love. In doing so he found himself forced to acquire the difficult art of loving and hating one person at the same time. As the primitive forms of hate receded into the background without losing their strength thereby, the original episodic system became constant. From that time human development becomes a 'continued story' of the mastery of unconscious guilt. With the birth of every individual the race-history of guilt formation is repeated: for the child too hates the things he loves and must learn to love the things he hates. The adaptation has been and is still a difficult one to make. One of its by-products is what we call civilization. And civilization is in danger only so long as unmastered quantities

of unconscious sadism call into action the dormant forces of masochism.

It is doubtless due to some unconscious appreciation of the strength of these forces that every great war is in turn regarded as a threat to civilization. 'One more war and civilization will perish' is the cry. Man is ready to seize every opportunity of externalizing his unconscious fears and wishes. Any asylum officer can testify that world destruction is the special pre-occupation of a certain type of lunatic, though he may not always appreciate that this phantasy is a projection of the lunatic's conviction that he dare no longer love even himself. And quite recently we have heard no less prominent a figure than the Governor of the Bank of England describe certain economic forces as powers which man may not be able to control. This is, to say the least, a gratuitous act of homage to so-called natural forces. The energies and mental institutions responsible for civilization come from within. And no matter how much we may seek to avoid the fact by attempting to project it, the danger to civilization comes also from within. The dangers of external reality are by comparison with endopsychic dangers easily measurable. And they provoke less fear. War may destroy the products of civilization but unless it is accompanied by a permanent breakdown of internal defences it cannot destroy the tendencies towards civilization. In so far as unconscious masochism is liable to sap internal defences, it may be regarded as the real traitor in the camp, even more dangerous than an excess of unconscious sadism.

CHAPTER III

The Problem of Prevention

IT is safe to assume that the ultimate reaction of the public to any persistently destructive criticism will be one of rather cold distaste. Only if the disagreeable content has been well sugared, or served with a relish of shrewd wit, may a reasonable degree of assimilation be anticipated. The plain, blunt destructive critic is lucky if he escapes a few hopefully-directed brickbats.

For the student of war and peace there is a moral to be extracted from this seemingly irrational and ungrateful procedure. There is a natural polarity in critical activities, which corresponds to the polarities of love and hate, of creation and destruction. And although consciously we distinguish between thought, utterance and action, such distinctions do not run in the kingdom of the unconscious. For the unconscious, destructive criticism is not simply a purgative process; it is regarded as a calculated assault. So unless the destructive critic is extremely tactful, he is liable to be treated as a malefactor and to have his platform turned into a pillory. Many are intuitively aware of this sensitiveness to any purely aggressive or destructive activity and take care to introduce a leaven of constructive suggestion in their work. But in any case the expectation that a critic should also be a reformer is as old as civilization. In animistic societies, the demand for 'white' (protective and curative) magic is naturally directed to purveyors of 'black' (destructive) magic. In mediæval times it was not unknown for the public hangman to turn physician. Even in modern medicine there is a faint suggestion of stigma about the Research Fellow who concentrates on diagnosis, or on the elimination of diagnostic error, to the exclusion of therapeutic

concern. As a rule the diagnostician is forced willy-nilly to turn apothecary.

I have emphasized these irrational aspects of human reaction at some length because it seems to me that whoever has the temerity to analyse the motivation of a peace organization has put himself in a peculiarly difficult position. In so far as he seems to criticize the activities of a reformist organization he must appear a doubly destructive critic. He has in a sense put his head in Chancery. On the other hand, the peace organization is bound by its own principles to accord any critic the kindest of hearings and to refrain from any of the more robust forms of reprisal. This is naturally a severe strain on the peace of mind of both parties; and the only way to lessen the tension is to ventilate it at once.

Now the thesis I have put forward with regard to the relations of war and peace is briefly as follows: the psychoanalyst alleges that *concentration of peace propaganda on ethical or economic arguments*, on measures of inhibition, pacts, disarmament treaties or limitations, to the neglect of unconscious motivations, interests and mechanisms, *is in a very real sense a reactionary policy*. He alleges that *peace and war manifestations are both essentially end products, the results obtained by passing the same psychic energies through different mental systems*. Or to put it in another way, that peace and war activities are both solutions of mental tension, the apparent and actual differences being due to the different defensive mechanisms employed. He states that *the driving energy in both cases belongs to the destructive group of instincts*, in particular that variety which when fused with some love components is known as sadism. And in illustration of this he points out that the fanatical pacifist under certain circumstances may be a danger to peace. He points out, however, that in addition to this active form of destructive impulse, an element of confusion is introduced by a passive form, namely masochism, in which destructive impulses are fused with passive love components. These *passive destructive*

impulses are more silent in operation than the active sadistic components: nevertheless they *contribute considerably to an unconscious readiness to tolerate or even welcome situations of war.* And they do so not merely by paralysing the operation of self-preservative impulse but because the acceptance of suffering in addition to being a primary form of gratification represents a primitive method of overcoming 'unconscious guilt.'

In so far as these conclusions reflect on the existing distribution of pacifist energies they represent a potentially destructive criticism. And the pacifist would be less than human if he did not experience some urge to put a few pointed questions in return. He might be tempted to say, "Well, if you know so much more about our unconscious impulses and motivations than we do ourselves, why not tell us what to do about it all." More downright individuals might even feel affronted and restrain with difficulty the *tu quoque*, "Could you do any better yourself for all your smug armchair psychology?" Anyhow, the inevitable demand, however couched, would be for practical advice: what should we *do*?

If I should appear to evade for a moment this demand for a practical policy, I trust this will not be regarded as a pusillanimous manœuvre designed to conceal the poverty of constructive thinking. The fact is, however, that my primary concern is not with the hasty formulation of policies. Such a course might indeed prove to be a detrimental one. *To give treatment without adequate diagnosis is the essence of quackery.* Moreover, it is fundamentally unscientific in method. What I do claim is that *we already know sufficient of unconscious motivation in war and peace to make it imperative to know more.* In a negative sense the person who refrains from knowing all that can be known about war and peace is as responsible for the next war as that more positive agent who first crosses the frontier or fires the first shot. From this point of view the analytical psychologist could scarcely be reproached if he refused to offer any so-called

practical suggestions. If he simply said, "The first thing to do is to know," and then pointed out in what directions and by what methods knowledge can be acquired, he would have made an ample and vital contribution to the problem. It would then be the duty of the professional pacifist to set the psychological research institutions of all countries humming with activity; to declare a state of psychological emergency, as one might declare a state of hygienic emergency, were the world threatened with a new plague virus. It is not difficult to imagine the pained indignation of the Daily Press if, in the face of a threatened pandemic, all the available bacteriologists were found to be busy studying the life-history of harmless fungi.

Yet, so far as 'peace preparedness' is concerned, that is the state of existing psychological investigation. Only a very small band of psycho-analytical investigators in various lands have set themselves the task of tracing human sadism from its earliest sources in the history of the individual; and here and there a few anthropologists endeavour to do the same for the history of the race. These researches have been carried out, in the case of psycho-analysis, to strengthen the therapeutic efficiency of psychological treatment, and in the case of anthropology to make the principles of that science more comprehensible; not, as one might reasonably expect, at the urgent request of peace organizations.

But let us suppose that this extraordinary state of affairs had been rectified: imagine research teams of trained workers subsidized both by governments and by private foundations investigating the whole range of human phenomena, tracing the history of human sadism from the first balling of baby fists in the cradle to the last grimaces of hate petrified in cadaveric rigour on the battlefield: following human ceremonial from cannibalism to Christian communion: amassing and correlating every detail of war reaction, studying every mechanism of peace: sifting the phenomena of insanity to understand what man is like when the barriers are broken; and examining the buttress

systems by means of which an appearance of social normality is maintained. Even so there would still be a demand for 'practical' measures or recommendations, an insistence on *action*. It is one of the specious attractions of economic committees, of equity sub-committees, of meetings and congresses and leagues, that they represent, or seem to represent, action or some immediate approach to action. Without decrying in the least the practical aspect of such activities, *let us consider whether the problem of war is one which can be solved by action*. Assume even that certain defensive actions can definitely prevent war (an assumption which has so far no historical justification), does this constitute a *solution* of the problem? Even so, is it necessary to employ such a cumbrous method? Is there no better solution?

Now in the matter of war policy the position of the average sociologist—and the pacifist whether he knows it or not is a student of applied sociology—resembles that of the Victorian Doctor of Medicine when confronted with a hysterical seizure. Suddenly irritated by such inexplicable behaviour his impulse was either to restrain the patient forcibly, or to dash a pail of water over her; on the whole rather punitive, though in the symbolic sense not necessarily entirely irrational procedures. If the hysteria took the milder form of indigestion or neuralgia or dropping of the internal organs, he still rushed to *do* something; to give bismuth or aspirin or apply a body belt or open up the abdomen and stitch the kidney. In the first decade of the Twentieth Century, there were literally thousands of sensitive mortals whose bodies showed the actual scars of misguided *rushes to (surgical) action*. The war-time neuroses first helped to popularize views of bodily disturbance which ought to have been domestic knowledge for centuries: first, that quite complicated organic processes can result from disturbance of instinct and adaptation: and second, that the solution of the difficulties in question lies, not in operating or drugging or

giving in marriage (*i.e.*, action), but in complete intellectual and emotional *understanding*. The hypnotist and suggestionist had already shown experimentally that it was possible to charm away certain organic conditions (the so-called hysterical conversions) without lifting a finger—but the element of charm prevented full understanding of both symptom and treatment. It was only with the dawn of analytic methods that the radical effect of purely mental exploration was appreciated. Nevertheless, *the bias is still heavily in favour of substituting action for understanding*: failing result from action, the tendency is to avert attention from the painful stimulus. In this respect the physician almost automatically adopts neurotic methods of defence. Two neuroses in particular exhibit these defence mechanisms. The obsessional neurotic uses all sorts of ceremonial tricks and gestures and habits to exorcize his painful thought-compulsions; the anxiety hysteric averts interest from all danger zones by the drastic expedient of blotting out huge tracts of mental experience (hysterical amnesia or forgetting). Pacifists with a bias in favour of concrete defensive action follow the obsessional type; the ‘man in the street’ who tries to put the problem of war on his blind spot and in so doing refuses to think of anything that might remind him of war—including even the possibility of joining the League of Nations Union—is copying the amnesic policies of hysteria.

At this point the discerning critic will be inclined to advance one or two objections. He may say, “Your bias in favour of ‘psychic action’ as a cure for ‘war states’ is all very well, but we are informed that even in the case of neurotic individuals the ‘complete understanding’ you mention involves the use of a highly specialized technique of mental exploration. Have we any guarantee that psychic action can or will be simply and effectively applied to large groups?” Or he may say, “Your bias in favour of ‘psychic action’ involves putting all your eggs in one basket. You are preoccupied with internal psychic

factors and therefore ignore external, environmental conditions. Even if we agree that economic factors are not primary, you must agree that they are nevertheless extremely important and require concrete handling. Moreover, you appear to neglect altogether external psychological influences: surely something can be done to modify warlike tendencies. Besides, we can't wait. Something must be *done* here and now."

To these cogent questions my preliminary response must again appear unduly chicken-hearted. I am prepared for the moment to evade reply to the first question, merely repeating that *bias* in favour of concrete action must be overcome if we are going to estimate at all accurately the value of peace propaganda. On the other hand, the relation of internal factors (*i.e.*, the nature of primitive instincts and defence mechanisms) to (a) external psychological factors such as the influence of family upbringing, social standards, etc., and (b) external economic factors, strikes to the root of all sociological effort. So I propose to spend the most of my available space in its consideration. How far should one *direct attention* to the *psychic state of the individual* or *attempt to deal concretely with end products through environment*?

On this issue scientists of varying breed have from time to time expressed strong opinions. I hasten, therefore, to reassure the reader. So far from having any desire to wax pontifical on the subject, I am acutely aware of the very shaky title psychology has to pontificate about anything. In recent times the market has been flooded with psychological textbooks designed to regulate the conduct of life; and it says a good deal for human common sense that these have latterly been met with an increasing amount of ribald comment. The turn of events is justified. A long-suffering and suggestible public has at last come to realize that a spate of publications on the behaviouristic aspects of new psychologies is to some extent a fresh monument to human fatuity. But of course there is a shade of uneasiness behind this newly acquired freedom to criticize, and a certain

amount of relief behind the malicious glee and contempt with which the more fatuous productions are greeted. The lay public, from the 'plain man in the street' to the most accomplished metaphysician, has always maintained that every man can and must be his own psychologist. It has resented any attempt to claim for psychology the immunity from uninstructed interference accorded any other exact science. It has made scornful comparisons between the inept fumbblings of applied psychology and the spontaneous wisdom of the sages. But in spite of this cogent comparison the resentment is, like most resentments, to a large extent dictated by anxiety. There is always the disturbing possibility that psychology might be able to penetrate the deepest layers of human motivation and shake the compact system of rationalizations interposed between these layers and consciousness !

Now let us suppose for the sake of argument not only that the Great Powers applied themselves seriously to problems of war and peace, but that they were temporarily converted to a psychological viewpoint. They would then instruct their central organization—the League of Nations or whatever—to set about establishing Research Institutes in all countries. The League of Nations would doubtless appoint Psychological Advisory Committees to assist in organization, and would feel justified in referring to a Central Advisory Body any problems that appeared to be capable of immediate solution. It is interesting to speculate on the constitution of this Central Board. To begin with we are safe in assuming that the new enthusiasm would be combined with a careful regard for tradition. Apart from its more realistic preoccupations the League has functioned, up to the present, not merely as a nursery for new idealizations, but as a forcing ground for traditional diplomacy. It would therefore decide on a 'thoroughly representative' Board. Having surmounted the difficulty of international representation it would next tackle the problem of representing different schools or branches of

psychology. In so doing it would gain the approbation of all scientifically minded people and at the same time prepare the way for ultimate stultification.

First of all the ancient seats of learning would be called upon to send delegates. And they would respond enthusiastically. A flock of Academic Psychologists would gather from Upsala, Oxford, Greifswald, St Andrews, Yale, Warsaw, Paris, Padua and Salamanca. Now whatever may be said about 'new' (that is to say, modern) psychologies, it is certain they were never spawned in academic waters. So the League would feel bound to invite representatives from various 'clinical schools.' It is possible but by no means certain that these would include a psycho-analytical delegate. Anyhow the list would be rounded off with a few distinguished freelance psychologists, *i.e.*, individuals who on the strength of earlier interests in metaphysics or humanism have developed psychological systems of their own. The whole Body would of course be leavened by the inclusion of a few biologists, invited under the misapprehension that biologists have 'something to do' with psychology.

Doubtless the first point to be decided by this Board would be the efficacy of preventive measures. At any rate we will assume that some member of the League Secretariat, having listened to an unusually acrimonious debate on disarmament decided to relieve his feelings by 'guying' the Psychological Board and submitted the following test question, *viz.* : *should children be allowed popguns?* Incidentally this is by no means a frivolous problem; it is one that has been totally and shamefully neglected by disarmament committees. For *if disarmament is a cure for war, it is only logical to inquire whether it should not be enforced in the nursery.*

It may be said at once that this issue would raise the most acute dissension. Even those representatives who appeared to agree would do so for different reasons. Thus it would be maintained by the 'humanists' and the 'environmental stimuli' school that to avoid inculcating or educating warlike tendencies,

children should *not* be allowed pop-guns. The 'behaviourists' would join with the 'play psychologists' in protesting that a child who has never seen a pop-gun will point his finger at his nurse and utter the magic monosyllable 'pop.' In so saying they merely emphasize the fact that the inventors of the pop-gun, to say nothing of the water pistol, the howitzer and the gas-shell, must have been themselves children.¹ Or more technically, that the child in his manipulation of external objects, both animate and inanimate, projects on to them his bodily functions and endows them with his own instinctual strivings. The 'active cathartic' school would then chime in to say that such being the case, it is clearly advantageous for children to be given 'firearms' to play with. But some 'suggestionists' would at once disagree. Favouring a system of defence by the 'reinforcement of antithetical ideas' they would insist on the contrary that all children should be given corked bottles and corkscrews. Their colleagues, the 'suggestionists by direct displacement,' would enter a protest here. They would say: there is no need to invert the situation: by all means let the child have his pop-gun, but substitute as soon as possible the game of tiddley-winks, and then divert his attention as soon as possible from tiddleywinks to crossword puzzles or to practical chemistry. This recommendation would immediately cause a small war between various 'fixation' schools. Seizing on the phrase 'as soon as possible,' the 'constitutional factor' group would say that a short period of gratification would be liable to induce traumatic 'fixation,' to make the child a secret and permanent addict to pop-gunnery. On the other hand, those interested in 'individual factors in fixation' would argue that it was risky to allow too long a period of gratification lest it should induce fixation to the gangster phase.

It is unnecessary to labour the point farther. The Central

¹ It is a sobering reflection that one of the most distinguished English pacifists of this century should be at the same time the author of a remarkable playbook for children called *Little Wars*.

Board would be unable to reach agreement. And if their Final Report took the form of this confession, all would be well. An honest disagreement honestly arrived at is an invaluable preliminary to more positive research. But it is too much to expect an International Advisory Board to admit advisory incapacity however temporary, more especially if the incapacity can be concealed behind Blue Books of majority and minority reports.

Had this problem of the pop-gun been put to a psycho-analyst, say about 25 years ago, his answer might have been much more emphatic than it would be now. In those days conceptions of mental conflict were greatly influenced by the discovery of actual *traumatic experiences*, i.e., environmental stimuli, which had occurred at critical phases in the childhood of the individual and round which it was felt most neurotic constructions were arranged. This view was an enormous advance on then existing theories of neurotic disorder by which the latter was attributed to some *immediate* adult factor, e.g., spinsterhood, childlessness, or shock from railway accidents. Then came the equally revolutionary discovery that the traumatic elements responsible for precipitating a neurosis *need not be real (environmental) experiences*, that an entirely phantastic system of unconscious ideas, if charged with sufficient energy, can give rise to neurotic disorder. Not only can phantastic (internal) systems induce neurotic reaction, but for the first few years of life the child constructs for itself *a phantastic external world* to which it reacts with apprehensiveness, fear, anger and hate. The real world, such as the adult recognizes, is real to the child only in so far as certain objects in the environment cater for the child's self-preservative and love needs. For the rest it is simply an anchorage for the projections of frustrated instinct, in particular, aggressive instinct. The development of this primitive animistic system has been sketched in the previous chapters. It only remains to add that the infant will see not only pop-guns but death-dealing instruments of war in paper-bags, in balloons, in Jacks-in-the-

Box, in puffs of smoke from the fire, in noisy bathroom pipes or in flapping curtains. It will misinterpret the masticatory noises of its nurse at tea-table, the crackling of dry toast, the squeak of shoes, the spluttering of kettles or the rattling of window casements, regarding these quite impartially as so many declarations of war on itself. The precautions and anxieties exhibited at this stage constitute what is naïvely called the 'nervousness' of the child although it is more obviously akin to madness. *In short we now know that in the absence of real external traumata stimuli the child will manufacture external stimuli of its own.*

Anyhow, it is apparent that the psycho-analysts' views on the significance of environmental factors must have passed through all the stages represented by the Majority and Minority Reports of the Central Board. And in terms of the pop-gun controversy these would, if assembled and all given equal value, end in contradiction. As a matter of fact it was due to a recognition of this difficulty that psycho-analysts have been in the past so chary (timid or conservative) in formulating behaviouristic codes. And so far they have reason to congratulate themselves. They have before them the awful example of enthusiastic parents who, more Royalist than the King, have swallowed hasty doses of badly compounded information and inflicted the result on their own children.

The psycho-analyst's delay has stood him in good stead. Extending the Horatian probationary period from seven to about thirty-five years, he has given himself time to discover a fundamental psychic situation common to all children up to the age of five. He is now able to show that these early mad and neurotic phases of development must be passed through by every child. And turning this discovery to advantage in the diagnosis of war situations, he adds that the *instincts giving rise to war phenomena belong to that period and to no other*. He also states that *the foundations of peace reactions are laid in the same period*, but is ready to agree that they are strengthened to some extent during the phases of childhood and early puberty.

It is evident that if a psycho-analyst were represented on the Advisory Board, his report on the pop-gun problem would be limited in the first instance to the statement that it was not in itself a problem but a red-herring. Anything that distracts attention from primary factors to one of a great number of secondary factors is ultimately an obstacle to research. Put this now in terms of adult or international disarmament and it runs : *disarmament is a secondary or auxiliary manœuvre fostering an artificial state of peace ; hence exaggeration of the importance of this factor is an obstacle to understanding and ultimately to attaining a stable peace organization.*

The reader will doubtless have arrived at the conclusion that if the foregoing is a sample of psycho-analytic thinking, the analyst must be not only a pessimist by profession but a confirmed sceptic as to the value of peace propaganda. To this the analyst would reply that there is no *a priori* justification for either optimism or pessimism in dealing with an instinctual problem ; secondly, that it is not pessimistic to take an exact measure of a problem, and finally that it is false optimism to be content with auxiliary devices, neglecting the prime factor. *If world disarmament (taking this in the sense of scrapping existing or modern weapons of aggression) were achieved to-morrow, the problem of war and peace would remain unsolved.*

‘ But,’ the critic will say, ‘ you must admit that if war and peace depend on the child’s reaction to a mad battle with primitive instinct, or relate to a wildly phantastic phase of development of reality sense, then we can only be secure provided the effects of this phase can be dealt with in a sufficient number of instances. At the very least all governing classes and officials of all countries in the world will have to be cured of any lasting effects of this phase. Don’t you think then the outlook is particularly black ? ’ This is an argument which might well have been advanced in the early days of diphtheria anti-toxin ; because you have discovered the *Bacillus diphtheriae* and

manufactured an anti-body, and because at the moment there isn't enough anti-body to 'go round,' don't you think the Public Health outlook is particularly blue? The fact is that the psycho-analyst is slowly grappling with this problem of the primitive phase of infancy and despite a chorus of cries of 'wolf' from professional colleagues has proceeded to evolve a form of treatment for adult insanity. And he is almost prepared to say that these mad states taken at a favourable opportunity, best of all during childhood, can be *radically* altered.

Once again I shall shelve the question whether the population as a whole can be psycho-analysed. Let us in the meantime consider possible alternatives. However he may estimate their depth of effect, the psycho-analyst is the last to deny that alternatives of some sort exist. Of the many reasons for forming this conclusion, the following may be cited: that most children and a few lunatics show a capacity to develop spontaneously out of such phases: that environmental factors, in particular the distribution of love and hate interest, play some part in this apparently spontaneous process: that non-analytical forms of treatment exist (suggestion, hypnosis), which bring about a readjustment of internal disturbances provided a definite environmental emotional situation (rapport) is established and maintained. Finally, although the analyst no longer regards early traumatic environmental factors as the main excitator of neurotic conflict, he does not deny that they have some significance. All he says is that they are secondary factors.

Nevertheless in so saying he has put himself under obligation to express some sort of opinion on the pop-gun issue. And provided his main point is conceded, he has no objection to any general formulation which does not exclude the possibility of elastic handling in individual cases. Agreeing that play has important ventilating, stabilizing, reassurance and research functions to perform, he will be in favour of giving even greater scope to play. He is aware that extra-familial necessity will impose limits to this activity, but will agree that intra-familial

limits might very well be extended. He will, however, stipulate that the child's play system should not be exploited by an adult for his or her own purposes, that the adult should not introduce either stimulating or inhibiting elements which have nothing to do with the child's immediate circle of interest or are beyond its scope. This naturally necessitates knowledge of the actual order of development of infantile interest. Put more generally : the spontaneous play manipulation of objects (including pop-gunlike objects) need not cause any perturbation in the parent's mind, *provided it does not take a form that is symptomatic and provided during this phase the parents are performing their parental functions adequately*. The function of the parents (preservative duties apart) is to provide and maintain a reassuring human environment (essentially loving the child without fear, jealousy or hate), during the animistic phase when the child is struggling with a phantastic and terrifying 'reality' mostly of its own construction.

Having rather laboriously arrived at this tentative and elastic formulation, let us use it as a measure of the environmental influences actually brought to bear on the child. Keeping in mind our main problem, how to influence the warlike or pacific tendencies of the child, let us put the following question : pop-guns apart, how do parents actually behave towards their children and what effect is that likely to have on the child's future behaviour? Expressed in a form that will appeal to psychologists with a bias in favour of the importance of environmental factors, the question is as follows : Even assuming that psychological environment has an important influence on future reactions to war and peace, what is that environment ; and secondly, if it is hoped to alter that environment, just how radical and comprehensive is the alteration going to be ?

It may be said at once that the only person in a position to answer the first part of the question satisfactorily is the psychoanalyst. The behaviourist it is true can give us sample

observations. And these are startling enough. Only to the analyst, however, is the stark truth painfully unfolded by both adult and child. *And the truth is that the human environment of the child is charged with feelings of anxiety and hate, with envy and jealousy, with tyrannical impatience and with aggressive and sadistic impulses which seldom stop short of psychic cruelty and sometimes proceed to positive physical cruelty.* In some instances these attitudes and impulses are not concealed (*vide* the records of the Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children): in many others they are mixed with or partly disguised by attitudes of parental love, care and patience. But these more or less obvious manifestations are less dangerous than the hidden tendencies. The fact has to be faced that behind a seemingly stable and dependable organization of parental, familial or social loving-kindness there are concealed attitudes of hate, anxiety and guilt towards children. Disguised frequently by a degree of genuine parental solicitude these tendencies are given indirect expression and provoke in the child in some instances even stronger counter-reactions of hate and fear than do the unvarnished cruelties recognized by the criminal code.

It is no mere matter of pop-guns. Within the first few weeks or days of life, the parents, having experienced some amount of preliminary ecstasy, begin to lay down policies which do not stop short of psychic and physical cruelty to their own babies. By the time the child has got the length of its first rag picture book, these tendencies have become consolidated into a silent conspiracy. There is hardly a picture or nursery rhyme book in existence which does not broadcast tales of cruelty, punishment and mutilation. There is certainly not one public park in Europe which cannot be justifiably described as a nursling's Star Chamber. True the children are not openly flogged, at any rate not so much as in earlier decades, but they are persistently subjected to psychic tyranny, torture and blackmail even by consciously well-meaning and solicitous 'child-minders.' And even if each individual case were traced to its home, there is no

guarantee that the actual mother will behave more reasonably. The hysterical loving mother is, after the baby, the world's first blackmailer. I say 'after the baby' advisedly. There is no need to gloss over the fact that the baby is a primitive organism, an exacting tyrant and parasite whose first maladroit performance is an unwitting attempt to rend its mother's body in labour, and who proceeds in its own interest and anxiety to blackmail its parents into accepting a situation that is frequently intolerable to the adult. *There is no need to moralize over the primitive attitudes of either parent or child. But if there is to be any attempt to control these primitive attitudes effectively, there is urgent need to pull aside the curtains of real and false sentiment that prevent recognition of the most dangerous forces in life.*

Here at any rate is a research on which psychologists of all schools can concentrate from different angles. When their results have been pooled and when the whole truth concerning familial relations is known, the ground will be to some extent prepared for a gigantic *experiment* in modification of psychological environment. Anything short of a large scale experiment will be useless. Only when a slightly disillusioned adult generation is prepared to abandon its technique of covering hate by love¹ and to cease exploiting or making vicarious

¹ A well-known pacifist, whose approach to the problem is mainly ethical, criticizes the importance attached to sadism in these essays. He expresses surprise that little or no mention is made of the positive love factors contributing to pacifist energies, and therefore takes exception to the view that the energies of war and pacifism have much in common. If people could only be persuaded to love one another more, the problem would, he thinks, be solved. I have never suggested that infantile and adult love energies however rarified do not promote peace. On the contrary the problem has been to explain why, despite all the natural tendencies in favour of peace, there is no certainty of peace. And the facts remain that *infantile* love tendencies are closely related to hate reactions, that conscious love is an excellent 'cover' for unconscious hate and that the energies driving the most active part of unconscious conscience are certainly sadistic in origin. Perhaps the best way of expressing the relation is to say that whereas a sufficient excess of love will certainly help to promote peace and a sufficient excess of hate will certainly promote war, the *uncertainties* of war and peace are due to various mixtures of unconscious *love and hate* which are well described as unconscious "ambivalence."

sacrifices of children, is there any real chance of arriving at a definite conclusion as to the importance of environmental factors in stimulating or inhibiting war-mindedness.

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And it is not only a question of familial environment. As the infant grows into childhood, it is passed from hand to hand and there is no certainty that any of these hands will refrain from striking it as it passes. It is indeed the proud boast of many English fathers that their children can still be flogged on the same public school whipping blocks on which they were themselves educated. There is still less guarantee that psychic blackmail will not be levied on the same journey, that the child will not be exposed to artifices of love and hate, praise and blame, petting or neglect, having as their unconscious object the appeasement of the adult's own sense of guilt. Once again there is here no question of moralizing over or taking sides in the eternal war between parents (or their substitutes) and the child (or its substitutes). Let us admit freely that many of these manoeuvres are intended to curb or divert the frankly primitive impulses of the child: and further, that to do him justice the adult is prepared to behave in the same way towards adults. He will fulminate from pulpits at the sins of society, from sociological platforms at signs of 'degeneracy' in the race; from the Opposition Bench at the acephalic stupidities of the Treasury. In fact cloaking his responsibilities behind the Majesty of the Law he will imprison, flog or decapitate his 'erring' contemporaries. But there is no special virtue in being indignant about this state of affairs. Indignation over misfortune (*i.e.*, painful function) is the privilege of the infant and the peculiarity of the savage. When an infant has a sudden colic, even those onlookers who cannot understand why it proceeds to kick the nurse in the stomach are ready to forgive it on the nurse's behalf, *i.e.*, to accord it a temporary privilege. When the savage has an abdominal pain he is prepared to pay a

medicine-man to deal with this magical attack by some counter-magic directed against a real or imagined enemy. This is a system which we Westerns are able to regard as 'peculiar' because we have hidden our own magical reactions under the guise of medical treatment. We pay a physician (scientist) to drive out inner enemies with purgatives, and we scare off our outer enemies with antiseptic sprays. The civilized adult who experiences a fine indignation over human frailties is behaving as one who would fly into a rage because there is such a thing as acute biliary colic. This blinding pain is essentially a problem of metabolic function. And the humane onlooker will be in a better position to correct or alleviate painful functioning if he keeps calm. He will certainly be ineffective if, on the plea that he has never experienced acute pain in his epigastric regions, he denies that there is any such organ as the liver. He will be equally ineffective if he turns his back on the sufferer because abdominal organs are 'not nice to think about.' *Any experiments in environmental influence, conducted with a view to immobilizing tendencies to war-like behaviour, can scarcely be called experiments until the actual facts have been ascertained without either indignation or aversion.*

If we express all this more technically it will be apparent that we have dealt with one aspect only of the environmental problem, viz. : how far modification of the sadistic influences brought to bear on children would ease the child's difficulties in dealing with its own destructive impulses. We know, however, that aggression and hate are the natural reaction, not only to attack from without but to the thwarting of *any* set of primitive impulses. Clearly then *the effect of frustration in general must be investigated* : are there any groups of primitive impulse subject to special frustration and inhibition ?

It will scarcely be denied by any reflective person that the whole group of sexual impulses (taking these in the broadest sense, from the primitive libidinal strivings of the newly born

infant to the organized and easily recognized impulses of the adult) are subject to a number of limitations imposed from without. These limitations are either arbitrary and irrational or rationalized on the strength of religious, moral, ethical or social sanctions. They are imposed with a degree of stringency, varying from the pressure of 'good form' to, in some countries, the pain of the lash or the ostracism of penal servitude. Knowing that there is a close connection between frustrated sexual impulses and hate reactions, it has sometimes occurred to psychoanalysts to consider whether in the case of infants and small children some more sane system of environmental response would reduce the child's struggle with sadistic hate. Being naturally cautious he has not gone beyond considering possibilities. Many self-appointed amateurs, however, have rushed in to conduct what they regard as 'experiments.' We are now familiar with 'enlightened' parents who will insist on ceremonial undressing before their children, or with even more enthusiastic reformers who believe that by altering this or that adult convention the millennium will come about.

The only conclusion that can be drawn from such 'experiments' is that the enthusiasm of the experimenter has paralysed his capacity for clear thinking. Granted that there is a dangerous component of sado-masochism in the parents' relation to the child, that the parental attitude to infantile sexual manifestations is absurdly alarmist, *all we are entitled to conclude is that alteration of these attitudes would give the child a better chance of adapting to reality.* It does not even follow that most children could or would take that chance. For the moment that is a matter of personal opinion. The optimistic experimentalist tends to neglect three important considerations. In the first place, the frustrated impulses giving rise to maximal hate-reactions never could be gratified in reality: they are too primitive, *i.e.*, impossible: secondly, the alterations in environment required by the child are equally impossible: thirdly, the attempted reassurances may actually frighten the child. As I once expressed

it, the gesture of ceremonial undressing before a child is, from the point of view of primitive impulse, like offering an alligator a bun : from the point of view of reassurance it may be as frightening as the appearance of a boa constrictor at the nursery tea table. And all the time the child may be more concerned with the shadow thrown by a curtain. In any case the child itself shows that really drastic measures are necessary to deal with its anxieties because it spontaneously employs the most primitive and powerful mental mechanisms to curb them. Hence *environmental alterations to be effective would have to be radical enough to obviate the necessity for projection or repression*. Now on this point the analyst can bring forward certain interesting if tentative conclusions. So far as his experience goes he has no reason to suppose that he can 'do away with' these developmental phases, but he does believe that given a suitable opportunity and sufficient time he can alter radically the effects of faulty function of these mechanisms.

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We are now in a position to give a straightforward reply to the questions left unanswered in the earlier parts of this chapter. The analyst believes that the environmental influences brought to bear on the child could be fundamentally altered to the great advantage of infantile adaptation. He is in favour of measures directed towards the elimination of sadism and sadistic inhibition from parental policies. He is even prepared to give his blessing to experimental research in these directions, provided the researches are not carried out by enthusiastic (biased) amateurs. On the other hand, although he believes that the phases of development responsible for war or peace reactions can be *favourably influenced* by environmental measures of a thorough and comprehensive kind, he cannot believe that such phases can be *radically altered* in this way. *He cannot say definitely that comprehensive changes in environmental policies will prove an effective safeguard against war*. Finally he says that the only

radical approach to the most primitive phases is a prolonged individual analytical approach, adding the rider that it may be impossible to bring about a deep change in the attitude of parents to their children until they too have been treated by the same process.

One can readily imagine the critic's reaction to all this. "At last," he will say, "the cat is out of the bag. You set out to make our flesh creep by a description of a Primitive Infantile Unconscious responsible for war and peace, and end by admitting that this system is accessible only to a highly specialized approach. Unless you can now show that this method can be applied to large numbers, you have wasted our time."

A more cynical observer might have difficulty in restraining the comment that there is evidently nothing like leather. This gibe would of course be unanswerable, and indeed I have never pretended that the views put forward are not psycho-analytical. Nor have I attempted to establish the validity of psycho-analytical principles, merely to apply these principles to the problems of war and pacifism. Even if we take for granted that nothing short of psycho-analysis of the race will safeguard against war—an extreme position which I have not so far maintained—the fact that psycho-analysis is a new and, numerically speaking, feeble instrument is no justification for either despair or contempt. It is true that owing to the peculiar psychological difficulties inherent in the work, psycho-analysis has not expanded so rapidly as other young sciences. By comparison bacteriology and immunology made more rapid strides in the first forty years. But then bacteriology never roused the same deep antagonisms: apart from an early phase of vilification by medical colleagues and a later passionate aversion to vaccine treatment on the part of a group of lay people, bacteriology soon wrested for itself both popular and academic recognition. And at the present time it gathers moral, financial and scientific support not only in every civilized country, but in every county-town, almost in every village.

Psycho-analysis has not expanded and may never expand at the same rate, although already organized Institutes are to be found in most civilized countries. But there is no reason to assume that given time and the overcoming of psychological inhibitions, antagonism and inertia, it will not advance to the stage of performing an important ventilating function.

The details of this expansion may for the moment be left to the Utopist. The latter will doubtless visualize an age when the number of available analysts will equal the existing number of nurses, teachers, scout-masters, psycho-therapists, faith healers, quack doctors, prison warders, commissioned officers, monarchs and hangmen. This could in fact be achieved at a cost much less than 0.1 per cent. of the total sum spent on armament, and without the loss of one life.

In the meantime these Utopian considerations can be more objectively expressed in the form of a time factor. Those who believe that war will never die out are bound to concede that there is ample time in which to organize psychological preventive measures. But even if it is held that another large-scale war will break out fifty years hence, there is yet time to take some elementary precautions. For example, given co-operation from the parties concerned, there is time to find out how many dictators, Foreign Secretaries, diplomats and peace delegates suffer from psycho-sexual impotence or have a secret fear of impotence. A prerequisite of this co-operation is, however, common recognition of two important facts, viz.: that impotence in some cases contributes to pacific tendencies, whilst unconscious fear of impotence is a common cause of war-mindedness and grandiosity. Space forbids any elaboration of those psycho-pathological factors. But it is just possible that fifty years might suffice to establish in the governing classes the beginnings of a system of psychological 'good form.' In this hygienic country, we have seen the beginnings of sanitary good form. We have, it is true, seen that sanitary scrupulosity can run mad. But at least some positive benefits have accrued. I

is no longer good form for a man with a streaming cold to sneeze unguarded over the bridge table, or to wave a wet handana in the faces of his friends. Some day it may be bad form for an anxiety hysteric to assume Cabinet rank¹ during an attack of anxiety, or for a 'persecutory type' to act as an Ambassador during an international crisis, or for an obsessional neurotic suffering from indecision and compulsive doubt to preside at a Disarmament Conference. This again may be an Utopian view. In any case, there is no advantage to be gained by starting work in a state of impatience, optimism or discouragement. Doubtless the most realistic course would be to sit down soberly and draw up a Thousand Years' Plan aimed at the resolution of unconscious conflict without recourse to war.

¹ Since writing this I have made a few discreet inquiries both directly and through reliable indirect sources as to the incidence of neurotic or characterological idiosyncracies amongst Cabinet Ministers past and present in two countries. The results are, of course, statistically worthless, but it is clear that neurotic foibles and inhibitions are at any rate not less common in this than in other groups. In course of this tentative investigation, I have encountered the apologetic argument that the neuroses of Ministers of the Crown are irrelevant since the individuals in question are busy living up to an official façade or administrative ideal. I am prepared to admit that the existence of such façades is to a certain extent a safeguard: but I have never found that they operated effectively in the case of less exalted neurotics. In the long run neurosis, like murder, will out: and, to qualify the aphorism of a celebrated military dictator who was also an intuitive psychologist, "Neurotic Character is Destiny in Burlesque."

An Outline of Research

"I am sorry to say that it is a common practice with romancers to announce their hero as a man of extraordinary genius and then leave his works entirely to the reader's imagination; so that at the end of the book you whisper to yourself ruefully that but for the author's solemn preliminary assurance you should hardly have given the gentleman credit for ordinary good sense."—SHAW: *Man and Superman*, 1903, Dedicatory Epistle, pp. xxv-vi.

SHAW's criticism of the romancer on the score of slipshodness of method can, with a few verbal alterations, be applied with equal cogency to the publications of some reformers. In not a few instances the practical proposals of the humanitarian are in inverse ratio to his zeal. Not that this is any aspersion on the zealot. Even if it were universally true—which is far from the case—propagandist enthusiasm can function usefully as a thorn in the well-protected flesh of the unimaginative. Nor is the plain blunt man altogether in the right, when, stung to reprisal, he roundly accuses the reformer of substituting the products of a heated imagination for sound common sense. In this respect the plain man shares with the nineteenth-century scientist the fallacious view that imagination has no place in scientific method. Imagination—by which is implied the application of unconscious modes of thought to mundane affairs—is the most economical of all instruments of research. Discovery is simply a process of short-circuiting modes of thought, observation and adaptation, which being generally accepted are regarded as rational rather than rigid: discoveries come about mostly through an elaboration of conscious content by the unconscious processes of symbolism, identification and condensation. Nevertheless, both layman and scientist are in the right when they take exception to the 'heat' of the reformer's

imagination. In other words, unconscious modes of thinking are invaluable, provided of course they do not stray from the subject, whereas both unconscious and conscious affects (potential and actual emotions) are more often than not obstacles to research and end as a rule in false conclusions.

What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. It has to be admitted that many psychologists fall between two stools. On the one hand they are inclined to treat psychology as the romancer would a combined hero, oracle and genius : on the other they are proud to ape the manners of the positive scientist, to accept his fallacies and by excluding imagination to commit scientific *hari-kiri*. This latter tendency accounts to some extent for the arid nature of old academic psychologies and for the laboratory frills and overalls of much experimental psychology. That clinical schools of psychology are credited with some vital quality is due not so much to their concern with 'human documents' as to the fact that in a great deal of this work, unconscious processes are not only uncovered in the object of investigation, but used as part of a research technique. Open recognition of these facts, together with a frank admission of the confusion due to unconscious emotion, permits an adequate approach to any problem without assuming either omnipotence or esoteric privilege. Once this method of approach through unconscious processes is more widely recognized, a good deal of the prestige-anxiety or heartburning which attaches to research work (*e.g.*, whether it is good or bad, brilliant or dull, useful or useless) will disappear. The value of any one piece of research will depend on the distribution of interest as between conscious and unconscious aspects of the problem, and as between conscious and 'unconscious' methods of approaching it. Following these general principles I have drawn up a very rough sketch of a possible organized research on war. Although it does not pretend to be comprehensive, this outline may conceivably serve to suggest that a psychological approach to war problems is something more than an academic day-dream.

OUTLINE OF RESEARCH ON THE PROBLEM OF WAR

(For the consideration of some future International War Research Board)

PREMISES

- (I) That there are individual and social advantages to be gained by the Abolition of War : nevertheless,
- (II) that these are periodically offset by individual or social advantages to be obtained in or through a war situation ;
- (III) that in the estimation of advantages conscious judgment is not necessarily a decisive factor.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

To investigate the relations of War to Peace and Pacifism, and to report from time to time on :

- (1) the practicability of large-scale preventive experiments,
- (2) the practicability of finding substitutes for the advantages of war,
- (3) the practicability of eliminating war advantages.

DURATION

Researches to be organized using time-units of from 5 to 50 years. A formal Interim Report to be presented to existing National Governments, and/or a central organization at the end of 50 years. Tentative conclusions arrived at by short-period researches to be available on application. Small-scale experiments to be conducted over a minimum period of 15 years. Large-scale experiments to be planned on 100 to 1,000 years' basis. Except in case of urgency no large-scale experiment to be initiated before the lapse of 50 years, *i.e.*, before some degree of objective estimation of data has been achieved.

WORKING HYPOTHESES FOR THE GUIDANCE OF INVESTIGATORS

- (1) That, superficial descriptive criteria apart, War and Peace do not stand in an antithetical relationship. War is not simply the opposite of Peace or Peace the counterpart of War. They have common origins but are forced into an arbitrary relation owing to some outstanding differences in end-results. Nevertheless,
- (2) that on the whole there is a general tendency to cathartic abreaction in War and a general tendency to defence by reaction-formation in peace :
- (3) that these general tendencies are combined in the case of both War and Peace with a number of other primary and secondary (auxiliary) tendencies, the operation of which requires individual investigation. Many, probably the great majority, of these tendencies are to be found operative under both war and peace conditions (*e.g.*, masochistic factors) :
- (4) that investigation of war and peace tendencies cannot be limited merely to investigation of mechanisms bringing about pro- or anti-war (pacifist) attitudes respectively :
- (5) that War and Peace are functional phenomena. Their functions cannot be accurately estimated without some understanding of mental function in general, in both its individual and social aspects :
- (6) that in regard to individual aspects, consciousness under ordinary conditions gives access to superficial phenomena only :
- (7) that unconscious mental systems exist in a dynamic as distinct from a descriptive sense.

METHODS OF INVESTIGATION

I. DIRECT

- A. *At conscious levels*.—Behaviouristic data in general. Ordinary data of introspection. Selected (Method "A.")
- B. *At preconscious levels*.—Available on closer unselected introspection with or without the assistance of suggestion or hypnosis. (Method "B.")
- C. *At unconscious levels*.—Available to some extent with the assistance of deep hypnosis otherwise accessible only to psycho-analytic methods. (Method "C.")

II. INDIRECT

Inferences drawn from the study of historical records or products of human activity

- (a) following rational systems of thought,
- (b) following irrational (unconscious) systems of thought. (Method "D.")

PRELIMINARY COLLECTION OF DATA

I. ON WAR

A. *Adult War*

- (1) Indirect : History of adult war in primitive, barbaric civilized races : individual and group aspects. (Approach by Method "D" : conducted by research teams selected for immediate convenience from different civilized countries. When this survey relates to the recent history of any one civilized country, the research should, as far as conscious and preconscious aspects are concerned, be conducted or controlled by an international team.) Special research on the psychological sequence of group events leading to any one outbreak.

- (2) Direct : Investigation (Methods " A," " B," " C ") of combatants or ex-combatants with a view to ascertaining (a) the psychological sequence of individual events through the pre-war phase up to and including the outbreak of war, (b) conscious and unconscious impulses and reactions under war conditions, (c) the psychological sequelæ of war experience in apparently stable as well as obviously unstable (symptom-forming) individuals. Examples : character changes in stable individuals : war neuroses, psychoses, etc., in unstable individuals.

B. Adolescent War. (Methods " A," " B," " C " and " D.")

- (1) The constitution of adolescent groups.
- (2) The hostile aspects of inter-group relations.
- (3) The hostile relations of adult to adolescent groups :
(a) physical, examples : initiation ceremonies in primitive tribes, flogging of adolescents ; (b) mental : psychic aggrandizement, moral discipline or strictures, reproach, exhortation, etc.
- (4) The hostile relations of adolescent to adult groups :
(a) physical : occasionally attacks of violence ;
(b) mental : hostility, contempt, scorn, caricature, negativism, rebellion.

C. Child War. (Methods " A," " B," " C," " D.") Subjects as in Section B (1), (2), (3) and (4), substituting ' child ' for ' adolescent ' and ' familial group ' for ' adult group.'

D. Infantile War. (Methods " A," " B," " C " and " D.") (Method " C," i.e., direct analytical exploration, is usually inapplicable before the age of eighteen months, i.e., before the child can use some verbal expression or at any rate apprehend verbal communication. Analytical inferences can, however, be drawn from properly oriented observation of infants up to that

age.) Problems : (1) the psychological constitution of the infant ; (2) the hostile aspects of individual infantile relations (*a*) to other individual infants, (*b*) to nursery groups with and without nursery adults—nurses, parents, etc. ; (3) as in Section B substituting ‘ infantile ’ for ‘ adolescent ’ and ‘ nursery adults ’ for ‘ adult groups.’

II. ON PACIFISM

A. *Adult Pacifism*

- (1) Indirect (Method “ D ”): The history of adult pacifism in primitive, barbaric and civilized races. (In the case of primitive and barbaric races it is difficult to disentangle this issue from the issues of animism and religion respectively. In the case of civilized races the relation of pacifism to religious systems is obscured by more abstract moral considerations and by more concrete economic preoccupations.) Examples : How various tribes or races come to terms with enemies : the preponderance of mechanisms of introjection and projection in pacifist technique ; *e.g.*, how far certain groups deal with hate by establishing a system of *inner* enemies, how far others prefer *external* enemies : a comparison of systems : animism-magic : religion-forgiveness : sociology-peace conferences.
- (2) Direct (Methods “ A,” “ B ” and “ C ”): (*a*) the technique of pacifist groups before, during or after war : (*b*) the psychological sequence of events in individual pacifists before, during and after war.

B. *Adolescent Pacifism*

- (1) Indirect (Method “ D ”).
- (2) Direct (Methods “ A,” “ B ” and “ C ”).

C. *Child Pacifism*

- (1) Indirect (Method " D ").
- (2) Direct (Methods " A," " B " and " C ").

D. *Infantile Pacifism*

- (1) Indirect (Method " D ").
- (2) Direct (Methods " A," " B " and " C ").

(To avoid tedious repetition it may be said that, substituting the terms ' pacifist ' and ' peace ' for ' hostile ' and ' war,' the problems arising in these various sub-sections are identical with the problems described in Section I on War. In this respect sub-section D on Infantile Pacifism is by far the most important : *e.g.*, how the infant comes to terms with its enemies (real or imaginary). Other important researches are : the relations of adult to adolescent, child and infantile groups in respect of pacifist technique : pacifist substitutes for physical violence (flogging, etc.) ; *e.g.*, psychic systems of inhibition and/or exhortation on the part of the adult or adult group : systems of expiation or restitution on the part of the child or infant.)

III. ON PEACE

As peace phenomena comprise practically the whole territory of psychology and psychological anthropology, investigations must be concentrated in the first instance on important aspects, leaving more complete surveys till later. It has been suggested that an Interim Report should be drawn up at the end of fifty years : this condition might well apply to the systematization of peace phenomena. The most important lines of selected research can be arranged as under. To avoid repetition it may be taken for granted that in each case the research would need to be divided in accordance with material and method, *i.e.*, Direct and Indirect Observation subdivided in accordance with the depth of the method of investigation, *viz.*, conscious, pre-conscious and unconscious, and the nature of the material, *viz.*, infantile, pre-pubertal, adolescent and adult ; and again, savage, barbaric or civilized.

SYSTEMATIC APPROACH

A. ON THE NATURE OF PRIMITIVE INSTINCT

- (I) The development and modification of primitive destructive impulse : individual and group aspects.
- (II) The development and modification of primitive sexual impulse : individual and group aspects.
- (III) The history of fusions of destructive and sexual impulse ; *e.g.*, sadism, masochism, etc. : individual and group aspects.

B. ON THE NATURE OF PRIMITIVE DEFENCE MECHANISMS

- (I) Projection : animism ; destructive magic ; infantile fear systems involving the external world ; external enemies.
- (II) Introjection : immanence ; demoniacal possession ; infantile systems of inner persecution ; primitive unconscious conscience : internal enemies.
- (III) Repression.
- (IV) Cathartic reactions : (a) Social : infant tantrums ; adolescent and adult orgies ; love, war and death ceremonials in the primitive adult ; saturnalia ; lynching ; gangsterism ; rioting. (b) Individual : hysteria, certain forms of insanity.
- (V) Self-punishment and expiatory mechanisms : self-injury, abasement, suicide, religious penance and flagellation.
- (VI) Punishment of others : blame, mental and physical discipline : flogging, torture, blood sports, murder ; black magic in the primitive adult.
- (VII) Expiation by restitution : absolution through works of grace : (a) social : philanthropy, reform, white magic in the primitive : (b) individual : obsessional neurosis and certain character peculiarities.

C. ON THE NATURE OF PRIMITIVE EMOTIONAL STATES (AFFECT)

- (I) Tension affects (due to increased instinct excitation with or without actual frustration): *e.g.*, anxiety, guilt, apprehension.
- (II) Mixed affects (due partly to tension, partly to inhibition of discharge and partly to discharge): *e.g.*, irritability, anger, etc.
- (III) Discharge affects: *e.g.*, anger, grief, depression.
Application of conclusions to specific problems: the relation of anxiety to fear, of anxiety and fear to guilt, of anxiety, guilt and fear to hate and aggression: war.

Application of these further conclusions to hostility reactions of groups (*a*) social forms, (*b*) war.

D. ON THE NATURE OF PRIMITIVE CHARACTER FORMATIONS:

infantile and savage: the earliest organized defence systems acting as a buttress against aggressive and destructive impulse and providing common ground for reality relations with environment.

E. ON THE PRIMITIVE RELATIONS OF ENVIRONMENT TO THE INDIVIDUAL

- (I) The gratification of aggressive and destructive impulses by the adult on the infant, child, adolescent and adult respectively: (*a*) mental: blame, exhortation, threatening, withdrawal of love, excommunication, ostracism, etc., (*b*) physical: starving, beating (infant), flogging, imprisonment, torture, (children and adults), execution (adult).
- (II) The inhibition of infant aggressive impulses by the adult: (*a*) by example: display of adult anxiety, (*b*) by the methods indicated in Section I (*a*) and (*b*).
- (III) The encouragement of infant aggressive impulses by the adult: (*a*) by example: display of adult

aggression, (b) by precept, inculcation of principles of pugnacity, (c) by direct tuition.

(IV) The gratification of primitive sexual impulse by the adult on the infant and child : seduction, etc.

(V) The inhibition of infantile sexual impulse by the adult.

(VI) The encouragement of infantile sexual impulse by the adult.

Conclusions drawn from above to be applied to specific problems, *e.g.*, the influence of various parental and social policies on unconscious anxiety, guilt and hate, and on conscious hate and aggressiveness towards objects or groups : war.

F. ON THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF 'PLAY': infantile, savage and adult : the possibility of influencing unconscious impulse and reaction through adult interference with spontaneous play ; cradle games, nursery games, school games, sports, hobbies, etc. (These problems are closely concerned with the unconscious mechanism of *sublimation*. Owing to considerations of space the mechanism of sublimation has not been described in this book. It is sufficient to say that sublimation has an important bearing on war problems. In the first place sublimation is concerned with the unconscious deflection in non-sexual directions of frustrated energy derived from primitive sexual impulse. In so far as these frustrated impulses constitute a psychic danger to the child and arouse anxiety followed by hate and aggression towards external objects, faulty or inadequate sublimation must be a factor in war-readiness. The second point is that the existence of highly charged unconscious aggressive impulse interferes with the equally unconscious processes of sublimation and therefore is both directly and indirectly a factor in war. The question of whether aggressive impulses can be sublimated is still *sub judice*. Aggressive impulses can be deflected or inhibited or held in suspension by love impulses : it is questionable if they are ever sublimated in

the strict sense of the term. This subject alone requires prolonged research before even a fair generalization can be arrived at.)

SPECIAL PROBLEMS

In addition to these systematized researches, there are a number of sociological and anthropological peace problems which, although apparently self-contained, have a more or less direct bearing on war. These specialized researches are bound to overlap with the more general systematized researches described above. A certain amount of overlapping is, however, positively advantageous, and in any case the existing machinery of investigation is so well organized (Societies, Institutes, Leagues, etc.) that it would be in many cases a waste of energy not to use this machinery. In other cases there is no machinery of investigation and the material is so inaccessible that special organizations would have to be built up to enable research to begin.

A. CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH

As a rule crime is regarded from a moral or sociological point of view, rarely as a psychological functional phenomenon. There are two particular aspects of criminology that concern the student of war and peace. First of all there is the purely individual aspect, the degree to which impulses towards criminal behaviour tend to run parallel to the impulses giving rise to war-mindedness. Perhaps more important is the function of crime in providing the average individual or social group with a vicarious outlet for unconscious guilt and self-punishment tendencies. It would be important to establish just how far society unconsciously exploits the existence of a criminal element in its midst ; how far under existing circumstances the stabilization of peace tendencies depends on the maintenance of a criminal class and a penal code. An interesting speculation is what effect the reduction of criminal activity would have on

pacifist and warlike tendencies respectively assuming that no other environmental changes took place or were effected *pari passu*. Apart from a systematic investigation of criminology and penology, an interesting post-war research would be the exact appraisal of alleged post-war waves of crime.

B. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Apart from more systematic research there are many special problems relating to war which require anthropological handling. In particular the relation of projection of hate (animistic systems) to the social organization of different tribes and to their killing systems (individual and social) requires prolonged and detailed study 'in the field.' On the theoretical side, the question of primal origins (incest taboos, sadism, guilt and group solidarity) requires more vigorous and imaginative handling than it receives at present. Anthropology has to a large extent been dominated by the conscious, self-preservative aspects of sociology, and needs to be injected with a more psychological tendency. Failing this new orientation, research will have to be suspended until a psychological branch of anthropology has been established and its members trained to use analytical methods of approach.

C. TEAM RESEARCH ON THE RELATION OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL DATA TO THE DATA OF INSANITY, NEUROSIS AND INFANTILE DEVELOPMENT RESPECTIVELY

In particular the relation of hate to primitive social systems, to the incidence of neuroses and psychoses and to the infantile forms of madness. How far war is a composite product due to regression to these levels of development.

D. TEAM WORK ON THE EXPLOITATION OF INJURY SYSTEMS

The functional exploitation of interest in organic illness, accidents, injuries, mutilations, malformations, monstrosities, etc., as a means of immobilizing unconscious destructive impulses.

E. RESEARCH ON THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF GROUPS

Current phenomenological surveys which are mainly concerned with adult manifestations should be wound up as soon as possible, and the energies of 'conscious' group psychologists diverted to the phenomena of child and adolescent groups. The psychologist of the 'unconscious' may be left in charge of the investigation of 'nursery' groups. The relations of individual to group psychology should be re-examined on an analytical basis. Here again research may have to be suspended until new scientific organizations or branches are built up.

F. RESEARCH ON THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF GROUP FUNCTION

The only justification for singling out these problems from other group researches is that in official pacifist circles great importance is attached to the difficulties inherent in organization by nations. It is frequently argued that a principal cause of war lies in multiplicity of administrations arranged on a more or less arbitrary racial basis. It cannot be denied that nationalist organizations frequently flout economic common sense. And it is certainly true that in many cases the tendency to territorial aggrandizement promotes both Chauvinistic friction and irredentist enthusiasm. Powerful as at first sight these rational arguments appear, there is no doubt that they function to a large extent as dangerous rationalizations. Individual psychological investigation shows that behind these reality relations lie some of the deepest infantile interests, *e.g.*, a sexual (symbolic) valuation of the 'stranger,' 'foreigner,' 'black' or 'yellow' man. Although less easy to detect in the case of war between, say, two European nations of roughly the same colour and culture, they can be observed almost entirely undisguised in the case of 'colour' barriers. The only effective counter to racial war cries and 'race peril' propaganda is to investigate the unconscious psychological factors leading to territorial aggrandizement and at the same time to lay bare the deep individual (emotional) factors which induce a state of racial 'inflammability.'

G. RESEARCH ON THE EFFECT OF ENVIRONMENTAL (PSYCHIC) INHIBITORY SYSTEMS

As far as effect on infantile and child development is concerned, this matter is already *sub judice*. But complementary researches should be carried out by trained diagnosticians on the therapeutic effect on the adolescent and adult of religious, moral, ethical and conventional systems of inhibition. In this connection the possibility of deleterious effects should be carefully explored. An interesting collateral research would be on the variation at different periods of religious practice, both active and passive in regard to war.

H. ON THE THERAPEUTIC RELATION OF LOVE TO HATE AND GUILT RESPECTIVELY

The 'screening' and reassurance functions of love phenomena. (This factor might almost have been introduced as a special condition governing all research, viz., that no love impulse towards an object can be taken at its face value until it can be shown to exist apart from a hate interest towards the same object. Witness, *e.g.*, the fact that violent hysterical love invariably relates in part to unconscious hate or fear.)

I. ON THE RELATION OF SEXUAL ANTAGONISM TO WAR

This is only one of a series of typical problems. The importance of antagonism between generations has already been dealt with in detail in the systematic sections (inter-group hostility). Clearly the Abraham-Isaac *motif* is repeated in the situation of the Elder Statesmen sending the younger generations to war, 'sacrificing their sons,' etc. And here the factors of unconscious fear and sexual jealousy are a first consideration. This leads naturally to the problem of unconscious antagonism between the sexes. This is important not only because it represents an as yet unmeasured reservoir of hate in human relations, but because such antagonism can get outlet in war situations, *e.g.*,

mothers sending their sons to war, wives their husbands, and girls their brothers or betrothed.

J. ON THE 'SCREENING' FUNCTION OF ECONOMIC FACTORS IN WAR

Assuming that the economic factors are thoroughly worked out by trained economists, the problem of their influence on war conditions must be taken over by the psychologist. The main point to investigate here is the degree of 'screening' (cover, masking) afforded unconscious motivation by conscious preoccupation with reality (and mainly self-preservative) situations. A second problem is the degree to which unconscious factors interfere with (a) the accurate estimation of economic data and mechanisms (*cf.* the confusion and heat engendered in England by discussions of Free Trade/Protection issues), and (b) the application of data objectively arrived at. If economic factors promote war readiness, why not estimate these accurately and having estimated them proceed if possible to their elimination? In this connection the factors of psychic 'inertia,' psychological 'stupidity,' etc., require careful investigation.

K. ON THE DEPTH OF RATIONALIZATION SYSTEMS

Rationalization can justly be called the last line of *unconscious* defence. 'Conscious' rationalization is not a good term: there are already in existence several equivalents (*e.g.*, day-dreaming, phantastic lying, plain lying, prevarication, equivocation, doubt, discussion for discussion's sake, etc.) which characterize conscious mechanisms. Pure rationalization is unconscious. It is essential to establish just how deeply this unconscious process extends. It is important because on an accurate estimation of its depth the success of all propagandist systems ultimately depends. For example, the success of a League of Nations Union meeting is seriously threatened by the working of several rationalizations, not the least of which is that a pacifist is necessarily pacific in reaction.

INVESTIGATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PREVENTION

These investigations fall naturally into three categories : an exploration of the advantages of war with a view to securing their elimination ; an investigation of the barrier spontaneously erected between primitive impulse and end-behaviour with a view to substituting, if possible, an improved system or systems ; and an investigation of *ad hoc* measures of inhibition (precautions).

I. EXPLORATION OF THE ADVANTAGES OF WAR

It has been laid down as a premiss that there are advantages to be gained in war situations. This claim is based not on the usual economic arguments (sociological, national, individual, etc.), but on the facts already ascertained as to primary and secondary psychic 'gains' which can be demonstrated in the most 'painful' neuroses and psychoses. The primary psychic gain in suicide is a case in point. To this basis of fact is added the essentially clinical hypothesis that war is a functional phenomenon, an end result of the conflict of forces involving a considerable amount of abreaction of earlier emotional experience as well as positive discharge of unconscious destructive, sexual and other instincts. The present investigation is not intended to establish this premiss, but to estimate the *amount* of gain. In this way rather naive (*i.e.*, one-sided) propaganda as to the moral and physical loss involved in war will be made much more balanced and therefore much more effective.

Here again some overlapping in research will be unavoidable. The first step in exploring advantages will be the *elimination of processes of rationalization*. This mechanism has already been dealt with in the section on Peace Research, but it will require special re-examination in the present connection. The difficulty can be best exemplified by the case of penological controversy.

Much bitter feeling can be aroused and confusion of counsel prevail owing to the reformist tendency to turn a blind eye to the 'gains' of a penological system or attitude. The 'heat' although in the long run an obstacle to reform (*i.e.*, to more effective adaptation) is natural. It is easy to establish clinically that much of the violent antagonism to beating is due to the reformer's struggle with unconscious desires or needs to be beaten. This easily established fact does not, of course, weaken any reality arguments against beating any more than a hearty enthusiasm for the 'sound flogging' of others proves the case for corporal punishment. It only goes to show that in any investigation of effective adaptation, special pleaders should be asked to withdraw.

II. STUDY OF SPONTANEOUS BARRIERS OR MECHANISMS DEALING WITH PRIMITIVE IMPULSE

This involves a re-examination of the factors dealt with in the section on Peace Problems (p. 82). It should be conducted with one special problem in mind, viz., whether those spontaneous defensive formations, which function unconsciously throughout the life of every individual, can be reduced or eliminated (where they operate in favour of war) or be substituted by less dangerous forms or can be *copied* (where they operate against warlike behaviour, or reduce potentialities of war-readiness). In regard to attempts to alter spontaneous methods it has been laid down (p. 70) that such attempts must be almost as radical as the primitive mechanisms they are intended to supplant. Only by the closest and most comprehensive study of the actual dynamic barriers to primitive gratification, by discovering what needs elimination and what requires imitation or reinforcement, is there the faintest hope of finding out what might be done to prevent war.

Apart from repression—which is essentially a flight reaction—and projection (see pp. 19–21) which is an emergency measure successful as a rule only in the case of small quantities of energy and only then with the assistance of repression, the main lines of defence consist either in inhibition or substitute gratification. But these are all methods of dealing with *existing* tension. It is easy to see that other ways of approach are possible. In fact we can subdivide the research in accordance with whether we are concerned with the *accumulation* of tension, with its *inhibition* or suspension, and thirdly, with its *discharge*.

A. ON PREVENTING THE ACCUMULATION OF PRIMITIVE INSTINCT TENSION

It has been shown (p. 18) that the factor of anxiety is itself sufficient not only to bring about the frustration of instinct but to stimulate aggressive impulse. Here we have a focal research on the problem of accumulation. Eliminate (if that is possible) some anxiety reactions, and you will certainly reduce the accumulation of tension and therefore reduce hostility reactions. Find out therefore which types of anxiety are capable of elimination and formulate experiments along these lines.

B. ON MODES OF INHIBITING OR COUNTERACTING EXISTING STATES OF PRIMITIVE TENSION

Here there are two main lines of approach :—

- (1) Unconscious systems of inhibition (a) without disturbance of the processes of reflection, (b) affecting also the processes of reflection. From the point of view of safety any processes interfering with reflection prevent the interpolation of an adequate *period of delay* in discharge of instinct tension. On the other hand, processes of reflection can be spun out in an excessive (obsessional) manner. This may be as dangerous as the short-circuiting

of reflection, *cf.*, disarmament conferences ending in panic and policies of increased armament.

- (2) Exploitation of love systems in order to hold primitive instinct in check or to make good the imaginary crimes of unconscious sadism.

Of these two systems the second is the more convenient, but it involves excessive expenditure of psychic energy and, if unsuccessful, may cause a good deal of personal unhappiness. Nevertheless, there is ample scope for the experimental application of orderly principles of environmental influence provided all the factors in the situation are made conscious.

C. ON MODES OF DISCHARGING PRIMITIVE TENSION

- (1) *Primal discharge* (mostly impossible, dangerous where possible owing to retaliation or threat of retaliation from environment).
- (2) Discharge by *part-projection* (possible in emergency, dangerous in excess because it distorts external reality).
- (3) Discharge by *internalization* (possible: dangerous in excess, because it distorts reality feeling).
- (4) Discharge by *displacement*
 - (a) to secondary objects, the aim of the impulse remaining unchanged: *e.g.*, a child killing a fly instead of attempting to kill its mother; an adult breaking coals instead of breaking heads or destroying an opponent's argument instead of destroying his body (useful when displacement certain: dangerous because the *aim* of the instinct is unaltered):
 - (b) displacement to secondary objects combined with alteration of the *aim* of the impulse: the classical mechanism of *sublimation*: applies so far only to primitive sexual impulse and to the sexual

components of sadism : unconscious in operation : *e.g.*, infant clambering up a ladder or child climbing a tree instead of attempting an infantile seduction of its mother or nurse : adult attempting to climb Mount Everest. One of the safest of unconscious mechanisms because the *aim* is altered, but can of course regress. Difficulty in application : that it is an unconscious not a conscious process like child guidance.

(It may have been remarked that, throughout, no mention has been made of education, pedagogy, etc. The reason may be stated here, viz. : that education is in essence an artificial expedient or experiment initiated by environment ostensibly to promote reality adaptation, but unconsciously to influence the mechanism of displacement in certain directions. Education has also (at present at any rate) much in common with inhibition but these aspects are usually glossed over by emphasizing displacement mechanisms. It follows that the influence of formal education on peace or pacifism cannot be accurately estimated until the exact range of displacement and of other unconscious mechanisms has been estimated.)

(5) COMPLEX MECHANISMS FOR DISCHARGE OF PRIMITIVE INSTINCT

The scope of this research can best be indicated by considering the phenomenon of *wit* discharge. The characteristic of wit is that it combines a number of unconscious and a few preconscious mechanisms. The result of this combination is that some primitive tensions obtain explosive discharge. But the discharge under ordinary circumstances does not injure the onlookers although it may sometimes hurt (psychically injure) any immediate object of the wit tendency (victim). And as a rule, obscene wit apart, the discharge is not out of harmony with the individual's code of behaviour.

(Assuming that all these and many other supplementary researches are carried to a conclusion, the successful application of results in the form of experiments depends on the degree to which an accurate perspective can be gained of the *total function of a primitive instinct barrier*.)

III. INVESTIGATION OF THE VALUE OF *AD HOC* PREVENTIVE EXPERIMENTS

This is a branch of research which could be expanded indefinitely and might run away with a good deal of valuable energy. A condition for initiating research should be that the method in question seems capable of practical application. Illustrative problems: to investigate the advisability of submitting politicians, diplomats and civil servants of high administrative rank to a psychological examination. Already diplomats and civil servants are compelled to submit to an examination of certain of their intellectual faculties and faculties of memory. The new examination would be aimed at discovering those individuals whose psychic and emotional make-up renders them 'suspect' or 'dangerous' from the point of view of concealed war reactions. As a preliminary to establishing reliable diagnostic criteria, many investigations of 'random samples' would have to be carried out. This would apply in the first case to true unselected samples, but it would be useful to apply the sampling system to special groups, *e.g.*, lawyers, members of parliament, political agents, newspaper proprietors, the administrative staff in employers' associations and labour unions, schoolmasters, and so forth. Yet another precautionary measure would be essential, *viz.*: an examination of sample groups of psychologists. It should be a prerequisite of all research that the investigators are themselves investigated. (Interestingly enough pure psycho-analysis is the only science which attempts to control error along these more personal lines. It is a hard and fast rule of training Institutes in all countries

that no one should do consultative or therapeutic work in psycho-analysis until he has himself been analysed. This is a measure that at least Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs might be requested to observe before embarking on political investigation and diplomatic therapy. But if for the moment it appears to be unduly stringent, there is no reason why lesser expedients should not become routine practice, *e.g.*, a diagnostic examination of governing executives for pathological character traits.)

CHAPTER V

Preamble to War

A PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE MUNICH CRISIS

ONE of the main drawbacks to the investigation of war-reactions is that the interest of trained observers is usually confined to phenomena occurring during the period of active hostilities. Naturally it does not occur to the descriptive psychologist to pay any attention to changes taking place before the outbreak, or, to be more precise, from the time when the *threat of war is recognized by the community at large*. As for reactions occurring after the war is over, it would appear that observers signalize their relief at the cessation of hostilities by suddenly abandoning their researches. It has to be admitted of course that the pre-war phase is usually short and that the observer may be caught napping by the crisis. In the case of the First World War, the threat was not really taken seriously by the general population until about two to three weeks before the outbreak. It is true there was a flare-up of interest*on the occasion of the Agadir Crisis in 1911, but as far as the ordinary citizen was concerned this died down in a few days.

However natural this lack of scientific interest in pre-war reactions may appear, it constitutes nevertheless a flagrant neglect of the principle of genetic continuity, which should govern all investigations of psychic events. The neglect is, however, capable of a significant interpretation, one that throws some light on the difficulty of investigating the causes of war. By limiting the concept of war to the *end-products* of war-drives,

i.e., the actual fighting and destruction, an arbitrary distinction is preserved between Peace and War. This is an essentially moralistic and behaviouristic distinction which serves to side-track attention from the aggressive components of Peace and from the peace components in War. Progress in research can be made only if it is recognized that the transition between War and Peace is a gradual one and that in most instances War has broken out long before it is officially declared.

At the present time when many of us are busy covering our previous political shortsightedness by being wise after the event, it is the mode to recognize this fact of transition although of course in a narrow political sense. It is frequently maintained that the Second World War is merely the continuation of the First World War: that the first war never really stopped but continued in different guise, *e.g.*, as an underground movement. Less enthusiastic converts to the theory of a Peace-War transition are content to maintain that the Second World War broke out when the German Army under Nazi instructions entered the Rhineland and that, after following a circuitous passage through Japan, Abyssinia and Spain, it settled down at last in Central Europe. Not without a trace of smugness, these commentators go on to maintain that blindness to this plain fact on the part of, for example, the British Governments of the period was really responsible for the Second World War. Incidentally this second view shows that their conversion to the transition hypothesis is only skin deep, not to mention being rather lopsided. For, if the first World War never ended, neither did the Franco-Prussian War, nor the Austro-Prussian War, nor the Napoleonic War, nor the Wars of the Roses. Whether they know it or not, these political theorists have committed themselves to the view that War never ends. In fairness, therefore, they should not go on to blame the Second World War on the fact that a timid and unimaginative Labour Government was followed by a timid and unimaginative Conservative Government or National Government or what not.

However this may be the fact remains that, in the sense of early recognition of a war-threat by the community as a whole, the Second World War was preceded by an unusual opportunity to study reactions to a war Crisis. The Munich Crisis occurred a year before the outbreak of war and lasted long enough to constitute a psychological phase. No doubt the pacifist reactions of the early thirties in this country served to cloak earlier war-apprehensions, and no doubt from the time of the Nazi revolution, people were becoming gradually more war-minded. But whatever may have been the factors which respectively increased or decreased the amount of apprehension existing in the country, it is still true that in the sense of a national crisis, the Munich Crisis stands out in distinct outline with a sharply rising curve, a narrow plateau of high tension and a long, tapering fall.

Here we encounter the second difficulty that persistently hampers war-investigations, namely, the fact that purely descriptive observations cannot give us any reliable information as to the dynamics of the situation. To the psychologist who believes in the existence of the unconscious mind it is a truism that the deeper meaning of events cannot be ascertained until they have been interpreted. This awkward fact necessitates the adoption of precautionary measures. In particular it is necessary that the interpretations should not reflect the preconceptions of the observer but should be made in accordance with the laws that have been recognized as regulating unconscious function. Thus it is easy enough to recall some of the outstanding scenes of the Munich Crisis: the sudden discovery of Czecho-Slovakia, the totemistic reactions to Mr Chamberlain's umbrella, the anxiously awaited reports from Berchtesgaden and Godesberg and the hysterical outbursts in Downing Street and in the House of Commons. But these, as it were, clinical observations of group behaviour cannot provide us with the information we need, and for a very simple reason. Viewed genetically, they represent merely the spray whipped off the

crest of a wave by the wind ; the basis of group reaction remains unobserved.

Unfortunately we cannot remedy this defect by sending a posse of psycho-analysts to harry the sightseers on their way home from Downing Street. Not only would the citizens rightly resent the procedure but, even if they submitted to it amiably, the results of the investigation would be almost negligible. Examination of normal persons is much more barren of result than the examination of persons suffering from mental disorder of one kind or another. This fact is frequently disputed and psycho-analytical conclusions are constantly criticized on the grounds, first, that they are drawn from the study of pathological material, second, that the numbers examined are very small, and third, that there are no 'control' groups to check errors in investigation. The answer is, of course, that as mental disorders are in the nature of regressions to *earlier* modes of (mental) function, we learn more of mental *origins* from the study of disordered types than we do from 'normal' types ; that even if the numbers are small, this fault cannot be remedied by a superficial examination of larger numbers ; and that although the controls used by natural scientists cannot be applied to deep psychological researches, still there are a number of appropriate checks that can serve the same purpose.

To cut a long story short ; immediately after the Munich Crisis a questionnaire was circulated amongst practising members and associates of the British Psycho-analytical Society, asking for information as to reactions to the Crisis observed during therapeutic and consulting practice together with subjective or objective observations made by each analyst in everyday life. The results were tabulated and discussed, as a result of which a further list of questions was sent out. In all twenty analysts reported on crisis reactions observed in a hundred cases. No doubt with a little more foresight the investigations could have been much more thorough. They might have commenced a year or so *before* the Munich Crisis. And they certainly should

be continued for some years after the present war is over. But despite all drawbacks, sufficient information was gathered to provide a scientific foundation for direct investigation of the psychological effects produced, first by the threat and later by the experience of air warfare on the civilian population of this country.

The first point to determine was the nature of reactions occurring in persons already suffering from psychological disorders, and the next to find out how deep these reactions were. To put it simply, it was important to find out whether, *e.g.*, neurotic cases reacted to the Crisis in the same sort of way as their more 'normal' neighbours or whether they reacted by increase in the neurotic symptoms or neurotic character traits from which they suffered. The anticipation was that they would show changes in their symptoms rather than in their more superficial everyday reactions, the reasoning being that as they had already reacted to everyday life by producing neurotic symptoms, they were likely to adopt the same unconscious policy when faced with the unusual stimulus of a war-threat. To avoid error, observers were asked to record only such changes as could be definitely attributed to the mental impact of the crisis. On being summarized, the results showed that the great majority of cases 'reacted,' although the reaction varied in intensity, manner and depth. Only a minority were unaffected: they were apparently indifferent to or almost ostentatiously ignored the whole situation. Of those who reacted, the majority showed some degree of deterioration of symptoms but a minority showed definite if transitory *improvement* in their previous symptoms. There were, therefore, three groups to be considered; those who got worse, those who were unaffected and those who improved.

The majority of those who got worse reacted with some form of anxiety varying in degree from apprehensiveness to panic. Apart from more general manifestations of helplessness, confusion, bewilderment or gloom, the reactions took a

symptomatic form, *e.g.*, fear of desertion or bodily injury, agitation or hyperactivity (usually in the form of taking war-precautions), sense of fatigue and sleepiness, mild conversion¹ symptoms (such as indigestion, flatulence, diarrhœa or increased frequency of urination), depression, increased self-accusation and increased sexual difficulties. In my experience increased anxiety symptoms occurred most frequently in cases already suffering from 'anxiety-states,' but there were exceptional cases of anxiety-hysteria who were apparently unaffected. Symptoms of increased anxiety were also observed in cases already suffering from sexual inhibition or perversion. The reactions of individuals whose unconscious homosexuality was overcharged or whose conflicts were associated with repressed sadistic charges were distinctly apprehensive.

With regard to cases other than anxiety states or sexual disorders, it could be said that although the majority showed some symptoms of deterioration, there was no standard pattern for any of the groups. There was also considerable variation regarding the phase of the Crisis at which deterioration occurred. According to some observers depressed and 'persecuted' types showed fear and anxiety most markedly some weeks before the Crisis: according to others, persecution types were relieved during the Crisis but became uneasy after it was over. Generally the reaction of those suffering from depression seemed to range between increased self-accusation and sense of responsibility on the one hand and a temporary sense of relief on the other. But despite these variations my impression remained that patients tended to react in accordance with the type of disorder from which they suffered. The symptom variation was, in my opinion, due mostly to the fact that mental defences can follow either of two main directions, *viz.*, increase in *discharge* of tension or increase in the *inhibition* of mental activities that would otherwise discharge repressed tension.

¹ 'Conversion' is a variety of hysteria in which unconscious mental tensions are discharged in the form of bodily symptoms.

Some factors of social variation were of interest. There was evidence for the view that reactions varied according to the social milieu of the patient. Some observers thought that 'clinic' patients reacted less than 'private' patients. My own impression was that patients rated as belonging to the 'intelligentsia' were much more affected than other classes. This observation must, however, be corrected for the fact that leftist intellectuals had as a rule been preoccupied with the state of Germany for some years before : though whether these preoccupations were realistic or the result of sensitiveness to 'catastrophe phantasies,' it was by then difficult to say. The evidence of variation as between British born and refugee patients was contradictory. Variation according to sex was not established.

As has been noted, a minority of cases did not react to the Crisis. It is significant, however, that a large proportion of these lived in the Provinces at a considerable distance from London, where, in my opinion, people are much more affected by national crises than elsewhere in the Kingdom. The lack of reaction had no discernible relation to the clinical type of disorder present. Explanations of the lack of interest varied. Some held that it was really a form of denial of reality due to a profound guilt over early infantile unconscious phantasies of aggression. Otherwise the explanations offered were of the following types :—either the patient was not affected personally by the outcome of the Crisis, or he was preoccupied with personal problems or he did not believe there would be a war. In some cases the mildness of reaction was attributed to a previous improvement in the condition for which the patient had been treated : on the other hand a case was recorded who, because of the improvement previously obtained, took the Crisis more seriously than he would otherwise have done. One patient could not understand why people got so excited about the Crisis ; she " wouldn't care twopence if her husband were killed," a comment which suggests that the apparent indifference

of some cases was due either to a restraint of sadistic interest or to a thinly disguised wish that an outbreak of war would solve some of their personal problems.

One would have imagined that similar explanations would have been discovered in the case of patients whose condition improved during the crisis. Observations made after war was declared indicated that the outbreak was often consciously welcomed by persons whose current emotional life was unsatisfactory. But as a matter of fact in most of the cases described as improved (almost one-tenth of the total number observed) the improvement was attributed to unconscious factors. It is of course well known that severe cases of mental breakdown may remit owing to an intercurrent physical disease or to an experience of mental or physical shock, and some of the improvements noted in cases of melancholia and hysteria were apparently of this nature. But the factor of relief from unconscious conflict was generally observed in this group, as for example, in a case where the crisis afforded relief from passive homosexual phantasies. A few patients attributed their improvement to alteration in the environmental conditions. For example, they felt that even strangers were more friendly or alternatively were less inquisitive. The anticipation of a possible outlet for hostility improved the condition of a patient with strong anti-Nazi feelings who looked forward to war. Naturally he was very much depressed, disgusted and disillusioned by the outcome of the Crisis.

Indeed, most of those who were relieved *during* the Crisis, but also some who developed anxiety symptoms, reacted with disappointment or depression to the 'peace.' Here again the explanations advanced by observers were in terms of unconscious factors. In one or two instances immediate factors were described, *e.g.*, a reality disappointment with the ultimate political situation: disappointment of hopes for change of occupation or solution of personal problems in the event of war; but as a rule the depression was attributed to such

unconscious factors as guilt over unconscious relief at the 'peace,' disappointment with an unconsciously over-idealised love-object (symbolised by Britain in the Crisis), unconscious belief that the imago of an aggressive father (represented by Hitler) was uncontrollable. As has been noted, a few cases manifested the strongest reaction after the crisis. Unfortunately, observers did not follow very closely the delayed reactions, but it was generally held that phantasies and reactions provoked by the crisis could still be observed for some time afterwards. I was able to confirm this later from study of civilian reactions to various military disasters in Belgium, France and Crete.

The next step in investigation was to compare the explanations advanced to account for the reactions observed. On the strength of this comparison it was possible to formulate a simple generalization, viz., that *whatever the nature of the ultimate reaction to the crisis, its form and to a lesser degree its intensity were due to infantile and for the most part unconscious patterns and conflicts*. Nevertheless there was wide variation in the valuation of internal psychic factors and environmental factors respectively. Also there was wide difference of opinion as to the exact nature of the unconscious content. This difference reflected divergencies existing in the Society as to the relative importance on the one hand of early infantile patterns and on the other of unconscious reactions that develop between three and five years. Despite these differences practically all observers agreed that patients reacted to the countries concerned in the Crisis and to the personalities who played a leading part (*e.g.*, Chamberlain, Churchill, Hitler and Goebbels) by treating them as if they were parental imagos. This was perhaps the most convincing evidence that, however much they disagreed in detail, all analysts were agreed as to the preponderating importance of unconscious factors in shaping crisis reactions.

When the war actually broke out it was possible to examine further this problem of the relative significance of internal and of reality factors in psychological reaction. The period

investigated was from the declaration of war to the evacuation of Dunkirk. This latter point marked the development of a more realistic reaction to the real dangers of war and was soon followed by the Blitz which finally brought these dangers home. The period chosen was that currently described as the ' phoney war ' and for this reason can with advantage be compared with pre-war crisis period. There was of course a preliminary phase of reaction following the declaration of war, but, unfortunately, this phase was not very well observed. It was clear, however, that there was little of the flamboyant excitement of the Munich Crisis. After a few weeks of tense expectation, the declaration of war evoked, by contrast, a sense of relief shot through with anxious expectation. This relief was no doubt accentuated by the fact that by this time more people were in favour of fighting : the anxiety was mainly concerned with the possibility of violent air-raids. Some timid people who anticipated this took the precaution of evacuating London, as did many of the more neurotic amongst the population. After a comparatively short time, however, the population settled down to a war which, it was anticipated, would, on land at any rate, follow the pattern of 1914-18. By this time it was no longer possible to follow up the cases originally observed or to use the same team of observers. There was no alternative but to study the cases of mental disorder coming for examination and to isolate for special examination patients whose breakdown appeared to have been precipitated by war conditions. Following the records of the London Clinic of Psycho-analysis, it soon became obvious that only a comparatively small proportion of the total examined qualified for this further investigation. Although there was an increase in applications for treatment immediately after the declaration of war, this was soon followed by a steady decrease, due to a number of extrinsic causes of no special significance. The incidence of different disorders did not differ much from that of peace years. Such differences as were detected had no obvious war correlation.

Examining further the group of cases (thirty-two) in which war factors were alleged to have played a part, it was soon possible to exclude half of them as typical neuroses in the precipitation of which war factors had played no part. In a small group (six) the neurosis proved to have been in existence *before* the war. These patients complained, however, of slight deterioration (increased anxieties or phobia formations) following the outbreak of war. In only eight cases was marked deterioration observed and half of these proved to have started to breakdown before the declaration. This reduced the total number of suspects to four who developed neurotic symptoms dating from the outbreak and apparently precipitated by war circumstances alone. Even so, in two of these it was doubtful whether the attack was as spontaneous as it appeared. A more elaborate investigation carried out during treatment showed that even where there was a convincing story of war-causation, the precipitating factor was not so much the impact of the *war* stimulus as disturbance of the domestic and social setting caused by war conditions. States of frustration were induced which in turn stimulated conflicts of a personal and unconscious nature. For example, a middle-aged man suffering from depression, fits of crying, incapacity to work, all dating from shortly after the outbreak, was found to have been subjected to sudden change in his personal and social conditions of life, *e.g.*, change of his residence and employment, isolation from his former friends, restriction of social activity and recreation owing to the black-out and petrol rationing. But when the precipitating factors were examined further it transpired that the most important of them concerned his psychological conditions of work. He had been called on to do a lot of extra work for which he got no thanks. He dared not refuse, but found himself unable to finish it in time and broke down. He had a good deal of fear of his immediate superior and of the Managing Director. Deeper analysis at this point led to the uncovering of his unconscious infantile attitudes of rivalry and

aggression, and when these were ventilated he improved rapidly and was soon able to stand up for himself in a normal manner.

But although during the immediate post-war period the amount of deterioration was much smaller than during the Munich Crisis, there was a certain amount of evidence that the outbreak of the war, like the Munich Crisis, produced alleviation of symptoms amongst a section of the neurotic population. This was clearly shown in the statistics of cases waiting for treatment. There was a remarkable drop in this group which, on investigation, proved to be due to two main causes: the desire to continue at war-work without being disturbed by treatment, and the spontaneous improvement of symptoms.

It would be idle to pretend that these investigations were adequate. On the contrary, both data and conclusions had to be checked and re-checked for sources of error.¹ Hence only the most tentative and sparing generalizations are permissible. Nevertheless, so far as I know, these were the only investigations of reactions to the outbreak of the present war in which both conscious and unconscious determinants were directly studied. In the absence of more detailed studies it is justifiable therefore to single out these conclusions which bear on the social analysis of war.

To begin with it is clear that unconscious and deep pre-conscious factors determine the quality, and to a lesser degree the intensity, of reaction to the threat of war. The anxiety provoked in civilians is greater before the declaration of war than after, unless of course the civilians are subjected to real danger immediately after the outbreak. The various symptoms

¹ Psycho-analysts have no special lien on scientific judgment. Their main advantage in the investigation of mental phenomena is that instead of taking events at their face value they endeavour to trace the unconscious factors in the situation. The validity of the conclusions they draw from their discoveries is in direct ratio to their soundness of judgment, a purely individual factor.

of mental disorder produced by the threat, although in most cases much less dramatic, do not differ in character from those observed in the 'war-neuroses' of combatants, but the characterological changes (in particular social responses) are less obvious than the symptomatic (*e.g.*, neurotic) changes. Moreover, in a well-defined group, the threat of war produces alleviation of existing mental disorders. It does so in some instances because it promises to alleviate current emotional discontent, but in the majority of cases because the actualities of war permit the individual to project his own unconscious phantasies on to the external world.

Obviously one of the main issues arising from these conclusions is the relation of real anxiety (fear of actual danger) to anxiety of internal mental origin (*i.e.*, due to conflict over unconscious repressed urges, feelings and phantasies). It is not suggested, of course, that real anxiety is due to unconscious phantasy, although some psycho-analysts have recently dallied with this biologically absurd proposition. And in any case the individuals examined had not been subjected to the stimulus of immediate personal danger. But the fact that manifestations similar to these of war-neuroses can be evoked by a *threat* of war, throws the problem of war-neurosis wide open. It compels the observer to discriminate between the factors of real war anxiety and those due to unconscious or repressed elements of an infantile type. By the same token it throws the problem of war-causation wide open. *For if, as this investigation shows, the war stimulus produces more and more personal and infantile responses (or conflicts) the deeper it strikes into the layers of the mind, it follows that in the genetic sequence of events leading to war, the earliest stages must be equally personal and infantile.* To psycho-analysts this may appear a truism, since the earliest mental mechanisms are closest to the most primitive and unmodified instincts; and since these instincts exist from birth the earliest mechanisms must deal exclusively with infantile tensions.

Despite this fact there are still many complicated problems regarding the causes of war that await solution. From the earliest stages of mental development the infant reacts to a number of dangers which the observer knows to be quite realistic. These are, significantly enough, associated for the most part with the instincts of self-preservation, *e.g.*, hunger drives, and the experience gained by the infant from the handling of these realistic situations helps to develop his sense of reality. With increasing experience estimations of reality danger become more accurate, and a 'reality' series of danger situations is developed, of which the real dangers of war are amongst the last to be fully recognized. Up to the period of adolescence war dangers are, in fact, not very realistically estimated. Difficulty in investigating the causes of war lies in the fact that a war-stimulus as well as activating unrealistic or phantastic systems of anxiety can act regressively along the realistic series. The question of vital importance is this: do war-stimuli travelling along the reality series operate more swiftly and uncontrollably than when they stimulate unreality reactions? This is quite possible, since the dangers associated with repressed instinct set up more complicated and constant systems of mental defence than reality dangers to which there are only two possible reactions, adaptation or flight. No doubt both sequences occur in war, and acting in combination overwhelm the protective systems that would otherwise lead to more rational behaviour. But we cannot remain content with this loose generalization. It is essential to establish as precisely as possible the point at which primitive varieties of reality adaptation lend their overwhelming force to the phantasies of aggression, destruction and mastery that lie dormant in the unconscious; and not only the point at which they combine but the exact nature of the identification by which repressed phantasies succeed in capturing the energies of the real ego. No doubt it is a mistaken identity that is then masked by the more superficial causes of war. *In this sense all wars may be*

said to be due to unconscious misunderstandings. At present all we can say with certainty is that repressed infantile sexual impulses, using the archaic modes of symbolic thinking, are responsible for an ordinarily ineradicable confusion between on the one hand adult fighting and its real dangers and on the other infantile loving and its dangers both real and unconsciously imagined.

The Return of War-Neuroses

It is appropriate that a discussion of the war-neuroses should take place under the auspices of the General Section of the British Psychological Society. For although most general psychologists are inclined to regard the problem as one that concerns only the clinical (medical) psychologist, this is far from being the case. Actually the war-neuroses afford a common meeting ground for every sort of psychologist, descriptive, social, anthropological as well as medical. In this respect war-neuroses resemble states of delinquency, which, although apparently the private preserve of the social psychologist and anthropologist, cannot be understood until they have been investigated also by medico-psychological procedures. In principle of course all psychological disorders are, in the long run, the result of a clash between the individual and his environment. But in the case of the classical psycho-neuroses (hysterias and obsessions) the connection is not usually obvious to the untrained observer. A psycho-neurotic symptom, a claustrophobia, for example, developing suddenly in the early forties, is apparently an inexplicable fear of being 'shut in' and to superficial inspection does not seem to have any particular relation to current affairs. The main clash is an unconscious one, a conflict, that is to say, over the unconscious wish to gratify forbidden instincts. And since the instincts in question are infantile in nature it follows that the environmental tabus imposed on them date from the same period. As Freud pointed out, there can be no adult neurosis without an infantile neurosis. The *decisive* environmental factors in the formation of the adult neuroses are not immediate. They have existed in the mind of the individual ever since childhood; they are in

fact an active deposit or record of the infant's struggle with its infantile impulses. Of course, if we look closely enough we can detect also in the adult neuroses certain current situations which serve to *precipitate* the process of symptom formation. These precipitating situations are in principle of the same nature as the traumatic situations occurring in infancy. For example, current frustrations in love may set up a state of emotional insecurity, or hurt, and so revive old (infantile) frustrations in love. But the connection between the immediate environment and the deeper instinctual problem is rarely obvious. The social setting may not appear to have altered very much. In the case of war-neuroses the connection between superficial and deep factors may not be any easier to see, but *the immediate stimulus is much more obvious, namely, a revolutionary change in the social setting.* In other words, what the clinical psychologist would call the *precipitating factor* in war-neuroses is a sudden change from the comparative safety of peace to a situation where, with the sanction and approval of the community, the individual is subjected to a number of unusual strains. Of these strains, two are particularly significant: first, that the individual (or those with whom he is emotionally related) may be exposed to danger of death, mutilation or imprisonment and, second, that he (or those with whom he is emotionally connected) has to undergo a peculiar and violent process of ethical contortion. It becomes his duty, and some think his privilege, to kill, mutilate or deprive of their liberty other human beings who are no more abnormal than he is himself. As we shall see, other and less dramatic environmental factors also contribute to war-neuroses. The sudden translation of a civilian to barrack-room life and the sudden imposition of military discipline may be enough to precipitate a breakdown. But such traumatic factors do not appear to us to be quite so 'legitimate' as the 'danger' and 'violence' factors, and indeed do not usually precipitate breakdown unless the individual is already in an unstable emotional state.

Before going any further it would be well for us to examine our terms of reference carefully. For a cautious Committee has asked us to discuss the 'so-called' war-neuroses; implying thereby, first, that the term neurosis may be either inaccurate or not comprehensive enough, and second, that the factor of war stimulation may be either unimportant or irrelevant. The first of these implicit criticisms is certainly just but the second is far from true. It is true that not all war 'states' are neurotic. Nevertheless the great majority of them are, or at any rate neurotic symptoms predominate in the total symptom picture. This is not seriously in dispute. I would remind you that most observers describe actual states of acute anxiety or panic which may be expressed either in physical or mental form. The physical symptoms are very closely allied to the familiar conditions of hysterical 'conversion' whereby emotional tensions are discharged through the organic systems of the body, causing, *e.g.*, disturbances of the heart, lungs, gastrointestinal or muscular systems. These symptoms are usually accompanied by various inhibitions of physical function which in turn are closely connected with pathological varieties of fatigue and exhaustion particularly following deliberate effort. The mental manifestations are usually divided into agitated and inert types. Acute phobia formations and hysterical disorientations occur, and in addition certain confusional states the exact nature of which is difficult to determine. Apart from these some symptoms occur which, however transient or relatively infrequent, are clearly psychotic in pattern, that is to say, they are to be found also in the common insanities. That being the case, it is obvious that the term 'neurosis' is not comprehensive enough. It is also inaccurate in the sense that in all cases a number of personality changes occur which are not psycho-neurotic at all. This is best illustrated in the so-called confusional states where, apart from gross disturbances of memory or orientation, the individual exhibits character changes, (*e.g.*, irritability in family and social relationships)

disturbances of sexual function (*e.g.*, outcropping of perverse phantasies or a degree of impotence), marked reactions of 'inferiority' which may alternate with aggressive and arrogant attitudes of a mildly megalomaniac type. In my opinion the peace-time conditions which correspond most closely to this series of character changes are to be found in the alcoholism group. And it is significant that excessive resort to alcohol is sometimes a feature of the war-syndrome I have described. To this point I shall return later. In the meantime we can agree that, despite the multiplicity of hysterical manifestations, even the psycho-neurotic varieties of so-called 'war-neuroses' are not *pure* neuroses. Unlike the peace-time psycho-neurotic, the 'war' psycho-neurotic suffers extensive even if transient character changes.

But perhaps the most significant observation is that *direct experience of combatant conditions is not essential to the production of war-neuroses*. During the past seven months I have had opportunities of observing a considerable number of transitory symptoms occurring amongst civilians already under psychological treatment for mental disorders of various kinds. These symptoms were directly traceable to the stimulus of the war situation: for example, attacks of vomiting and colitis in patients already suffering from conversion hysteria; the development of siren and other noise phobias, also black-out phobias, in anxiety hysterics; obsessional rituals over the reading of war-news in a male obsessional; impotence dating precisely from the outbreak of war, barely rationalized on the ground that it was somehow wrong to have intercourse during a period of national emergency. In psychotic types I observed as follows: in depressive cases reactions varying from increased depression and frenzied participation in civilian emergency measures, to a degree of disorientation of a stuporose type alternating with freer periods characterized by marked defeatism over the war; in a paranoid type a mixture of spy-mania with a tendency to acute religious conversion; in a schizophrenic

type marked increase in depersonalization phenomena with a corresponding increase in the persecutory types of anxiety. Admittedly there was no change characteristic of any one group, unless we regard children as one group, a procedure which is not really justifiable. In children there were obvious manifestations of increased anxiety, *e.g.*, frequent disturbances of sleep, night terrors and a tendency to sporadic bedwetting. Nevertheless it was easy to infer from the study of adults that however much the symptoms might vary there was a pathological increase in the amount of anxiety.

In addition to this it was not difficult to demonstrate in so-called 'normal' people a variety of reactions to the outbreak of war which, although milder in type, correspond to those I have already described for abnormal cases, *e.g.*, extremely common transient conversions affecting the gastro-intestinal system, mild anxiety reactions, a tendency to obsessional ritualization, various mild disturbances of memory and orientation (particularly as regards time) and perhaps more generally a subdued depressive reaction. Here also minor changes in character and in psycho-sexual reaction could be detected, particularly a compulsive increase in sexual activity or in sexual phantasies of a promiscuous type. But clinically, the fact of most significance is, that *almost identical changes occur in both normal and pathological groups as the result of a threatened war situation*. This fact was clearly established during the September (Munich) Crisis of 1938.

All of which suggests that an actual (*i.e.*, real) combatant stimulus is not an essential pre-condition of the so-called 'war-neurosis.' It also suggests that a precipitating factor of 'mental shock' is of importance. But, although pathological reactions can and do follow a *threat* of war, it is evident that the threat must be a serious one; hence that however indirect the war factor may be, it is still a factor of prime importance. For this reason alone it is legitimate to concentrate our attention on the nature and influence of this environmental factor.

Before doing so, however, it is desirable to summarize briefly what emerged concerning the 'nature of the 'war-neuroses' as a result of experience gained during the war of 1914-18. Unfortunately very little was learned about 'war-neuroses' in the last war. In an excellent summary of the relevant literature Bibring and Kris were able to boil down the whole subject to a few sentences. There were only two theories of causation, (a) a 'trauma' theory, and (b) a 'conflict' theory. According to the trauma theory, the protective barriers of the mind are broken down, and the Ego is flooded with great quantities of energy which it seeks to diminish, bind and master in every possible way. Jones suggested that the energy with which the ego is flooded is narcissistic libido (both conscious and unconscious), that is to say, love interest that is concerned exclusively with the individual's own bodily and mental function: this narcissistic libido is greatly increased during situations of danger, and at the moment of shock it exceeds the ego's limit of tolerance and calls for active suppression. In the case of the war neurotic, it is discharged in the form of symptoms. According to the second or 'conflict' theory, the trauma is only the last of a series of factors which reanimate an infantile neurosis, and bring it to the surface. Both theoretical and practical considerations indicate that there is no sharp contradiction between the two theories. On the one hand it can be argued that the ego's readiness to be flooded with narcissistic energies could only have been due to early pathological disturbances of development, that is to say, to early conflict over instinctual urges and frustrations, hence to the early emotional insecurity that follows such conflict. And on the other hand it is significant that all forms of psychological treatment¹ of war-neuroses can

¹ I am not considering here the various forms of treatment by drugs, either sedative or counter-irritant, or the more massive irritant treatment by electrical shock, although the rationale of such measures has obvious psychological implications, *e.g.*, the reduction of psychic tension, or its repetition under more favourable conditions. Drug-therapy, shock-therapy and psycho-therapy can also be combined.

be divided into two groups : in the first of these an emotional *discharge* (catharsis) is promoted, and in the second the unconscious mental content of the disorder is *analysed* to a varying depth. The first of these types of treatment is based on the shock theory, the second on the conflict theory. Both separately and in combination these methods can bring about satisfactory results.

Apart from this there is one clinical observation which not only proves that the two theories are not incompatible, but also *enables us to trace for the first time some relation between purely clinical standpoints and the views of general and social psychologists.* In my opinion the only useful discovery about war-neuroses made in the last war was that what psycho-analysts call the 'unconscious homosexual factor' is of prime importance in their causation. I need hardly remind you that unconscious homosexuality differs from manifest homosexuality. The latter is a manifest perversion or system of current sexual discharge, the former indicates the active persistence in the unconscious of a phase of mental development which may have covered some of the most vital years of infantile life. It is now well recognized that the infantile homosexual phase represents the 'negative' phase of that positive infantile incestuous attachment which goes by the name of the 'Œdipus situation.' In the case of the boy it represents a love attachment to the father and simultaneously a turning away from the mother imago. But this formal description does not bring out the most significant dynamic factors in the situation. These are twofold : (a) the unconscious homosexual situation although an advance on a purely narcissistic state of existence is still only half-way towards a true hetero-sexual attachment to a love object. Homosexuality retains many affinities with narcissism. Hence the infant who passes through a strong 'negative Œdipus situation' (or, as the phrase goes—develops an infantile homosexual fixation) tends to suffer from a reinforced narcissism and from the 'anxiety-readiness' that goes with excessive narcissism,

(b) a marked alternation between positive and negative œdipus attachment tends to accentuate the disappointments, hatreds and rivalries of the infantile period. And these in turn mobilize and augment the charges not only of unconscious sadism but also of the unconscious masochism into which frustrated sadism can be unconsciously converted. Hence it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that *the original conflicts over unconscious homosexuality are due to conflict over sadistic and masochistic urges.*

If we apply these findings to the problem of 'war-neuroses' and in particular to the evaluation of the precipitating factor it is clear that whether the war-stimulus is direct, as in the case of actual combatant service, or whether it is indirect, as when an individual has some relative in the fighting line, or, for the matter of that, when he merely identifies himself with the fighting man, it is calculated to reinforce these conflicts over hate and sadism which give rise to a masochistic expression of guilt. *Evidently the fact that the cloak of social sanction is spread over the violence of war is not sufficient to overcome this extra charge, and the danger and hardships experienced merely make matters worse by mobilizing both real and unreal anxieties.* From the point of view of war-prevention it would be greatly to our advantage if we could establish with some accuracy the various stigmata of unconscious homosexuality. But work on this subject is so far in its infancy. Some of the few observations made are, however, extremely suggestive. For example: that those regular soldiers who have come to terms with their unconscious homosexuality and are at home in a setting of sublimated homosexuality, *i.e.*, friendly relations with their fellow combatants, are less likely to break down, or if they do, usually suffer from the most disguised of psycho-neurotic manifestations, *i.e.*, functional or conversion symptoms. On the other hand, with recruits who break down readily, it is not difficult to establish that the family upbringing has been emotionally unsatisfying and has led to a prolonged state of

inferiority-feeling together with unconscious phantasies of superiority; that adolescent sexuality has not run smoothly though there may have been no signs of manifest homosexuality; that relations with social or occupational superiors have been difficult; and that marriage and particularly the fathering of children have not been weathered very well. Altogether the suggestion of reinforced narcissism together with the existence of an unconscious homosexual problem is very strong. The point is, however, that any or all of these strains may have been masked by the conditions of civilian life, and the unconscious conflicts may only have become acute when the individual is suddenly conscripted and has to endure army life or war dangers or both. Incidentally one occasionally obtains interesting corroborative material from some women's war-service camps, where, after a period of great 'matey-ness' and efficiency, the voluntary unit begins visibly to show patches of deterioration signaled by squabbling, regression, and minor hysterical outbursts.

Here then is a task for the individual psychologist, provided of course his descriptive methods are catholic enough in approach, in other words provided he knows where to look for what he suspects may exist. Not only should he build up and apply a new system of type-psychology, but *he should examine the precipitating factors of war-neuroses in order to classify them in accordance with their psychological significance.* This second and apparently easier task is not so simple as it looks. It is easy to classify the dangers or hardships of the war area and not very difficult to sort out the aggravations to which civilians have so far been subjected. *But it is much harder to distinguish stimuli that operate because of their reality significance from those that take effect because of the individual's unconscious valuation of them.* It cannot be denied that in the war areas the elements of *real* danger and constant strain are sufficient to mobilize strong charges of 'reality anxiety' as well as a marked 'narcissistic overinvestment' of the ego. It is of course true

that nowadays the civilian is also *threatened* with *real* dangers but up to the present¹ these have not materialized except for persons serving in the Merchant Navy. So far the civilian has been affected by war-dangers either through his family or social ties to combatants or through the unconscious mechanism of identification with combatants. Nevertheless he does share with the combatant some of the hardships of war. I need hardly catalogue the different varieties of regulation and interference to which he is subject—*e.g.*, rationing, black-out restrictions, evacuation, loss of wages or employment and so forth. But it should be remembered that *all these forms of hardship are calculated to arouse also unconscious and mostly unreal anxieties or guilt*. The simplest example is that of food restriction, which often produces much more unreal anxiety of a persecutory type than it does real anxiety. And the same can be said of black-out restrictions. Even such obvious economic strains as loss of wages, overdue rents, etc., have their unconscious valuation. Finally, it is clear from a study of dreams that war imagery (guns, shells, war-planes, bombs, bayonets, etc.) is excellently adapted not only to symbolize primitive forms of unconscious sexual phantasy but to express the unconscious sadistic phantasies that are associated with them. In short, successful investigation and classification of war-reaction depend on a correlation of the various clinical groupings, not just with the current psychological and social setting of the individual but with his psychological development in early life.

Now in a sense we could describe many infantile neuroses as sociological in type, since they were due in part to the influence and pressure exerted on the child by its (family) environment. But the sociologist or social psychologist has a more immediate interest in the war-neuroses. It is well-known for example, that anxiety states are 'catching' and the military policy of putting anxiety neurotics in some form of quarantine has justified itself as an army routine. But this is only one way

¹ See Preface, p. 8.

of saying that the relation of the individual to the group is of importance in psychological disorder. And just as the individual may infect the group or those members of the group in closest contact with him, so group conditions, in particular the conditions of leadership, have an important influence on the stability of the individual soldier. In his essay on Group-psychology, Freud pointed out how group solidarity was maintained to a very considerable extent by the *aim-inhibited impulses*. These consist of originally sexual impulses which in the course of early development have lost their sexual aim, but have retained their non-erotic components of affection and esteem. A large part of these aim-inhibited impulses are derived from the unconscious homosexual drives of childhood and promote an unconscious bond between each member of the group and the common leader, who embodies the common ideals of the group. Freud regarded group panic not as the immediate result of danger but as the result of a break in the group bond to its leader. The whole of the binding energy is suddenly released, and, having nowhere else to go, turns back to increase the narcissistic valuation of the 'self.' The individual then becomes vulnerable to the danger which he could withstand when in a state of group-rapport.

In the case of the regular army (and all the more so when enlistment is voluntary) the factor of sublimated homosexuality acts as a powerful consolidating agent. But where recruitment is compulsory and disciplinary training hurried, the situation is a testing one for those who have never really adjusted themselves to their unconscious homosexual disposition. In particular they prove hypersensitive to the factor of violence either received or inflicted. The soldier whose homosexuality has been adequately sublimated is not so sensitive, for a number of reasons. The war has received social sanction; the violence he has to inflict or endure is now praiseworthy; the army group has a common enemy whom it is now virtuous to destroy; and all the time the virtues of active and passive obedience to

his leaders reinforce his will-to-destroy-the-enemy and hold in check both his guilts and anxieties.

But if the psychological position of the unconsciously sensitive conscript is precarious, so is that of the unconsciously sensitive civilian. For although so far in this war the impact of aggression on the civilian has been indirect (in this country at any rate) there is less compensating virtue to be extracted from enduring it. Moreover, each civilian has to shoulder a degree of personal responsibility for the war from which the combatant, once he enters the army, is freed. In other words, the psychological situation of the civilian is in some respects more conducive to neurotic reaction than the psychological situation of the combatant. Although the civilian suffers less from reality anxiety (of danger) and, even if he is a munition worker, less direct guilt (of killing) he suffers in some respects more from unconscious anxiety and guilt. He has the war stimulus without any of the dispensations and compensations enjoyed by the soldier. In the event of air-raids on a large scale, it will be interesting to compare the incidence and severity of neuroses in the civilian population with that in the army. Already we know that minor war-neuroses existed amongst civilians both before the war and, though to a lesser extent, during this 'phoney' war. But it may be that the incidence of individual neuroses will not increase greatly even in the event of air-raids. I should have expected, however, that proportionately there would be more sign of strain in the civilian group *as a whole* than in army groups.

Of course it is difficult to distinguish sharply between manifestations affecting the group as a whole and manifestations affecting the individual. For the group is after all made up of individuals. But it is more than a mere aggregate of individuals; it is an organization united by common bonds. Admittedly it is easy to overlook signs of deterioration of the whole group but that, I think, is largely because we do not look for them in the proper quarter, viz., amongst the minor manifestations of group

solidarity. Indeed, it might be said that the civilian group in war-time is itself sick. However enthusiastic its outward reactions it is 'sick of' the war from the day of declaration. As a matter of fact the outbreak of this war was not greeted with any enthusiasm. The manifest anxieties of Munich merely gave place to anxiety-readiness, and, compared with the hysterical reactions of 1914, the reactions of September 1939 were distinctly depressive in type. This depression has not yet lifted, a state of affairs due possibly to the continued inactivity of both sides. It may need only a sudden flare-up of hostilities to actuate that deep conflict over sadism and unconscious homosexuality that requires either a degree of hysteria to contain it, or a defensive reaction of a more paranoid type. And here the services of a special branch of social psychology should be enlisted. Granted that war strains 'pick' on those types which are frequently called 'psychopathic':¹ granted also that the 'psychopathic' type is a person who has split on the rocks of bisexuality and of unconscious sadism, *yet I feel convinced that there are still deeper and more primitive factors in the situation which are bound up with the past history of man's development.* It is no mere coincidence that hysteria plays such a large part in the manifestations of war-neurosis. You may recall that in Freud's view the hysteria observed in civilized communities represents a precipitate of primitive emotional reactions that were 'normal' at an earlier stage of racial development. And I feel sure that a reinvestigation of the war preparations, rituals and celebrations of primitive communities would throw some light on the incidence and function of war-neuroses. It would be interesting to know, for example, whether the preparatory tribal rituals (e.g., war dances) which are of a hysterical pattern were more effective than the

¹ 'Psychopathy' is one of these terms originally invented and still employed to cloak ignorance. Its literal meaning is 'disorder of mental functions.' But in practice it has come to be applied to emotionally unstable individuals whose conduct, although neither neurotic or psychotic, is 'disordered.'

tots of rum served out on the Western front during the last war. It should be remembered also that almost all psychopathological states are attempts at self-cure—*i.e.*, they are not due simply to a break-through of unconscious tension. I have often suggested that the civilized community suffers more from war and endures more devastating wars, first, because it has lost some of the ritualistic control of killing effected by the savage and, second, because the civilized substitute for savage conscience is not effective enough either in the individual or in the community. And it is quite possible that in the case of civilized war-neuroses we have been led astray by the fact that under service conditions, the neuroses *follow* the war service. As I have pointed out, breakdowns under civilian conditions may *precede* the war, as in the case of the Munich Crisis. *It may well be that some service war-neuroses are merely measures of war prevention in an inverted order.* The fact that the combatant may secure a good deal of secondary gain from a war-neurosis, *e.g.*, freedom from combatant duties, would merely confirm this possibility. Anyhow the matter is one which anthropologists may help us to decide. So much is certain : although so far we have no evidence that wars can be prevented, we do know that a good war-neurosis is an effective albeit unconscious means of bringing to an end the participation in war of the sufferer.

CHAPTER VII

Pacifism in Eclipse

DURING 1931, when the first of these essays was written, Britain was nearing the peak of a pacifist reaction to the World War of 1914-18. Now, thirteen years later, we are in the thick of a Second World War. This fact alone would justify a certain amount of stocktaking. It would seem natural to inquire whether the present outbreak calls for any important modification of the theories regarding war, peace and pacifism presented in this book. In any case it is desirable that scientific theories should be re-examined from time to time. Even if the material of investigation has not changed, the theories may have dated. Scientific theories are after all subjective reactions. At best they are disciplined prejudices that can be upset at any time by the application of new methods or discoveries ; or, for the matter of that, by the importation of new prejudices. And in most new sciences the pace of discovery is rapid enough to necessitate changes of outlook every ten years or so. In fact I have realized for some time that when the second impression of this book was exhausted, I would not be able to avoid the task of preparing either a revised edition or a more ambitious and systematic treatise on the subject of war. Indeed, when I wrote the chapter headed ' An Outline of Research ' I was well aware that it was also an outline of the book on war I was myself too occupied or too lazy to write. These essays were never intended to do much more than challenge the almost total neglect of a psychological approach to the problem and at the same time indicate

the principles on which a fruitful psychological investigation should be based. And so when it came to deciding between revision or writing a new book I had to ask myself whether with the passage of time there was any justification for repeating the original challenge. *I have regretfully come to the conclusion that there is now even more urgent need to stimulate psychological interest in the causes of war and in the forces that motivate pacifism.* The very fact that we are engaged in a 'righteous' or in the last resource 'unavoidable' war is calculated to swell the numbers of those who are not prepared to look beyond conscious and rational factors in war-making. The more righteous our immediate motives appear to us, the less objective we are likely to be about unconscious causes. The conviction that a war is unavoidable or obviously justifiable may appeal even to those who ordinarily give intellectual assent to the part played by the unconscious mind in regulating human affairs. They may say with some relief, "Well, anyhow, *this* war has nothing to do with *our* unconscious impulses: for us it is obviously a war of self-preservation." That the 'unavoidability' may be the result of unconscious interference with the instinct of self-preservation, producing a blind spot for danger signals in the pre-war years is not likely to disturb the conviction that 'it couldn't have been helped.'

Now it is possible to maintain that a war is defensive and yet be prepared to admit that instincts other than self-preservation may have played a part in the outbreak. The only trouble is that we are inclined to advance the extenuating plea of self-defence on our own behalf and to attribute the deeper causes to the peculiar mentality of the enemy. But it is almost impossible to accept moral and ethical justifications, such as that we have embarked on a crusade to end Fascism or that this is a 'war to end war' without becoming in the scientific sense reactionary and obscurantist. Admittedly a crusading spirit is essential to the prosecution of a long and hard war. Self-defence by itself will only maintain morale up to the point where its

immediate aims are satisfied. It requires long distance aims to carry a successful war beyond this point. Even these need not be clearly understood or stated. The slogan 'Never again' is by far the commonest expression of distant aims, implying as it does that whatever contributes to the outbreak of war must be eliminated. Yet if fundamental causes are to be neglected, how can we hope to be successful in the maintenance of peace? Peace after all is only an indication that for the time being the actual technique of living at the cost of wholesale destruction has been suspended. Not only so, the preparations for peace after a righteous war are likely to be conceived in the same spirit of righteousness, to say nothing of retribution, revenge or a conviction that the enemy should make reparation. And nothing in my opinion is more calculated to prepare the ground for the next war. To approach peace in this way is to carry our immediate war aims into peace. All of which merely indicates how hard it is to keep one's head in war-time. Even psychologists from whom some degree of objectivity might well be expected have for the greater part become camp-followers of war. It is their social duty, or at any rate the war-time task imposed on them by the state, to exploit their knowledge and techniques in order to assist in defeating the enemy. In short, there is every reason to suppose that for some years to come, the psychological approach to the problem of war will be sabotaged by more immediate necessities. Under these circumstances it seemed justifiable to postpone re-writing this book and to retain its original aim of stimulating thought on the essential nature of war. I have therefore decided to allow the original text to stand and to content myself with bringing it up-to-date.

An apparent drawback to this course is that the main argument of the book is concerned with the techniques of pacifism. At the time these essays were published this seemed the obvious approach. The pacifist movement in this country was nearing its maximum strength, and not long afterwards celebrated the

occasion by organizing the famous Peace Ballot. Ostensibly an attempt to measure objectively the strength of pacifist forces in the country, this was actually a propagandist device by which powerful ethical pressure was brought to bear on a good natured population, already averse to voting against the angels. The political effect of this and other propaganda devices was by no means negligible. It had been strong enough to convince a Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, that if he went to the country on a rearmament programme his party would be defeated at the polls. Nevertheless by the time of the Munich Crisis the pacifist movement had reached a low ebb. Many pacifists had turned warmongers, if we may still use that term to describe anyone who for whatever reason is actively in favour of a solution of international problems by recourse to war. Not only did many pacifists become actively war-minded, some took a prominent part in leading public opinion in this direction. At the time the German army re-entered the Rhineland a few had reluctantly favoured the imposition of military sanctions by France. By the Munich Crisis many more were in active opposition to the Government for what they regarded as the Munich 'betrayal' although it was obvious that by then anything short of compromise meant war.¹ The general populace understood this and celebrated their temporary relief from anxiety in an almost hysterical outburst when Chamberlain returned with 'peace in our time.'² Only the hard core of the pacifist movement, consisting for the most part of truly conscientious objectors, stuck to its principles. This core was

¹ I am not concerned here with the opposition of those politicians who were not professed pacifists or with the rights or wrongs of the controversy, or with the antecedent factors in the situation. The relevant point is that many convinced pacifists changed their views at the time of the Munich crisis.

² It is necessary to stress the fact that this manifestation was not so much the result of anti-war feeling as of a sudden relief from the anxiety of an *impending* war. It was similar in type to the 'mafficking' that follows the termination of any hard and depressing war. Another and deeper factor is considered elsewhere (p. 108 *et seq.*).

further reduced on the outbreak of war. It is evident then that, given a good cause, quite sincere pacifist scruples can be overcome.

Now it may be argued that with the war-time disappearance of the pacifist movement there is no longer any point in drawing attention to the forces that give it its momentum. Against this I would advance the following reflections. To begin with : the fact that not only the pacifist rank and file but many pacifist leaders can, however reluctantly, be induced to abandon their principles seems to me to provide incontestable proof of the validity of one of my main contentions, viz., that when the motivations of War and Pacifism are traced to their source, the forces concerned are found to be identical. Speaking of the means whereby man masters his aggressiveness towards external objects, namely by a system of division and distribution within the self, I pointed out that given certain circumstances this system can be defeated.

" Suppose, for example, that the ordinary person not actively warlike but not actively peace loving is fired by some ideal, *e.g.*, love of his country, suppose further that he is exhorted by the representatives of social law and order to rise in defence of his fatherland or pursue a crusade or take part in a ' war to end war,' the chances are that his inhibiting mechanism will give way under the strain of social sanction and the full sweep of his aggression will once more turn outwards. But not on this occasion towards his old enemies of nursery times ; he will now assure us that much as he hates war, he must gird up his loins and go forth to fight the Afghans, or Basutos, or Chinese or Dutch or English or French or Germans—or whatever appointed object is indicated to him in the first place by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of his own country." ¹

The present war has proved that with one or two reservations this statement applies not only to the ordinary person but also to many convinced pacifists. The main difference is that the pacifist when he changes his mind does not do so at the behest of representatives of social law and order. To do him justice he is already in the vanguard of social law and order. It is

¹ See p. 24.

not the strain of social sanction that breaks down his war inhibition : it is the strain of his own inner sanctions. His faith in the right overcomes his faith in the righteousness of pacifism.

But despite the evidence of his war-time behaviour the pacifist has not really abandoned his pacifism : he has in many instances only temporarily withdrawn his energy from pacifism so that he may either support the war or fight in it. Only part of this withdrawn energy, however, goes into the fight. The rest is displaced to more distant pacifist aims—for example of world peace after the war. And it is to be presumed that after this war many pacifists will not only devote themselves with even greater energy to their original aims but revive their original techniques. They will revive their older faith in the potency of ethical or economic argumentation, or in the uses of disarmament pacts, or in the necessity of an international police-force. In all probability their earlier ideas of international co-operation will be greatly expanded. The desirability of a League of Nations will no doubt be associated with a plea for other forms of internationalism, based on a system of world economic planning. However that may be, we can assume with some certainty that after the war the pacifist movement will remobilize some of its earlier energy and consequently that it will merit as close psychological scrutiny as it did in its heyday.

But this is to analyse the situation too exclusively in terms of the individual pacifist. If we regard changes of individual reaction in terms of the pacifist 'movement' or 'group' as a whole it is clear that what we have been observing is the rise and fall of a 'wave' of organized feeling. We are bound then to ask whether there is any 'periodicity' from which we might calculate the next rise. Unfortunately no exact measurements of this sort are available. It is doubtful whether they are possible. We may be certain that the periodicity of peace movements must have some correlation with the periodicity of war movements. But at this point the ordinary procedures of descriptive

and mensurational psychology break down. The descriptive psychologist may plot curves but he cannot reliably interpret them. There are several good reasons for this. For example, the fact that a country is not engaged in a major war does not mean that the unconscious war impulses of its citizens are in abeyance. They may be getting vicarious satisfaction from a war in China or a civil war in Peru. The unconscious mechanism of *displacement* that enables us to transfer a friendly if somewhat perfunctory interest to the domestic habits of the Chinese also permits us to enjoy at a safe distance the horrors of their wars. And so it is difficult to establish a reliable periodicity of peace and war impulses for any one country. To attempt to do so is to gamble one's reputation for good judgment against the dubious satisfactions of prophesy. In the past I have often been asked when I thought the next outbreak would take place. All I could say was that I did not think we would be involved in another major outbreak until 30 years had elapsed. Allowing for the 'phoney' war this estimate was 4-8 years out. In any case it was based, not on statistical researches but on an estimate of psychological probabilities. A gap of 30 years allows the memory of the 'lost generations' to be effectively dimmed. Boys who were entering puberty during the previous war—a period when the romantical aspects of war have their maximal appeal—are then 42-46 years of age, a number of them holding key positions in the administration of the country. Former 20-year-olds who sampled the previous outbreak are already 50. Now the age period of 45-55 is as significant for men as it is for women. At the lower level they are threatened with the anxieties of middle age, at the upper limit they are faced with the actual problem of declining powers. To some this brings an apparent tranquility but in others it arouses a mute and distant bloody-mindedness. Moreover, the leaders of the last war if not dead are in retirement. Their place is taken by a new band of elderly men. In short, after 30 years the psychological danger period has set in and even if the result is only

an attitude of *laissez-faire*, who is to say that this cannot lead to the neglect of obvious measures of war-prevention or postponement. In short, although we cannot speak with any accuracy of the nature of war periodicity, we cannot ignore this factor. No more can we afford to neglect the periodicity of pacifism.

Finally, the fact that this book started as a study of the nature of pacifism may have given rise to some misunderstanding. It is difficult to analyse a 'virtuous' movement without giving the impression that one is condemning it. This, by the way, is true of all forms of mental analysis. Even 'good advice' is resented for a similar reason. Experience of lecturing on the subject has certainly convinced me that, after the first flush of friendly response from pacifist sections of any audience, their delayed response is one of hurt. This is perfectly understandable. The belief that one's views are righteous soon breeds the conviction that they are sacrosanct. The Virtuous like the Beautiful and the True shelters under the wing of the Absolute. Soon the tabu against scientific criticism spreads from the ends to the means. This was never clearer than during the period when the League of Nations was rendered idealistic lip service by all the constituent nations. Nothing could have been plainer than that so far as war-prevention was concerned the methods adopted by the League were identical with the (exploded) technique of catching a bird by putting salt on its tail. Yet to suggest this provoked immediate reproach or disapproval.

But although I believe that after this war the 'convinced pacifist' will again be a danger to peace—a danger, that is to say, because his emotional convictions prevent his applying scientific standards to the investigation of war causes and so lead him to bark passionately up the wrong tree—I do not suggest that he will be the only danger. It is easy to foresee the development of a 'New Pacifism' supported mainly by go-ahead politicians who in turn will be discreetly encouraged by all

manner of 'social scientists' and pseudo-psychologists. These will not regard themselves as pacifists in the ordinary sense : On the contrary, many of them will insist that they are not pacifists. They will maintain, however, that the problem of war is a practical problem that can be solved by all sorts of adjustments of our existing social machinery. The vanguard of this army of empirical reformers has already made its appearance. On all sides we hear talk of 'reconstruction' and of 'a better world after the war.' Movements of this sort are characteristic of all wars. They develop when the phase of war-justification gradually gives place to moods of expiation. These moods are naturally reinforced by some anxiety as to what may happen on the day of reckoning. Disbanding armies deserve or require more than gratuities : the hardships they have undergone must be solaced with at least the prospect of a better world. So runs the more superficial and 'laudable' argument. Nevertheless the deeper mood is one of guilty expiation. And so political convictions, already obstinately held, are reinforced by a drive to righteousness that will thrust aside any less emotional impulses, such as scientific interest in the true causes of war. Here again I have nothing to say against the aim of the movement : I am only concerned with the validity of the methods to be employed. Actually the thesis I put forward so far from being a condemnation of pacifism was intended to call attention to a misdirection of pacifist energies, namely, the exclusive concentration of interest on ethical and economic (self-preservative) factors to the neglect of psychological causes. Holding the view that the phenomena of peace and war are both *end-products*, the results obtained by passing the same psychic energies through different mental systems, I maintained that the first step towards effective pacifism is to uncover the existing *bias* in favour of concrete action, particularly in the direction of inhibition, and then to concentrate attention on the nature both of the psychic forces involved and of the mental systems through which they pass.

Believing that this is still the proper course I now propose to examine the fields of psychological and sociological research in order to determine whether any new discoveries bearing on our subject have been made, or, at any rate, whether any sharpening of the instruments of investigation has been effected.

CHAPTER VIII

The Instruments of Investigation

PSYCHOLOGY : THE NEW PSYCHIATRY : THE NEW SOCIOLOGY

PSYCHOLOGY

As the layman knows, often to his exasperation and sometimes to his cost, there are all kinds of psychology nowadays. Not so very long ago the situation was simpler. There were then only two varieties—academic and clinical. The former was originally the result of a cross between physiology and metaphysics : the latter was derived from the study of mental illness. But the academic psychologist, fortified by techniques of psychological description and measurement, has gradually ventured out of his university laboratory to take a more direct interest in ordinary human affairs : and the clinical (medical) psychologist has succumbed to the temptation to exercise professional authority on the field of normal behaviour. On this common ground the two groups met and, until recently, were accustomed to eye each other with a distrust not unmixed with contempt. In course of time each developed special sections. ‘Normal’ psychologists subdivided into educational, industrial, and social branches : clinical psychology, developing originally from purely Freudian concepts, split into ‘schools’ representing various degrees of deviation from basic Freudian principles. Hence the familiar division into Freudian, Jungian and Adlerian schools. This was soon followed by the formation of various eclectic and empirical groups. A few psychologists developed private systems, each remaining the sole exponent of his own school. All this is confusing enough, but it was further complicated through the invasion of psychology by psychiatry.

Psychiatry in this country was until recent times a medical speciality concerned exclusively with the supervision and organic treatment of cases of insanity. It had no interest in clinical psychology and rather prided itself on the fact. Now that it has acquired or arrogated a certain amount of psychological prestige, it is difficult for the layman to distinguish between such terms as psychiatrist, medical psychologist, psycho-analyst, child psychologist or industrial psychologist. Obviously a new classification is desirable.

The simplest way to distinguish one brand of psychologist from another is to ascertain first the principles and second the methods he follows. Adopting this course, we can again recognize two main divisions of psychology; viz., *dynamic* psychology and *static* psychology. The dynamic psychologist's main concern is with the vicissitudes of various mental forces, the existence of which he postulates. The *static* psychologist may have a theoretical interest in mental forces but his primary concern is with the more familiar attributes of mind; that is to say, with the measurement, classification and valuation of conscious thoughts, feelings and behaviour. The discovery of the unconscious mind provided yet another and in practice more important distinction. We can indeed distinguish between psychologists who accept the existence of the *unconscious* and those who confine their interest to what Freudians call the *preconscious* system of the mind. Many psychologists seek to evade this issue by distinguishing a 'subconscious' from a 'conscious' mind. But this term merely obliterates a vital distinction and ends by shouldering out the true unconscious. On the necessity of preserving a dynamic distinction between different mental systems, the psycho-analyst is adamant. The (pre)conscious and the unconscious are, he maintains, two entirely different systems of the mind, as different as chalk from cheese. The former comprises only such mental activities and content as are capable of direct experience, introspection or recall. Although in the topographic sense extensive, the

preconscious is essentially a surface organ, having no direct contact with the sources of human instinct. The unconscious on the other hand lies perpetually close to the most primitive and unmodified instincts, its content under ordinary circumstances is unaccessible, the laws that regulate it are alien to rational thinking, its phantasies are archaic and cannot be understood without interpretation. Yet it is first and last the most effective regulator of the mind. In short, while the preconscious is concerned with end-products of instincts, the unconscious silently control all the vicissitudes of instinct that lead to the formation of these end-products. The two systems are separated by a barrier of repression which is ordinarily impenetrable.

To continue the classification : while most clinical psychologists are dynamic psychologists by no means all of them believe in the dynamic unconscious. Using the term 'subconscious' they in effect restrict dynamic forces to what is strictly speaking the preconscious system. On the other hand some static psychologists believe in the unconscious but do not apply analytical methods in their professional work. Such dynamic concepts as they use are of the preconscious variety. Hence though there is apparently a good deal of overlapping between the two groups, this can be discounted in practice. For the purpose of reviewing research on war, we can fairly distinguish dynamic from static psychology. The position of psychiatry will be considered separately.

(a) *Dynamic Psychology*.—At a first glance the field of dynamic psychology nowadays looks depressingly bare. In most new sciences, as I have said, a period of ten years is long enough for rapid advances to be made in both theoretical and applied work. But so far as dynamic psychology is concerned—and dynamic psychology is after all the branch of mental investigation from which alone deep understanding can be derived—this is not the case. Perhaps we expect too much. During a period of over forty years Freud built up a new psycho-analytical science. Year after year he continued to pour out a series of discoveries

regarding the unconscious mind that were not only revolutionary in the scientific sense but carried the promise of almost unlimited extension to the affairs of everyday life. Although he was supported by a number of able assistants in different countries, they did little more than dot the 'i-s' and cross the 't-s' of his original work. When, shortly before Freud's death in 1939, his productivity suffered an inevitable decline, it became apparent that there was no one of the calibre necessary to maintain the pace of discovery set by him. Most of the work done by his followers has consisted of accumulating evidence in corroboration of his findings or of filling in some of the gaps left when Freud, as he so often did in later life, outlined in a few pregnant sentences some new development of his researches. Thus the impetus of his work has encouraged pupils to extend his findings in, for example, child psychology, psychiatry, criminology and general sociology. Enough work lies in these departments to keep analysts going for the next fifty years without making a single new discovery. Unfortunately in the case of psycho-analytical psychology it is not possible to make new discoveries merely by the accumulation of data. No doubt new mental worlds remain to be conquered. But these invisible territories cannot be discovered until some new 'break through' is made similar to the first penetrating intuitions by which Freud crashed through the walls of the familiar to discover the unconscious. Psycho-analysis awaits the coming of another Freud.

Nevertheless in one particular direction recent developments in psycho-analysis have a special claim on the interest of the student of war. Although from the very beginning Freud paid attention to the peculiar manifestations of the aggressive impulses, which he found in close association with the primitive love impulses of the child, his concern with them was linked to a central preoccupation, namely the part played in human development by the rise and fall of infantile libido. Even so his description of the hates, rivalries and jealousies of the infant

and of the influence these may exert on its behaviour in adult life is still accurate in every particular. But it was only in the later period of his work that he traced in detail the vicissitudes of the instincts of aggression and indicated the part their frustration plays in the formation of the early ego.¹ This study was taken up with enthusiasm particularly in the department of child psychology. Unfortunately the enthusiasm developed in some instances into a cult. This is not altogether surprising. In psycho-analysis as in other sciences it is difficult to exclude the influence of fashion on research. Anyhow, during the past ten years psycho-analytical controversies have raged regarding the relations of early love and hate. These have been reflected in the various 'reconstructions' of infantile mental development. For it must be remembered that outlines of mental structure existing during the stage prior to developed speech are of necessity hypothetical reconstructions. These reconstructions are in turn based not directly on accumulations of data but on *interpretations* of these data together with simple intuitions, and sometimes no doubt guesses at probability. In more technical language: psycho-analysis although ready enough to use syntheses of observed facts cannot progress without interpretative analysis of them. Indeed its future depends on the accuracy with which these 'reconstructions' can be made; for in that mysterious period when the infant passes from almost animal stages of function to the highly developed mental life of a three year old *homunculus sapiens* lie the keys to the riddles of psychology. The controversies that have recently split psycho-analytical science in this country centre round these reconstructions. The battle lies between those who accept Freud's original views on the subject and those who regard the onward thrust of life as being to a very large degree a reaction to the conflict over (hypothetical) forms of early aggression. The point of immediate importance is that

¹ For his more general formulations, see *The Ego and the Id*, *Civilisation and its Discontents*, and *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*.

until these controversies are settled, psycho-analysis, regarded as an instrument of research, must remain blunted. Under these circumstances the only safe course for the student who would analyse the problem of war is to use and extend as widely as possible only such psycho-analytical principles and findings as are beyond peradventure. And these are almost exclusively the principles and findings arrived at by Freud himself. It is some comfort to reflect, however, that this task will keep the student busily and fruitfully occupied for a long time to come.

The practical bearing of all this on war research is as follows. During the past ten years a certain amount of literature on the dynamics of war has been published. At first it was only a trickle, mainly in the nature of observations corroborating earlier findings. Nothing new or significant in the way of psycho-analytical contributions made its appearance. With the rise of the Nazi party to absolute power, a noteworthy change in subject matter occurred. A distinct preference for analysing the Nazi movement and its leaders could be detected. In the years immediately preceding the war an increasing number of contributions on these lines appeared. Although not strictly speaking psycho-analytical, they were based on interpretative technique. And since the Nazi movement appeared to be heading in the direction of war, it was inevitable that discussions of war problems should become more and more discussions of the mentality of the Nazis. The papers were in fact tracts for the times. Since the present conflict began, psychological essays on war have practically disappeared, while essays on the Nazi movement although scientific in form have become definitely propagandist in content. No doubt a similar comment might be made regarding the sciences of chemistry or engineering in this war. Their immediate aims both theoretical and practical are to help defeat the Nazis. This orientation is no doubt necessary but in the psychological field it leads inevitably to a neglect of unconscious factors. What is perhaps more unfortunate, this bias is likely to remain operative during the

early peace period when more than at any other time an attitude of objectivity is desirable.

(b) *Static Psychology*.—Psycho-analysts are often taxed with an attitude of unreasonable aloofness towards what was once called academic psychology. The accusation is not without justice but neither is the attitude of aloofness without justification. Whatever his failings, and these are no doubt plentiful enough, the psycho-analyst pins his faith on three postulates :—first, that psychology without the unconscious is largely an exercise in description and statistical tabulation ; second, that the unconscious or (to use a term that is more convenient) the *Id* is not a static mental institution but a reservoir of active instincts whose earliest psychic derivations are incredibly primitive and incredibly powerful and, third, that these early forms of instinct cannot be accurately studied unless the unconscious defence mechanisms of the Ego by which they are controlled are dealt with by special techniques. To these postulates might be added the belief that the most fruitful field of study is that of human suffering.

This does not imply that static psychology under which may be included most varieties of psychological description, tabulation, classification and measurement is an aimless pursuit. On the contrary static psychology has already served many useful purposes in the educational, industrial and anthropological fields. But as I have said its main concern is with *end-results*, with the final and potentially conscious forms of mental activity. Its systems of classification are based either on descriptive standards or on the adaptation value of the activity in question or on its *apparent* motivation. Moreover, static psychology is mostly concerned with the normal population. Even when, as in the educational field, it measures varieties of mental defect, it has little direct interest in suffering. It is the educational aspects of the deficiency to which special attention is devoted. In short, its sphere of influence is confined to the (pre)conscious system of the mind and its aim to the cultivation of adaptability.

It follows that such interpretations of human conduct as are ventured by static psychologists cannot be more than (pre)conscious interpretations. Finally, static psychology has little or no concern with the irrational. It rather pointedly ignores the irrational. When it can no longer ignore it, static psychology is reduced to offering rational explanations of the irrational.

It is necessary to emphasize these points because in contrast to the meagre advances of dynamic psychology in the last ten years, the advances in static psychology have apparently been spectacular. Cohorts of young and able students ably led continue to produce innumerable papers on every conceivable subject from the play activities of insects to the war-time reactions of evacuee children. Improved techniques of mental measurement have been increasingly employed in both school and factory, and have become all the rage with psychiatrists in the fighting services where they are employed to determine both negative and positive forms of adaptability. It might be natural, therefore, to assume that the methods of static psychology could succeed in solving the problems of war-research.

At this point the analytical psychologist becomes mulish and ungracious. War, he maintains, is essentially an irrational form of maladaptation. It is not only a problem in death and destruction but a means of inflicting endless suffering and sorrow on the living. To the survivors, both civilian and combatant, it is retrospectively a state of suffering. It is also an orgy of dynamism. Tempting as the explanations of static psychology may be, war cannot be explained either by facile comparisons with the fighting habits of animals or by equally inadequate tabulation of rational motivations. *To the extent that it is compelled by its own limitations to ignore the unconscious and to concentrate on preconscious motivations, static psychology obstructs preventive measures.* Granted that in some formal respects it may be a more exact science than analytical psychology. It is for example less open to subjective error and it can often

check its results by control observations. Nevertheless it is in a deeper sense profoundly unscientific. And to the extent that they obstruct measures of war-prevention its findings are reactionary. This is an issue that must not be burked. Present-day forms of static psychology are useful enough in their own legitimate sphere, but outside that sphere they are a positive menace. At the very best they threaten us with appallingly superficial views of mental life, with a kind of scientific conventionality that is alien to the purposes of pure science.

Harsh and prejudiced as these judgments may sound, they do *not* imply that there is no future in static psychology. On the contrary, I look forward to a time when it will graduate to the status of a pure science. But this cannot happen until static psychology pays serious attention to the psychology of the unconscious. Admittedly psycho-analysts have been standoffish, but they never denied that (pre)conscious psychology has its uses and virtues. The charge of stand-offishness lies more justly on the other side. It was static psychologists who, when not actively hostile to psycho-analysis, remained and for the most part still remain aloof from it. There is indeed a great future for static psychology. But it cannot develop until students realize that their observations are at present directed almost exclusively towards the sophisticated and, one might almost say, the suburban, layers of mind. It is not sufficient to look : one must know what to look for and where to look for it. Already some dynamic psychologists have shown how static methods might be usefully employed. In their spare time they have collected outside the consulting room observations on various aspects of the psychology of the individual from the behaviour of sucking infants to the reactions of elderly people during air-raids. These they have classified in terms of the *total function* of the mind, that is to say, they have taken into account the unconscious as well as the preconscious significance of the data. Where the *meaning* of the observed data remained unclear, *they have endeavoured to interpret it*. This is what

distinguishes their work from the work of static psychologists. Only when the latter familiarize themselves with analytical principles and techniques may we anticipate fruitful advances in static psychology.

THE NEW PSYCHIATRY

Instead of taking this necessary step, static psychologists entered into a working alliance with psychiatrists. It is true that the psychiatrists made the first overtures and that most static psychologists are unaware an alliance has been formed. Many of them are still of the opinion that, for example, modern developments in child welfare represent a struggle for mastery between the static psychologist and the psychiatrist, a struggle in which the psychiatrist, it would seem, has won the first round. They can point to the fact that in psychiatric clinics, the educational psychologist responsible for mental testing is rated a little lower than the psychiatric social worker, both being of course subject to the direction of a psychiatrist. There is a good deal of truth in this theory of a battle. Certainly it is absurd that psychiatric and child guidance clinics should be run mostly by alienists who know less of psychology than their lay workers. There is of course a fight for supremacy between the static psychologist and the psychiatrist. But it is really an internecine conflict in which so far the honours are easy: The static psychologist has the advantage of prior authority in the school and (if we ignore, as well we may, the existence of factory medical officers) in the field of industry: the psychiatrist has the advantage—although so far he has made little use of it—of an almost exclusive right of approach to the data of insanity. But all questions of privilege apart, the two groups were bound to form some kind of alliance, because even if their methods are not identical, the limitations of their scope are the same. Their interest goes no farther than the margins of the (pre)conscious. The main difference between the groups is that one is concerned mostly with normal people, the other with abnormal. Static

psychologists can teach psychiatrists the elements of scientific mental measurement : psychiatrists can repay static psychologists with a modicum of the psychiatric information the latter so sorely need.

Yet not so long ago psychiatrists were denied any standing whatsoever in the psychological world. This was a sweeping if mainly implicit judgment, but in the main it was a just judgment. For although the psychiatrist shared with the static psychologist a passion for card-indexing, at no other point had they anything in common. Indeed it is difficult to forgive psychiatry its past and present errors of omission. It is hard to forget that before their card-indexing days, most psychiatrists were content to act as warders and for the rest to cultivate their gardens. Yet the charges at whom they gaze with uncomprehending and often condescending eyes represent a wealth of psychological information the like of which is to be found nowhere else in human society. Psychiatrists still live cheek by jowl with the melancholiacs, the maniacs, the paranoiacs and the schizophrenics who, because of their conflicts, have been compelled to evert the unconscious systems of their minds, displaying thereby the ideas, feelings and mechanisms that lie dormant in the recesses of the normal mind. What an opportunity to learn about reactions that otherwise can only be dimly apprehended in the lives of children and savages ! What an opportunity to study the mechanisms that perpetuate war ! Yet the sole outcome of this unparalleled opportunity for learning is—more and more card-indexing based on criteria of an almost childlike simplicity. True, there have been some distinguished exceptions to this myopic rule : and there are to-day psychiatrists, mostly stationed at teaching centres, with a psychological flair that does them credit. But in the past the psychiatrist's only claim and in the present his chief claim to scientific training was and is a working knowledge of neurology, a physiological pursuit which only accidentally overlaps with the study of mind. To the thunderous reverberations of Freud's

discovery of the unconscious mind they remained and for the most part still remain either apathetic or refractory to the point of open hostility.

The story of the psychiatrist's acquisition of psychological authority makes curious reading. It came about quite fortuitously. Of the factors that produced the changes, the least effective was a gradual percolation of ideas from psycho-analytic to psychiatric teaching centres. Even this process was largely indirect. The psychological casualties of the last war and an aftermath of 'pension neuroses' had called into being a number of 'psycho-therapists.' Having no systematic ideas of their own, the latter soon formed themselves into eclectic groups—a term which meant simply that in their view there was something to be said for all sorts of psycho-therapeutic method. Their attitude to Freudian psychology varied from a luke-warm acceptance of the more palatable bits and pieces, which, however, they were usually at pains to 'improve' until the original theories were improved out of existence, to a somewhat virtuous rejection of dynamic theories and an open preference for non-analytical procedures. But in spite of themselves the 'eclectics' gradually took over a good deal of the terminology and a smaller amount of the understanding of Freudian concepts. And so they came to function as a filter through which psycho-analytical ideas could pass in acceptable form to more intransigent psychiatric groups. In short, only when these ideas had been bowdlerized and reduced once more to a (pre)conscious form did the psychiatrist begin to accept them—and go on to maintain that he had 'known it all the time.' The most potent factor was not, however, a conversion at secondhand to carefully censored psycho-analytical ideas. *The force of lay opinion created a demand that psychiatrists were compelled to supply.* An intelligent public, demanding more enlightened understanding of neurotic conflicts and misled by the sound of the word 'psychiatry,' naturally concluded that there was no difference between a psychiatrist and a psycho-

analyst. On this misapprehension the new psychiatry was founded. The public insisted on psychological explanations and psychiatrists naturally endeavoured to supply the demand, taking care, however, to lard their interpretations with copious and somewhat revengeful quantities of exhortation and not a little reproof. When after the first world war a legion of psychological casualties was finally scattered to the ends of the country, this demand for medico-psychological understanding spread. Soon the official recognition of psychiatric clinics, mostly linked up with existing 'mental hospitals,' added to the growing authority of the psychiatrist. When the second world war broke out the stage was set for a considerable expansion of this authority. It would seem that this expansion has now taken place: also that, with the development of a state mental service after the war, the process may continue unchecked. The deciding factor will no doubt prove to have been the development of 'military psychiatry.' The original concern of service psychiatrists was with the elimination of cases of psychological disorder and with the isolation and empirical treatment of the mental casualties of war. But the enormous development of the fighting services called for methods of rapid and effective selection by which the best use could be made of the human material conscripted. Naturally the methods of mental testing devised by static psychologists were employed, but experience of eliminating cases of mental disorder gave army psychiatrists the opportunity of supplementing these with 'clinical' or 'characterological' tests. At this point psychiatry and static psychology joined hands.

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I have traced at some length these developments in psycho-analysis, in static psychology and in psychiatry because they have an extremely important bearing on the future of general psychology and thereby on the part psychology will play in the investigation or prevention of war. Put briefly the situation is this. Psycho-analysis, in this country at any rate, will contribute

little more until it settles its internal dissensions. The great body of non-clinical psychology is wedded to static methods, to the observation and measurement of (pre)conscious reactions. Psychiatry, having had a reputation for psychological acumen and understanding thrust upon it, has tried to rise to the occasion but its efforts so far consist in aping the manners and opinions of static psychologists. Certainly there is no such thing as a purely psychiatric psychology. Yet between them static psychologists and psychiatrists make up in numbers what they lack in depth of understanding. And so there has come about a powerful reinforcement of the authority of (pre)conscious psychology. For these reasons, the study of human motivation will become more and more barren and unilluminating. I have always believed that under certain circumstances the revolutionary discoveries of unconscious psychology might be watered down to a point where they would be little more significant than the inferences of conscious psychology. As far as I can see this is the alarming prospect with which we are now faced. From Lands End to John o' Groats psychological centres will be established at universities and mental hospitals or clinics where the writ of a 'rational' psychology will run. More and more the direction of research will be taken over at these centres. In so far as Government Departments pay any attention to the opinions of psychologists they will naturally listen to the pronouncements of those who run these centres. More important still, training in psychology will be carried out by those whose own preferences are in favour of the rational and discreet motivations of a superficial psychology. The whole system will reflect the screening function of the (pre)conscious, a defensive function which, in the case of the individual, serves to keep understanding of unconscious forces and motivations at a respectable distance.

To sum up : when we review recent tendencies of general psychology and of psychiatry we can well understand why so little work of importance has been produced on the psychology

of war during the past ten years. Nor can we look forward with anything but misgiving to future developments in these sciences. If psychology proceeds in its present direction, we can expect little more than an expansion of our knowledge of the (pre)-conscious system of the mind. At its best this may contribute to our understanding of some of the immediate (precipitating) causes of war. No doubt these explanations will be attractive because they will appear to be natural and reasonable. But it is useless to attempt to explain the irrational in terms of the rational. Even the neurotic who consciously desires to be rid of the mental pain occasioned by his malady, betrays his unconscious preference for neurotic illness by favouring rational explanations of it. By accepting these explanations, he denies himself the opportunity of finding the true causes and, possibly, ridding himself thereby of his complaint. It is a good working rule that the more irrational a symptom appears, the more necessary it is to discount rational explanations of it. This is terribly true of the aberration that is war. There is no hope of getting to grips with the problem unless we are ready to consider that its roots lie deeply in the unconscious. For this reason alone I maintain that an essential step in the direction of war prevention is to make some understanding of the working of the unconscious mind part of every liberal education.

THE NEW SOCIOLOGY

After this somewhat depressing review of the state of individual psychology it is refreshing to turn to the cognate science of sociology. Here at least some progress can be recorded. Up to comparatively recent times, Sociology was even more backward than psychology. This is not surprising when we reflect that the older forms were derived from political systems of thought. The art of politics is essentially a sociological art. The science of economics is a disciplined variety of political thinking. Incidentally, although it is generally held to be closer to 'natural' science than to psychology, the study of economics

is actually a branch of the mother science of psychology. It is concerned with the manner in which men arrange, or might arrange, the material affairs of groups. And clearly this is determined by the instincts men harbour. The incompetence we display in ordering our affairs is not so much a monument to our natural stupidity as a proof that self-preservation is not the only instinct that determines practical behaviour. However that may be, sociology was for a long time preoccupied with the material activities of groups. True, there were many isolated centres of a broader sociological research. The work of folk-lore societies, of anthropologists and archæologists, or for the matter of that, the works of many historians were essentially, if superficially, psychological. But an organized study of group behaviour and motivation was slow in developing.

Looking back one can see that the real obstacle to progress lay in the fact that the material of investigation was apparently refractory to direct examination by analytic procedures. Attempts had sometimes been made to 'analyse' small groups but these experiments were essentially therapeutic devices by which the reactions common to the group and to the leader (therapist) were mobilized as a process of cure. Such methods could not function very well in research. It seemed indeed that social psychology would have to depend on purely static methods of observation and measurement from the results of which inferences might be drawn as to the nature of the group. A typical example was the postulation of a 'herd instinct' differing, it was thought, in some essential respects from the instincts of love, hate or self-preservation found in the individual.

Then came the turning point in the development of social psychology. As had been so often the case, Freud, in the course of investigating one problem, discovered the secret of another. Analysing some of the earliest differentiations of the child's mind, he discovered the key to social structure and function. In 1921 he published his essay '*Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*,' a pioneering achievement that will live as

long as sociology itself. The way was open to apply the principles of dynamic psychology to the study of the group.

It is impossible to condense in a simple form the theories contained in this monograph, itself an extremely condensed production. But three main points should be noted: first, that the forces and mechanisms concerned belong to the deep layers of the unconscious; second, that the system whereby members of an organized group are bound together in common allegiance to a leader (or leading idea) can be traced to the unconscious system whereby children develop common bonds whilst in emotional dependence on their parents; and third, that this unconscious state of *rapport* is nourished by love instincts that have undergone a high degree of modification. In short, the infant is almost from birth one of a group of two, and all subsequent group reactions follow the original unconscious patterns of childhood. Moreover, these reactions persist because once the child's mind is split into egoistic and parental 'recording institutions,' the latter constitute a portal of entry by which environmental influences have constant access to the mind (except of course in certain states of disease). Here then were some new and dynamic principles wherewith the problems of sociology could be attacked anew. To cut a long story short, some analysts began to make a hobby of sociological investigation. The obvious line of approach was to consider how far one could explain group phenomena on the assumption not only that group formations follow the unconscious patterns laid down in the individual but that the forces and mechanisms employed are identical.

It may be said at once that this approach provoked a certain amount of opposition in sociological circles. Although never so hostile to psycho-analysis as static psychologists and psychiatrists were, members of the formal schools of Sociology felt that this was to extend a hypothetical parallel too far. But support came from an unexpected quarter. The study of primitive races showed that many primitive forms of group

function could be more satisfactorily explained by interpreting them in the same way as one would interpret the irrational habits of infants and of the mentally disordered. Gradually contributions were made to what were then called the social aspects of psycho-analysis including certain aspects of war. The trouble about these contributions was simply that the authors did not go much farther than stating the general principles of psycho-analysis adding on the strength of these a few generalizations about social conduct. These were interesting enough but no attempt was made to work out the structure and dynamics of the group. Until that is done it is scarcely accurate to talk of a psycho-analytical sociology. In any case psycho-analysts are themselves rarely familiar enough with the (pre)conscious aspects of social organization to speak with authority on the subject. Fortunately a new and enterprising group of sociologists—of whom Prof. Karl Mannheim is the most distinguished representative in this country—have stepped into the breach. Sympathetic with the methods and discoveries of psycho-analysts, they are ready to co-operate with the latter in building up a new Sociology in which the relation of unconscious forces and mechanisms to social structure and function can be determined. Admittedly the new Sociology is in the embryonic stage but provided it does not regress to purely (pre)conscious modes of thought, it at least promises well. That is more than can be said of individual psychology at this juncture.

One can also record a welcome improvement in the technique of general sociology. The development of methods of estimating public opinion and of studying the behaviour of groups, promises, if carefully directed, to add considerably to the value of sociological data.¹ The material studied by the natural

¹ One of the more promising of these developments is represented by *Mass-Observation*. Founded in 1936 by T. Harrison, a field anthropologist and explorer who was concerned with the objective study of social institutions and units on anthropological lines, and C. Madge, a poet and journalist interested in subjective documentary reportage

scientist being inanimate cannot speak back. It cannot answer questions. This may perhaps account for the fact that the art of asking sociological questions has been so much neglected by those social investigators who prided themselves on copying the scientific manners of the biologist. However that may be, some workers in the sociological field are now ready to ask questions and to check the answers scientifically. But of course there are three overriding considerations. One must know what questions to ask and that, in turn, means that one must recognize the existence of sociological defences comparable to those by which the individual unwittingly hides his true nature from observation. The art of asking questions lies in knowing where the hidden answers are to be found. Finally, and this is really the crux of the matter, one must be ready to interpret the data collected by these newer methods.¹ No doubt many valuable, and surprising, conclusions will be arrived at without interpretation. That at least was the experience of individual psychology. Freud's original interpretations led to his discovery of the surprising complexity of infantile sexuality. But after a preliminary period of scepticism and hostility, corroboration of his findings was the work of intelligent and observing parents who were able to record at first hand many of the manifestations the existence of which had been so hotly disputed. But when all is said, the progress of sociology depends upon interpretation and the more its students know of unconscious human nature the more likely their interpretations are to be correct.

from untrained informants, it remains the only independent organization which does not concern itself with statistical interviews, but rather with limited studies of habits, attitudes and environments. *Mass-Observation* does not believe that cross-sections of the population on standard interviews give anything more than a day-to-day report of superficial public opinion. Although approving of and often employing the method the organization has, since 1940 (when it came under the sole control of Harrison), concentrated mainly on an observational and analytical approach.

CHAPTER IX

The Second World War

PSYCHOLOGICAL CASUALTIES : WAR-TIME SOCIAL RESEARCH

SHORTLY after the outbreak of the present war I began to receive letters from readers of the first impressions of this book asking me in effect 'where I stood.' These letters increased in numbers on the publication of *The Psychology of Fear and Courage*, a small book I wrote after the fall of France with the patent intention not only of analysing the nature of morale but of helping to promote as best I could civilian resistance to the trials of war. It was evident the writers of the earlier letters felt that anyone who has ventured to examine the unconscious factors in war, which are *ex hypothesi* common to both sides, should not himself take sides. At the time I was content to reply as follows :

"By the same reasoning one might deny the right of a physiologist to hold personal views on food because he had written a book on the normal and abnormal functions of the digestive system. Even the meteorologist is entitled to take his mackintosh with him in rainy weather. It is true that there is little prospect of eliminating war so long as we refrain from investigating those causal factors that lie fathoms deep in the minds of men. But in times of war the investigator has no special privileges. And in any case he might well support the war on the barest ground of expediency. For if Britain were to lose, the freedom of European social scientists would certainly be curtailed for some generations to come."¹

Anyone who has read the invocations to Hitler with which, from the early days of the Nazi regime, German scientists prefaced their published works will recognize the cogency of this argument. A similar issue arose over the question of war-time propaganda. The success of propaganda depends on the

¹ *The Psychology of Fear and Courage*. A Penguin Special. 1940. Second Impression.

extent to which one can exploit understanding of both (pre)-conscious and unconscious aspects of human nature, not only to disintegrate the morale of the enemy but to consolidate and activate our own. Here again I had to plead guilty to tendentious writing and broadcasting. True I had not, so far as I knew, made any false statements about the enemy and had often suggested that we were not ourselves free from human frailties. But I had said nothing that might in any way reduce our own strength. The censor would anyhow have seen to that.

This situation has now changed in two important respects. The first is that we are apparently on the edge of victory. Psychologists and sociologists need no longer fear for their scientific integrity. They merely share with other civilians the risks and hardships of total war. Whatever danger may threaten our freedom of scientific expression need no longer be apprehended from the enemy. The second consideration is more vital. We are now apparently threatened with a peace for which we are psychologically unprepared. Not only unprepared in the sense that we do not know how best to treat a defeated enemy and so may, unwittingly, sow the seeds of the next war, but unprepared in the sense that we do not know how best to deal with ourselves. We therefore run the risk of accepting all sorts of ill-conceived peace projects many of which will no doubt have the blessing of contemporary psychologists. It is all the more essential therefore to return to our starting-point and once more plead for a careful study not only of the unconscious factors that contribute to war readiness on *all* sides but also of the unconscious factors that threaten the duration of any peace phase. The comments that follow have this aim in view. They are intended not so much to tabulate the reactions with which we have been inundated since the war began as to examine how the researches of psychology have fared during this supreme occasion for research.

The answer unfortunately is that they have not fared very well. Students of the various branches of psychology have for

the most part been doing hack work in the services, useful no doubt in helping to make the war machine run smoothly, but of little or no research value. Even in the case of the war-neuroses—incomparably the best field for commencing the study of war psychology—service exigencies have hampered the long-term analytical investigation that is necessary if one would link up deep unconscious reactions with the immediate war-conditions that precipitate illness. The choice in the services lies between comparatively short treatment of favourable cases and rapid invaliding of unfavourable ones. Lack of trained psychological personnel has been accentuated by the diversion of energies to the task of selection and of weeding out. To this consideration may be added the fact that this war is very much like other wars. New weapons have produced new varieties of old strains. The tempo of disintegration both mental and material has quickened, but the regressions set up take much the same course as before. Under these circumstances it would be unreasonable to expect any serious advances in war psychology at the present time. Here and there some minor researches have been set on foot, for example, on the different manifestations of fear amongst the troops and the best ways of counteracting or, in the case of the enemy, reinforcing them. But to discover whether bayonets or bombshrapnel are the more frightening to soldiers ; or whether abdominal wounds are more dreaded than genital mutilations ; or which particular noises or weapons frighten the enemy most does not take us very far. Such observations may be usefully exploited in the training of soldiers but, unless they are followed by the analysis of the instinctual conflicts of which they are the end results, they are not of much use to the student of war motivation. This applies with even greater force to the study of factors in morale, such as the degree to which fear of being thought a coward overcomes the fear of battle. This is the kind of investigation which, if pursued deeply enough, might throw some light on the eleventh hour fatalism of civilian populations, but to be usefully interpreted

it would require to be linked up with that deeper clash of ideals which so frequently gives rise to a guilty readiness to accept injury. It would be ungenerous to suggest that these independent observations have no value beyond their immediate utility in training soldiers. Some time after the war, when duly assembled and edited, they may be capable of useful interpretation and classification. In the meantime the investigations are quite frankly tendentious and to that extent will require a good deal of correction before they can be applied to the purpose of war research.

By way of contrast a certain amount of systematic research has been carried out on non-combatants. In the first World War the civilian population of this country was regarded by the state mainly as a mass-instrument on which the theme-songs of war-time propaganda could be played. Apart from a moderate degree of hardship due to rationing and from a relatively small amount of bombing and bombardment, the main factor affecting civilian morale was the constantly mounting toll of military casualties, an oblique factor common to all wars. During this war the extension of air attack to civilians not only aggravated civilian hardships and restrictions but introduced what was, in this country anyhow, a new civilian factor, namely, personal experience of military violence. Here was an unique opportunity to study what is now called *civilian morale*.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CASUALTIES

It will be readily admitted that some understanding of the nature of *morale* is a necessary part of research on war. Obviously wars cannot be successfully waged without a high degree of morale amongst the troops. And nowadays it is equally obvious that they cannot be very successfully waged without a fairly high degree of civilian morale. Not only does poor civilian morale spread sooner or later to the armies in the field, but it affects the output of munitions of war. 'Good' morale is

therefore an expression of the will-to-war and as such must be investigated. But it may not be so obvious why the *psychological disorders* stimulated by war-conditions constitute an even more important source of information as to the causes of war. Similar disorders, it may be argued, are to be found during peace and in any case the percentage of 'war-neuroses' whether at home or in the services is only a small one. How can these bizarre and apparently incomprehensible products throw any light on causes of war? Now, strange as it may seem, normality is always more difficult to understand and to analyse than abnormality. Indeed it is now almost a commonplace of clinical psychology that disorders of mental function are the result of regression to earlier and more primitive forms of mental function; they afford us therefore a glimpse of what lies behind and leads up to normal function. By investigating war-time mental disorders we can kill two birds with one stone: we can not only draw inferences as to the war-like disposition of the normal mind, but observe *what anti-war devices already operate in the unconscious*. For clearly if war-neuroses were universal there would be no war. This leads to a second point of importance, viz., that all neuroses are compromise formations, the result of conflict between repressed and repressing forces. *Hence in the ultimate analysis 'war-neuroses' must be the result of conflict between war psychology and peace psychology*. It is just because the 'war-neuroses' are compromises that they afford an opportunity of determining which unconscious factors promote war-readiness and which inhibit it.

This, however, is only the first step in investigation, one that permits us only to make inferences about the nature of peace-time morale. Sooner or later we must make quite sure whether the unconscious factors operating in peace are identical with those existing in war. When all is said the combatant 'war-neurotic' has undergone military training before he is subjected to battle strain. True he has been conscripted and often breaks down during (or perhaps it would be more accurate

to say—because of) his training ; but even so the situation is not comparable with that of the civilian. At this point the study of ‘ war-neuroses ’ amongst *non-combatants* provides a useful link in the chain of evidence. Living under civilian conditions, a large number of individuals are nevertheless subjected from time to time to some of the strains of battle. A three-pronged attack on the subject is thus possible—on the nature of the ‘ war-neuroses ’ proper, on the nature of ‘ civilian war-neuroses ’ and on the unconscious reactions to war existing in peace-time. This last is a nodal point in war-research. All we know to begin with is that peace morale must have a much deeper significance than war-time morale. For although it is a form of social cohesion, it still contains the seeds of war-readiness. Put rather too simply, war-time morale is fighting morale but *peace-time morale is not simply a peaceable gregariousness, it is a form of gregariousness that may lead again to the outbreak of war.*

(1) *War-Neuroses among Combatants*¹: Before embarking on a description of research along the lines described above, it may be well to define what is meant by the term ‘ *war-neuroses.*’ Originally described as ‘ shell-shock,’ these disorders were found to occur under a great variety of battle conditions, and were later labelled ‘ war-shock.’ Reports drawn up some years after the last war indicated that the symptoms of war-shock were not solely neurotic in type, but that the condition could reproduce almost every known variety of mental disturbance. The great majority, however, were neurotic ‘ anxiety states ’ and so in course of time the term ‘ war-neuroses ’ was adopted for convenience in reference. It would only confuse the reader to tabulate the various symptoms that have been observed. But it is important to note that they are divisible into two large groups : (a) *disturbances of function* either mental or physical, *e.g.*, hysterical phobias, disorders of speech, gait or heart action, various forms of exhaustion ; and (b) changes in the *personality*, *e.g.*, irritability in family and social relation-

¹ For a more detailed discussion of this subject, see pp. 112-125.

ships, disturbances of psycho-sexual life, aggressive and arrogant behaviour and a tendency to outbursts of violence. Of these two groups, the first is the more obscure, the second is the more obviously significant, since it suggests that *the manifestations of 'war-neurosis' whether disguised or not can be viewed as a form of behaviour*. After the last war two main theories of causation emerged. One was the 'traumatic' theory and the other the 'conflict theory.' According to the former, the protective barriers of the mind were disrupted by the overwhelming excitation of war dangers: according to the latter, the war excitation was only a precipitating factor leading to activation of old (infantile neurotic) conflicts. Towards the end of the war it was noted that conditions resembling the 'war-neuroses' were also to be found amongst soldiers who had never been in the battle line and had suffered merely the general hardships of war including the ordinary varieties of military discipline and the usual separation from the amenities of civilian or domestic life.

(2) *Civilian 'War-Neuroses'*: Before this war began, exaggerated apprehensions on the part of psychiatrists as to the effect of air-bombing on civilians were as plentiful as rumours, from which in principle they differed very little. It was anticipated, for example, that psychological casualties in London alone would run into thousands every day of attack. When the time came to take stock of the 'Blitz' these psychiatric anticipations proved to have been purely subjective phantasies: it was discovered that only a small percentage of the bombed population developed 'neuroses' of a type resembling the true war-neuroses. For a number of reasons dependable comparisons between the incidence in civilians and in combatants were difficult to arrive at. Civilian populations have no war-training; combatants are selected and trained. Except in a few instances, the traumatic stimulus of civilian raiding is incomparably lighter and less constant than the traumatic strain of battle. Again, the civilian suffers because he cannot fight back when

attacked, but on the other hand, he has the advantage of not being compelled to kill. Still the fact remained that 'civilian war-neuroses' (which, for convenience in presentation, we may call 'Blitz-neuroses') did occur and that the unconscious factors were apparently identical with those found in war-neuroses. So far so good. The results of other researches, however, began to complicate the picture. For one thing, nervous disturbances were observed where the precipitating factors were mainly, often exclusively, a cumulation of 'hardships' (restrictions, blackout, long working hours, rationing); that is to say where the factors of violence and destruction played no direct part in activating the psychological disorder. And here again the unconscious causes were found to be identical with those of 'Blitz-neuroses' and 'war-neuroses' respectively. But, most baffling of all, it was discovered that under certain circumstances the *threat* of war (a situation that is to say where there is neither war-hardship nor war violence) could give rise, in a still smaller percentage of civilians, to reactions which, although relatively mild, were unmistakably pathological. And once again the same unconscious factors could be established.¹ It is tempting to draw the inference that *the reactions observed both during and immediately after the Munich Crisis, although apparently an expression of relief following a sudden anxiety were in a deeper sense a measure of a constant factor of unconscious war-readiness*. It has long been a psycho-analytical commonplace that pathological anxiety is not simply an exaggerated reaction to a real danger or exaggerated reaction to an exaggerated danger, but a reaction to weakly repressed unconscious wishes. In other words, morbid anxiety is a sign that primitive instincts of an infantile pattern have been reactivated and have reached a state of tension that is regarded as dangerous by the inner signalling systems of the mind.

But still further complications were to hand. The effects of a special variety of war-hardship began to attract public

¹ See pp. 97-104.

attention. Reports, not unmingled with rumours and complaints, began to pour in from the evacuation areas. Evacuee children were said to be not only a nuisance and dirty in their habits but badly behaved and often ailing. Moreover, stories of 'waves' of delinquency amongst both evacuated and non-evacuated children began to get abroad. Soon a few trained observers reinforced by a larger number of untrained but sympathetic workers began to study the situation. *Stripped of alarmist embroideries, the fact emerged that many of these children had developed psychological disorders.* Two varieties in particular were noted. The first manifested itself in symptoms of anxiety either in mental form (phobias, night terrors, disturbances of memory and concentration, apathy, lack of capacity to play and learn and depression) or as disturbances of function (sleeplessness, bedwetting, stomach and bowel disorders). The second group were essentially behaviouristic in type, in other words, they were externally directed symptoms (commonly but rather misleadingly called anti-social conduct). These manifestations varied from simple untidiness and disorderliness to quite open destructiveness or violence. There was indeed an inevitable rise in the juvenile delinquency rate. It is clear that even in children we can find psychological disorders of the same type as the war-neuroses. The causes to which these disorders were attributed varied according to the predilections of the observer. All were agreed that these children had usually experienced an unstable upbringing and/or displayed earlier (pre-war) manifestations of psychological disorder; but, beyond that point, differences in the approach of the psychologist showed up very clearly. Most static psychologists advanced the theory of the 'broken home.' This picturesque term was also accepted by dynamic psychologists as a convenient way of describing an important environmental factor; but whereas the static psychologists were content to explain it in terms of lack of parental affection, guidance and discipline, dynamic psychologists (or, at any rate, those interested in the function of the

unconscious) insisted on estimating these (pre)conscious factors in terms of the unconscious energies and constellations that gave them force and direction. This in turn called for some distinction between normal and disordered functioning of the unconscious mind, *e.g.*, the degree to which excessive rivalry or hostility increases the child's proneness to anxiety. When these deeper observations (interpretations) were made, it was again found (believed) that the unconscious factors behind the 'evacuation neuroses' were identical with those behind the 'Munich-Crisis-neuroses,' the 'War-hardship-neuroses,' the 'Blitz-neuroses' and the 'War-neuroses'!

This similarity of unconscious causes has always been an obstacle to clinical progress in psycho-analysis. Early investigations of the classical psycho-neuroses (hysterias and obsessions) had shown that these disorders could be traced to one important phase of infantile love, rivalry and hate. This Œdipus phase was in consequence described as the 'nuclear complex' of the neuroses. But the fact that diseases differ clinically seems to call for a specific set or combination of factors appropriate to each disorder. Attempts were then made to isolate specific causal factors. These took three directions: first, to link the disorder with special aspects or layers of the main complex (for example, with homosexual or heterosexual aspects of the Œdipus situation), second, to establish which of the unconscious mechanisms had failed in the task of maintaining balance of mind, and third, to correlate the disorder with the stage of mental development (in other words, with the Ego-structure) existing at the time the original complex developed. Much has been done in this direction but vastly more remains to be done. And so it is always possible that the apparent identity of causal factors observed in the various pre-war and war neuroses is due to insufficient knowledge of the unconscious mind. On the other hand it might be argued that the fault is due not so much to lack of differentiation of causal elements as to an arbitrary distinction drawn between different types of

'neuroses,' in particular between the neuroses of peace and the neuroses of war. This criticism is of course not new. It has often been suggested that there is nothing specific about war stimuli and that the 'accident-neuroses,' and 'compensation-neuroses' observed in peace-time show little difference in structure from that of war-neuroses. The importance of this issue for war-research cannot be exaggerated. According to this argument the war situation is merely a threat to the individual in no way different from other threats real or imaginary. It is, according to this view, purely a precipitating factor differing only in quantitative and realistic respects from other precipitating factors. Here again the analyst is bound to take a firm stand. Experience has taught him that most psychological disorders can be traced to vicissitudes in the instincts of love and aggression, and it would be very queer indeed if war situations, calling as they do for a maximum and continued expression of destructive instincts and reactions, to say nothing of the drain on love-energies involved in maintaining a huge army group, did not produce specific reactions. At the very least it would appear likely that the hate and love strains of war would reactivate earlier love and hate strains and that if this reactivation went deep enough the primitive mechanisms of love and hate responsible for psychological disorders would finally be set in motion. As a matter of fact this hypothesis has been supported by the results of the analytical war-time researches already described. In the case of children¹ of an average age of 2-3 years it was observed that when they enjoyed effective emotional contact with their parents no signs of traumatic shock were present. Where, however, these 'positive' contacts were absent or where parents were killed in the raids or where the protecting parent showed obvious signs of anxiety, the children tended to manifest acute anxieties and inhibitions. Now it is well known that emotional disturbances of the child's relations to the

¹ Burlingham and Freud: *Infants without Families*, 1943; See also *Young Children in Wartime*, Geo. Allen and Unwin.

parents giving rise to hostile ('negative') reactions are a natural part of the unconscious development of all children even if they are not expressed in manifest forms of anxiety, guilt or aggression. So it is easy to argue that *unconscious reactions which reduce the inner security of the child also give rise to that 'discharge potential' which later on we call war-readiness.* Observations on adults were all to the same effect. Neurotic patients under treatment reacted less to bombing when the 'positive' transferences of infantile love feeling to the analyst were strong. Even when the 'negative' (hostile) transferences were activated, cases under treatment reacted better on the whole than similar cases having no treatment. Amongst the contributing and predisposing factors of Blitz neuroses were old age, previous evacuation or break-up of the family, lack of friends, isolation, responsibility for children, lack of efficient shelter accommodation, poor anti-aircraft defences, poor rescue organization, inefficiency of social welfare arrangements, disturbances of work, and generally any sign of social and economic insecurity. Expressing these situations in terms of infantile hate and love we may say that anything tending to reactivate or augment the individual's unconscious belief that he is not adequately loved, anything that reduces his own unconscious 'love potential,' and anything that arouses a sense of neglect without however affording an outlet for the hostile feelings thereby engendered, predisposed to Blitz illness. *Presumably, therefore, these factors play a part in increasing the unconscious war-readiness of 'normal' people.*

To sum up this problem of the identity of unconscious factors: no analyst would dream of suggesting that his clinical researches on mental war-disorders are adequate or that he has fully grasped the significance of clinical differences between psychological disorders; he would certainly not attempt to deny that there is a suspicious sameness about the causal factors so far discovered. Nevertheless I maintain that we cannot simply dismiss this 'sameness' as a proof of ignorance. On the

contrary it is capable of an extremely significant interpretation. The close resemblance, even apparent identity of causal factors in pre-war and war-time neuroses does not indeed exclude the specificity of precipitating factors ; but it does suggest that the deeper layers of the mind do not differ in war and in peace. To some this may appear merely a commonplace. It is not inherently likely that the oldest established and most inaccessible patterns of the mind alter very much. But even those who are most familiar with the workings of the unconscious find it difficult to refrain from attributing to the unconscious the characteristics of the (pre)conscious and in particular the more adult and sophisticated characteristics of the (pre)conscious.¹ It is hard to grasp that the unconscious is different in almost every conceivable respect from the pre-conscious with which we are in close contact throughout our daily lives. In the case of war-research such a confusion would be fatal to understanding. It is one thing to agree that war-strains are specific but quite another to assume that the unconscious reacts to them as 'we' do or, more accurately expressed, as our pre-conscious does. The unconscious is the repository of our earliest emotional history ; the Id is a reservoir of our unmodified instincts, the different institutions of the unconscious Ego represent records of our earliest struggles with these instincts. All these are permanent characteristics of the unconscious. Hence when we look for unconscious causes of war, we cannot or should not expect to find more than the unconscious permanently holds. Least of all may we hope to hear from it some adult echo of conscious conflict over war. Quite the contrary : it is the adult part of our mind that occasionally resounds with echoes of infantile conflict. So when we talk of unconscious war-readiness

¹ One of the causes of the recent split in psycho-analysis in this country is just this 'dressing-up' of the unconscious. The orthodox Freudians hold that some recent 'reconstructions' of early mental organization are really projections of adult pre-conscious psychology into the mind of the child. They represent what an adult, or, more accurately, *some* adults would think the child ought to think.

it is not some dim and embryonic form of adult war-readiness that we should visualize. It would not be accurate even to suggest that unconscious war-readiness is the war-readiness of the infant, although that would bring us a little closer to the understanding of war. In the unconscious sense of the term war-readiness simply means that given certain situations of tension and insecurity the unconscious responds by throwing open the sluice gates which ordinarily control the flow of primitive instinct into action. If we would help ourselves to realize how primitive and powerful these instincts are, we can draw conclusions from the destructiveness (and constructiveness) that has already been loosened (and activated) in this present war. Or if we prefer to do so we can recall the scenes of frenzied violence or megalomaniac achievement that are occasionally dramatized in our dreams. But we should remember that, whether acted out by millions of men in a devastated Europe or merely dreamed in a solitary nightmarish sleep, these orgies and feats are merely end-products. The manifest content of the dream already bears the hall-mark of the pre-conscious. It is the latent (unconscious) content that we must discover before we can understand the true dispositions of mental energy during sleep. Similarly it is not the manifest but the latent content of battle that holds the secrets of war.

All this may simply amount to saying that man's psychological disorders can be traced to *one* cause, namely, his passage from an animal state of function to what in peace-time anyhow we call his high state of civilization : that the magistrate's bench and the divorce court, the psychiatric clinic and the asylum are part of the price we must pay for civilization : finally that war itself is part of the price of peace. Anyhow it cannot be disputed that this unconscious transition has to be made by all infants of whatever race. Uninspiring or improbable as this view may appear, its bearing on war-prevention cannot be ignored. I have said that the ways and means of the unconscious are not likely to alter very much. But the particular unconscious

mechanisms used to control mental energy certainly vary from time to time or from one phase of development to another. Once a war has begun it no doubt feeds on itself. The loosening of unconscious mechanisms of discharge produces the actual war, and the war in turn aggravates and accelerates the inner disorder that set it agoing : and so until the energy-crisis has been passed, more and more war is needed. Yet all the time the unconscious is simply repeating an old and essentially infantile pattern. If we would inhibit war, we must uncover the unconscious trick of peace and that too will be found to be an old and essentially infantile trick. For, mentally regarded, man is as old as his ancestors and as infantile as his offspring.

WAR-TIME SOCIAL RESEARCH

Reviewing these various investigations, it will be apparent that while some of them depended on observation or analysis of disordered individuals, others were on the whole of a sociological nature. It remains to indicate what other group investigations have been initiated during the present war. One of the more interesting and, at one stage, promising of these researches was that known as *War-time Social Survey*. This was really a development of an anthropological 'field' method of studying primitive races, namely, by living amongst them, watching their habits and customs and, having learned their language, questioning them about their feelings and ways of life. Earlier sociologists did not apply this method to the study of civilized man partly because they have always been scared of the subjective, partly because their interests lay in economic organization, but in the main because they took civilized life for granted. They might have a cursory interest in the folk-lore of the rural counties but it practically never occurred to them that more important fields for the study of superstition lie in Kensington, the Mile End Road and the offices of Whitehall.

Anyhow, *War-time Social Survey*, a composite organization¹ which received the blessing of the Ministry of Information, began to ask questions. The methods chiefly employed were the recognized methods by which accurate cross-sections can be taken of public opinion. Subjected to careful analysis these permit us to estimate with considerable accuracy the conscious reaction of the community as a whole. But of course there are all sorts of public opinion. We must distinguish, for example, reactions to matters of fact, like the amount of the jam ration, from reactions to matters of opinion (or prejudice), like, say, war-aims or anti-semitism or the significance of a Cabinet Minister's latest utterance. All these reactions are subjective and to a varying extent infantile but, naturally, our reaction to matters of fact is more 'matter-of-fact.' During the retreat to Dunkirk or the victorious advance in Tunisia we may have complained less about the jam ration: when the issues of battle are in doubt and the state of uncertainty is prolonged, we are likely to complain more. But under ordinary circumstances our response depends on our capacity to adapt to actual hardship. However babyish we may feel about the jam ration we do not consciously believe that jam is a war aim in itself or a missile to throw at Jews, or (except in the case of the Food Minister) a sign of a Cabinet Minister's affection for us. When, however, deeper emotions and more violent personal prejudices are stirred we have a much better chance of estimating morale. These emotions and prejudices lie nearer to the unconscious and reflect more accurately the inner state of mind of the individual.

¹ *Mass-Observation* was for some time associated with *War-time Social Survey* but retained its independent organization, and has both before and since produced separate reports on various aspects of social life in this country. As previously noted (p. 153) its methods differ in some respects of those of *War-time Social Survey* and from those of other organizations contributing to Home Intelligence. This has some bearing on the interpretation of data, since obviously the function of Home Intelligence is to contribute to the war-effort rather than to make scientific surveys. Needless to add, the scientific value of all the organizations depends on the degree to which their workers are adequately trained.

For this very reason *War-time Social Survey* soon fell foul of the politician. Its main function was to estimate morale and obviously we cannot estimate morale accurately if we do not probe the emotions. It is interesting to reflect that the political hubbub over 'Cooper's Snoopers' had little to do with infringement of the democratic right to privacy of opinion (only a minute fraction of those questioned took any exception to the procedure) and a good deal to do with the politician's belief that *his* right to represent public opinion was implicitly disparaged by the method; a view, incidentally, with which the Press naturally sympathized, since it too claims to reflect public opinion. But I think the true objection lay deeper. Politicians and the Press depend for their authority on the more superstitious and submissive reactions of their supporters. Anything that really enables the submissive masses to express their true opinions is in the psychological sense a revolutionary move the end of which none can foresee.

Anyhow the wings of the survey were soon clipped and we must wait till some years after the war before we can judge whether the material it had already collected can be used for the purposes of war-research. Such observations as I have been able to make suggest that a good deal can be discovered by such surveys provided the questions are put in a form that will evoke whatever conflict may exist and provided the answers are interpreted in accordance with analytical principles. For example: the early phases of the war provided only too frequent opportunities of testing civilian reactions to military reverses or disasters. Obviously it was important to discover the duration, intensity and underlying causes of such reactions. It was clear that the fall of France even more than the capitulation of Belgium produced a shock reaction that was still patent six months after the event. Even when obvious reactions died down there was a good deal of evidence to suggest that the effects of the trauma still persisted under the surface. Many reactions of personal insecurity were displaced and transformed into forms of

social insecurity: such as grumbling, financial anxiety and various kinds of defeatism. Subsequent disasters, the fall of Greece, Crete, and the reverses in Africa were followed by much less prolonged shock usually of a few weeks' duration; partly, no doubt, because they were less traumatic, but also because a certain amount of immunity to shock had developed in the meantime. Although it is premature to form any final conclusions on the point, the capacity to 'bind' or 'annul' traumatic stimuli has an obvious bearing on war-readiness. It touches in particular on the problem of social forgetting by which memories of traumatic war experiences are dimmed and the strength of post-war peace drives reduced to an ineffective level.

Much more intensive research is required in the case of war reactions of a hostile type occurring within the group. Whatever may be the immediate justifications for a 'good' war, it is evident that even the 'good' side must react with unconscious guilt to the organized killing and destruction that follows. That is why it is so important to measure the various forms of social aggressiveness that are directed not to the enemy but to focal points within the community. War-time increases in anti-semitism are amongst the more interesting reactions of this type. Although they are by no means the only signs of aggressiveness between sections of the group. The scapegoat system is well adapted to reduce inner strains and, although up to a point it has a certain discharge value for the community (as all Aunt Sally systems have) it is nevertheless a sign of weakness wherever it is found. The importance of war-time aggression arising within the group is not confined to its significance as a morale 'indicator': the same aggressiveness can in peace-time act as a war 'instigator.' This is another of these key-points in war research to which due attention must be paid. Obviously the cohesion of one nation can be increased by directing aggression at another. The most extensive and careful researches on this point must be carried out if we are really going to make

an honest attempt to organize war-prevention. At the very least they would add to our knowledge of the functioning of groups. It is just because we have only the sketchiest ideas of group function that we cannot indicate the points at which pacifist effort might be most fruitfully directed. No doubt present methods of investigation are far from perfect ; but already the steps that have been taken in sociological research are promising enough to justify their immediate extension after the war. Obviously we must not be too optimistic about immediate results. The number of skilled workers is still hopelessly inadequate. But skilled workers can be trained and the time and money spent in training them will be time and money well spent. At the very least it will prevent the squandering of energy on superficial and fruitless researches. In matters so grave as war, superficial conclusions are worse than useless : by diverting attention from the more profound and significant factors they play a part in maintaining war-readiness.

CHAPTER X

Views and Reviews

ECONOMIC CAUSES OF WAR ? INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY AND GROUP PSYCHOLOGY : SEXUALITY AND WAR

ALTHOUGH my first concern in writing these war-time essays is to re-examine the original thesis in the light of subsequent events, I am naturally tempted to seize the opportunity of reviewing my own book. For some years after its publication I was invited by various societies and organizations to lecture on the subject of war, and have encountered a number of criticisms of my approach. From these I have selected the arguments that appear to call for a considered reply, and propose to add thereto some criticism of my own.

ECONOMIC CAUSES OF WAR

The criticism most frequently advanced was that I had ignored the economic causes of war. As might be expected the more pungent of these comments appeared in Communist periodicals. The Communist has from the beginning invested heavily in the economic interpretation of history, so heavily, indeed, that it is difficult for him now to free himself from this handicap in thinking. Expressed in psychological terms, and allowing for certain differences between the original *Communist Manifesto* and modern interpretations of it, his position is briefly as follows. Man's reactions to the material affairs of life are guided in the main by instincts of self-preservation and acquisition. Self-preservation the Communist is content to regard as a primary biological urge although, of course, capable of expression in a great variety of ways. It is not quite clear to what extent he views the instinct of acquisition as primary,

but it is evident that he distinguishes between mental forms, such as the accumulation of power and mastery and material forms such as the accumulation of profits. For the Communist these distinctions are perhaps no great matter, since it can be argued that there is anyhow a good deal of overlap between the various derivations of these instincts ; for instance, that material power increases the efficiency of self-preservation. The acquisitive (egoistic) instincts lend themselves to group or class expression either because of the identity of interest between members of the group or because individuals acting in combination can defend their privileges better. Further the Communist believes in the existence of reactive instincts. He holds that a reaction of violent aggression will follow any serious threat to the vested interests of the capitalist class, in other words, any serious frustration of their acquisitive instincts. Not only so, he believes that as a step towards abolishing these vested interests, one particular class—the proletariat—must turn its aggression towards the capitalist class and violently overthrow it. Once this has been done the proletarian state will control all the material activities of all individuals or groups in the community. Whatever powers or profits accrue will be used for the benefit first of the proletariat and later of the people as a whole. When this stage is reached all will be well. Incidentally, there is no direct mention in the *Manifesto* of the forces of love, including the sexual impulses. One gathers, however, that in the Communist's opinion these are directed almost exclusively to the attainment of their legitimate and conscious aims. In this he apparently does himself less than justice. His concern for the material benefit of the proletariat argues a degree of love for or identification with this class which is not cancelled out even by his fixed idea that the proletariat must be led, forcibly if necessary, by the Communist Party.

It is not difficult to infer what are the Communist's views on war. The Communist is nothing if not a group psychologist. He is also to a strictly limited extent a dynamic psychologist

and an analytical psychologist. All wars up till now have, in his opinion, been due to economic causes; that is, they have been group manifestations arising when the material acquisitiveness of the most powerful class in any community is frustrated or threatened with frustration. Therefore, if man's acquisitiveness can be controlled or regulated by the state for the benefit of the people, war will automatically and finally cease. That is his view in a nutshell. In passing, however, we may note that he is an *ex-parte* advocate of the uses and finally the virtues of civil war not only in his own country but in all countries where capitalist systems exist. Moreover, if he believes in a Communist International, he must also be ready to approve of war between capitalist and communist nations. Such wars would not, according to his views, be ideological conflicts but wars of economic origin.

No one can fairly deny that in working out his theories, or economic interpretations, the Communist has produced a wealth of arguments and instances, a great number of which are apparently very convincing. He can point to trade-wars, to concession wars and to wars over the possession of natural resources. Studying the habits of armament firms or international cartels, he can maintain that profit-making itself develops international forms, adding, of course, that because of these profit-making motives, such forms of internationalism keep the proletariat in subjection and so debase human currency. If asked to correlate his political and social views with some form of scientific thinking, he shows a distinct preference for 'biological' concepts, appealing in particular to manifestations of the 'struggle for existence.' By so doing he ties himself to the view that man's evolution from the animal involves no significant break with familiar biological laws. Anyhow it is clear from his concern for the material well-being of the proletariat that the Communist believes in the greatest happiness of the greatest number. He is therefore bound to feel that he is on the side of the angels, even if he is ready to wage civil or international war

to achieve his aim. Naturally any suggestion that economic factors are not the primary causes of war threatens his whole system of human motivation and must appear to him not only jejune but positively wicked and presumably bourgeois.

It is only fair to add that he is not the only one to give economic interpretations of anti-social conduct. Until comparatively recently it was taken for granted that one of the main causes of delinquency was economic in nature. During the past fifteen years, however, dynamic psychologists have maintained with increasing emphasis that delinquent behaviour is not only a psychological problem, but in very many cases an expression of mental *disorder*. Acting on this assumption they have set about the treatment of selected cases by psychological means, and have been able to demonstrate that in these cases the condition can be eradicated either by psycho-therapeutic means alone or by altering the environment in accordance with well-defined psychological principles, or by a suitable combination of these methods.¹ The great majority of workers in this field have been impressed by the fact that in the cases they have observed or treated, economic factors are of secondary importance. Active opposition to these clinical theories of motivation come from two quarters: from those who believe in 'original sin' and from politically minded groups who believe that crime is due for the most part to economic hardship. There is, indeed, a certain amount of resentment in the opposition of politicians, suggesting that, but for their political convictions, the partisans of economic interpretation would be themselves inclined to approach the matter from a moralistic angle. Anyhow they are not slow to hint that psychologists are fanatical people who ignore obstinately the significance of 'common-sense' or 'natural' (*i.e.*, economic) causes of delinquency.

¹ Glover: *The Diagnosis and Treatment of Delinquency: being a Clinical Report on the Work of the Institute during the Five Years 1937 to 1941*. Published by the Institute for the Scientific Treatment of Delinquency. London. 1944.

Now it would be foolish to suggest that there is no foundation for this criticism. Many exponents of dynamic psychology, in particular those who approach the subject of mental disorder with a strong 'feeling' for unconscious causes, show a lack of perspective and judgment in approaching the problems of everyday life. This form of bias is difficult to distinguish from any other form of fanaticism. Moreover, it is notorious that the treatment of psychological illness attracts all sorts of cranks whose own disordered functions are the subject of cynical or delighted comment by their more matter-of-fact neighbours. But personal criticism of this sort, though valid enough in its way, does not invalidate the findings of psychological science. No doubt many psychologists, outside their consulting rooms, are cranky enough. It might even be argued that one should set a crank to catch a crank—in other words, that subjective experience of conflict may in certain cases increase understanding of conflict in others. But provided the appropriate safeguards are instituted, and the proper 'corrections for error' made, there is no just reason to discount even those findings which are apparently improbable or irrational.

In making a psychological transcript of communist theories, I have started from the more moderate position taken up by British exponents of the doctrine, namely, that although motives other than economic interest may play a part in social organization, yet economic motives exert a *primacy* over all others. Not only so, the part played by other motives will depend on an environment the nature of which will be *determined* by its system of *economic* relationships. Finally, the *basic* factor in any given society is the way in which it earns its living. This is the *ultimate* or *fundamental* cause of social change. So runs the argument. If we turn this argument into psychological terms, its apparent coherence disappears. Primacy of instinct is indeed a concept that the dynamic psychologist employs, but, of course, primacy varies from one stage of development to another, from one level of the mind to another, from one day

to another, indeed from one hour to another. A basic (primary) instinct is a concept of a totally different order : it is a form of unmodified instinct energy existing at birth. Further, environment is not simply a natural or economic order, it is a system of 'contacts' in which the emotional relationship between the individual and other human beings exerts unchallenged priority. The period at which society nowadays earns its living does not begin until adolescence, and ends usually about sixty. By the time a child is five years old, that is to say, almost ten years before he earns a brass farthing, he has already acquired the main cultural patterns that will stamp his thoughts, feelings and behaviour until the day of his death. He has already had transmitted to him the system of civilization that it has taken the race many thousands of years to build up. Indeed, if the communist or the economist or, for the matter of that, any advocate of the primacy of economic motives would take the trouble to tiptoe (quietly) into the nearest nursery and sit down in a corner, he would learn more about human nature in two hours than he would in a ten years' course at any School of Economics. He would observe the simple fact that the infant is an ecto-parasite sucking milk from the real or substitute breasts of its mother, 'earning its living,' that is to say, by the preposterous barter of a howl, a gurgle and a satisfied smile. He would further observe that when this 'work' is completed, the infant retires for a time into the Nirvana of its unconscious almost as suddenly as the cuckoo retires into the privacy of its clock. Awakening once again and protruding itself into the real world through a mental foam of hallucinatory bubbles, the infant proceeds for a space to lay down the law. And this law is the law of love and hate. Or rather it is the emotional prolegomena to love and hate which can only be called law when the infant learns how to distinguish objects and to think of them in terms of its own emotional need and experience. With each waking interval rating as a lifetime, it is not hard to realize that after a calendar year, the infant faces life with a combination

of illusion and disillusion that we grown-ups are accustomed to attribute only to nonagenarians.

I will not attempt to amplify here the outline of child development I have already sketched in these essays. But I will say this. The more one observes the blind and bland effrontery with which politicians seek to shout down the complications of human life with sterile slogans concerning adult conduct, the more obvious it becomes why political activities are from time to time disrupted by those outbursts of infantile reaction we call wars. Nor does the politician improve matters by attempting to pass off his superficial generalizations with sales talk about biological function. The most important fact about man is not that he is kin to the animals, but that his mind differentiates him from all other animals ; and the most important thing about man's mind is that under the surface it retains in active function those earliest modes of reaction by which pre-historic man bridged the gap from reflex action to reflection. War, despite its apparent resemblances to the fighting habits of animals, has lost all direct association with those habits. It is essentially a human development—a *system* or *institution*—resulting from the passage of psychic conflict through endless phases of animism and primitive religion. The most elementary study of the economic organizations of man shows that these cannot be measured by the standards of self-preservation or acquisition existing amongst other animals. The very simplest assumptions, such as that material power increases the efficiency of self-preservation, are open to question. Human acquisitiveness is not like the storing of acorns by squirrels or the storing of glycogen by the liver : it is part of the expression of a mental system. *It is the positive aspect of a mental system the negative aspect of which leads to the destruction of what has been acquired.* Man emerged from an animal state by, as it were, standing animal instincts on their heads. He superseded animal mechanisms by mental mechanisms, which blurred the sharp distinctions between one instinct and another, and so permitted the modes

of gratification of one instinct to be transferred to another. Where the animal eats to live, man may eat as an act of love also. When the animal collects food to live, man may collect possessions to give himself the feeling that he is loveable. Poverty, as the miser's love of gold plainly indicates, is a state of lovelessness. And so through the whole range of human phenomena—unless we accept fundamentally human (if unconscious) valuations we can neither understand ourselves nor adequately control our actions. If the economist would redeem himself, he must start again. Let him try out the proven conclusions that dynamic psychology offers him. Let him start his investigations not with trite observations about the 'normal' economic functions of grown-ups, but by studying the abnormalities and *perversions* of economic function existing from birth to death. When he has established a *pathology* of economics he may make the gratifying discovery that his work on normal economic function begins to make human sense, and that his conclusions can be dovetailed with other researches on mental origins. Until he does so he can justifiably be rated as an obscurantist, and, if we believe in evolutionary adaptation, a reactionary. The more he offers misleading interpretations of war, the more war-minded in effect he is. In the realm of science good intentions are not enough.

INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY AND GROUP PSYCHOLOGY

Throughout these essays I have gone on the working assumption that the findings of individual psychology can be profitably applied to the study of the group. To this a number of objections have been raised. It is argued that to treat the group as if it were an individual is simply to ignore the essential differences between them: these differences, it is held, are qualitative as well as quantitative and involve not only structure and economy but, according to some, the psychic forces employed; moreover, the parallel if too closely drawn ends in the

creation of scientific fictions such as the 'group mind' or the 'collective unconscious'; some regard the procedure as being little more than a projection into the group of the mental characteristics of the individual, in other words, an irrational process of anthropomorphisation by which we seek to mould the group after our own image. In some instances the atomistic view is taken that already we ascribe much too much significance to group manifestations, neglecting the fact that all groups are merely aggregates of individuals, whose similarities in mental function determine the nature and direction of group activity. And so on.

A certain amount of misunderstanding has evidently arisen from my somewhat unguarded use of the term 'individual psychology.' It would have been better to say outright that Freud's discoveries regarding the mind of the individual throw light on the nature of the group, adding that they do so because they recognise the paramount influence of the unconscious mind on *all* human affairs. I am perfectly ready to admit that the (pre)conscious psychology of the individual throws little direct light on the origin and function of the group: further that most researches on group psychology are crippled from the start by a ridiculously exclusive concern with the 'rational' behaviour of grown-ups. But I think there is a simpler way of getting round the difficulty. For my part I should be perfectly happy if the term 'individual psychology' were abolished or at any rate restricted to the mental functioning of sucklings. For after the first months of what we may call somewhat loosely 'narcissistic function,' there is no such thing as 'individual' psychology. Not only is the child from early infancy a social animal, *i.e.*, a recognized member of a small family group, but the patterns of his mind soon become group patterns. The 'group mind' is by no means a fiction. The real objection to the term as originally used is that the 'group mind' described by some sociologists has no psychic locality. The sociologist either looked for it in the wrong place or, having first excogitated

the concept could not find a place for it and so had to leave it in the air. Actually the 'group mind' is *part* of the psychic equipment of each individual. As I have explained earlier, it is set up by a mental act of fission. When part of the early Ego becomes a specialized receptor of parental influences, the mind is thereby split in two, a 'parent' part and a 'child' part. Because of the same act of fission the newly formed group mind develops the more primitive characteristics of leadership. True, the balance between the 'leader' (Super-Ego) and the 'led' (the Ego) is at first an uncertain one. But as the infantile years pass the power of the restraining Super-Ego becomes more permanently established and can only be overthrown on occasions of extreme stress. It is a profound mistake to assume that development from the infantile family group to adult forms of extra-familial organization is achieved by a direct transmission of responses from the earlier to the later form. Many sociologists who are anxious and willing to employ Freudian concepts in the study of the group fall into this error. The transition is indirect: it takes place through the medium of the unconscious 'group mind' which is an essential part of the individual psyche. The unconscious group mind operates with the assistance of a number of equally unconscious mental mechanisms of which 'displacement' and 'identification' are the most effective.¹ The error lies in confusing a sequence of actual experiences of group life with a developmental sequence of mental mechanisms, the most important of which are unconscious. In the same way it is entirely confusing to think of group psychology in terms of the groups that manifest the reactions. It has taken a long time to establish a clear distinction between the concept of a mental apparatus and the material existence of the central nervous system; it will take longer to make clear that group psychology has nothing to do with group photography: it is concerned with the *mental* operations by which the energies of group formations are discharged in group action. The

¹ See pp. 22, 199.

distinction between individual and group psychology is for the most part one of convenience. Its main justification appears to be that certain mental phenomena are more easily studied in the activities of organized or unorganized groups. So far as psycho-analytical research goes, the function of groups does not call for any mental activities that are outwith the psychic range of the individual.

The argument that it is fallacious to invest the group with the characteristics of the individual, in other words, to anthropomorphize the group, raises a consideration of some importance. The procedure would indeed be entirely unjustifiable but for one awkward fact, namely, that man's habit of anthropomorphizing does not stop short at animistic phantasies *about* the external world. Man not only sees his own image in the various aspects of the universe that surround him : he *moulds* his environment after his own unconscious images. *Whatever he creates constitutes a projection of the inner aspects of his own mind.* Whatever may have been the earlier biological significance of the group, it has, from the beginnings of human civilization, been moulded after individual patterns. Indeed, we can sometimes get a clearer idea of the complications of the individual mind by studying the different varieties of group-specialization than by studying the individual. Groups isolate and organize functions which in the individual constantly overlap. To take a simple example : the ' Church ' clearly represents an organized externalization of the function of the Super-Ego (unconscious and conscious conscience). With a little more insight we might well have postulated the existence of the Super-Ego in the individual from a study of Church groups. And so with other specialized forms of group organization : the Law, Medicine, Parliament or the Dockers' Union : these represent in group form the externalized functions of mind. Even the instruments of mind can be externalized. For what is a Reference Library but a precipitate of memories adapted to group function ? Had dynamic psychology started with intensive study of the group

instead of the individual it could have made valuable contributions to the unconscious psychology of the individual. It had only to observe varieties of behaviour and thought which, although apparently recessive in the individual, are capable of intense reactivation in the group. The phenomena of modern warfare comprising as they do an immense variety of destructive procedures are much closer to (what we now know to be) infantile unconscious phantasies of destruction than to the ordinary fighting habits of the individual adult.

Not only so, the apparent obstacle to applying the psychology of the individual to that of the group proves on closer examination to be a valuable source of increased understanding. This obstacle is usually described as a lack of coherent (central) organization of group systems. There can be no comparison, it is said, between the mental apparatus of the individual and the organization of groups that dissolve into simpler units at any time of the day or night. But this argument is based on a misapprehension of the nature of the individual mind. Despite a semblance of unity due for the most part to the activity of consciousness, the individual mind is rarely at one with itself. In active life its main components vie with one another for the right of approach to consciousness. This is most clearly demonstrated in the process of dreaming. For many years now I have advanced the view that the main parts of the mind are not split off from a primitive total Ego, but that on the contrary the earlier formations of mind consist of isolated centres of organization which later on merge to form the main divisions of the fully organized Ego. This *nuclear theory of ego-development* has its counterpart in a *cell theory of the national group*. Examined in detail, national groups are seen to consist of an immense number of smaller groups, varying in size and importance, all linked up in an apparently inextricable confusion—like the tangle of ‘magic’ rings which a conjuror forms from separate links and then invites us vainly to disentangle. The apparent confusion in the cell-structure of large groups is,

however, due to lack of systematic investigation of the inter-relation of different cells and of their common relation to the nuclear formations of the individual mind.

All this may appear to be very remote from the investigation of war, yet in my opinion it ranks as a war research next in importance to the investigation of 'war-neuroses' and of the 'unconscious war-readiness' of the civilian. It is true that, by and large, the constituent units of national groups ordinarily lack central direction (Parliament and the Statute Book notwithstanding). They can achieve such integration only temporarily under conditions of great stress and provided the aims and ideals of the various group leaders can be merged with those of the Governing Executive. Even in war-time this happens only rarely. Properly interpreted the function of promoters of war-morale is to see that this identity of aim is constantly strengthened. But ordinarily the condition of the national group is like that of a blind giant whose right hand knows not what his left hand does. It exists in a state of constant dissociation. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that the mental structure and function of the state resembles most closely the mental structure and function of the schizophrenic patient. And it is no coincidence that the nearest approach to the war-time behaviour of the group is to be found in certain schizophrenic forms of insanity.¹ This view is entirely distinct from the commonly accepted theory that the manifestations of war are due simply to the enormous impetus given to individual impulses when these are collectively organized. In a superficial sense this is no doubt true but it misses the real point, namely, that *the institution of war is an archaic institution, the persistence of which is due to the fact that in the group archaic and superstitious systems retain a vitality which they have to a considerable extent lost in the individual.* This tendency is no doubt reinforced by the fact that as individual outlets for violence are progressively

¹ For the sake of clarity in presentation, I have left out of account the hysterical mechanisms mobilized in war.

restricted group outlets actually increase. This shift in the 'point of discharge' from individual to group violence, though obvious enough, is seldom given the consideration it deserves. The fact that a larger amalgamated group can take over from its constituent groups the right to make war has led to the assumption that the formation of still larger group units will reduce the quantity of violence discharged. Thus it is often argued that because the petty wars of the Heptarchy were eliminated by the merging of these petty kingdoms there is nothing to prevent the total elimination of war by the formation of larger and larger federated states. The plain fact remains, however, that in the meantime increase in the size of state groups has certainly given rise to a catastrophic increase in the range and fury of war-making. In short there is so far no direct evidence that the size of large groups is of greater significance in war-prevention than the qualitative factors of instinct modification.¹

SEXUALITY AND WAR.

Occasionally the criticism is advanced that too much space has been devoted to the unconscious sexual factors in war-readiness, and that the significance of manifest sexual factors has been neglected. Reference is usually made to the generally accepted limitation of combatant activities to males, and to war-time relaxation of sexual restrictions occurring amongst both combatants and civilians. Some bulky volumes have been written on the sexual accompaniments of war but as a rule the authors accept the more popular connotation of the term sexual, limiting it to the manifestly erotic aspects of the sexual impulse :—erotomania, nymphomania, perversions, prostitution, promiscuity, adultery, divorce or separation rates, to say nothing of such transparently sexual rituals as that of the 'white feather.' Even when they admit the existence of unconscious sexuality

¹ See also under War-Prevention, p. 198.

they impose a similar limitation. By so doing they deprive the term of much of its significance. In particular the phenomenon of 'sublimation,' by which the frustrated libidinal impulses of infancy and childhood are unconsciously diverted to non-sexual aims, are left out of account. Yet the process of 'desexualization' of unconscious sexual impulses is responsible for the smooth running of our social organization in both its individual and group aspects, and any important disturbance of the process must have some bearing on both individual and social disintegration.

Actually the criticism has brought home to me a serious error of omission in my presentation, namely the absence of any systematic description of 'aim-inhibition' and 'sublimation.'¹ This I must make shift to rectify now. To understand the processes of aim-inhibition and sublimation we must consider once again the psychological situation that prevails throughout the first five years of life. Equipped from birth with sexual instincts of the most primitive order, the infant grows up in a world of adults who, although ready to preserve and, to the best of their ability, love children, are not prepared to countenance either their sexual impulses or the aggressiveness with which children naturally respond to frustration of impulse. Even if the parents were prepared to gratify (in spite of their normal disinclination and of the law) the manifest forms of infantile sexual demand, they could not satisfy the unconscious demands of the child, which are by reason of their phantastic nature incapable of fulfilment. And so an unequal conflict begins between the infant and the adult. The normal adult having long since renounced his or her own infantile sexuality (except of course such components as can be merged with adult sexuality without producing conflict) knows all the tricks of the combat. Even if the mother and father ignore or remain blind to the infantile instincts of their offspring, they nevertheless frustrate and by frustrating convey disapproval of these instincts.

¹ See pp. 21, 93, 122.

The only forms of direct love parents are prepared to offer children are *inhibited in their aim*, that is to say, their attitudes of tenderness are devoid of any conscious erotic component. This unconscious trick of inhibition they themselves acquired in their own childhood. The response they try to cultivate in their children by precept and example is a form of love and affection as aim-inhibited as that which they offer. Obviously the child is at an immense disadvantage in the combat: for if it persists in the expression of its primitive instincts it sets in jeopardy the love and affection that are so essential to its security of feeling. It is a clash between the clay pot and the iron pot, one that lasts from infancy until the incestuous phase breaks up, as a rule about the age of five. During that long drawn out struggle, one form of infantile sexuality follows another. Every known sexual component which if exhibited by the adult would be called perverse makes its appearance, and is either abandoned or marshalled in a sexual constellation which is more and more dominated by the child's genital impulses. Strictly speaking it is this organized genital stage of infantile sexuality that goes by the name of the Oedipus phase; a term implying simply that the objects of the child's sexual impulses are the parents or their substitutes. When, owing partly to frustration and partly to the child's conscious and unconscious anxieties, this final infantile organization is shipwrecked, there is only one way left to attain security within the family, namely to follow the path of aim-inhibited impulses.

But aim-inhibition alone would not solve the child's problem. Its mental apparatus has at the same time to face the gigantic task of *mastering* the charges of frustrated instinct that are a constant source of inner danger. The unconscious mechanism of repression is capable of dealing with all but the more explosive tensions. But repression calls for a constant expenditure of energy to keep the dangerous excitations under control. There is only one satisfactory solution to this problem in psychodynamics, namely, to modify the sexual energy permanently.

This remarkable feat is achieved by a process of 'desexualization' of infantile sexual drives. Adults who are inclined to regard the achievements of childhood with amused condescension should reflect that this unconscious process of altering permanently the aims of a powerful instinct is a staggering feat quite beyond the compass of the grown-up. But desexualization is not yet *sublimation*. Only when the further step has been taken of *transferring* desexualized energy to non-sexual aims and objects can we talk of real sublimation. The process is a complicated one subject to many trials and errors before it is well established: but once in effective operation sublimation not only provides the final solution of frustration but by following the path of unconscious displacement brings about a spectacular expansion of non-sexual interests. An almost inexhaustible supply of driving energy is put at the disposal of the individual. The ultimate goal may develop from the simplest forms of child's play to the most recondite forms of intellectual activity, but for our present purpose we may confine ourselves to the social functions of both aim-inhibition and sublimation. *Man's capacity to maintain the complicated structure of modern society depends almost exclusively on these two mechanisms. It follows therefore that when, as in war, the social organization is flooded with destructive impulses and when we are prepared to gamble our social stability for the sake of overcoming an 'enemy,' something must have gone radically wrong with the functions of sublimation.* Here is yet another of the key points in war-research.

And here again a hint of the solution to a social problem can be gained by investigating pathological disorders occurring under war conditions. Practically the only discovery of importance made about the 'war-neuroses' of the 1914-18 war was that an 'unconscious homosexual factor' played a significant part in their causation. To prevent misunderstanding it should be added that 'unconscious homosexuality' differs both quantitatively and qualitatively from the group of manifest sexual perversions that are officially designated 'homosexual.'

Constitutionally all human beings are bisexual, and in its simplest sense the term 'unconscious homosexuality' refers to those homosexual impulses of the child which have arisen during the Oedipus phase, have been directed to the parent of the same sex and have in due course succumbed to the action of repression, leaving only 'aim-inhibited' forms accessible to consciousness. In a wider sense, however, it represents a *phase* of mental development which leaves a lasting imprint on the character of the individual. But it is more than an unconscious imprint, it is an elaborate unconscious *pattern* by which impulse has been and, given an active regression, can again be regulated. Manifest homosexuality on the other hand is an organized form of sexual perversion observed occasionally in young children but more commonly from adolescence onwards. Between the normal 'unconscious homosexuality' of the child and the manifest homosexuality of the grown-up there are many transitional forms. What the clinician has in mind when he talks rather loosely¹ of an 'unconscious homosexual' is an individual in whom the unconscious homosexual phase has for one reason or another (*e.g.*, in the case of the male excessive hate of the mother) been unduly accentuated and where repression systems have some difficulty in preventing regressive overcharges of unconscious homosexuality breaking through into consciousness. It is from this group that most 'war-neurotics' are recruited. Manifest homosexuals vary in their reaction to war conditions. If they are going to break down, they do so as a rule in the early stages of training. Many 'æsthetic' types of passive homosexual, for example, simply cannot endure barrack

¹ This slipshod usage is harmless enough so long as the specialists who use the term understand exactly what it means, and so long as they use it with due regard for professional discretion. Unconscious homosexuality is not a disorder to be recorded on medical certificates or discharge papers; it is a normal phase of development which not only promotes a normal state of social cohesion but greatly enriches the character of the individual. If the existence of unconscious tendencies were to be made the basis of social assessments, we would soon be busy putting each other in concentration camps.

room life and the training procedures of the army. The breaking point of the 'unconscious homosexual' varies according to the strength of his unconscious disposition and the severity of the 'war-strain' he has to endure. Nevertheless there are certain character formations that indicate the existence of unconscious homosexual difficulties, and given careful enough examination it is not hard to detect the type of recruit who is likely sooner or later to break down for this reason.

But for the purposes of the present argument the 'stigmata' of unconscious homosexuality are not so important as the causes of the breakdown of the 'unconscious homosexual' under war conditions. Clearly the most important determining cause is a breakdown in the sublimation of infantile homosexual impulse induced by a violent change from civilian to military and combatant life. The sensitive type has only just succeeded in overcoming the sadistic charges and 'death wishes' that accompany unconscious homosexual drives. Army conditions project him suddenly into a society of males—a society the ultimate aim of which is to seek out another society of males (the enemy) and kill as many of them as possible. This double strain is just too much for the conscript and he seeks (unconsciously) to escape from the situation by turning his sadism on himself and discharging it through his body or his mind. The breakdown represented by the war-neuroses renders him incapable of war service (*i.e.*, the destruction of males) and at the same time withdraws him from the danger of being destroyed by other males. These reactions are not, it is true, peculiar to the war-neurotic. On the outbreak of this war many civilians betrayed their unconscious interpretation of the war-situation by imposing on themselves sexual restrictions of a superstitious type. The commonest was to abstain from sexual intercourse so long as other men were fighting to defend their country from danger. Some put the matter quite bluntly: only the fighting man is entitled to have sexual intercourse. But those sporadic manifestations, which in any case did not last very long, are not

so convincing as the more extensive mental disorders precipitated by military life.

If now we seek to correlate these individual findings with the psychology of the group, the first point we have to bear in mind is that the sublimation of unconscious homosexual impulse provides a large part of the binding energy that holds the group together. On the other hand under war conditions sublimation is called on to justify a complete reversal of the fifth commandment. What for the individual is stigmatized as the crime of murder is the accepted standard of the combatant group and is regarded as praiseworthy also by non-combatants. On the declaration of war, society automatically re-enacts one of the stages of its own prehistoric development, a stage, that is, before homosexual bonds had effectively reduced the rivalries between males. True this re-enactment is strictly limited in purpose. The aggression that is released is canalized in the direction of the 'enemy.' And it is associated with a reinforcement of sublimated homosexuality between members of the 'home' group. *The problem for the psychologist to determine is whether the periodic outbreak of war represents a flash-point in the tension of unconscious hostility between males touched off during a phase of unconscious homosexual regression within the group.* If so, we must discover at what level of regression the explosive situation develops. We must also consider how far the increased size and complexity of modern groups is an obstacle to the effective control of war, whether in fact we would not be better off if the modern group were small enough and simple enough to be in touch with its own primitive origins.

CHAPTER XI

The Principles and Practice of War-prevention

LESSONS FROM INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY : APPLICATIONS TO
THE GROUP : THE PROBLEM RESTATED : THE PRINCIPLES
OF PACIFISM : LEADERSHIP, THE FAMILY AND THE STATE :
SUMMARY

It is a commonplace of psychotherapy that intellectual convictions regarding the unconscious causes of nervous symptoms cannot be depended upon to bring about their resolution. When it comes to an emotional pinch patients show a distinct preference for 'natural' or 'rational' cures. The nervous dyspeptic may give lip service to interpretations of the unconscious emotional factors responsible for his illness ; but he continues to share with the rest of the population an almost unshakeable belief in the natural and rational procedure of swallowing pills and powders. Should some alleviation ensue, his conviction becomes absolute. Forty years later, hale but still a martyr to dyspepsia, he can be found swallowing with undiminished faith the same brand of powder.

A similar reaction is to be observed among those who concern themselves with schemes for the prevention of war. Even when they are ready to agree that war must be due to unconscious causes, their conversion to this view does not diminish their belief in the efficacy of 'natural' and 'rational' methods of war-prevention. The fact that the measures they suggest may differ in principle or in practice, does not disturb the therapeutic convictions of the pacifist. On the contrary, when they are faced with the flat assertion that before we can hope to eradicate disorders we must first understand their causes, pacifists tend to form a sort of 'popular front' in which

internal differences are sunk before the common heresy. The Communist is more consistent. Either he rejects the existence of unconscious causes or he regards them as of mainly academic or at least subsidiary interest. Convinced of the primacy of economic causes of war, he insists on an 'economic cure' which must, however, be forcibly administered after a series of civil or international wars.

The passage in these essays to which most strenuous objection has been taken runs :—

"The first effective step towards abolishing war must be the complete investigation and individual understanding of the nature of sadistic impulses, their original form, strength and depth, the history of their modification and inhibition. This will entail equally complete understanding of the defence mechanisms whereby we succeed in remaining unaware of our sadistic urges."¹

This statement, it has been suggested, implies that no effective steps towards abolishing war have yet been taken : it constitutes a total depreciation of all past progress in economic, governmental and other social forms of war-prevention. How, it is asked, can this sweeping assertion be squared with, for example, the fact that large groups of men within wide geographical areas and over substantial periods of time, have lived out their lives without engaging in war, although they had the same 'impulses' as the peoples who became involved in war? Is the diminution in incidence of war occurring in certain regions during certain periods without significance? Does not the institutional machinery existing in these regions deserve some credit as an anti-war device? What about Norway and Sweden? And the abolition of private duelling? Could not war be abolished by extending to all other areas the types of political institution existing in those areas where diminution in incidence has occurred? Could these institutions not be reinforced by others of a more ambitious sort, by extensions of Federalism, by international Courts of Justice, by International Police

¹ See p. 29.

Forces, by World Councils, in short by any form of social regulation tried or untried ?

Now the answers to these questions depend on the hopes, predilections and methods of interpretation of the observer. Estimates of the success of *untried* methods are based more on hopes than on probabilities. No doubt the Sovereign states of Europe could form themselves into a Mothers' Institute, if they really wished to do so and kept on wishing hard enough. In the meanwhile, regarded as methods of war-prevention, such schemes belong to the ' salt on the bird's tail ' order of technique. As for the application to war of so-called *tried* systems of controlling aggression, three plans would seem to be favoured, (a) the application to sovereign states of legal measures similar to those employed by these same states to suppress killing amongst individuals (murder and the duel) or amongst small groups (the blood-feud or vendetta), (b) the organization in all sovereign states of the political and social systems of administration existing in countries which have enjoyed long periods of peace, and (c) the establishment of federal union between sovereign states. Deductions drawn from the state regulation of killing amongst individuals and small groups are misleading. It would be just as natural to suppose that the enormous increase in the scale and ferocity of war amongst large groups is due to the suppression of killing amongst individuals and small groups. As for the two other categories, it is to be observed that experience of two ' world wars ' does not encourage very sanguine hopes that war can be eradicated by these methods of state organization. The apparent diminution of incidence of war in certain areas can be compared to the condition of the nervous dyspeptic who has kept his stomach quiet by a careful regimen but who may develop an acute indigestion on any emotional provocation. Moreover, the experience of Norway, the United States and the British Empire does not permit the deduction that the internal organization either of individual states or of federal groups has kept these states or groups out

of war. And it would be hard to persuade any of the European 'neutrals' in this war, Sweden or Switzerland, Portugal or Turkey, that they owe their present immunity to their internal political and governmental organization. A more pertinent question could have been asked regarding the war habits of *primitive* tribes, namely, whether the fact that, by comparison with the wars of civilized nations, tribal wars are much less organized and much less sanguinary, indicates that we ought in self-interest to return to tribal organization and ways of thought. The fallacy in the argument is of course the assumption that only the war-impulses of 'aggressors' 'cause' the war. Experience shows that the 'attacked' are sometimes even more determined to win their 'defensive' war than the 'attackers' their aggressive war. Defenders are rarely content to arrest the war process at the point where their defensive aims have been achieved. *Yet every war measure they take beyond that point, every plan for 'total' victory is indisputable evidence that they have been converted for the time being to the aggressor's original view, namely that some ends justify the means of war.* Of course it can be argued that this is a different kind of war, involving presumably a different kind of aggression: that it is a war to end group-aggression and that the enemy must be so thoroughly defeated that he can never again wage war; that it is difficult to determine when the point of successful defence has been reached and in any case difficult to persuade the enemy that it has been reached; that owing to its own psychological impetus war cannot be arrested at the point of successful defence. With the cogency of these arguments I am not immediately concerned except perhaps to say that the argument for 'total victory' would also justify a 'repressive peace,' leaving the problem of the antecedents of any outbreak untouched. *My immediate concern is with these simple facts, first, that unusually prolonged periods of peace in any given area do not confer any permanent immunity from a 'defensive' war and, second, that the pursuit of defensive war usually ends in the conduct of an*

aggressive war by the original defenders. Under these circumstances it would not be safe to assume that existing state or federal organizations constitute an effective step towards the abolition of war.

LESSONS FROM INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY

But although it seems reasonable to claim that 'tried' methods of abolishing war have not been effective and that 'untried' methods are still a prospective gamble, we can readily sympathize with the hopes of the 'rational' pacifist. And so I propose to review briefly the problem of war-prevention, estimating various schemes of prevention in terms of unconscious psychology. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to summarize Freudian views as to the structure and function of mind and indicate the rationale of treatment or prevention of mental disorders occurring in the individual. *Since war is a mental disorder of groups and the group-mind is a part of the individual psyche, it seems likely that the principles of treatment applied to individual disorder will also be valid for group disorder.* Briefly the position is as follows :—Mind, according to Freud, is an apparatus whose primary function it is to distribute and to discharge the psychic excitations of instinct that pour into it from (ultimately) bodily sources. In principle therefore the energy that drives the machine is instinctual energy ; but of course these instincts operate through the ideas and affects (emotional states) they produce. Of these, affects are by far the more dynamic. If instincts cannot be gratified it is then the function of the mental apparatus to reduce the instinctual tension as quickly as possible to a low (tolerable) level. This it does with the help of a number of mental mechanisms which operate at the most suitable point between excitation and discharge. As a rule the earlier the reduction of tension takes place the better : hence the most effective mechanisms are those which obliterate all traces of the urge before it can reach the

(pre)conscious system. *Repression* is the best example of this type of mechanism. But if the instinct derivatives cannot be repressed, there are a number of other mechanisms by which they can be controlled and tensions avoided. If, as in the case of sexual instincts, the aim of the impulses can be modified, 'substitute' gratification can be secured. Energy can also be *distributed* in a great variety of ways; or, again, one instinct can be played off against another; finally, the ego can succeed in *inhibiting* the discharge of instinct in action. As the result of accumulated experience of instinctual gratification and frustration the mental apparatus becomes organized into a number of departments (Ego-institutions) each of which is responsible for the regulation of specific instincts or fusions of instinct. Thinking activities are simply forms of mental reconnaissance, sample actions calculated to promote adaptation. In the form of phantasy they have also a certain discharge value. Behaviour is an end result of instinctual excitation. Normal behaviour is a suitable compromise between the original instinctual demand and the opposition offered to it either within the mind or by environmental codes or conditions.

Regarded in this light psychological illness is seen to be an unsuitable compromise between instincts and the internal and external forces that oppose them, in other words a form of maladaptation to life. However irrational and senseless they may appear, the symptoms of psychological illness when analysed and interpreted are found to have *meaning*: they are simply disguised or distorted varieties of thought and behaviour accompanied as a rule by mental and occasionally by physical pain. Sometimes the symptom is monophasic: *i.e.*, the distorted thought or actions and the accompanying pain express simultaneously the forbidden instinct and the countermeasure it unconsciously provokes. This is characteristic of hysteria. Sometimes, as in the case of 'obsessional' rituals,¹ two phases are observed, one representing the unconscious instinctual

¹ See also pp. 235 *et seq.*

striving and the other its unconscious condemnation, punishment or expiation. When symptoms are localized, the remainder of the Ego remains more or less normal. But sometimes the whole Ego is involved and reality sense is severely impaired. Here again the diseased reactions may exhibit alternating phases as in the disease known as manic-depressive insanity. What are called *inhibitions* are only in the descriptive sense symptomatic. They are reductions of function initiated by the Ego. Sexual impotence and impairment of working capacity are the most familiar examples. Other disturbances of function are:—*perversions*, commonly but not exclusively sexual, and *hyper-trophy* of function leading, for example, to outbursts of violence and aggression.

With the help of these generalizations it is possible to understand *the rationale of curative measures*. These are directed either to the modification of instinctual energy or to the correction of faults in the controlling mechanisms or again to the elimination of disorders in the structure of the Ego. As, however, the energies, mechanisms and structures concerned are for the greatest part unconscious, a technique must be adopted that renders these unconscious factors accessible to influence. This is the method of psycho-analysis. Purely (pre)conscious approaches also can be successful in curing symptoms but only if the unconscious state of rapport between the patient and the physician is such as renders the suggestions of the latter acceptable to the former. And this depends on factors that are not ordinarily within the control of either. To sum up the dynamics of psychotherapy: *successful treatment of mental disorder depends on the reduction of stresses set up in the psychic apparatus: radical cure involves a permanent correction of the particular imbalance of instinct forces which has brought about the disorder: the influence of the (pre)conscious depends on the underlying unconscious psychic dispositions of the individual*. To all this must be added the cautionary remark that, no matter what kind of treatment is employed, its initiation is no guarantee of ultimate cure. No

doubt many patients have a profound and partly superstitious belief in the magic of whichever form of psychotherapy they try ; and there are not wanting psychotherapists with an equally naïve belief that their methods are infallible. The awkward fact remains, however, that successful results cannot be achieved unless the patient has a fundamental need for and care for objects outside his own Ego.

When we turn from methods of treatment to *methods of prevention*, we find that although the principles remain the same, the methods of application are more circumscribed and superficial : hence the results are much more uncertain unless, of course, we carry out 'preventive psycho-analysis' of apparently normal persons. The preventive methods usually employed are based on two observations regarding psycho-neurotic disorder, first, that it is precipitated by significant frustrations of instinct in the current life of the individual and, second, that many of the traumatic factors contributing to infantile neuroses are due to faulty emotional upbringing. The importance of both of these types of stress depends of course on the reaction of the unconscious to them. The precipitating factor may be apparently insignificant : on the other hand even severe traumatic factors may not have resulted in infantile neuroses. Nevertheless it has seemed reasonable to follow two lines of prevention : first and foremost, the elimination, as far as that is possible, of faults in upbringing, and the adjustment of current life in a way more consonant with the individual's instinctual strivings and his Ego-aspirations than that he has hitherto followed. Unfortunately it has not proved possible to provide 'control experiments' by which the results of these preventive measures can be checked. Even if wider statistics were available, the number of variables is so great that no certain deductions could be drawn from them. The methods are based simply on the assumptions that elimination of pathogenic factors may prevent a breakdown, and that, in cases where the margin between health and breakdown is a narrow one, even

a marginal reduction may be sufficient to ease stresses in the mental apparatus and so permit it to carry out to better advantage its own measures of defence. Impressions gathered from a number of observations permit only the most cautious of generalizations as to results. *It would seem that planned prevention can be successful provided the predisposing factors are not too strong and provided the changes effected are regulated in terms of their unconscious significance. On the other hand it does not appear that even with the most elaborate of environmental precautions, the tendencies of the infant to psychological disorder can be eradicated.*¹

APPLICATIONS TO THE GROUP

Turning now to the phenomena of war, it is easy to see that we have to deal with disturbances of the mental function of groups. Certain functions are inhibited, others are hypertrophied, and others again are perverted. As far as the enemy is concerned our love instincts are inhibited and our aggressive reactions are magnified ; both of these changes are accompanied by perversions of the aims of certain instincts. Perversions of the instinct of aggression are widespread, and an increase of sexual perversion is also to be observed. Following the same line of approach it is not difficult to indicate the main lines of war-prevention. *The only procedures that are likely to bring about radical changes in war-readiness are those which reduce conflicting stresses of instinct.* This can be effected in two ways : alteration of the *aims* of the instinct, or by effecting a *change in distribution of forces* which will prevent or reduce explosive discharges of aggressive instinct. Next in order of effectiveness comes the *modification of mechanisms*, either by strengthening those that inhibit aggression or reducing the strength of discharge mechanisms which lead to pathological aggression. With this second type of modification is closely associated the *modification of Ego structure*. The aim of the procedure in this case must be

¹ For a fuller discussion of environmental influence, see pp. 64, 70, 83.

the strengthening of the reality functions of the Ego and in particular that part of the Ego which deals with group relations. This must not be unduly disturbed by subjective fluctuations in instinct drives or their associated emotions. Also it must be modified in such a way that a more realistic relation is established between the leaders of groups and the rank and file.

With the help of these criteria we can *classify* the various measures of war-prevention suggested by different schools of pacifism. Some are concerned almost exclusively with the instinctual aspects of the problem. The change of heart called for by religious and ethical groups is an attempt to mobilize and reinforce love instincts in order to neutralize or cancel out the excesses of aggressive impulse that give rise to war. The Communist too dabbles in the psychology of instincts, but combines his policies in that direction with measures of inhibition and with alterations in the political structure of society. As far as the instincts are concerned, his attention is exclusively directed to the restraint of the acquisitive instincts: these in the case of the individual he is prepared to inhibit: group acquisitiveness he would deal with by forcibly establishing an identity of social aim in all national groups, in other words by international communism. Other instinctual devices are intended to distribute (pre)conscious impulses among new and different objects. This is the rationale of the 'football' cure for war. It is modelled on the technique of the outraged husband who, having been worsted in argument by his wife, goes out for a sharp walk during which he now and then kicks unoffending stones from his path. Other schemes of international organization vary in type. International Courts of Justice are in principle concerned with the elimination of instinctual frictions between national groups but have to depend in the long run either on the goodwill of the Sovereign states or on punitive measures. No structural alterations within the constituent groups are envisaged. On the other hand Federalism is essentially a structural device; as in the case of communism it envisages a

new structure of government by which internal and external frictions can be eliminated. An organization like the late League of Nations comes under two headings. By building up an elaborate extension of the Diplomatic Services of constituent nations it sought to interpose greater delay between impulse and action. But by its system of sanctions it obviously favoured measures of inhibition. Naturally it is difficult to draw a line between measures of inhibition and punitive measures. Disarmament societies must be ready should persuasion fail to bring about compulsory enforcement of their aims. And an International Police Force, ostensibly an instrument for effecting inhibition by force, is as closely associated with the idea of punishment as the civilian police force from which it takes its name.

When we come to make provisional estimates of the possible value of these methods, it is easier to indicate their comparative than their absolute value. Obviously systems of inhibition are less likely to be effective than techniques of reducing stress, partly because beyond a certain point they are liable to provoke the very outbreak they are intended to control but in the main because they are applied later in the 'tension series' than other measures. They come immediately before action and may be swept aside by the momentum of the war-drive. Punitive and war 'sanctions' not only come last in the series but suffer from the disadvantage that they seek to abolish war-making by making war. By so doing they put a premium on the art of successful war-making.

As far as absolute value is concerned we must either indulge in guesswork or follow the hints afforded by the treatment of mental disorder in individuals. If we adopt the second and more scientific of these courses we must allow for the fact that in all radical treatment of mental disorder the instincts, mechanisms and structures that call for modification are unconscious. In the psychotherapy of groups visualized by different schools of pacifism no account is taken of unconscious factors. The

religious pacifist is earnestly concerned with man's impulses but he has no idea of the nature of unconscious impulses. The Communist evidently regards the acquisitive instincts as (pre)-conscious in origin. Of the nature of unconscious love and hate he is apparently quite ignorant. The measures of control suggested by the various 'Inhibitionist' schools are also of a conscious type. No consideration whatsoever is given to the fact that the most powerful and effective mental mechanisms are completely unconscious in operation. The modifications of group structure favoured by both Federationists and Communists (or for the matter of that by Fascists) are intended to effect new distributions of conscious impulses. Now it cannot be denied that modification of (pre)conscious impulses, mechanisms and structures can effect therapeutic changes, but they do so to the extent that they promote reduction of unconscious conflict. Experience of psychological disorders occurring in the individual certainly shows that whatever the form of treatment an accurate estimate of curability calls for a fairly shrewd measure of the unconscious forces involved and of the strength or weakness of unconscious mechanisms. While, therefore, it is open to anyone to claim that some existing form of social organization will at some future date bring about the abolition of war throughout the world, he exposes himself to the obvious comments that, so far, it hasn't had this effect, and that estimates of probability based solely on (pre)conscious factors are mere gambles. To these I would impenitently add that the first effective step towards the abolition of war must be the complete investigation and understanding of the unconscious forces responsible for war.

THE PROBLEM RESTATED

Put as briefly as possible the *psychological situation* is as follows :—From shortly after birth until death man is essentially a group animal. During most of his working life his thoughts, feelings and behaviour are continually influenced by his position

as a unit of a series of groups, varying in size, homogeneity, structure and aim. Even when apparently alone, as for example during sleep, he is still a group animal, since, owing to the prolonged stage of immaturity and dependence through which he has to pass to adult life, his mind develops permanent group characteristics. Moreover, he seeks to mould his group activities after the pattern of his individual wishes and conflicts. His range of direct mental activity is thus extended from apparently individual manifestations to the most elaborate activities promoted by the largest groups of which he is a member. It is still further extended by his capacity to identify himself not only with the totality of the groups to which he belongs but also with groups (or the aims of groups) to which he does not belong. Now his mental activities are concerned with the solution of instinctual problems, some of which, in particular the problems of love and hate, can give rise to the most violent conflicts. One particular outcome of violent conflict is the loosening of destructive impulse, which in turn produces still further conflict. As a result of this double conflict man's inhibition of violence is observed most readily in his relation to other individuals and to small groups. Moreover, when administrative groups establish their authority they tend not only to increase the inhibition of individual violence but to regard violence as a group prerogative. So long as the state limits this prerogative to the infliction of flogging and capital punishment we are bound to admit that, however brutal, barbaric and senseless these punishments are, they do not represent an extensive outbreak of violence. But when any national group exercises the prerogative of making war it increases immeasurably the total amount of destructiveness loosened. Not only so, the state demands that individuals (who must no longer kill on their own account) must now kill in the alleged interest of the group. An expert sniper for example, who, under civil law is threatened with capital punishment if he commits murder, may under military conventions be awarded

a decoration for killing a hundred or so enemies of the state. In addition to which the risks of war provide the soldier with opportunities to be killed or maimed which if taken deliberately by a non-combatant would be rightly regarded as evidence in the latter of a suicidal tendency. All non-combatants mentally share in the destructive activities of war by virtue of their capacity to identify with the aims of the state and the actions of combatants. An opportunity is thus afforded them of gratifying vicariously those impulses which otherwise can only obtain the most elaborately disguised gratification in their dreams. *In short, in the series of man's human relationships there is a very obvious and recurring tendency to release violent destructive impulses through his group relations. The power he has for all practical purposes lost as a private individual is regained through the destructive activities of the group.* The problem is whether it will ever be possible to close these last avenues of discharge of aggression : and if so, by what means.

THE PRINCIPLES OF PACIFISM

As I have pointed out earlier, this question can be expressed in three different ways : can man modify his impulses : if he cannot, can he nevertheless employ inhibiting mechanisms effectively : finally, can he alter the structure of his mind in such a way that these reinforced inhibitions (or other defensive mechanisms) produce a permanent defensive Ego-system ? To all of these questions the student of the (pre)conscious, familiar with the processes of rational reflection, with modifications of conscious wishes, and with manifest changes of character, in a word steeped in the lore of conscious adaptation, is inclined to return a lighthearted ' Yes.' And his optimism is shared not only by professed pacifists but by the majority of more ordinary mortals. The dynamic psychologist, aware that in the long run human endeavour is determined by unconscious impulses, by unconscious mechanisms and by unconscious mental institutions,

is not so sure. If pressed on these points he can only state what he knows about unconscious function. He knows that for example although both the aim and the object of some early sexual impulses can be permanently modified, the process of modification is an unconscious one initiated during the prolonged emotional crises of infancy and childhood and only to a very slight extent reinforced in later life. *There is so far little evidence that aggressive impulses can be modified in the same way.* They can be fused with love impulses and, of course, displaced freely but they do not appear to alter their aim of destruction or mastery. In any case the processes of fusion and displacement are unconscious processes. *As far as unconscious mechanisms are concerned, experience shows that under ordinary circumstances these are not modified.* During particular stages of mental development, some mechanisms are more extensively employed than others, but recession of function does not involve any permanent change. Even during psycho-analytic treatment, when the action of certain unconscious mechanisms may be suspended, the alterations that ensue are not due to any change in the nature of the mechanism but to the relief of mental conflict that has been secured. Similarly with Ego-structure. In the course of development and again in old age spontaneous alterations in structure occur but *in mature adult life only the prolonged application of psycho-analytical techniques will bring about any permanent modification in unconscious Ego-structure.* And these changes again are due to the relief of unconscious conflict. Given a severe enough stress, the older forms of Ego-function may be reactivated. Moreover, the changes observed by the (pre)conscious psychologist are not the direct result of (pre)conscious influences but a sign that the balance of unconscious forces has altered. *For (pre)conscious modifications to be successful they must have at least the same force as the mechanisms they are intended to supersede.* The truth is that as far as important or primitive instincts are concerned, the preconscious acts successfully only when its plans are in concert

with those of the unconscious. Indeed, if left to itself the pre-conscious with all its tricks of delay, indecision and doubt would make an unholy mess of the work of human adaptation. This is very clear in the case of the obsessional neurosis.¹ When originally unconscious prohibitions and taboos gain access to the preconscious system and commandeer intellectual processes, they spread in all directions and finally develop into a mountain of rituals which threatens to smother ordinary mental life. Despite the manifold ramifications of the pre-conscious system, and the infinite complication of thought processes, the (pre)-conscious is best suited for the solution of sophisticated mental stresses. Fundamental instincts, emotions and conflicts call for more drastic and immediate measures which so far only the unconscious is able to provide.

All this may sound a very depressing account of mental function, although for the life of me I cannot see that it is particularly depressing to know that the unconscious can usually be depended on to do smoothly and automatically what the pre-conscious, despite its pride of intellect, usually bungles. The depression is no doubt a kind of disguised annoyance at any aspersions cast at the efficiency of the intellect. Yet it is surely a commonplace that when emotional crises occur, even intellectual giants are often reduced to behaving like children. In any case there is no point in being depressed. Granted that under present day standards of adaptation war causes society much heavier losses than it brings gains, let us consider instead the evidence on which more optimistic views of war-prevention might legitimately be based.

Needless to say, the most significant observations in this direction are concerned with the possibility of reducing *mental stress* in the community. Experience of so-called cathartic methods of treatment proves conclusively that although we cannot get rid of our primary instincts, we can reduce the mental strains that tend to cause outbreaks of violence. As has been

¹ See also pp. 199, 235 *et seq.*

pointed out in these essays, the anxieties and guilts produced by unconscious drives frequently lead to aggressive behaviour. This has now been amply confirmed by the study of those delinquent states in which violent anti-social actions are the most prominent feature. Reduce unconscious anxieties and hostile reactions begin to disappear. It is true that in some mental diseases, 'persecutory' types of insanity for example, the mechanisms of defensive aggression are not amenable to treatment, but on the other hand it has been well established that the tantrums of apparently normal children can be adequately dealt with by reduction of anxiety. *Obviously then we must distinguish between short-term and long-term methods of reduction*, that is to say, between correction of immediate stresses and keeping stress at a low level from childhood onwards. Both methods no doubt can be applied, but it seems probable that long-term methods are the more promising. I need not repeat the arguments on this point I have advanced in my earlier essay on prevention,¹ except to remind the reader that for the effective reduction of infantile stress two environmental policies are necessary—the elimination of anxiety situations likely to provoke unconscious aggression and the elimination of sadistic interference on the part of parents. In short, if we would only study the conditions that contribute to the peaceableness of children we would have a shrewd idea what to avoid or counteract when attempting to reduce their states of aggression. In the nursery as in international affairs it is necessary to have a peace policy and to see that it is pursued patiently and systematically *in bad times as well as in good*. Sooner or later we must make up our minds whether we are going to regard war as a purely adult manifestation or whether we are going to take seriously the view that we cannot alter the adults' disposition unless we commence work during the formative periods of infancy and early childhood. If we take the long-term view, we must see to it that our policies of prevention are both extensive and

¹ See pp. 64, 70, 83.

intensive. Above all we would have to capture the key points from which ordinarily the policies of upbringing are dictated. I am not thinking so much of our formal educational institutions, for although our schools could be used for the spread of ideas and the introduction of behaviouristic codes, the emotional influence of the school is negligible compared with that of the family. We could, however, make a good start by instantly dismissing all authoritarian psychologists from the Child Guidance Clinics of all countries. We might not live long enough to observe the cumulative effect of humane upbringing on the 'reality sense' of the community, but we could reasonably anticipate that future generations would. This, as I have pointed out, might or might not produce the marginal effect necessary to limit permanently the chances of war, but it would be worth doing anyhow.

Next in the importance to a general policy of reducing the anxieties and hostilities of childhood comes that of *reducing the specific stress due to the close relation between the sexual impulses and the impulses of aggression*. Naturally the most important factors in this relation are unconscious, and cannot therefore be altered by mere social regulation. We cannot expect to eliminate by conscious means that unconscious identity between fighting and sexual achievement that is due to the symbolism they have in common. Nor can we alter by such means the primary 'death wishes' that are the unconscious reaction to childish rivalry and frustration and which I am convinced do more to perpetuate war than any other peculiarity of human development. But at least we could try to reduce the tangled mass of superstitions and conventions that obstruct all rational adaptation to sexual life. It is difficult to overestimate the reduction in emotional friction that could be secured if more rational codes were applied to sexual problems from infancy onwards. Here again it is unlikely that the change would be radical enough to effect a decisive reduction in war-readiness, but it might bring about a marginal reduction in human misery

which combined with other and more radical procedures might have the desired effect.

I have singled out these two long-term methods of reducing mental stress in the community because I believe they are essential to the success of any scheme of war-prevention. I do not believe that war between civilized nations will ever be abolished until we learn how to bring up children in a more reasonable and understanding way than we do at present. Perhaps I should have said until we regain some of the wisdom we have lost. For compared with primitive tribes, civilized nations are immensely backward in their upbringing of children. Let there be no misunderstanding about this. I am not trying to resuscitate the myth of the 'noble savage.' Primitive races are heavily burdened with superstitious anxiety and often give expression to this in ways that we regard as cruel and senseless. They also follow superstitious codes in their upbringing of children. But in many respects their sense of human values is immeasurably superior to ours, and in many instances they treat their children and their children's problems in a natural and sensible way. No doubt their policies would shock our child-specialists and headmasters into sky-fits. But in my opinion the sooner these mentors are shocked into sky-fits the better for our children. The really shocking thing about Western Civilization is that it permits and approves, on both cultural and economic grounds, the delegation of upbringing from the family to every conceivable form of substitute parent or training institution. To my mind it is much more shocking that Anglo-Indian parents should board out their little three and four year old children in Bognor than that a native mother should go to work with her baby slung over her back, or that little tribal children should carry on their sexual play before the indulgent and amused eyes of their parents. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that the successful upbringing of children requires a Renaissance of Family Culture. The family must somehow or other win back from the State the rights it has lost ;

and it must re-establish a scale of values, in which the place of honour is given, not to social achievement but to transmission of humane family culture. Here is another long-term policy to be pursued with patient assiduity and understanding.

Turning to the question of *short-term policies*, we must first of all be clear as to the nature of the *immediate war-strains* they are intended to reduce. Anyone who has waded through the White Papers, Yellow Books and historical treatises that deal with the outbreak of the First World War might naturally assume that the immediate war strains were exclusively concerned with international relations, with power-politics, trade-politics and so forth. And they might naturally conclude that if only these strains could be reduced by the appropriate 'departments' the problem would be solved. However natural it may be this is a serious misinterpretation. *The mounting international tension that precedes a declaration of war is not a cause of war but a preliminary phase of war.* Like the fever that ushers in a serious infection it is part of the 'symptom-picture.' The immediate strains that contribute to war-readiness are of the same nature as those that precipitate mental disorder in the individual. They are probably identical with the individual and social strains that precipitate war-neuroses. As has been indicated earlier¹ the war-neurosis represents an internalized war situation, and given the appropriate neurotic pre-disposition is readily precipitated by conditions of 'psychological insecurity.'² Hence preventive measures must be directed to the reduction of those anxieties which induce psychological insecurity. It is here that the importance of the economic factor in war-readiness can be accurately assessed. It is the custom of post-war planners to talk of 'social security' as if it were a purely economic consideration. Strictly speaking economic security is one of the factors that contribute to psychological security. But unless economic security is combined with psychological stability and satisfaction in love, family life and work, it cannot be expected

¹ See p. 125.

² See p. 121.

to bring about that deeper tranquility that is necessary to maintain a peaceable community. The sharp contrast between war and peace, together with the interpretation of civilian unhappiness exclusively in terms of economic hardship tend to foster the illusion that the peace-time community is peaceable. As yet no quantitative assessments have been made of the envies, jealousies, rivalries, hostilities and the host of other negative emotions that permeate the community-at-peace. Indeed, observers who suggest that these disruptive emotions exist in a state of constant fermentation in every section of society are regarded as unduly jaundiced. It requires little imagination, however, to see that cathartic explosions like war could not occur but for the brewing of malice that occurs during 'peace.'

THE TECHNIQUE OF PACIFISM

We are now in a position to consider the actual technique of pacifism. Whether we favour long-term or short-term methods of preventing stress or whether we are content with the reduction of pre-war tensions, it is obvious that adequate reduction calls for a much more elaborate organization than exists at present or than has so far been imagined. As I have pointed out earlier there is an absurd disparity between the magnitude of the problem of war-prevention and the means adopted with the ostensible aim of preventing war. We take less trouble to prevent war than to prevent an outbreak of scarlet fever. We leave all our instinctual problems untouched: when a war crisis threatens we mobilize the services of the Diplomatic Service whose members are no more instructed in psychology than the humblest members of the Civil Service: when that fails the problem is then tackled by the Cabinet, a body whose main claim to psychological authority is that its members have been fighting political battles since their nonage. When the Cabinet fails, war is declared, and except for a few half-hearted 'peace-feelers' in its later stages, the attainment of peace is left to a 'War'

Cabinet that must either follow the advice of its War Office or encourage its members to start playing soldiers in their fifties. It is clear then that if a peace technique is to be effective it must be applied systematically. It must be a permanent part of group organization and operate throughout the whole structure of the group. It must also be capable of dealing with fluctuations in war strain and of mobilizing the most effective measures at the right place and time. Without exception existing modes of prevention do no more than lock the stable after the horse is loose. By the time serious efforts are made to avert war, war is already inevitable. There is no correlation between our measures of prevention and the flash points of psychic strain in the group. In any case the best time to apply short-term measures of war-prevention is when peace is apparently most secure. The relation between war and peace is not simply an antithetical one. Like those mental states that run in alternating and contrasting phases, peace and war have, psychologically regarded, a reciprocal relation, and it seems perfectly plain that the most favourable time to apply short-term measures is neither when war-tensions have already commenced their slow crescendo nor in the post-war period of war-weariness and depression, a period which gives us no accurate measure of peace-feeling, but during the phase when group aggression is at its lowest ebb. The view that the next war is born at the previous Peace Conference is a misleading one. The Peace Conference is not really a peace device. It is simply a terminal phase of war during which the attack is pressed home without shedding of blood. Peace cannot really be said to exist before the victors have abjured their own Peace Terms and the defeated have regained their self-respect : It may be that when highly organized nations go to war they cannot stop before a childish contrast between Victors and Vanquished has been established, although many primitive tribes can and do stop long before this point, but it is certainly true that victors and vanquished cannot make enduring peace so long as they insist on remaining on terms of psychic inequality.

The time to make an open bid for peace is when war passions have really cooled and when the spurious valuations that are maintained by both victors and vanquished have given place to a realization of the aims and fallibilities they have in common.

Assuming, however, that all varieties of war-prevention should be mobilized, the problem is to develop group organizations by which they can all be applied adequately. The first step in this direction must be to fuse the technique and organizations of politics with the techniques and organizations of science. Sovereign states are at pains to equip themselves with a War Office, but none of them take the trouble to organize a Peace Office. For it cannot be maintained that the Foreign Office with its traditional bias towards the interests of the home side and its lack of concern for the anxieties of other nations is really a peace organization. In no respect does it rise to the standard of a scientific institution. When a disease is sufficiently widespread or lethal enough, most advanced countries proceed to build up in self-defence a scientific organization which is not only based on sound procedures of research but extends its ramifications to the smallest sections of the community. International Associations are soon formed for the pooling of information and ideas. A serious peace organization would of necessity follow on the same lines. We have depended long enough on the happy-go-lucky methods of amateurs. Heaven knows I am not suggesting that the scientific equipment of psychologists or of 'social scientists' is anything to write home about, still less that we should entrust our political destinies to experts. There would be little point in fighting against Nazism if we were to win at the price of saddling ourselves with a multitude of little pontiffs. The place for the sociological expert is at his observation post, or in the antechambers of political decision. But the shortcomings of scientists, however grievous, do not justify the *laissez faire* of politicians. So inadequate is our system of peace organization that it is difficult not to describe it roundly as a species of latent war-mindedness.

Indeed, as our wars get bigger and bigger we become more and more paralysed in the imagination. In olden times both civilized and uncivilized tribes kept open avenues of communication in the very heat of the battle. Whereas to-day, despite the opportunities of communication provided by radio, we become more and more isolated from the enemy. Ignoring the simple fact that you cannot overcome your enemy psychologically unless you get him to believe that you have his interests at heart and, by promoting this identification, seduce him from his allegiances to his own leaders, we actually extend our warfare through our wireless systems, bawling into the ears of the enemy just those arguments of superiority and virtue most calculated to make him continue the fight. It may be true that in earlier wars the methods adopted to offset the severance of diplomatic relations were not particularly effective, but that was largely because the techniques for re-establishing peace were not very seriously pursued. On the other hand it would be little use setting up a standing Peace Conference on the outbreak of war unless the combatant states had already within their own boundaries a permanent peace organization.

In any case it would be a mistake to assume that peace organizations must follow political patterns, ramifying from a central (state) nucleus to the fringes of political administration. The truth is that the political organization of the state, however useful at general elections or for purposes of tax gathering, is the most arid and loveless of human institutions. It camouflages the natural structure of nations and thereby deflects our attention from the defects and virtues of group-life that contribute respectively to war-readiness and to peace. It creates a fiction of national life to which the most superstitious reactions can cling and around which the most ungovernable of emotions can be made to surge. This is all the more unfortunate since, owing to a shift of the prerogative of violence from individuals and small groups to sovereign groups, the state can canalize these emotions and superstitions in the interests of war. Actually its

authority to do so is entirely arbitrary. The state derives its influence from the family within which an attitude of subservience to leadership is originally developed and fostered. The 'social contract' is not a very good bargain. In return for our subservience the state is prepared to provide us with post offices, health insurance and old age pensions. But it cannot give us love through which alone peaceableness can thrive.

I have said that the state is a loveless institution living on energies borrowed ultimately from the family. But it is not the only derivative from the family group. As I have pointed out earlier,¹ the social organization of every country consists of an infinite variety of groups, some highly specialized and apparently isolated and others overlapping one another to a varying extent. The aim of all these groups is the gratification of special varieties of instinct in a more elaborate and satisfying way than is possible within the limitations of the family. But however much they may vary in aim, all these groups exhibit the same variety of cohesion and adopt the same attitude to leaders (or leading ideas). It is through these groups that the community respire. The power of the nation for good and evil resides in them. And it is this living stratum of the social fabric we must investigate if we are going to detect the flaws in social structure which permit a breakthrough of archaic violence. That such flaws exist is abundantly clear in the case of civil war where the central authority of state suddenly proves to be a hollow sham and the real clash of instinct is seen to lie between the more important natural groupings that make up the community. Peace techniques and organizations cannot be very effective until we realize where the real power of the community lies and through which spontaneous groupings it is most readily canalized. *The main flaws in so-called democratic government are that it by-passes the 'cell-system' by which communities ordinarily regulate their existence and that it forges an absurdly tenuous and ineffective link between the individual and the state.* Government by

¹ See p. 185.

dictatorship is merely a perversion of this error. Indeed it can only exist when the cell-system of the national group has broken down or is in effect in a state of civil war. At such times it is possible for a small junta to play off one group against another and by masquerading as a 'parental state' centre in itself the powers of the groups it has superseded.¹ It is then a short step to capture the allegiance of the family groups, already accustomed to patriarchal government.

LEADERSHIP : THE FAMILY AND THE STATE

Apart from these structural flaws there is one emotional characteristic of group life that we must somehow or other succeed in regulating if we are to have any success in war-prevention. Freud pointed out that in the life of groups, the state of subjection existing between the individual and his leader resembles very closely the condition of a hypnotized patient. Now hypnotic rapport flourishes at a very primitive level of the mind and it is not surprising that in group relations the political leader although, as a rule, the 'lowest common denominator' of the group, is credited with godlike virtues. Hence the apotheosis of Hitler whose natural aptitude for tub-thumping and salesmanship would have found a more appropriate outlet in some Rural District Council in Austria where his half-baked and disgruntled philosophies would have found the level their unrelieved shoddiness deserves. But it is a different thing when the executive nucleus of a powerful nation is made the sounding board of myth and superstition and when the nation reduces itself to such a state of hypnotized adulation of the leader that it has no common will of its own. The secret of this condition of 'fascination' is that the dictator state, having sapped the strength of the more vigorous constituent groups, brazenly offers itself as the appointed head of a model

¹ See also Karl Mannheim: *Diagnosis of our Time* (chap. vi). Kegan Paul, London. 1943.

family group. The dictator state is thus more personal and, even in its brutalities, more intimate than the democratic state. It is able not only to tap the archaic family emotions existing in the community but to exert more effectively and on a grander scale the despotic powers that originally resided in the family. The patriarchal state is in fact no longer designated by the neuter pronoun 'it': through the totemic personality of the leader it becomes 'he'—the hero and father. A fictitious warmth is soon added to this mythical figure when 'he' proclaims himself ready to rescue and defend the collective 'she'—the motherland. As we have now good reason to know, when this 'build up' is effective the danger of war is very near. For only a massive deflection of aggression towards external 'enemies and persecutors of the motherland' will reduce to impotence the commonsense that would otherwise sweep away the modern version of the Tribal God.

Now it would be ridiculous to pretend that these factors are to be found only in backward or undeveloped states. Identical mechanisms and attitudes exist in *all* sovereign states, in *all* the constituent groups that make up a sovereign state, in *every* family and finally in *every* individual. The megalomania that comes to the surface of weakened minds merely betrays a psychic situation existing in the unconscious mind of *every* normal person. It represents a surrender of function by one part of the Ego to another, similar to the surrender of volition by the group member to his leader. By comparison with the megalomania of states, individual grandiosity appears to be more peculiar, more out of touch with reality, yet it is of the same order. There is in fact an identity between the 'regulator' systems of individuals, crowds, family groups, organized non-familial groups and state organizations. This common link can be on occasion a source of strength to the community: but it is also a source of grave danger. It may provide a discharge point for aggression. It is one of the unfortunate consequences of the close association between love and hate that the trail

blazed by the one can be readily followed by the other. And it has to be admitted that love more often blazes the trail for hate than hate for love. Once the governing executive has, by hook or by crook, established its authority, and by playing on the infantile emotions of the community has consolidated the authority, anything may happen. If at the psychological moment the executive (or the dictator) can produce a 'righteous' cause, no counterforce exists strong enough to arrest the progress to war: or rather, no 'delaying' mechanism exists that will hold up the war process long enough to allow the forces of reason or love to reassert themselves. It is easy enough to see what has gone wrong. It is not the surrender of the individual to the community that has weakened the controlling mechanisms; but the surrender of the family to the community: or, to put it another way, the usurpation of family authority by a state, which, being devoid of love, cannot establish checks on its own violence of purpose. Aggression, though often to be found in the track of love, naturally breaks through at the point where love is least. It was within the family circle that love scored its first real triumph by holding in suspense the hates and rivalries that would otherwise have broken the family asunder and so reduced its chances of surviving. It is within the family that, generation after generation, what we call civilization is reborn. The more widely the state is divorced from family influences the more it is capable of behaving in an uncivilized way. Its collective organization may be suitable enough for the development of the material resources of a community in either defensive or offensive directions but in the direction of love it has no more competence than an idiot. In short psychological overestimation and fetishistic worship of the state is one of the most dangerous of our modern superstitions. The state is nothing more than a social instrument, and like any other social instrument should serve to express such cultural purposes as our family civilization may direct. Yet with every increase in the scale of modern war, the family loses more authority than

it regains in the subsequent peace. The noise of battle deflects our attention from a bloodless and unequal combat that goes on behind the lines between the state and the family.¹ During this civil war family cohesion is seriously disrupted and the authority of the state more heavily clamped down on the sphere of family influence. Yet our plans for post-war reconstruction visualize in the first instance a further extension of the authority of the state to regulate the cultural activities of the community !

SUMMARY

Summing up these various considerations it would appear that two conditions are essential to the development of a satisfactory peace-organization. First it should represent not simply the will of the population at large but the influence of the family group and of those of the larger group formations that ordinarily run the community and guide its emotional discharge. The time is past when we can afford to leave the Pacifist Movement in the hands of small 'societies' each advocating a nostrum of its own and having no point of contact with the others save its enthusiasm for a cause. In peace-time the real cultural authority of the community is invested in large spontaneously developed groups. Either this authority must be mobilized in such a way that it can control the war-making tendencies of the state or a means must be found whereby some

¹ The war-time disruption of the family effected by the state serves to conceal yet another manifestation of 'civil war.' The conflict between women and the state is even more acute. While men take readily to games of war and politics, women are more keenly aware of the direct threat to their deepest aspirations offered by state war-making. Their active opposition may be reduced by an indulgent identification with the war-urges of their menfolk ; or it may be side-tracked by gratifying the secret masculine aspirations of the under forties in the uniformed services ; but a profound undercurrent of resentment remains which often expresses itself in a querulous defeatism. This war-time defeatism, however, might well be canalized in peace as a vigorous pacifism. It would, of course, be a pacifism of sexual origin, but since the wars waged by men against men spring also from sexual sources, there seems no reason why the sexual elements of pacifism should not be mobilized for purposes of prevention.

of these constituent groups can hold up a general landslide to war. Once on a time family and territorial interests tried to achieve this aim. In 1642, during the early weeks of the Civil War, some counties proclaimed their 'neutrality' although in the long run the pressure either of Cavaliers or of Roundheads was too strong for them. Indeed, if Church organizations could only succeed in maintaining that the ungodliness of war is a more important issue than state politics, they too might act as a brake on war-making. I do not suggest for a moment that either of these particular expedients would be effective nowadays: it is a long time since either an Archbishop of Canterbury or a Lord Lieutenant of a County could put a spoke in the wheels of national war. But the principle at stake is a vital one. *If state-war is due to a flaw in group organization, it is clear that we must either mobilize more effectively the pacifist forces of the most powerful constituent groups and play them off against the state, or we must play those constituent groups off against themselves and so divide the state against itself.* In short we must adopt the policy followed by the mental apparatus when confronted with individual stresses. When it cannot counter a disruptive drive with a drive of antithetical aim, the mind seeks to set the component forces against themselves.

The second condition is also essential: whatever peace organization is developed should be backed by a powerful scientific organization equipped to investigate fully the complicated problems presented by the social discharge of aggression. Amongst the more urgent of these problems are the following: how to extend the cultural authority of the family and to curtail the spurious cultural authority assumed by the state: how to prevent the exploitation of that superstitious reverence of authority which keeps the most advanced countries in a state of semi-savage unreason and subjection: how to improve and further develop 'delaying' systems whereby a sudden merging of the aggressive impulses of the whole community can be more effectively held up: how to modify those irrational frustrations

of creative impulse that lead to the accumulation of aggressive tension in the community. A more extensive list of problems has already been given in the outline of Research¹: I have singled out here only a few of the issues that seem to me to call for priority of attention. It is scarcely necessary to add that should any discoveries of importance emerge from these various investigations, ways would have to be found whereby they could be given effective political expression. This would no doubt involve a revolution not only in political thought but in existing political forms. It is obvious, for example, that we cannot tolerate much longer existing methods of regulating Foreign Affairs. Organizations for conducting the material aspects of relations between countries are obviously essential and could be expanded with great benefit to all concerned. But the regulation of policy by a small caste of permanent Civil Servants under the nominal direction of the Cabinet is merely a grotesque archaism.

Whatever direction political reforms may take, it is certain that until they are carried out extensively enough, the most ambitious international schemes to prevent war are not likely to be successful. Apologists for the late League of Nations were accustomed to argue that the reason for its failure was the retention by constituent nations of their sovereign status. It would have been nearer the mark to say that so long as the constituent nations did nothing to reduce their war-readiness, the creation of a complicated inter-state organization was not likely to prove a successful inhibiting mechanism. The only sure safeguard against war is that inhibiting mechanisms and counter-forces derived from the love-instincts should be able to operate effectively at the point where break-through of aggression is most likely. If states are themselves inadequate vehicles of love, it is improbable that a network of states will be any more richly endowed. Even the international forces of religion have not been conspicuously successful in mobilizing

¹ See pp. 72-96.

universal brotherly love, for the simple reason that fraternal relations are from the beginning shot through with the hate that goes with rivalry. On the other hand there is some reason to believe that if only one powerful nation could establish an effective peace organization backed by sound scientific researches, the windfalls it would collect in the form of increased happiness and health in the community would soon tempt other countries to follow suit. This tendency would be greatly strengthened if instead of forming Leagues in which power-politics follow their accustomed political courses, the forms and principles followed by international scientific congresses were accepted. Even during war-time and despite the isolation of scientific bodies from one another, all combatant states share many of their scientific discoveries, though not their resources. But whatever may be the international organization ultimately adopted, its first guiding principle must be that adopted by all scientific bodies worthy of the name, viz., an objective measurement of the data of observation.

I should like to add that although I have suggested the development of a Peace Organization I have not in mind any particular form of organization, still less any idea of 'Committees' or 'Standing Peace Commissions' or 'Departments' or 'Ministries.' It would in any case be ridiculous to suggest specific forms of organization until we know what we are going to organize. *We may reasonably assume that whatever alterations are effected in the social regulation of instinct cannot have permanent effect on war-readiness unless the new codes (mechanisms, techniques) are constantly applied from generation to generation, and so bring about a permanent change in our social structure.* Needless to say the influences exerted must extend throughout the whole community. In the dynamic sense, peace is a state of mind of the community, and peace of mind cannot be achieved unless the whole mind is working in relative harmony. A dependable degree of equanimity is necessary to maintain a good sense of reality in the individual.

Similarly in the family group: a capacity for upbringing without violence is a sign of healthy function. The aim of a peace organization must be the encouragement of healthy function in the community. It is not likely to be achieved by the hasty creation of new Ministries eager to demonstrate their bureaucratic prowess by piling ill-considered and compulsory regulations on the top of existing codes. It may well be that even our present old-fashioned social and political machinery would serve to put the preliminary reforms in operation. Just before the War, Parliament was considering the amendment of criminal law. It might conceivably celebrate the declaration of peace by abolishing flogging and capital punishment not to mention many forms of imprisonment. Further, if psychologists everywhere would only agree to learn something about the psychology of children, and if psychiatrists everywhere would only condescend to learn something about psychology, they might bring their growing influence to bear on the upbringing of children. Flogging, imprisonment and the psychological equivalents of capital punishment might then be abolished from the nursery. Bullying and intimidation of children, the compulsory imposition of grown-up codes of convenience, in fact most of the reactionary artifices which go under the misleading label of 'good upbringing' might be restrained. And all this preliminary spade work for peace could be done without putting one brick of a new Ministry on another, without even earmarking for promotion to Cabinet rank as a Peace Minister some Trade Union Secretary, or Chairman of a Steel Corporation or second son of a Viscount.

All this is as may be. It may not be necessary to create a *separate* peace organization. What must be created as soon as possible is a science of politics that will serve to guide politicians. Under our present democratic system politics consists of a running series of squabbles over, shall we say, Free Trade or Protection, or national expenditure, or the regulation of drink traffic, or state control, or dog-racing, or trades disputes. And

all the time the major psychological conflicts that affect the happiness and well-being of the population are left to find their own solutions, which usually prove to be superstitious codes handed down to us by our remote and anxiety-ridden ancestors. The main concern of the future science of politics will be to solve the problem of culture transmission.¹ But first the research organizations necessary to give birth to this new science must be created. And these cannot be created until a sufficiency of trained workers can be provided. Far be it from me to join in the current adulation of 'science' or to associate myself with the heresy that 'scientists' should *regulate* our psychological affairs. Then indeed the task of preventing war would be hopeless. For unless the scientists knew how to manipulate the forces of love and hate they would make a greater mess of government than any layman. As I have said the greatest of human revolutions, the change from bestial existence to what we now call, not without right, a state of civilization, was effected in the pre-historic past, at a time, that is, when the instruments of science were sticks, stones and flint heads. No comparable change has occurred since that remote period. If new revolutions are to be brought about they will in all probability be initiated in the same layer of social structure, namely in the family. Only in the family is it possible to strike when the iron is hot, to mould the human mind during its period of relative plasticity. But psychological science may help us to render more effective and enduring the transmission of a less anxiety-ridden culture, a process which if it is to have any permanent effect must be repeated from one generation to another. Psychological science may, and I believe can, help us to remove or lessen those obstacles to culture transmission which by perpetuating human conflict increase our social readiness to make war.

¹ I have given a brief outline of the relation of politics to culture transmission in *The Dangers of Being Human*. London. Allen & Unwin. 1936.

CHAPTER XII

The Angle of Approach

AT various points in this series of essays I have singled out problems which seem to me to have a very close bearing on both the causation and the possible prevention of war. These problems should, I maintain, be given priority in all planned schemes of war-research. I have also insisted that *no* research can be considered adequate unless it takes into account the influence of unconscious processes, and that where research methods are restricted to the collection of (pre)conscious observations, the conclusions based on this descriptive evidence must then be *interpreted* in terms of their unconscious significance. There is, however, some danger that in stressing the need for focal researches I may have given the impression that final conclusions can be arrived at by adding up the results obtained from isolated investigations. On the contrary no psychological problem can be solved in this way. It is impossible, for example, to understand a neurotic symptom unless we discover what part it plays in maintaining or disturbing mental balance, that is to say, in the total function of the individual mind. Similarly with Group psychology. Isolated observations must be correlated with the total function of the Group. In short the problem of war is one that calls for the very widest angle of approach. To gain the necessary perspective we must first discard the natural but erroneous conviction that war is simply a present-day problem, the solution to which can be found merely by examining the present-day structure and impulses of society. Unfortunately this misapprehension is extremely tenacious of life : and so before concluding this review I would like to bring forward some further considerations

bearing on the scope of research. These are for the most part speculative in nature.

To begin with it may be admitted that since the origins of civilization lie in pre-historic times, the origins of war must also be sought in those unrecorded epochs when man had already shut himself off from the other animals by the development not only of consciousness but of differentiated layers or sections of his unconscious mind. Incidentally it is because of this revolutionary development in man's mental processes that we cannot accept the more simple-minded 'biological' approach to the phenomena of war by which these are traced back to the fighting habits of animals. However far back we trace human behaviour we find that it is still regulated by characteristic *mental* mechanisms. The gulf between man and the other animals is a psychic gulf that cannot be bridged by biological analogies.

Of the very earliest stages of man's mental development we know nothing: but it is safe to say that from the time he developed an unconscious conscience—and that must have taken place about the time the incest barrier was first established—combat acquired a *psycho*-biological significance. In other words it was no longer a form of instinctual discharge based on elaborate but essentially reflex actions: it was regulated by new mental mechanisms which in course of time gave rise to ritualistic behaviour. Parricide together with other forms of manslaughter was no longer purely self-preservative killing: it became a ritual murder bound up with the expression of sexual rivalry. And although our peace-time murderers are unaware of the ritualistic nature of their crimes, murder is still a ritual. Admittedly killing continued to serve biological aims. Nevertheless it remained a rite and except for sacrificial purposes moved from the centre of the family to its periphery. But it did not stop there. In the wars we are now familiar with the enemy no longer lies within the family group or within small non-familial groups or even within state groups (except in the case

of civil war) but outside the frontiers of the state. The survival value of this outward displacement of killing must have been more obvious in the earlier stages of group development than it is nowadays. To divert destruction from the family or small group adds to the stability of the unit, hence to its chances of survival. But in total war victory can only be secured at the cost of enormous damage to all the states involved and to all the constituent groups of which these states are comprised, to say nothing of the maiming and slaughter of millions of individuals. Killing has thus lost much of its survival value. Study of primitive tribes, which, next to the study of infantile development and of mental disorders, affords us the best opportunity of making hypothetical reconstructions of the mind of prehistoric man, suggests that the primitive rituals that govern war-making provide also a means of control of killing. It is obvious for example that if the purification rituals that follow scalping and head hunting were part of the rites of war, our modern armies would soon be reduced to impotence by the necessity of isolating the best fighting men (the killers) in huts where for months on end they would strive to qualify for readmission into society as sane decontaminated persons. Even apart from ritual control, primitive tribes exhibit in some respects a degree of common-sense about war that puts the intransigence of civilized nations to shame. It has often been recorded how, after inter-tribal conflict has led to the death of half-a-dozen tribesmen, the war is called off by common consent; or how battle strategy frequently consists of a single charge after which honour is satisfied. In some instances, as in the case of the Kwakiutl,¹ the technique of war is partly displaced to a bloodless competition in which one Chief seeks to overcome another by destroying his own goods and chattels. If his adversary is unable to go one better he is adjudged the loser. Apart from the deeper significance of this competitive ritual

¹ Benedict: *Patterns of Culture*. Boston. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934.

which shows clearly how masochistic impulses can be used to gratify sadistic aims, one is reminded of a flippant suggestion made during earlier air-battles in this war. It used to be said that if the margin of superiority could only be ascertained beforehand, the prospective losers might send up the requisite number of planes to bomb their *own* side allowing the main body of both Air Forces to go to bed. Perhaps the suggestion is not quite so foolish as it sounds. When after a war, waves of hate and retribution have spent themselves and when the final tally of destruction comes to be made, it is no longer so important who destroyed whom. The focus of personal interest has by then been displaced to war-memorials. Anyhow it is clear that in course of becoming civilized man has lost some of his ritualistic control of killing and that because of this loss of control killing has passed the point where it retains survival value.

I have chosen this observation on the habits of the Kwakiutl at random, but it is no exaggeration to say that our understanding of war-causation and therefore of war-prevention can be immeasurably increased by detailed investigations of anthropological data. One of the most urgent anthropological tasks is to determine in what respects the various psychological adaptations and organizations of primitive tribes are superior to those of 'civilized' communities. Obviously, if reliable conclusions could be arrived at on these points, it might be possible to modify some of our 'civilized' patterns of culture transmission by imitating some of the more successful patterns of 'primitive man.' Admittedly the task of investigation is not an easy one and is rendered more difficult by the fact that a good deal of confusion reigns over the interpretation of the behaviour of primitives. Anthropology like other branches of sociology has responded to the impact of new ideas by producing a number of different 'schools': and as in other branches of sociology these schools can be classified according to whether or not the observer in making his interpretations takes into

account the existence of unconscious processes. Already there is in existence an embryo 'school' of psycho-analytical anthropology, but it is still too small and too unfamiliar with field research to do much more than interpret observations collected by other workers. On the other hand, the more traditional schools of anthropology, stimulated by their experiences in the field and influenced by Gestalt psychology,¹ have developed a 'configurational' view of human society. Unfortunately this 'configuration' school has ignored the existence of unconscious psychology and the methods they apply (descriptive study of total function) will not help them to discover the unique uses of deep analysis.

But despite differences in approach, modern field methods of observation have uncovered a number of facts that simply cry out for interpretation. To take a case in point: several researches have been published on differences between the behaviour, attitude and temperament of various primitive tribes; between, for example, the anxiety-ridden culture of the Dobuans, in which the accent is laid on suspicion, persecution and aggression, and the milder and apparently more social behaviour of the Trobrianders; or between the Dobuans and the Zuni, a ritualistic tribe whose members cultivate the art of compromise; or again, between the peace-loving Arapesh and the war-like Mundugumor. The authors² who, as has been pointed out, did not take into account the existence of unconscious processes, developed their conclusions into a special theory of group behaviour. They believe for example that people are plastic to the moulding force of the society into which they are born, in other words, that human behaviour

¹ According to Gestalt psychology the total function of a mental unit cannot be gauged by isolating and analysing its parts. The function of the whole, in the view of the Gestalt psychologist, determines not only the function but the nature of the parts. Applied to anthropological science this view necessitates the functional study and contrasting of whole cultures.

² Benedict, *op.cit.* Fortune: *The Sorcerers of Dobu*. New York. 1932. Mead: *Sex and Temperament*. London. Routledge. 1935.

will take the form suggested by the *institutions provided in any given society*. The gentle Arapesh are gentle because from birth onwards they are conditioned by the prevailing cultural configuration of the tribe. Incidentally it is to the credit of these field anthropologists that although they do not go beyond descriptive assessments of the influences brought to bear on the young, they do pay attention to the enormous importance of the 'moulding process' on young children. Following this general theory of culture transmission, they regard war as a culturally selected *trait*. Mead¹ in particular implicitly rejects the sexual significance of war-phenomena, believing that the relation of aggression to sexual differences and indeed the existence of sexual differences themselves are determined mainly by the influence of cultural patterns imposed by the community. There is in their view only a small 'generic core' of biologically determined behaviour: the rest is a vast accretion of local, cultural and man-made patterns. Mankind is 'unbelievably malleable.'

It is not my intention to discuss at any length the rights and wrongs either of this 'configurational' point of view or of the method of approach. Obviously examination of the total function of a group is an essential part of group psychology: equally obviously it can tell us little of dynamic factors. As in the psychology of the individual, total function is regulated (whether successfully or not is another matter) by the need for a working balance within the group. The data of descriptive group psychology are *end results* of instinctual stresses. And as in individual psychology the fate of any important instinct depends on the amount of opposition it encounters from other instincts. Between extremes of expression and of inhibition we may find all sorts of compromises. Indeed, when the antithetical instincts are equally strongly charged, neither may come to the surface and the observer is given only a false impression of weakness and inertia. And not only a false

¹ *Op. cit.*

impression but, if matters of group policy are at stake, a dangerous impression. For it may require only a marginal stimulus to tip the balance on one side or the other. This uncertainty is the penalty the configurationist pays for neglect of the dynamic psychology of the unconscious. Apart from this, exception might be taken to the comparison of tribes like the Zushi, who, although belonging to a primitive culture, have regressed from a phase of more elaborate social organization, with tribes like the Dobuans who apparently have not. Regression products are not strictly comparable with progression-products. No doubt these controversies will be settled in due course. In the meantime the importance of this work lies not so much in the conclusions arrived at by the authors as in the data on which these conclusions are based. These afford some opportunity of studying within a convenient compass an unwitting experiment in 'selected' culture transmission. There may be differences of opinion as to the degree of malleability of human beings. Psycho-analysts would agree that up to a point, *i.e.*, during infancy and early childhood they are extremely malleable, although the ultimate influences brought to bear are internal and unconscious rather than external and deliberate. But both during early childhood and later life the internal forces working against malleability are also extremely strong. As for the view that war is simply a culturally selected trait, all that can be said of this remarkable assertion is that, if true, the human race has good reason to congratulate itself. But even if, as the observations of dynamic psychology suggest, the statement is only a quarter-truth, this would not invalidate attempts to influence unconscious war tendencies by appropriate methods of upbringing.¹ In the meantime we may consider how far the data in question can be approached from a psycho-analytical angle.

Starting with the significance of primitive ritual as a spontaneous inhibiting process, we may recall that in Freud's view, many bizarre forms of emotional behaviour observed in

¹ See pp. 65, 70, 83, 202.

psycho-pathological states—in hysteria, for example, represent reactions that were once the ‘normal’ behaviour of primitive man and presumably therefore of prehistoric man. Freud also pointed out the close parallel between the symptom-rituals practised by sufferers from obsessional neurosis and the magical tabus observed and imposed by primitive tribes.¹ And certainly it would be significant if we could prove that cultivation of superstitious ritual goes either with a reduction in the total amount of aggression expressed by any given tribe or, at a deeper level, with a diminution of the aggression ‘potential’ of its members. It would of course be necessary to show that ritualistic observances produce the same result in both primitive and civilized races; and the first step in this investigation would be to examine the most primitive forms of ritualism to be found under civilized conditions, viz., the ‘symptoms’ of obsessional neuroses.

The characteristics of an ‘obsessional neurosis’ will be readily grasped by those who have detected in themselves those minor ritualistic practices that occur in everyday life, *e.g.*, stepping over cracks in the pavement, ‘touching wood’ or, on hearing a clock begin to strike the hour, trying to pass a certain lamp post before the chime is completed. Apart from these ritual actions, the secret object of which is to bring good luck or avert disaster, ‘normal’ persons can observe in their minds a number of minor ‘obsessive thoughts’ (so-called compulsive thinking) sometimes nonsensical in content but frequently concerned with ideas of inadvertently inflicting injury. In a true obsessional neurosis these obsessive rituals and thoughts are magnified to grotesque disproportion. They may take up hours of agonizing uncertainty every day. And they tend to spread rapidly to any associated objects or ideas: simple decontaminating rituals (*e.g.*, a hand-washing mania) or a *folie de doute* concerning the choice of clothing may soon develop into a haystack of observances which are no sooner completed

¹ *Totem and Tabu*. Pelican Series.

than they begin all over again. Doubt and indecision give rise to endless alternations of action or of thought, and end by crippling the patients' working capacities. The 'doubt' that is so marked a feature of the obsessional neurosis is concerned with some fundamental unconscious uncertainty on the part of the sufferer as to whether he can love or hate. Indeed it is not hard to detect that most obsessional rituals are connected with the avoidance or expiation either of unconscious phantasies of violence or of unconscious (infantile) sexual phantasies. Love and hate of a primitive kind are unusually closely fused and an exaggerated element of unconscious homosexuality is also present. In passing, it is interesting to note that almost identical unconscious factors are responsible for the outbreak of war-neurosis,¹ and it is an easy guess that together with some forms of hysteria the obsessional neuroses are developed in order to control some of the unconscious impulses which, under the conditions of war, are given direct expression. It is additionally significant therefore that although obsessional neurotics are on the whole of superior intelligence, their actual love and hate capacities are below the average. Their social behaviour is distinctly non-aggressive in type: indeed they show many signs of over-scrupulosity and queasiness.

So far so good. If now we trace the history of an obsessional neurosis, we find that the adult symptoms have been preceded by an earlier outbreak occurring usually in the years immediately preceding puberty. And if we go farther back it is often possible to establish that already in early childhood ritualistic behaviour of an obsessional type has manifested itself. This behaviour often goes undetected because it does not differ very obviously from the stereotyped forms of behaviour observed in normal children. It might be thought that this difficulty in distinguishing normal from abnormal forms of ritualistic behaviour in early childhood would bring the investigation to a dead end. Exactly the contrary is the case. The very lack of clear distinction

¹ See pp. 122 *et seq.*

strongly suggests that every child passes through a 'normal' obsessional phase and that only if it is unduly exaggerated can it be described as a true infantile obsessional neurosis. Indeed I have often suggested that man owes the expansion of his intellectual faculties to a phase of primitive development when the *technique* of 'obsessional thinking' was the 'normal' social technique for the group, and that every child repeats between the ages of two-and-a-half to four years this phase of racial development.

Unfortunately no anthropological evidence is forthcoming from which to establish with any certainty the state of prehistoric man before this obsessional phase of culture established itself.¹ The most primitive records we can study are already steeped in magical ritualism. But we *can* study the state of the infant before his normal obsessional phase begins and his normal intellectual faculties expand. Now the most obvious characteristic of early life is that the infant has very little control of its emotions and consequently of its actions. It falls an easy prey to frustration and expresses its reactions in a violent way. On the other hand it passes through experiences of relative gratification which in their own way are equally intense though not so compelling. Exuberant joys contrast with wailing sorrows: anxiety, fear, and suspicion pass readily into violent hate and are only temporarily assuaged by partial relief of tension through gratification. Obviously all this rapid alternation of violent emotional reactions adds enormously to the helplessness of the child and sets a high premium on the discovery and development of more stable reactions even if these can only be purchased at the price of partial renunciation, that is to say, of compromise. It is at this point that normal ritualism, obviously fostered by the need for magical control of life, creeps into the child's

¹ In opposition to the views of configurational anthropologists, who believe that culture is imposed by the existing social environment, the psycho-analyst believes that culture establishes itself from within outwards, and in so doing creates the social conditions to which it is then subject.

private and social behaviour. It would seem that by developing an infinite variety of magical ideas and by promoting an infinite variety of superstitious rituals the child provides itself with a kind of mental screen with which to hedge in the most painful and unbridled emotions. When this barrier has been erected the more unbearable emotions can thereafter pass through to consciousness only in an attenuated and therefore more assimilable state. It would of course be inaccurate to suggest that all normal behaviour is derived from originally obsessional patterns. A great variety of normal types exist (depressive, persecutory, manic, etc.) which derive their characteristics from some distinct variety of infantile organization. But it is probable that a large part of our normal intellectual and rational function, our capacity to deal with waves of emotion, to see the two or more sides of every problem, is derived from our ritualistic phases of development. *The point is that these faculties and capacities are precisely the faculties and capacities we depend on to control the impulses of aggression.* Anyhow it is certainly true that when the infant passes into his superstitious ritualistic phase his character begins for the first time to stabilize. He becomes quieter, more restrained, more patient, and much less aggressive. The process may indeed go too far. The change in character, although welcomed by harassed and sleep-deprived parents, may reach an intensity that has pathological effects and damages the child's normal capacity for emotional response. He may become too quiet, too restrained, too patient, too unaggressive. In short we may presume that the infant's problem and the problem of the obsessional neurotic are identical. *Unconsciously both are concerned to master mixed charges of primitive love and hate.* If the mastery is successful normal function is (re)established. If not, both suffer from a lack of capacity to love and from a general poverty of the emotions. The obsessional child and the neurotic adult can understand but they cannot feel. Above all they can no longer hate. Their aggression is effectively damped down although at the cost of

indecision and inaction, and both have an inner longing for innocence that would warm the heart of an archangel.

Needless to say, I am not going to suggest that the cure for war would be to make all the infantile population develop obsessional neuroses, and give them another attack at puberty in case the original mental inoculation had not 'taken.' We cannot artificially induce mass neurosis although we do know that parents suffering from neurosis can unwittingly educate their children in neurotic behaviour. I am not even going to suggest that some deliberate cultivation of the normal ritualistic phases of infancy would be a desirable method of diminishing war-readiness. Admittedly both normal and neurotic character reactions can be cultivated, but such a method should only be a last resource ; we ought first of all to try bringing up children free from the avoidable anxieties, guilts and despairs that breed unconscious hostilities and so promote war-readiness. My present object is quite otherwise : it is to consider whether a valid correlation can be established between, on the one hand, the ritualism found in primitive tribes, in the early phases of childhood and in adult obsessional neuroses and on the other hand the inhibition of aggression. I believe this correlation can be made, and that what we 'civilized' races regard as 'neuroses' result from an inversion into the mind of a former peripheral layer of it : as if a once externally placed defence organization had become 'folded in.' This would mean that, as the result of repetition in childhood, a former *ad hoc* system of social protection had become a permanent and active part of individual defence.

Unfortunately not all internal (mental) disorders are equally successful in inhibiting the external expression of aggression. On the whole the psycho-neuroses are successful in this respect but, for example, 'persecution anxieties' tend to foster externally directed aggression, as witness the extreme case of the homicidal maniac. Nevertheless it would be desirable to study more closely those conditions that do succeed in damping down aggression. As I pointed out earlier, if 'war-neuroses' were

universal, war would be automatically inhibited as soon as hostilities commenced, possibly even when the mere threat of war developed. Unfortunately these spontaneous 'cures' are accompanied by certain disadvantages. Not only are they extremely painful, but the inhibiting mechanisms do not limit their action to war-like impulses. The symptoms tend to cripple also the peace-time capacities of the individual including his capacity to love others adequately and to defend or maintain himself. If, however, the action of the disorder could be made more selective, we would certainly possess an effective if uncomfortable form of war-prevention: we might even look forward to the time when these immediate reactions to the external stimulus of war would become part of a *permanent 'internal' system of defence against unconscious war-readiness*. But alas for the prospect, we know that only a small section of the total population has the mental predisposition necessary to develop (internal) 'neuroses': under ordinary circumstances the 'normality' of the ordinary civilian is proof against major attacks of neuroses. As I have suggested it might be possible to influence the development of 'normal' children in the direction of neurotic character formation: at the least we might well be able to cultivate in them rituals that damp down aggressive reactions; but we could only do so at the cost of increasing the child's already excessive tendency to inhibition in love and work. In any case piling up defences is never so economical or effective as reducing the stresses that give rise to excessive discharge of emotion.¹

I have brought forward these speculative considerations not in support of any particular system of war-prevention but to indicate that the problem of war cannot be held in proper perspective unless we keep in mind the part it has played in the mental development of the race. It is a stock argument of those who attempt to idealize war, that war brings out the nobility of the race, that it is responsible for an immense increase in man's

¹ For Note see page 242.

creative achievements, to say nothing of his capacities for endurance, discipline and self-sacrifice. To this the usual counter is that these manifestations are not a direct result of the loosening of aggression, but are due to the rapid counter-charging of creative energies and of all the social mechanisms of love that follow the war-time threat to man's existing love attachments. But this view although sound enough in its way does not reach to the root of the problem. It is equally true that the aggressive impulses manifested in peace are indirectly stimulated by the unsatisfactory way in which we regulate our creative and love energies. Merely to contrast the constructive aspects of peace with the destructive aspects of war gets us nowhere. We cannot estimate the significance of war unless we correlate it not only with the antecedent state of peace but with the particular manifestations of peace that exist amongst non-combatants in war-time. Viewed from this angle the manifestations of every nation at war are seen to resemble very closely those neurotic symptoms in which both primitive love and primitive hate are *simultaneously* over-charged. And if we take a long enough view the alternation of peace and war corresponds to that neurotic form in which the over-charge of the love-morality *follows* the over-charge of primitive hate-morality. It is at least plausible that prehistoric man passed through phases of alternating and antithetical emotions more frequently than he achieved phases of quiescence. His progress must have depended on the capacity to withstand frustration without falling automatically into a rage. The more he could do so the more effective would be his ultimate capacity to master frustration. Yet it is hard to modify ancient canalizations of impulse. When primitive man learned to bear the frustration of primitive sexual impulse without disrupting the small group of which he was a member, he added immeasurably to his prospects of survival. But the price he had to pay for this twofold restraint (of love and of hate) was a close and permanent association between love and hate in his unconscious mind. It

is this unconscious association and fusion of love and hate impulses that has baffled him ever since. The persistence of war is the most striking evidence of his failure to solve this problem. Yet although man has from time to time embarked on dangerous regressions, he has never gone back on his first step towards civilization and there is no evidence that he ever will. The problem that all students of dynamic psychology have yet to solve is whether this unconscious fusion of love and hate can be rendered harmless in the case of the individual without periodic flight into neurotic illness, and in the case of group formations without periodic flight into war.

¹ It might be argued that permanent internal (mental) defences against war-making could be evolved without any necessity for deliberate encouragement of neurotic reactions. Man has developed unconscious mechanisms that automatically control the most primitive of his sexual impulses; yet only a minority of the adult population are, strictly speaking, neurotic. Is it not possible that equally automatic defences against primitive sadism could be developed without necessarily involving widespread mental disorder?

Now it is quite true that the maintenance of the incest-barrier no longer depends on the enforcement of savage external prohibitions. Furthermore, the automatic operation of the incest tabu has brought about a marked reduction of the aggression between individual males. Parricide and other forms of murder are comparatively rare crimes, much rarer than incest: yet, despite popular belief to the contrary, they are restrained, not by fear of capital punishment, but by unconscious prohibitions. On the other hand, aggressive instincts are less labile than sexual instincts and consequently more refractory to total prohibition. And although aggression between individuals has undergone a steady reduction, group aggression has steadily increased. So far as we can judge, there is a limit to the unconscious control of impulse which, if exceeded, leads either to internal explosion (mental disorder) or to external explosion (sexual perversions or anti-social conduct, or, in the case of the group, civil or international war). Moreover, we cannot indicate with any precision under what pre-historic conditions the incest-barrier was evolved. The safest guess is that it came about owing to the pressure of conditions that threatened man with extinction. Before we can put even this assumption to the test we must wait the coming of some dire natural catastrophe, a new Ice Age perhaps, or a pandemic of a new pestilence for which we have no cure; unless, of course, man himself succeeds in precipitating some disaster that falls equally and simultaneously on all communities. In any case there is no certainty that civilized man would be capable of further achievements in the direction of unconscious control of instinct. In all probability only a race of children would be malleable enough to compass the feat.

CHAPTER XIIIPreparations for the Next War?

FOLLOWING the principle that the 'outbreak' of any war occurs some considerable time before the actual declaration, it is reasonable to assume that the 'outbreak' of peace occurs shortly after the war has reached its major climax; in other words, about the time when it is at its bloodiest. No doubt the most favourable condition for a war-time peace movement is that both sides should have experienced a 'certainty' of victory and a realistic fear of absolute defeat. And from this point of view the peace movement of this war may be said to have acquired a perceptible momentum after the Allied invasion of France in 1944. It is possible therefore that the time has already passed when peace aims can be guided in the direction most likely to lengthen the interval between wars. On the other hand, it is just possible that peace plans can still be modified by rational pacific aims. And although personally I think it is already too late, there is no harm in reviewing the situation from this point of view. As, however, the problem of war-causation has not yet been solved, all we can do in the meantime is to take stock of our 'war-aims.'

Now the task of classifying war-aims is complicated by the fact that although we have as yet no scientific certainty as to the causes of war, most of the statesmen concerned in formulating 'official' war-aims believe that the causes of any given war are known and can be put in a nutshell. This view naturally

influences their conception of war-aims. Perhaps the best example of the 'nutshell' ideology was afforded by official British views on the war at the time of the fall of France. More complicated theories as to war-causation and war-aims were abandoned for the time being in favour of the simple approach. Germany through her will to aggression and domination had 'caused' the war and looked like winning it. Therefore Britain's immediate war-aim was victory, victory in order to save the Country from defeat. We can thus distinguish in theory two types of 'official' war-causation, positive and reactive. Indeed, since it takes two sides to make a war, some such dualistic approach is unavoidable. According to this view the war-aims of Germany 'caused' the war and were thus 'positive'; whereas the war-aims of Britain were 'reactive,' *i.e.*, to oppose successfully (by securing victory) the war-aims of Germany. In other words, as far as Britain was then concerned, the causes of her participation were the opposite of German war-aims, whereas, again in the British view, Germany's war-causes and war-aims were identical. But although this is apparently the only common-sense partisan view it is by no means so simple as it looks. Translated into terms of instinct the 'reactive' aim is not simply an immediate manifestation of the instinct of self-preservation devoid of any more complicated ideological factors. The concept of a British 'victory' implies more than immediate successful self-defence: it implies also a longer distance ideological aim, *viz.*, the liquidation of Germany's war-aims which are themselves ideological, *e.g.*, the domination of inferior races by a master-race. So that even if the British view is accurate, namely, that the other side 'started' it, it is clear that Britain was, and is, prepared to continue it, that is to say, to adopt a war technique for reasons apparently the opposite of those of Germany. Unfortunately the argument suffers from the weakness that the 'other side' can also exploit it. The Germans can and do maintain that the war was started not for purposes of aggression and domination but because of long-

distance views of self-preservation. The familiar 'lebensraum' argument was of this order. There is of course no end to this bandying of alleged causes. All we are entitled to conclude is that opinions on war-causation and war-aims differ and that whatever may be their accuracy, the fact remains that wars do break out from time to time.

A useful corrective to this 'simple' approach is to consider two other theories in both of which official 'war-aims' are very seriously discounted. One is maintained by a group of people, who, on the strength of animal observations, regard themselves as 'biologically minded': the other is advanced by those who believe fanatically and exclusively in the unconscious determination of war. The main distinction between these groups is that the 'biological' one ignores unconscious factors whereas the 'unconscious' group regard biological factors as constitutional and in that sense merely predisposing. Members of the first group maintain that instincts of aggression are rarely observed in pure culture in the animal kingdom and that on the whole fighting and aggression subserve the purposes of self-preservation and reproduction. Even aggrandizement is regarded as in extension of the aim of self-preservation. Hence the only objective war-aims they are disposed to admit are those openly expressed in terms of self-preservation, and sexuality. Although they do not employ the psychological term rationalization, it is clear that they regard most currently accepted war-aims as sophistications without any real dynamic force. The fanatical exponent of unconscious determinants goes much further. He maintains that whatever may be the case with other animals, man has succeeded in developing his instincts of aggression to such a pitch that they can be pursued for their own sake, as well as in the interests of self-preservation and reproduction. But, he adds, since the pattern of adult life is determined by infantile stages of development and since the most dynamic forces of infantile life remain in the unconscious as an 'infantile potential,' only infantile war-causes or war-aims have any

objective validity. All others are in the nature of rationalizations, that is to say, unconscious excuses, accepted by the conscious mind with a suspicious alacrity.

For the moment I am not concerned with the rights and wrongs of these controversies, but with the fact that, *whatever the ultimate causes of war, the stated war-aims may either give direct expression, or have an antithetical relation to them; or, again, serve to conceal them.* Naturally any combination of these possibilities can also exist. But there is yet another case. *The statement of war-aims may have no relation to the causes of war.* It may be simply part of the technique of war; in other words, *it may be simply a form of war-cry* intended in one way or another to assist in defeating the enemy. This the statement of war-aims can achieve either directly, by seducing the enemy from his existing allegiances or by intimidating him, or indirectly, by increasing the fighting spirit and cohesion of the home side. The fact that the publication of war-aims often produces exactly the opposite effect is merely a tribute to the stupidity of their sponsors; it does not invalidate the hypothesis that some war-aims are nothing more than war-cries.¹ If this view were correct, one would expect to find not only a great variety of 'war-cry'-aims but a distinct variation in accordance with the state of the war. There would be little point for example in stimulating cohesion on the home side if it were already flushed with success and obviously on the point of victory. On the other hand true war-aims as distinct from war-cries would not be likely to vary so much with the ups and downs of war although they might well show a greater degree of specialization when victory was certain. But by that time it is questionable

¹ This is not the place to discuss in detail the function of war-propaganda. But comparing the effect of Wilson's Fourteen Points with that obtained by some of the more amateurish efforts of the present war, it is evident that, in official circles at any rate, little advance has been made in the practice of war-cries since 1918. Needless to say the efforts of Dr Goebbels, although apparently more successful in the first phase of the war, produced in the long run little or no effect in the very quarters where positive results were most essential.

whether we can speak accurately of war-aims, since the prejudices and pre-conceptions of peace are also most likely to erupt precisely at that point.

Anyhow it is clear that the task of distinguishing war-aims from war-cries is not an easy one. Nor is it rendered easier by the fact that we cannot yet point with certainty to the ultimate causes of any war and are even uncertain as to the chain of proximate causes until at least half a century has elapsed. Under these circumstances the only course open to the observer is to study the development of war-aims on what appears to be the winning side. Obviously the war-aims of the victors constitute the most decisive factor in the drawing up of Peace Treaties, and in this way influence the duration of the next peace period. *For unless the Peace Treaties embody aims that will offset war motivations on both sides, they might as well be listed under the heading of preparations for the next war.*

Reviewing the war-aims both official and unofficial that were current in Britain after the outbreak of war it is clear that despite their multiplicity they soon passed through a phase of unification. So far as the general population was concerned, little accurate information is available. There was of course a consensus of opinion that Germany was responsible for the war and therefore had to be defeated: otherwise popular war-aims differed very widely. But it was evident that something more than a defensive aim was necessary if the war was to be carried beyond the point of successful defence to total victory. This is strictly in keeping with psychological principles. The use of reactive aggression merely to counter positive aggression is too limited to sustain morale during a long and hard war. There must also be something positive to fight for. If some creative aim captures the allegiances of the people, the drives to aggression or counter aggression (the will-to-war) can be augmented and sustained by love drives. This explains why the authorities were quick to mobilize peace-time reactions to and prejudices about Nazi Germany and to express their highest common factor in a few

simple formulæ : the war was a conflict between freedom-loving democracies and a country steeped in the perverted political philosophy of Nazism. This conflict had come to a head when the Nazi leaders, despite conferences, concessions and warnings, proceeded with a concerted plan of conquering its nearest neighbours. The invasion of Poland was in fact the *casus belli*. The war was thus an ideological war. We fight, said Mr Chamberlain 'against evil things.' Even when Britain found herself the only democratic country left in the field, the ideological aim was retained. Britain was in Mr Attlee's words 'the last bridgehead of freedom.' But by that time the simpler and more urgent aim of self-preservation through victory had become paramount, and up even to the present retains a powerful lead over other aims.

Paradoxical as the fusion may appear the simultaneous pursuit of war-aims derived respectively from the forces of love and the forces of counter-aggression is capable of a simple explanation. Counter-aggression is not just an expression of the instincts of self-preservation, or, to put it more accurately, the self-preservative urge in man operates through a deep system of self-love. Any threat to this form of love loosens reactive aggression. Once self-preservative aims are attained, or, in more ordinary language, once self-defence has proved successful, the more egoistic forms of love give place to other and more altruistic varieties of love aim. The important point is that no war could be continued beyond the point of successful self-defence on the strength of purely aggressive impulses. This is true of both sides in the conflict, and it accounts for the fact that, as Britain's position improved, the original war-aim of defending democracy and freedom was gradually extended in a number of directions.

Some of these were derived from earlier political schemes for social reform. The idea of a 'better world' began to present itself, but on further inspection this appeared to take the form mainly of demands for economic security and advancement.

A rather broader concept of war-aims was based on the preservation and advancement of what are often called the 'rights of man.' These 'rights' are simply civilized 'values' established in the course of man's emergence from his animal origins. In an analysis of the war-aims that can transcend national ideals without neglecting them¹ I pointed out that, although the list was a lengthy one, there were five main aims to which everyone in this Kingdom could subscribe: to preserve one's life, home, family and country from either physical or mental violence, to defend cherished institutions from violence, to protect the weak, dependent and infirm, to preserve truth and to uphold law. All of these aims, however concrete or abstract, derive their force from love energies: they are opposed to the aims that are maintained by hate. And in fact whether they are officially recognized or not, they represent the forces on which wittingly or unwittingly all democratic Governments draw in war-time.

A more comprehensive and in certain respects more specific declaration was published by H. G. Wells in his *Rights of Man*. Everyone, he maintained is 'a joint heir of the world in its entirety.' He has an equal right to food, covering, medical care and 'to do what he can do for the world from birth to death.' The community must protect the child and the family: it must protect man's right to work and provide him with work. The right to earn must be maintained but there must be no profit without service. The individual's home and lawful possessions must be protected and he should have freedom to go about. His personal liberty should rest on the maintained right of *Habeas Corpus*. He should be free from violence, have freedom of thought, and a right to knowledge. He should be subject to the legitimate and useful restraints of Government.

By comparison the official pronouncements made when Britain and America joined forces were more reserved. The Atlantic Charter although apparently not a binding and

¹ *The Psychology of Fear and Courage*. Penguin Special. 1940.

sanctioned instrument may be taken, together with the Four Freedoms, as a sort of fighting creed. At the least it represented the degree of agreement that could be attained between the Western Democracies at a time when the prospects of victory although brighter than those obtaining at the Dunkirk period were by no means settled. The four freedoms included freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religious belief, freedom from want and freedom from fear. The last condition did not of course imply that man can be freed from his fear reactions, a state of affairs which even if it were desirable is psychologically impossible. It refers to freedom from fear of aggression. The actual Charter expressed this more specifically in terms of frontiers, sovereign rights, self-Government, trade access to raw materials, improved economic standards, social security, freedom of the seas, disarmament of aggressive nations, and lightening of armaments for peace-loving peoples.

The complication of war-aims brought about by the alliance with Russia, a country with ideological aims differing in many important respects from those of Britain and America, has until recently been officially screened by restricting them to the necessity of victory over Nazi aggression, tyranny and atrocity. As the prospects of ultimate victory brightened, this more restricted aim was crystallized, for the Western Fighting Powers, in the formula 'Unconditional Surrender.' But the movement toward specific and detailed aims could not be arrested, and, as one victory followed another, it became more clear that those unofficial persons or institutions who were at pains to state their war-aims, tended to do so in terms of the ideologies on which they had been nourished before the war. In that sense their aims were less war-aims than a gate-crashing of peace-time political and economic philosophies into war-time ideologies.

It can of course be argued that under these circumstances there is no justification for considering them under the heading of war-aims. Yet for example the declaration of the International Labour Organization, although concerned mostly with economic

and financial measures, with the abolition of poverty and with conditions of employment, is linked specifically with the right of spiritual as well as of material well-being. Only on social justice, it is contended, can a lasting peace be established. So if this is really a war to end war we are entitled to assume that social justice is a war-aim. Even the declaration of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture regards as pre-requisites the winning of the war and the deliverance of millions of people from tyranny and hunger. In this declaration also it is maintained that freedom from fear and freedom from want must be aimed at as soon as the war is won. It is not surprising therefore to find that in the declarations of more openly political organizations, a partisan note creeps in, as when Mr Harold Laski expresses the view that the war will be justified only if a Socialist Commonwealth is established afterwards. There is of course no end to this modification of war-aims. Doubtless conferences of Conservatives or Liberals or for the matter of that of poets, theologians and natural scientists could each produce aims consistent with their peace-time ideologies.

We are now in a position to simplify a little this medley of war-aims. First of all we can eliminate these formulæ that are merely war-cries masquerading as war-aims. These can as a rule be distinguished by their rapid variation in accordance with the state of the war. The next step is even more essential. It is to isolate a special group of aims which are essentially *moralistic expressions of unconscious guilt*. However assiduously the parties to a war may seek to attribute 'war-guilt' to the 'enemy' the fact remains that once the dangers of defeat have been overcome, and again when victory appears to be assured, a powerful factor of unconscious guilt begins to take effect. It is impossible for man to break the tabu on killing, and to go on killing on such a colossal scale, without sooner or later suffering from unconscious guilt. Naturally the winning side suffer more severely from this unconscious reaction than the defeated. The mere fact that the defeated have endured irreparable military

disaster represents to the unconscious a measure of punishment that goes far to liquidate unconscious guilt. A similar effect is produced by onerous peace-terms, a fact that is deserving of more attention than it is given by the victors. Needless to say an unconscious sense of guilt, of its very nature, rarely gains expression in consciousness. Its existence is manifested in ideas of reconstruction, reparation or the creation of 'better' worlds. Like most New Year resolutions these are largely exercises in expiatory thinking, which partly explains why post-war achievements in the direction of reform fall so far short of the original blue-prints. The Devil was well—the devil a monk was he !

Having isolated the 'war-cry'-aims and discounted the expiatory slogans, we are left with two main varieties of war-aim. The first is a logical extension of simpler 'victory' aims. The feature of the extension is that counter-aggression is not suspended with the cessation of hostilities : in order, it is suggested, to 'secure peace' various sanctions are enacted against the aggressor, which, though no longer purely military in nature, enable counter-aggression to be maintained against him. It is unnecessary to give a detailed list of these measures : occupation of territory, frontier alterations, demands for indemnities and reparations, disarmament, punishment of the war guilty and so forth. These various sanctions are obviously of an aggressive nature and are backed in the first instance by the threat of renewal of hostilities should they not be accepted. In principle there is no limit to the projected measures. Some people contemplate with relish the idea of total extermination of the enemy, but as a rule the idea of dismemberment of the enemy country is preferred, or that more disguised kind of dismemberment which takes the form of indefinite military occupation with a view to total elimination of the enemy's aggressive potential, in particular his power to produce modern weapons of war. Indeed there is a very obvious resemblance between the more draconic dismemberment policies and the

reactions of primitive tribesmen whose ritual practice it was to castrate the defeated enemy or ceremonially to eat him.

The second group of real war-aims is in marked contrast to the first. These are on the whole long distance aims intended to curb some of the forces of hate. Victory is regarded as providing an opportunity to apply measures that will promote peace amongst nations. The rationale of these measures has been considered in some detail in earlier essays¹ and we need only consider here some difficulties and contradictions to which they give rise. Prominent amongst these appears to be a very general conviction that the desired result can be achieved through schemes of economic reform. As has been pointed out to restrict peace measures to the economic field would destroy any hope of curbing man's warlike nature. In any case it is to be observed that the plan is a very lop-sided one. If it is to have any effect it must be applied to the defeated aggressors as well as to the victorious counter-aggressors. Yet it is significant that the victors tend not only to claim priority for the economic advancement of their own countries but to bracket any economic reform of the defeated countries with reparation clauses that are bound to obstruct economic reform.

Summing up the tendency of real war-aims, we find that they can be divided into two main groups in accordance with the degree to which love or aggression respectively determine their form. War-aims are not necessarily abandoned because peace is declared: nor are peace-aims abandoned because war is declared. There is war in peace and peace in war. The true measure of a peace-plan is therefore the degree to which it is based however indirectly on the love instincts. Adopting this criterion we can examine more closely the plans for peace which, as victory grows closer, begin to infiltrate the fighting creeds of the United Nations.

In the autumn of 1944 at Dumbarton Oaks various Conferences took place between the United Nations (Britain,

¹ See pp. 50, 174, 194.

China, Russia and the U.S.A.) as the result of which certain Agreements were arrived at regarding measures for the maintenance of international peace and security, the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of international aggression. In the preamble it is laid down that the organization necessary for this purpose is to be based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states. Having by the use of the term 'peace-loving' thereby begged the whole question of the causes of the war the Agreement proceeds to express five pious hopes, any one of which if unfulfilled would hamstring the new Organization as effectively as an unfulfilled Covenant hamstrung the League of Nations. These 'undertakings' include the fulfilment by Sovereign States of their obligations to the organization, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, the abandonment of threats or use of force that are inconsistent with the purposes of the organization, and the refusal to assist any State against which preventive or enforcement action is being undertaken.

The actual structure and function of the new organization, or 'United Nations' as it is to be called, can best be grasped by singling out the differences between it and the old League of Nations. The General Assembly of 'peace-loving' States, each one of which has one vote, can as before make recommendations but not take action. There is, however, no need for unanimity of decision between the Assembly and the Council as was the case with the old League. A two-thirds majority in the Assembly will suffice to invoke some action by the Security Council. This Council will have five permanent members (Britain, China, Russia, the U.S.A. and in course of time, France). Six other States can be represented for two-year terms by election from the Assembly. All of these representatives are to be permanently stationed at the United Nations Headquarters. The question of voting within the Council was not settled owing to a split over the issue of unanimous as against majority voting in the case of armed intervention. In the new organization

preventive action may be taken on the development of a threat to peace, provided the Council decides that a realistic threat exists. The old League could take no preventive action until war had actually broken out between two States. The sanctions to be taken include severance of means of communication or of Diplomatic and Economic relations with the offending state, and the institution of blockade or armed intervention. Towards this last end a military staff Committee is to be set up by the Council in charge of a force that is to be permanently mobilized for action. Unlike the League Council, the United Nations Council will settle beforehand the exact constitution of this force. For all practical purposes therefore the Dumbarton Oaks Agreements constitute a military alliance between the present United Nations with a permanently mobilized force at its disposal. To be sure the old League was also a cover for alliances between the Great Powers but these were not directly specified. That is the most important difference between the 'United Nations' and the 'League of Nations.'

In addition to all this an Economic and Social Council is to be created to work for the solution of economic, social and humanitarian problems. This will consist of eighteen members elected for three-year terms by the Assembly. The Committee has many functions but no powers. An International Court of Justice is also to be formed to settle legal disputes and give legal advice to the Council. This Court has likewise many functions but no powers, as indeed is already implied by the retention of Sovereign Status by the members of the United Nations. Finally the Secretary General is invested with a new power to call the attention of the Council to any situation that in his opinion threatens peace and security.

Although these Agreements are so far of a tentative nature and, according to Mr Cordell Hull, made available for full discussion and study by the peoples concerned, it is not to be anticipated that when peace comes and the more chauvinistic elements existing in the United Nations are given freer

expression, the proposals will be any more liberal in tone than they are at present. So it is legitimate to inquire how the Agreements stand up to measurement by the standards we have already discussed. The first conclusion is surely that the Agreements depend on the durability of a military alliance between the existing Allied Nations : and the second that whereas schemes for the institution of sanctions, or, in terms of human instinct, schemes of counter-aggression are to be backed by actual force, the schemes that are concerned with economic, social and humanitarian problems are to have no such backing : the only power to which they can appeal is the force of international reason and idealism, a force already hampered by the rider of sovereign equality of states. In other words the constructive love forces are to be left to their own devices. It is obvious therefore that the " peace-loving peoples " are more at home with methods of compulsion than with methods that might conceivably help to eliminate some of the causes of war. Indeed it could hardly be otherwise with nations that are in process of winning a major or world war. It may be argued that under these circumstances any criticism of the plan is factious and perverse ; that it is unfair not to distinguish between plain aggression and concerted counter-aggression and that from the common-sense point of view, it is reasonable enough to back two horses even though they run in opposite directions. To this criticism there is a good deal to be said in reply. In the first place when causes of illness are unknown or uncertain all treatment is empirical and can be judged only by its results. Whether the old League should have worked or not, the fact remains that it did not work ; and we may well ask ourselves whether the new Military Alliance is any more likely to work than any other post-war military alliance has been or for that matter whether it is more likely to work when disguised as an international organization and supported (or, as the case may be, encumbered) by a fry of small nations. If it will not work, we are no better off than before. And if we really want to know

what chance the alliance has of working we may well consider one of the terms of reference of the projected Economic and Social Council. For if anything is clear in the present confused state of society, it is that precisely on questions of economic organization, the so-called democratic members of the United Nations are both in theory and in practice at variance with such of their allies as are organized on the basis of dictatorship. It may be said of course, and it is doubtless true, that the first necessity of the existing alliance is to sink differences in face of the common enemy. But peace proposals have more than a war reference. They pre-suppose that the enemy has already been defeated. It may be argued further that these differences in principle and practice can be composed without necessarily disrupting a military alliance. But if we are to judge by the events taking place in defeated countries and in liberated countries there is not much comfort to be extracted from this argument. On the one hand we have the spectacle of defeated countries not only changing their official ideologies after defeat but on the strength of these new ideologies changing sides in the war ; and on the other we can plainly observe in liberated countries that parties differing in their political and social allegiances are, given the opportunity, ready to proceed to civil war in order to secure their respective ends. If sovereign states can be split in this way, what likelihood is there that a military alliance can be maintained in the face of opposing ideologies ? It may be that despite all these difficulties the alliance can be preserved ; but to judge from the history of past alliances it is to say the least of it a gamble. It may also be that a peace plan calling at the same time on organized forces of aggression and on much more weakly organized forces of love is the only way in which peace-intervals between wars can be extended. It is certainly an old formula but so far it has not succeeded in preventing war. To depend on it is to embark on a gamble that can only be justified by results. If in the course of time it should fail, historians will be justified in claiming that all the

elaborate effort expended was in effect a preparation for the next war.

If there is any moral to be drawn from the study of war-aims and of peace projects it is that treatment without accurate diagnosis is merely a method of trial and error, and that accurate diagnosis without an investigation of causes is largely a matter of luck. In the first of these essays (written in 1931) I asked : " How many millions are spent by the League of Nations or at the instigation of the League on psychological research into the nature of war impulses ? " The answer was, of course : " Not a penny is spent by the League on immediate investigation of war phenomena : not one country in the world spends a sou on investigating the psychological phenomena and motivations of war. On the other hand, hundreds of thousands are available for research on cancer, leprosy, measles, foot-and-mouth disease, wheat rust, the boll weevil, the death-watch beetle and sundry vegetable saprophytes." ¹ On that occasion I commented that in this paradox we had a curious example of the uneven functioning of self-preservative impulses ; yet, after a lapse of fourteen years and the passage of a second world war, I can see no sign of any change of policy in responsible quarters. Heaven knows psychology is still a fallible instrument, psychologists themselves still more fallible in their use of it. But they do try to the best of their ability to apply the known principles of their science to the solution of human problems. If they fail to find a solution at least they fail honourably. In the meantime our politicians, undaunted by an endless and humiliating story of absolute failure, continue their labours with an unruffled faith in the rule of thumb. This state of affairs can be tolerated only on the assumption that war can never be eradicated, in which case it doesn't matter whether politicians build a new *Palais des Nations* every thirty years or whether they hang up anti-war charms on rhododendron bushes. But if we take even the bare view that it is worth while trying to find out whether wars can be prevented,

¹ See pp. 12, 13.

there is no excuse for rule of thumb. On the grounds of probability alone we are justified in the belief that some entirely new method of approach to the problem is essential. In my opinion Freud's discovery of the unconscious mind provides us with a new method of approach. To say the least of it any investigation of the subject which neglects to correlate war phenomena with primitive infantile phases of unconscious mental development can end only in futility and frustration.

CHAPTER XIV

Homo Sapiens

THE RENASCENCE OF PACIFISM : ARGUMENT FROM GUNPOWDER

THE RENASCENCE OF PACIFISM

SHORTLY after the last of these essays was written the war with Germany ended in the victory of the Allied Nations and a few months later the defeat of Japan brought the Second World War to a close. These events have once more demonstrated the validity of two propositions one of which is, to say the least of it, extremely barren and the other quite terrifying. In the first place it has been re-established that, given adequate leadership and a reasonable amount of luck, the side that is stronger in arms and men is almost certain to defeat the weaker ; a proposition which, if not axiomatic, can at any rate be demonstrated with greater economy during a hand of bridge. More terrifying in implication is the fact that countries which since the end of the First World War have proclaimed themselves peace-loving by nature and pacifist by design, have waged a Second World War more effectively than countries with openly war-like ambitions. Already before the advent of the atomic bomb, there was no technique of destruction in the application of which the Allied Nations had not effectively surpassed their militaristic opponents. The use of the atomic bomb only clinched what was already obvious from the course of the war. Out-Heroding Herod, the 'pacific' nations have finally demonstrated that as far as war-readiness and war-capacity are concerned the difference between a 'war-like' country and a 'peaceable' country is only skin deep.

Having established these propositions to their own satisfaction, the conquerors now find themselves saddled with

the responsibility of making peace, or, more accurately, have arrogated to themselves the 'right' to make peace. Unfortunately the capacity to gain victory is no guarantee of capacity to make peace. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the task is one for which most victors are peculiarly unsuited. The more overwhelming the victory the greater the likelihood that the victors will inflict bad Peace Terms on the vanquished. There are two main reasons for this incapacity on the part of the winning side. The first and more obvious is that the victors, having halted the aggression of the enemy, are left with nothing to oppose their own fully mobilised and triumphant aggression. The likelihood is, therefore, that they will continue to vent this aggression on the enemy not only until the conclusion of Peace Treaties but so long as the more hostile clauses embodied in these Treaties remain operative. The second reason is less obvious, namely, that, by winning the war, the victors have shouldered an additional burden of war-guiltiness. Although it is difficult to measure the exact strength of such emotional reactions, it is safe to assume that this additional war-guiltiness equals the amount which the enemy by enduring disaster has, both consciously and unconsciously, liquidated.

But although, or rather, because this second factor is for the most part unconscious, it is all the more likely to vitiate the process of peace-making. People who suffer from unconscious guilt are always prone to ventilate it in the form of aggression towards an 'enemy.' They are also at pains to overcome their inner uneasiness by attributing *all* guilt to this same enemy. Similarly with victorious nations. Their preambles to 'peace-making' disclose a marked preference for pinning war-guilt on the defeated enemy and an equally marked disinclination to discover and, if possible, remove the proximate causes of the war. In the past this manifestation of unconscious guilt on the part of the victors has usually been followed after an interval by a tendency to expiate their victorious aggressiveness. This

has taken the form of whitewashing the actual war-guilt of the enemy and leads in turn to a relaxation of those clauses of the Peace Treaties that might conceivably have some value as measures of war-prevention. By so doing the victors make certain that sooner or later another war will break out, in which there is an even chance that they will expiate their former triumph in a decisive defeat. The whole process is usually described in retrospect as 'losing the peace'; and certainly there is no easier way of 'throwing away a victory' than by indulging undisciplined and aggressive guilt-reactions, following these up with equally irrational forms of expiation. The history of post-war movements amply illustrates the operation of these two factors and goes far to foster the belief that peace-making is little more than a preamble to the next war.

But it is vain to expect victorious nations to relinquish the spurious 'rights' they have bought so dearly; still more futile to hope that they will approach their self-imposed task of peace-making in that spirit of neutrality by which alone objective policies can be effected. Indeed it is already clear that in their first steps towards peace the Allied Nations are proceeding on the very assumption they so proudly set forth to combat; namely, that possession is nine points of the law, or, not to put too fine a point on it, that might is right. In principle the measures they have initiated fall into two distinct categories, while in practice they involve the application of three main varieties of technique. Analysing them, in the first instance, in accordance with their aim, it will be seen that some are apparently governed by the idealistic aim of establishing universal peace whilst others are directed towards the conclusion of peace treaties by which the enemy is first punished, then subjected to various controls and sanctions and finally compelled to make reparations which it is hoped will restore the damaged fortunes of the victors.

As far as technique is concerned it is not hard to distinguish between setting up a world-peace organization, representative of

all except the defeated nations and drawing up Peace Conditions to be dictated to the enemy by the victor nations. Even so there is an inevitable though fundamentally absurd overlapping of the two systems. For although the world organization will have little or no say in the actual war settlement, which will be dictated by the victorious allies, either independently or in dubious concert, yet this dictated settlement will determine the nature of the peace which the world organization will then be required to maintain and defend. Any serious and unsolicited attempt to modify this dictated peace will be regarded as a disturbance of the *status quo* constituting a threat of war. And this in turn will lead to a counter-threat of war levelled by the world organisation at the 'recalcitrant' nation or nations. In short the world organization from the moment of its inception will function with its hands tied behind its back.

But this is not the only handicap to successful function of the world organization. More paralysing is the fact that the United Nations Organization is to be run by a dictator group. As was indicated in the previous essay,¹ the victorious combatants have set up a cabal possessing the power of purse and sword. Nothing that has happened since Dumbarton Oaks has altered the plain fact that the United Nations Organization is for all practical purposes a cloak for a military alliance between the permanent members of the Security Council. The modifications of the Draft effected by the San Francisco Plan have not materially altered the balance of power. The day that military alliance is broken, and already the bonds that hold it together are becoming increasingly tenuous, the power of U.N.O. will vanish.

In any case peace policies are not exclusively determined either by the formation of world organizations or by meetings of Big Threes or Fives or whatever number of diplomats is necessary to represent the foreign policies of the victorious countries. Nor, despite the glare of publicity directed at these

¹ See p. 255.

methods, are they the most important techniques of peace-making? All the while the ordinary courses of secret diplomacy are running at speed. The main powers, with or without their satellites, are busy jockeying for position in the race to establish security and power either for themselves or for the special blocs in which they are interested. These diplomatic efforts are reinforced or, as the case may be, handicapped by more spontaneous movements occurring either in the smaller nations that have been involved in the war or in 'neutral' countries that are vitally concerned with the conditions of peace or again in former enemy countries, eager to re-establish some effective national status. The methods adopted vary according to circumstances. They include various revolutionary devices, not excluding civil war, by which the political and economic systems of the country can be radically altered, territorial 'rights' established, and political or economic alliances concluded with more powerful neighbours. The ultimate object of these movements is to confront the treaty-making nations with a series of *faits accomplis* which, it is hoped, will be accepted by the Big Powers and in due course given the support of the United Nations Organization, a body which, as we have seen, cannot in any case go behind the backs of the Big Powers. Indeed, in some instances, these apparently spontaneous movements are rather obviously inspired by the diplomatic activities of Treaty-making nations eager to secure decisive world power or at least to establish an effective balance of power between the larger blocs.

Once on a time this combination of secret diplomacy with spontaneous or inspired revolutionary movements was the accepted technique of peace-making, and although it is now overshadowed or masked by more 'idealistic' methods it still exercises the most potent influence on peace settlements. It draws its strength from the fact that political and nationalistic passions are skilfully mobilised and fused with the ordinary motives of peace-making. Its success depends on the possi-

bility that the Big Powers, being uncertain of their own strength and consequently reluctant to quarrel too openly before the Peace Conference begins, may, through timidity, lack of principle or a belief in bargaining, be ready to accept the arbitrary logic of circumstance. Anyhow it is significant that at a time when the desirability of establishing world peace has gained an immense amount of lip service and has secured expression in a world organization, the older methods of peace-making should have been brought to a pitch of feverish activity unprecedented in the history of post-war movements. It would scarcely be accurate to suggest that an open battle has been joined between, on the one hand, methods of secret diplomacy and revolution, which have so often been saddled with the responsibility for world war, and, on the other, idealistic methods that ostensibly aim at world peace. It is nearer the mark to say that the older methods are just as active as ever before and have already demonstrated their vigour by hamstringing the infant world-peace organization.

Whether or not the present world organization will prove to have deserved this fate is of course a matter of conjecture. All we can say at present is that compared with its ill-starred predecessor, the League of Nations, U.N.O. is more patently a dishonest organization. Officially dedicated to the promotion of world peace, it lends its prestige to the proposition that might is right and that, even if it isn't, those who won the last battle can, by virtue of this triumph, lay down the law on international morality. Both wittingly and unwittingly it supports the thesis that the ultimate cause of war is to be found in the bad behaviour of the 'aggressor' nations. This fundamental confusion or dishonesty has been manifested in a more extreme form in some of the measures taken by the victor nations to bring home to the defeated their 'delinquent' nature. Not content to deal summarily with such glaring and barbaric breaches of the accepted laws of war as were committed by Germany, and ignoring the fact that breaches of non-existing international

laws cannot seriously be dealt with as international offences, the Allied Nations have set up Courts, some of whose activities threaten to make them the laughing stock of posterity. No doubt it has always been unconstitutional to have an unsuccessful revolution, and it is true that successful revolutions soon acquire the odour of sanctity. But the punishment for the unsuccessful *coup d'état* is usually left in the avid hands of the counter-revolutionaries. The spectacle of a few nations, all of which have achieved imperialistic status, in one instance after carrying through a revolution of such ruthlessness that it actually served as a model to the Nazi regime, arraigning and sitting in judgment on the pre-war policies of Germany is, to say the least of it, unedifying. Nor does the levelling of charges of ruthless conduct of war befit countries that have evolved and used or benefited by the use of the most bestial weapon in the history of warfare. Equally unedifying are some of the *ad hoc* measures already employed against or in store for the defeated enemy. The unscrupulous annexations and lootings carried out by Germany are not very appropriately countered by measures of dismemberment and economic destruction initiated by the Allied Nations. There is not much distinction between slave-labour and forced labour. Two blacks do not make a white. The fact that the Allied Nations are also ready, mostly of necessity, to help set Germany on its amputated feet only serves to emphasize the fantastic confusions of thought and policy to which victorious nations are, it would seem, incurably addicted.

But it is not because their policies are confused and contradictory that the Allied Nations deserve so ill of peace-loving people at this juncture. The confusion is to some extent unavoidable in the transition from war to peace, and is due to the fact that the antithetical instincts of love and destruction are simultaneously operative. And it is in any case characteristic of states that their right hands seldom know what their left hands are doing. A similar incongruity is present in war-time, when love-impulses embodied in Red Cross organizations

operate almost to the fringes of the bloodiest battlefield. The peace-crimes of which the Allied Nations stand self-convicted are three in number: first and foremost, stupidity in the face of the defeated enemy, secondly, conversion to the ideologies against which they went to war, and thirdly, an impenetrable smugness which protects them from self-scrutiny. Having won the war and provided themselves with an unparalleled opportunity to apply the principles of peace to peace-making, the Allied Nations are apparently prepared to sacrifice it for the obsessive satisfaction of proving to the enemy that he shouldn't have gone to war unless he was certain to win it. They have thus lent their support to the ancient heresy that it pays to win a war.

ARGUMENT FROM GUNPOWDER

A minor consequence of the discovery that atomic energy can be released at will is that pacifists have enjoyed a temporary surcease of the perplexities induced by the Second World War and subsequently by the preliminaries to the Second World Peace. Having fulfilled the expectation¹ that on the cessation of hostilities they would renounce their recently acquired martial enthusiasms for a renewed and sanguine belief in the techniques of pacifism, and looking round for new arguments in support of these old techniques, pacifists have found the atomic bomb a positive godsend. Their line of argument runs as follows:—However fallible the methods adopted to secure world peace, they simply *must* be successful: with improvements in the manufacture of the atomic bomb it will be possible to obliterate not only capital cities, but large industrial areas, possibly even whole countries: civilization will perish: the human species may perish: there is therefore no question of fighting one more war: either we secure world peace or we face extinction in a last cataclysm: war has finally outlawed itself by

¹ See p. 131.

reason of its immeasurable destructiveness. We *must* therefore pin our faith on U.N.O. or whatnot.

Pronouncements of a similar nature have been made by politicians of varying complexion and nationality, have been echoed and amplified by responsible persons in every walk of life and have been taken as texts by journalists the world over. But to argue that because man-made dangers to life have achieved the status hitherto accorded to earthquakes, famines, floods, pestilences and other natural catastrophies, therefore wars *must* stop, and to seal this argument with the belief that wars can be prevented, either by methods that have already been tried without success or by methods that have not yet been tried, is to surrender oneself to a hopeful belief in magic. Man has always reacted to the more terrifying powers of nature with superstitious ideas and animistic observances. And although 'civilized' man flatters himself he has risen above savage superstitions, the conviction is not very deeply seated: his trust in the power of reason has been largely stimulated by homilies on the subject delivered by natural scientists, reinforced no doubt by a compensatory pride in his own common-sense. Under the surface, however, man still believes that the destructive forces of nature are directed by evil spirits. He does so because of a deeper (unconscious) conviction that his own primitive impulses are a power for evil that can be controlled only by rituals of expiation and sacrifice. It is only natural therefore that he should react with superstitious awe to the dangerous forces he has himself released and that the protective measures he envisages should resemble the magical systems by which primitive man seeks to placate his tribal gods. Even if our reason tells us that U.N.O. is a somewhat flyblown committee of professional politicians, our savage belief in the virtues of ritual delivers us to the obsession that it will act as a charm against war. Indeed it could be argued that the professed faith in reason with which civilized man hides his superstitious nature deprives him of some of the advantages of superstitious belief.

If civilized man were a little more openly irrational, if he really believed that he could by expiatory observance placate the new God, *Atom*, he might be more readily persuaded to sacrifice on the altar of World Peace those egoistic ambitions that lead to nationalistic aggression, a view which incidentally is held in a slightly more sophisticated form by most Christian denominations.

A clearer idea of man's reaction to the more dangerous of his own inventions can be obtained by studying the history of gunpowder. Some seven hundred years ago the explosive force of this compound was discovered and was soon exploited in the manufacture of firearms. Although by comparison with the development of modern high explosives, technical advances in the use of gunpowder were much slower, extending as they did over a century or so, the invention was from the first regarded quite simply as the work of the Evil One. Nevertheless its secret was carefully guarded and, once the difficulties of controlling the force of the explosion were overcome, inventors steadily applied themselves to the development of more and more deadly firearms. The sanguine belief entertained by some contemporaries that war had lost its charm was soon dispelled. The laws of chivalry had, it is true, sustained a severe setback, although it is interesting to note that they lingered on as laws of war, and were later officially resuscitated in Geneva Conventions only to receive an apparently mortal blow from the atomic bomb.

But however justly it can be maintained that pacifist reactions to the advent of the atomic bomb are based more on hope, fear and superstition than on a rational and realistic estimate of the possible consequences of the discovery, to confine oneself to this apparently defeatist comment would be merely exasperating to the reader. In any case the pacifist might well retort that if his premisses were translated into psychological terminology they would gain the support of a respectable number of psychologists who believe that changes in environmental

conditions bring about decisive changes in the function of the mind. And it cannot be denied that once an atomic bomb has been manufactured and loaded into a plane or any other delivery apparatus it becomes an environmental factor of some significance. Clearly then we are under obligation to examine the premiss that nations are now faced with a development of war technique sufficiently alarming or conscience-stirring to produce either a radical change in man's war-going nature or an effective and permanent means of war-prevention.

In favour of the view that such a change may come about is the argument that if an invention materially alters man's social situation or social codes, his mind is bound to adapt to this change in a way that will serve the interests of self-preservation to say nothing of implementing his ethical aims. The invention of soap, it is said, definitely altered man's social constitution. He was never the same again. A dangerous innovation, it is assumed, will *a fortiori* produce a more profound change. Man's sense of realistic danger has led him to avoid walking on live-rails, and since atomic warfare is a gamble with death in which the odds are no longer in favour of survival, there is no reason to suppose that he will not develop similar precautions. As has been suggested, support for these views can be drawn from psychologists belonging to the 'peripheral' schools, who believe that behaviour is conditioned by external factors rather than by internal (mental) patterns.

The 'central' school, on the other hand, recruited mostly from dynamic psychologists who believe also in the existence of the unconscious mind, do not subscribe to this view. According to them man's behaviour is determined by powerful instincts springing from the very core of his unconscious mind. The environment or periphery of mind merely provides him with means towards a central aim, namely, the gratification of instinct. Regulation of instinct also develops from within and although, on superficial analysis, social conditioning appears to be a true environmental factor, closer examination shows not

only that these social conditions originate in man's mind but that they operate only provided they secure the continued assent of his mind. The aspirant for suicide who finally decides against life may actually choose the live rail as a short cut to death. His realistic fears of electrocution are overwhelmed by internal and in most instances quite unrealistic judgments. According to this view an invention is merely a means to an end ; and although the atomic bomb happens to be an unusually dangerous means there is no guarantee that man will develop the same realistic precautions as in the case of electric cables. The instinct that favours locomotion by means of electrical energy is quite distinct from the instinct that favours the destruction of 'enemies' by means of atomic bombs. In the former case it is natural to avoid being electrocuted : in the latter instance it is natural to kill even if the process offers the risk of death.

As for the companion view that, even if realistic concern for self-preservation does not bring about a change of heart, man's conscience will make him stop short of practising atomic warfare in future, all that can be said is that, so far, the evidence points in the opposite direction. There is no reason to doubt that had the Germans been first in the field of atomic-bomb production, they would not have hesitated to use the new weapon as they used flying bombs and rockets. And they would have been taxed, by such survivors as were free to speak their minds, with a disregard of the laws of war and of humanity even more ruthless than the use of gas, the bombing of civilians or any other of the devices of total war. Fortunately for the prospect of the Allied Nations they were not first in the field. The deliberate decision to use the atomic bomb was in fact made and carried out by one of the Allied Nations, a country which has consistently paraded its idealistic desire to put an end to Nazi methods of waging war : in other words the exterminatory form of total war was put in action by a country which has displayed as sensitive a social conscience as any national group in

the world. This is in keeping with the view that during the past half-century and despite an apparent increase in the desire for peace, a consistent lowering in the social conscience of nations-at-war can be detected.

In this connection it is sometimes argued, as, for example, by Einstein, that the release of atomic energy has not created a new problem, that it 'has affected us quantitatively, not qualitatively.'¹ In the dynamic sense this is true enough. Man's instincts have not been altered by his inventions: in times of war he continues to behave like an infant who has found a box of matches in his cot and is quite capable of setting himself as well as the cot on fire. We cannot, however, assume with the same certainty that no qualitative changes have been heralded or initiated by the introduction of atomic warfare. It is true that, so far as we know, no profound change in man's nature has occurred since the development of exogamy, but it is always possible that some variations in human conduct may be the precursor of a qualitative change in mental function. The variation brought about by the use of the atomic bomb lies in the fact that by using it man has implicitly *abolished* laws of war that were intended to localize and restrain martial conflict. These restraints were originally derived from the animistic war-rituals practised by primitive man which, after undergoing various modifications, survived in the form of military conventions. But as man's conscious belief in superstition weakened, he lost the benefit of savage restraints. This process was accelerated by improvements in the technique of war, in particular the substitution of mechanical warfare for hand-to-hand fighting. The development of air-warfare merely accentuated modern man's tendency to disregard the established laws of war. So far from developing new conscience reactions to control aerial methods of distance-fighting, man suffered a regression of conscience which permitted young aviators to obliterate a town with the lack of compunction displayed by

¹ Einstein : *Atlantic Monthly*, 176-5-1945.

any housewife who pours a kettle of boiling water on an ants' nest. This regression has reached its lowest level in the use of the atomic bomb. Whatever may be said of earlier regressions such as the omission of official declarations of war, the inclusion of civilian targets on land and sea or the withdrawal of immunity from women and children, it can always be argued that these measures were merely incidental to new military forms, that the main aim of war remained the weakening or destruction of one armed force by another. Atomic warfare has completely altered this conception of war. The military machine has been supplanted by a civilian machine run by scientists. The last shred of dignity and heroism has been stripped from war. The substitution of codes of extermination for the rituals of war may not indeed represent a qualitative change in man's nature but it certainly represents a return to methods which, we may surmise, were sometimes practised by prehistoric man.

The violent regression to primitive standards that has now taken place is, incidentally, the only valid argument in support of the belief that atomic warfare will finally destroy civilization. Similar alarmist views have been advanced in the opening stages of all modern wars. And up till now it has been sufficient to say that civilization cannot perish so long as even small family groups of the human species escape extermination. Natural catastrophes apart, civilization cannot perish so long as the unconscious mental mechanisms that regulate human instinct are not radically altered. It cannot perish so long as the obscure phantasies of good and evil that dwell in the unconscious mind maintain their present balance. But there would certainly be a danger to civilization if man's group-life developed to such a stage of dissociation that codes of extermination could be practised at the same time as codes of world peace were preached. The greatest danger to the mental life of the individual lies in a simultaneous hypertrophy of conscience and regression of instinct to primitive forms. And although it may be argued that the group regression we are now witnessing is a necessary

step towards the abolition of war, that we cannot abolish war unless we abolish the martial laws which by sanctioning restraints also sanction war, we must make quite certain that this is not another variety of the now exploded rationalization that wars are waged to end wars.

At least, before jumping to conclusions on the subject, we ought to take stock of some of the more dangerous potentialities of our unconscious nature. No doubt the discharge of atomic bombs does not differ in principle or in motivation from snowballing. There has been no change in fighting methods since Cain threw the first stone with intent to kill. Nevertheless the actual and potential destructiveness of the atomic bomb plays straight into the hands of the Unconscious. The most cursory study of dream-life and of the phantasies of the insane shows that ideas of world-destruction (more accurately destruction of what the world symbolizes) are latent in the unconscious mind. And since the atomic bomb is less a weapon of war than a weapon of extermination it is well adapted to the more bloodthirsty phantasies with which man is secretly pre-occupied during phases of acute frustration. Nagasaki destroyed by the magic of science is the nearest man has yet approached to the realization of dreams that even during the safe immobility of sleep are accustomed to develop into nightmares of anxiety. The first promise of the atomic age is that it can make some of our nightmares come true. *The capacity so painfully acquired by normal men to distinguish between sleep, delusion, hallucination and the objective reality of waking life has for the first time in human history been seriously weakened.* For whatever may have been prehistoric man's estimate of the reality of dream-life, the conviction that dreams are 'true' has been regarded for a long time as a sign of insanity. Civilized man may still rejoice to find on waking that his nightly struggle with primitive instinct is 'only a dream,' but he wakes to find that his unconscious mind has stolen a march on him. Following the devious track of scientific discovery it has brought within an

ace of realization unconscious phantasies of catastrophe that are activated when the grandiose needs of the primitive ego are overwhelmingly frustrated.

But however disruptive these unconscious phantasies of wholesale aggression may be, it is unlikely that they would be dangerous to civilized man if they were not reinforced by unconscious interests of an antithetical nature. The danger about unconscious phantasies of destruction is not that they may break through to consciousness under their own impetus. Repression and the nightmare can usually be depended upon to perform their protective functions satisfactorily. The real danger lies in the hidden forces of masochism with which all human beings are endowed. As has been pointed out in the original essays¹ frustrated aggression can be usefully absorbed or cancelled out in masochistic phantasies or activities, thereby satisfying at the same time the needs of unconscious conscience. But if the masochistic forces are too powerful, there is some risk that man may satisfy his urges to bring disaster on others by enduring it himself. This is the real answer to those who hold that we will be so frightened or conscience-stricken at the prospect of atomic warfare that we will refuse to employ it. Our relative blindness to danger and our apparent lack of imagination and foresight in anticipating danger, can be adequately explained by this silent and unobtrusive factor of passivity. It was Freud's considered view that man's sadistic and masochistic instincts are both derived from an inherent tendency which impels living matter towards an inanimate state. The atomic bomb is a triumph for the Death Instinct and it remains to be seen whether the Life Instinct can stage an effective comeback. Biological probability would seem to suggest that the balance can once more be redressed. But man is fundamentally an irrational animal. He is perfectly capable of placing the rational powers he has so painfully acquired at the disposal of unreason. And this reduces the already luke-

¹ See pp. 38-41.

warm comfort that can be extracted from a study of biological probability. Other species abide the instinctual and environmental stresses that compass their destruction. Man alone is in the position to take an effective hand in the game of Life and Death. From this point of view the post-war antics of the combatant nations exhibit a degree of purposeful irresponsibility that is more bizarre than anything to be observed in a madhouse. It is for the reader to decide according to his predilection whether the feeble efforts now made to plan for peace are dictated by a realistic estimate of the forces to be overcome or whether they are in the nature of placebos intended to beguile our pacifistic illusions in the interval before the next war. Whichever conclusion he may arrive at he has the dubious satisfaction of knowing that in our present state of ignorance of the unconscious causes of war one man's opinion is as good as another's.

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