TEXT FLY WITHIN THE BOOK ONLY

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_164897

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OUP—880 -5-8-74—10,000.

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 110 / 114 Accession No. 1.69.28

Author Halstone, V.

Title Pathway to ... dy ... 1926

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below.

THE PATHWAY TO REALITY

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

THE REIGN OF RELATIVITY

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMANISM
AND OF OTHER SUBJECTS

THE CONDUCT OF LIFE
AND OTHER ADDRESSES

HUMAN EXPERIENCE
A STUDY OF ITS STRUCTURE

UNIVERSITIES AND NATIONAL LIFE. THREE ADDRESSES TO STUDENTS

HIGHER NATIONALITY
A STUDY IN LAW AND ETHICS

All rights reserved

THE PATHWAY TO REALITY

BEING THE GIFFORD LECTURES
DELIVERED IN THE UNIVERSITY
OF ST ANDREWS, 1902-1904

BY

VISCOUNT HALDANE

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET

VOL. I. *first issued* 1903
VOL. II. *first issued* 1904
First Issue in One Vol. 1926

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
OLIVER AND BOYD, EDINBURGH

PREFACE TO THE NEW EDITION

THIS book has been out of print for some time, and a desire has been expressed for another edition. It is now reprinted just as it stood, but in one volume.

Although, since the *Pathway to Reality* appeared, I have published the *Reign of Relativity* and a still more recent work on the *Structure of Human Experience*, I have not parted from the standpoint and conclusions of the earlier book. Its substance has been elaborated, and new material has been incorporated in the later volumes, but the original plan remains what it was. The *Pathway to Reality* consisted of Gifford Lectures delivered orally, and in consequence the form is less abstract than that of the later books. For the lectures were delivered to a mixed audience at the University of St Andrews, and the language in which they were spoken had to be as popular as was practicable.

It is partly for this reason that I have ventured to republish these lectures. There is a freshness in their language which belongs to a time when I was younger than I am now, and they form an introduction of the study of Idealistic Philosophy

easier to follow than what is usually found in more formal treatises. If there is ground to which they do not extend I hope that it will be found to be covered in the subsequent books, which include one on the *Philosophy of Humanism.*

Philosophy has not stood still of late years either in this country or abroad. After the period of the great German Idealists who were the contemporaries of Goethe, there came reaction towards views in which the nature of the real was again held to be of a self-subsistent order, and to be no mere form belonging to intelligence. One of the most acute and thorough among the critics in Germany of Idealism, was Lotze. He was a thinker who exercised over philosophers a profound influence, although his books, even the *Mikrokosmus,* were too technical to penetrate the public. For him experience discloses that general conceptions have for us entered into its constitution. But it discloses not less that there is independent reality that enters into it and that is simply apprehended.

Much of the most important of Lotze's contributions to the history of philosophy consisted in his refashioning of Logic. His work here was of a thorough order, and its influence was great. English writers like Bradley and Bosanquet obviously drew inspiration from his work. He also brought up Idealism with a searching question as to the extent to which what was independently real entered into our experience. But Lotze

turned out in the end to have accomplished criticism of a high order rather than construction. Despite the number of the thinkers whom in his own period he influenced he has left no school. Philosophy owes much to him but not any standpoint that has proved to be permanent as well as fresh. His was a great personality, but its influence has passed into other forms of thought, not only in Germany but here and in the United States. It led to a retesting of the thesis of Idealism and to the work having to be done over again. But those who have done it once again, like Bradley and Bosanquet, have so far, like him, left no definite body of adherents to their system. I had the privilege of being a student under Lotze, and of knowing him personally and how great he was.

Despite the fresh mode of approach which New Realism and the Cambridge and American schools have brought about, the influence of Idealism still remains, and it has to be seen whether we are in fact outside its doctrine that knowledge, more fully conceived than Kant conceived it, is not in truth completely foundational to experience.

I thought so when I first published the *Pathway to Reality*, and, after more than twenty years of further reflection, I think so still. The principle of Idealism as it is now understood gives a further significance to the immanence of mind in the real world, and I do not believe that either the special

branch of science called Psychology or the advance which unquestionably has been made in Logic touches the fundamental principle itself. The book now republished was an introduction, as far as practicable in a form which any educated person might understand, to Idealism in its modern significance, and it is reprinted as it stood in the hope that it may still prove of some use to those interested in philosophy. For those so interested are numerous, more numerous than is popularly supposed in a time where specialised occupation, practical as well as theoretical, is the feature of the day.

The book is, as I have said, intended to be an introduction to the study of Idealism. The lesson it seeks to teach is that in the interpretation of experience recognition is required of Art and Religion as being as much part of reality, and as playing as great a part in it, as does abstract thinking. On no other footing does it seem possible to comprehend the significance of God as immanent in our minds. Apart from such a doctrine the reality of the World, even as we who are finite beings know it, seems to me to be in the end unintelligible. If I were to try to put in a sentence the result of this book it would be to describe it as the justification for reason of the passionate faith in an immanent God impressed on the world in the "Last Lines" of Emily Brontë.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE TO BOOKS I AND II . . . *Page* 1

BOOK I

THE MEANING OF REALITY

LECTURE I . . . . . *Pages* 3 *to* 33.

The purpose of Lord Gifford in founding his Trust may be taken to have been to promote a *thinking* consideration of the nature of God and of His relation to the world.

To such a purpose objection has been taken on the ground that there is no way of applying a scientific criterion of truth, such as we possess in the chronometer, or the balance, or the measuring rod. But criteria of this kind have only a limited application. We cannot apply them to art, or to morals, or to history, or even to the simplest conception of development in the region of life. Truth must, therefore, have a wider meaning. The test of a conception must be, not mere conformity to some external standard, but adequacy to the facts which it has to explain. The history of philosophy is no mere record of hypotheses rejected successively, but the history of a development in which criticism has succeeded to construction and again construction to criticism. God cannot be defined as less than the Ultimately Real, in terms of which all else can be expressed, while it cannot itself be expressed in terms of any thing beyond. The development of the theory of Ultimate Reality is the history of metaphysics. Sometimes the work has been merely negative or critical, as with sceptics like Hume. At other times it has been constructive, as with Aristotle and Hegel. But through it, if

we confine our attention to the product of the great minds of philosophy, we may observe the evolution, in ever deepening form, of a single conception of Reality. This conception is conditioned by the materials which the Time-Spirit provides. The task of these Lectures will be to answer the question: How, in the commencement of the Twentieth Century, ought we to conceive God? We may, of course, find that Ultimate Reality bears no analogy to what is meant by "God" in common parlance; but, if God cannot be less than the Ultimately Real, a good deal of what is obscure is got rid of at once. It is plain, for instance, that the Ultimately Real cannot be described as a First Cause, for the relation of cause and effect is a relation which can obtain only within the forms of Time and Space, and these forms may turn out to fall within the Real, instead of conditioning it. Nor can God be defined as Substance. The deepest and most fundamental of all relationships appears to be that of being object for the subject. Even the existence of a Universe of mere matter and energy could have meaning only for the mind of a fully equipped spectator. For a lizard it might seem something different from what it does for us, and for an angel something not less different, but in another direction. We must try first of all to get at the meaning of subject as distinguished from substance, for this appears to be the wicket-gate to the pathway to Reality.

LECTURE II . . . . . *Pages* 34 *to* 60.

Yesterday we made a first and tentative step, which took us only a very little way. We rejected the conception of cause and also that of substance, because they both fell within the limits of being object for the subject. The subject is no substance. For substance means the thing as distinguished from its properties, an abstract inert identity, a mere point of view in experience. Subject is more akin to life than to substance. For in life we have the whole existing, not as distinct from its parts but in and through them, and this notwithstanding their apparent externality to each other—but in the thinking of the subject we have more than this. The

great advance made by Aristotle as against Plato was to show that thought did not exist apart from its object, any more than the object existed apart from the thought *for* which it was object. He showed that the universal existed in and through the particular, and that, not less, the existence of this particular was in and for the universal. It was for him only by abstraction, legitimate only provisionally and for special purposes, that the individual object in experience could be broken up into universals of thought as operating on particulars of sense. This has been the view of modern metaphysics since the time of Hegel, who first taught people to understand Aristotle. So far as Mill's doctrine of the nature of the real as consisting in a system of permanent possibilities of sensation goes, he is at one with this teaching. He shows that a mere sensation, if it could be conceived, would not only be a vanishing quantity, but would be indescribable. We have none of us experience of our neighbours' sensations, nor can we even reproduce our own past sensations for comparison. We compare properties, universals, which are the outcome, when abstracted, as abstracted they are at every instant of our lives, of thinking and not of feeling. The system according to which we think, and in which our feelings are set, is objectivity, and on this system depends our conception of truth. Through it we get our notions, not only of our neighbours, but of ourselves as individual intelligences and personalities. Thought is free to determine itself, and to choose the conceptions under which, and the standpoints from which, it will abstract. The hard-and-fastness of the world of experience which confronts us is the outcome of the selection—unconscious, if sufficiently the outcome of habit—of particular conceptions and standpoints. Of this the stereoscope, the hypnotised subject, and the madman may be taken as examples. Their world is for them apparently immediately there. They have in it the sense of satisfied meaning, and search for certainty. But their worlds are untrue in so far as they conflict with the general system of experience, and not from any want of the power to produce conviction. The commonsense standpoint appears to combine this power of producing conviction with compliance with the system in which men and women agree in thinking in experience. The hardness-and-fastness of that experience

is the outcome of common conceptions and standpoints under which commonsense has abstracted and hypostatised its abstractions. The aims, nature and meaning of these abstractions we must examine as the next stage of the journey along the pathway to Reality.

LECTURE III. . . . . *Pages* 61 *to* 89.

The dilemma put is that either things make thought, or thought makes things. Berkeley and Mill have shattered the first alternative; but the second is just as absurd, if it means that *I* make things. There must be a rational explanation of the fallacy of solipsism. The dilemma on which it rests is really founded on a false metaphor. When we speak of "making" or "constructing" we are dragging in the notion of processes in time and space, and this is out of the question, for time and space are general relations which have to be accounted for as much as anything else. Further development of the topic of last Lecture, the true relation of universal and particular. Mind, the subject, is not a *thing* operating *ab extra* in the construction of experience. Divest the object world of experience of the incrustation of bad metaphysics which has arisen through the standpoint of everyday life being taken as a guide to more than what is true for practical purposes, and the difficulties become gradually lessened. The "window" theory of mind must be rejected, whether we approach it as physiologists, or as psychologists, or as metaphysicians. The notion of the self as a *thing* is a derivative and secondary one, and is not adequate when we are inquiring into the foundations of the system in the course of which it appears as such. Kant was infected with a point of view which is of great practical utility in psychology, but only provisionally valid, the point of view from which knowledge is assumed to be capable of being laid on the dissecting table and broken up into faculties and separable elements. Modern psychologists like Münsterberg have carefully pointed out that this hypothesis is to be made use of only for strictly limited ends, and is a source of error when the inquiry is into the nature of reality. The teaching of Aristotle ought never to be forgotten.

LECTURE IV . . . . *Pages* 90 *to* 114.

Having 'got rid of the "window" theory of the mind, and of the notion of separate faculties of intelligence, we must inquire what the true nature of experience is. It is not put together out of atomic sensations, for these are what they are only in so far as thought in universals. Their *esse*, like all *esse*, is *intelligi*. Experience is rather to be conceived as a living and indivisible process, in which the activity of intelligence proceeds from the indefinite to the definite, the organisation by thought of an ἄπειρον, which has no meaning except as a stage in the entirety of experience. Experience itself, the content of consciousness as immediately present to us, is permeated in every supposed element by the universals of thought, and has no meaning outside of or apart from these universals. It is within this field and through these universals that we frame our distinctions and evolve the notion of the *thinker* as distinct from what is thought, a distinction which cannot be adequate for the purposes of the ultimate view of things. I can form no *picture* of myself as distinct from its manifestations, from my body, my history and relationships. I can, it is true, by a process of abstraction eliminate each of these in turn, and get further and further towards the notion of the pure subject in knowledge; but as I do this I recede further and further from what, as a plain commonsense person, I mean by myself. For practical purposes I know well enough what I mean by myself, but this does not help in metaphysical inquiry when these purposes are neither in question nor relevant. The true view of experience would seem to be that it is for us what it is in all its complexity as the result of habitual reflection at many and different standpoints—scientific, ethical, æsthetic, religious, etc., at each of which abstraction and hypostatisation take place under different conceptions or categories, adopted because of the purpose or end to be realised in each case. The ultimate nature of reality can only be found when these conceptions and categories have been carefully criticised and their limits ascertained. When we have understood that the different aspects of nature, such as mechanism, life, etc., are the outcome

of abstraction under different categories, we perceive that there is no conflict between the results of the sciences, and that we have no title to reduce, *e.g.*, life to mechanism, and so contradict the commonsense of the plain man, for whom, because he does not abstract and define in the same fashion, these standpoints easily co-exist. Thus our belief in the reality of the world as it seems may be restored to us, and we may come to see that the way to get at the nature of reality is by thinking experience at the highest of standpoints. In this way the conception of experience as containing *degrees* of reality becomes a legitimate one.

LECTURE V. . . . . *Pages* 115 *to* 139.

The outcome of the preceding Lectures may be expressed in five propositions:—

1. That activity of intelligence which we mean when we speak of the subject is not like the motion of a mechanism and cannot be described by the analogy of cause and effect. It is the self-determination of reason which acts on rational grounds, and which can detach itself even from the most formidable phase of experience, and abstract freely even when confronted by its own negation, such as is pain.

2. The organisation of experience into a world is the result of the purposes and standpoints which reason adopts. That world may be quite different for the inhabitants of Saturn and Jupiter, if they have different senses from ours and different social relationships. They may bring into clear consciousness and hypostatise as hard and fast appearances from which they cannot get away in their daily existence, phases which are unknown to us; and they may be unconscious of phases, *e.g.*, those which depend on the sense of colour, which are for us omnipresent. What must be common to them and us are, however, the universals of reflection. For these not only have no locality in the time and space for which they form the very conditions of possibility, but apart from them we cannot conceive rational beings at all. Without them even scepticism were impossible.

3. It is thus rather in ends than in causes that we must seek the explanation of the world as it seems.

4. To all of the phases of this world as it seems must be ascribed reality, but degrees of reality differ, and are higher the more fully they manifest themselves as pertaining to the standpoint at which the world is presented as the outcome of thinking rather than of feeling.

5. We could not, even if we would, *deduce* the universe, or present it in terms of universals or thought relations. The idea of doing so comes only from our not having got rid of the notion that thought is some faculty of a thing, and that perception is a process in space and time. The self conceived as a thing is only a secondary and derivative conception. *That* the Universe should be there is the very condition of self-consciousness. We can disentangle in reflection the general nature of *what* it is. But thought no more makes things, than things make thought. Each contrasted with the other is a mere abstraction. Aristotle and Hegel have both sought to exhibit the work of Reason in the constitution of the Universe, the pulsation of thought even in the *That*. But neither has endeavoured to deduce the Universe, nor could consistently have done so. Examination of the criticisms of Professor Pringle Pattison and Professor Royce.

LECTURE VI. . . . . *Pages* 140 *to* 165.

The view of the process of knowledge which has been developed in the last five Lectures goes beyond that of the older text-books of logic and psychology; but the modern view is closely akin to it. Modern writers do not draw the distinction between thinking and willing which used to be drawn, and instead of regarding thinking as a process of establishing relations between individuals or classes, they regard the development both of knowledge and of the soul as resting not on an atomistic basis, but on a process of determination of what is indefinite and abstract into what is more definite and concrete. The influence of Schopenhauer and Lotze has prevailed against the abstract view of intelligence which some of the disciples of Hegel took, but which was not taken by Hegel himself. At

the same time modern science has brought about great developments both in logic and in psychology. In modern text-books of logic we are shown how the individual mind builds up its world of reality. The judgment is the bringing of further definitions into the subject of the judgment, which is the *that* of reality, the qualification of the *that* by incorporating into it a further *what*. In modern text-books of psychology what is treated of are the events of a single soul considered merely as events that happen, *i.e.*, immediate experience taken as belonging to something that has a past and a future. These are limited standpoints, but they yield fruitful results, and in no way conflict with the attitude of metaphysics. Fuller consideration of the standpoint of logic and psychology, and transition to the standpoint of mathematical and physical science.

BOOK II

THE CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES

LECTURE I . . . . . *Pages* 169 *to* 188

Retrospect. A criticism of the conceptions or categories which we employ in the daily business of life is essential, if we are to avoid mistaking abstractions for reality. Such a criticism is certainly not less essential in Science. Illustration from Mathematics. The individual object in Nature, and Nature herself. Her broadest characteristic is the relation of Externality. The method of scientific investigation, and the relation to it of a criticism of categories. Character of a true "*Naturphilosophie.*" It must always be limited by the quality and quantity of the material which the science of its age has provided for it to work on. This was the difficulty which Hegel had to contend with when he tried to treat this part of his system. Yet a careful criticism of the limits of the categories employed in the various Sciences, and an examination of the relation of these categories to each other, are duties unavoidable by those who search after final truth.

LECTURE II . . . . . *Pages* 189 *to* 237.

Science comprises every branch of knowledge which aims at a better comprehension of experience by systematically considering its object under defined categories or abstract conceptions. Greatly as men of Science have benefited mankind, they have also, at times, terrified it by treating reality as if it must be brought under these conceptions to the exclusion of others. How this has happened we must now try to discover in detail by reviewing critically the procedure of various Sciences. Illustration of the fashion in which applied Mathematics abstracts from and ignores the real, as the price of its assistance in enabling us to calculate distance. The difference between the conceptions of Space and Time of the Geometer and the Physicist. That of the former is much more abstract and limited. The conception of quantity itself has two aspects—the discrete and the continuous. The second is the subject of the Infinitesimal Calculus, the notions of which seem to contradict those of ordinary Mathematics. The controversy between the disciples of Newton and those of Leibnitz about Infinitesimals turned on language mainly. Geometry as the Science of pure Externality can dispense with the conception of measurement. What is called Projective Geometry does so, and thereby gets rid of the assumptions which Euclid makes. Consideration of the Euclidean assumptions, and of the dimensions which it assumes to characterise space. Modern Physicists, like modern Mathematicians, tend to a more abstract procedure than formerly. They have eliminated the notion of Cause, and are trying to eliminate that of Force. But Physics must always be more than mere applied Mathematics, and consequently in practice it combines several standpoints, and is thus a composite Science. Difficulties arising out of the conception of action at a distance. Differences between the conceptions of the molecule of the Physicist and the Chemist. For the latter the molecule means the smallest mass into which a substance can be divided without changing its chemical nature. The Atomic theory is an artificial and abstract view of things, and no more than a valuable working hypothesis. The conception of the living organism is quite different from the conceptions of the

Mathematician and the Physicist and the Chemist. Commencement of the consideration of its nature.

LECTURE III . . . . *Pages* 238 *to* 278.

In the organism the leading features are totally incapable of reduction to these of mechanism. They belong to a different plane of comprehension, at which it is natural to have experience of a whole which does not exist outside the parts and yet determines their behaviour. The problem of "Abiogenesis" is founded on a confusion of categories. We can no more conceive an ultimate limit of life than we can conceive an ultimately indivisible atom. Both are fictions of reflection, and have and can have no place as individuals of experience. The inability of uncritical theorists to accept in its simplicity the experience of life as a whole existing *in* its parts, and these as acting in consequence *quasi*-purposively, gave rise to the old Vitalism. The notion of a special vital force was mechanical, and is now exploded. The cell theory: Johannes Müller and his work. The influence on biology of Schleiden and Schwann. Schwann's theory of cellular growth and his analogy of crystallisation. The "intussusception" difficulty. Protoplasm. *Quasi*-purposiveness apparent throughout. There is no real difficulty about the modern theory of Vitalism. It is the necessary outcome of the criticism of biological categories. Between those of mere life and those of conscious life there are intermediate conceptions, such as that of Instinct. To the explanation of these the categories of biology are inadequate, and still more so to the phenomena of the soul. The definitions of life by the philosophers and by the physiologists. Life is the co-operative action of the parts in a common course of development. The nature of the action of the organism in health and in disease. We cannot proceed further without the use of categories under which man appears in experience as a conscious and rational being.

LECTURE IV . . . . . *Pages* 279 *to* 312.

The individuality of a human being is incapable of resolution into any single aspect. The nature of Consciousness. The attempted regress in analysis to the self as mere subject. The relation of the categories of Consciousness to those of Life. Illustration from the case of the frog whose cerebral hemispheres have been removed. There appears to be between Consciousness and Life a borderland where action is *quasi*-purposive. The higher the stage of an animal in evolution, the more does its power of adapting itself to its environment, and of displaying intelligent action, accord with the development of its cerebral hemispheres, and appear to be distinct from the functions of the lower centres and the spinal cord. The phenomena of the soul are in close accord with those of the action of the cerebral hemispheres, but the soul is not a "thing," and has no "seat" there. It is the same real individual in another aspect. Definition of psychology. It is an abstract science which often transforms its object-world to suit its own standpoint. The nature of this transformation. The separation in psychology of thought and volition is artificial.

The examination of the categories of Science ends with those of psychology. Final retrospect. What has been attempted in the last four Lectures does not cover the whole ground, for it is only in the form of a system, such as Hegel sought to construct, that the full truth can be exhibited. Whether the truth can be so exhibited it is not necessary, for the purpose of these Lectures, to determine.

PREFACE TO BOOKS III. AND IV. - - - *Page* 315

BOOK III.

ABSOLUTE MIND

LECTURE I. - - - - *Pages* 325 *to* 360

RETROSPECT

Throughout these Lectures what has been meant by the word "God" is nothing short of the Highest and most Real. The images and metaphors of everyday theology are inadequate in an inquiry of the character prescribed by Lord Gifford. Ultimate Reality was, as the result of the first series of lectures, found to be Mind, and within Mind the whole of experience, possible as well as actual, was found to fall. In the course of the first part of the inquiry three things became apparent:— (1) Peril of going off the track through the use of metaphors; (2) the necessity for careful criticism of the limits and validity of categories; (3) the absurdity and self-contradiction of the notion that abstract thought could either be a product of things, or itself create them. Neither Aristotle nor Hegel sought to deduce nature from logical forms, though it is a common superstition to believe that they did. They held that self-consciousness was the ultimate fact behind which it was logically impossible to go; that it was no net-work of abstract universals, but concrete and living subject, not substance; that within it arose and were contained, as the outcome of its own distinctions, the entire universe of thought and things. For them this ultimate reality was individual, unique, and singular, as an ultimate fact must be. Outside of it nothing could, with any intelligible meaning, be said to exist, and within it the two

aspects or moments of its nature as Intelligence, the universals of thought and the particulars of feeling, were separable in logical analysis but not in fact. Among the further topics which must engage our attention are the question in what sense mind so conceived can be described as a Person, and what is the relation to such mind of the finite forms in which self-consciousness appears—*e.g.*, in man.

LECTURE II. - - - - - - *Pages* 361 *to* 392

Further examination of what is implied in self-conscious mind. Metaphors more than usually out of place here. To call mind a "thing" is utterly wrong. To call it "subject" is better, but is still misleading, for the distinction from the object, though essential for self-consciousness, is made by and falls within it. Again, to look upon mind as resoluble into feeling, out of which what is higher has become evolved by differentiation, is for the purpose of a metaphysical inquiry quite insufficient, for such evolution presupposes time, and time has itself to be accounted for. Nor, as we have already seen, can it be described as a system of universals, for, as Aristotle showed, such a system is nothing apart from the particulars in which it realises itself. It must be described in terms of itself, as a final and unique fact, the nature of which is to be disclosed only by the study of its own movement. The meaning of "finiteness" in relation to the self. Comparison with Berkeleianism. With the rejection of the conception of mind as substance, solipsism becomes meaningless, for it is apparent that to try to think of a finite self as the ultimate form of reality is to try to think what is self-contradictory. The forms of finitude are the outcome of the limited ends and purposes by which our intelligence is in everyday life dominated. Meaning of Understanding as distinguished from Reason. Illustration from space and time. The categories of thought are the forms of Reason, and they constitute a system in which each link logically implies every other link. The whole system is implicit in and presupposed by the earliest link. From the days of Plato onwards the method of the greatest thinkers has more or less explicitly been to try to comprehend and set out the nature and interrelation of categories. Meaning and nature of Dialectic. The Hegelian "Notion" and "Idea."

The nature of mind is to posit itself in distinction, and to comprehend and pass beyond the distinctions. What is called Pantheism is a misunderstanding of the nature of God.

LECTURE III. - - - - - - - *Pages* 393 *to* 416

The result of the inquiry so far has been to insist, with Bradley and Royce, as against Green, that stress must not be laid exclusively on intelligible relations. But Bradley holds thought to be at once capable of raising the problem of reality and incapable of adequately solving it. His reason is that to him thought appears to be relational or finite. It is difficult to see how his scepticism can escape from the reproach of inconsistency. For if thought is adequate to the comprehension of its own limits, it must be able to go beyond these limits. Royce's work is valuable because of his insistence on the concrete and ethical character of the activity of intelligence. But it is open to the criticism that it is only in the *systematic* exposition of its own forms that intelligence can at all adequately set forth its nature as the ultimate reality. Notwithstanding the freshness of Royce's method, it therefore appears to be unsatisfying. One is driven back to the Hegelian system, not because one believes that it contains the final word, but because of its unflinching thoroughness. The value of Hegel's attempt at a dialectical explanation of the relationship of the distinctions which self-consciousness makes is that it leaves no gaps. He declared that all that is actual is rational, and all that is rational is actual, and, again, that the spiritual alone is the real, but he certainly did not mean that nature could be displayed in terms of intelligible relations. He insisted, on the contrary, that the appearances which make up the realm of nature have the characteristic of contingency and foreignness to reason, and he explains that this is so because the system of these appearances is a system of abstract separations, made by intelligence dominated by purposes which do not lead to full comprehension, and which operate under finite forms of thought. So far from being rational, nature is rather for him unreal, excepting as comprehended at a higher level than that of thinking under finite forms of self-consciousness, a comprehension which would change its appearance. Such a line of criticism leads back to the conception of God as the mind of

which ours is a manifestation on a lower plane. The Hegelian Logic is no ordinary logic, but the system of categories in which the notion, the characteristic movement of thought, displays itself. This system, as exhibited in the Logic, is but one aspect of Ultimate Reality, of the Absolute Mind, and it is reached by abstraction. The philosophy of nature deals with another aspect which is abstract in another way, and is the outcome of intelligence operating after the fashion of the understanding, which separates and isolates, as in the forms of sense perception, in space and time. The standpoint of such particularism is the outcome of abstraction, and, like that of the Logic, finds its correction and completion in the self-consciousness of concrete spirit, which is described in the Philosophy of Mind.

LECTURE IV. - - - - - - - *Pages* 417 *to* 438

It is the elusiveness of the subject-matter that makes philosophy difficult. Hard thinking is the only instrument with which we can break through the misleading images and metaphors of daily use, misleading because they furnish views which, while sufficient for the purpose in hand, and in that sense representative of truth, are inadequate for those who want light on the nature of Ultimate Reality. Art and religion demonstrate the fact of this inadequacy, and, after all, the difficulty appears in the same fashion in other studies—for example, those of the higher mathematics. Having found that the apparently hidden nature of Reality is self-conscious mind which contains within itself all the appearances which go to make up the world as it seems, we have now to ascertain how and why it is that the distinctions exist to which these appearances at their various grades are due. That self-consciousness is the final form of mind cannot be doubted, for the very doubt really implies the principle as its basis. To speak of absolute mind as unconscious is to use words without meaning. In some sense, accordingly, God is a Person, and we have to inquire in what sense! The fact of self-consciousness implies a distinction of subject from object, of self from not self. The nature of mind is to make distinctions and to exist in and through them. It is no inert *simultaneum*, but, as Aristotle long ago pointed out, is active reason, life and more than life, intelligence which com-

prehends, and in its comprehension is present in every form of the content of its self-consciousness. The end which determines its activity is the end of making itself explicit to itself, and this end seems to be implicit even in the lowest forms of mind. In its lower forms, as mere understanding, mind lays stress on the reality of its distinctions and the self-subsistence and isolation of what is distinguished. In its higher forms, as reason, mind interprets and comprehends what is distinguished and the acts of distinction as having meaning only as links or moments in a series. Examination of the nature of time. Time is continuous just as much as it is discrete, and, when taken as a final form of reality, proves to be self-contradictory in its conception, and unreal in appearance. The meaning of the expression "comprehension *sub specie æternitatis*." The world as it must appear in the mind of God. The degrees of reality in appearance.

LECTURE V. - - - - - - *Pages* 439 *to* 464

In this lecture we must not pass by the next problem that confronts the inquirer, that of the nature of finite mind. The ground of finiteness lies in distinctions made within the Absolute Mind, whereby it appears as object to and other than itself. But these distinctions and what results from them presuppose, as their logical foundation, the notion of a mind that is absolute. It is a misconception of the teaching of Hegel to imagine that he identified the Absolute Mind with mind as it appears in History. For there the forms in which mind displays itself are never more than finite, *i.e.*, relative to what has gone before or is to come after. What we are dealing with is not the relations of substances derived from substance, but stages or planes in the comprehension of its own appearances by all-embracing mind. Indeed there may well be higher planes of comprehension than that which characterises the mind of man or the world-spirit, and such planes may yet be finite. Man is at once in separation from and in union with God, because the foundation of his existence is Intelligence, the essential characteristic of which is Dialectic, difference in unity and unity in difference. Thus man has a double nature, out of which arises for him, on the one hand, the consciousness of separation from God, or evil; and, on the other hand, the consciousness of potential union with God, or religion. Though finite spirit, man is none

the less spirit, consequently he is essentially free, and therefore *responsible*. The relational character of the finite, insistence on which is the mark of the understanding, and the quality of dialectic, because of which spirit, even though it be finite, has to distinguish itself from what is other than it, and yet to find itself in that other, is the explanation of man's relation to nature. It is also the reason why he appears to himself as emerging out of nature, and as one among many others. The doctrine of degrees of reality in appearance is important in this connection. It is because man, though spirit, is finite spirit, and because what is typical of his knowledge of his every-day world is the separation and isolation which the understanding seeks to make, that for his plane of comprehension the universe with himself in it appears as it does. As Hegel points out, nature cannot be taken as appearing to God in the abstract externalities of space and time, and indeed stands to Him in no direct relation, for the plane of appearance which is distinctive of it pertains merely to the finite mind of man. Nature is in the mind of God only in as much as the mind of man is comprehended as a degree in the absolute mind of God. Bosanquet's analysis of the relation of the "universal self" to the actual individual consciousness.

LECTURE VI. - - - - - *Pages* 465 *to* 492

The problem of the nature of God. Retrospect. In His nature there can be conceived no difference between Thought and Thinker, for we have passed beyond the category of substance. With Him to create must mean to think, and to think to create. Thus intelligence and volition fall together. Because self-consciousness turns out to be the highest of all categories, and to be the basis of all intelligence and therefore the presupposition of our reasoning about the nature of ultimate reality, God must be self-conscious. He must have ends which are realised in the mere fact of their being proposed. The character of His activity cannot be represented in images drawn from the world of appearance in space and time. Yet because His nature is to posit and realise Himself in forms which are the forms of otherness, in difference, and yet be self-identical, that nature cannot resemble the Spinozistic *simultaneum* of Pantheism, which lands us in a lifeless identity without difference. Here it is more than usually necessary to study

critically the categories we employ, and to guard against the anthropomorphism which is natural and comparatively harmless in other spheres of inquiry. Inasmuch as mind conceived as Absolute must be self-conscious, it must have an object through distinction of itself from which it is so. As it is all-embracing that object can be no other than itself, distinguished by itself from itself. It must be *for* itself, and comprehend itself in the utmost fulness—compare the *νόησις νοήσεως* of Aristotle, and his doctrine of the Active Reason. Because what appears for the mind of God as its other is just itself, that other is self-conscious, and because its essential characteristic is to be *for* God, to stand in relation to and depend on Him, it is *finite*, and the forms of its knowledge are throughout marked by finiteness. While potentially those of reason, they are actually those of understanding. Thus in the mind of man, which, like the mind of God, seeks to distinguish itself from its other or not-self, as the very condition of self-consciousness, there arises a world of appearances in relations of isolation. Space and time are fundamental among such forms, but nature presents many others less strikingly characterised by apparent irrationality and contingency, and these forms of knowledge ultimately turn out to be comprehended and to have their truth in self-knowledge, in which mind, having found nature to be only *for* itself, and thus its not-self to be really itself, is at a higher plane of comprehension than that in which nature is given. The forms of finite mind and the differences which are thus created have their value, meaning, and justification as stages in the dialectical movement in which Absolute Mind is conscious of, and so realises and enriches, itself. Without them God were not perfect. In Him they are comprehended and transformed. Only by the free choice of finite Spirit in selecting its ends have they assumed the aspect of hard-and-fast separation from God, and in the spirit that knows itself as one with Him and His ends this aspect is comprehended and put past. For the scope of the Divine Intelligence is not contracted by finite ends as is ours. Yet even in man such ends and purposes are not the only ones, nor are his comprehension and nature wholly limited by them. In Art and in Religion he passes beyond his finiteness. This is what is meant to be illustrated by such phrases as "Dying to Live." The medium of Religion is, like that of Art, not abstract thought. Religion is a practical matter; it belongs to the will and it expresses

itself emotionally, as a "new heart." It is the consciousness of a direct relation to God, but in forms that belong to the region of feeling, and are consequently describable only symbolically. Under its own forms it grasps the presence of God as here and now in the object world; it is the sense that He is immediately manifested, and this feeling is expressed in the symbols and pictorial manifestations of the creeds. The metaphysical theory is that Absolute Mind is conscious of itself in Another which is just itself, and that these, its two aspects, are only distinguishable by abstraction in the entirety of self-conscious Spirit of which they are the moments. This Christianity expresses in the well-known symbolical form of a Father who sends His Only Begotten Son into otherness, the world, to return to Him with the otherness overcome and the redemption of the world accomplished. Thus the doctrine of the Trinity, which is by no means peculiar to Christianity, embodies a profound truth. It is an analysis in symbolical form of the three aspects or moments in the self-consciousness of God, in Hegelian terminology, Logic, Finite Intelligence (including Nature and Finite Spirit), and Absolute Spirit; the realisation of the Universal and the Particular in the Individual. We are neither to confound Persons nor divide Substances. The Athanasian Creed, which owed its origin to the influence of Neo-Platonic metaphysics in the Church of Alexandria, has been too little appreciated. The analysis also throws light on the origin of evil, the responsibility for which rests with the finite spirit which is free to prefer the good. Because man can transcend his separation from God he is responsible. In order to be finite man he must be separated, and his duty is to overcome his separation. The choice of a higher plane implies the surrender of the self, with its particularism. Thus evil arises and is a necessary moment in the Universe. But it is in finite spirit that it arises, and, like nature generally, it stands in no direct relation with God. Because man is thus separate from God, and must surrender his finite nature in order to gain union with Him, he worships. The love of God is just the consciousness of the potential unity of the finite and the absolute self.

This completes the examination in outline of the theoretical aspect of the nature of Ultimate Reality. The succeeding lectures will deal with concrete questions which arise out of the relation of man to God.

BOOK IV.

FINITE MIND

LECTURE I. - - - - - - - *Pages* 495 *to* 522

As we have seen, the mind as human is finite; knows itself as known, and as known yet knows. It comprehends itself in time-distinctions, the characteristic of which is relativity. But even in presentation knowledge is aware of its own limits, and in comprehending transcends them. The recognition of beauty, however, is not abstract knowledge. It is in the immediacy of feeling that we are conscious of beauty, although it *is* only for the mind that is capable of thought. The object of Art must be *expressive*. The beautiful in Art is higher in its kind than the beautiful in Nature. Schopenhauer's view of music. The true meaning of poetry. Goethe on the study of Art. Art never really expounds abstract conceptions, yet the world as it is for Art is what it is in virtue of Reason, which shines, as it were, through a sensuous garment. The difference between the artist and the man of science. Kant's *Critique of Judgment*. Schiller and Carlyle. Beauty is the middle term between sense and thought.

LECTURE II. - - - - - - - *Pages* 523 *to* 547

In Art mind stands revealed to itself in sensuous form, but as freed from the trammels of finitude. In Religion we have a similar deliverance. Religion is a phase of the will, and belongs to the region of practice. As in the case of Art its certainty is immediate, and assumes the form of feeling. In Philosophy also the mind transcends the limits of the finite in comprehending them. But its medium is not concrete, as in the case of the other two. Its procedure is like that of the sciences, for it concentrates on that aspect of mind in which mind appears as an abstract system, and thus Philosophy gets

beyond the limits of what is immediate. One of its problems is the deeper meaning of the contrast between life and death. The aspects in which the self presents itself as body and soul belong to time, and are in their nature transitory. Explanation of this. For these aspects death is a necessary and natural part of their history. Illustrations of how death is natural in the case of animals and human beings. But this is only a part of the meaning of death. It has been said to be superseded in a higher stage of the reality of self-consciousness; consideration of this opinion. The antithesis between life and death is the work of understanding, and is not a final view. The real significance of what is called eternal life. Is it for us more than an abstraction? Consideration of this question.

LECTURE III. - - - - - *Pages* 548 *to* 575

It is clear that as subject the mind is directly conscious of possessing an infinite and non-sensuous character, and is continuously yielding up the particularity of its forms. This infinite quality cannot be exhaustively given in any temporal present, and hence, as expressive of the limit of that temporal present, the mind determines itself as realised in a future. In this attempt to present as a temporal picture the infinite quality of the mind, an antinomy arises, which, like other antinomies, can only be solved by a deeper and more thinking consideration. Reason why the difficulty does not arise in Art or Religion. The pictures of Art are symbolical. The faith which characterises the self-surrender of the will in Religion is a sense of reality above and beyond what is seen. In its doctrines of the eternal nature of the self and of degrees in reality Metaphysics teaches the same truth in scientific form. The true relation of spirit to spirit, and the meaning of Love in its highest and most general sense. The understanding can never solve the problem of another life, for it is hampered by a dilemma based on the finality of the idea of duration. A direct presentation of the unreality of death can never be accomplished in our picture world, and yet the recognition of that unreality is necessitated. For a higher degree of knowledge, though short of absolute knowledge, such recognition may present no difficulty. For ordinary knowledge it appears only in the symbolical representations of Art and Religion.

LECTURE IV. - - - - - - *Pages* 576 *to* 594

Characteristics of the doctrine of the mind of man as set out in the preceding lectures. The teaching of what is called "Spiritualism" has no bearing on it. Place of Spiritualism, as expounded by Mr Myers and others, in anthropology.

Survey of the ground covered in the twenty Gifford Lectures now delivered, and of the results reached. CONCLUSION.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

HEGEL FROM THE BUST IN THE HEGEL PLATZ IN BERLIN *Frontispiece*

ARISTOTLE FROM THE REPUTED BUST IN THE CAPITOLINE MUSEUM, ROME - - - - *Frontispiece*

GOETHE - - - - - *facing page* 315

HEGEL - - - - - *facing page* 438

BOOK I

THE MEANING OF REALITY

PREFACE TO BOOKS I AND II

THESE Lectures contain the outcome of meditations, extending over some years, about the meaning and nature of Ultimate Reality. My chief ground for hope about the conclusion arrived at is that in substance it has been arrived at long ago. It seems to me that the history of speculative thought, properly read, is no record of discordant hypotheses. It is rather the story of the elaboration of a great conception, in the building up of which, from time to time, construction has been broadened by criticism, and criticism has then been succeeded by more adequate construction. But the main structure of the conception has remained unaltered. Its foundations were laid, more than two thousand years ago, by Aristotle, and these foundations were uncovered, and the structure overhauled, by the great German thinkers who began to interpret Aristotle at the beginning of the last century. As the Time Spirit brings fresh materials with which to work, that structure will have to be again overhauled and added to. It is the legitimate work of ordinary mortals

to seek to understand and set forth the plan of the building, and this is all that I have tried to do. In a subsequent series of Lectures I hope to deal with the meaning of that plan for Conduct and Religion.

The Lectures were for the most part delivered *ex tempore*, of course with assistance derived from carefully prepared notes. I did not choose this form from any indisposition to find time to write. The reason was that experience in other vocations, of the difficulty of explaining remote and obscure issues to those whom I had to assist to grasp them, had taught me that one ought to watch one's audience, to follow the working of its mind, and to try to mould one's discourse accordingly. I did not see why this should not be as true of an Academic lecture hall as it seemed to me to be of other places. Whether I have been right I do not know. What is printed in the pages which follow is, at all events, just what the stenographer took down, with verbal corrections.

In conclusion, I wish to express my gratitude to my friend Mr Kemp for reading the proofs of the book, and for many suggestions made while it was passing through the press.

LECTURE I

THE purpose of Lord Gifford in founding these Lectureships may be said to have been to promote a *thinking* consideration of the Nature of God and of His relation to the actual world. He appears to have believed in the possibility of what Cardinal Newman called a "Science of God," and defined as "the truths we know about God put into a system, just as we have a science of the stars and call it Astronomy, or of the crust of the earth and call it Geology." *

Whatever conclusion we may arrive at as to the possibility of its fulfilment, this purpose of Lord Gifford was highly laudable. For everywhere we see the unhappy consequences which have followed the neglect of Faith to seek support from Reason. The Churches are to-day, in the commencement of the twentieth century, still very strong. The laity recognise them as the guardians of certain phases of human nature, which they hold to be real, and esteem as highly as ever. But although the organisation of the Churches, as practical agencies for raising and maintaining the

* *Idea of a University*, Discourse ii., 7.

level of conduct, is held in high regard, the authority of the Churches as exponents of a system of truth has sunk somewhat low. The majority of educated men and women, and, for that matter, the bulk of the people generally, pay to the creeds much less attention than was once the case. The creeds and confessions of faith have come to be looked on as containing a number of metaphors, suggestive in a vague fashion of something which their language does not adequately express. The progress of Science has caused this language in large measure to pass out of use in the daily discourse, even of the ministers of religion. Nothing in their sermons is to-day more characteristic than the absence of any attempt to place reliance on its propositions as a guide to theoretical truth. They seem to yearn for a region of scientific certainty towards which they turn their eyes, as though they felt themselves separated from it by a gap which they know they fail to span. The words in which Virgil, in the sixth book of the *Æneid*, described the figures standing on the banks of the Styx might have been spoken of them also :—

> "Stabant orantes primi transmittere cursum,
> Tendebantque manus ripæ ulterioris amore."

It seems as though nothing but Reason herself could span the gulf which Reason has made between the Church and the ground on which she longs to plant her feet with firmness and the assurance of having reached final forms of

truth. For the advance of Psychology in the last twenty years has shaken to its foundation the alternative of depending on that immediate certainty which is the foundation of Authority, and which has been the refuge of many admirable men and women. Of the genuineness of their conviction, and of the depth of their feeling, there can be no doubt. Of the value and validity of this conviction and feeling as a foundation on which to build a theory, there is unfortunately room for much doubt.

My distinguished predecessor in the Gifford Lectureship, Professor James, has published his Lectures in the form of a book which he calls *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, and in which he has brought the results of the most recent Psychology to bear upon the question of the nature and origin of religious faith. He has relegated the immediate certainty which rests on feeling to an origin, the comprehension of which he calls the most important step forward recently taken in Psychology—the hidden background of mental process to which we do not attend, and of which we are not even aware, the subliminal self which does not cross the threshold of ordinary consciousness. For its existence he has accumulated a great body of evidence. To it, to this subliminal self, he traces alike the phenomena of hypnotism, of neurosis, of the effects of nitrous oxide, and of religious emotion even in its highest form. He shows that the development of all

these is governed by the same psychological laws. The function, he says, of these invasions from a sub-conscious region must be permanent. Their peculiarity is that they suggest to the subject external control. When we try to get further than this psychological result, he declares that what he calls the "overbeliefs," the inferences which go beyond the facts, begin. So far as the facts go, they do not warrant disbelief in one infinite God, but they are just as consistent with recognition of a plurality of finite gods. "Thus," he says, "would a sort of polytheism return on us." At this point he stops. His book forms a powerful Critique of Pure Faith. It certainly is in danger of being put on the "Index" of any Church which bases itself on the appeal to right feeling as the foundation of its claim to authority.

In these Lectures I shall place no reliance upon feeling as such. Feeling would appear to become valuable only after it has been justified by thought, and not before; and I think the facts which Professor James has collected put that question very nearly beyond doubt. In the twentieth century in which we are living, it must be recognised that apart from the sanction of Science the foundation of a faith is impossible.

We have, therefore, to return to a thinking consideration of the nature of God in the spirit of Lord Gifford. If we are to find such a foundation, and would see the truth, we must not fear whither the pathway may lead us. We

must tread it if we can. All men, who are worth anything, feel that they have to know as well as to live, that to eat, drink, and make merry is not the end of existence. Most of them have at some period of their lives had the faith that somewhere there are bridges which span the gulf that separates and isolates the various phases of the world as it seems—that separates the conviction produced by the exact sciences from the conviction of the reality of those other regions of beauty, of moral worth, and of certainty in religion, which concern the same world as it seems when aspects wholly different from those of scientific knowledge are considered:—

"Thoughts hardly to be packed
Into a narrow act,
Fancies that broke through language and escaped.
All I could never be,
All men ignored in me,
This was I worth to God, whose wheel the pitcher shaped."

It is this sense of things unseen which is the motive of such an undertaking as Lord Gifford desired. This is the source of what Aristotle called "Wonder," and declared to be the beginning of all Philosophy.

Yet this sense of things unseen is of value, as modern Psychology has shown us, only if the effort which it arouses can justify itself scientifically. And therefore the question at once arises: Is there any hope—since we must turn to Reason—of finding in Reason the firm ground for which

we seek? For does not the record of the efforts of Reason, as set forth in the history of Philosophy, afford us the spectacle of system succeeding system, of hypothesis coming after hypothesis, only to be rejected and laid aside in favour of some new fancy? The affirmative answer to this question appears to me to turn on a very narrow view of the history of Philosophy, and to rest on a misconception of the nature of the standard of truth. There are some sorts of truth to which we can attain only by considering whether a conception which we have formed agrees with some external object or standard. For example, when we wish to test a conclusion about size in space or duration in time, it is necessary for us to resort to the balance, the measuring rod, or the chronometer. The standard in such a case is external, but an external standard is not the only test of truth. There is a form of truth which deserves the name just as much as the truth which measurement gives us, and that is the truth which we recognise in the perfection, say, of a great poem, of Shakespeare's Hamlet, of Milton's Lycidas, of Wordsworth's "Lines written near Tintern Abbey"—or the truth which we recognise when we say of a great picture that it is inevitably painted as it is, and not otherwise—the truth which we find when we look at the expression on the face of the Virgin in one of Raphael's Madonnas, the consciousness of her great calling as the Mother of

God, and the profound feeling with which that consciousness has filled her mind. Or take a sunset painted by Turner. There, again, we feel that to him Nature looked at that very instant as he has shewn her, and not otherwise, and that before us we have, in the deepest sense of the word, Truth. Or again, if we turn to the sphere of action, we find the truth in the conduct of the men who charged at Balaclava, and who preferred duty to life; in the justice of Aristides; or in the character of Socrates; or in the surrender of self to God as manifested in the life of Jesus; or in the suppression of the will to live as shown through the career of Buddha. In all these facts there is that which appeals to our minds, to reason as well as to feeling, as indubitably the truth, and the truth in a sense which compels assent just as much as did the results we arrived at when we applied the balance, or the measuring rod, or the chronometer.

In instances such as these, the test seems to be the completeness of what is expressed—its adequacy to the deepest conception in the light of which it can be judged. The test is certainly no measurement by a rigid external standard, and the critics of art and conduct fail if they do not recognise this.

Even in some departments of Science we find that the notion of conformity between an external standard and the conception to be scrutinised is insufficient. Take, for instance, what we have

in Biology, the development of a life. What does a true development mean? It is the development which fulfils the end or quasi-purpose of the organism. According as the development follows a course which leads to such fulfilment, we pronounce it to be true. Adequacy to an end is the test applied.

In Philosophy, in like fashion, a system is true only in so far as it is adequate to its subject-matter. The method of Philosophy, like the method of every sort of science, is hypothesis. When Newton said "*Hypotheses non fingo*," what he meant was that he did not make hypotheses except for the purpose of verifying them by experiment. So it must be with method in every department of knowledge. We first frame an hypothetical conception, and then, in the fashion which is appropriate, test it by applying it to the subject-matter. But the criterion of adequacy is not necessarily an external one. In Philosophy comparison by measurement is no more possible than it is in Biology, or in Art, or in Conduct. The adequacy of the conception is judged otherwise.

All inductive method begins by hypothesis, and accordingly in Philosophy the method is the evolution of a conception—a conception taken up and enriched and advanced at each stage by some great man, who tests in the light of facts the adequacy of what he has thought out. In the history of Philosophy you find true evolution, a

process in which criticism succeeds to construction, and again construction succeeds to criticism. There have been different rates of progress at different periods, and the form of the movement has not been always the same. Hume and the sceptics illustrate the negative or critical phase of it. Their work was to show inadequacies in current philosophical conceptions. But when you turn to men like Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel, you get the constructive phase. These are men who have worked out the great conception of the nature of reality a stage further, to be tested, to be examined by the critics, by the sceptics if you will, and as the result of that testing and examination to emerge enriched and a stage further on.

The process by which Philosophy progresses has been described by Hegel in the introduction to his *History of Philosophy* * in words which I will quote to you:—

"The World Spirit does not sink into the rest of indifference; this follows from its very nature, for its activity is its life. This activity presupposes a material already present, on which it acts, and which it does not merely augment by the addition of new matter, but completely fashions and transforms. Thus that which each generation has produced in science and in intellectual activity is an heirloom to which all the

* Hegel, Lectures on *The History of Philosophy*, Introduction, English Translation, p. 3.

past generations have added their savings, a temple in which all races of men thankfully and cheerfully deposit that which rendered aid to them through life, and which they had won from the depths of nature and of mind. To receive this inheritance is also to enter upon its use. It constitutes the soul of each successive generation, the intellectual substance of the time; its principles, prejudices, and possessions; and this legacy is degraded to a material which becomes metamorphosed by mind. . . . In this manner that which is received is changed, and the material worked upon is enriched and preserved, both at the same time. This is the function of our own and of every age: to grasp the knowledge which is already existing, to make it our own, and in so doing to develop it still further, and raise it to a higher level."

This description seems to me to be an accurate one of the movement of thought in Philosophy, and to give a view of truth which, if we are in earnest about it, will deliver us from the fear of not being able to advance towards the truth about the things with which we have to deal. For Hegel shows that the great problem of Philosophy has given rise to a conception which has developed as generation has succeeded generation, until we have got it, in our time, in a form adequate to the new materials which the Time Spirit has brought to us.

What we have to do is to try in our humble

fashion to grasp this conception in a form which is adequate to the commencement of the twentieth century. Many minds are at work upon this problem; the minds of very different men, but men who have like purposes. And the problem is one worth solving, for through the solution, even if the solution be such as is adequate only to the materials of the time in which we live, we may find, not only clearer ideas, but the way to rid ourselves, in Science for example, of a great deal of unconscious and bad metaphysics.

Whatever may be said against Philosophy as an instrument for construction, it is certainly valuable when we come to deal with the unconscious dogmatism into which men of science are apt to fall—I mean dogmatism in the sense in which Kant used the term. The truth is that in Science, as in some other things, we have every now and then to look for and lay aside our uncritical assumptions, to "clean our slates," and the cleaning of the slates is not always an easy or wholly agreeable process. But this at least is certain, that the aim of Philosophy can be no less than to reach a standpoint so comprehensive, so free from particularism and narrowness, that from it, with a clear light, we can detect and put aside the analogies and metaphors that are inadequate and therefore false. So only can we rid ourselves of the dogmatic assumptions, most of them unconsciously made, which obscure the view into the ultimate and inmost nature of Reality. Our

everyday experience implies a system of beliefs which, for the practical purposes of life, are necessarily and properly assumed to be adequate representations of the truth. But for Science and for Philosophy, both of which go beyond the phenomena of immediacy, and resolve their apparent finality, the individual resting-places of that experience disclose themselves as, in fact, no resting-places at all, but as transient, self-contradictory and self-abolishing. It is the task of Philosophy to unravel the reasons for this, and unless it can do so, it fails.

I shall try, therefore, to help you, with such light as I can bring to bear on the problem, towards the conception of which we are in search. I shall try to set out that conception in simple language, and I will begin by saying at once that the thought which I have to lay before you —what I may call the single thought which I shall have to lay before you — is no new thought. It is as old as the time of Aristotle, and what we have to do is to try to express it in the form which is most adequate to our age.

Such will be the aim and spirit of my endeavour. I must begin at the beginning, for I can only hope to have even a chance of carrying out Lord Gifford's purpose, by trying to work out the truth in a systematic form. Only at the end will the meaning fully emerge. At present the important thing is the foundation. The relationship of man

to God cannot be expressed in a sentence. It can only disclose itself in its proper place in a system of truth. It is one of the great difficulties of the philosopher, that, from the very nature of his subject-matter, he can never express things epigrammatically or succinctly; with him a systematic form is essential.

Well, two questions must confront a Gifford lecturer who seeks to try to give effect to Lord Gifford's purpose in the serious spirit in which it was meant. The first is: What do we mean by the word "God"? The second is: How, in the light that in the twentieth century philosophy has cast on Reality, must we conceive and speak of Him?

Now, as regards both of these questions it seems to me that people have embarrassed themselves with an assumption which has pervaded much of the speculation. In Goethe's story of *Wilhelm Meister* he tells us how Wilhelm, the hero, listened to a conversation between two characters who figure much in the book, Lothario and Jarno, and how, in the course of that conversation, something was said that struck the hero deeply and influenced the whole course of his life. Wilhelm had been longing for some remote sphere in which he might give free rein to his abilities and aspirations. He had thought of going to a foreign land, to America, to seek such a sphere of untrammelled action, but he learns from this conversation a principle which enters

into his very soul—that in the duties that lie nearest to him is the true Infinite, and that here or nowhere is his "America." Now, something of the kind, it seems to me, ought to be told to those, and they are many, who set out in the search after the nature of God as if its truth must lie in some sphere remote from the Here and the Now. People are always looking for some other and different world in which the balance of this one may be redressed. And yet that involves a dogmatic assumption which may turn out to be a profound fallacy. It assumes that this world as known by us, as in our everyday life it is taken by us to be, has appeared to us in the fullest phase of its reality, and that we have so entirely comprehended it that, as we do not find the notion of God within it, we may assume that this notion must be sought elsewhere. And yet it may be that it is just in the world that is here and now, when fully comprehended and thought out, that we shall find God, and in finding God, shall find the Reality of that world in Him.

The same sort of fallacy, the same sort of dogmatic assumption, manifests itself in such controversies as that about life and mechanism. People assume that the living organism and the machine are two things, not only quite different in their nature, but external to one another, like two marbles. But there remains a possible point of view which these controversialists seem not to

have thought out, the point of view from which mechanism and life disclose themselves, not as separate things, but as appearances from different standpoints, as different aspects of a single Reality. That is a view which we shall have to ask about further in the course of these lectures. For the present the only observation that can be made is that what separates mechanism from life, and makes the broad and vast gulf that seems to lie between them, may quite as well be the ends or purposes of the mind in organising its system of knowledge, as some absolute separation between the two. Just so it is at least possible that it may turn out that the view of this world, as a world in which God cannot be looked for, may have to give place to a view in which it becomes apparent that, seen at its highest, viewed from a different standpoint, and with fuller insight, this world may turn out to be but appearance and God the Ultimate Reality disclosing Himself in that very appearance.

Now the want of a comprehension of this point of view as a possible one, the failure to realise the dogmatic assumption which underlies its exclusion, has prevented people from understanding a great deal of what has been most notable in the history of speculative thought. If they had read and taken to heart the lesson, not of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* so much as of his *Critique of Judgment*, they would have learned something, the lack of which has made it im-

possible for them to read with understanding or sympathy the bulk of Greek Philosophy. They would have learned that the way in which the world seems to us depends on the standpoint from which we approach it; that our ends and purposes, consciously or unconsciously formed, determine the conceptions under which the organisation in knowledge of what we call experience takes place; that this experience is always relative and shifting in its signification. The Greeks used to teach this truth, and Kant rediscovered it. To those who are penetrated with it, it has seemed as if it was at least possible that we human beings, with our minds at the highest, might see and realise close to us something of the nature of God. There are even some, such as the Mystics, who have believed that like Moses of old, they might view Him; perhaps be blinded in the process; yet at least have found Him near.

We cannot go beyond our limits as human beings, beyond the conditions under which alone knowledge is possible for us. If we would rise above the plane at which the world of experience discloses to us the meaning that contents us in everyday life, it is to reflection that in the main we must look. For direct vision we can hardly hope.

Yet it seems that something more is possible than merely abstract reflection. Something of direct insight would seem to have come to great men, to great artists, to great poets. One finds

it in such lines as those of Wordsworth, when he speaks of the

> "Sense sublime
> Of something far more deeply interfused,
> Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
> And the round ocean and the living air,
> And the blue sky and in the mind of man;
> A motion and a spirit that impels
> All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
> And rolls through all things."

Ah! In the poets, when at their best, we have the discernment of what has been the last, and perhaps the highest, result of the greatest speculative thinking in the history of Philosophy.

Let us then rid our minds of this dogmatic presupposition which blocks the way. Let us set out on the search after the nature of God with our minds free. Let us begin by trying to get some clear notion of that of which we are in quest. To me it seems that by God we mean, and can only mean, that which is most real, the Ultimate Reality into which all else can be resolved, and which cannot itself be resolved into anything beyond; that in terms of which all else can be expressed, and which cannot be itself expressed in terms of anything outside itself.

But this definition, the only definition which is at all adequate, enables us at the very commencement to rule out a number of conceptions which have often passed current, but which have never been used without getting the people who

used them into difficulties. For example, you cannot talk of God, regarded as the Ultimate Reality, as a First Cause. That proves to be a totally inadequate metaphor, because cause and effect is a relationship that obtains and can obtain and have meaning only within the object world of experience, in the forms of Time and Space. Your problem is in point of fact directed to the existence and significance of that very object world itself. It is, in Kantian language, a transcendental problem. For it cannot be assumed that the explanation of Ultimate Reality can be found within the field of the object world, the nature and foundation of that field being one of the very aspects of things which falls within Reality. You cannot, therefore, speak of God as a Δημιουργός, as a Creator of the Universe from the outside. He cannot stand to the world in the relation of a Cause. For He must be independent of Space and Time, and we can attach no meaning to a Cause excepting as operative within Space and Time. We must reject that conception as wholly inadequate. Nor do we fare any better if we define God as a Substance. A substance is that which we know only in distinction from its attributes or its properties. The substance of that table is what I mean when I have abstracted from it in my mind all the properties by which I recognise it. Substance is a conception arrived at by negation, and has meaning in relation only

to accidents or properties. To define God as Substance would, therefore, be to define Him as something relative, and not in the deepest sense of the word real. We must go further down for our foundations. Now there is one conception which, provisionally at least, we may use, because it is the one that does go deeper than any of these — the conception of God not as Substance but as Subject.

Let me try to make clear to you what is meant by the expression Subject. Supposing the Universe could be traced back to a point at which we were contemplating it as matter in a gaseous form at some enormous temperature, ready, in course of time, to evolve itself in accordance with well-known physical laws into the starry heavens which we know, the solar system in those starry heavens to which our globe belongs, and the world on which we live as an appendage or part of that solar system. Supposing that we could trace our globe back to a condition in which there was no life in it, at which it had only begun to assume shape as the gaseous matter had begun to solidify. What then? We should have eliminated life from the face of that globe; but still that globe, that solar system, that universe, that mass of gaseous and incandescent matter, would be there only as object for the subject. It could have no meaning on any other footing. Its colour, for colour of some kind it would have, would import the impressions called up in the brain of a

spectator by the waves of ether it caused traversing space and striking the retina of the spectator. Its time-duration would only have meaning to somebody who could conceive and measure it—ay, and remember it, so that past and present might be brought together and contrasted with the possible future. Its relations of space would not have meaning for a lizard, nor even for a more highly organised intelligence, but would be intelligible only to a mind possessing the categories and conceptions of quantity, and able to take them in. The appearance of that Universe to a being endowed with totally different senses would be wholly different from the appearance of that Universe to a being endowed with the senses that we possess.

Now, you do not get out of this difficulty by saying: "Oh, but a human being, a man, is not to be assumed to be there, because we have not reached that stage." The question is, what is the meaning of the object world in which such a Universe would appear, excepting for a mind or subject to which it was object? And the answer must be that it would have no meaning at all, and, therefore, be nothing in any sense that we can assign, except in relation to a percipient mind. And thus it comes about that even from the very beginning of things you have to presuppose mind, if you would speak in any language which is intelligible or communicable, and the deepest relation of all is that which you find when you

go even to the very commencement of the Universe, the relation of being object for the subject.

If experience means that of which we have been and are conscious and have arranged in our mind—the systematised consciousness of our perceptions, past and present, still it has no meaning except as somebody's individual experience. That deepest relationship of being object for the subject, crops up at every turn. Professor Fraser has shown what was the meaning of the new question which Bishop Berkeley put to the materialists. He asked what Locke meant by the substance which was the foundation of the supposed properties of matter, and his answer was that it was a mere name significant of nothing with an assignable meaning, significant of nothing that could be described or spoken of, that, in fact, it *was* nothing. And the conclusion of Berkeley may be summarised, as Professor Fraser points out, in the expression "To be is to be perceived." Do not imagine that I am suggesting that to be, means merely to be perceived by me, as an individual. That, of course, would be nonsense. I did not make the Universe, the Universe has rather made me. But, on the other hand, you will find that as we work that out, in the dilemma which you can put you have asked a question which does not arise when its origin, which rests on a misapprehension, is properly grasped, and you will see that the theory of Bishop Berkeley, worked out in its fuller and

deeper meaning, does not in the least imply the notion that the Universe is just a series of states of my individual mind, or the doctrine known as "Solipsism," the doctrine that the individual mind which perceives is the only existence in the Universe.

But I do not want to dwell upon Berkeley, because I wish to quote to you what, to my mind, is the still more remarkable utterance of John Stuart Mill upon this very subject, in what I think was the greatest of Mill's philosophical writings. Mill goes very far down and gets very near to the conclusions of the great thinkers who arose in Germany a century ago, conclusions to which many writers and thinkers in our time are now tending.

Mill shows that the belief in an external world arises in this fashion. There is no direct feeling or perception of such a world. * "When," he says, "we think of anything as a material substance or body, we either have had, or we think that on some given supposition we should have, not some *one* sensation, but a great and even indefinite number and variety of sensations, generally belonging to different senses, but so linked together that the presence of one announces the possible presence at the very same instant of any or all of the rest." Thus we get the belief in permanent possibilities of sensation, and also

* Mill, *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, p. 223. (Third Edition.)

of a fixed order of succession among the groups. Thus he says,* referring to the result of the laws of association of ideas, "the sensations, though the original foundation of the whole, come to be looked on as a sort of accident depending on us, and the possibilities as much more real than the actual sensations, nay, as the very realities of which these are only the representations, appearances or effects." "The whole set of sensations, as possible, form a permanent background to any one or more of them that are, at a given moment, actual, and the possibilities are conceived as standing to the actual sensations in the relation of a cause to its effects, or of a canvas to the figures painted on it, or of a root to the trunk, leaves and flowers, or of a substratum to that which is spread over it, or, in transcendental language, of Matter to Form."

Aristotle might have written that sentence, or Kant, or Hegel, just as well as Mill. He goes on to speak of the permanent possibilities:—† "When this point has been reached, the permanent possibilities in question have assumed such unlikeness of aspect and such difference of apparent relation to us from any sensations, that it would be contrary to all we know of the constitution of human nature that they should not be conceived as and believed to be, at least as different from sensations as sensations are from one another. Their groundwork in sensation is forgotten, and they are

* *Idem*, p. 225. † P. 225.

supposed to be something intrinsically distinct from it. We can withdraw ourselves from any of our (external) sensations, or we can be withdrawn from them by some other agency. But though the sensations cease, the possibilities remain in existence; they are independent of our will, our presence, and everything which belongs to us. We find, too, that they belong as much to other human or sentient beings as to ourselves. We find other people grounding their expectations and conduct upon the same permanent possibilities on which we ground ours. But we do not find them experiencing the same actual sensations. Other people do not have our sensations exactly when and as we have them; but they have our possibilities of sensation; whatever indicates a present possibility of sensations to ourselves indicates a present possibility of similar sensations to them, except so far as their organs of sensation may vary from the type of ours. This puts the final seal to our conception of the groups of possibilities as the fundamental reality in Nature. The permanent possibilities are common to us and to our fellow-creatures; the actual sensations are not. That which other people become aware of, when and on the same grounds as I do, seems more real to me than that which they do not know of, unless I tell them. The world of possible sensations succeeding one another according to laws is as much in other beings as it is in me;

it has therefore an existence outside me; it is an external world."

In other words, reflection, not impression made from without, is the source of our knowledge of the object world, and only in so far as they reflect in the same way, or have the same system of thought about that world as we have, does that world exist for other people and ourselves in common. Our sensations they cannot experience; nobody can penetrate into the feeling of another being, or in the least realise it except in its qualities or properties,—in other words, in universals or general conceptions which can belong only to thought. Our sensations they cannot experience, nor can we experience theirs. Sensation is, as Heraclitus said long ago, by its very nature perishing and incommunicable, the unique and exclusive property of him who has it. The real world lies in the common system of what we *think* are sensations. If I have a feeling, for instance, a feeling of heat in my finger, you cannot, any of you, experience that feeling, but what you can become possessed of is the description which I give of what I feel. But if you examine the words of description they all convey not sensations to your mind but reflection, judgments about sensations, general conceptions, what are called, in the language of Philosophy, universals. I say "hot" of the fire; hot is a general conception. I say of the light "bright"; bright is a general conception. By enough of words, each of them

expressing a universal, I can give you sufficient abstract thoughts to enable you to frame a general conception, and in this sense I can communicate the actual feeling which I have. It is something perishing which can only be fixed and described by universals. That is what Heraclitus meant to convey, and that is what Mill meant when he said that the realities of the world consist in the Permanent Possibilities of sensations.

But Mill does not stop here. He applies his psychological analyses to the Mind, which he finds in like manner to be a series of present feelings and possibilities of present feeling. Yet he comes on a difficulty which he tells us his analysis cannot resolve. The idea of a mind substance he has got rid of, but, to quote his own words:—* "Besides present feelings and possibilities of present feeling there is another class of phenomena to be included in an enumeration of the elements making up our conception of Mind. The thread of consciousness which composes the mind's phenomenal life consists not only of present sensations, but likewise, in part, of memories and expectations. Now what are these? In themselves they are present feelings, states of present consciousness, and in that respect not distinguished from sensations. They all, moreover, resemble some given sensations or feelings, of which we have previously

* P. 241.

had experience. But they are attended with this peculiarity, that each of them involves a belief in more than its own present existence. A sensation involves only this, but a remembrance of sensation, even if not referred to any particular date, involves the suggestion and belief that a sensation of which it is a copy, or representation, actually existed in the past; and an expectation involves the belief, more or less positive, that a sensation or other feeling to which it directly refers, will exist in the future. Nor can the phenomena involved in these two states of consciousness be adequately expressed, without saying that the belief they include is, that I myself formerly had, or that I myself and no other shall hereafter have, the sensations remembered or expected. The fact believed is that the sensations did actually form, or will hereafter form, part of the self-same series of states, or thread of consciousness, of which the remembrance or expectation of those sensations is the part now present. If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind or *Ego* is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, *ex hypothesi*, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series." . . . "The true incompre-

hensibility perhaps is, that something which has ceased, or is not yet in existence, can still be, in a manner, present; that a series of feelings, the infinitely greater part of which is past or future, can be gathered up, as it were, into a single present conception, accompanied by a belief of reality."

Now Mill endeavours to account, or assumes rather that he can account, for this intellectual system in which he places reality by the principle of association of ideas on which he laid much stress. But when you come to examine the theory of the association of ideas, you will find that Mill overlooked the fact that before you can get associations growing up in the mind, you must already, as the basis of the process, have the system in which the ideas are arranged, the expectations, the beliefs in the possibility of recurrence of the past sensations or sensations like them, the co-ordination of the feelings in Time and Space, the very system which is to be accounted for through association of ideas. The system which gives its only meaning to the word reality, cannot, therefore, itself be explained through the theory of association. I shall have to return to this in a later lecture, and I will only mention it now.

But, meanwhile, what is remarkable is that Mill recognised quite completely, as completely as any Hegelian idealist could do, that the reality of the world around us, its externality,

its independence, lies in this, that it is an objective system in which the mere sensations of the moment are in themselves transient and have no abiding reality. Reality consists in the fact that the mind in all men fixes and thinks these sensations in like relations. Therefore, in the universals of thought, and not in the impressions of sense, are to be discovered the true foundations of the world.

So far it is easy to get, but the important question that arises is: What does this lead us to? Berkeley and Mill agree that it is in the recognition which our intellects *must* make of a system of laws and principles according to which sensations and feelings are actually and possibly experienced, that the reality of the world, external and internal, lies. Thought rather creates things than things thought. How is this possible? Well, we have got to dig deep down into what is meant by the world being independent of our individual wills,—in other words, what is meant by the objectivity of the system of universals which form the setting in which our impressions and feelings arise. If it be true as they think, and as, indeed, nearly all competent thinkers agree, that the actuality of the world around us, the reason why it is so and not otherwise, and why I cannot alter it by my will, lies not in some "thing-in-itself," the notion of which I cannot express in words, and which vanishes under Berkeley's question, but in the

fact that my mind like the minds of other people is compelled to think the world according to a system of conceptions, to think it in what may be called an objective system, then I am travelling on a new road. It is in this conception, along this road, that we have got a direction in which to seek for the Ultimate Reality. The relation of object to subject becomes in this sense the deepest relation of existence, because existence has now resolved itself into the fact that the subject thinks the object, presents it in a fashion which is not arbitrary but determined by laws of thought. Well, that brings us to the verge of a problem which is yet more difficult, more remote, than any we have got to so far. What must be the nature of the mind which thinks thus objectively, and which, even as manifested in individual form, compels the individual to think thus objectively?

We have got so far a very little way on our journey. To discover that the deepest relation of existence is being object for a subject, is the beginning of wisdom, but the beginning only. We may liken ourselves to the pilgrim in whom feelings of wonder and even alarm have been excited by the tidings which have reached him in the City of Destruction. He has begun to look for a way of escape. He sees in the distance the wicket-gate, but he must cross the Slough of Despond before he can reach it. We shall have, in the next Lecture, to endeavour to

find some firm ground on which to keep our footsteps, from what, to many of you, has seemed a veritable Slough of Despond. To change the metaphor, we are still in shallow water—water too shallow to enable us to swim properly in it, and we must trust ourselves boldly into deeper water before we can learn to swim properly. To-morrow, I hope to endeavour to put before you some considerations which may tempt you to think that the deeper water is the safest place to swim in.

LECTURE II

We have to try this afternoon to get a stage further on our journey and to make some definite progress along the pathway to Reality. For this purpose it is essential that we should bring the method of thinking consideration to bear upon the problem of the nature of mind, and of its relation to the object world of its experience. And before I enter upon that task, I think I had better summarise shortly the results of yesterday's lecture.

I began by speaking of the purpose which Lord Gifford had before him in founding his trust, and I said something of the spirit in which, so far as I was concerned, I should try to carry out his wishes. I pointed out that, in consequence of a common but fallacious assumption, the history of Philosophy was often taken to be no more than a story of hypothesis after hypothesis being thrown overboard in favour of new and inconsistent conjectures. I reminded you that, while such a procedure was inevitable when, with the aid of the chronometer or the measuring-rod or the balance, we were verifying conjectures about physical

occurrences, such as successions in time or combinations in space, it was neither necessary nor possible when we were examining the relations to each other of phases of art or morals or history, or even when we were watching the simplest course of development in animal life. There, development was called true, not when it accorded with some external standard, but when it disclosed the fulfilment of the purpose or quasi-purpose of the life of the organism. The true type, for instance, of feminine beauty is not the type which we should accept in the case of men. In like manner, in the history of Philosophy measurement was not a possible test. In this case the truth was rather to be looked for in the adequacy of a conception to the explanation of the matter with which it had to deal. I pointed out that you had only to read the best histories of Philosophy to see that, from this standpoint, we had been the witnesses of the growth of a conception ever increasing in depth and breadth, deepening and broadening as criticism succeeded to construction, and again construction to criticism; developing itself, as experience discloses, at different rates in different periods, with times of apparent stagnation and times of obvious vitality, adjusting its scope to the new materials and the fresh science which the Time Spirit called into being, but never going back on its traces. *Vestigia nulla retrorsum* is the motto of the philosopher. Our first task in these lectures must therefore be

to get as clear a grasp as possible of this conception in a form appropriate to our age. The contributions to it in the past of some great minds, such as Hume and the famous sceptics, had not been the less valuable or in the common line because they had been in the main negative, and directed primarily to disclosing inadequacies and abstractness in what had gone before. But it was in the constructive work of the outstanding men of metaphysical genius, men such as Plato and Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, that, making allowances for differences of time and place, we should look with most hope for our materials.

Having so defined the spirit of the endeavour, I insisted that no effort to get a view of the nature of things could be adequate, which failed to take account of all the phases of the world as it seems. These, the common heritage of plain men, we could neither rule out nor ignore. We had to account for them. To this end, if we had to pull the world as it seems to pieces, we were bound to try to bring the pieces together again when we had ascertained their meaning and relation to each other. Our first business appeared to be to try to find out as clearly as we could what we meant by the word "Reality." For God, the investigation of whose nature was our purpose, could not be less than the supreme reality; that in terms of which all else could be expressed, and to which all else could be reduced, and which could not itself be expressed in terms of anything beyond, nor reduced

o any other level. This simple consideration excluded the notion of God as a Cause, first in time, nd acting *ab extra*, that is, in space. The thinkng consideration of the nature of the real disclosed hat the popular accounts of His nature must be ooked on as metaphorical merely. Nor could He e defined as Substance. For that again imported relation to properties distinguished from it. What then could His real nature consist in if he conceptions of Cause and Substance were nadequate to it? We had to try whether we had etter fortune if we spoke of Him as Spirit, as ubject, and not as Substance.

If with the aid of Science we were to retrace ur steps, and get back to a Universe of atoms nd energy in the form of gas at a high temperaure, that Universe, mechanical though its conception, to the exclusion of mind as an object *within* it, could still have meaning only as object or the subject. To be this is the deepest, most eal and supreme of the relationships of experince. All others presuppose and are based on it. f we take an experience even in the most limited ense of the word, as meaning only what we have ersonally perceived and arranged in our minds; he directly presented and systematised content f our consciousness, the fundamental fact which merges is that it has meaning and exists only s object for the subject. Apart from Mind and except as *for* it, Matter is an absurdity. The loctrine of Berkeley that *esse* is *percipi*, and Mill's

theory of the system of permanent possibilities of sensation as the *reality* of the worlds of Matter and Mind alike signify just this fact.

In getting so far as this, we have not crossed the *pons asinorum*. For this result is almost a common-place. The question is what the conclusion implies as its premises. The first difficulty is to get a working conception of the relation of subject and object. Short of this, there can be no rest for the sole of the foot of the searcher after truth. The world as it seems is a hard-and-fast reality. It was not created or even constructed by you or me as we perceived it. It was there before we existed, and will be there after we cease to exist. Nay, we form but small parts in it, insignificant events in its history; we are its creatures, at least as much as its creators.

These results are, after all, mainly negative. They have taken us away from an old crude conception of the relation of Mind to Matter, the conception of realism. Yet they have not brought us very far. They have taught us, however, one thing, and that is that we are very prone to make an abstract separation of the mind from its object, and to represent the two as if they could be regarded as things different from one another in space and time. People forget, when they speak of object and subject, that they cannot be talking of two separate things, because what they are trying to do is to define the relation of

ıe mind to its object world, an object world hich, as Berkeley and Mill have shown, has eaning only as *for* it. Therefore, relationship ' the mind imaged as a thing existing indepen- ently of another thing, its object, would be just ıe of those relationships which fall within the ɔject world of experience, which have no mean- g except as falling within that object world, ıd cannot be used to account for it. If e are to throw any light upon the relation of ıe mind to that object world, the nature and ·igin of which is the very thing which we have ɔt to explain, it is clear that we must be in ırnest. We must divest our minds altogether of ıe idea of mind as a thing, as properly described nder the category of substance. Substance, the ıing, I repeat, is the relationship of something to s properties, a distinction between the properties ıd the self-identical somewhat in which they here, and which can never be the direct object ? perception. But the notion of this "somewhat" a product of a process of abstract reflection which ·e enter upon only when we come to contemplate ɔlations *within* the object world of experience, and hich has no bearing when we are trying to find ɔrms apt to describe the mind, the subject, for hich that object world is there, and apart from hich it has no meaning. It is only in reflection ıat the notion of the substance, as distinguished ·om its properties, or of the cause as distinguished ·om the effect, emerges. It is the result of a

system of thought analogous to that which Mill described in tracing the origin of the notion of permanent possibilities in relation to sensation and feeling.

Now I am quite aware that while this line of thought is very familiar to those of you who have been students of Philosophy, it is very difficult for people to follow who come to that study for the first time. The truth is that in the everyday world, in our daily life, we are able to use freely certain conceptions which are useful and valid when they are confined to their legitimate purpose of guiding us, guiding our minds in their everyday operation. On the other hand, when we come to the exact sciences, such as mathematics, we are constantly finding these conceptions quite inadequate and having to be replaced by other conceptions, the product of reflection. And when we come to Philosophy we find this to be so most of all, because language which is quite adequate in everyday life, language in which we describe ourselves as if we were things, living beings assigned to a particular time and to a definite place in space, and regarded, in this aspect at any rate, as things, from the time of birth to the moment when we are borne away in our coffins—that kind of language which is useful and legitimate for everyday purposes, becomes altogether misleading when we get to the problem of what is the true nature of reality. And the great difficulty which the metaphysician

investigating the true nature of reality has to face is just these incrustations of the everyday point of view, the language which we get into the habit of using, and the notions which pass current, and which are for everyday purposes sufficient, but which give rise to what we may call superstitions of common sense based upon them, such as that the mind may be properly spoken of as a thing.

I need hardly remind you that the standard of knowledge which we call common sense is something which is always changing as knowledge gets deeper. To the superstitious Chinaman, an eclipse is a source of terror. He regards it as a divine event, and takes refuge in concealing himself or in incantations. But, to the average person living in the West, the eclipse is nothing, is so familiar that he pays no special attention to it, but regards it as an ordinary occurrence. In other words, the point of view of everyday life about that phenomenon (as indeed about countless other phenomena) has changed. And so it is when we pass from common sense to Science, and from Science to Philosophy. We find our point of view constantly changing, and we find that we are dealing with material which involves the use of new tools in digging down to the foundations upon which we have to build.

Well now, the subject, the subject in knowledge, the mind, may be best understood in its true nature if we begin by taking it negatively. First

of all, let us contrast it with a machine. A machine is an arrangement of external parts such that, by means of an outside impulse, all the parts can be set in motion. But the parts are external to one another; they are separable. But now, even in nature, we get away beyond the externality of the arrangement of mechanism. In life we have in the organism this remarkable feature, that the life of the whole is present in each of the parts. Take, for instance, the body. The body, as biologists tell us, is made up, even in its apparently simplest tissue, of countless units of life, of what are called cells. But these cells act together in maintaining the common life of the organism. They form themselves and group themselves. We have the foot, the hand, the limbs, the various other parts of the body, and all these parts acting together, and permeated and dominated by the life of the body as a whole. But this whole of life does not in its work resemble a cause operating, *ab extra*, upon the organism, but is more like, more really analogous to, the purpose which the soldiers in an army or the citizens in a State are moved by when they act together. The cells of the body, the cells which make up the totality of the organism, act together purposively, or quasi-purposively, which is a better expression — and I refer to them in order to illustrate to you how really the analogy of the actual purpose of living beings, acting together in a regiment or in a State, is a better

analogy to the life of the organism than is the analogy of a machine. In the body you have got the quasi-purpose dominating the whole; but not only so; you have the organism pursuing a definite course from its embryo state to birth, and from birth to death, and so fulfilling an end.

Then again, you have got beyond that not only the demonstration that the process shapes itself for the benefit of the species, but, within the life of the individual organism, the remarkable feature which is called Metabolism. All the materials of which the organism is made up change in the course of a very short time. There is not a particle in the body which was there when the organism was born, but yet, by the conservation of the End through this Metabolism, the life of the whole is preserved, and the course of development is maintained. Now, under those circumstances, life discloses itself as something totally different from mechanism. In mechanism you have got mere externality and separability of the parts from one another. In life that externality is superseded, is overcome: the whole is present in each of the parts, and this notwithstanding that the parts are in a sense external to one another. The hand is external to the foot. By abstraction it may even be regarded as a separate thing. Certainly it may be called a thing when it is cut off and dead. In other words, the parts of the organism,

although they carry out a common quasi-purpose, are yet in another aspect external to one another. They resemble mechanical things in that other aspect.

But now, when you come to the mind, you will find that the mind is just as different from life, as life is different from mechanism. The mind manifests itself in its thoughts, in its activity, and yet its thoughts, its feelings, its impressions, its activity, are all there *for* the mind and have only existence *in* the mind. They are in no sense separable, like the hand and the foot, from one another. They have their existence in the activity of the mind as a whole. The activity of the mind manifests itself in its particulars and differences, and its particulars and differences exist only for and in the conscious mind in which they occur. In other words, the whole, the mind as a whole, exists only in its manifestations; and, on the other hand, the manifestations have no meaning apart from the mind of which they are the manifestations. My consciousness cannot be broken up into what I am conscious of, as one thing, and the self that is conscious, as a separate thing. My mind is a unity which cannot be broken up—a unity of thought which maintains itself amid boundless difference and ceaseless activity.

When you have got to the notion of mind, you have altogether transcended that conception of things as external to one another with which

you are affected, to a certain extent, in considering the nature of the organism. Take, by way of showing the contrast between the action of an organism and a mental operation, the example of a melody. What is a melody? A melody is an arrangement of sounds which, comprehended in the light of a relationship that pervades and unites them, form for the mind a musical whole. It is only, for instance, when the sounds of a sonata of Beethoven take their places in the sonata as a whole that they have any significance. The sonata is nothing apart from its course, and yet its course has only its meaning through the musical conception which pervades it, and gives it its utterance. Now that utterance is only for a being that *thinks*. For a sheep or a pig it is not there. It is the work of the mind, present in every sound as apprehended, and qualifying it in reflection.

You have in this work an illustration of a great truth, that the universal is nothing apart from the particular, and the particular is nothing apart from the universal. If we look into our own minds we shall see just the same thing in countless other forms. Hume was quite right when he pointed out in his "Treatise" that he could not find what Bishop Berkeley seemed to think he could find, some idea of the mind as apart from its impressions and ideas. He could not catch any perception of the self. No, because there is no perception of the self to catch. The

self is nothing apart from the activity of its mental life, and the mental life has no existence except as in a self, as in a mind which gives it its unity and its meaning, as the mental act of musical conception gives its meaning to the sonata of Beethoven.

If you look into your minds, you will find one thing characteristic of them, which is quite different from any phenomenon in the external world of objects, and that is the power of free withdrawal. You can withdraw your mind from its own experiences. You can withdraw it to almost any extent, as the martyrs at the stake, when under the influence of a powerful enough faith, have been able to withdraw it from their own pain and even from their own death. If you try to analyse the notion of self which you have there into mere feeling, you will fail to grasp any feeling of the self as a particular object. You will find that what you at first take to be such a feeling, on scrutiny recedes into mere corporeal sense, the consciousness of the body as sentient. And then it turns out that these sensations of the body derive their significance only from the previous conception of the body as that which has them. Experience is just the manifestation of mind disclosing itself in the organisation of its object world—the object world which is for it—and the mind as subject is just the other pole in the process. It is only in reflection that we separate the one from the other. We are outside

the region of mechanism; we are outside even the region of life. Their real existence is in one whole of activity.

Well now, this brings people to what looks very like a Slough of Despond, for, say they, the world is a hard-and-fast world, and it was not made by us. It is all foreign, and in our knowledge we have but a fragment of it. Now we do not question this, those of us who reflect along these lines. It is no business of Divine Philosophy to disfigure her countenance by running her head against brick walls. It is ridiculous to suppose that my mind makes the Universe. But then, as Mill showed in the passage which I quoted to you yesterday, existence has no meaning except *for* thought and *through* thought, and, therefore, it is plain that *in some sense* reality is simply the work of mind. We are reduced, therefore, to this, that it is with regard to the nature of mind that the difficulty comes in.

Then what is the "I" that does *not* make the world? Well, when you think of it, it is perfectly plain that this "I"—this M. or N. as the case may be, living in a particular period, in a particular place, with particular relations, with a particular past and a possible future — cannot be what makes the Universe, but discloses itself only as a secondary and derivative conception which we get by reflecting on it as something within the object world of experience, the outcome of a particular standpoint. But now we

must be careful about our metaphors, for Philosophy has often got into disrepute by using metaphors unreflectingly and uncritically.

It is plain to common sense that, in one meaning of the word, at any rate, thought does not make things. A distinguished writer, Mr Bradley, has summed up the case against that doctrine in the declaration that the Universe is "no unearthly ballet of bloodless categories," and he, and that acute critic, the present Prime Minister, have directed heavy artillery against those who seemed to suggest the contrary. Not least, at any rate in the case of Mr Balfour, has the artillery of common sense been directed against the late Thomas Hill Green, a man to whom Philosophy owes a great deal, but who certainly did give countenance in some of his expressions to the notion of a mind as constructing its object world, as though *ab extra*. Mr Green, of course, knew a great deal better than that, and I doubt whether he has been properly understood. He has suffered from a too copious use of metaphor in his writing, always a dangerous thing. But there is no doubt that there have been others who have proved too zealous interpreters of what they believed the great Germans to have laid down. I remember that, when I was at the University, a distinguished student of Philosophy, once, in an essay, described the Universe as a "thick complexus of intelligible relations," greatly to the disgust of the distinguished Professor who had to adjudicate on the

essay in which this phrase occurred. It suggests a saying of which the late Master of Balliol was fond: "A false quantity in a man is like a *faux pas* in a woman."

We must abjure, therefore, crude metaphors such as "making" and "constructing." Thought does not make and construct, in the sense in which making and constructing take place in the object world of experience. We have to face the difficulty that, on the one hand, there is no apparent answer to Mill's argument for the doctrine that *esse* is *percipi*, or *intelligi;* and that, on the other hand, we cannot possibly regard the self as a something external to the world or independent of it, and constructing it out of universals. We cannot even express the rich, warm, concrete universe in terms of the abstract universals of thought. Therefore, we seem driven to the conclusion that the nature of Ultimate Reality cannot be sought in a world of mere universals. With this before our minds we have to scrutinise the nature of experience. But we are forced to observe at the outset that the object world of experience is always presented in reflection more or less abstractly. We cannot even *name* the objects around us except by fixing on some aspect which forms but one feature in their individual actuality. The time, for instance, is no sooner pronounced to be one o'clock than it is past, and discloses its nature as a mere vanishing point abstracted from what is continuous and changing. "Now" is a universal,

which is only true of each moment as it succeeds to the one that has passed. To this consideration we shall return later on.

Now, the problems which I have been discussing to-day are no new problems, nor are the solutions which I am going to suggest new solutions. We are coming back, as others have come back, after two thousand years, to the light furnished by the Greeks, who thought about these things with a singular freedom from the incrustations of misplaced metaphor which baffle us. The Greeks had less difficulty than we in avoiding the suggestion of the individual as a thing outside another hard-and-fast thing, the universe with which the individual was confronted. Perhaps it was the influence of Christianity in raising to such a high level the value of the individual that turned men's thought into another channel; but this much is clear, that the fruitful period of metaphysical speculation ceased at the time when Greek thought ceased to be dominant, and for a very long period did not revive.

The other day, in looking into the latest collection of the *Fragments of Heraclitus*, I found a remarkable sentence, quoted, indeed, by the earlier collectors of these fragments (such as Bywater), but quoted in a different context where it had less importance. In Hermann Diels' new book *Herakleitos von Ephesos*, there is a sentence which puts the teaching of Heraclitus, I think, in a different light from that in which it

is generally put. Most people think of Heraclitus as having summed up his philosophy in the famous phrase: "All things flow"; the Universe is made up of particulars which are in a constant state of flux, and there is nothing real. But in the edition of Hermann Diels is a remarkable sentence,* standing by itself: "Thinking is what exists as one and the same in all men." If you take that, and I think you must, as meant seriously, it shows that Heraclitus had a distinct notion of what it is that imparts stability and objectivity to the flux of the impressions of sense, the fleeting nature of which he had clearly seen. It distinguishes Heraclitus from Sophists like Protagoras, with whom Plato deals, who declared that man was the measure of things, and that there was no such thing as objective truth.

In the *Theætetus* Plato first of all disposes of Protagoras, and it is only later on in the Dialogue that he turns to Heraclitus, and then through the lips of Socrates he brings us to the verge of setting up, what Plato ultimately did set up, just that doctrine of Heraclitus, that "thinking is what exists as one and the same in all men." Take, for instance, in order to get at the meaning of Plato, what by analysis of our minds we find our "impressions" to be. We find that there is no answer to Mill's reasoning as contained in the passages which I quoted to you from the *Examination of Hamilton*, that all our impressions are in a

* P. 26: "ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι το φρονέειν."

state of flux; that it is only in so far as they are; so to speak, put into a system by reflection, in so far as by the aid of memory, by judgments of arrangement in space and time, they are *set*, that you get the kind of "orderliness" which Berkeley held to be the essential feature in the Reality of the Universe. Well, but that must be the work of thought, if our analysis of the relation of the mind to its object world is a true one.

Now Plato, accepting this conclusion, said that what makes the world into an objective system is just the universals of thought. But in the abstract fashion which comes out in his doctrine, he separated these universals from the particulars of sense and set them apart as self-subsisting realities, with the result that it is very difficult to follow his reasoning. Then after Plato came Aristotle, who was not only a great speculative thinker but a great observer of the actual. The actual was what most of all interested Aristotle. The great step he took was to show that the universal existed *in and through* the particular, and that the existence of the particular was *in and for* the universal. He saw clearly that the particulars of Heraclitus were fleeting and perishing, and that they could not even be named. To say, for instance, that something is here and now is to use a universal, a general name. This paper is here, but, as I move away, the next moment it is there. That paper is there, but again it is now here. It is plain that

the expression "here" signifies a universal relation which is significant only for abstract thought, for reflection, and whether you take the "here" or the "now," or the "this" or the "that," you will find all these names indicative merely of universals. Still, as Aristotle saw, while its "thisness" is a universal, what is "this" cannot be constructed out of universals. You cannot deduce the Universe out of the universals of thought, any more than you can divide or divorce thought from its object or from the particulars of sense. Aristotle came to the conclusion, therefore, that in the indissoluble union of the two, of the universal of thought and the particular of sense, the Real was to be found, and to be found always as an individual. The individual, then, of experience, and all experience is in its nature individual, is in this light what is ultimate, that behind which we cannot go, what we can separate into universal and particular moments in abstract reflection only, and not in reality. It is the ultimate phase to which you come back. But for Aristotle the individual was what it was only in virtue of—I do not like to use the word "coalescence,"—the union in the individual of what I have called two "moments," the universal and the particular, which you can only divorce by abstraction. I am paraphrasing Aristotle into my own words, but that is the substance of his teaching. In reading Aristotle you are embarrassed partly by the want of a complete collection of his works, and, I am

afraid, also by a certain confusion which one cannot explain away. In his Logic, he seems to treat the universal as if it were the same thing as a whole of extension, as a class, and the result is that his Logic is mainly concerned with the discovery of the common properties of individuals, the formation on the basis of these of a class or whole, followed by a return from the class to the individuals which were aggregated in it.

But though in the Logic the universal appears in the main as the class or whole of extension, in his Metaphysics, and, most of all, in his Psychology, he is thoroughly clear about his great doctrine of the relation of the universal to the real. People misunderstand Aristotle very much when they think it odd that there should be ascribed to him the doctrine that there is "nothing in intellect which was not first in sense." Perception gives you the individual; the universal you only get by abstraction. But then, he also says there is nothing in sense which was not first in the intellect. The particular of sense only gets its meaning, its distinction from nothingness, its existence, in qualification by the universals of thought.

Now, what makes Aristotle so great is his freedom from the narrowness which appears in the use of such bad metaphors as "make" and "construct" when applied to the relation of thought and its object. Such expressions, and the expression "the relation of subject and

object," are apt to be very misleading. They are the outcome of an abstraction, relatively and provisionally necessary for certain purposes, but abused when made outside of these purposes. Our purposes and the plane of reflection which we occupy in following them, colour our view of reality, and limit the aspects it presents to us. Look at the table in front of me. A being who had no accumulated human experience—a baby, for instance, and still more, one of the lower animals, such as a lizard—would not know that it was a table. For such a mind, at such a plane of intelligence, it would not *be* a table. It is only because of conceptions with which the mind has become informed that I recognise this as a table, distinguish it from other things, and arrange my conduct accordingly. But, even so, I take a very abstract view of the table. If a carpenter were to cut down a tree, and, while the wood was still fresh, make a table of it, we should still look upon it only as a table. But the wood would have another aspect in its reality. It would still be living; it might still, like the Rod of Tannhäuser, develop and burst into blossom. Yet by abstraction the whole world, until its attention was directed to the other point of view, would determine it, fix it, as a table, and as nothing else.

Aristotle called the universal "form" as distinguished from "matter." The matter is the raw material of sensation. The conception under

which we identify the object and pronounce it to be a table is the form, the universal, the activity of thought, the position and setting which gives it its meaning, and, as we shall see presently, its reality. The universal, the form, what he called "Eidos," is, as distinguished from the matter, the definite aspect; it is what introduces determination and character into the matter, which is an indefinite which requires specification and determination before it can be recognised as an individual.

Well now, matter can only be regarded as coming before form in the course of the building up of the world of experience of an individual regarded, as in one aspect every human individual must be regarded, as having a history in time and a knowledge which develops in time. You begin in individual experience, in your mental history, in time, with the indefinite, and make it definite. But then you can perceive that in making it definite you have been guided by these very conceptions and categories which afterwards turn out to be the form, the "Eidos," as Aristotle called it—the form which gives its meaning to the particulars of sense, and gives its reality to the world of things.

Matter, in that point of view, has real existence only in the light of the form which gives it its character as individual, although in the history of the individual struggling after the light and guided by what one may call the objective neces-

sities of thought in the process, the matter is presented as coming first, and the form as coming second.

Now that may seem to you to be a very modern sort of analysis of the problem, but I should like to quote to you just a few sentences of the *De Animâ* of Aristotle, because they show in a very striking way how far Aristotle had got in this direction. In the fourth chapter of Book III., he says: * "In the case of immaterial objects" (that is general conceptions or abstract universals, such as Mill's Permanent Possibilities of Sensation) "the subject thinking and the object thought are one and the same; just as speculative science is equivalent to the objects and ideas of speculative knowledge (a fact, it is true, which leaves the question, why we do not always think, to be investigated). In the case, on the contrary, of those objects which are imbedded in matter, each of the ideas of reason is present, if only potentially, and implicitly. And thus reason is not to be regarded as belonging to and governed by the things of sense (reason being a faculty independent of the matter of such objects), but the world of thought must be regarded as belonging to and regulated by reason." † "The forms of reason," he goes on to say in the eighth chapter of the same book, "are not something different from the

* Aristotle, *De Animâ*, Book III., end of Chapter iv. Wallace's Translation, p. 159.

† Aristotle, *De Animâ*, Book III., Chapter viii. Wallace's Translation, p. 171.

forms of sense. As there is, according to the common opinion, no object outside the magnitudes of sense, it follows that the ideas of reason are contained in the forms of sense, both the so-called abstract conceptions and the various qualities and attributes that determine sensible phenomena."

Thus Aristotle refuses to listen to any attempt to show that the concrete riches of immediacy are put together out of universals which exist outside and apart from them. And yet he holds equally firmly that it is only in and through the intelligible notions which are imbedded in sensations and which give them their substance that these sensations have reality. We shall see that Hegel asserted the same position as against Kant.

There has been a very great deal of discussion on these matters since Aristotle's day. The importance of the doctrine that thought makes things in the limited sense I have indicated, is that it gives you an explanation of what we mean by "objectivity" and the "reality of the world." Mill has declared that reality can lie only in a system of permanent possibilities of experience of sensation, of feeling. But that is a hard thing to grasp; it is a hard saying. Yet, I think, I can show you, by way of conclusion to this lecture, very shortly and simply, that the mere hard-and-fastness of this world as it seems, the mere being beyond the control of our wills, is not the test of its reality, or what makes it a real world for us. If you look into a stereoscope, you will see what

is really a series of lines in two dimensions assuming the aspect of being in three dimensions—you have what is called a stereoscopic view. There you have got the conviction of the hard-and-fastness of the supposed three dimensions borne in upon you, and yet you know it is not true because it does not consist with the rest of experience. In the same way, the hypnotised person has a world of his own, hard, fast, and beyond the control of his will, a world produced out of his subconscious self under the influence of suggestion. It is not the real world, and yet it is a world which seems absolutely real and genuine, and the only real and genuine world, to the hypnotic subject. The madman, again, believes firmly in the reality of his world, although that world has no reality from the larger point of view of sane intelligence.

The test of hard-and-fastness cannot therefore be the criterion of reality. That reality cannot be found merely in the circumstance that the world is beyond the control of our wills. It must lie in something deeper down than that, something the nature of which we now begin to divine, something I shall endeavour to analyse in my next lecture. So far, all we can say is that we have got a new light on the relation of the universal and particular. We have found that the individual phenomena of experience are inseparable wholes, not to be broken up or resolved into any aggregation of independent things, but uniting and giving reality to the moments of uni-

versality and particularity. We have found that the universal and particular are only abstract aspects of a single and indivisible reality which is always individual in character. We have found that in the individual, the mind, by abstract reflection, separates out and describes in language those universals which are the forms of its own activity in combining and setting the particulars of sense, and so finds itself there. But we have got to swim in yet deeper water if we would get at the truth about these matters, and in the next lecture I will try to clear away a mass of weeds which seem to impede the swimmer.

LECTURE III

I AM afraid that yesterday some of you may have found that portion of the pathway to reality which we had to tread, stony and dry. And yet it was essential that we should tread it. I had to show you how Aristotle refused to go behind the individual, how he recognised in the individual the ultimate form of reality, in the sense that individuality could not be deduced from any premises or shown to be brought about by any ground or cause, and, at the same time, could not be resolved into terms of anything beyond itself. Individuality was for him, as it was for Hegel after him, the ultimate form of actual experience.

Indeed, it is not necessary, and not only is not necessary, but is not rational, to ask how individuality is made. Such metaphors as "making" and "constructing" belong to that object world of space and time which is itself individual in form. They therefore cannot, as I have already more than once pointed out in these lectures, be used to explain it. Individuality is neither the result of a putting together in space, nor the outcome of any process in time. It is just what we indicate

and do not define when we point and say "that is." It is the present reality with which we are in direct contact, and from which we start and must always start — the form of the ultimate reality to which we always come back.

I showed you that while Aristotle, like Hegel, takes the individual to be the true form of the actual, he still recognises that in reflection you do separate in the individual two moments, which you try by abstraction to keep apart from each other, the universal and the particular. The "that," the "is," what I mean when I speak of my immediate experience, is what confronts the mind as ultimate, but yet has for reflection these two moments of the activity of thought. In my immediate experience alone do they gain existence. Now, my immediate experience has meaning only for my mind, and my mind has meaning only in experience. The individual, therefore, *is* only as the form in which the mind and its experience exist, a form which mind alone can resolve by its power of abstract reflection about its own processes. But if this form be the form of mind, it must be like mind itself—not inert, lifeless identity, substance, but changing, living, self-resolving, and self-sustaining subject. The view I have of the sea out there is complete in itself, self-subsisting, unique. Thought rests in it satisfied that it has found immediately presented individual existence. Yet it is only there for me in virtue of an infinity of judgments, of relationships, of universals, and these are in

their nature self-altering and self-developing. The horizon looks to me bounded as it does because there is implied in my recognition of it, and of the entire view, a reference to myself as a spectator in a particular position. If this changes the view changes. The simplest individual perception, even what seems to approximate to the barest feeling, involves, as part of its nature, an infinity of relationships which can be established only reflectively. The simplest individual perception is determined by potential relationship to everything else in the Universe. Nay, more, it is implicitly the Universe itself. When I judge about the poorest of subjects, whatever it may be and however bare its nature, it occupies for me a unique place exclusive of all other reality, and yet potentially inclusive of it. I cannot say "this book" without a reference to surroundings, which are not to be restrained from extending over the entirety of space and of time. In other words, the subject of every judgment, as we shall see later on, is just reality, and potentially the whole of it, and the work of the judgment is to make explicit what is implicit. The sea view is not less the entire Universe to me, because in reflection I qualify it as limited by an infinite Beyond.

The problem of Philosophy may be defined to be to find the highest categories under which to think individual actuality, and to get the most adequate and complete conception of it. So alone, by this method and by no other, does it seem as

though we could reach a view of God. At the plane of experience of our everyday lives we do not use the highest categories, because we are not in search of ultimate truth. Our necessities, our purposes, our standpoints, are provisional and finite only, and we have no need to go beyond them in the organisation of our view of experience.

The great fallacy in speculative inquiry of looking upon the mind as a thing arises from not keeping this in view. We find it in our everyday parlance very convenient to speak as though the mind could be regarded as a thing, as though human beings, with souls as well as bodies, could be talked of as things in space. This uncritical way of speaking is very convenient and perfectly legitimate for everyday purposes, but when you take what is an everyday useful tool and divert it to other purposes, use it as a speculative instrument, you get into all sorts of trouble.

Let me give you one illustration of this. The nature of the mind is to be free, active, with the power of withdrawing itself from its own associations. I instanced to you yesterday the martyr at the stake, who is capable of withdrawing his mind from what he endures, by virtue of a great conception which he has before him. The nature of the mind is to be capable of abstracting itself from any or all of the particulars in which it is manifesting itself; and, that being so, the freedom which the mind possesses

is the freedom of the universal which is in the particulars, which transforms the particulars, which gives them their meaning, gives them their existence, although it does not exist apart from them. And the mind, with an activity of this nature, is obviously wholly outside the category of cause and effect, which has only significance if we are talking of relationships within space and time. Consequently it becomes at once plain, when we think about it, that the old controversy about free will, the old speculation as to whether volition was an uncaused something, or whether, as philosophers used to maintain, the operations of the mind are only a series of causes and effects making up a single and unalterable chain, was really beside the point. We are dealing with mind, and controversy is needless, as soon as, in the light of criticism, we get rid of our dogmatic presupposition that the mind can be regarded as a thing, or as subject to the relationship of cause and effect. The nature of the mind is to be free. It has the power of acting rationally, or for that matter irrationally, but its choice is free, and it can abstract from any particular, and follow the individual form with which it is concerned. Therefore, a little bearing in mind of the lesson which Aristotle taught might have rid theology of a great many controversies which arose from dogmatic assumptions on which the theory of Determinism, the theory of the impossibility of free will, was

based; while I need not tell you that the deduction drawn from the notion of God as a First Cause, the outcome of which was to make freedom of will impossible to an individual, who is represented uncritically as a something distinct in the object world of Space and Time, is another fallacy equally apparent.

Thought and sense, the subject and the object, cannot be taken apart from one another; neither of them is what the Greeks called a "χωριστόν," a thing apart.

Well, the individual as we saw assumes forms in reflection, which vary according to the points of view and purposes which reflection brings to bear on it. If you allow thought to turn in upon itself and watch its own operations, you will see how this is. Take, for instance, the illustration of the stereoscope. What we see in the stereoscope is really only a flat surface in two dimensions of space, but it appears in three dimensions. We are, so far as mere observation goes, presented with an object in three dimensions. The reason of this is, that the instrument has made a powerful suggestion to us to bring to the organisation of the experience which we have to interpret the conceptions or categories which are determinative of space of three dimensions. It is difficult to overcome this suggestion even when we have learned to refer the illusion to its proper place in the context of experience. It is suggestion and the belief which

follows after it, and the conviction that the conceptions which we are employing are the right conceptions, and the true modes of organisation of the aspects of experience which are present to us, that give that form and fixity alike to the world of the stereoscope, and to that in which we say that we really live and move and have our being. If thought be allowed to play freely, we find these appearances resolving their own fixity, just as it easily dispels the conviction which makes us interpret the plain flat surface which we see in the stereoscope, as an object standing out in three dimensions.

The test of what is real, the test of what is actual, cannot be found in the mere appearance of immediacy. The picture in the stereoscope, ro the delusion of the madman, also present the same aspect of immediacy. The criterion of reality cannot, moreover, be looked for, as has been suggested, in what has been called the *uniqueness* of the individual, or our sense of purpose satisfied in it, because, after all, the picture in the stereoscope is an individual picture in which our purpose of searching for reality rests satisfied that it has reached reality. What seems to be essential is — that the conception we have formed should fit in with the context of experience.

The truth is that the individual, the phenomenon of experience, gets its fixity and definiteness from the universals of reflection—derives from these what the Germans call its "*Dasein*"—

the being there and as it is of the individual thing. The being of that tumbler, for instance, standing there on the table, is definite and fixed for me, because I interpret its appearance through a system of everyday and very familiar conceptions. It is the system of these conceptions which gives me the table and the tumbler, and a vast variety of other things to which habit has made me assign meanings and uses so regularly, that I have ceased to be conscious of the processes of doing so. For a dog, or even an infant, that tumbler would not have the significance which it has for you and me, nor stand out with the reality which it does to our minds. The analogy of the stereoscope repeated on a huge scale is the key to the fixity which the outside world seems to present. I shall have to develop this further and make it more intelligible a little later on.

The individual in which thought can rest satisfied satisfies thought only for a moment, and when thought passes to another point of view, to another set of conceptions, it takes up another aspect of the individual and so transforms it, and gives it another meaning. I gave you as an illustration yesterday the man who cuts down a tree and makes a table. The wood is living wood in his hands, but when he makes it into a table he passes away from the living tree and thinks only of dead matter. He has come to the conception of the table as a purely

mechanical arrangement of parts, and of the wood as something dead and inert.

We cannot resolve the truth and reality possessed by individual being, by the "that," into the mere satisfaction that we have in it, the mere conviction of its reality, or the notion that our purpose of seeking Reality is complete in it. If so, the stereoscope would give us real things. But as I will presently show you, that is not the test of Reality. The resolution into something beyond, into the satisfaction of the purpose of my mind, as an explanation of the meaning of Reality and of the individual, would simply, if we relied upon it, prove, as it seems to me, a broken bridge, because we should then be confronted with the question, What does the "is" mean when it is applied to the mind, and the purpose of the mind which is so satisfied?

My distinguished predecessor in this Lectureship, Professor Royce of Harvard, has written a very able book upon Idealism, and he appears to suggest that the true meaning of being, of the actuality of the individual, is to be found in the satisfaction of purpose. But it seems to me that this is only to push the controversy a little further back, and to leave you to ask what he means by the being of a purpose. Can this be resolved into satisfaction of purpose in having such a purpose? I venture to doubt whether this analysis, if true, is helpful. It seems as though it left us with an endless regress, and no further on. I prefer to

say that you must start with the individual fo
Satisfied purpose, fulfilled meaning, are rat
features of individuality, than explanations of
So, at least, it seems to me.

We must have a belief in the real world; tl
of course, we must start with. We must beli
in the appearance, whether it be in the stereosc
or in anything else, as real. But what is the t
of its reality? Not the mere fact of our belief
it, but something else; its harmony with our o
other experience, that is the main feature. I
show you what I mean. I go into a room, an
think I see a chair in it. The room is dark, w
only the moonbeams playing in. If I trust o
to my sense of sight, I may make a mistake
thinking I see a chair. I may try to sit down
it. If I do so, I shall speedily and effectively f
out whether it is real or not. Other senses h
corrected the impressions of the sense of sig
But it is not enough that my present impressi
should agree in telling me that the chair is
real. A madman might believe he saw a ch
even if he had sat down and had painfully fou
there was no chair there. Even if another elem
came in he might still remain under his delusi
He might be deceived about his past impressi
as easily as about those of his present experier
If I look round, and think that I see a ch
before me, and then remember that a mom
before the space was empty, I may conclude t
my present impression is illusory. But the m

man may have quite a different impression. His whole experience, what he remembers as much as what is immediately present to him, may be distorted. Yet another element must come in before the test of reality can be satisfied. My personal conviction is not enough. My experience, if it is to be true, must harmonise with the experience of the other people in my world. All men must see and feel in such a fashion that the universals in which their descriptions are recorded are the same, if the impression is to be given the title of real. The context with which there is to be agreement must be that, not merely of my own experience, but of the experience of the rest of mankind. It is not enough that the entirety of my personal experience should be self-consistent. The madman may pronounce self-consistency of his own experience. There must be correspondence of what I believe with the beliefs of other men about what their senses tell them. The image of the chair must be there for the experiences of all other people; it must fit in not only with the general context of my individual experience as this particular A.B. existing at a particular time and on a particular spot; but it must consist with the experience of all other individuals, and fit in to the general context and harmony of the general experience. If it does so completely, then I come to the conclusion that it is a real chair. My will is then satisfied, has been convinced. In other

words, I assent. In fact, I have accepted the perception of the chair as part of the real world. But my belief in its reality is not enough unless the reality is in fact in harmony with the experience of myself and other persons alike. That is what Mill meant by the *system* of Permanent Possibilities which he said made the reality of the object world.

Such harmony with a system is a conception which we get only through reflection, only through judgments, which we fix and make definite and preserve in the mind, in universals such that we can remember them and speak about them and communicate them to others through language. They do not give you the actual "is" of these things. That is the unique experience of the mind that has it. What is communicated is a description of a system which you can put in language which deals with universals, and universals alone, and it is in the objectivity of that system, that is to say in the fact that it is the system of the similar experience of everybody, that you get the test of reality. You do not make reality; you do not make the world. You do not construct, or deduce, or put it together, but you have a test of the presence or absence of that which is meant when we speak of reality. It is very difficult to grasp this rather elusive point, but it is very important to keep hold of it, and we shall come back to it later in another form.

Our characters and our outlook on life change

as our purposes and our standpoints change with changing time and circumstances. With enough of variation of purpose and standpoint, our conceptions may so alter that experience itself may become organised quite differently. Insanity is the best illustration of this truth. We may, too, conceive a whole world of people whose experience has grown in forms different from that of human beings. I am quite unable to figure to myself what the world of experience of a lizard or a dog may be. I can to some extent by watching its motions guess what sort of mind a lizard or a dog has. But if there be such a being as an angel, how does an angel think? Again, those who live, if they do live, in Jupiter and Saturn, may construct quite a different world for themselves from any we know. Their senses may be wholly different from ours. They may have no perception through sight, for example. But it is plain that when you get to the universals of their experience, these must be the same, because we could not otherwise attach any meaning to their worlds or to themselves as inhabiting them. It is only on the basis of a common system of thought, of the validity of Reason as the basis and foundation of any possible kind of knowledge, that Scepticism can even raise its head.

Now the poets have sometimes very clearly set before themselves this fact, that the mind does not really discover in the world which lies

in front of it something hard-and-fast which does not vary. They have penetrated, by the power of genius, over and over again to the fact that the external world which confronts us is only apparently permanent and impenetrable, and may be transformed by thought. I think it is something of that kind which Shakespeare has in his mind when he makes Prospero in the *Tempest* tell Ferdinand that

> "Like the baseless fabric of this vision
> The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
> The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
> Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve,
> And, like this unsubstantial pageant faded,
> Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff
> As dreams are made on and our little life
> Is rounded with a sleep."

Or again, when Browning talks of

> "Life for ever old yet new,
> Changed not in kind but in degree,
> The instant made eternity."

he is speaking of the power of the mind to transform the world — to turn it into a system which may have a reality quite different from that of the world of Mr Worldly Wiseman.

Again, when the author of the Book of Revelation tells us of Him who sat on a great white throne, from whose face the earth and the heavens fled away so that there was found no place for them, he seems to me to have had in

his mind the unreal and transitory and relative character of the universe of sense.

Perhaps one of the most striking and most remarkable breaks-away in our poetry from the standpoint of the hard-and-fast finality of every-day immediacy to another point of view, is to be found in that extraordinary poem, I think, too little recognised in its greatness, that was written —the day before she died — by a Yorkshire girl in a country parsonage. She lived among the moors, far away from learned society—that girl of whom Mr Swinburne somewhere tells us that she takes rank as the direct descendant of the Titans, as in the line of Shakespeare and of Milton. I will quote Emily Brontë's "Last Lines" to you entire:—

"No coward soul is mine,
No trembler in the world's storm-troubled sphere
I see Heaven's glories shine
And faith shines equal, arming me from fear.

"O God, within my breast
Almighty, ever present Deity!
Life that in me has rest
As I—undying Life—have power in Thee.

"Vain are the thousand creeds
That move men's hearts, unutterably vain;
Worthless as withered weeds,
Or idlest froth amid the boundless main

"To waken doubt in one
Holding so fast by Thine infinity,
So surely anchored on
The steadfast rock of immortality

"With wide-embracing love,
Thy spirit animates eternal years,
Pervades, and broods above,
Changes, sustains, dissolves, creates, and rears.

"Though earth and man were gone,
And suns and universes ceased to be,
And Thou wert left alone,
Every existence would exist in Thee.

"There is not room for Death,
Nor atom that his might could render void,
Thou, Thou art Being and Breath,
And what Thou art may never be destroyed."

Matthew Arnold speaks of these lines as the too bold dying song of her

"Whose soul
Knew no fellow for might,
Passion, vehemence, grief,
Daring, since Byron died."

I do not think he exaggerated. Certainly speculative poetry has rarely reached a higher intellectual level than in this dying outburst. It contains the teaching of Aristotle transferred from the abstract to the concrete.

Now the poets have the power of suggesting, of making us feel what is real. It may be that what they tell us is the outcome of promptings from what Professor James calls the "subliminal self." That is probably true. But none the less is it equally true that these feelings fall within the world as it seems and belong to reality, and

the result of our investigation may be just to show that they are better pictures of things than the pictures that the commonplace man presents, in that they exhibit the individual with equal reality, but presented at a higher plane.

Well, we must return for a moment from this digression to our threefold test of what we mean by reality: Agreement furnished by (1) Our own present senses—of every kind; (2) Our past sense experience; and (3) The sense experience of others. That these afford only a relative test we have seen. But they throw light upon what we mean by reality and unreality in human knowledge, or, for that matter, in human perception. It means the assignment of the phenomenon to its proper place in the context of experience. If I am standing on a hillside looking across the valley at the hilltops opposite, behind which the sun is setting in a red glow, I may be tempted to believe that the hills are on fire. Now that is a wrong inference. Why? Because I know that if I go over there I shall not find them red at all, that the apparent redness arises from the falling of the sun's rays upon them. Everybody standing at my point of view would find them apparently on fire, but the phenomenon of appearing to be on fire would not agree with the general context of experience, with the place to which the rest of humanity assigned the phenomenon in its reflection. Accordingly, I come to the conclusion when I reflect on it, that what I did when I

thought the hills were on fire was, not to make a mistake about mere sense impression, but to assign the phenomenon to a wrong place in the context of experience.

In other words, it is wrongly construed experience that makes the difference as regards reality. When people agree about a thing, and so give ground for saying that a phenomenon has appeared in the same way in the common system of their varying perceptions, the accord or correspondence between these experiences is an accord or correspondence for reflection, and not for mere perception. I cannot experience your sensations any more than you can experience mine, but what we can do is to communicate to one another common judgments, identical judgments, which we have formed about these sensations. We can describe them in language, and if you search the language you find that it speaks only in universals. If I say that a thing is *here*, it is to you, looking at it from a distant point of view, *there*. Language is entirely taken up with universals, and conveys them, and describes a system of intellectual constructions which are not events in Space and Time, but are judgments under conceptions which give their meaning, and the only meaning they have, to what are called the individuals of experience.

In knowledge we rise by abstraction, by isolating these universals, and therefore knowledge as such is never reality, because the universal is nothing apart from the individual out of which it

has been taken by abstraction. On the other hand, the individual emptied of universals, the particular as such, is never real, because it *is* only as determined by the universals of knowledge in the individual, a transitory resting place which varies as the universals vary, that the individual has its reality.

Very often the correspondence that is of the essence of reality is correspondence between different points of view. Suppose one man eats a loaf and another watches him doing it, and recognises what he does as a real event. The experience is different in the case of the first man from what it is in the case of the second; but they recognise a common social system, which is the foundation of their common interpretation of what takes place. Therefore, what is real must not only be assented to, which is a matter of will, for belief is an act of will, but it must formally accord with the criterion afforded by a system of common conceptions, and that is what gives it its objectivity.

Well, when in abstract reflection we distinguish thought from its object, we get what we have called the subject, and we have now learned that the subject as distinguished from the object is not reality. It will be convenient to get a phrase to express the view of the ultimate reality of things which insists on the indissoluble union, so far as existence is concerned of subject and object, of universal and particular. We may call what we

come to as the basis of reality Mind, or we may call it Spirit (*Geist*). At any rate it is what is individual, and it holds in a union which is irresoluble, because it is presupposed as the basis of all analysis, the two moments of the universal and the particular which cannot exist outside of it. We cannot deduce it, or the universe which exists in it, in its unique individual form as a "This." You presuppose it in the subject of every judgment. Yet the permanent element is the universal which is isolated, it is true, in reflection only, and which gives us the system in which alone permanence is to be found.

All language is abstract, even the language of poetry. But poetry suggests—its art is to suggest to us—individuals which embody the universal in a highly concrete and sensuous form. Philosophy gives us more permanent light than poetry does. Philosophy moves in the region of abstract thought. But it pays for so doing by being cold and lifeless. Therefore, we want in our world, not only the cold mind of the philosopher, but the feeling of the artist, the moral sense of the good man, the self-surrender of the religious soul. Without these aspects of reality our world would be a very poor one.

We may now consider that we have provisionally defined our ultimate reality as Mind or Spirit. How then do we proceed to view the ordinary world as we have it before us? We

have already seen that its hard-and-fastness to a large extent arises from the conceptions which we bring to bear, and the purposes or ends under which we organise our knowledge. Take, as another example of this, what is called an explosion. Nobody can define what an explosion is. In the book of the great French chemist, Berthelot, there are attempts at a definition; but they come only to this, that an explosion is nothing more than a very rapid burning, and its consequences. But rapidity is a relative word. What appeared to a giant to be an instantaneous detonation, might seem to a gnat to take a very long time — to be almost a slow burning. Their *tempo* is different. So it is with space. From the point of view of the cell, the organism of the body, which is just made up of all the cells acting together, may look very much like what the starry heavens look to us — something very remote and of which we form a mere isolated unit. But it is conceivable—and the speculation has often been entertained—that there may be an organic and conscious life in which we are but as cells in a larger organism, to the intelligence of which we appear in a similar fashion to that in which we view the cells of our own body. In that way the appearance of the universe would be quite transformed by reflection. In other words, the standpoint, or the purpose, or the end for which we are organising knowledge,

and which determines the conception under which we attend and abstract, is what really gives its meaning and hard-and-fastness to the world which confronts us.

As another example, take the extreme transformation which thought makes in the case of sound. Suppose a man, A.B., comes into my room. A person who had never seen him before might think him uninteresting or even repulsive to look at. Another person, who knew that the disfigurement of his face was the result of an accident which he met with in saving his friend's life, and that his short-sighted look was the result of constant study, might think his face expressive of all that is best. He takes up a book and reads a few lines of German. The one man recognises the words as forming one of Goethe's lyrics. A person who did not know German would have one kind of impression, a person who did know it quite another. A.B.'s voice conveys to the one man a mere succession of unintelligible sounds. To the other man it suggests a vast wealth of images and reflections. He forgets the sounds — ceases to distinguish them, thinks only of the sense and the feelings which are awakened. "*Ueber allen Gipfeln ist Ruh.*" From the standpoint of the mere student of acoustics, these sounds form an experience for the listener complete in its individuality. His purpose rests satisfied and seeks nothing beyond. He has brought it under his

special conceptions, converted it by abstraction into universals, and is satisfied. But to the other man, who knows nothing, and cares little about acoustics, the bare sounds cease at once to be bare sounds. They are merged in the thoughts which they awaken. The result is two totally divergent experiences, arising from the fact that the two observers, in whom respectively these experiences have arisen, have different mental furnishings and different purposes. So far as each recognised a man, they had a common impression. But even this was only the outcome of common conception and standpoint. A wild animal might not have even recognised a man. A lizard might not have even recognised a living object. So deep down does the penetrating work of thought reach, and so much does the constitution of experience depend upon conception and purpose. It is the exclusiveness of the standpoint at which I am, and of my abstraction under its conceptions and for its purposes, that make the world seem hard-and-fast. In other words, the world as it seems is determined in its form rather by ends and purposes than by causes.

Now, the German book which awoke such a mighty response in the mind of the man who appreciated the meaning and form of the thoughts expressed in it, would to the dog be only so much paper and ink, and the dog would know no better even after he had chewed it. The reality is thus very different in the case of the

dog and in that of the person with an instructed and developed mind, although so far the basis may be a common one.

It is the necessities of social intercourse among individuals with like purposes to fulfil, purposes ethical and other, which have really made our common world; and in order to fashion, each for himself, the common ethical and general world in which we live, we have adopted certain common ends, and these common ends have developed our common language, our common standpoints, and determined us to abstract from all aspects of the world except those which fit in with these standpoints and purposes.

Suppose somebody asks what is the cause of the fire. The scientific man would say that the fire was caused by the uniting of the atoms of oxygen with the atoms of carbon, but the housemaid would say that the cause of the fire was the putting of the match to it, and from her point of view she would be right. Her business is to apply the match, and with the chemical side of the question she has nothing to do. Thus what is real and true in the world, however important, depends upon its harmony with the context of experience, and is always in a sense relative.

Thought, reflection, is free and self-determining, and can and does select its purposes and ends and the conceptions under which it will work. It is by following certain purposes and ends that the notion

of the hard-and-fastness of the world which confronts us becomes evolved. But, of course, this valuable faculty has its dangerous tendencies. We tend to hypostatise those abstract views which everyday life gives us, so that what are really abstractions become mistaken by us for real things. We can see how this constantly happens. It is enough for me to remind you of the way in which, in even the exact sciences, such abstractions as force and atoms have arisen; working hypotheses which the man of science has hypostatised into notions of real individuals, of which he talks as though they could conceivably be reached through the senses. They are really nothing of the kind, but, as we shall find later, only the outcome of abstraction under certain categories.

What it comes to is this—thought does not make things any more than things make thought. That kind of notion, with its implication of causality, belongs to the old theory of the mind as a thing which looks out from windows of sense at other things in the outside world. This window theory is inadequate from every point of view. It breaks down physiologically, because, if my optic nerve is destroyed, I do not see the outside world. A race of people born without optic nerves would have no sense of sight at all. The realities of things arise by objective construction. Psychologically the window theory is just as inapt, for the reasons

which Berkeley and Mill have given us at length.

Do not be misled by the difficulty which arises from the notion of separate minds, existing outside each other in space and time, on the footing of each one being among many like it. That, again, is only the result of the organisation of our experience under certain categories. I interpret myself as one among many, as one individual among a multitude of individuals in a world in which we all live. I cannot penetrate into your minds or experiences, but by a knowledge of my own I can form a conception of their nature. Professor Ward, in his admirable Gifford Lectures, discusses what a distinguished continental psychologist, Richard Avenarius, used to call "Introjection." It means that my picture of you comes from interpreting. I interpret you in a way which I get by considering myself. Now the notion of myself as the basis from which I do this is only a secondary and derivative notion in the system which is presupposed as the foundation upon which we build up our ideas of separate individuals, each standing to the rest as one among many.

I may observe that the critical philosophy of Kant, one of the greatest systems which the world has ever seen, breaks down just at this point. Kant had to account for experience. He said, "What I have to do is to ask, how is experience possible?" and his view of it was that the activity

of mind, not of mind conceived as an individual with a locality in space and time, because that for Kant was only a derivative conception, but the activity of mind, taken simply as the pure activity of thought constructing its object world, operated upon a certain raw material of sense which he refused to attempt to deduce. Kant never would try to deduce the particulars of sense. But he thought that the activity of intelligence, operating upon the particulars of sense, arranged them in two pure forms of Space and Time. And so the world of experience was constructed, and beyond the limits of the twelve categories which Kant took from the Logic of Aristotle and regarded as exhaustive, he did not allow the categories of experience to go, and he limited the real world to the world of experience so constructed.

Now there are many criticisms to be made on Kant's philosophy. We shall have to deal with the Aristotelian Logic at a later stage. The main criticism which I wish to make — and, indeed, the last word I have to say to you to-day — is that Kant was infected with the psychological point of view, the notion that you can break up experience, that you can treat the particulars of sense as if they could be converted into individuals of experience by the synthetic activity of pure intelligence working from outside them, and, as part of the process, welded together in the independently existing forms of Space and

Time. How far this point of view will carry you, the modern psychologist Münsterberg has shown in his admirable little volume *Psychology and Life.** There the author points out that Psychology, like all other sciences, has got its own categories and conceptions, and that, adopting these categories and conceptions for its own purposes, it views the individual abstractly, busying itself only with certain universal features which it selects by abstraction, and consequently gives rise to the notion that the mind consists of a series of separate feelings or impressions or sensations—in other words, that what is called atomism is the basis on which the mind is built up.

Even by looking into our own minds we can see that this is not true. In watching the development of a child's mind, we see that knowledge grows by the further development of an ἄπειρον by the gradual introduction of definite organisation into a vague continuum. The truth is that Kant, like many other people, illustrates the dangers of those metaphors which make the path of the philosopher at once so easy and so difficult. Experience is no onion, the coats of which can be peeled off one by one. Experience is not a thing to be laid on the dissecting table and taken to pieces. It is the ultimate reality behind which you cannot get if you once realise that it means and is just the individual as the presupposition of knowledge. That is a point of view in which

* Münsterberg, *Psychology and Life.*

Hegel had to correct Kant, in the same way as Aristotle had to correct Plato.

I think that we have now cleared our way so far, and that we may feel that we have got some firm ground on which to tread in making our ascent to a further, and, I am afraid, not less difficult stage of the pathway which we shall have to tread to-morrow.

LECTURE IV

At the commencement of these lectures I told you that my task would be to develop a single thought, and that no novel one. I have in each lecture reiterated the doctrine that the real is the individual, and that it is a fallacy to think that we can divorce the universal from the particular, or find either of them elsewhere than in the concrete experience in which we men and women live and move and have our being. Those of you who are theologians may be thinking of the old Scottish preachers who made a point of expounding in each discourse the scheme of salvation in its completeness. They had a reason for this, and, like them, I have a reason for my reiteration.

My reason is that the acceptance of the doctrine which I have just stated, purified from the language of false metaphors and bad metaphysics, is nothing short of our πού στῶ, and is the basis on which alone we can build up an intelligible view of the Cosmos, and our place in it. Yet we have found that the individual of perception, the real, as we insist that it is, behaves in a way that is unsatis-

factory when we try to keep it in the rigid bonds in which for everyday purposes we seek to bind it. Under reflection it discloses itself as full of contradictions, as self-developing, in as much as the thought which seems to fix it is really self-developing thought of which the conceptions are constantly altering.

When by abstraction we try to hypostatise the individuals of experience into a final and fixed shape, these forms always turn out to be mendacious, to disclose inherent contradictions. Yet they point to fuller and more adequate views of themselves which lie beyond. There was an English judge who was fond of saying that the truth lurks even in an affidavit and will come out, and we may say of the individuals of sense that even in them there unfolds itself a higher view of things. The truth shines through them, as, indeed, the poets have shown us in illustrations such as those which I quoted to you in my last lecture.

Well, at the close of my second lecture I said that I should endeavour to clear the way a little more—to get rid of the weeds which might impede the strokes of the swimmer progressing from the shallow water from which we started to the deeper water in which we must swim if we are to make progress. We have cleared away in the course of these lectures several masses of weeds. We have got rid of the "window" theory of the mind; the metaphor of making or constructing things by thought; the atomism of the old Psycho-

logy; the notion, which misled even Kant, that experience could be divided into elements, and the mind into faculties. All these we have more or less got rid of, and we find ourselves in agreement, not only with great teachers of speculative science like Aristotle, but in this matter with the great critics of life, the great poets and the great artists also.

Goethe, for example, is never tired of telling us that we cannot break up experience, that we must take life as a whole; that even in Science we fail utterly when we forget that we cannot break up the living thing into a mechanism. When the student in *Faust* goes to interview Faust, and finds Mephistopheles dressed up in his gown, Mephistopheles gives him some very wise counsel. Among the wise things which Mephistopheles says to the student is this:

"Wer will was Lebendig's erkennen und beschreiben,
Sucht erst den Geist herauszutreiben,
Dann hat er die Theile in seiner Hand,
Fehlt leider! nur das Geistige Band.
Encheiresin naturæ nennt's die Chemie,
Spottet ihrer selbst, und weiss nicht wie." *

But the name of Goethe and the thought of the scheme of *Faust* suggest to my mind the yet

* "The man who seeks a living thing to know
First seeks to drive the soul out—so,
Then the parts he can hold in his hand and class,
But the soul and the spirit are gone, alas!
Encheiresin naturæ this Chemistry names,
Nor knows how herself she thus mocks at and blames."

wider way in which Goethe put this great truth. Indeed, it underlies and forms the scheme and basis of the whole drama of *Faust.* Let me try to describe it in a few sentences. Faust, as you all remember, is a man who has spent his life in the acquisition of abstract knowledge. He grows old. He is dissatisfied with the want of the richness of life in the universals, the abstract universals, among which he moves. He summons up first of all the Earth Spirit, but he finds between it and himself no affinity. He has cut himself off too completely from the fulness and immediacy of nature. The Earth Spirit tells him that he, Faust, resembles the spirit that he comprehends, and not him, the Earth Spirit. Then Faust goes farther; he is willing to make a bargain with the Powers of Darkness by which he is to get back youth in its freshness and richness, to quaff the full goblet of the senses, and so to make up, as it seems to him, at any rate at the moment, for what he has lost. But then comes in the subtlety, as it has always seemed to me, of the whole poem. Faust's mind is a completely furnished mind; he has lofty categories and perceptions; he knows what truth is; his is the highest point of view. His only mistake has been that he has divorced the world of knowledge too much from the concrete riches of immediacy, and so has won it in an abstract and unsatisfying shape. Well, he makes his bargain with the Power of Darkness, and in the

first part of the play you find the preliminary working out of the tragedy. The bargain is that when Faust shall say to the passing moment, "Stay, thou art fair," he shall then pass into the hands of Mephistopheles. But although in the first part Mephistopheles puts within the reach of Faust, not only the youth which he bargained for, but every kind of delight of the senses, every kind of extravagance of youthful life, Faust remains unsatisfied. The large conceptions of his mind find in the riches of the sense world which are offered to him something divorced from thought, divorced from his own large ends and purposes, and so what is profoundly unsatisfactory. His great mind cannot *find itself*, to use a German expression, in the world which is now opened up to him, and accordingly the first part ends in disaster and misery.

Then comes that second part, which Goethe wrote after the meditation of a quarter of a century. We are introduced to the spectacle of Faust, now a middle-aged man, after the wild career of his youth, lying on a flowery bank, sprinkled by the spirits with the waters of Lethe, in order that he may forget the disappointments of the past. He awakes, goes out into the world of men, just as a middle-aged man in the full strength of his powers would do. He thrusts himself into the life of courts, of state-craft. He endeavours, not from any high or lofty purpose, but merely to give himself the sense of power

satisfied, to control the affairs of his fellow creatures; he succeeds, and yet he is not satisfied. He seeks to bring back by magic power the spectacle of Greek art and of Greek beauty in its noblest form. He gains experience. Still he is not satisfied. For he is desiring these things, not in the light of any large and lofty purpose, but for the mere satisfaction of his individual wishes. Thus his mind still remains divorced from the true object world in which alone it can find reality, find itself again. His universal is not combined with the particular in an individual whole in which it can rest.

The situation remains abstract. But time passes, and there comes a moment when Faust, full of years, but also rich and powerful, sees some poor people on a property of his own, trying to keep out the sea which is breaking through, and destroying their little village. He directs that they should be assisted. He watches them struggling day after day, and struggling at last through his aid successfully, to keep out the waters which have been ruining their land. A new sense, new altogether, is awakened in him. He feels now not only that he is using his power for an unselfish end; he realises that he has found objectivity—he has found a world in which his mind is face to face with what it recognises as real and akin to its own ends and purposes. He feels, too, that here is the real

learning of which he has been in search. And then he says, looking up:—

> "Ja! diesem Sinne bin ich ganz ergeben,
> Das ist der Weisheit letzter Schluss:
> Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben,
> Der täglich sie erobern muss." *

Or, translating these things into the thought that underlies the whole, he only can gain life and freedom who looks upon them, not merely as goods to be desired from outside, and as independent in their nature of his own energies, but as that highest experience which comes to Will and Intelligence only through constant striving to realise themselves at their highest level.

Faust now sees that the former alternative is an untrue view, and that it is only when the mind daily works out for itself, daily earns for itself again its life and freedom through its own exertions, that it can really gain and keep them.

And so it is that in *Faust* you have at the end just what we learn in the Prologue. The Deity in the Prologue, after allowing Mephistopheles to have his will and telling him that, while he may go forth and tempt Faust, he will in the end fail, because Faust is of the higher order

* "Yes, to this thought I hold with firm persistence,
The last result of wisdom stamps it true,
He only earns his freedom and existence,
Who daily conquers them anew!"

of the sons of men, speaks these significant words :—

"Doch ihr, die echten Götter-söhne,
Erfreut euch der lebendig reichen Schöne!
Das Werdende, das ewig wirkt und lebt,
Umfass' euch mit der Liebe holden Schranken,
Und was in schwankender Erscheinung schwebt,
Befestiget mit dauernden Gedanken." *

This is the last injunction of Philosophy, the lesson that Faust is to learn. So the great tragedy of *Faust* is worked out. So it is that Faust's mind at its highest, having found itself again in this the highest conviction, that it must work out its own life and freedom in the larger sphere of action on behalf of others—passes into the Eternal. So it is that when Faust says to the Moment, "Stay, thou art fair," and at that same instant dies, his soul is saved, the bargain notwithstanding; and the Devil, whose categories of comprehension are of a limited order and cannot take in the true meaning of what has happened, finds that his prey has escaped him.

Well, one sees in these illustrations from the poets how if you take the greatest minds in literature, the greatest critics of life, that same thought which underlies Philosophy is constantly repro-

* "But ye the only real Sons of God
Enjoy the rich, the ever living Beauty,
The self-creative changing forms that work and live,
Hold these in bonds of love that never weaken
The self-dissolving shapes that ever move before you
Fix and make firm through thought that stands for ever."

ducing itself. The highest is not to be looked for in some world beyond. It lies in the Here and Now, in just this world comprehended at a loftier plane. We have not to try to deduce the Universe around us. What we have to do is to clear away from our minds the rubbish of hypostatised abstractions, which hinder us from apprehending the nature of reality under adequate conceptions and categories.

Now the Greeks were probably less hampered than we are in thinking after this fashion, because their minds were free from some at least of the abstractions that trouble us. For example, take the great distinction which runs through modern Philosophy, and which I started with in the first lecture, the distinction between subject and object. Scarcely a trace of it is to be found in definite form anywhere in Greek Philosophy. Aristotle, who was systematic if anybody was, makes it clear that in the individual nature of actuality he does not recognise a divorce between what we should call subject and object, nor yet a divorce between the universal and the particular. He is perfectly aware that there is an aspect in which the mind appears as the mind of a particular person, and in which nature confronts the mind in that form as something foreign. He knows that Philosophy has to take account of the fact that the world itself belongs to the field of nature, and that in the object world the mind finds itself as a thing in time and space with a

history and a body. For mind in this aspect the particulars of sense come first. Yet these particulars, and the individual intelligence, and the system which is the outcome of thinking of it at this standpoint, presuppose a deeper view of mind in which the categories of the particular self are transcended.

In the Third Book of the *De Animâ*, in the fifth chapter, Aristotle, after dwelling on the double character of Νοῦς or Reason, which, he says, can perceive and so *become* all things, and also *create* all things, goes on:—

"This phase of reason is separate from and uncompounded with material conditions, and, being in its essential character fully and actually realised, it is not subject to impressions from without: for the creative is in every case more honourable than the passive, just as the originating principle is superior to the matter which it forms. And thus, though knowledge as an actually realised condition is identical with its object, this knowledge as a potential capacity is in time prior in the individual, though in universal existence it is not even in time thus prior to actual thought. Further, this creative reason does not at one time think, at another time not think [it thinks eternally], and, when separated from the body, it remains nothing but what it essentially is: and thus it is alone immortal and eternal. Of this unceasing work of thought, however, we retain no memory, because this reason is

unaffected by its objects; whereas the receptive passive intellect (which is affected) is perishable, and can really think nothing without the support of the creative intellect." *

In other words, putting aside metaphors, which Aristotle uses and understands, he is drawing the distinction between intelligence as taken at two planes, the passive reason, intelligence viewed abstractly and at a standpoint from which it exhibits itself as within nature; and, on the other hand, the active reason or intelligence conceived as the mind or spirit within which the universal and particular fall, combined in the individual within which they are inseparable except by abstraction.

Now, another remarkable thing about Aristotle is the way in which he realises that when we get to the standpoint of the active reason, of mind or spirit, as we should call it in modern parlance, we have got away from the embarrassing conception of the relationship of the one and the many. It has always been a great difficulty to those who looked at these things uncritically to understand how, if idealism is true, the mind can be one thing among many. Aristotle sees perfectly plainly that the mind can be regarded as one thing among many only when it is looked at from the point of view of a stage of thought which is not that of speculative knowledge.

* Wallace's Translation, p. 161.

Now, we have always to bear in mind the difference between these two planes of thought or ways of looking at the individual. The standpoint of A.B. as a person in this world, with a name and a history and relationships, is one that we cannot possibly get away from. The very basis of my being here and speaking to you, and myself thinking and reflecting, is that I am just this particular individual with a particular mental and physical history, surroundings, and relationships. It is on that very basis that I proceed. But then, it is just because we have learned that mind, in so far as it is the ultimate reality, is not a thing distinct from mind looked at from the point of view of individual experience, but a fuller thinking out of what already is potentially there in the individuals of first experience, that the gulf which has so embarrassed people who approach the consideration of Philosophy is bridged over. We find in everyday life that the individual of experience is not taken as final. We do not either in theory or in practice limit our consideration by the assumption that the individual so taken is an end in himself. The soldier on the battle-field who goes to death without a doubt for his country, transcends the individual standpoint. The martyr at the stake does so likewise. And in the field of Science the mathematician who goes beyond immediacy, and reasons about the relations of space in the region of remote worlds, has also transcended

the immediacy of the senses, and has carried the power of reflection, through abstract methods, to a point which has enabled it to break through the limits of his powers of direct perception. Then again, the mathematician gives us other illustrations of the extraordinary power of thought to transcend itself. He can use the symbols in mathematics of impossible quantities —quantities of which he cannot predicate existence, but which are yet symbolical of relationships which, in mathematics, are not only realised, but made practical use of.

The poet, again, who makes us realise the overwhelming presence of what eye hath not seen nor ear heard, teaches us, in Matthew Arnold's phrase, "to see life steadily, and to see it whole."

In our everyday life we, at every moment, transcend the point of view of mere individuality. However much the plain man may find that the standpoint of individuality is a necessary and useful one, it is a standpoint which is necessary and useful only within the limits of the purposes for which it is made available. Without it we could not get on. Unless I, by an abstraction, which, for the purposes of social intercourse, is essential, looked upon myself as a thing with a particular mind and history attached to it, as a being standing in social relationships, it would be impossible for me to conduct any conversation with you or to live in a common social

world. It is only on the basis of the relationship of the one and the many, it is on the basis of assuming this relationship as our working hypothesis, that we can make any progress at all, and the assumption is, I need not say, a legitimate one. Of course, even on that footing, the assumption is only valuable and legitimate when used for everyday purposes, and it is certainly an assumption which will not stand when we come to the purposes of speculative thought.

For social purposes we must regard men, women, and children as beings with histories and names, and look upon them as things with minds in them which peer through the windows of the senses and possess faculties. It is necessary for everyday life. It is a common way of looking at things which we have evolved and use in social life.

But in social life we have got complex points of view. Even the everyday person, in his everyday conduct, is constantly coming upon a standpoint which transcends these purposes. The moral law, religion and the church, the state and the duties of the citizen, these all carry you beyond the individual, and they carry you beyond the individual in the very midst of an experience which we treat as single and do not break up, because it is our everyday life, in which we have no need to distinguish the purposes and standpoints which combine in focussing it. All these

standpoints and purposes seem to combine and lie side by side in producing the complex whole of what we call social life.

I showed you that the relation of cause and effect would not bear looking at in the case of the housemaid putting a match to the fire. I pointed out to you that what she did was not in any intelligible sense a cause, that the potential energy in the wood was just as much the cause of the fire as the putting of the match to it. But it was for the social purpose of responsibility to those who had the direction of the affairs of the house, that the housemaid, in explaining the cause of the fire, selected this conception—over which she had control. Well, cause and effect is just an illustration of that rough-and-ready kind of conception which we use in everyday life and which we hypostatise. We talk of a "cause" as though it were some event which we could separate off from other events and consider by itself; whereas, when we look scientifically at the burning of the fire we find that the cause is only the totality of the conditions, and that the effect is nothing else but these taken as a whole. But we hypostatise the one feature which we have selected and called the cause. We tend in consequence to apply this category where it has no application at all —to apply it to the nature of ultimate reality, to apply it to the nature of God, to apply it in the symbols and forms which the poets and artists in their own way use. Only the poets

and artists see, shining through these images, that higher aspect of the truth which discloses the contradictory and transient nature of all these hypostatised individuals which, by abstract conceptions, we figure to ourselves.

It is, of course—as I have often said in the course of these lectures—our social purposes which develop this way of looking at things. The desire to communicate with those around it develops the child's intellect more than anything or anybody else. Language enables us to think and compare our conceptions, and yet if there is anything which has become plain it is that language conveys, not the experience of the individual, because that is unique and incommunicable, but universals, conceptions which enable other people to view their individual experience from just the same plane or standpoint as our own. There is not a single word in language which does not import a universal. We talk in universals, and it is our social necessities which have caused us to develop our faculty of communicating in this fashion to an extent of which we are wholly unconscious.

What we have to do, starting on the basis of the view of the self as an individual being in the world, is to disentangle the highest plane of comprehension which is implicit in that individuality, and which emerges when we let thought play upon itself. Of course Philosophy, when it does this systematically, is abstract. Philosophy is always abstract, but art and religion, which operate sym-

bolically, help to a closer grasp, and they have their justification from Philosophy even though it must at times criticise them. But apart from the test of Philosophy, which never can give you the full richness which you have in art or religion, but which can give you a test of their truth, they are, as Professor James has pointed out, no safe guides to truth.

Well, we have got to deal with the individual self in this light, that it is a conception which is never wholly thought out, and in which we cannot really rest. People talk as if they knew what they meant by their individual selves, but if they analyse there is nothing more difficult than to say what they mean when they use the phrase. The world thinks of A.B.'s particular appearance, name, family, body, clothes even, and so on. But he may change his name, may ignore his relationships, may go to a country where he is not known, and still remain himself. He is identified for new reasons, and a self with different particulars is attributed to him. Now what is his real self? Not his body, because his hand, for instance, he can cut off, and still remain himself. Not his memory even, because although his memory fails him, he will still be recognised as a self. Certainly not his history and relationships, because if these were unknown or had been forgotten, he would still be credited with his selfhood. It is very difficult really to come to any other conclusion than that the word "self" is like the word

"cause," one of these outcomes of half thought out standpoints which are useful in everyday life, but which will not bear the dry light of Science.

The self may be taken to mean the corporeal feeling—the feeling of the body that one has as something distinct from outside things *in* which one does not feel, but which can make the body feel. But even that is a vanishing conception if we understand the process of Metabolism. The body is always changing its substance, and taking in new material. The truth is, that you can extrude, one by one, the particulars which you try to hypostatise as the elements in the self. You find that they are merely made part of the Ego, and that the notion of the self as comprising them, although a necessary and valuable working hypothesis, is a notion that will not stand the test of reflection even at the level at which we mean by the self an individual in space and time, one among others. If, on the other hand, I try to confine the identification of the self to what belongs to pure thought, I find that I am in a difficulty of another kind, because if I abstract from all my internal experience, if I distinguish my emotions, feelings, experiences, from the subject *for* which they are, I get back to the pure abstraction of mere thinking, and that again is so unreal that, divorced from its particulars, divorced from its manifestation in an object world, I cannot even name it, so completely have I eliminated all reality from it.

The truth is, that in order to get the real meaning of self, you must go to a more complete view of mind than the one with which we have just been dealing. We have been chasing a *supposed* individual which we cannot find just because it is an abstraction, and have been trying to identify it with reality. Its notion discloses itself as full of contradictions, as a notion which has only emerged because people are forced to go beyond the old "window" theory of the mind as a thing with faculties. Hume was perfectly right in declaring that he could catch no separate idea of the self when he looked into his mind. If your method is to look into the mind, regarded as a stream of psychical occurrences, you will find no presentation of a substance which manifests itself in them. It is only when you realise that there is another aspect of mind that you cease to trouble yourself. Knowledge, final reality, is Mind; for the final reality is always in an individual form. Your self, your personality, is a phase of final reality which it is a fallacy to seek to find as existing independently of that in which it manifests itself. It is that on which the entirety of experience is dependent. Your self is not the final and ultimate fact, the individual which only discloses itself as free from contradictions, when you have brought to the understanding of it the highest categories. Your self spoken of in everyday parlance is only that same

ultimate reality viewed from the lower standpoint at which it is presented as one among many. You are on a wild-goose chase when you try to identify it with any particulars of experience, divorced from the movement of thought in which they are set, and in which they have their being. It is the abstractness of your point of view that has given rise to the difficulty.

Now, it is easy to state these things, and it is extremely difficult to get a concrete conception of them before the mind. We are in a region where we have passed beyond the conceptions of everyday life; but it is well for anybody who is discouraged by such a reflection to remember that we have exactly the same sort of difficulties in the Sciences. In pure mathematics, for instance, and particularly in the calculus, there is the same turning upside down of our everyday conceptions. But the view which I have put before you is the view not of one system only, but of every concrete system of Idealism.

In his *Logic*, Hegel gives a description which I should like to quote, as putting, in other words, just what I have been trying to state to you. He says:—

*"If thought never gets further than the universality of the Ideas, as was perforce the case in the first philosophies (when the Eleatics

* Hegel's *Encyclopädie*, par. 12. *The Logic of Hegel*; Wallace's Translation, Second Edition, p. 21.

never got beyond Being, or Heraclitus beyond Becoming), it is justly open to the charge of formalism. Even in a more advanced phase of Philosophy we may often find a doctrine which has mastered merely certain abstract propositions or formulæ, such as 'In the absolute all is one'" — (elsewhere he likens Schelling's Absolute to the night in which all cows look black) — "'Subject and object are identical,'—and only repeating the same thing when it comes to particulars. Bearing in mind this first period of thought, the period of mere generality, we may safely say that experience is the real author of *growth* and *advance* in Philosophy. For, firstly, the empirical sciences do not stop short at the mere observation of the individual features of a phenomenon. By the aid of thought they are able to meet Philosophy with materials prepared for it, in the shape of general uniformities, *i.e.*, laws and classifications of phenomena. When this is done, the particular facts which they contain are ready to be received into Philosophy. This, secondly, implies a certain compulsion on thought itself to proceed to these concrete specific truths. The reception into Philosophy of these scientific materials, now that thought has removed their immediacy and made them cease to be mere data, forms at the same time a development of thought out of itself. Philosophy then owes its development to the empirical sciences. In return it gives their contents, what is so vital to them,

the freedom of thought." . . . "The fact as experienced thus becomes an illustration and a copy of the original and completely self-supporting activity of thought."

In other words, he says, that the work of thinking is to transform the individual of experience by setting it in new lights at the standpoint to which thought has now attained. One might multiply illustrations of this. What he says is as true of the Sciences as of Philosophy. The illustration which I gave you of the fire shows how thought carries you beyond mere immediacy to the conceptions which give to mere immediacy its meaning, and it shows the play of thought with the individual. We always start from a "that." The judgment of knowledge is always about a "that." My recognition as such of that glass of water standing on the table is a judgment which starts from a "that"—a "that" which is indefinite, which I qualify and make definite by the conceptions which I bring to bear on it. The "that" is always relative and transient. With new standpoints, with further insight, the "that," the glass of water, gets a new meaning for me. It may be that I am thinking of it now with the knowledge of certain chemical combinations. The process of developing the content is always going on. Water may mean the same to you and me so long as we look at it from the same point of view, but water means a very different thing from the point of view of the chemist from what it does from the

point of view of the man who merely drinks it. For the chemist the "that" has had a further "what" incorporated in it, and is enriched. If we say that the *Esse* of the subject in judgment is *Intelligi*, that is true in a sense, provided that we are careful that we understand and eliminate the metaphor, which represents the subject as separable from the entirety of reality, and the predicate as separable from it otherwise than by abstraction. It is a very useful phrase for making plain the dependence of the "that" of individual actuality on the universals of thought, and the nothingness of mere feeling. But we cannot, as I have often said, separate thought from things except by abstraction.

The picture of a pure self-consciousness regarding things from the highest standpoint, finding itself in its objects and no longer troubled by any distinction between the object world and itself, because it has got rid of all the abstractions of lower standpoints, such a picture we cannot present to ourselves, because we are compelled to view the universe from the standpoint of the particular individual. But by reflection we may get towards the grasp of the concrete truth that this is the final conception of the self, the real foundation and meaning of experience, and that it is really actualised in experience.

Well, from this standpoint we eliminate the notion of nature as being related to intelligence as an effect to a cause, and we cease to attempt

any deduction of nature. This is expressed in a passage in Hegel where he speaks of* "the one living Mind whose nature is to think, to bring to self-consciousness what it is, and, with its being thus set as object before it, to be at the same time raised above it, and so to reach a higher stage of its own being." The "that" of mind so regarded confronts us in self-consciousness as the ultimate fact, the finally real, and the business of Philosophy seems to be just to allow reflection, freed from wrong categories and metaphors, to allow the movement of mind to disentangle its own nature, and to bring it to self-consciousness. As Goethe said :—

> "Natur hat weder Kern noch Schale,
> Alles ist sie mit einem Male."

"Nature has no kernel as apart from husk." All aspects cohere in it and are inseparable. We cannot break them up, and the test of whether we have successfully disentangled the movement of thought, comprehended and grasped its concrete nature, seems to be this :—Can we show that the world seen from the higher standpoint is disclosed as reality, as compared with the world seen from the lower standpoint which by contrast is appearance only ?

In the realm of feeling we know that the great artist does this, and that the good man does it,

* Hegel's *Encyclopädie,* par. 13. *The Logic of Hegel;* Wallace's Translation, Second Edition, p. 22.

and he also who is in the deepest sense religious. They may give us no detailed picture of what they see. But their ideal worlds shine through immediacy, and disclose themselves to the eye of faith as its truth. The task of Philosophy is to make the ideal actual for the eye of knowledge.

There is only a single actual universe, the universe which, in one abstract aspect is thought, in another, nature, in its concrete, individual, living actuality, mind. This same actuality presents to us its different aspects according to the plane of intelligence at which we approach it. With the categories we employ its degrees of appearance vary and arrange themselves. These degrees of appearance, degrees not of substance but of comprehension, give us the differing and changing aspects of the world as it seems, and, it may be, the justification for our faith in their several titles to places in reality.

LECTURE V

We may now pause for a moment to look back on the road which we have trodden. If it be true that the divorce between the mind and the object world of experience has disclosed itself as provisional only, and in fact and in truth no longer exists for us, then we have reached ground from which a new view of what lies ahead of us must begin to unfold itself. The end, the final form of reality, can no longer be sought for as mere mechanism, or as the last link in a chain of temporal evolution. That end, that form, must have been implied and present at the very beginning, and hidden from us only by a veil woven out of abstractions. If our purposes determine the aspect for us of the world as it seems, then moral ideals have played a large part in shaping and fashioning that world. If the cause presupposes for its own existence the effect, if in the law of nature mind is only rediscovering and dragging into the light its own activity, then what we take to come last must really be first. If the truth of the universe be my individual experience thought out to the point

at which my finite individuality becomes disclosed as the outcome of a distinction which mind itself has brought about, there is no longer any reason why I should hold my world to be cut off from God as from Another.

The objective world, and the system of universals which give to it reality, disclose themselves as but the workings of a mind which is not another than mine, but the mind in which all reality, myself included, has its place. The development of my own knowledge is but the struggle towards a plane of comprehension, which, just because it is the presupposition and basis of finite experience, compels my reason to accept it as the truth, as what intelligence, at the standpoint of the individual, did not make and cannot alter. "From the goblet of our spiritual kingdom our infinity foams back to us," and we learn that the world can only be fully comprehended when it is viewed *sub specie aeternitatis.* We are compelled to throw off the abstract "either, or" of the finite understanding, and cease to take it as a garb in which full knowledge can disclose itself. Reality has its degrees of appearance, and to one among these degrees belongs the human mind and the object world with which it is bound up, in the indissoluble unity of what is individual.

Within that object world the self appears, appears as human, as, if you please, the outcome of a process of evolution through boundless time and in unending space, but yet *for* thought, *for*

itself. Think out the content of this individual experience, and its sharp lines give place to yet other distinctions, which drive us from causes to laws; from laws to ends; from nature to spirit, the last in reflection, the first in the system of reality, presupposed by and determining the course of reflection. What was always implicit is thus made explicit. The "this" is qualified by the incorporation in it of a further "what," and so, while still the "this," has become richer. The judgment in which the universe is sustained now discloses itself as the very presupposition of time and space, and as in nowise presupposing them.

In the last three Lectures I have tried to bring out certain truths, and these truths I may now summarise in propositions. The first of these propositions is that intelligence is free and self-determining. Now, I do not need to elaborate the meaning of the word freedom, because I dealt with it in a former Lecture. I need only remind you that negatively its definition implies that the relation of cause and effect is totally inapplicable to the relation of motive and volition, and that, therefore, the problem of free will, which has given occasion for so much discussion and so much troubling of spirit, is founded upon a false metaphor, and disappears. The mind is free to choose its course of action. It acts rationally, with the power to abstract from any phase of its content, and in that sense it is completely free from the chain of necessity which is expressed by

the word "causation." The dilemma about free-will is just one of those applications of what Hegel was fond of calling, in the words just quoted, the "either, or" of the abstract understanding; the understanding which says that things must come either within species "A" or within species "not A," and so creates a dilemma which turns out to have no application, as soon as you see that the genus is too narrow for the subject matter which you are trying to bring under it.

In the second place, we may take as a leading proposition of these lectures that the foreignness and hard-and-fastness of our everyday experience of the world that confronts us, is the outcome of a system of social and other purposes with reference to which we have been forced to organise our knowledge in order to fulfil them. The abstractions made for these purposes, have given rise to what I have called "superstitions of common sense," superstitions which arise when you try to apply what you have got in this fashion to speculative problems, which lie outside the scope of everyday reflection. Individual experience, the knowledge that I have of the world as it stretches out before me, is always relative; that is to say, however definite it may seem, it turns out to owe its definiteness to my adherence to a standpoint, with the result that when that standpoint changes, the form of this individual experience changes with it. The only element in

knowledge which is permanent and abiding and never alters, is the system of the conceptions and categories of thought, which must be the same for all individual minds. Otherwise, we could raise no question of any kind, not even the question of the sceptic, which, like every other, assumes that reason is able to raise doubts which, for the very statement of their validity, depend on her own capacity for truth.

Then, as a third proposition, I may take this, that ends and not causes make the world seem as it does. That is a corollary of the last proposition, and I need not further explain it.

Passing to the fourth proposition, this, I think, may be taken to be that we ought to be prepared to believe in the different aspects of the world as it seems—life, for example, as much as mechanism; morality as much as life; religion as much as morality—for these belong to different aspects of the world as it seems, aspects which emerge at different standpoints, and are the results of different purposes and different categories in the organisation of knowledge. And if Philosophy gives us back what Science threatens to take away, and restores to plain people their faith in the reality of each of these phases of the world as it seems, then Philosophy will have gone a long way to justify her existence.

Finally, and as a fifth proposition, we may say that it is a fallacy to imagine that there can be any question of trying to deduce nature. All experi-

ence is individual in its form, as I have already endeavoured to show you. We start from the individual. It is the "that" with regard to which every judgment is made, and it is the foundation and presupposition of self-consciousness — the ultimate form of experience from which we cannot get away, and which closes for us the circle. The work of thought is merely to examine, develop, and further define, what is implicit in that experience. The notion of deducing the universe, of showing it as construction of thought, is really a remnant of that old notion, which, I trust, I have succeeded in expelling, the "window" theory of the mind as a thing with faculties of different kinds through which it reaches out to a world independent of it. What is called the finite self, a thing with a proper name, manifesting itself in a body, one day to be carried off in a coffin, exists only within the system of experience, and the notion of it is a secondary and derivative one.

Well, it remains open to Philosophy, taking individuality as in this sense ultimate, and only by abstraction resoluble into the moments of the particular and the universal, to exhibit the work of abstract reflection in forming the "that" at each particular stage in reality. Now, as the "that" is always relative, and as its aspect varies with the standpoint from which we approach it, we may thus show the pulsation—if I may use a metaphor—of thought in the shaping of

individuality. We may even try to disentangle and arrange the abstract conceptions which go to this shaping to the extent of throwing them into a system, as Hegel sought to do. But Hegel never tried to deduce the "that"—although he has been misinterpreted as doing so, and abused in consequence. The very foundation of his Philosophy was that you could not deduce the "that," and, agreeing with Aristotle in this conclusion, what he endeavoured to do was to unfold the "what," the characterisation of the "that" with which he had to start.

Now, there have been many critics who have attributed to Hegel doctrines which he never put forward, just as others have attributed to Aristotle things which he never said. Even distinguished men like Trendelenburg seem to treat the Hegelian system as though it should be looked at as being an attempt to resolve experience into universals, and nothing else. But there is a much more sympathetic and understanding critic of Hegel, one whom you all know here, Professor Pringle Pattison. Professor Pringle Pattison, in his last work, *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, has given a view of the Hegelian Philosophy, which is, to my mind, such an admirable piece of work, that really I have little comment to make upon it, except that I would like to have more from the same pen. In an earlier book, however, *Hegelianism and Personality*, he has made some criticisms with which I feel myself not wholly

able to agree; because I do not think he has done the Hegelian system full justice. There are, even in his last book, some points on which Professor Pringle Pattison seems to separate himself from the Hegelian conclusion, but they are so minute compared with those which he raises in the earlier book, that I will only allude to them very shortly.

For instance, Professor Pringle Pattison takes this ground. Hegel, he says, rightly declared that it was impossible to go beyond the individuals of experience; with that experience you must start, and can only re-think experience and recognise in it degrees of reality. But then, he asks, what did Hegel regard as the highest view of reality; what does he give us as the final view of ultimate reality? And, alluding to Hegel's doctrine of the development of the World Spirit, Professor Pringle Pattison says that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Hegel meant to take human self-consciousness, as it appeared in the nineteenth century, and with that to identify the highest manifestation of absolute mind. Well, in this view Professor Pringle Pattison is following Lotze, who made the same criticism of Hegel, and declared that it was impossible to think that the movement of the absolute mind could have culminated in what he called "a dialectical idyll on the shores of the Mediterranean." I notice that most of those who demur to the shores of the Mediterranean,

seem anxious to suggest that the culmination of the manifestation of absolute mind is rather to be found upon the banks of the Jordan. But neither Lotze nor Professor Pringle Pattison say this, and my own view is that Hegel would not have recognised that there was any real issue which could legitimately be raised between his point of view and theirs.

Hegel took human experience as he found it, and sought to think it out again in the light of the science of his age. He set himself to solve the very same problem which Aristotle put before himself—how to present as a system human experience taken in the light of the highest conceptions which could be brought to bear upon it. Hegel never, as I think, meant to identify the absolute mind with human consciousness; or to say that, because the absolute mind manifested itself at a particular plane of its development in what we call human consciousness, you had, therefore, got an adequate picture of the absolute mind. What I understand him to have meant is that you must always deal with the "that," with an individual, and that in the stage of history which in our time has been reached—we have got what for us is the highest picture of it, with the certainty that as knowledge gets richer we shall get to a conception yet more adequate, and that, if human thought were not subject to the limitations of human weakness, we might have a conception of absolute mind beyond any which

discloses itself in even the very highest contemporary manifestation of human self-consciousness. And, therefore, it seems to me that Professor Pringle Pattison, in the countenance he lends to Lotze's criticism, is hardly doing justice to Hegel, because, although I agree that there are ambiguous passages in Hegel, commentators like Dr Hutchison Stirling have pointed to other passages in which his (Hegel's) conclusions on this point are in a different sense.

Now, in his book *Hegelianism and Personality*,* Professor Pringle Pattison takes another point. He says that Hegel "deprives man of his proper self by reducing him, as it were, to an object of a Universal Thinker," and "leaves the Universal Thinker also without any true personality." Then he goes on, † "If we speak of God at all, there must be a divine centre of thought, activity, and enjoyment, to which no mortal can penetrate." "The point of my criticism has been that in its execution the system breaks down, and ultimately sacrifices these very interests to a logical abstraction styled the Idea, in which both God and man disappear."

It is no business of mine to stand up here as the apologist of Hegel or of any other philosopher, but I think that the Hegelian conception is so closely akin to the conception which we have been

* *Hegelianism and Personality*, Second Edition, p. 233.
† *Ibid.*, p. 224.
‡ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

discussing through these Lectures that it is right to point out that this conclusion of Professor Pringle Pattison seems to be founded upon a too narrow view of what is the outcome of this way of looking at things. It seems to assume that very separation of the universal of thought from the particular which we have been combating. Of course, Professor Pringle Pattison's standpoint is very different from that of Professor James and Mr Arthur Balfour. He accepts the entire Hegelian criticism and most of the constructive side of the system, and only stops short at the end; and in the later book, *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, in his admirable critique of Mr Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, he does not even stop short at the point where he stops in the earlier work, but pronounces himself frankly Hegelian.

In his little book on *Theism*, Professor Pringle Pattison again illustrates the gulf which separates him from Professor James and Mr Balfour. Agreeing with the Hegelian criticism upon those who deny or ignore the immanence of reason in the world, he doubts * whether Hegel did not assign to reason too important a part. "It is well, as Hegel does, to insist on the *rational* character of the Universe, but to make Thought the exclusive principle is either to fall into a one-sided extreme or to use 'thought' in a non-natural sense. Thought cannot fairly be made to include will,

* *Theism*, p. 45.

and any theory of the Universe which neglects the fact of will omits that which seems to communicate a living reality to the whole. A system which, like Hegel's, lays exclusive stress on thought, is always in danger of reducing the Universe to a phantasm of the intellect—an impersonal system of thought harmony—or, in Mr Bradley's vivid phrase, 'an unearthly Ballet of bloodless categories.' 'In the purposive "I will" each man is real, and is immediately conscious of his own reality.'" *

That is Professor Pringle Pattison's criticism, and if Hegel had really laid down the doctrine against which he is contending, I should agree with that criticism. But whatever shortcomings in expression there are here and there in Hegel, they seem to me to arise, not from a want of desire to insist on the "that" in self-consciousness, but from a habit he had of constantly using his own special terminology in description. He is perfectly well aware of the limitations which language imposes on him. Does he really differ from the conclusion arrived at by Professor Pringle Pattison? Let us see. I will quote first from the Introduction to his "Logic" in the *Encyclopædia* †:—"The content, of whatever kind it be," writes Hegel, "with which our consciousness is taken up is what constitutes the qualitative char-

* *Theism*, p. 46.

† Hegel's *Encyclopädie*, par. 3. *The Logic of Hegel*; Wallace's Translation, Second Edition, p. 6.

acter of our feelings, perceptions, fancies, and ideas; of our aims and duties; and of our thoughts and notions. From this point of view feeling, perception, etc., are the *forms* assumed by these contents. The contents remain one and the same, whether they are felt, seen, represented, or willed, and whether they are merely felt, or felt with an admixture of thoughts, or merely and simply thought. In any one of these forms, or in the admixture of several, the contents confront consciousness, or are its *object.* But when they are thus objects of consciousness, the modes of the several forms ally themselves with the contents; and each form of them appears in consequence to give rise to a special object. Thus what is the same at bottom may look like a different sort of fact." Now let us pass on to the third part of the *Encyclopædia* and see what Hegel says of the nature of mind when he comes to deal with it: * "The essential but formally essential feature of the mind is Liberty," he says, "*i.e.*, it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect it *may* withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite *pain*, the negation of its individual immediacy; in other words, it can keep itself affirmative in this negativity, and possess its own identity." "The distinction of Intelligence from Will is

* Hegel's *Encyclopädie*, par. 382. Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind;* Wallace's Translation, p. 6.

often incorrectly taken to mean that each has a fixed and separate existence of its own,"—(the very point which Professor Pringle Pattison falls foul of; Hegel has the very distinction which Professor Pringle Pattison deals with clearly in view)—"as if volition could be without intelligence, or the activity of intelligence could be without will. The possibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched, as it is said, and of the heart without the intellect—of hearts which in a one-sided way want intellect, and heartless intellects—only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. But it is not Philosophy which should take such untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth—take the worthless for the essential nature. A host of other phrases used of intelligence, *e.g.*, that it receives and accepts impressions from outside, that ideas arise through the causal operations of external things upon it, etc., belong to a point of view utterly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study." *

Now Hegel does not here deny the distinction between will and intellect. What he says is that it turns out to have been provisional merely when it is examined from a standpoint at which neither will nor intellect is reducible to the other, but is shown to have been distinguished only by abstraction, legitimate for the purposes of everyday life,

* Hegel's *Encyclopädie*, par. 445. Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*; Wallace's Translation, p. 64.

but not legitimate when the ultimate nature of reality is being sought. The objection to his language is like the objection to the language of the mathematician, who is sometimes forced by the necessities of usage to speak of *dy* as if it could be separated from *dx*.

If Hegel were reducing the Universe to self-subsisting substance, as Spinoza did, there would be room for the charge that he reduces God, not only to a bare identity, but to human self-consciousness. But the human self-consciousness is only an aspect, a stage, a plane, a degree in Reality. The dog and the angel disclose other degrees of the logical evolution of the categories of mind. And human self-consciousness, like all that is individual, transcends itself. In art, morality, religion, when we come later on to deal with them, we shall see that this is so, and that their prophets have told us the truth.

There is no warrant in the mere fact that human self-consciousness is our "that" — our πού στῶ—the basis upon which we conduct not only the whole of our everyday intercourse with our fellow creatures, but our most abstruse and scientific thinking — there is no warrant in this, I say, for regarding human self-consciousness as more than a finite and relative presentation of Reality. The great doctrine of Hegel, and, as I read him, of Aristotle, is that when the immediacy of our world of self-consciousness is thought out, its "that" discloses a new significance, a

fuller "what," seen to be its meaning at a plane on which intelligence and will are no longer separated by the appearance of pertaining to different faculties. Personality may in one sense be said to be the highest of all categories—the conception in which the transcending of subject and object takes place, and the mind is *in* its object and the object is *for* the mind. Now if the universal and the particular are indissolubly united in the individual, you have equally got the union in that highest conception of individual experience which you have in personality. In personality the whole manifests itself in the parts as it does in life, but in personality there is a great deal more. You have got the relationship at that level which I pointed out to you when I was examining the distinction between consciousness and life, a level at which the self excludes nothing, but comprises the entire Universe. For the objectivity of this Universe is, as we have seen, wholly the work of the mind, and is thus *for* it; while, on the other hand, the mind *is* only in so far as it realises itself, or, in other words, only in so far as the universal and particular have reality in their union in this work. The self, the spirit, is the totality of a process, which, so far from taking place in time, is presupposed as the condition through which experience in time becomes possible. Thus the self is free, and in so far as it comprehends itself as free, it is a person. It is then difficult to see how we

get rid of the conception of mind as personal. Personality is just the basis on which we proceed as soon as reflection has overcome for us the apparent foreignness of the object world, and even when thought out at its highest, it would seem as though the mind must still be characterised by what we call self-conscious personality. It may be that along these lines there is possible a conception of personality, so much above the plane of human experience, that it must properly become an object of what we call worship. In relation to such a personality, our own separate minds may turn out to be, when the provisional nature of the level at which they are for us is fully grasped, mere appearance. At such a standpoint, the categories of the One of the Many, would, of course, be transcended. But I will not linger over the conception of personality in this highest sense, because I shall have to return to it in the second course of these Lectures.

What hampers us is that we start in the hard-and-fastness of common perception from the level of the particular individual, and that it is only in the universals of reflection that we are, at that level, able to transcend it. If I am to remain a human being, if I am to continue to stand as I do to my kind, I must, even in my philosophy, be human; that is to say, it is only in reflection, and occasionally in the *aperçus* of art, that, at least on the theoretical side, I can transcend my standpoint. And yet in various phases of

life which are not theoretical, I do transcend my standpoint. The artist, the poet, the moral being, the religious man—they seem to escape from the closed circle. They touch a higher level; it seems as if they could comprehend at a higher plane of intelligence, and thereby they show us how even finite beings can approach near to God.

Hegel has a sentence which is worth quoting in this connection, because he shows in it how essential reason, the power of thinking, is to religion. He points out that the beast which does not think, in the sense in which we are using the word, is not religious; and that the higher you go in the scale of capacity to *think*, the more distinctly do art, morality, and religion emerge, so that it becomes plain that these are just phases in which thought is manifesting itself. He says:* "Man—and that just because it is his nature to think—is the only being that possesses law, religion, and morality. In these spheres of human life, therefore, thinking under the guise of feeling, faith, or generalised image, has not been inactive: its action and its productions are there present and therein contained."

Now, in connection with this topic, my predecessor in one of these Lectureships, Professor Royce of Harvard, has made some striking contributions to the treatment of the subject. In the chapter headed "The Union of God and

* Hegel's *Encyclopädie*, par. 2. *The Logic of Hegel*; Wallace's Translation, p. 5.

Man," in the second volume of the series of Gifford Lectures which he calls *The World and the Individual*, he asks the question: How can I know my finite nature? He answers that, rightly viewed, I am linked, even in my weakness, to the life of God, and the whole Universe is linked with the meaning of each individual. In God, he says, I possess my individuality. The human self is not a substance, it is not a thing, but a life with a meaning. No one can more strenuously than Royce refuse to separate Intelligence from Will. The individual is for him the embodiment of a meaning, a purpose, an end, in which Intelligence and Will are found to be one.

* "Personality, to our view, is an essentially ethical category. A person is a conscious being whose life, temporally viewed, seeks its completion through deeds, while this same life, eternally viewed, consciously attains its perfection by means of the present knowledge of the whole of its temporal strivings. Now, from our point of view, God is a Person. Temporally viewed, His life is that of the entire realm of consciousness in so far as, in its temporal efforts towards perfection, this consciousness of the universe passes from instant to instant of the temporal order, from act to act, from experience to experience, from stage to stage. Eternally viewed, however, God's life is the infinite whole that

* Royce, *The World and the Individual*, vol. ii., p. 418.

includes this endless temporal process, and that consciously surveys it as one life, God's own life. God is thus a Person, because, for our view, he is self-conscious, and because the Self of which he is conscious, is a Self whose eternal perfection is attained through the totality of these ethically significant temporal strivings, these processes of evolution, these linked activities of finite selves. We have long since ceased, indeed, to suppose that this theory means to view God's perfection, or his self-consciousness, as the temporal result of any process of evolution, or as an event occurring at the end of time, or at the end of any one process, however extended, that occurs in time. The melody does not come into existence contemporaneously with its own last note." *"God in His totality as the Absolute Being is conscious, not *in* time, but *of* time, and of all that infinite time contains." And again: †"Every fragment of life, however arbitrarily it may be selected, has indeed its twofold aspect. It is what it temporally is, in so far as it is this linked series of events, present in experience, and somehow contrasted with all other events in the universe. It is what it eternally is, by virtue of those relations which appear not now, in our human form of consciousness, but which do appear, from the divine point of view, as precisely the means of giving their whole meaning

* Royce, *The World and the Individual*, vol. ii., p. 419.

† *Ibid.*, p. 429.

to these transient deeds of ours. To view even the selfhood that passes away, even the deeds of the hour, as a service of God, and to regard the life of our most fragmentary selfhood as the divine life taking on human form,—this is of the deepest essence of religion. From this point of view it is indeed true that now, even through these passing deeds, we are expressing what has at once its eternal and its uniquely individual being."

I have quoted Royce to you, because I wanted to show you that the notion that the ultimate reality is nothing but abstract thought or reason, is not the conclusion to which some of the most thoughtful students of Hegel have come, as the result of applying his methods. Royce is distinguished among those whom Hegelian conceptions have influenced, by the extent to which the notion of will is prominent in his system. He has viewed, in the book which I have quoted, the ultimate reality as a mind, active on the practical side as will, quite as much as active on the theoretical side as reason, and he has proposed to identify each individual human life as a purpose, as one among the purposes or manifestations of the divine mind. He has no difficulty in getting, upon this footing, to a notion of reality in which will, the moral element, is certainly quite as prominent as the intellectual; and we may set Professor Royce against Professor Pringle Pattison in the controversy as to the outcome of the

Hegelian system. I must say for myself that I think that Professor Royce goes to the other extreme, and that to be logical he would have to try to deduce, as he almost seems to do, the individual of experience itself out of what he calls purpose or meaning. I think we are safer in simply taking the individuals of experience as they come before us, not trying to explain them as resoluble into anything beyond, but recognising in the satisfaction of the will, a valuable test, but no more than a test, of whether we have actually got to the bed rock of real unique individuality.

It is because of narrow categories that we get into the dilemmas which frighten philosophers. We keep on with our pictorial representations of what cannot be pictorially represented under these narrow categories, at a level of conception too low to enable us to get any adequate comprehension of reality. It may be that as finite human beings we can never fully rid ourselves of this tendency, which our daily social life seems to require. Goethe says somewhere that "man is born not to solve the problem of the universe, but to find out where the problem begins, and then to restrain himself within the limits of the comprehensible." That is true, no doubt, if he means that man, finite as he is, living at a standpoint from which he cannot tear himself away without ceasing to be a man among his fellow-men, can never present to himself, with the fulness of immediate knowledge, a conception

of reality to which he can only attain by abstract thought. But to say, as Professor Pringle Pattison does, that we must recognise that there is a region which we cannot penetrate, and as to which a wise agnosticism is the only judicious attitude, is, if we take the words literally, to assert that there is some gap in the fabric of reason, some mystery in reality which reason cannot penetrate. But if there be such a gap, if there be such a mystery, then surely it is itself the creation of reason, and reason—to use a metaphor which I have used before—must be adequate to bridge over the gulf which reason has made. No doubt the spectres which are raised by the narrowness of our categories disappear, when we once realise that they are due to narrow categories. We are not in the difficulty in which the theologians are when they talk as if they had to set up another world to redress the balance of this one. We are really breaking down the hard-and-fastness of the world in which we live, and disclosing its true and deepest reality as belonging to a standpoint relatively to which our present standpoint is mere appearance.

Then, besides this difficulty which I have alluded to in Professor Pringle Pattison's criticism, it seems to me that when he offers us a constructive alternative, he falls into the very shortcoming which he criticises. When he speaks of a "divine centre of thought activity into which no mortal can penetrate," and enjoins an attitude

of tempered agnosticism, he is really no agnostic. For he is surely setting up once again the category of substance and the relation of the One and the Many. If he seeks to do more than to call a halt to the arrogance of some of Hegel's disciples, we must put to him Berkeley's new question, and ask, What do the words mean? If no answer can be given, then following Berkeley, we may apply the old maxim:—"De non apparentibus et de non existentibus eadem est ratio." "Things to which we can attach no meaning are things of which we cannot say that they exist." And it is no answer to refer us to Faith. He who does so comes at once within the range of the guns of critics like Professor James. For Professor James tells us that, in the light which modern Psychology has cast on the functions of the subliminal self, the attitude of the man of faith, the man of immediate certainty, is one which "antedates theologies and is independent of philosophies. Mind cure, theosophy, stoicism, ordinary neurological hygiene, insist on it as emphatically as Christianity does, and it is capable of entering into closest marriage with every speculative creed."* Therefore, it would seem that the only safe place, the only foundation upon which we can build a faith in things unseen, is the foundation of Reason itself, which must be capable of spanning the gulf which Reason has created.

* *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 289.

In the next Lecture I shall complete this first part of the series, the part which deals with the ultimate nature of reality, and then a new topic rising out of the one we have just considered will have to be dealt with.

LECTURE VI

In the course of the last five Lectures, a view of knowledge has been developed which is, in many respects, very different from that which was current in the old text-books of Logic and Psychology.

Of late years thinkers have given very much more prominence to the ideas of life, of growth, and of volition or will, than was formerly the case. Even in connection with the problem of knowledge, the *practical* aspect of the self in volition has come to be much dwelt on. This has been due in part to a negative reason, to reaction against the extreme formalism of the disciples of the great German thinkers of last century, and to dislike of the very extreme and one-sided representations of their systems which were afterwards pressed forward.

On the affirmative side, however, there have been two streams of tendency in speculative science, both of German origin, which account in great measure for the change. The first of these is the influence of Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer as you know, made his point of departure

take place over the teaching of Kant. He insisted that a true reading, a true development, of the conclusions of the Kantian system would lead to the recognition of the Kantian Thing-in-itself as Will, and he dwelt upon the notion of Will as the truth of reality, and upon knowledge as a pain-giving illusion which the wise man, the philosopher, would seek to get free from.

Well, Schopenhauer had this great merit in a philosophical writer, that he had the instinct for facts very intensely developed in him, and as one consequence of that quality, he put forward his case with a freshness and fulness of detail which caused it to exercise a profound influence upon people about him. But he, too, comes under the guns of Professor James. The immediate experience to which he appeals, the direct knowledge which he invokes, might be labelled anything just as accurately as will, and the foundation upon which he built his system has turned out to be one of shifting sand. He was apt to use phrases uncritically, and he fails to explain how he gets to Will as the nature of the Thing-in-itself.

The other stream of tendency to which I allude took its rise with Herbart, a very acute thinker, and was still more developed in its modern form in the hands of my old master at Göttingen, Lotze. Lotze was one of those whom nobody who has seen can ever forget. He was

a man, not merely of great intellectual stature, but of high moral worth; and you could not be in his presence without being dominated by the sense of his personality. I have often thought that Lotze resembled Kant in that respect. We have nowadays broken away in great measure from the Kantian teaching, so far as its theoretical side is concerned; but the influence of Kant's personality still remains, because the moral figure of Kant appeals to all students of Philosophy. So it has been with Lotze. He was just one of those people whose personality is greater than their work. It is apparent in almost every line of his writings, and the consequence is that he has had an influence out of proportion to the value of his theoretical teaching. His principle was that knowledge was not adequate as a presentation of reality. He frankly divorced reality and knowledge altogether, and, although he did not degrade knowledge to the extent that Schopenhauer did, or treat it as a mere veil of illusion, still he resolutely insisted that you could not, through knowledge, attain to the nature of reality. The consequence has been that scrutiny has tended to show that Lotze, like Schopenhauer, proceeded *per saltum*. Herbart and he have turned out to have been relying upon a bridge which will not bear the weight which they both tried to impose upon it.

But the close scrutiny of the actual facts of the process of knowing to which men like

Herbart and Lotze called subsequent thinkers, has led to one great result. The science of Psychology and the science of Logic have been revised under their influence. If, for example, you take Logic as meaning the science of the construction by the individual mind of its world of reality, taken as a process in time—a definition which I think would fit the text-books of the most modern type—you find that there have been co-operating, in producing the view of Logic which these text-books show, a series of modern writers of great distinction, largely influenced by Herbart and Lotze. Men like Sigwart, Bradley, and Bosanquet, have done work which stands at a very high level indeed.

Well, there has been another result of this revision of current logical and psychological notions, and the consequent development of these two sciences. There has been a demand for a restatement of the thesis of idealism on a basis more close to concrete facts. Modern Science has disclosed a great deal which was not in men's minds in the early days of idealism, and the apparent rebuff which idealism has suffered has turned out to be a rebuff which has caused it to retire for a moment, only to reappear with increased vigour. "*Reculer pour mieux sauter*" has been its motto.

What has tended most to bring about the restatement and reconstruction of idealism is the fresh material which the modern idealists have had

to deal with. Aristotle wrote at a time when the results, which for modern Science are commonplaces, were non-existent. And although Hegel wrote less than a century ago, we see to-day that he was in a position not altogether dissimilar. He scrutinised the facts of experience, and investigated the broad features which distinguish nature as such, before the development of modern Science had put his material on a new footing. There was no Dedekind to work out for him the science of number; there was no Lobachewski to throw new light on the assumptions of the Euclidean geometry. Joule and Helmholtz and Kelvin had not yet elaborated the theory of Energy; nor had biologists, like Schleiden and Schwann and Johannes Müller, revised the conception of the living organism and the methods of Botany and Physiology. No Darwin, bringing to his facts the insight of genius, had yet given to the world the conception of the origin of species and the view of evolution which came with it. The work of a Hegel was, therefore, necessarily abstract. It had to be done without the insight which these great minds have given to a later generation into nature and her processes. He was without the materials which we should consider absolutely necessary, and when criticism is brought to bear upon his work—the criticism of those to whom all those things have become matters of everyday knowledge—we can only feel that this was bound to be so, and that it gives the oppor-

tunity for doing over again a great deal of work, which must necessarily be done over again from time to time, as the subject matter on which it has to operate varies and becomes enriched. The critical attitudes of men like Professor James, Professor Royce, Professor Pringle Pattison, and Mr Bradley, are all to the good. It is to the good that there is so much of what one may call an independent re-thinking taking place in our time. There is no more striking feature in modern Philosophy than the way in which, across the Atlantic, in Harvard University, you have men like James, Royce, and Münsterberg, examining all over again the old problem, restating the old questions of Philosophy with a keenness of insight that gives one the feeling that the next great step forward in the history of speculative thought may come, not from this old side of the world, but from the United States of America.

Well, the standpoint which we have been trying to work out in these Lectures discloses that for knowledge the essence of the real world lies in its aspect as dependent on a system of universals, that is to say, upon mind; and that alike in thought, in perception, in feeling, so far as these are individual and definite, the process is a process of self-recognition, or of the finding of itself, if we may call it so, by mind. This, as we have seen and as I have insisted over and over again in these Lectures, does not mean that the object can be resolved into the universals of thought. But it

does mean that when we reflect we separate out these universals, and preserve and label them in language which deals with and can record nothing but universals. In the system which is so established lies the real objectivity of the world, as distinguished from the mere hard-and-fastness which has been shown to be nothing more than the outcome of abstraction at certain standpoints and for certain purposes. The modern developments of the Sciences of Psychology and Logic bear this out.

Let me take Psychology first. Psychology we may define in a modern fashion, following Bradley and Bosanquet on this point, as the Science which is concerned with the facts experienced by a single soul considered as events which happen—that is to say, as an immediate experience taken as belonging to something that has a past and a future. Now, there is a preliminary observation which one has always to make in using a definition of this kind. It necessarily involves presuppositions, because this is a Science which professes to take things at a definite standpoint, and that is what distinguishes Psychology from Metaphysics, which is not concerned with the merely relative aspects of things, but always must have as its object the ultimate nature of reality. Psychology starts, and professedly starts, with the assumption that the soul is known as an individual in time; in other words, it presupposes the entire system of the object world in which the soul is just an event,

or a series of events. This is the outcome of reflection at an abstract point of view, and Psychology itself discloses this characteristic when you follow out its teaching. The child, the infant, does not distinguish itself from the world that confronts it. The notion of itself as distinct from the world confronting it is only evolved by degrees as the result of its education—I mean education in the most elementary sense, the tuition which nature gives—and as the outcome of certain purposes, consciously or unconsciously formed, which guide the child in the organisation and building up of its experience, and teach it to look upon itself as belonging to the social whole of which it really forms a part. At first it does not know itself as distinct from the world. Probably one of the earliest ideas borne in upon its consciousness is that there is a part of its outside surroundings —the part which ultimately it comes to recognise as its body—which has a capacity for feeling which other outside things do not possess, and through this power of feeling it distinguishes, for example, its finger from the table on which the finger presses. The child's knowledge is not a process which begins with a definite system of experience and then by abstraction builds up from this the knowledge of a world, but a process of making more and more definite what is at the outset an indefinite continuum. I use this word "continuum" because I want to impress upon you that for the psychologist there is no

warrant for the assumption that experience, even in its simplest form of feeling or sensation, begins with isolated units. There can be no such thing as a separate feeling or sensation, unless thought has first been there with its universals to qualify the particular into an individual. The beginnings of mind, the beginnings of intelligence, rather disclose themselves as an indefinite which by degrees is made more and more definite.

Now, while that is perfectly true as regards the general result of psychology, the psychologist has at times to use methods which ignore this origin of the furnishing of the mind. The psychologist above everything wants to bring his science into definite relation with other sciences, and we consequently hear a great deal nowadays of what is called Psychophysics—the bringing of Psychology into systematic connection with Physiology and with Physics. The outcome of Psychophysics is a tendency on the part of the modern psychologist to look more and more at the stream of events in his mind, the subject-matter with which he has to deal, as though it consisted of definite units of feeling or sensation which could be separated and pieced together. It was very much upon this footing that Hume was proceeding when he said he could not find a separate impression of the self. But such a procedure is artificial, and is not a natural mode of regarding the mind. Modern psychologists know this very well. I will quote only one of them, Professor Münster-

berg, who puts the matter in the following words in that very suggestive little book of his, *Psychology and Life:** "This is the point which even philosophers so easily overlook: as soon as we speak of psychical objects, of ideas and feelings and volitions, as contents of consciousness, we speak of an artificial transformation to which the categories of real life no longer apply,—a transformation which lies in the direction of causal connection, and which has, therefore, a right to existence only if the right to extend the causal aspect of nature to the inner life is acknowledged." . . . † "The working hypothesis of Modern Psychology—that every mental state is a complex of psychical elements, of which each is the accompaniment of a physical process in time and space, and influences others or is influenced by others merely through the medium of physical processes,—is then not an arbitrary theory. It is the necessary outcome of the presuppositions which the human will has freely chosen for its logical purposes, and to which it is bound by its own decision."

Observe how, in the last sentence, this distinguished psychologist insists on what I have been pressing on you in these Lectures, although he approaches it from quite another quarter. He points out that it is purposes or ends which organise our immediate experience, and give to it its appearance of reality.

* Münsterberg, *Psychology and Life*, p. 267. † *Ibid.*, p. 271.

Again,* explaining the artificial basis of the psychophysical standpoint, he says: "Psychical states must be described somehow; otherwise the possibility of psychology would be excluded. If they are not directly communicable, we must take refuge in indirect methods; if the psychical facts are never object for two, and thus strictly individual, we must link them with physical processes which belong to all."

What he means may be explained thus: If I look into my mind, and become conscious, first, of an act of attention, a concentration of thought, and then of a movement of my lips in expressing the result of my thoughts in words, there are present two distinct sets of phenomena, of one of which I myself alone am conscious, of the other of which you are all conscious. You can all see my lips move. You could even, if the contents of my brain could be dissected without putting an end to these Lectures, see the physical concomitants of the process of the development of my thought and its expression going on in such a fashion that every individual in the room could have experience of them. But the working of my own mind exists only for me. In the same way, while I cannot dive into the inner experience of those of you who sit there before me, I can receive communications from you about it, through those universals of language which are the main medium of intercourse between human beings.

* Münsterberg, *Psychology and Life*, p. 49.

Münsterberg points out that Psychology can only give us direct experience of what is going on in our own minds, and that, in order to get what is common to ourselves and other people, we must resort either to mere abstract descriptions in language founded on the universal element which has been separated out by reflection, or to the physical processes which accompany mind. Therefore, the physiological psychologist endeavours to transform the presentation of his mental experience into that kind of abstract atomism of which Münsterberg speaks. It helps him to connect psychical with physical phenomena, the latter of which he can subject to exact measurement, and so indirectly measure the former. But when you are trying to trace the genesis of the development of a child's consciousness, you are driven away from the point of view which we have been discussing, and which is sometimes called "Presentationism." Because of its double method, Psychology is a complex science. No doubt the first method is the natural one. But this method of presentation of which I have spoken is a very characteristic feature of the Psychology of our time; and in reading books upon Psychology, and in making use of the results which we get in them, we must always remember the transformation of which Münsterberg speaks as having taken place, and which exists only from standpoints and for purposes which are not the standpoints or purposes of

the investigator into the ultimate nature of reality.

Passing from this phase of things, and going on, the only other observation which need be made here about the presentational method in Psychology is that it takes a course which is justified only by the presupposition of a system. If it be said, for instance, that a change in the self must be antecedent to any knowledge of that change, the answer is, that this view presupposes an abstract knowledge of a system in which the process takes place, a system in which the self has a position, and that the consciousness or knowledge of the mere change is in time antecedent to this abstract knowledge of a system in which it occurs. In other words, you have an inversion of the natural order of things when you are at the psychological point of view. The fact first in time is really the last in reflection, and in the abstract system of knowledge which Psychology creates the natural sequence is just inverted. Even acute writers often forget this, and confuse the order of things, overlooking the artificial nature of the science with which they are dealing.

Modern Psychology has brought out a number of important results of which the earlier writers knew very little. The notion of subconscious processes, which Professor James has so fully discussed, and the notion of corporeal feelings, organic sensations, which has more than any-

thing else to do with what the ordinary man means when he speaks of his body and identifies it with his individuality,—these cast light upon what we mean by the expressions we use in our everyday life. But, like all conceptions of the kind, as soon as we try to make use of them for other purposes, they disclose themselves as self-contradictory and vanishing. And it is quite clear that if we simply let thought play naturally upon itself and look at what the genesis in time of the life of the soul is, apart from artificial presentation, we shall find that the origin of the soul's life is not a series of atomic feelings, as Hume thought, but the making more definite of an indefinite and changing continuum.

Now look at one or two of the fallacies that people have fallen into by neglecting this very plain fact. We hear a great deal of the laws of association as being the real reason why one idea gets associated in memory with the image of another, and so on. But before you can have any association of ideas you must have the ideas already juxtaposed in some relation, and that you can only have if you have already got the very system of the object world, the genesis of which you are trying to account for by association. Association depends on identity of content, and presupposes, as the condition of its possibility, the very system of associated psychical events which it is called in to account for. It is of

very little use to the searcher after the ultimate nature of reality.

Again, take the notion of the Ego. If you look quite simply into your own bosom and try to find out what your Ego is, you will find that you have embarked upon a very difficult task. You first eliminate corporeal feeling; you then eliminate all the contents of memory, and your position as a particular "this" in the general world, and the result is that your Ego comes to disclose itself as a mere asymptotic regress towards a notional pure subject of knowledge,—a thinker without thoughts, an abstraction, nothing at all. The truth is that you cannot get, by this method, any abiding conception of the individual. The individual eludes you, just because when you pass from the rough and practical, though complex, way of looking at things, in which, in daily life, individuality comes directly before you, and take to looking into yourself psychologically, you have passed from the standpoint of practice, at which the self had a definite meaning, and are putting that conception to a use which goes far beyond the practical purposes of life. When, for instance, in daily intercourse we use expressions that import personal identity, our meaning is always relative to some special standpoint. We really have some social reference in our minds. There is a basis of presupposition in the very phrase, and unless we know what that presupposition is, it is clear that we shall entangle ourselves.

The same kind of confusion exists about the notion of the soul as distinct from the body. If there is any truth in what has been said in the preceding Lectures, it is ridiculous to suppose that the soul is a thing existing apart from the body. When we take the word "soul" quite simply, and ask what we mean by the use of the expression, it is plain that what we are talking of is just the life of the individual looked at from a higher standpoint than that of mere life. When we speak of the soul of a man, what we mean is just the man considered as rational, as responsible, as a free moral agent, as capable of the experiences of a human being. We are really taking the notion of the individual, which in everyday life we do not analyse or fix precisely without making any attempt at an exhaustive definition of it. When we speak of a man's soul, we really mean the highest aspect in which the man appears in everyday experience. The relation of the soul to the body is much better expressed as the individual regarded from the highest standpoint, and in the aspect in which the rest of his life finds its completion, than in any metaphor that suggests a thing distinguished from another thing. Soul and body are related as higher and lower, and it is just one of the advantages of the idealistic standpoint that it can accept the common-sense way of looking at the matter, quite fully and simply, and so avoid many of the consequences which follow from the adoption of

other standpoints. We are not in any danger of materialism when we take things so, because we are not regarding the world as made up of separate phases, each of which represents an independent reality. We are looking upon the world as containing a series of aspects, and, when we come to the aspect of the soul, we have got an aspect of the human being just as real as the bodily aspect, and one in which we rise to a standpoint from which the consequences of identifying the individual with his body no longer trouble us, because they have no longer any terrors for us.

Now I think one thing has been made pretty clear, and that is, that the notion of the particular self is a derivative conception which appears far on in the course of the development of knowledge, and which cannot be taken as its foundation. With that observation I turn to Logic.

Logic starts with this derivative conception of an individual mind which is supposed to be, in its everyday life, somehow in contact with reality. Just as Psychology, when you work it out, finds for you no resting-place, so Logic works away from the standpoint from which it started, the notion of the mind as somehow different from reality. Logic shows how the world is built up by the individual mind, how the individual constructs his object-world of experience. It is not like Metaphysics, because it is looking at this as a process of an individual mind; and it is not like

Psychology, because it is considering this process, not as a series of events, but as the connected process of thought by which the world becomes what it is for the individual mind. That is the view of modern Logic. There is a great gap between this view and that of the old Logic. Before people had applied their minds to the criticism of the categories they used, they took Logic to be a science which could be dealt with by itself, and isolated from the rest of Philosophy. Looking at Logic in the light of what we now know to have been a misconstruction of the spirit of the Aristotelian system, there is no doubt that it was erected into what was conceived to be a very simple science, but was really a most artificial one. The result has been that the science of Logic has stood still. Though in Aristotle we find something like the hard definitions of the subsequent formal Logic, still we must not assume that Aristotle did not know a great deal better than his would-be interpreters. Aristotle's Logic, as has been observed, may be taken to be the method by which he taught his pupils to commence their metaphysical investigations, and it may well be that Aristotle adopted only provisionally what is really an artificial view of things because he found it the best introduction to the study of Philosophy.

Well, Logic, as we conceive it nowadays, carries us beyond the self into an objective system—just

such a system as Mill's Permanent Possibilities came to be—and that objective system consists of what we are obliged to think. The mind is free, but the nature of the mind is to be rational, and the mind, following out its own processes, is accordingly logically obliged to think in subjection, as it were, to certain principles which give us the objective world. In that way the τέλος, the end, the universe as a completed whole, is presupposed in every attempt to make what is indefinite in knowledge more definite. I will follow this out in a moment, but what I want to keep before you is that, as has been pointed out in the earlier Lectures, reality consists in an objective system,—that is to say, a system in which the subject of the judgment is made definite and made permanent by making explicit in the individual the union of the universal with the particular. It is on the universal aspect of the individual that thought in its abstraction dwells, and Logic is just the building up and the ascertainment of the system of these universals. In that light many notions, so familiar that we seem to be passive in apprehending them, such notions as present and past and future, are all found to be constructions of thought which belong to the universal. The general conceptions of a "Here" and a "Now" are likewise constructions of thought. When one man says to another that he sees the same world as the man to whom he speaks, and that other understands him, they both mean a

common objective system of relations; and what is communicated is the universals of thought which language deals with and embodies, and thus makes possible the establishment of a certain correspondence between the views of each particular mind. These correspondences are not mere abstract identities. One man eats a loaf, and another, seeing him do it, understands what he is doing, and understands it by means of a common system of universal conceptions, through which their experiences correspond in a fashion that makes to each real what the other is doing.

The modern theory of the judgment starts with the individual. The self is taken as, to use a metaphor, in contact with a "this," an individual of knowledge. The mere fact of "thisness" is a universal of thought, but the judgment does not start with a universal thought. It starts just with reality, and reality is a particular qualified by a universal, and is therefore always individual. The reality of the two is only to be found in the individual, and it is only by abstraction that you can break them up. When I say "this tumbler," I describe it as "this" by an abstraction of thought, dragging out the universal element in it; but none the less I start in my judgment with an actual individual of experience, which I cannot construct in thought, and which I cannot get away from. The judgment then starts with the "this," and the "this," when we follow it out, is found to be

related to, and inseparable from, the Universe taken as a whole. In the individual I have got a potential and implicit relationship to the whole universe, and the judgment, starting with this, proceeds to unravel the system of reality. I amplify this present perception by adding an ideal content, and, looking at it, I say, "A tumbler full of water." I have qualified my "this" by a "what."

Knowledge is thus a continuous judgment, proceeding always by the qualification of what is real, that is to say its subject, and the subject is just the phase of the reality of the universe with which we are in contact. Every judgment begins with an individual "this" or "that." The "this" or "that" can never be deduced. The judgment can qualify it, and does qualify it by bringing it into a new relationship which can only be expressed as a universal, and so we get back the "this" or "that" enriched with a new meaning.

Take, for example, the 47th Proposition of Euclid: The squares of the sides of a right-angled triangle equal the square of the hypothenuse. — I start with the right-angled triangle, and taking it as a "this," I proceed to qualify it by judgment after judgment, dragging out its implication, the τέλος which is presupposed in it, and I thereby continuously enrich the conception of this right-angled triangle with which I started. I give it new meaning and a new

significance until I arrive at the conclusion. It is this consideration that has led people to say that the judgment is not really an act in time. It is presupposed by the reality of things in time, and, viewed even as a process of the individual mind, it is a bringing to light what was implicitly there at the beginning.

Now, the concept and the syllogism on this footing become mere aspects of judgment. The judgment is the radical form of thought, and is the activity which develops the object world for us. This view of the nature of the judgment was no doubt retarded by the language used by Aristotle. I will not dwell on that because you will find an admirable account of it in an article* written by the late Mr T. H. Green, in which he deals with the Aristotelian Logic in its relation to the rest of Aristotle's Philosophy. He shows that Aristotle concerned himself in his Logic with universals in the form of classes, with wholes of extension, and that formal Logic persisted in this view, with the result that the revolt of Bacon against formal Logic became inevitable. Even Kant thought that the old formal Logic was final, and had made no progress since the days of Aristotle; for even he believed the Aristotelian forms to represent exhaustively the categories of conception.

I have dwelt in this Lecture upon the tenden-

* T. H. Green, "Philosophy of Aristotle," *North British Review* for September, 1866. Reprinted in his collected works.

cies of recent Psychology and Logic, because they illustrate in yet another form the single thought which I have been trying to set before you. These sciences, although not properly metaphysical, have the closest bearing on Metaphysics. They belong to the borderland of the region in which we have to seek for Reality; and they point to a path which, when followed, leads into that region. They leave the student with the conviction that neither in mere reflection nor in mere feeling is the ultimately Real to be found. They, like other forms of inquiry, point to a different conception of the Universe, the conception of it as, in final analysis, the unique Individual that ultimately discloses itself as the totality of Experience, or as all-embracing Mind, according as it is looked at from one side or the other. If we take it from the standpoint of Logic, we have it on the one side, but put before us as the subject of judgment, the "this" or "that" which the judgment determines and qualifies, with the result that it is presented in reflection as the identically same individual, but under new universals. If we take it from the standpoint of Psychology, we get it as the self, which, when we have removed the artificial scaffolding of "presentationism," erected by ourselves for convenience of treatment, discloses the totality of existence, and nothing short of this, as its content. Whichever, then, of these several paths we elect to follow, we find that they all lead to

the same point, to the Individual which, more than two thousand years ago, Aristotle declared to be the ultimate and irresoluble nature of Reality. This view, once accepted and steadily adhered to, makes plain the final stages of the pathway. If the student will but adhere to it and keep the broad lesson which it unfolds firmly in his mind, he will have little difficulty in following its development in the history of thought. He will see and understand how the great thinkers of more recent times have advanced each of them a fresh stage along the road which the Greeks mapped out for them, have hesitated, have stopped, have even, under the influence of metaphor, strayed, but have not the less improved the way for those who came after them. He will see and understand how in our own day the tendency of philosophic reflection, whether critical or constructive, is steady in the same direction. The history of Philosophy will be for him who so reads it no longer a tale of miserable failure in the search after truth, but a record of genuine progress towards more adequate definition.

I have now got to the end of the first part of this series of Lectures. I have endeavoured to show in it how much the organisation of the world as it seems, is due to the ends or purposes which we have in our minds. I shall pass in my next set of Lectures to the special sciences, and I shall show that the special

sciences transform the world of reality for their own purposes, in virtue of a yet more abstract set of conceptions than those of the plain man. But Science gains greatly in so doing. It gets rid of the Here and the Now. It takes the world from a standpoint which is independent of the individual, and it amplifies and extends the abstract world which it so creates, far beyond the limits within which the senses of the individual are confined. It places the same abstract universe before each individual, whatever may be his particular circumstances. This is again an illustration of the great truth that in ends and purposes, and not in causes, is to be found the shaping of the world as it seems.

And now we have traversed the first stages of the pathway to Reality. We have seen something of how Knowing and Being stand to one another. The everyday world no longer confronts intelligence as something remote from its moulding power. The Cosmos begins to disclose itself as the manifestation of mind and the revelation of purpose.

But in front of us lies a valley which to him who seeks for God has but too often proved a very Valley of Humiliation. We have to descend from the open ground of the plain man to the more obscure and difficult region where the sciences reign. There we shall find ourselves confronted with serious hindrances, and the path barred by notions of reality which present more difficulties

than any we have yet encountered; such notions as atoms, energy, force, molecules, the very hob-goblins of materialistic method.

Yet we need not lose heart. For if we grasp firmly the sharp weapon of criticism with which we have put to rout the metaphors of the plain man, we may find it a weapon with which we can dispel as easily the spectral figures that haunt the traveller over the ground that lies in front.

In the next part of this first series of Lectures, I shall invite your attention to the categories of the Sciences.

BOOK II

THE CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES

LECTURE I

In the first part of this course of Lectures I endeavoured to work out a view of the ultimate nature of Reality which would afford firm ground upon which to tread in following the difficult pathway that lies before us. It is one of the chief recommendations of that view that it is by no means novel. We find traces of it in Heraclitus of Ephesus; further traces in the Socratic questionings; a yet further development in the Ideas of Plato; and something hardly to be distinguished from the most modern form of the doctrine in the teaching of Aristotle about Metaphysics and Psychology. When Hegel first taught the world how to read the Aristotelian Philosophy, he rendered a great service to men; for he showed them that the history of Philosophy is not a vain rejection of hypothesis after hypothesis, but is, in truth, the working out, with the fresh materials which the Time-Spirit brings with it, of a single solution of a single great problem.

The main feature of the answer which Aristotle and Hegel alike gave to the question as to the ultimate nature of Reality was, that we can never

get behind the form of Individuality, that the ultimately real is an experience in an individual form which contains nothing but what is individual —a form in which the particulars of sense can no more be divorced from the universals of thought than can the universals of thought have any subsistence except as setting, fixing, and giving their meaning and existence to these vanishing particulars. It is owing to the poverty of language, which is always derived from the familiar standpoints of everyday life at which this kind of problem does not arise, that we have not ready to hand words adequate to express the proper relationships and conceptions to which this doctrine points, and that the metaphors and analogies into which we slip are thoroughly misleading. At the standpoint, for instance, of everyday life, for the purposes of daily practice and social intercourse, we speak and act as though the things of experience were permanent and had a fixed nature; whereas, as Wordsworth points out in the last of his sonnets to the River Duddon, the form alone is unchanging:

> "For, backward, Duddon! as I cast my eyes,
> I see what was, and is, and will abide;
> Still glides the Stream, and shall for ever glide;
> The Form remains, the Function never dies."

When we let thought turn in upon its own operations and watch its own movement, we find that the individuals of experience are no more fixed and permanent than the water of the flowing

Duddon. It is only in knowledge, and particularly by reason of the purposes or ends which have to be fulfilled in organised knowledge, that the external world gets its fixity of aspect. It is only relatively that the individual is conceived as a hard-and-fast entity. When we think out its nature, even at our everyday standpoint, we discover that it is our reflection that has introduced orderliness and definiteness into what at another standpoint would be but a confused blur. Between the organism, for instance, ever taking in and giving out in the metabolism of its material, and the environment which surrounds it, we could, if we looked minutely enough, discover no hard-and-fast line.

Again, the *tempo* of the sharpest explosion may seem, for anything we know to the contrary, a long time to a gnat, while the explosion appears instantaneous to the less discriminating senses of a giant. The individual phenomenon seems, in short, to be rescued in the general flux of experience through the categories or conceptions which we bring to bear in developing knowledge—a knowledge which therefore depends for its form on the ends or purposes which determine the choice of these categories. This is true not only in everyday life, where what we call the same experience presents different aspects to different individuals, but still more strikingly so in different kinds of knowledge. In mathematics, for example, we abstract under a set of conceptions far sur-

passing in definiteness any which we apply in daily life, where the rough standards of common-sense suffice. Nowhere in our daily experience do we witness a perfect square or a perfect circle. Yet, the mathematician, by abstracting from every other property, has definite conceptions of these upon which he bases his science. It is plain, therefore, that since experience must present different aspects according to the difference between the categories employed, a critical examination of these categories must be an essential part in any complete theory of knowledge. Such a criticism is required, for, if it does not exist, the world of imagination will soon teem with fallacies and spectral illusions, such as those forced on us when we look through the stereoscope and think that we see things in three dimensions, when we are only under the influence of an incomplete view of the conditions of our knowledge. The unconsciousness of the limitations of that knowledge, and of the relativity of our notions and purposes, gives rise to the view that what is in truth only a mere aspect of reality is the manifestation of its exclusive and ultimate nature. In this way the working ideas of everyday life become hypostatised, and we slip into talking of God as though He could be a cause in the physical sense, or into speaking of atoms and forces as if they were real individuals, which we could envisage. Thus there come upon us abstractions, arising out of the application of the working common-sense stand-

point to speculative problems, where it has no application. The ideas of this standpoint are hypostatised, and the very habits of thought which are such useful guides in our rough-and-ready intercourse with fellow human beings who have in the main like social purposes with ourselves, give rise to superstitions of common-sense. These superstitions tend to destroy the reality of the rich concrete world, by letting some of its aspects dominate and even negative the other aspects. And yet for us, remaining simply at our ordinary point of view, these various aspects of that world as it seems have an equal title to the appellation of real.

Such a criticism is essential in Science as well as in Philosophy, for the Sciences also operate by means of abstraction under sets of categories which are peculiar to each of them, and by their use of which the various Sciences are distinguished and ought to be classified. By means of these categories each Science strips the individual (for instance, the triangle or the circle, or what the plain man would call a triangle or a circle) of the immediacy in which many points of view uncritically converge. The mathematician abstracts, in order to get clear knowledge, by concentrating his attention upon relationships, which by this means he presents to himself with great distinctness. He transcends the immediacy of his surroundings, the limitations of his physical body and his organs of sense, and is able to traverse the whole field of

space and time, as, for instance, in the science of Astronomy. What he presents to himself as the result of his reasoning, a result come to through the mediation of abstract knowledge, is again an individual, but an individual hypostatised by imagination upon an abstract foundation. He cannot guide us to any aspects of reality that lie outside the limits of his own science, but, by separating off these aspects in abstraction, he can, as we shall see hereafter, enormously extend our knowledge.

Let us turn then to a thinking consideration of the methods of Science. First of all, we must look at the nature of the field in which the Sciences operate, before we enter upon a detailed criticism of their respective categories. The physical Sciences deal with the realm of nature. By this realm we mean the world as it appears in space, as well as in time, that aspect of reality which is most foreign to abstract thought. Yet even this aspect is not really foreign, for the world in space and time turns out—like every other individual in experience—to be a self-dissolving and self-disintegrating conception, when the light of reflection is turned in upon it. This topic we shall have to pursue further on. At present a simple illustration of how little meaning even an ordinary thing in space has apart from the abstract universals of reflection, will suffice. What is it that I recognise when I look at a tree? The tree is a self-identical individual and remains so amid all its changes of foliage, and notwith-

standing the alterations of substance which are constantly taking place in it. The leading idea which we have about it, the idea which dominates us, is that of identity in all these differences, not only identity of form and life in the metabolism of its material, but in its distinction from the other things which surround it. Its leaves may fall, its branches may be cut off, but yet it remains this tree, different from the others which are near it. Thus we have identity and difference, conceptions which belong to the universals of thought, playing a vital part in giving us our knowledge of the tree. Again, the tree means for us the union of experiences through totally different senses—colour, touch, taste, smell, resistance, muscular effort, etc.—and this union is not perceived through sense, but is a concept of reflection, again a universal. In the supposed hard-and-fast image of the tree which we have really thus fixed through the universals of thought, there is an infinity of relations and predicates which we have incorporated in the "This" of the tree, and they have meaning only as related and harmonised in reflection. An infant does not know what a tree is and cannot distinguish it; and in a universe which was known only to a mind at the stage of that of an infant, the existence of a tree would have no meaning.

Now this is true of the whole of nature, this union of a multiplicity of aspects in reflection. We do not, in knowledge at our daily standpoint, separate them. It is only by abstraction for the

purposes, say, of the mathematician, that we confine ourselves to the relations of space; and these relations of space, excepting when hypostatised by abstraction, lie in our perception alongside of other relations with which for the purposes of daily life they are in no conflict. The tree, for example, is a living organism following a course of development, determined by the quasi-purposive manifestation of the whole in the parts in which it exists. The tree, in other words, is a life, and the relation of the whole to its parts in this life is not a mechanical relation, and cannot be expressed as spatial. Hence, when we speak of the tree as a thing in space, we really shut out, for the moment, our view of it as a living whole, and by abstraction regard it from another standpoint, which comes into our language about it in daily life—the standpoint of a mechanical arrangement occupying a part of space, a standpoint, moreover, which cannot either be reduced to that of life, or permit of life being expressed in its own terms. If, therefore, the world of nature were strictly limited to what can be presented as spatial, it would shut out all life and organisation. But in the case even of things which are more naturally looked at as arrangements which do not transcend the merely spatial view—such as a rock or a machine, although their parts are naturally and properly conceived in the relationship of complete externality and mutual exclusiveness, they have other aspects — beauty, utility, and so on—aspects which have no meaning

for the mathematician, and very little for the physicist. When we look at nature in the popular sense of the word it seems, as soon as we try to divorce it from the manifold aspects which it receives through the different kinds of reflection, to be a mere abstraction, the creation of reflection working under categories which exclude, or at least for the moment shut out of consciousness, the relationship to the subject for which it is. The system of nature seems to start from a point which is itself a vanishing point, the contrast of the not-self with the self as separated from it. Yet when we ask what we mean by such a self, we find that in everyday parlance we vaguely indicate the sentient body with its organs — a meaning which partly abolishes itself as soon as it is realised that this sentient body is itself an object in nature. Thus we find that we are dealing in such language with abstractions, with an individual appearance which can only be sustained through the very construction which we wish to eliminate. The conception of nature is part of the conception of a system which emerges on reflection, and things are in nature only in so far as they belong to this system. When scrutinised, the standpoint of nature turns out to be an abstract standpoint, the character of which is externality — externality to the mind which perceives it, and, at first sight at any rate, externality of its own parts each to the other. In the language of the German metaphysicians, and for that matter

of the Greeks, it discloses itself as the Other from which thought, as hypostatised in abstraction, is distinguished, and to which thought, similarly dealt with in abstraction, is itself related only as the Other. The divorce is only for and through reflection; in the real individual nature of mind there is no such divorce inherent. It is a distinction which emerges at a late stage in knowledge. In the early life of the soul there is no distinction drawn between nature and the self. It comes only with the development of reasoning, and as part of the general intellectual system.

We may say that nature stands to thought as the particular stands to the universal. It is within the individuality of spirit that the distinction falls, and the two may be said to be abstract ways of regarding what are the moments in this individuality. As we have already seen, our knowledge as human beings is knowledge from the standpoint of a particular self, conscious of itself as finite. We are, as it were, shut up within a closed circle of self-conscious knowledge; the self emerges only as contrasted with the not-self. It is true that under analysis these distinctions turn out not to be absolute, but in our ordinary proceedings we reflect on the basis and assumption of their validity, and for the purposes of our social intercourse with each other, we regard ourselves also from the standpoint of the one among the many, and, in this sense, as ourselves falling within the sphere of externality. We can by means of

abstract thought conceive an absolute intelligence with which it would be otherwise; that is to say, an intelligence at a higher plane than ours, and it may be that our own intelligence, as viewed in daily practice, has meaning only as a stage towards or a degree in such a mind. It may be that when our plane of intelligence is thought out it presupposes mind so conceived as its beginning, end, and ultimate reality. Yet in the world as it seems we accept the lower plane of knowledge as our working basis, and as the degree of reality with which we are concerned.

In the light of these remarks let us take an illustration of the procedure of one of those sciences which, in the next three Lectures, we shall examine in more detail. What does a physicist do when he has to investigate, say, an explosion? His procedure is to inquire into its cause. He begins by talking of this as though it were a mere antecedent or outside event, for example, the setting of a match to gunpowder. But reflection carries him much further as he proceeds towards scientific knowledge. He begins by reasoning and experiment to get a clear conception before his mind of the composition of the gunpowder; of the structure of the molecules containing the atoms of oxygen which are held in a loose grasp by the atoms of nitrogen; of the proximity of the carbon which is required for the production of the carbonic oxide and dioxide; and of the presence of the sulphur, which is a useful adjunct in the

production of the chemical change. He then realises the necessity of an infinity of other conditions, the dryness which is essential to enable the separate chemical substances to get at each other, and many facts equally important. In the end he sees that the setting of the match was really only one out of an inexhaustible multitude of conditions, and that the reason why an unreflecting person—such as, say, the schoolboy who put the light to the powder—singles it out and names it as the cause, is merely because that schoolboy is guided in his reflections by a certain purpose or point of view. What gives to the setting of the lighted match to the powder its importance, is the notion that it is a freely done act, for which somebody is responsible and may be punished. The reality, the explosion, the effect, turns out to be the sum of an infinity of conditions. More than this, if you had the whole of the conditions, including the passing of the potential energy into kinetic energy, you would find that the explosion was not distinguishable in time from the aggregate of these conditions, assuming that the aggregate of these conditions could be presented together in an individual form. Thus the physicist, the man of science, whose object is clear knowledge, who seeks to isolate the underlying relations of things by means of conceptions which will enable him to put aside everything that is immaterial, and to reason on the basis of what alone can advance knowledge beyond the mere immediacy of experi-

ence through the senses, can pass away from the notion of cause. Cause turns out to be a self-abolishing and vanishing conception. The cause, when thought out, is not really distinguishable from the effect, which is just the aggregate of its conditions viewed from another standpoint. The physicist gets as the result of his work, not the mere abstraction called a cause, but a more instructive set of relations which constitute the *law* of the phenomenon. He is now deeper down than the mere appearance. He has got into the region of what logicians call the Essence. The man of science does not stick to the mere facts of things. He believes in laws which are manifest only to reflection; and so nature, in those aspects of it which alone are interesting to the physicist, turns out to depend, not upon her otherness from thought, her exclusion of mind, but upon the capacity of the reflective mind to discover its own universals, to find itself in nature. In this very same nature, which we started by taking to be the immediate presentation of the senses, confronted with which the mind seemed merely passive, we now become aware that reflection is everywhere operative in the characterisation of it. We discover in nature yet higher relations, which take us beyond those of which the pure physicist can alone take cognisance—the relations of life and organisation. It is only for limited purposes and through conceptions which turn out to be self-contradictory and therefore self-abolishing, that the living

organism can be regarded as a thing. In the relation of the whole to the parts as manifesting itself in them and in the quasi-purposive nature of the parts, we reach a relation which is nearer to that of a regiment to the soldiers composing it, or of a state to its citizens acting together for the fulfilment of a common purpose consciously set before their minds, than to the relation of mere externality which we see in the parts of a machine. It is when we hypostatise these different aspects arrived at by abstraction from different standpoints, that we get into such vain controversies as those about Abiogenesis, the reduction of life to mechanism. There is no such continuity in actual experience as enables us to develop the aspects of one standpoint into those of another, without a change of the categories we employ. The tendency to hypostatise, here as elsewhere, has given rise to countless fallacies, and tormented the minds of men with innumerable spectres. The physicist passes away, by means of his group of conceptions, from the seeming disconnected externality to one another of the properties of things, to the essence which underlies their appearance in the form of their law. The biologist in investigating life passes away from the mere appearance of mechanism; and the psychologist, who regards the organism as not merely living, but conscious, passes to a view of things in which consciousness transcends life, just as completely as life transcends the

categories of mechanism. Thus, in the results which the sciences give us from their abstract points of view, the appearances which nature presents seem to us to be degrees of reality. A true Philosophy of Nature does not question the validity of the results won by the various sciences. It simply for its own purposes disentangles and arranges the categories of the various aspects, and by a criticism of these categories—that is to say, by an examination of the limits of their application — gets rid of confused thinking, and as far as it can, of bad metaphysics.

As Hegel says:* "The first thing that has to be established against experimental physics is this, that in it there is much more of thinking than it admits or knows, that it is better than it believes itself to be, or if in physics thinking must be taken as something bad, then, that it is worse than it imagines. Physics and Philosophy of Nature are distinguished from each other, not as observation is distinguished from thinking, but only in the mode and fashion of their thinking; they are each of them a thinking science of nature." In other words, each of the two, Philosophy of Nature as meaning the entirety of the sciences, and Philosophy of Nature as meaning the account which the metaphysician, who is investigating the ultimate nature of Reality, has to give of nature as an appearance within the field of knowledge,

* Hegel, *Natur-Philosophie*, p. 6, 1842 edition.

has a totally different aim. Science proceeds on the basis of its own ends and purposes, the extension of its own kind of inquiry beyond those limits of his immediate surroundings, within which the plain man is restrained. It is true that the knowledge even of the plain man is more or less abstract, that he too hypostatises under conceptions. But he does not abstract to the extent of the man of science, nor is it necessary for him, nor would it be useful to him in the fulfilment of his social ends, to make the distinctions or employ the conceptions of the man of science. In the same way it is not to the purpose of the man of science to make use of the comprehensive categories which are required by him who cannot rest at any stage short of the ultimate nature of things. The knowledge which this last may attain to, will, indeed, if he attains to it, in all probability turn out to be in its own fashion more abstract than that of the man of science, as the knowledge of the man of science is more abstract than that of the plain man. Yet each is necessary for the fulfilment of its own end, and none can fulfil the ends of the others.

It appears to have been a want of clear perception of the real nature of the problem of Philosophy which has led in the past to the violent condemnation of what the Germans call *Natur-Philosophie*. It is perfectly true that under the name of *Natur-Philosophie* there has been given to the world a great deal of what will not bear

scrutiny. The reasons for this are partly to be found in an inadequate conception of the ultimate nature of Reality; but partly also, and not less frequently, in the fact, which people are apt to forget, that those who were endeavouring, even less than a century ago, to work out a view of the system of the different degrees of appearance in nature and of the relations of these degrees to each other and to mind as their foundation, were imperfectly furnished with what to-day, in the twentieth century, we properly regard as indispensable material. When, for example, Hegel wrote the book which made that distinguished physicist, the late Professor Tait, so angry, the principle of the conservation of energy had not yet been discovered; chemistry was in a very imperfect condition; mathematical analysis had not been pushed forward to anything like the point which it has reached in our time; and the great doctrine of biology, evolution, was still in a rudimentary condition. The result was that Hegel, who had to work with such materials as the Time-Spirit furnished to him, could not do more than work out the outlines of a very general view of science as it existed in his day. His *Natur-Philosophie* is no doubt open to criticism by the men of science of our day, but if anyone were to undertake a similar task now, his work would be found to be just as defective if looked at in the light of the knowledge of three or four generations later. Just because science changes, and changes

by way of advance more rapid and more certain than that in any other department of knowledge, the great principle that the ultimate view of things can only be expressed in the language of a particular period is more obviously true here than at any other point. Shakespeare has spoken to the world in language that is true for all time. He deals with the individual images of sense, and these remain unchanged, though his art heightens their significance. But men like Newton and Darwin fight only the battles of their own period, and, though their figures will stand out prominent in the Walhalla of the heroes of the spiritual world, their work becomes in large measure absorbed and superseded, as more adequate conceptions take the place of those which their abstract reflection has elaborated.

Then again, pausing for the moment to speak of Hegel, we have to bear in mind that we never got from Hegel's own pen any completed account of his view of *Natur-Philosophie.* All that we have is a collection of fragments, consisting at the best of the *Hefte,* or short paragraphs, written by himself after the fashion of a German professor, to form the text, each of them, for the lecture of a day, and the notes taken down by the students who heard his oral discourses upon these texts. As the editor of his *Natur-Philosophie,* Michelet, tells us, he lectured no less than eight times upon this subject, between the year 1804 and the year 1830, in different forms, in which the arrange-

ment and substance of the lectures varied. We have not, for the most part, Hegel's own connected discourses, or even the context of many of his expressions. He died suddenly, of cholera, in the end of 1831, before he had time to write out or even edit these lectures in their final form. Had he lived, he might have avoided many mistakes of detail, which he shared with some of the prominent men of science of his time. For example, at page 304 of the 1842 edition of the *Natur-Philosophie*, he, like many others at that time, follows Goethe's theory of colour in preference to that of Newton. The result is that in dealing with a topic where form is very much affected by substance, he gives us conclusions which are of little help, even for philosophical purposes, in a region where exact and accurate knowledge of true scientific principle is essential. Indeed, as I have already suggested to you, in that part of a system of the science of ultimate Reality which is concerned with the criticism of the categories of science, the work has constantly to be done over again. The contribution which reflection under abstract categories has made to the science of the time, and the investigation of the nature and limits of these categories, can only be adequately estimated and taken in hand by those who have full knowledge of the results attained by the people who are competent judges of results, the men of science themselves. This is the reason

why I approach the consideration of the topics which I shall have to try to develop in the three following Lectures, with unfeigned diffidence. I feel that I cannot be sure that, as an outsider, I have correctly appreciated the meaning of the statements of the experts. Practical life has taught me that there is no temptation so insidious as the temptation of the outsider to yield lightly to the mistaken belief that he understands where he does not understand. And yet, just as the plain person has to do the best he can in the practical business of life with such knowledge as he can get, so we who wish to find out the truth about reality must do the best we can with such light as we can obtain. We must crave the indulgence of those who know better if we make mistakes in our estimates of their work, and we must beg them to believe that it is no want of humility or of sense of the limitations of our knowledge, but the conviction of the necessity of trying to get clear notions about the meaning of the universe as a whole, that has led us to pursue the pathway towards reality through so difficult and obscure a valley. On one side of the path through that valley lies the quagmire of error in estimating the work of science; on the other, the ditch of acquiescence in uncritical metaphor. We must do our best to keep in the centre.

LECTURE II

"If, Theætetus, you have a wish to have any more embryo thoughts, you will be all the better for the present investigation, and, if not, you will be soberer and humbler and gentler to other men, not fancying that you know what you do not know." We may take to ourselves the words which Plato makes Socrates address to his pupil after leading him to a place very like that we have now reached on the Pathway to Reality. Even if we were to get no further, and to give up the goal of clear knowledge as unattainable, we should have gained. For we have learned that the old uncritical attitude was all wrong, and that we remained so long in it only because of a happy ignorance of its dangers. Looking backwards, we can see that the searcher after truth has escaped from a region where he ran the risk at every step in his search of being overpowered by some evil metaphor. But now he has learned to be on his guard against those who approach him with such suggestions as that mind is a thing, or man a machine, or God a physical cause. He has been

armed with a weapon of defence, the power to criticise his categories, with which he can now cut such dangerous figments of confused thinking into pieces. If he will keep this always in his hand, he may continue to descend into the valley that lies in front, without fear of the spectres that will throng his path.

Let us take a view of the prospect that lies before us. Experience has turned out to be an ἄπειρον, an indefinite manifold made definite only in so far as it is arranged by reflection under general conceptions, bound together and determined as here and now, then and there, this and that. Science has turned out to be the mode of reflection which, by isolating and confining itself to certain abstract aspects of reality, gets away from the here and the now, and transcends the apparently immediate experience by which in self-consciousness we find our minds confronted. We have used the word "science," but we have not confined its meaning, as is sometimes done, to what has the balance, the measuring rod, and the chronometer, and these alone, for its ultimate standards. Every branch of human knowledge which, by systematically bringing objects in experience under certain defined abstract conceptions, aims at a better comprehension of the aspects, present and future, of the kind of experience with which it deals, is science in the sense in which the word is here used. The instinct of a dog or a mother is not science, nor is the shrewdness of the common-

sense man. But if there be any general principles upon which the procedure of, say, the moralist, or the artist, can be shown to be founded, these may belong to its domain. What this stage of our journey necessitates is a closer examination of the character of the abstract conceptions which certain of the sciences employ, and of their relations to one another. We have already found in the indications we have discovered of the ultimate nature of reality, that the claim to finality and exclusive domination, with which the prophets of some of these conceptions threaten to block the way, cannot prevail against the pilgrim who keeps ready in his hand that weapon of criticism with which he is furnished. These prophets have taught mankind a great deal that is of the utmost use. They have cleared from the pathway of life the weeds of superstition and of prejudice, which are the outgrowth of unreflecting common opinion. They have vastly extended human knowledge, and may extend it in the future yet more vastly. Even when they have at times magnified their office, and raised terrifying spectres, they have afforded a new subject of interest for those who have no fear, and have faith in the power of human reason. How these spectres came to be raised, it will be our business to try to find out as we encounter them one after another at the various stopping-places where we shall find them. Our task will involve some sort of attempt at a general view of the various sciences, and the marking out on our

map of the regions which they have appropriated and rule over.

Let us begin by trying to get a clear notion of what is the most general aspect of things with which Science concerns itself, and of how it goes to work. We will begin with a very simple example. I will suppose that I am standing on a lawn looking at the view. I see in the distance a railway signal-box, and further along the line, which runs across the field of my view, another signal-box. I want to find out the distance of the one box from the other. I could, by taking a long time and great deal of trouble, go to the railway with the measuring rod which I have by me, and measure the distance. But the little instrument lying by my side which can be used for measuring angles, enables me to do better. I take my rod, and mark off a distance of, say, sixty yards along the lawn, between two points on it. I then, from one of these points, measure the angle which this line makes with the straight line got by looking through the instrument at the box. Afterwards, I go to the other point on the lawn, and measure the angle of the straight line got by looking at the box from that point. I have now got a triangle, and I know the measurement of the base and of the angles at the base. A simple calculation gives me the lengths of the sides. I next ascertain by similar observations and calculation the distances to the other signal-box. Then, knowing the length of a straight line drawn from

one of my points to each of the boxes, I obtain, by subtraction of the already observed angles, the angle which these lines, taken from that point to the two boxes, make with each other. I have now got the measurement of each of the two sides of a triangle, and the measurement of the angle which they enclose. The base is the very distance between the boxes that I wanted, and a simple mathematical calculation gives it to me. In this way abstract reflection on the materials afforded by two or three easy measurements, made without leaving the lawn, has enabled me to transcend the immediacy of the surroundings which confront me, and to anticipate the result of what would have been my experience had I journeyed to the distant railway and measured it piece by piece.

But what price have I paid for the power thus to annihilate the limitations of immediate experience? From how much of the riches of nature have I been forced to avert my eyes? Let us ask what it was that we measured. Not anything that we can see or feel. Not the length of any actual roads, or strings, or bullet flights, for none of these would ever be precisely straight. We have shut out from consideration the unevenness of the ground, the curvature of the earth's surface, the deflection of rays of light by the atmosphere, and a countless multitude of other things which make a great gulf between what comes into actual experience and mathematically straight lines. We have put before our minds

an ideal construction, which can never be a real object of perception, a triangle conceived as made up of the absolutely shortest distances from point to point, with sides that have neither breadth nor depth, but are pure measures of the extent to which these points must be thought of as outside and away from each other. Such a presentation of points and their distances, and the angles of these distances, is one which thought can only make through a special kind of abstraction, and is no object to be found in actual experience. Yet it is a very valuable presentation of thought. It does not guide us to real things, but it does guide us to aspects which real things always present when we regard them under the categories of this kind of abstraction. In our social intercourse, language, as we have seen, expresses aspects such as these, and is found to be a sufficient means for the description of our individual experiences. The knowledge and recording of these aspects enable us to predict how the aspects of other future and remote experiences will be found to present themselves when reflected on. The intervening life, the beauty of the scenery, the details of the landscape, all these we have for the moment blotted out, and we pay this price for what we get in return, far clearer and more definite knowledge than any which so-called passive observation through the senses can furnish to us, knowledge which teaches us to make more of even such present observation than we

otherwise could. Truly a remarkable instance this of the wonderful power of thought to overcome the foreignness of nature! Even if we had gone to the railway and measured with our rod, we should have gained no greater victory, nor got any substantially more exact result. We should indeed have found that a truly exact ascertainment of the facts was impracticable, because in that case, just as in the former one, it was only in our conception of them that there were exact facts to ascertain. We proposed, in the loose language which for everyday purposes is sufficient, to measure from signal-box to signal-box. We spoke as if these were two definite points which our perceptions would disclose to us when we went to them. But what is the real truth? The signal-box is a wooden structure twelve feet odd in breadth. To what point in it does the supposed demand for adequate and exact knowledge make it proper that we should measure? Here is a new difficulty. It is only for the mathematician that a point — position without length, breadth, or depth—exists. It is only from a different, but also limited and abstract, point of view, that the signal-box itself has any meaning. Mathematically speaking, it has no actual nearest edge to which we can measure. Even to the naked eye, that edge is rough and uneven. To the microscope, it is yet more so. The wood is always, even on the stillest day, parting with its particles; and if we considered closely enough, it would be

impossible to say whether a particular loose particle, itself far short of being for the mathematician a definite point, belonged to the box, or had ceased to be within its edge. It is only from the point of view of practice, and special practice, that there is any distinction between the box and its surroundings. For the practice of the horse which shies at it, or even the baby that looks at it, there might be a wrong distinction, or none at all. For the highly developed reflection of the person who knows what a railway is, or what carpentering is, it exists. But that means that the distinction is derivative and secondary, the creature of reflection, hypostatised into a reality only as the outcome of selective attention from a special standpoint. What, apart from thought, would be an empty and indefinite manifold is worked up by thought into a part of the presentation of a real world. But even this real world here again turns out to be real only through a special phase of reflective activity. The theory of the senses as windows through which the mind looks, breaks down once more. If the mathematician's point turns out to be a construction of thought, so does the railwayman's signal-box. So does the individual observer himself. They are all figments of thought, whether they be the objects of the most active or the most passive reflection. Reality will be found to lie at least as much in the universals of thought as in the particulars of sense,

whether the object be considered from the standpoint of the observer or of the observed.

These considerations seem to throw some light on what the science of Mathematics really is, and on the extent as well as the limitations of its claims. Excepting as the creature of reflection, there is no world which can be adequately described in the language of geometry and arithmetic. The axioms and figures of Euclid are legitimately to be treated as of real validity, only if we are confining ourselves to certain conceptions in the business of bringing definiteness into the manifold immediacy that confronts us. If we so confine ourselves they are legitimate modes of expression, as legitimate as those which obtain in other branches of knowledge which employ different conceptions. It is only by blotting out for the moment the rest of the phases of experience and confining ourselves to particular categories, that our experience can be raised into clear knowledge. Here, as elsewhere, the saying of Goethe is true, that, "he who would accomplish anything must limit himself."

Legitimate as they are, the conceptions of the geometer are not, even from a mathematical point of view, final resting-places. They indicate relations in space and time, but our notions of space and time are not always the same. The physicist, for example, when he talks of these, has images in his mind different from those of the mathematician. He thinks of them, not as mere

forms or relations of externality, as does the mathematician, but as fields in which forces operate, and which are to be conceived as thereby filled. He regards Time and Space as the stage on which what occupies them plays its part, as vortex rings, it may be, in a frictionless physical medium. Such a medium seems to give him a resting-place for his pictorial imagination in the midst of a sea of abstractions. Space means a definite space filled with such a content. But for the mathematician this meaning has to be put aside. *His* space and time are yet more abstract, and even more remote from what is discernible by the eye. They are abstractions as pure as he can make them. The senses cannot isolate pure outness or pure succession. In everyday life we talk as if they could. "It is three miles to London." Here we do not really mean to be exact, and it is not any such loose description of experience that the mathematician aims at. For him, the assertion of such a distance would mean a straight line composed of so many units of distance. But he knows, or ought to know, that he is not dealing with a real thing. If his assertion meant that such definiteness is to be actually experienced in the manifold immediacy which confronts him, he would find himself at once in difficulties to which attention has already been drawn in the illustration of the signal-box. It is only at the cost of eliminating the bulk of what makes it real for us, what gives it its individual form, that experi-

ence can be represented in mathematical forms. When we are reasoning about such forms, we are dealing with thoughts and not with what, in everyday parlance, we mean by things. It is not sight or touch that tells us that figures which coincide in space with the same figure, coincide with one another. Of a perfect coincidence, our senses cannot tell us. They can furnish the proof of no axiom of geometry. It is not for our senses that the world is an aggregate of self-subsisting parts, possessing independent reality. It is only for thought, and as relations in thought, that these parts exist. Language leaves out of account that being made what it is through reflection which is of the essence of reality, and speaks as though the object were exhaustively defined apart from this relationship. That is why language seems to have been inaccurate as soon as, even in common life, we pass to another point of view. "Nothing," said the Sophists, "is true, for its opposite is always true." "Nothing," said Heraclitus, "is, for everything is in a state of becoming."

"Nur scheinbar," wrote Goethe, "steht's Momente still."
"Das Ewige regt sich fort in allen;"
"Denn Alles muss in Nichts zerfallen,"
"Wenn es im Sein beharren will."

What is characteristic of the speech of humanity at large is characteristic also of that of the most profound mathematician. We cannot, any of us, from whatever standpoint, resolve the immediacy which confronts us into the universals of thought.

When we have tried our best to do so, we find that we are always setting these universals up again in a pictorial guise, as individuals, and as something else than they are meant to be. The pure space of the mathematician he talks of as a thing, and tells us to draw a straight line in it, regardless of the fact that if so pictured it ceases to be the pure space in which alone he dare assume that his axioms will be self-evidently true. The physicist with his atom, the biologist with his self-conserving organism, and the psychologist with his subject introspectively made object, does the same. Each hypostatises into an individual of experience what is really an abstraction. This is why there is an apparent though no real contradiction in mathematical science. Its subject is externality, the aspect of the world which is disengaged when the relations of things, as outside each other in space and time, are brought by reflection into clear consciousness by means of a set of categories of which magnitude and number are examples. We can estimate the cost of building a house by calculating the number of bricks required to build it. In doing so we make use of the conception of quantity as discrete, and properly to be exhibited as addition of finite parts. But there is quite another aspect of quantity, upon which is founded quite a different side of mathematics, which treats quantity as continuous. Now, if the view of reality which has guided us thus far be right, there are not two sorts of quantity, existing side by side, but distinct in

experience, like red and yellow apples, but two aspects of one and the same fundamental relationship. The understanding of this would save many a student from confusion. To try to teach him the Calculus without explaining that it does not really contradict the aspect of quantity that has become familiar to him, but simply deals with quantity under another aspect, is like trying to show him how to waltz without first teaching him to count the time of the steps. Most of the text-books give no warning, but go on as if the writer was still occupied with the discrete side, whereas in truth it has been put away. This is how an American writer, who has seen the difficulty clearly, describes the state of mind of the unhappy student when he begins the Infinitesimal Calculus. "He finds himself required to ignore the principles and axioms that have hitherto guided his studies, and sustained his convictions, and to receive instead a set of notions that are utterly repugnant to all his preconceived ideas of truth. When he is told that one quantity may be added to another without increasing it, or subtracted from another without diminishing it; that one quantity may be infinitely small, and another infinitely smaller still, and so on *ad infinitum;* that a quantity may be so small that it cannot be divided, and yet may contain another an indefinite and even an infinite number of times; that Zero is not always nothing, but may not only be something or nothing, as occasion may require, but may be both at the same time in the same

equation, it is not surprising that he should become bewildered and disheartened." . . . "To clear the way for a logical and rational consideration of the subject, we must begin with the fundamental idea of the conditions under which quantity may exist. We must, for the purposes of the Calculus, consider it not only as capable of being diminished, but also as being actually in a state of change. It must (so to speak) be *vitalised* so that it shall be endowed with *tendencies* to change its value, and the rate and direction of these tendencies will be found to constitute the groundwork of the whole system. The differential Calculus is the science of rates, and its peculiar subject is quantity in a state of change." *

Once upon a time there was a very bitter controversy as to the respective merits of Newton and Leibnitz, in the discovery and elaboration of the infinitesimal method. Much of the dispute was due to the use of language appropriate only to the discrete aspects of quantity for the purpose of describing it when regarded as continuous. Newton, at all events, saw very clearly that what he had to do was to conceive quantity as continuous. Thus he treated of geometrical magnitudes as springing from continuous motion, the line as arising from the motion of a point, the surface as generated by the motion of a line, and the solid by that of a surface. He shows

* Buckingham, *Elements of the Differential and Integral Calculus.* Chicago, 1881. Preface.

that if we conceive a point as moving along a curve which is referred to co-ordinate axes, the velocity of the moving point can be resolved into two velocities, one parallel to the axis of X, the other to that of Y. These velocities he calls the "fluxions" of X and Y respectively. Reversing the process, he calls the arc the fluent of the velocity with which it is described, and the abscissa the fluent of the component velocity parallel to OX. In this, the fundamental conception of his method, he is dealing with what are essentially continuous aspects of space and time, and is abstracting under what was in his age a novel set of conceptions. The difference between Newton and Leibnitz appears to have been that while the former regarded his continuous quantity as in a state of continuous growth, the latter regarded that growth as taking place by means of infinitesimal increments. This difference was probably much more important in form than in substance. In the hands of both of these thinkers, all quantities, except mere constants, are regarded as changing from one value to another by continuous growth. In the hands of both we get a new and powerful way of dealing with quantity. It depends on two new notions. First, that of a rate of change of a function with respect to what is called its independent variable; secondly, that of a fixed magnitude to equality with which we conceive a variable magnitude as approaching indefinitely near, without our ever being able to present the case as one of coinci-

dence. The fixed magnitude is called the limit. The method based on these notions enables us, whether we use the language of Newton or that of Leibnitz, to solve problems which lie beyond the grasp of mathematics on its other side. We can solve, for instance, problems as to the areas produced by points moving in curves. The ascertainment of the limit brings us to something about which ordinary calculations can be made, and a relationship is in this way established between the varying quantity and a fixed one, through which we can measure things that would be otherwise immeasurable. The substance of the method was the same with these great men, and it was the unavoidable inaccuracy of ordinary language, when applied to ideas that are not ordinary, that gave rise to most of the controversy about their work, and divided their commentators into hostile camps.

Mathematics deals with the most abstract of all the relations of reality, and because these relations are the most abstract, they are after a fashion the simplest and most easy for reflection to grasp and reason about. When reduced to the skeleton figures of geometry, space becomes a simple subject of study, and its relations can be described with plainness and precision. We do not really know what we mean when we talk of a straight road between London and Bedford, but most of us think we know what we mean when we talk of a straight line connecting two points. In a sense

we present it to ourselves as an image. We think of a concrete case of a figure of something which has many other properties. It is black, and heavy, and hard. But from the colour, and weight, and resistance, we divert our attention. Its surface is irregular, so that a line drawn on that surface would be crooked. This also we ignore. We thus construct an image which is very indistinct, and corresponds to no general experience. But it is an image, and as such, we have experience of it. Those of the relations of the concrete thing which we want are clearly before our minds, isolated by ignoring the others. In this way the mathematician gets a kind of experience with which he can compare his conceptions, and by which he can test the outcome of his inferences, applying the method of verifying hypotheses which is common to all science. And in his case, if the experience is dim, at least its outlines and relations, just because they are the most abstract, are the simplest and most easy to isolate and apprehend. The result is that the method of mathematics is the most far-reaching of all the methods of science. Its concern is not the individuals of perception, but the general relations of these individuals in space and time, and it is in no way limited by the "here" and "now," which have no meaning for it. It was this unrivalled range of the science of quantity that led the Pythagoreans to take number to be of

the very substance, as well as of the form, of things; in other words, to identify reality with number. But number, like all other relations of quantity, is just one of those general conceptions under which reflection brings the object world of things in space and time. It is the work of mind, but is not the whole of the mind's work. And it soon becomes apparent that quantity, if in one sense the most fruitful, is in another the most barren of the aspects of the object. In it the play of abstraction has removed us the furthest from the concrete richness of immediacy.

We ought not to pass from this topic without noticing that the power of the mind to abstract, by means of mathematical reasoning, has taken it into a region lying beyond even magnitude and measurement. Recent mathematical research has, for example, led to the discovery that we can build up a science of abstract externality from which the notions of magnitude and measurement, essential parts of the geometry of Euclid, are totally excluded. The space with which Euclid deals is the space of our ordinary experience with its three dimensions. It is assumed to be always the same, so that a straight line is in every sense the shortest distance between two points, and parallel straight lines can never meet in it, as they might do if one of its dimensions had a twist in it. Let us try to get into our heads what is meant by saying that Euclid makes this

assumption, and what difference it may occasion if he does so without warrant.

Suppose a shadow to be thrown on to the surface of a smooth sphere. Suppose next that the shadow could become conscious of its own existence. Being a shadow it would have and take cognisance of but two dimensions of space, length and breadth. But the curvature of the sphere would really constitute a third, in which the shadow had its existence, though it could not know it. For the length and breadth would be length and breadth on a curve of a certain radius. Such a shadow would believe that the straight line along which it was moving could be projected to infinity, unconscious of the fact that the line would come round the sphere to the point from which it had started. Such a shadow would have notions of geometry which would turn out to be erroneous. For, in the first place, certain lines that the shadow would take to be straight lines, would, if produced sufficiently, come round to the point from which they started. Euclid shows that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles. But to the shadow this would only be true of very small triangles. As the triangles became bigger, the demonstration would be more and more untrue. Now is it not logically quite conceivable that we ourselves, whose faculties preclude us from presenting to our imaginations more than three dimensions, are, like the shadow, deceived, and that we really exist in more? A

writer on spiritualism once pushed this possibility to a comical point when he suggested that to such a shadow as we are considering, a simple loop in a string would appear as a knot and a simple plane figure as a closed box; that the knot could be untied without loosening the ends of the string, and an object put into the box without opening it, by a power that could get off the surface of the sphere and move in a third dimension.

Science can only tell us that the real space in which we exist, and the real time which is based on motion in that space, *may* be quite different from what we take them to be. As a consequence it is quite possible that Euclid may be wrong; that parallel lines may ultimately meet; and that two straight lines may enclose a space. And it may be that a square which coincides with another square in one kind of space, may chance to coincide with a quantitatively different figure when removed to another kind of space, with the result that the axiom which lies at the foundation of quantitative or metrical geometry, that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another, ceases to be universally true. The only principle, then, which must remain true however the nature of space may change, will be one from which the notion of quantity has been eliminated, and which depends on distinction of quality alone. We may make a beginning in this direction by simplifying our preliminary *datum* or assumption of fact, and confining it

to this, which we may assume without bringing in the notion of measurement at all, *that we can recognise difference of position.* This we do always assume, because it is of the very essence of that fact of externality which we are to endeavour to treat under categories which do not go beyond it. Thus, if we take a number of points on a line which joins them, we can distinguish them as found in the line on which they lie. Their distance from each other we must put out of account, for this would require the category of measurement for its recognition. It follows that if all that is given is the mere fact of several points on a straight line, they cannot have any different quality from any other points on that line. We have, therefore, in order to construct a geometry apart from measurement, to get further, and to find out how to describe qualities of points and lines and figures which will enable us to distinguish and reason about them without bringing in that notion. This is done by a new and highly abstract branch of mathematical science which is called "Projective Geometry." It takes a point outside the line on which the original set of, say, four points lies, and draws lines from the new outside point, intersecting the original line at the four old points. Now suppose that across the pencil of four new lines so drawn we draw other lines, they will each intersect the four new lines at points which will have a certain relation to the

old points, in virtue of which they can be distinguished and described. In this fashion a qualitative equivalence may be got at which becomes the object of this new geometry, in place of the quantitative equality which was the object of demonstration with Euclid. Space is treated as nothing but a set of qualitative relations. From two points we cannot, without the category of quantity, describe and determine a third, unless that third lies in a different line. But given three points joined by different lines, we can construct figures, such as that referred to, which will enable us to determine descriptively or projectively any number of fresh points, and to distinguish them, and the lines and planes resulting from them, qualitatively.

A science confining itself to such abstract conceptions as does Projective Geometry, may not be an instrument very well adapted for practical application. Its use is to disengage from out of ordinary mathematics certain assumptions which confine the latter, in some, at least, of its branches, to the limited experience with which we are familiar, and which prevent it from being used for the attainment of a still wider reaching knowledge. Its advantage is that its propositions are true, not merely for space of three, but for space of n dimensions. We have stopped to look at it here because it enables us to see very clearly the truth that Science can extend itself only by sacrificing the great bulk of what concrete experience gives

us, and that the more wide reaching are the conceptions of Science, the less do they present us with an adequate description of the concrete reality of experience. Beyond the science of measurement, barren as that turned out to be, we have seen that there lies, in a region yet more barren, a science of mere externality. We had better now pass on from the merely ideal constructions of mathematics, and next consider how far the conceptions of what is called physical science do justice to real things.

Of the conceptions of physical science, it is not easy to pronounce with accuracy what is their broad characteristic. One view is that they are invariably mechanical, and that if they represent actual physical changes at all, they represent them as effected by causes operating from without in space and time. If this be so, their aim must be to present to reflection the manifold of the departments of nature with which they deal, as combinations of the simplest and most homogeneous mechanisms. They must seek to represent the universe as an aggregate of atoms, of which the leading characteristic is that they attract each other from a distance, and so produce such phenomena as that of gravitation, according to a law which is one of the best known of the results of physical science. But such a description is not wholly accurate. Some of the standpoints of the modern physicist are much more abstract, and have little to do with the old-fashioned notions. Indeed, the tendency of the most distinguished

men of science of our time is to try to do without the category of Cause altogether in discussing the phenomena of nature, and, for the purposes of their science, to confine themselves to descriptions of motion. Even when they come to the forces of nature they refuse to look at force in any other aspect than as the direction and rate in and at which change of motion takes place, instead of calling it, what the older physicists and the man in the street call it, the cause of the change. When we consider the motion of a point in space, we are considering a mere abstraction When we pass to the question of what is moved and how, we seem to have got to something real for physics to consider. But the modern physicist sternly sets his face against us. He tells us not only that we know nothing of matter, even in the sense in which Locke spoke of it, as the substance which underlies phenomena, but that his science rejects every definition of it except as "that which can have its motion changed by the application of force. Two bodies are of equal mass if equal forces applied to these bodies produce in equal times equal changes of velocity. This is the only definition of equal masses which can be admitted in modern dynamics, and it is applicable to all material bodies, whatever they may be made of."* When we bear in mind the scientific conception of force just given, we find that matter and energy are, at all events for some

* Maxwell, *Matter and Motion*, p. 40.

of the modern physicists, merely two of the abstractions of one of the most abstract methods by which experience is investigated, and apparently cannot be themselves further reduced. But if physics be defined, as it has been and must be if it is to cover the whole field without leaving huge gaps, as an inquiry into the causes of the changes in the modes or qualities of dead matter, it is a Science which, both in its theories and on its experimental side, will go far beyond such abstract definitions as we have been speaking of. Modern physics is in short a composite science, in which the methods of the mathematician are called largely in aid in dealing with a subject matter which is much more concrete and individual than that of the mathematician proper. We are forced in this new region to go beyond the categories of the mathematician, and to look for causes and effects, do what we will to turn our faces in a different direction. We may try to confine ourselves to mathematical conceptions, but we cannot. Our definitions of force and of mass, of matter and of energy, will turn out to be circular if we do. These conceptions are really fundamental. They make physical science what it is, and cannot be extruded from it. They are, in short, the special categories which lie at its foundation. The failure to realise this fact has made many a good physicist degenerate into a bad metaphysician.

Now, we have already, in the first Book,

asked the question how far the conception of cause and effect, the principle that every change is due to some event anterior to it in time and separate from it in space, is adequate to reality. We saw that while this conception is less abstract than those which mathematics offers, it still can take no account of the bulk of what the world of phenomena appears to be. If we are justified in the hope that we may yet come to believe in the reality of that world as it seems, we shall apparently have to get beyond the category of cause. We will begin, however, as usual, by trying from a concrete example of its application to get a clear notion of how phenomena are dealt with through that category when we abstract under it. If I put a lighted match to gunpowder it explodes, and if I ask someone, to whom I have to justify my conduct, what was the cause, the answer is, "Why you, to be sure, who put the lighted match to the powder." But while for ethical or popular purposes this view may do, it is, as was earlier pointed out, plainly insufficient for any scientific purpose. For if the gunpowder be wet, it will not go off. We must, therefore, ask what, from a scientific standpoint, is the cause. Now Science tells us that gunpowder consists of a mechanical mixture of particles of saltpetre, carbon, and sulphur. The saltpetre contains in its chemical molecules oxygen, in loose combination with nitrogen and potash. When the oxygen is shaken loose from the nitro-

gen and potash, as it is, among other methods, by ignition, it rushes to the carbon, for which it has a strong chemical affinity, and its atoms unite with those of the latter, and form carbonic acid and carbonic oxide gases. These gases, which increase their volume as heat is developed, produce great pressure, so violent that an explosion is the result. Now what was, scientifically speaking, the cause of this explosion? Which one of the conditions, the loose combination in the nitrogen group, the greater affinity of the oxygen for the carbon, the dryness of the mixture which made combustion possible, or what else, are we to pick out and designate as the cause? Plainly it was only in a popular sense that putting the light to the powder was the cause. For the practical purpose of finding who was to blame, it was convenient to fasten on that particular one among a multitude of conditions which were necessary if we were to witness the explosion. But if our contemplations are to be scientific, we may not import outside and irrelevant considerations to guide our choice. The man of science will tell us, that the most accurate answer he can give to the question is, that the cause of the explosion was the liberation of the potential energy stored up in the gunpowder. But this only shows that our selection of the cause varies with our standpoint. We should never let off the man who

applied the match and blew up the house, and arrest the manufacturer of the gunpowder. The notion of cause seems to be, like that of quantity, one by means of which we pick out for some special purpose certain abstract aspects of reality, in order to get a clear view of them. It is always a relative term, and is always loose. There is no such thing as one independent event which precedes the effect, and is for all purposes its cause. The only antecedent we can name which could be so described with any truth, is the entire sum of the conditions, including, in the case of the powder, not only the potential energy and the active force which turned it into kinetic energy, but every other condition the presence of which contributed to the explosion. And then a new difficulty at once arises as to the point at which the cause so understood ceased to be a cause, and the effect began to be an effect. In nature there seems to be nowhere any such line of division between the event and the entire sum of its conditions, though for loose practical purposes it is convenient to ignore one or more of the conditions, and speak as if it were otherwise. The laws of nature seem to exclude the breach in the continuity which would be involved in affirming seriously that the energy which already existed, and which science says can never be either destroyed or increased, ceased to be one thing, and subsequently became another really independent thing. When we try to find

such a breach of continuity, we find ourselves face to face with another conception, that of something which is incapable of diminution or increase, and is indestructible except in form or appearance, the conception of substance. For it becomes plain that all the chemical atoms which make up the gas of the explosion were already in the powder. It is true that their relative positions in space have changed. But that is all that has happened, and the energy which effected the change was likewise there in the powder. In the end we are driven to the conclusion that not only is the cause not a thing nor an event distinguishable in time or space from the effect, but that if we try to define it accurately, we can come to no other result than that it is just the sum of the conditions; in other words, is just the effect itself. Now, of course, the word "cause" has a legitimate use. But that use is a popular and provisional, and not a scientific one. It means an aspect under which, for practical purposes, and in order to get a clear view for some special end, we separate out some one antecedent and lay exclusive stress on it. That is to say, the word imports a mere abstraction, and is wholly inadequate to reality. Here, again, we are confronted with that disintegrating work of reflection, which brings despair to the orthodox upholder of the "room with windows" idea of the perceiving mind.

The obscurity which we have observed in the conception of cause and effect is, of course, well known to the modern physicist. He, indeed, has put the words under a ban, and he refuses to talk in such language. He confines himself at the outside to such phrases as matter and energy. But have we here, any more than in the former terminology, anything beyond an indication of an aspect of phenomena, separated out by abstract reflection, as distinguished from the indication of reality itself? Can we for a moment suppose that the word "matter," to begin with, means a self-subsisting reality, without falling into hopeless difficulties? Let us commence by supposing it to fill space continuously and homogeneously. If it is of this nature, then not only is the conception of bodies as numerically separate impossible, but some of the simplest phenomena cannot be accounted for. How can it be, for instance, that when an electric spark is passed through a mixture of the gases oxygen and hydrogen, they combine to form an enormously diminished volume of water? Space surely cannot be continuously filled with the material of which they consisted. On the other hand, suppose this not to be so! We are then face to face with another difficulty. We have to make clear to ourselves that the action at a distance on each other of the atoms which are in space, is intelligible. Now action through a void interval, at a distance, as a fact which they accept, has been a standing puzzle to physicists

since the days of Newton. Newton himself appears to have thought it to be an ultimate and irresoluble property of the particles of matter, of which no account could be given. And modern physicists have struggled hard, only to find that they can get no further than he did. They cannot accept the first alternative that space has a continuous and homogeneous content. Yet when they are driven to the second, even if they are content to take the atom as something which, in a fashion that is inexplicable, acts at a distance, they are driven to hold that the word atom is itself a mere abstract expression for a centre of force without content or dimensions. In the words of a brilliant modern mathematician:* "We come to see that action at a distance is something ultimate, which we cannot reduce to any simpler conception of the action of substance. It is indeed the final conception of substance in general, for all the mechanical activity of substance consists in action at a distance. That which exercises action at a distance, which we have now allowed to reduce itself to the mere *point* which is sufficient to account for it, ceases to be interesting to us, and action at a distance steps into its place." The old notion of Lucretius and Newton that matter is made up of inelastic and indivisible atoms, is hardly tenable by the modern man of science. If it were true, we should have found, what Science

* Paul du Bois-Reymond, *Ueber die Grundlagen der Erkenntniss in den Exacten Wissenschaften*, 1890, p. 101.

does not disclose, some indication of a limit to the compressibility of matter. For this reason men like Boscovich and Faraday passed to the notion of the so-called atom as no more than a centre from which attractive and repulsive force is exercised. But the question then arises what force is. In popular acceptance what is meant by the word is a subjective experience, the sensation of force. If we try to find a purely objective significance, we find that we have got, not a thing, but the mere name of a measure or relation, the rate at which work is done. It turns out that the notion of a point from which force is exercised, is a convenient mathematical abstraction, but that it does not indicate any conceivably actual experience. Driven by difficulties such as this, physicists have turned to another hypothesis, that which is associated with the name of Lord Kelvin. This is the famous theory of vortex rings, the theory that the atoms into which matter, for the physicist, must be taken to be finally resoluble, consist of portions, rotating as do rings of smoke, of some medium which fills the whole space. If such a medium be conceived as a frictionless fluid, and if it can be conceived that in such a fluid there are everywhere present vortex rings, there results a view of the nature of matter which avoids a good many difficulties. Such a view enables us to understand how it is that every atom of every one element is, so far as the spectroscope can tell us, possessed of the same properties. It would seem

even to lend itself to the mechanical explanation o gravitation which was propounded, nearly a centur ago, by Lesage of Geneva. Lesage proved mathe matically that gravitation could be accounted fo if it were assumed that, besides ordinary an larger particles of matter, there is an infinitel greater number of smaller ones, which dart abou in all directions with immense velocity. Whe two of the larger particles are placed near eac other, the one screens the other from the impac of a number of the smaller particles, and th consequent excess of battering on the outmos sides over that on the inmost, produces a tendenc of the particles to approach each other. H showed mathematically that the result of such process is equivalent to an attraction varyin inversely as the square of the distance; in othe words, to gravitation.

But even if we adopt this hypothetical explana tion of gravitation, and with it the conception c space as filled with larger and smaller vortex ring in a perfectly frictionless and continuous fluid, w do not seem to be any further forward. In th first place, we have no idea what such a flui means. There is no analogue of it in experience So far as that experience is concerned, such medium is, in the literal sense, metaphysical. I the second place, even if we could present som image of it to our mind's eye, we must find our selves face to face with the old difficulties. I experience we never do reach, and, indeed, w

cannot conceive ourselves as reaching a *ne plus ultra*, an ultimate limit. Everything in experience is and must always be, capable of being viewed as divisible, and further resoluble. Were it not so, the continuity of nature would be broken. Applying this to the conception of a frictionless fluid, continuously occupying space, and not itself further resoluble, we see that it is self-contradictory. As a thing in space, we cannot think of it as compressible, unless it consists of parts; and this, by hypothesis, it cannot be, for otherwise it would not be continuous. But if it be not compressible, how can vortex rings be formed and motion take place in it? These are but illustrations, which might be multiplied indefinitely, of the fact that this theory has only put back one stage further the difficulties which attended the other theories about the ultimate nature of matter. The truth is, that in setting up these conceptions, we have passed beyond the region of what can belong to any possible experience. We are making use, not of concrete facts such as those to which men of science sometimes profess and erroneously profess to confine themselves, but of abstract conceptions which are really metempirical, and whose only justification is that they are the means by which we can shut out all that is irrelevant to the purpose of the moment, and by a process of reasoning get clear knowledge of the structure and characteristics of certain phases of experience, and of their place in the really indivisible whole of

knowledge. Such conceptions correspond to methods of abstraction under certain definite categories, and represent the outcome of those methods. They possess a validity no greater, and a utility no less than the abstract conceptions of mathematics. Most useful they certainly are, for they have helped us, for instance, in astronomy, to a knowledge which far transcends that which is immediate. Yet, if we attribute to them any validity other than that which attaches to the mere figments of abstract thought, and jump to the conclusion that, if we could indefinitely magnify our senses, we should experience real things corresponding to them, we fall into hopeless self-contradiction. Whether we are speaking of matter, or of energy, or of force, or mass, or momentum, or of any of the other great physical conceptions, we are dealing with abstractions reached by employing categories such as cause and substance, to guide our process of reflection. What the categories of quantity, discretion, continuity, and, further back still, of bare externality, have done for us in the region of mathematics, these others have done for us in that of physical science. It is by the categories which each of these sciences employs, that its scope and method, and the limits of its results, are determined. These categories for the time confine him who employs them, with the intensity of concentration that Science requires, to certain phases of the world as it seems, and to certain phases only. Of the others, they, rightly

interpreted, can neither affirm nor deny the reality. For it is inherent in the nature of these categories, as only partial and fragmentary manifestations of the activity of reflection, that they should take no cognisance of these other aspects.

Over the interesting sights which are to be seen in the region through which our pathway is leading us, we must not linger. Our purpose has been merely to find out what sort of claim to forbid our further progress is set up by the various menacing forms which beset the region of Science. Over all the varieties of each species of these forms, it is not an object of our journey to pause. What we wish to find out is, whether they have any title or any real power to prevent us from getting to higher ground beyond the valley of abstraction in which they dwell. For, if we can reach such higher ground, perchance we may have a view of the distant things of which we are in quest, which may enable us to believe them and that world of which they are the highest appearances to be what they seem. But so far, we have only been face to face with the mathematician, with him who would bid us limit ourselves, in our search for the real, to quantity, if not to externality; and with the physicist, who tells us that beyond these lie causes, substances, and the like, but nothing more. We have spoken in friendly language with these captains of a spectre world, for we have understood the immense value of their methods, as aids to human knowledge. It was only when certain of

them sought to bar the path, that we quarrelled. Let us now make a step further, and get acquainted with another master of the method of applying abstraction to the concrete universe.

The methods of the physicist rule out fewer of the phases of nature than do those of the mathematician; the methods of the chemist rule out fewer than do those of the physicist. When the physicist defines matter and energy, in terms which will enable him to use these conceptions in his methods, he knows that he is thinking abstractly, and without reference to any conceivable particular experience. For him the atom is, as we have seen, in the last resort but an ideal point to or from which motion proceeds. He is really, at least in his theoretical as distinguished from his experimental methods, under the domination of mathematical categories. The chemist, on the other hand, does not require to regard the atom so abstractly. For him, at least as he talks, the atom might conceivably be seen, if a microscope powerful enough could be got, and he discourses of atomic weights and affinities in language which suggests that the atom may be a real thing. Modern chemistry has, indeed, passed beyond the idea of elementary substances to that of diverse elementary atoms of which all its substances consist. For it all substances are, in a special sense, composite, and their qualities and differences depend on the fundamental attributes of elementary atoms, or on molecular structure aris-

ing from the chemical union of the various kinds of atoms. Chemistry deals with experience from the point of view of change of substance so conceived. Its main category is the molecule. For the physicist, the molecule, if he used the word, would mean the point of application of the forces which determine the physical state of bodies, the small particle which, for the purpose of considering the action of these forces, may be taken as a unit. For the chemist the molecule has quite a different significance. He thinks of it only as the smallest mass into which a substance can be divided without changing its chemical nature. Take, for example, a piece of sugar. I dissolve it in water. The sugar is now divided up ever so finely, but the imperceptible particles suspended throughout the water are still sugar, and nothing else. Now add to the water sulphuric acid. The solution blackens, and presently there is evolved out of the sugar, charcoal. The sugar has as such ceased to exist. Its constituent elements have become separated, and some of them have gone into combination with some of the constituent elements of the sulphuric acid. We have got a new set of substances. Take, again, water. It can be subdivided almost indefinitely without alteration of its chemical nature. Indeed, no mechanical subdivision of it that we know will change its chemical nature. Just before it bursts, the film of a soap-bubble is less than $\frac{1}{1000000}$ of an inch in thickness. When it is converted

into vapour the water is divided up yet more finely, still without any change of chemical character. By means of heat we can separate the particles of the vapour to an extent which, so far as the senses aided by the finest instruments can tell, is incapable of limit. But we can make a still greater subdivision. If we pass through the water an electric current, bubbles of gas arise round the two poles of the battery. The bubbles which surround the one pole turn out to be quite different from those at the other. For one set of bubbles encloses hydrogen, the other oxygen. Here we have, arising from a new sort of operation, products equivalent in weight to the amount of water that has disappeared, while enormously exceeding it in volume. The chemist tells us that each molecule of the lost water, described, in his abstract terminology, as H_2O, has been resolved into three constituent atoms, two of hydrogen and one of oxygen. This is his atomic theory. Yet valuable as are the atomic theory and the processes based on it, processes which enable him accurately to foretell phenomena of experience, and so to get beyond the immediate, this theory is but a method of regarding nature abstractly, a set of general conceptions through which it is useful to approach the facts. No one has ever seen a molecule: no one has ever seen an atom. They are convenient expressions in which to record chemical changes that cannot be envisaged in space and time. "I wish," writes a distinguished modern chemist, "to

declare my belief that the atomic theory, beautiful and consistent as it appears, is only a temporary expedient for representing the facts of chemistry to the mind. Although, in the present state of the Science, it gives absolutely essential aid both to investigation and study, I have the conviction that it is temporary scaffolding around the imperfect building, which will be removed as soon as its usefulness is passed." * In other words, it is a method which we justify, because it gives us results which we can check with experience, and which fit into the context of what we see and feel. But it is the results which are verifiable, and not the conceptions which form the foundation of the method. And if chemists find any other method, more adequate in the sense of being yet more fruitful in results, they will throw overboard the atomic theory, just as they have thrown overboard the notion of Imponderables; that is, of attenuated forms of matter which could be added to or subtracted from bodies without altering their weight, and which at one time were put forward in all the text-books as the explanation of the phenomena of heat and electricity. It is by means of hypothetical and abstract conceptions that we are able, not to describe what we experience, but to isolate in thought such aspects of it as we wish to bring into clear knowledge, for the purpose of extending that knowledge yet further. The test which we accept of the legitimacy of the conceptions is the

* Cooke, *The New Chemistry*, p. 118.

correctness, as shown by subsequent experience, of the concrete results to which they guide us. The conceptions themselves we cannot and do not seek to verify.

Chemistry deals with the composition and changes of substance. Its leading conception is the atomic theory, and this has led to grouping the so-called elements according to their atomic weight, and affinities, and structure. It deals with topics which, on the face of them, are less remote from what we see and feel in the concrete than those of physics. The latter takes no account of most of the conceptions of chemistry, because they are beside its purpose. By way of contrasting the methods of the physicist and the mathematician with those chemical methods to which we have been referring, it is worth while quoting the description of the field of physical science given by a well-known writer; "That which is properly called Physical Science is the knowledge of relations between natural phenomena and their physical antecedents, as necessary sequences of cause and effect; these relations being investigated by the aid of mathematics—that is, by a method in which processes of reasoning on all questions that can properly be brought under the categories of quantity and space conditions, are rendered perfectly exact, simplified, and made capable of general application to a degree almost inconceivable by the uninitiated, through the use of conventional symbols. There

is no admission for any but a mathematician into this school of Philosophy. But there is a lower department of natural science, most valuable as a precursor and auxiliary, which we may call scientific phenomenology, the office of which is to observe and classify phenomena, and by induction to infer the laws that govern them. As, however, it is unable to determine these laws to be the necessary results of the action of physical forces, they remain merely empirical until the higher science interprets them."* Chemistry is a department of what, in the passage just quoted, is called "scientific phenomenology," differing from experimental physics in its conceptions and hypotheses, but yet akin to it. The fields overlap. Mathematics comes to the aid of chemistry in a much less degree than it does to that of physics. If it is called in by the chemist to render assistance, the assistance is of a comparatively simple kind. Still it is most useful in the application of the atomic theory. When we passed our electric current through the water, mathematics enabled us to calculate the weights of hydrogen and oxygen respectively which were evolved, from the data afforded by the weight of water lost. In this fashion, and in connection with the chemical law of Avogadro, that equal volumes of all substances, when brought into a gaseous state and under the like

* Tait, *Recent Advances in Physical Science*, 2nd edition, p. 348.

conditions, contain equal numbers of molecules, it tells us what to expect as the results of a vast variety of processes. But, perhaps, the best illustration of all is the chemical equation, where the molecules, with their atomic structures, appear on one side; while the other side not merely tells us what new substances and in what quantity we may expect as the result of reaction in accordance with chemical laws, but enables us to test whether we have correctly analysed the products of the reaction when it has taken place.

Let us pause for a moment in our journey, and cast a glance back at that group of sciences which we are just parting from. They all deal with those relations of things which are regarded as external to one another, and as being acted on from without. They all belong to the region of externality in space and time. Physics is more abstract than chemistry, and mathematics than physics; but with whatever class of conception they deal, it is invariably one which is conditioned by the notion of some abstract relation of things outside each other in space or time, or both. Whether it be the projection of the metageometer, the propositions of Euclid, the numbers of the arithmetician, the continuous variation of the Calculus, the principle of the conservation of energy, the law of gravitation, the atomic theory, or the chemical equation, we are conceiving relations between things regarded as outside each other, and standing in no other relationship. This relationship falls

into many categories and derivative conceptions. It might be very useful work to try to make something like a comprehensive table of these categories and their derivatives, which should disclose them in logical order, and exhibit their relations to each other. A clear understanding of these relations might save a great deal of confusion. But such a purpose, however meritorious, is outside the business of these Lectures, which is simply to thread the way among these categories. For this purpose we have had to try our hands at some criticism of them, and it would probably be part of a complete system of Philosophy to make that criticism exhaustive. Such a system ought to be able to display to us, approximately at least, how much, amid the gain which Science yields us, we shut out and lose by the assumption, often made as unconsciously as it is dogmatically, that the categories which take cognisance only of what can be expressed as relationship in space and time, are the only categories that can guide us in the search after reality. For us here it is sufficient if further inquiry has convinced us that this is not so. We do not need to go into details, if we have once seen clearly that the fact that the categories of externality have been of immense service to the reflection of mankind is no reason for confining that reflection to their use. There has so far appeared no reason why we should not in the end be able to believe in the reality of the world as it seems. That world is no mere net-work of the abstractions

which in point of time not only do not precede, but, in fact, are quarried out of it by reflection. Nor have we found any reason to compromise our faith in the world as it seems, by conceding, what is taught by Kant in his *Critique of Judgment*, that so far as our experience of the world cannot be expressed in terms of space and time relations, and of external conceptions such as those of cause, substance, reciprocity, and the like, it has but a secondary order of reality with an origin referable to the observer as such. Such a distinction is no more capable of being justified than is that of Locke, between primary and secondary qualities. All the relationships of the phenomena of the object world are by their very origin and nature, as products of reflection, there for reflection and for reflection alone. They are abstractions secondary in time to the experience out of which they are separated. So much we can discover by the simple process, which Locke tried to pursue, of looking into our own breasts. Only let us be warned by his example. Just as he went wrong when he thought he had found an abstract idea of matter, so shall we go wrong if we think we can present to ourselves a universe consisting of, say, vortex rings in a perfect fluid in motion. Such a universe is a possible and proper working conception for abstract reflection to make use of, but not a possible or proper subject for a pictorial presentation of reality.

Nor do we better the case by making the

addition of what we call a mind operating from without upon such a universe. The conception of such action belongs, as has already been pointed out, exclusively to the field of space and time, and by these it is conditioned. It is but the conception of a cause, which can operate only within that field. To talk of such a cause as antecedent to space and time, or as a First Cause, is to use language which has no clear meaning. Causality is descriptive only of the relationship between phenomena presented as external to one another, and, just because it is a mere relationship that is described, we can conceive no cause that is not, in another aspect, effect. Nor do the difficulties end here. Such a mind, operating in such an external fashion, is meaningless, excepting as object for the subject. It turns out, when scrutinised, to be itself an abstraction, to yield, like all else of the kind, to the analysis of that reflection of which its notion is the product. We are face to face here not only with one of those metaphysical figments which the man of science seeks to expel, but with a figment of what is even worse, of bad metaphysics. A wrongful application of the categories of the physical sciences has raised this shadowy apparition. Do not let us follow it down the bye-path along which it beckons us. For that bye-path will but bring us round again to the slough of despond.

But it is not only in the quest after a so-called First Cause that these categories have been mis-

applied. We have seen of what enormous service they are in assisting us to the fulfilment of a purpose, most of all necessary in the exact sciences, the measurement of quantity. In most branches of knowledge the measuring rod and the balance and the chronometer are useful. In the exact sciences they are of the essence. But when we look around us, we behold aspects of nature, in relation to which the importance of measurement dwindles. For the man whose thoughts are engrossed with the beauty of the hills under the glow of the setting sun, the measuring rod and the balance and the chronometer have no meaning. For the moralist, who is contemplating conduct, they are irrelevant. It is true that the psychologist may occasionally, and not wholly without some result, bring them into æsthetical inquiries under such guises as the law of what has been called the "Golden Section." Fechner, who gave a great impulse to the quantitative study of Æsthetics, found that when he consulted a large number of persons as to which out of a number of different rectangular figures they preferred, there was a marked preference for those in which the short side stood to the long side in the same proportion as did the long side to the sum of both. Many investigations of analogous kinds are taking place in the psycho-physical laboratory to-day, and good may come of them.

The statistician, too, armed with the categories of measurement, may come to the assistance of the moralist. But while throughout the whole of the

fields of nature there are possible applications of the principle of measurement, it can be made use of, in such instances as those indicated, only in a subordinate fashion, which allows it no pretence of being adequate to reality. Now besides these clear cases there is a kind of phenomenon as to which it has never been so willingly conceded, that the conceptions of the exact sciences are inapplicable. The phenomenon in question is that of life. Our first observation of its nature and its distinction from other aspects of existence is probably suggested by our consciousness of ourselves, as excluding what is not ourselves. In the consciousness of the self as object we have, of course, phases which go beyond mere life—phases such as those moral and intellectual aspects which go to make up personality. The consciousness even of sensation is more than the consciousness of mere life. For this phase of the object world has, as such, nothing to do with consciousness. A thing is living when it is a self-conserving whole, preserving its identity through a course of development in which the material in which it is embodied may be wholly changed. That material can always be represented as consisting of parts external to each other. But as so presented it is not the living organism, but a lower aspect of the material which the organism uses for its embodiment. For life does not appear as a cause operating externally to the substance which it animates. Its relation to that substance requires for its recognition and compre-

hension a set of conceptions of its own, the leading feature of which is that of a whole, controlling and conserving its parts. Now of such a self-conserving whole, we seem to get our first notion in the recognition of our own bodies, as something distinct from the rest of what is outside us. They are the embodiments of our personalities, and of life as a feature of these personalities. We speedily transfer the conceptions so derived to other living people and to living things, and we abstract in reflection under them. What for our more careful reflection really does mark off from the rest this portion of the external world in which our self and our life is embodied, is not any mathematical line of demarcation, to be got at by measurement or calculation, but, among other facts, this fact that it is absorbing and giving off material, and yet remaining identically ours through the change. The substance in which life is at any given moment embodied, is no more quantitatively divided from the substance which surrounds it than is the French nation from the Spanish. It is only in a wholly secondary fashion that we can make use of the measurement of quantity in this connection. We cannot even tell whether the air we are breathing, or the food we are eating, or the perspiration our skins are exuding, are at any given moment part of us or not. We talk as though there were a line of demarcation only loosely, and because it does not at the time matter, whether we are or are not using accurate language.

LECTURE III

In this Lecture we shall have to pursue yet more closely the topic which has already engaged our attention, the nature of the phenomena of life. In the living organism, the life of the whole determines the parts, and develops until a certain course has been accomplished. So much common observation makes certain. This life is self-conserving, and it is not imparted by any cause outside the organism. Indeed, the act of determination and conservation amid the change of substance is not one in which we can perceive any relation like that of cause and effect, or which is capable of being expressed in terms of space and time relations. That it is there, that these are living beings, and that they are objects in nature in which this self-determining and conserving property predominates, is a patent fact. To say that such a property is an illusion, and that the supposed life of these objects is merely a confused and imperfect idea of what is really the interaction, according to physical and chemical laws, of particles of matter, is to darken counsel.

Observation and experiment, the two great criteria of Science, certainly afford us no warrant for so pronouncing. If they disclosed to us matter and energy as real things, existing independently of our reflection, instead of as useful working hypotheses, we might be driven to doubt our senses, and to say that our vision of the life that surrounds, was but a dream. But we are not driven into either trying to reduce life to mechanism, or to regarding the two as independent and self-subsisting realities, lying side by side in experience, like the leaves of an artichoke. Both possess, what is the mark of all the constructions of thought, the capacity of being indefinitely resolved into simpler parts. Just as the machine can be regarded as made up of parts external to each other, so the most complex self-conserving organism is found to consist of simpler units of life, called cells, each of which is a self-contained and complete living organism.

Nowhere does experience disclose to us a point where the cell is constructed by the operation of energy upon matter, according to mechanical principles. Nowhere do we come to a boundary line at the other side of which mere mechanism lies. The result is analogous to what we found when we sought for a final division of matter. An ultimate unit of life put together out of atoms and molecules, is no more conceivable than the ultimate atom. Nor is it any more to be regarded as a logically possible notion, the

necessity of which is forced on us by natural law.

The problem of *abiogenesis*, of the necessity for getting back to a stage at which life is produced by physical and chemical action, disappears when we realise that experience gives us no warrant for thinking that anything of the kind can possibly be perceived by the senses, and that abstract reasoning does not necessitate it either. We were not troubled because we could not conceive the physical atom as either indefinitely divisible or as definitely indivisible. For both notions we understood to represent not things, but thoughts. And so it is with the unit of life. So long as it is a living organism it cannot be a mechanism, because the abstract conception of life, through which alone it is presentable, is different in kind from the abstract conception of an external relationship.

Into the history and progress of Biological Science, it is not the business of an inquiry of this kind to try to enter. It is sufficient if we are able to ascertain the nature of the methods and categories of that Science, and to illustrate by examples of them the truth which these Lectures aim at setting forth. Nowhere do we see more clearly than we do here the proof that Science, like Philosophy, really progresses by means of *à priori* hypotheses, tentatively applied, and afterwards tested by and adapted to the facts of experience. Nowhere do we witness more

distinctly the embarrassment which the prepossessions of an unconscious and therefore crude metaphysic have caused to those eminent men who of all others desired to be free from anything of the sort. These men appear to have been under the domination of the conviction that the science of Biology could make no progress except by exhibiting the phenomena of life as mere illustrations of mechanical and chemical principles. They refused to accept the view of the plain person, drawn from everyday observation, that life was something *sui generis*, as much entitled to be credited with reality as mechanism. They could not bring themselves to believe in the world as it seemed. And why! Because they thought that to do so was to give up the faith in the universality of the great laws of matter and energy, which had brought them so far on their way. They were not without an excuse. Vitalism, the alternative view, had up to their time for the most part been put forward as an exception to these laws. The phenomena of life had been sought to be explained as caused by a vital force, resembling the known forms of energy in everything except conformity to the great principle of conservation. If such a force has seemed to most of the best intellects of our time a symbol for the stultification of Science, can we wonder? The old vitalism was simply a new mechanism. It was no more to be reconciled with modern Science than was the notion of Jupiter,

sitting on Olympus, and causing thunderstorms by willing them, with modern views of electrical disturbances in the atmosphere.

As the mists of controversy roll away under pressure of more complete observation and research, we begin to realise that, if Biology is to be rested on the observation of facts, the days of the old vitalism and of the mechanical theory of life are alike numbered. Both notions must be labelled "unconscious metaphysic" and be relegated to the lumber-room, where repose the discarded failures of Science. We now know that there is no trace of evidence that the laws of the conservation and degradation of energy suffer any exception in the region of life. We know not less certainly that Science is making no progress towards the exhibition of life as a specimen of mechanical or chemical action. The great result which modern Biology has achieved, lies in the demonstration that the living organism is an aggregate of the living units which are often called cells. But the aggregate is no mechanical aggregate. The cells are less like marbles in a heap than like free citizens living in a state. They act for the fulfilment of a common end, which continues so long as the life of the organism continues, and the fulfilment of which appears to be just that life. The impulse which moves them so to act, cannot, as far as observation and experiment teach us, be brought under the mechanical category of physical causation. That the embryos of individuals of the same species

should grow into new and yet similar individuals, that the foot of the newt when cut off should replace itself again, these, and countless other illustrations of purposive development and behaviour, are in vain referred to the analogy of crystallisation. Yet not the less is it unwarrantable to conclude that here we are in the presence of *conscious* purpose or intelligence in the cells. What we have to do is not to theorise, not to assume that we are face to face with what must be either mechanism or intelligence. We have to disabuse our minds of all *à priori* limitation of the possible aspects of experience, and to trust ourselves to careful observation, and to that alone. If the criticism of which the earlier part of these Lectures consists be true, there is no reason why we should hesitate to do so, or refuse to believe the evidence of our senses, when they assure us that what experience discloses cannot be shut up within any limited set of categories. When we say that life consists of purposive action and development, we do not mean that there is a conscious and purposive application, *ab extra*, of mechanical force by some independent agency. Such a conclusion would only signify the reintroduction, under another form, of the old mechanical theory. We mean rather to record that we have observed phenomena which present no analogy to the mechanical or chemical action on each other of independent atoms, and which do present a certain but very limited resemblance to the action of a

number of intelligent individuals working together to fulfil a common end. There are in nature other and much more remarkable resemblances to the conscious and intelligent common purpose of the citizen. The behaviour of a colony of ants or a hive of bees; the common instinct which makes the shoal of herrings or pilchards seek particular waters at particular times; the phenomena of that instinct which, in the case of animals, achieves results far transcending in range and accuracy what conscious intelligence could do under similar circumstances, all warn us of the danger of saying that the world is confined in its reality to this or that class or category of phenomena, and that all others are reducible to them.

If we turn to the other side of the inquiry, we find a like result. We saw that the idea of a final and indivisible atom was not only without foundation in experience, but was inconceivable, and that the living organism of finality in the subdivision of matter, however useful in practice, was only justifiable as a provisional working hypothesis. In the same way, we have not the slightest reason to think that if our microscopes were increased in power indefinitely, we should be any the nearer reaching a particle of living matter which could be seen to be constructed mechanically. Such a result is as inconceivable as that such microscopes should disclose to us an ultimate and indivisible atom. What for our observation characterises living matter, even in its simplest form, is the capacity,

already referred to, of quasi-purposive action, in which the particular material is indifferent, is taken in, passed away, and changed, while the character of the whole remains. Now this is the very antithesis of what we find in crystallisation, where the form is not the reason but the result of the affinities of particular particles of matter, which, because of these affinities, arrange themselves, without metabolism, in a particular way. In life, the material is changing, while what lives preserves its identity; in mechanism, this is never so. To witness the transition from one to the other, would be to witness each contradict its nature. We can no more resolve quasi-purposive action into the result of molecular arrangement, than we can so resolve conscious purposive action, or morality or beauty. Life and mechanism are related, not as fields lying side by side in space and time, but as different points of view, disengaged, by the concentration of attention under definite categories, out of the infinite complexity of concrete experience. In contemplating life, we are so disengaging the realisation of very simple and apparently subconscious purpose in utilising changing material for the fulfilment of an end. The word purpose is used here because, although properly meaning intelligent purpose, it indicates by an analogy the broad feature which is in view, and which distinguishes even the simplest forms of life. Any other expression which would serve as a common name for the phenomena we wish to mark off

would do as well, better, too, if it were free from the suggestion of that intelligent action which properly pertains only to another and yet higher field of experience.

It is worth while in this connection to follow out the growth of the new idea of modern Biology, known as the cell theory. About half a century ago, while the old and really mechanical notion of a vital force operating *ab extra* still prevailed, the leading figure among biologists was the great physiologist, Johannes Müller. He thus stated the difficulty which attends every mechanical conception of vital processes:—* "Some have believed that life—the active phenomena of organised beings—is only the result of the harmony of different parts, of the mutual action, as it were, of the wheels of the machine, and that death is a consequence of a disturbance of this harmony. This reciprocal action of parts on each other evidently exists. . . . But the harmonious action of the essential parts of the individual subsists only by the existence of a force, the operation of which is extended to all parts of the body, which does not depend on any single organ, and which exists before the harmonising parts, these being in fact formed by it during the development of the embryo. A complicated piece of machinery, constructed in adaptation to an end—for example, a watch—may present an action resulting

* *Elements of Physiology*, by Johannes Müller, English Translation Edition of 1840, p. 24.

from the co-operation of individual parts, and originating in one cause; but organic beings do not exist merely by virtue of an accidental combination of elements; but, on the contrary, by the vital force inherent in them, they generate from organic matter their essential constituent organs. This rational creative force is exerted in every animal strictly in accordance with the nature of what each part requires; it exists already in the germ, and creates in it the essential parts of the future animal. The germ is 'potentially' the whole animal; during the development of the germ the essential parts which constitute the actual whole are produced." Müller found no evidence of a special force directed *from without*, and operating mechanically to set and keep the parts of the organism in motion. But he did suggest some kind of internal force operating alongside of other forms of energy. The theory of such a force had no warrant from observation, and was presently found to be inconsistent with the doctrine of the conservation of energy which was about to be established as the new and grand principle of physical science. Yet Müller had laid hold of the truth under one aspect. He was too close an observer not to see clearly that the mechanical laws, which were quite adequate to account for the phenomena of crystallisation and of chemical combination, were hopelessly inadequate to the realm of life. The fact of quasi-purposive action had to be faced. No doubt, men of science

would have been more ready to credit the evidence of their senses, and to record what they saw without twist or bias, but for one circumstance. Then, as to-day, they were under the domination of an *à priori* point of view. They thought, and one side of the teaching of Kant had confirmed them in this dogma, that the real was the mechanical, and the mechanical the real, and that Science could not properly admit any higher categories. The result was a long period of torturing the facts, to make them fit into this modern bed of Procrustes. The notion of a designing force, operating *ab extra*, being laid aside, other hypotheses had to be devised, within which the facts could be brought, and which would dispense with the necessity of assuming the presence of a designer. It was as one of these hypotheses that the early form of the cell theory was first brought forward by Schwann, a famous disciple of Müller.

Before Schwann's time some curious facts had been ascertained by the botanists. They had found, by examination, that vegetable tissue was made up of minute cavities or cells, separated from each other by thin walls. Schleiden, another distinguished German investigator, had reached the conclusion that a plant, taken as a whole, might be regarded as an aggregate of such cells, and that it was to the study of the cells of plants that he had to look for light upon their essential characters.

In 1831 the British botanist Brown had ob-

served that within many cells there was present a round body, subsequently called the nucleus. In the case of the developing cells of embryo plants Schleiden found that a nucleus was always present, and he not unnaturally drew the inference that, somehow, the nucleus was specially connected with cell development. As the result of further observation, he drew the inference that cells were formed from a generative fluid which filled the cavities of the old cells, and mechanically precipitated granules that increased in size by accretion. Schwann was struck with this notion, and proceeded to apply it to animal structure. He came to the conclusion that the tissues of animals might be found to develop in the same way as those of plants, and observations which he made led him to formulate the proposition that all tissues have one common principle of development, and arise out of a nucleus or nuclei, which assume the form, first of cells, and then of tissue.

Because all tissue elements are originally cellular, Schwann thought that the conditions of growth and development are probably everywhere the same, and to be looked for in the nature of the growth and development of the cell. The ovum, for example, of the animal (and in the plant world there are analogous cases), is a single cell, and yet it lives by growing. How does it grow? It must grow, argued Schwann, in this case quite independently of other cells, and if this be true, does it not furnish the key to the real principle of the

growth and development of the organism? "The cause," he said, "of nutrition and growth resides, not in the organism as a whole, but in the separate elementary parts, the cells." This phenomenon of growth and nutrition he held to be similar to the process of crystallisation, and to require only a physical explanation. He saw, of course, certain differences. The new molecules of a crystal are deposited only on the surfaces; whereas the cell walls not only thicken, but expand from the inside. Certain cell molecules must therefore be acquired by "intussusception." The power, which observation showed him that the cell possessed, of chemically changing the liquid in which it grows, he likened to the action of the galvanic pile. Anyhow, he said, there was no reason to look for a meta-mechanical explanation.

Schwann's doctrine had the great merit of leading Biology away from the notion of an outside and non-natural mechanical influence. Such a notion had become more and more difficult to reconcile with the new theories of energy, as put forward by the great physicists of the middle of last century, and with that of development as suggested by Kant and Goethe, and placed on a scientific basis by the embryologists. But almost from the first his theory of cell development had to encounter difficulties. It was soon found that new cells are formed only by the division of previously existing cells. "Omnis cellula," said Virchow, "e cellulâ." It turned out that no case

could be found of living matter being derived directly from a lifeless *plasma*, or from anything except living matter. New cells, it appeared, were related to old ones, not as in the case of crystals by mechanical division, but by descent. Common descent was found, in point of fact, to be the real explanation of biological similarity. Epithelial cells, for instance, always gave origin to epithelial cells, and never to connective tissue, or muscle cells. Virchow further found that the growth of the cell is unlike that of the crystal in this, that it does not always take place according to the quantity of molecules of its own kind supplied to it. The assimilation of material by a cell, he observed to depend on a number of associated processes in the cell itself. We now know that growth is regulated by the cell itself, and not by the abundance of any particular nutrient material in the surrounding liquid. Cells similar to each other may grow in different liquids, and cells of different kinds in the same liquids. If the supply of oxygen be varied within certain wide limits, the organism absorbs the same quantity, and the same is true of the cells. In the words of a distinguished modern physiologist, Professor Pflüger, "the living cell, and not the amount of oxygen in the blood, regulates the consumption of oxygen."

The next great step in advance of the point reached by Schleiden and Schwann was made when the nature of the cell was further defined. These

inquirers had laid stress on the nucleus and the cell wall as the two important elements of the cell, and they had not attached much significance to the intervening liquid. But the discovery of protoplasm, as the common basis of life in the animal and vegetable worlds alike, changed all this. The intervening liquid turned out itself to have the characteristics of the living cell, and the cell to be no more than a nucleated mass of living protoplasm, endowed with the power of altering its own configuration. This conception proved fertile. A muscle fibre came to be regarded as a family of cells, the protoplasm of which had never been definitely apportioned off, but had become differentiated into striated material, the peculiar contractility of which was but a special development of the contractility of the original protoplasm. The most various structures and kinds of material found in the organism came to be regarded as either products from the living protoplasm, or as modified protoplasm. When we trace back the development of the tissues of an animal, we arrive at last at a single cell—the ovum. Little is known of the nature of the protoplasm out of which this ovum is formed. But even in the lowest forms of life, in the *amœba*, and in the simplest manifestations of protoplasm in the vegetable world, there are traces of quasi-purposive action. Not of purposive action, as the older vitalists conceived it, in the form of an impulse from without, but as a movement from within. The living organism can always, however

highly developed, be regarded, by abstraction, from a purely mechanical or chemical point of view. The substances it takes in, and its kinds of energy, are all known, and it presumably gives them out in the same quantity, changed only in form. What physics and chemistry do not explain to us, is the principle of its metabolism, the preservation of its identity in changing material, as the state preserves its identity while generation succeeds generation of its subjects. For this, the essence and characteristic of life, physical science has no formula, no name even. On the one hand, this may be a fact which we observe and cannot get behind, in which case we had better agree with Johannes Müller, and disabuse our minds of the prejudice which either denies to the organism any existence as a self-conserving whole, or, if it looks on the cell as something *sui generis*, yet insists that the organism is a mere mechanical aggregate of these cells. On the other hand, the quasi-purposive aspect conceivably may be an illusion of our senses which it remains for science to dispel, and to exhibit to us as a form of mechanical relationship, cognisable under categories which rise no higher than those of physics or chemistry. But why should we start, as so many men of science have done, with the preconception that this last alternative is the true one? Is it more than one of Bacon's *idola theatri*, a current notion which we adopt without proper reflection, just as the theologian adopts, at the

other extreme, the notion of an outside designer as being a notion without which there is no option but to turn to materialism? If the standpoint of these Lectures be a true one, we are free to believe in the world as it seems, and not driven to sacrifice any aspect of it on one altar or another. If the supposed facts of observation which we indicate by our names life and development are, what all plain people assume them to be, real facts, why should we strain every faculty to explain human beings away into automata, or quiver with excitement when some one writes that he has found that protoplasm may apparently be reduced to a condition of chemical inertness (*e.g.*, in resting seeds), devoid of metabolic activity, and yet conserving through generations the potentiality of life. If a thousand such results were really established, we should yet be as far as ever from exhibiting life as a mechanical arrangement of molecules. We should be just as near that result as we are to exhibiting at one extreme a world made up of geometrical figures, or, at another, to displaying the sense of duty as depending upon a quantitative estimate of sensuous pleasure. Let us at least be careful to learn to criticise our categories before we embark on such enterprises.

We have just been considering a particular set of the fundamental forms in which the content of the object is arranged in knowledge. We have found that in the presentation in thought of a whole which is self-conserving amid changing

material, the categories of life, development, and organisation are just as much fundamental as are the categories we first considered, and as little capable of being explained away by them as they in their turn are capable of being explained through each other. We naturally abstract under such fundamental conceptions, because they are just the fixing in abstract knowledge of fundamental relations of thought which pervade the constitution of our experience.

So far we have had no cause to reject as unreal any aspect of the world as it seems. We have found ourselves bound to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the physicist and the chemist about life. Now there is another appeal which we may have to reject, and of which we hear a little even at this stage of our journey. Conceded, it is said, that the living organism is a real and irresoluble phenomenon of nature, there is at least no ground for saying that any other than a derivative reality is to be ascribed to such appearances as the community, or the nation, or the state. This assertion marks off for exploration a region which we cannot neglect if our inquiry is to be complete. But the assertion also suggests that we cannot satisfactorily undertake that inquiry without in the first place ascertaining a good deal more about the individual. Is its reality to be limited to that of life, with its quasi-purposive manifestations? Or must we not recognise as equally real that higher type of the action of living beings, in which they not only act

quasi-purposively in conserving their individual identity and development as organic wholes amid the metabolism of material, but act quasi-purposively as members of a community. The ant-heap and the bee-hive afford illustrations of the habits of animals which exhibit such action in an extraordinary degree. The process of reproduction of the species, and the quasi-recognition of this duty to the species even at the cost of life, is another striking illustration of it. And then, beyond the field of all this lies the vast region of conscious purposive action, attended by the recognition of a moral duty owed to the community, the assertion of which is embodied in the laws and other institutions of the state. This we find in a variety of forms, some rudimentary, others of a high order of development. We see something analogous to it even in the animal world, lying between the regions of instinct and those of developed intelligence. It is plain that the actions of living beings endowed with any of these attributes, even at their lowest stages, must be widely different from those of machines. And it may be, also, that our modern notions of evolution, and the interpretations put on the principles of Darwinism, have been in consequence of too narrow an order. The realisation of other ends than those only of natural and sexual selection may have guided the evolution of species.

In the course of the further journey that lies in front of us, we shall have to pause to consider

what we see of two new sets of phenomena, the higher aspects of the individual, and the existence of the community. Before, however, we proceed to the first of these kinds of phenomena, there are one or two things which are suggested, as bearing on the second, by the consideration of the categories of life, and which deserve a glance, even at the risk of anticipating. We saw that the living organism is conceived as a self-conserving whole, embodied in, but controlling, its parts. We saw that this organism is made up of living units, themselves possessing all the attributes of living beings, and, in addition, acting quasi-purposively in fulfilment of the common end. Not only is this so, but the organs of the living being act also quasi-purposively. If a kidney be removed, the other kidney will commence to do double the amount of work, repudiating the characteristic of a mere machine. The eye and the ear adapt themselves in like manner to the necessities of new surroundings in the mine or the forest. If there be one thing plainer than another, it is the reality of the living body as a whole, as distinguished from its reality as a mere numerical aggregate of the cells and organs of which it is made up. The conception of this relationship between parts and whole, a relationship which, as already pointed out, more nearly resembles that of citizens to a state, or soldiers to an army, than that of an arrangement of mutually external things grouped together by

external action, as in a machine, seems just as much fundamental as any other we have yet come across. If so, there is no reason to suppose that we shall have to yield to the doctrine of atomism when we get to the higher aspects of living things. If the organism be real as a whole, why not also the state as a whole?

It would hardly have been necessary to raise this question at this point, were it not for the circumstance that it is one which arises naturally. Our plane of intelligence as human beings is, as has already been several times remarked, the plane of individuals, whose situation is that not only of being confronted by a not self, but of being one among many. We naturally enough incline to take our plane or stage as final, because it is the plane or stage at which the Universe, with ourselves in it, happens to be presented to us. It is easy to recognise our bodies as really living wholes controlling the units of which they consist. But it is quite another matter to present the other relations, such as those of the individual to the state, or even the family, as real in the same sense. That they must be regarded as such, we may find. But the witness of their reality is, for intelligence of our order, the result of cogent inference rather than of direct perception. A view from a higher standpoint than that of man might find the family and the state presented as wholes in perception, just as plainly as it could find the organism so presented. But for us, the

limits of whose capacity of what passes for direct presentation are restricted through a medium which has already been discussed, no such view is possible. History and sociology, not to speak of morals and jurisprudence, no doubt recognise its possibility, and speak in language which suggests such a direct presentation. But we shall find, when we come to them, that these sciences, like the others which we have already considered, speak in the language of abstraction, and proceed by putting the individual, and therefore, for the moment, what in everyday parlance is meant by reality, out of account. Throughout the series of the sciences, one seems to feel the necessity for a criticism of categories, were it only for the sake of trying to introduce order and precision into the use of words.

These observations, however, are made at this stage only for the sake of getting rid of any preliminary prejudice. They will have to be developed in their proper place. Meantime, in pursuance of the general plan, the next step on our pathway must be taken in the direction of the living individual, and with a view of getting a closer notion of its nature.

In the crystal we have what is fixed and unchanging. The form is the result of the relationship of particles standing in a definite and permanent conformation. In the living organism, from the cell upwards, the material is constantly changing. The form of the organism cannot

possibly be the outcome of the action on each other of the molecules of its substance, for these molecules are constantly changing, chemically as well as physically, and giving place to fresh material. More than this, the form of the organism is itself in a course of continuous change from birth to death, and of change in accordance with a definite principle, first of growth, and then of decay. If we held any longer the window theory of the mind, and looked upon the senses as simply transmitting the images of things that are there independently of thought, we should be at a loss how to reconcile the experience of life with the rule of mechanical law. But life and mechanism we found in the first Book to be but abstract dispositions in reflection of the particulars of sense, self-contradictory, if taken even for a moment as final and self-subsisting, and legitimate only as modes of abstraction. To those who have succeeded in crossing the Asses' Bridge of Philosophy, and have so got away from the region of superstition, the difficulty of recognising the living organism as equally real with the machine, has disappeared. Both are points of view which of necessity emerge in reflection, and go to the making of the riches of the world of experience. Just as we found that we could define the characteristics of the machine or of the chemical molecule or the crystal, so we find that we recognise at once those of the living organism. Its existence is not, as with these, of a statical order. It

preserves itself through a complete alteration of its substance. It not only preserves, but develops and produces itself according to the law of its being. It has a form that varies, but varies in strict accordance with this law, and in such accordance and the continuity of behaviour which flows from it lies the identity of the organism, of which the varying characteristics are produced, not by forces acting from without, but by development from within. We never find it as an aggregate of particles of mere matter. The harmonious co-ordination of such particles into one life would be, not a miracle, not even a triumph of the laboratory, it would be as much a self-contradiction as the discovery of a round square. Life, when we analyse it, ever turns out to be the co-ordination of living units or cells, themselves no more final or fixed in their existence than the organism to which they belong. We are in this region at a standpoint which is entirely different from that of the mathematician, or the physicist, or the chemist, and we are arranging our materials under a wholly new set of categories. The *differentia* of the individuality of the organism is not the principle on which its parts externally act on each other, but the dominating law of its own development. As a living being, I am what I am, in that I exhibit the characteristics of my time of life, and of my relationship to other living beings, from whom I am descended.

Every point of view we have examined has

proved to be abstract, and therefore insufficient. As soon as its general conceptions were isolated and treated as though they could be exhaustive of reality and more than a useful but temporary and provisional mode of approach, the point of view turned out to be self-contradictory, to exhibit what Plato called "Dialectic." The individual as qualified through it proved to be no resting-place. From the conception of abstract externality to that of subject and object, we found ourselves safe so long only as we regarded the ground we were for the moment treading as only provisionally sound. And, like the rest, the conception of the living organism turns out to be abstract and provisional only. When by means of it we try to express what nature presents to us in the case of the bee that unerringly returns to its hive from miles away, of the dog that barks with joy at the return of its master, of the human being that feels and knows and acts, this conception turns out to be inadequate. It has taken us above the still less adequate standpoint of mere externality, to which the mathematician and even the physicist is confined. It has shown us control of parts otherwise than from without. It has taken us no distance towards the notion of the great fact which confronts us, the existence of conscious, purposive, freely self-directing mind. The relation of mind to its object is not one of externality, for externality, exclusiveness, whether

in space or time, is but one of the relationships which obtain and have meaning within the object world. It is not like the relation of the living organism to its changing substance, for it is only as embodied in that changing substance that the living individual exists; and although raised above mere externality, the conception of life is not wholly independent of it. But the mind neither is external to its object nor exists in it. From that object it can wholly withdraw, detach, distinguish itself. It stands to that object, not as a thing outside another in space, but as that *for* which that object is. When it is itself made object, it becomes such through conceptions which not only are incapable, like that of life, of being expressed in relations of space and time, but are different from all those which belong to the externality of nature. Of the conscious individual our conception is highly composite. His individuality is, as has been already pointed out, dependent on a multitude of considerations, some, at least, of which belong to the province of the outside world. He exists as a this, here and now, or as a that, there and then, in virtue of his situation in space and in time, and of his relation to other individuals. His height and his weight are made definite in knowledge through the physical categories. His organism belongs to those of life. But beyond all these lie his intellectual and moral peculiarities, peculiarities which exist only for a mind applying

categories which transcend those of the external object world. When we speak of his soul we mean, if we attach meaning to our words, not a substance somehow in contact with the brain, not an entity separate from the body, but those aspects of the individual which transcend his aspects as a physical object or even as a living object, and in which he appears as an intelligent and moral being. To speak of the soul of an automaton, or a rose-bush, or a lobster, is to use language of more than questionable application. We perceive in the lower animal world little, if anything, higher than life. Man lives, but he does more. He is conscious, and thinks, and acts freely. In the object world it is this or that man, determined through, among other things, a definite physical organism, that is so conscious, and thinks, and acts. His soul is bound up with nature to the extent of being an aspect of the natural individual. But it is an aspect of the individual that passes beyond nature. Body and soul are not two things somehow bound together. They are different aspects of one and the same object. Just as the life of the body is the harmonious working together for the fulfilment of a common end of a multitude of parts, each of which consists of independently living units, so the existence of the soul is the harmonious self-direction of the body for the realisation of intellectual and moral ends. Between mere life and mere intelligence there lie intermediate stages, above the categories of the

first, below the categories of the second. There is, for example, the sub-conscious quasi-intelligence of the dog who, never having seen them before, avoids the poisonous reptiles, or eats grass as a medicine. Such phenomena as these lie between life and mind, as the relations of chemistry lie between mechanism and life. All of them enter into the structure of the individual man. But the highest and most distinctive of his characteristics, those that make him. for us just this individual like unto ourselves and no other, are the characteristics which are recognised by the application of categories higher than those through which mere nature becomes an object in our preception. It is through these categories that the living being becomes something more than merely living. It is finally through them that the externality of space and time is transcended, and we recognise him as equally with ourselves the subject for which an object world which includes ourselves is there. It is so that, in regarding him in his aspect of a moral and intellectual being, we have transcended space and time. When this stage in the logical scale is reached, we are thinking from the standpoint of the subject distinguishing itself from the object, and conscious of itself as spontaneous and free in the process. What we perceive of the individual so imaged in the world of nature around us is, in one point of view, not directly this, for it never can be bodied forth in the relations of externality, but the

suggestion of it, the things which indicate and suggest it as the blotches of paint on the canvas indicate and suggest the conception of the artist. Just as they can be looked at as mere blotches of paint, so can the actions of the conscious individual, so far as they are manifested in the world of externality, be regarded as mere life, or even as mere mechanism. But in both cases the truest as well as the most appropriate and ordinary significance would be lost. The complex standpoint of the common sense of the plain man assumes the highest just as much as the lowest. And if they are not disentangled in everyday perception, it is because it is not necessary for the purposes of everyday life to disentangle them. The incrustations of the habitual assumptions of our common intercourse and language form the ground on which we tread our daily path. The ground is firm and satisfactory enough for ordinary use. It is only when we seek to drive along it the heavy coach of philosophical inquiry that it proves to be yielding.

Above mere life, instinct; above mere instinct, the intellectual and moral harmony of the body which we call the soul; above and beyond the soul, mind, transcending the categories of the one and the many; between them all a multitude of minor phases; the individual emerging as the result of a combination of aspects and standpoints; this is the result to which analysis brings us. Let us pause at the lower aspects of

individuality, and look for a moment at life as the physiologist's microscope discloses it.

To define life has always been a difficulty. Every one knows what it is, no one can explain it in terms of anything but itself. The reason of this may be that its conception is so far fundamental that it can only be resolved from the standpoint of a yet higher conception towards which it is a stage. This at least is clear, that the attempts at definition in terms of physical forces have been conspicuous by their failure. To call life, as Mr Spencer does, "the definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external co-existences and sequences," is not to define, but to describe, and to describe pedantically and insufficiently. If we are to go to the philosophers for definitions, it is better to turn to Kant and Hegel. "Life," said Kant, "means the capacity of a substance to set itself in action by virtue of an internal principle." * "Animal nature," said Hegel,† "is characterised by that subjective unity through which all the organic parts are subordinated to a whole that is a unity. The physiology of the animal organism deals with the functions of the parts which co-operate in the continuous development of the whole, and are themselves developed and conserved in the pro-

* *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, edited by Rosenkranz, 1838, p. 408.

† *Propædentik*, 1840 Edition, p. 176.

cess." Hegel, it will be observed, does not try, like Mr Spencer, to define the unity mechanically, as a "definite combination." Rather does he regard it as something pointing for its explanation to a set of conceptions beyond mechanism altogether. It is interesting to compare this with a popular description of the life of an organism given by a recent writer on physiology.* "Just as an organism is a collection of cells, each having its own life, yet all bound together for mutual service, so is a nation a collection of individual men and women. And as the perfection of an animal is measured by the completeness of the division of labour among its cells, so is the civilisation of a nation measured by the harmony of organisation of its labour. Further, just as there have been many species of animals which have appeared, lived for a time, and then given place to higher species, so there have been civilisations which have flourished for a time, and then died away. Any fairly complex civilisation will serve as a type of the division of labour in the body of one of the higher animals. First there are the persons concerned in the getting of food, like the limbs and mouth of an animal. Then the food is prepared for use by other labourers; such are the digestive organs of the animal. The food has to be distributed to all members of the community by merchants and carriers; the blood and blood-vessels perform this function. The whole com-

* Article on Physiology in *Chambers's Encyclopædia*, 1891.

munity has to be warned of dangers, directed and governed, and made to act harmoniously by the statesmen of a nation; the same things are done by the sense organs, brain, and nervous system of an animal." Here we have "subjectivity" brought in with a vengeance. It is analogy merely, and not truth. But it is at least more like the truth than those descriptions of the physicists which fall further short of the facts than this goes beyond them. What we know for certain is that if we are to look at facts and not to allow our faculty of observation to be distorted by theories, we must recognise that the body of the living man consists of a great number of living parts, or organs, each of which has its own special work to do. Each organ not only does its own special work, but acts in harmony with other organs. The relationship between the organs groups them into systems. Thus we have the circulatory system, that is, the group of organs (heart, arteries, veins, etc.) concerned in the circulation of the blood; the respiratory system, that is, the group of organs (air passages, lungs, etc.) concerned in the act of breathing; the digestive system, which deals with the digestion of food; the excretory system, which gets rid of waste products; the muscular system, which deals with movement; the skeletal system, which has to provide for the support of the softer parts of the body; and last, but not least, the nervous system, the great master system of the body, which presides over, controls, and regulates

the other systems. If we go further with our analysis, we find that each organ consists of elementary tissues. These are of four principal kinds: epithelial, connective, muscular, and nervous. If we go yet further, we find that the individual tissues are built up of structures which require the microscope for their study. The tissues, when scrutinised, turn out to consist of living units called cells, bound together by more or less intercellular material according to the nature of the tissue. The cells have common characteristics. They originate in a living material called protoplasm, and may be described as small masses (varying in the case of the human body from $\frac{1}{300}$ to $\frac{1}{3000}$ of an inch) of protoplasm, containing in each case a nucleus. The simplest animals, such as the *amœba*, consist of one cell only, the most complicated of many millions. All cell life originates from cell life. Even the higher animals and plants are uni-cellular to start with, but the original cell, in dividing, instead of forming, as is the case with the lowest forms of animal and vegetable life, another complete and independent animal or vegetable, forms cells which stick together and subsequently become differentiated and altered according to a definite principle of development. When a certain stage of development has been reached, the different descriptions of cell reproduce their own kind, and their own kind only. Thus epithelial cells produce epithelial cells, and no others. Every cell, of whatever kind,

possesses five great powers: movement, assimilation (the power to convert nutriment into protoplasm), growth, reproduction, and excretion. But, although in a sense living beings with an independent life, the higher forms of cells live only as component parts in higher unities. The cells of the more complicated organisms tend to differentiate in function. Certain sets predominate in irritability, others in contractility, others in storage, others in secretion, and so on. In such cases, one function predominates over the others, which become subordinate, or even mere dormant possibilities. In this fashion there arise muscle cells, nerve cells, fat cells, and the like.

We see now what life is, from the point of view of the physiologist. It is the co-operative action of the various parts of the organ, and of the cells which build up the structure of the organ, in the bringing about of a common course of development. This course of development has a beginning, a highest point, and an end. Its efficiency depends on the co-operation of the parts for the fulfilment of a common function. The perfectly developed function is not attained at once, nor does it last for ever. The reason, the final cause of this, is seen when we turn to the species, the whole in which the individual in its turn functions for the attainment of an end beyond its own life. In the process of its greatest function, the one of which it is capable only in its perfection, reproduction, the individual exhausts

itself. This exhaustion may take the form of instant death in the act, as is the case with some of the lower organisms, or it may assume the form of the tax which family life forms in the case of the man and the woman. The species in each case requires fresh individuals for the fulfilment of its end, and this requirement is facilitated and room is provided by death, or the dissolution of the individual, in which, after a period, the parts cease to co-operate. In the lowest forms of organism, where the common life of the species is but little apparent, this is much less strikingly so. In the case of the uni-cellular Protozoa, it has been suggested by eminent biologists that they may, so far as any reasons or indications to the contrary go, be immortal. But in the higher organisms, the break-up and ending, after the course of development has been run, of the common life of the organism, is as much a part of nature as the beginning of that life in birth. The ground of both beginning and end is to be sought in no physical cause, but in the tendency towards the realisation of an end which may be called *ideal*, meaning thereby that it cannot be found in any physical or chemical relation, and operates from within and not from without. This ground is not a cause, nor on the other hand is it the kind of internal ground that we know when we distinguish the mental phenomena of conscious purpose. There is no more reason to connect it

with consciousness than to seek for a special vital force to account for it. It is simply a fundamental feature of that sphere of the organic which lies midway between mechanism and mind in the forms under which the object is known. The human body has mathematical, mechanical, chemical aspects, but not as living. It has aspects which belong to the sphere of consciousness, but these, again, it has not merely as living. To mere life belong the phenomena of the individual in its relation to the species. But what in life, as compared with mere mechanism, is spontaneous action from within and not causation from without, is still something entangled with externality. The stimulation of the physiologist is more than the causation of the physicist. The consequent, be it movement, or secretion, or sensation, is not just the energy of the antecedents in another form. It is different from this, on the one hand, and from motive and consequent volition on the other for there the phenomena are purely subjective, so far as directly presented in consciousness. There is no room for the suggestion of identity. In the relation of nerve stimulus to its consequent, although the change which travels along the substance of the nerve is in some sense physical, as is shown by the electrical phenomena which accompany it, it is not this change, nor yet a mere liberation of energy in the nerve centre, which is the effect. For the nerve and the nerve centre both adjust

and restore themselves. They act, in other words, not as machines, but as parts of living beings; and they show all the phenomena of self-conservation in change, which are characteristic of life.

In the *Times* newspaper of 11th October 1902, there was reported an address delivered by a distinguished surgeon, Sir Frederick Treves. Speaking of the advance of Surgery since the time, 260 years before, of the author of the *Religio Medici*, he gave a description of disease as the surgeon of to-day comprehends it, which is so relevant an illustration of what we have been discussing that I am going to quote the report without comment:—

"In the days of Sir Thomas Browne a conception of disease was current which still influenced the minds of many, although that conception should have vanished with the advance of scientific knowledge. The old idea of disease was, that it was a malignant entity, a something vaguely individualised as evil in origin, evil in intent, and evil in effect. It was the roaring lion going about seeking whom he may devour. The conception went further, and made of disease a Prince of Darkness vindictively hostile and potent only for ill His minions fell upon the land like a hideous blight, and covered a smiling country with the shadow of death. Primitive people regarded disease as the work of a malignant spirit, who entered into a man, and who was to be propitiated

by gifts and flattery on the one hand, or driven out by the beating of tom-toms, or by strident incantations, on the other. To the author of *Religio Medici*, disease was still the outcome of an influence which was outside the body and quite distinct from it. There was nothing natural in any of its processes, and nothing beneficent in any of its manifestations. It followed from this that every symptom of disease was of necessity regarded as wholly noxious, and as needing to be stamped out by unconsidered violence. If the patient vomited, the vomiting must be stopped; if he coughed, the cough must cease; if he failed to take food, he must be made to eat. Not for a moment could it be considered that there was any benevolent purpose in these phenomena. The physician of the present day could not include this conception among the articles of his faith. In the new *Religio Medici* this matter of belief must follow some such lines as these:—The human body is highly organised, is frail, is finite, and is, of necessity, prone to decay and dissolution. It grows, it reaches its maximum power, it declines, and its capacities fail. In the progressive enfeeblement, and in the slow elimination of the evidences of life which attend old age, there was nothing preternatural, and nothing which could be considered to be due to other than the simplest natural influences. The inherent decay of the human body rendered it liable to accident, and there was no reason why it alone—of all other organic structures—should be exempt from injury.

The body also—like other living fabrics—was prone to be infested by parasites, and upon the action of these parasites very many maladies depended. Not only was there nothing preternatural in disease, but it was the outcome of natural processes, and, more than that, there was evidence to show that many of its manifestations and of its methods were marked by a purpose, and that that purpose was beneficent. The time had come when it would rather appear that many of the so-called symptoms of disease were expressions of a natural effort towards cure. Having enlarged on the relation to specific diseases, he said this matter might be followed out a little more in detail in connection with the symptoms of the disease familiar by the uncouth name of appendicitis. In this malady a trouble occurred in the appendix. The wall of the little tube became perforated, and an acrid poison found its way into the sensitive cavity of the abdomen. This, at least, was the essential calamity in many instances. The perforation was sudden, was accidental, and might be preceded by no warning sign of any kind. The manifestations which followed the perforation were termed the symptoms of peritonitis. They were distressing and urgent, but they were all benevolent in intent, and were the outcome of nature's vigorous effort to minimise the calamity, and save the patient's life. The intense pain and collapse imposed upon the victim absolute rest, and, more than that, enforced rest in the most advantageous posture

—that, namely, of recumbency. He was rendered helpless at a moment when any movement might be attended by disaster. The sickness and the utter nausea which attended it secured some emptying of the alimentary canal, and forbade the introduction of any fresh material into an intestine which was best placed for recovery when it was least occupied. The skin of the abdomen became acutely sensitive, and so protected the damaged parts from disturbance and pressure, and this most necessary end was further secured by another symptom—the remarkable rigidity of the abdominal wall. Even should the affected area be accidentally pressed upon, the firmly-contracted muscles which covered it would shield it like a protecting cuirass. Thus was brought about that state of absolute rest which was essential as the very first step towards the repair of the injury. At the same time, the condition of the circulation was so modified as to render absorption of septic matter from the affected district as little ready as possible. Within the abdomen the manifestations of peritonitis are appearing. Peritonitis had commonly been spoken of as one of the most deadly and most malignant of calamities. Never was a condition more unjustly abused. The phenomena of peritonitis should be hailed with thankfulness. Peritonitis was concerned only in effecting good. Many of the symptoms of disease, instead of being pounded out of the body by violence, as wholly pernicious, should rather be regarded as means

for guiding the physician in the treatment he should adopt."

We have now seen what life means, from the point of view of the physiologist and the physician; and we have also seen the importance, in giving a clue to the meaning of death, of the position of the individual, as belonging to a species. There are other relationships of the individual, not to the species, which is a biological conception, but to such higher social wholes as the family and the state. But the meaning of these can only be appreciated when man has been considered as a conscious and rational being, for it is to these aspects of his nature that his social relations are linked. We must, therefore, pass from the sphere of the physiologist, that of life as such, to the sphere of the psychologist, that of consciousness.

LECTURE IV

LET us make a start by again trying to disentangle what is meant by a man's personality. It must not be forgotten that the individuality of a human being depends on no single aspect. His physical, his physiological, his psychical idiosyncracies, all go to make this up. He is just this, and no other man, from the standpoint of everyday life, which is never very abstract, and therefore never very precise, and which brings in, without distinguishing them, a number of wholly distinct aspects. It is another of these aspects which we have now to consider. Man not only lives, but knows and wills. His existence is not only that of a self-conserving whole, but of a consciously self-conserving whole. As a being who knows and wills, and is conscious of himself as knowing and willing, he is an intelligent and morally responsible member of society, standing in relations to the family and the state as real as those of his organism to the species. It is at the nature of this aspect of man's existence as a conscious being, that we must now try to get. The problem is a baffling one, yet we are not without some clue to its solution. We

have found it impossible to regard the world as it seems, as made up of the relationships of externality. The notion of a whole conserving itself in changing material through a course of development, cannot be expressed in terms that are mathematical, or physical, or chemical. We found ourselves driven to invert the usual process, and instead of trying to construe the world as it seems, in terms of these sciences and as unreal so far as it pretended to be anything beyond them, we found it easier to exhibit all such terms as the names given to abstractions from the concrete and individual facts of experience. Let us begin, then, by getting an idea of what we mean by consciousness, for it may turn out to be just as absurd to try to reduce it to mere life, as it proved to be to try to reduce life to mere mechanism. Now, it is generally best when one wants to find out the nature of a particular experience, to begin by asking what it means to the plain man. If we ask the plain man what he means when he speaks of his consciousness, he will say that it is what he has before his mind when he is not in a profound sleep. When his mind is awake, that is when he knows, and knows that he knows, he is aware of two sorts of object—the one, the world which he perceives, the other, himself perceiving it. Of the perceiving self, he will probably add that, so far as he has any clear idea about it, it is an individual among other individuals, with feelings and faculties which are directly and intimately known to him as

pertaining to himself as, in a fashion, at the centre of the universe. Pressed as to what he means by the centre of the universe, he may be got to say first, that it is the centre, in so far as it is the only here and now, and carries with it memories of what has been here and now, and expectations of what will be here and now. All else is, has been, or will be, there and then. Pressed further, he will, as was pointed out in the first Book, trace all this back to a foundation which he cannot see, or hear, or feel, or taste, or smell, a subject of knowledge which can never as such be presented as object, towards which he can go back indefinitely by abstracting from the object world, but which he can never reach in perception. In perception, the nearest approach to the perceiving self is found by the plain man in the particular object of knowledge which is most nearly here and now, the feelings and activities of which are experienced in a direct fashion in which the feelings of no other self can be perceived. It would seem as though at times he was seeking to isolate the subject and make it an object of perception, and that the only result of the attempt was a constant failure.

When he tries to ascertain precisely the nature of this subject self, he does it by means of abstractions, which represent not the real, but only aspects of it, and which yield truth in a form which is provisional only. The here-ness and now-ness, which are characteristic of the approach to the

standpoint of the knower as distinguished from the known, are, after all, abstract conceptions belonging to that externality in space and time, which is transcended even in life, and much more in thought. We cannot say of the life of the body that it acts upon the body at any particular place or any particular moment. It is neither here and now, nor there and then. When we speak of it in such terms, we have really ceased to speak of life, and have passed to another standpoint from which the body is conceived as a mechanism. Now, in the plain man's world of experience, all these standpoints are adopted indiscriminately, and without being distinguished. His habit of passing unconsciously to whatever plane of abstraction is most convenient for the moment, enables him to talk of mind, and life, and mechanism, as though they were so many separate things lying side by side in space, instead of being so many different points of view from which he unconsciously analyses and arranges experience. Just as he talks, in a fashion that cannot be justified, of himself and his fellow-men as receiving the same impressions from without, and as this idea, useful and necessary for everyday intercourse, has become embedded in the language by which it was created, so when he talks of himself he indicates a highly complex and derivative conception, drawn from more ståndpoints than one, embracing features that are physical, organic, intellectual, æsthetic,

and moral, all unconsciously combined. One of the reasons why it is so difficult to define what is meant by self in common speech, is the enormous complexity and intricacy of what is indicated, a complexity and intricacy which are latent in our words, and which only do not come to consciousness because attention has been long since diverted from the process by which even in childhood the idea began to be built up. A man's self includes, in a sense, even his clothes. In a more precise use of the word, it excludes these, but includes his finger. But his finger is only relatively here. From another point of view it is there and outside him. It may be cut off, and yet he remains the same self. He remains himself, though his moral character changes, and although he is temporarily unconscious. Surely we have here just one of those practically useful but only provisionally true constructions of language, such as we became aware of in the case of the supposed identical object world perceived in common by A and B and C, but which turned out to be merely a figment of the practical activity of common sense. The word self seems in this connection to indicate an asymptotic approach to the conception of the subject, and a vast accumulation of material picked up and stored in memory in the course of the journey.

Just as the conceptions of life, inexplicable and unreal if the principles of mechanism were taken to be final, proved to be both explicable

and real when the latter were seen not to be final, so the conceptions which belong to the region of what we term consciousness are in their turn valid within the sphere of their application. Mechanism, life, and consciousness are not separate things, but are standpoints interwoven in the practical whole of experience. Consciousness perplexes us only if we insist on making reality stop short at something below consciousness, instead of seeking for it in something above. Pass to the standpoint of consciousness, and we find a whole region of characteristic conceptions which we make distinct to ourselves by abstraction. In the region of mechanism the parts are external and independent. Their position relatively to each other, their action among themselves, is determined from without. In the field of life the parts are controlled through their course of development by a whole which is ideal in the sense that it is neither external to or separate from its parts. That this control is consciously purposive we have no reason to believe. The frog or the pigeon whose cerebral hemisphere has been removed continues to live and to act. But the action is always in response to some stimulation from without. There is none of that self-determination which is characteristic of the intact animal, and makes its action impossible to foresee in advance. The plant lives, but it shows no sign of voluntary self-adaptation. It develops and moves its parts in accordance with

rules that can be ascertained. The phenomena of reflex action, and even those of instinct, do not seem to be consciously directed. There is between mere life and purposive action a borderland, where what takes place is *quasi*-purposive, yet not, so far as the observer can get evidence, actually purposive. But when we get to the region of consciousness, the phenomena are of an entirely different order. Here we experience the will to act, and the nearer we get to completely voluntary self-determination, the further we have penetrated into the region of consciousness. Into the simplest feeling there enters an element of comparison with some other feeling, present or past, from which it is distinguished. Such an act of comparison is essentially an act of will, of what is inward and self-determined. My body is what is mine, what I have control over. The process of selective attention, the foundation of all abstraction, and therefore of all knowledge, is an act of the will. The more one reflects upon the phenomena of this region of consciousness, the less does it seem possible to separate or even distinguish intelligence and volition. They are different aspects of one reality. What in ultimate analysis that reality would disclose itself to be, is difficult to ascertain, because it does not seem itself to belong to the object world of which alone introspection can take cognisance. If it be only through an act of attention that some feature of that object world

can be brought into consciousness, it is difficult to see how the act of attention itself, as distinguished from what it has brought about, can be observed. We are here again face to face with that unending regression towards the subject as such, of which so much has been already said. But if we cannot in introspection present to ourselves intelligence and volition, if, as psychologists, we can but infer *that* they are, without being able to say from introspection *what* they are, we can at least bring into the light the phenomena in which their action is most apparent. When I distinguish the object from the subject for which it is object, I find that, as a fact, I have set up another object which I call myself. This turns out, as we have seen, to be a fleeting and indefinite presentation whenever we try to submit its nature and limit to scientific scrutiny. The question, what it embraces and what it excludes, proves incapable of a precise answer. But from the point of view of the plain man, the rough distinction is clear enough. My self, so taken, is in the closest way identified with my body; not with my body looked at as merely living, but with my body viewed as also a sentient, intelligent, responsible, and free being. For the plain man there is no such entity as a soul separate from this body. That notion comes only to the mind that has passed into the wilderness of theory. But no more does he think of himself as having a body without a soul. The soul is, for him, the body in its highest

aspects, and the body is the soul in those aspects that are lower. When he speaks of feeling, he speaks of a feeling in his finger or his heel or his head. One thing that distinguishes the portion of the objective world which he claims as his body from the rest is, that it feels, while the rest does not. It is a sort of projection of the subject into experience. Other things are felt, the body feels. In so far as it does so the body is a self, interpreted as such through categories which are those of the subject. It is the manifestation of will, as well as feeling. Its movement is self-determined. It thinks as well as wills. If I am standing on a mountain top, the circle of my surroundings is a limited one, but I am the centre. It is here that I stand localised and perceiving, and the I that perceives, so far as I can present it as object to myself, has a local situation. I can even place the organ or physical manifestation of my thinking in my brain. If I turn to Physiology, I find an unmistakable relationship between the activity of the mind and that of the brain. The fluctuations of the blood-supply to the cortex correspond to the increase or diminution of mental activity. The higher the stage of the animal in evolution, the more does its power of adapting itself to its environment, and of displaying intelligent action, accord with the development of its cerebral hemispheres, and appear to be distinct from the functions of the lower centres and of the spinal cord. If one may for the moment speak in

language which mixes up two points of view, it may be said that in these higher animals the lower centres appear to act from present *stimuli* alone, while the hemispheres act from what physically represents conscious processes of reflection, and what is only set in operation by external stimulation. The disease called *motor aphasia* results from injury to a part of the left frontal lobe of the brain. The patient's voice is all right; he can utter. But he cannot arrange his words. It seems that in most people the left hemisphere of the brain is the seat of control, not only of the power of orderly speech, but also of that of orderly writing. If the part of the hemisphere which controls these powers is out of order, not only the power of consecutive utterance, but capacity to write and spell, is affected. The faculty of vision in man appears similarly to be dependent on the health of his occipital lobes. *Alexia*, or inability to read, and general want of capacity to understand, results from injuries to other portions of the hemispheres in which these functions have been localised by recent psycho-physiological research. Lesion of the temporal lobe may affect or even destroy the faculty of hearing; such lesions have been known, so great is the indication of localisation of brain function, to leave the patient able to read, write, talk, but not to understand what is said to him. It was observed, in some recent investigations, that if the lesion was in the left lobe, the side which with most people—with all, indeed, who are right-

handed—is the most important in direction and control, the mere hearing sense did not disappear, for that was provided for by the centres on the other side. But the power of translating the sounds heard into conceptions, and the conceptions into words, had disappeared, a result which points to the conclusion that the nerve stimulations which are the conditions of the sensations of hearing, do not innervate our motor centres directly, but only do so after arousing what corresponds to the mental equivalent of the words.

Not only do we seem to localise the physical concomitants of our mental functions, but it seems impossible, in the region of the object self, to separate the two excepting in thought. The body may, by abstraction, be regarded as a machine. But in another and equally real aspect it is living. So when we turn to the mind we may, but again only as the result of abstraction from all but certain features, regard the individual as a living organism, and his brain as exercising the functions of life in an immensely high degree. But it is none the less true that, in the experience of the plain man, the individual whom he sees and hears has a higher aspect than that of mere life. That individual is conscious and knows and wills, presents, in fact, the attributes of the subject of knowledge, so far as these can be made object to the subject itself. It is through categories which are as far above and beyond those of life as the categories of life are above and beyond those of

mechanism, that these higher aspects which go to make up the individual are alone possible. Thus the true view of the relation of soul and body would seem to be, not one in which they appear as two things, but another in which they disclose themselves as two aspects. So far from pointing to the conclusions of materialism and mechanical or causal determination, such a result points to just the reverse. It is only because we will assume that the mechanical aspect is the only real one that we think of living beings as really automata. Whenever we are rid of this superstition, a vista that is entirely new opens up.

Psychology is the science of the mind as directly presented object in knowledge, and its methods are partly introspective and partly physiological. Just as mathematics and physics and chemistry can be made of immense use in the study of that region of life to which their conceptions are none the less wholly inadequate, so physiology is brought to the aid of psychology. By abstraction, we represent to ourselves the phenomena of mental life as broken up into separate elements, which elements are emptied by still further abstraction, until we have reduced them in our presentation to the abstractions which we call mere feelings. These feelings we find to have, as their concomitants, physiological processes, and these physiological processes, again by abstraction, we make available for the chronometer, the measuring rod and the balance. In

this fashion we indirectly bring mental phenomena into relations of quantity. But just as this reduction of the mental to the physical is but an artificial construction of reflection, so the view of mind as an object from which we start is itself abstract and unreal. We never, as psychologists, get before our mental vision the mind or subject as such; what we do get is the endless process of regression towards it. We are constantly, as it were, baling out contents which have turned out to be indifferent to the self, and not really to belong to it, but we never get completely rid of them. The limitation of human faculty steps in, and tells us that so far and no further shall we see, and that beyond we can only proceed symbolically, or by means of indirect metaphysical methods, the results of which are shadowy and bloodless. What we have done, when we have made the mind our object, is to abstract from the supreme relationship of reality as object for the subject. We break up and isolate the parts of a phenomenon which from the standpoint of common sense is neither broken up nor consists of parts. For the ordinary man his personality is one and indivisible. He does not separate soul and body. The body, which is the man himself, feels, and no one but he himself can be directly conscious of this feeling. This fact separates off what he calls his body from the rest of the external world. Yet, just because he does not separate soul and body, he regards other people

as having bodies that feel, notwithstanding that he cannot himself experience their feelings. His standpoint, when examined scientifically, turns out to be complex and merely provisional, incapable indeed of accurate statement, and the product of conventions adopted for purposes that are of the most limited validity. But such as it is it lands him in no doubts or difficulties. These arise only from the abstractions of Science, not from those of a common sense which is willing to admit every aspect of the world as it seems. Now Psychology like other sciences is forced, in order, through selective attention, to get clear knowledge, to make violent exclusions of the aspects of reality which for its own purposes it does not happen to require. It begins by shutting out in the first instance the reference of mind to body, though it may afterwards talk as though a great thing had been accomplished in the rediscovery of this relationship. It pictures the contents of consciousness, all that is loosely spoken of as known through internal sense, as consisting of streams of isolated impressions and ideas. It attributes to the mind in dealing with these impressions and ideas separate faculties, such as memory, association, perception, conception, judgment, volition. All these are but the outcome of an artificial and abstract procedure, justified only by the clear though limited knowledge which is obtained through it. Of the contents so abstracted and arranged, some are more com-

pletely than others pushed out, as it were, into the field of the object world. A mere sensation, for instance, does not exist. The qualifying work of memory, comparison, judgment in general, is always present. But it suits the purpose of gaining clear though artificial knowledge, say of the proportion which the increase of the external stimulus bears to the increase of the so-called internal sensation, to treat the sensation as if it were merely passively received, and could be held out at arm's-length and inspected. When we pass to such so-called faculties as memory, or conception, or judgment, the relationship of object and subject becomes more difficult to ignore. We cannot present the subject, but we can go a long way in presenting the object of knowledge as actual only in the act of knowing, that is, as mere object for the subject. The process of such construction we call thought, but as the limitations of our plane of intelligence preclude our presenting it to ourselves in its entirety, we, by abstraction, cut off thought from its aspect as activity of the subject, and represent and speak of it as the thought of an abstract and vaguely conceived psychological object-self. In this way we get to the standpoint of what it has been usual to call formal logic, the logic of the old-fashioned text-books. It is really the science of thought, transformed by abstraction into an object of introspection, and represented as a faculty of a particular thinker. None the less on this

account does such logic form a transition to what lies beyond mere Psychology.

When we scrutinise our procedure as finite minds confronted by an object which we cannot wholly take in or exhaust, we find that we proceed by concentrating attention on aspects which we select. Such selection is an act of will, and the motive which impels it is the particular purpose we happen to have in view. The man in the street concentrates attention on certain aspects; the mathematician, the moralist, and the artist on others. In this way, the characteristics of the world as it seems, are determined for us by the ends which we will. The fundamental form of the activity of selective attention is judgment. As we saw in the first Book, a judgment is a true one when it harmonises with experience generally. It is only by a process of abstraction which removes us further from, and not nearer to, reality, that we split up the judgment into the subject, the copula, and the predicate. For the judgment is the elemental and characteristic form of the activity of the subject, and though it be true that where intelligence is only being considered as at a plane at which the subject is confronted by the object as something foreign to it, the judgment as the activity of the subject apparently does no more than unravel what is presented, this is a view which, as we have already seen, is not only not final, but, on scrutiny, discloses itself as vanishing to an extent which is indefinite. As soon as we

have penetrated the hard crust of everyday conventions and metaphors with which language has overlaid reality, this becomes apparent. There is only a single experience, that which is ours. Other human beings have neither the same experience, nor a different experience. For a plurality of experiences is, as we have already found out, a totally unintelligible and self-contradictory notion. The other human beings are, as other human beings, but parts of that experience, and the observer himself, so far as he observes himself, is likewise but part of it. If we pass to a higher point of view there is but one subject in knowledge, and this manifests itself in a plurality of individual minds, not like light through a number of glasses, but rather as a plurality of images which the light creates. Yet this simile is no more than a simile. It is just because such similes and metaphors are all drawn from a region of direct presentation of concrete objects in the externality of space and time that they are inadequate, and useless, and misleading, and have been the occasion in Philosophy of difficulties far greater than those they were called in to explain.

When we form a judgment we start from something which is an actual object to our minds, and is in this sense real. "Croquet is a tedious game." Here, although there is no such thing in reality as a game of croquet in the abstract, I am referring to what is a fact of the real world, my generalised experience of the game. Reality is

the logical subject of my judgment. But this presentation of reality is indefinite, so far as my impressions about the quality of croquet as an amusement go. I proceed to connect it with a multitude of impressions of long hours and damp grass, and I frame a general conception, the predicate, and by means of this render definite and apparent what was before indefinite. If my judgment is a right one, I have so far unravelled experience and extended its connotation. The present conception is amplified, and receives content. Now if, as we have seen it must be, experience is a continuous system confronting the individual mind, and knowledge is the making parts or phases of this system definite by selective attention, we can understand the true nature of the process of reasoning. When we reason inductively, we are in search of the general principles on which the system of experience is there for us. We frame imaginative hypotheses, and apply conception after conception until we find one that, after testing, emerges as in harmony with the rest of experience. We thus infer a general principle, having started with particulars. This is induction. Or having got the system before our minds, we wish to find out whether a particular case belongs to it. "Games that involve standing about in the rain are tedious"; here we have a principle that binds certain experiences into a system. "Croquet involves standing about in the rain"; here we have the minor premiss, with a middle term asserting a harmony

between a general feature of croquet and the special system of tedious experiences with which we want to know whether it is connected. "Croquet is tedious"; here we have the conclusion of the syllogism, making explicit a feature of croquet which was not explicit before, because the game had not been assigned a place in my system of tedious experiences. It will be observed how abstract, subjective and selective, both these processes of reasoning are. Abstract they are, because they fasten on a single feature arbitrarily. The keen croquet player does not attach any importance to the dampness of the atmosphere. His impression of this is disregarded as wholly inferior in interest to the pleasure derived from the game. But set the same man to walk up and down the grass reading a book, and he will complain bitterly, and, without waiting, draw the inference that reading on damp grass belongs to the system of the tedious. Thus the subjective element comes in. Now this is the result of selection, probably in this case of habitual selection. He has concentrated attention in the second case on a feature which he did not select for attention in the first. Thus it is that thinking passes into willing, and willing into thinking, and we find that it is only artificially and by abstraction that they are represented as different kinds of mental acts. The world is will just as much as it is idea, and idea just as much as it is will. Assent, and its subjective aspect belief, is the

manifestation of this will. It is only the persistent attempt of some psychologists to treat thought and volition as though they were fundamentally distinct, and not merely provisionally separated, that has led to the difficulty which has puzzled people when looking for light on the nature of the act of assent or belief. The will is not free in so far as it is confronted by a world of objects which hem it in, and are foreign to it. But if we could conceive intelligence which in the act of knowledge, of being subject, was aware of itself as one with its object, and of its object as one with it, then we should have likewise conceived a will that was wholly free. The analysis of the nature of reality which we have pursued up to the stage we have reached in our journey seems to have shown that experience discloses an infinite regress towards such a conception as the unseen foundation of all that is. Even in experience we seem to have found that no limit can be set to the penetrating power of thought or to its work in the construction of reality, and now the same appears to be true of will, which by its selection seems to sustain, alter, and, to an extent which is for us limitless, create the experience amid which we live. What has obscured this truth is only the hypostatised abstraction from the action of the subject which both the man of science and the plain man are forced to make, in order to save time and energy. Even at the standpoint we have been considering, it seems as though the final explanation of reality were to

be sought in a system of Ends rather than of Causes.

I will now ask you to look back over the road that has been travelled through the region of the special sciences. Not external compulsion, but the end, the purpose, of the observer, determines the method of his investigation. The essence of the method is abstraction, under a particular set of categories. The point of departure is always the world as it seems, the world of concrete fact, which is thus stripped of its wealth and diversity. In a sense, too, the subject-matter is, throughout, concrete fact. But it is fact under selected aspects only. When I set myself to solve the problem of whether the square of the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the squares of the other two sides, I start with what I treat as an actual thing, the idealised pictorial construction of a right-angled triangle, which I look on as a fact, notwithstanding that such a fact is never to be found in an exact form in nature. I can reason from its properties, because I have got the clearest and most exact notion of them. In the course of my reasoning, I pictorially construct again, and in the end, I construct the result. Thought is in this fashion made adequate to reality. It constructs its object. It is free in so doing, to go right or to go wrong; but if, in such a case, the free self-determining activity of thought is to go right, it must follow the principles which make up the system of intelligence in the region in which it is

operating. By so doing, and only by so doing, is it possible to construct, as the outcome of the reasoning process, an ideal fact, individual, in the sense that with it the subject is satisfied, satisfied on the theoretical side as intelligence, because it finds the ideal individual fit into the context of experience, satisfied on the practical side, as will, because the self is content to rest in the final outcome, and has no desire to seek anything beyond. In other words, what has been attained complies with the test of what is individual, and so is unique. In geometry, in short, we experiment on, and mould, the fact with which we start, just as we do in chemistry. The perfect square is as much, and as little, a fact as the molecule made up of two atoms of hydrogen, and one of oxygen. In both cases, we make experiments which we could not make, without materials purified and rendered definite by abstraction. When we have thus idealised a fact of experience, we go on to reason to a result which, if true, must disclose itself as another idealised fact.

That this should be possible, suggests again the conclusion already reached by other ways, that it is in the reflective activity of thought that the nature of things as known, lies. Truth and error, the difference between the reality and the chimera, have been already discussed in the second and third Lectures, and there is no need of repetition of what was there found, in order to prove that the proposition, *Esse* is *Intelligi*, in no way conflicts

with the common-sense view of the plain man. Much of the hesitation in accepting such a result, frankly, and without reserve, arises from a view of the relation of thought to its object, which I have been trying to get rid of in these pages. Even Kant could not help speaking as though the mind were a thing which built up the object out of sensations. Now, so long as we talk of building up, or even of construction, without making plain what we really mean, we shall be apt to give a false impression. These are metaphors drawn from the picture galleries of time and space. It is, however, for the world in time and space, and for time and space themselves, that we have to account, and we shall only fail if our metaphors seem to beg the very point on which we employ them to throw light. In truth, thought no more exists apart from its object, than does the object exist apart from thought. It is in self-conscious mind that the two are distinguished, and, except as aspects within self-conscious mind, they seem to have no meaning or reality. It is within this field that the whole universe is comprised, lives, moves, and has its being. Within it, we must look for truth and error as well as everything besides. It is the whole field of reality, because it is the whole field of mind. And mind creates reality only in the sense that reality has no meaning, save as a distinction within mind, while, on the other hand, mind cannot become a distinct object for self, save in contrast to an object, conceived as real and self-

subsisting. That the distinction of the one from the other exists only in thought, is plain. The one is just the other, under a different aspect. I see that chair! What makes its reality, its actuality, for me? Differences, the distinctions through the medium of which what is first formless comes into consciousness as an object, the categories, if you please, which I have applied. And yet I cannot exhibit the chair as a deduction, in the fashion in which I exhibited the special content of the square of the hypothenuse of the right-angled triangle as a deduction. In both cases we are dealing with hard facts, hard in the sense that they are independent of the imaginings of my mind looked at under the aspect of a finite individual. But in the geometrical case, I, though finite, though confronted by a reality which was beyond my control and independent of me, was able, by abstraction, to take one of its relationships or aspects, and mould, control, and experiment with it within much wider limits than my position as here and now in the concrete world of actuality enabled me to do with the real things of that world. That was how I set immediacy at naught, and could take flight on the wings of inference to the most distant regions of space and time. Now, Philosophy, while recognising this process, does not deal so with the universe that confronts it, for it has to give an account of that universe as a whole containing all its boundless fulness; and the philosopher is

but an individual spectator, reflecting upon what confronts him, and for him, what confronts him not only exists independently of any particular spectator, but includes the very self in certain aspects in which that self appears. Yet, in other aspects, the spectator is the thinker, *the* subject in self-consciousness, and as such his individuality may be subjected to the free investigation of reflection, of thought, and turned in on its own operation. So looked at, his limitations, at first sight impenetrable and baffling, disclose themselves as mere appearances. From the every-day working standpoint from which the onlooker must be taken as a thing of which his thought is a property or activity, these appearances are final reality. But pass from the practical standpoint even for a moment. He sees the branches of a tree waving in the wind. The branches with their leaves are now with their leaves here, but, in a moment, while his eyes have been shutting and opening again, they are in a new position. Just as we found earlier that the individual man could have no direct experience of his neighbour's sensations, and could recognise in their descriptions no more than universal elements, that is to say, elements which exist for thought only, and are not passively received sense impressions, so he has no direct experience of his own individual sensations of the moment before. He cannot even *reproduce* them in memory. All he can do is, like the geometer, to construct an

image embodying those general features of them, which thought alone can apprehend and retain in an act which is not one of passive reception, but an active identification in difference through general conceptions. In this fashion he forms a judgment, he determines the concrete object of perception in the present moment by reference to the conception which he has constructed of the past moment. He determines a certain identity or continuity in the change of form of the tree as the wind moves its branches, and he so enriches and expands its present actuality for himself. But the work done is obviously not accomplished by passive reception. However proper a matter for attention the aspect of passive reception may be at another standpoint, there can be no question of it here, where the inquirer has to get at the truth about the relation between his mind and its content. That content can be described by him to himself and to others only in terms of the universals which mind establishes, and which give meaning, nature, and actuality to that content. The object world of nature has sometimes been called externalised thought. Such a name is good enough if we bear in mind what we mean by the words. We do not mean that in the aspect in which John Smith appears as a reasoning animal, an individual among other individuals, whose reason is the soul of what otherwise would be a soulless body or thing, his thinking faculty can be shown

to put together the universe of which he is part. It is only when in reflection we have transcended John Smith, the observer, as well as what he observes, that we find the two and the difference between them to be distinguished only *within* knowledge. Such a view of reality is far removed from subjective idealism, and even from the modified doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason. If the distinction between subject and object emerges at a plane of intelligence, which is neither the only plane nor the highest plane, the doctrine for which this is so is more analogous to realism than to the old subjective idealism of Berkeley and Hume. Nature it treats as real just as much as the individual percipient. For a percipient, who is in many aspects part of nature itself, and conditioned by it, the nature from which he has emerged must always be impenetrable and uncontrollable, expanding itself in a contingency which is boundless, and disclosing itself at every turn as inexhaustible by the intelligence of its creature. But the individual is more than an individual. He is a thinker, and in thinking of his own limits he transcends them. These limits become disclosed as falling within thought itself. He who in one aspect is a creature, is on another side more than a creature. He is also the manifestation and embodiment of mind, and distinguished therefrom in appearance only. Finite as he appears, he can, by letting intelligence

analyse and pick and choose among the aspects of that whose *esse* is after all readily discovered to be *intelligi*, transcend the limits of his own immediacy, and cause its foreignness to disappear. The use of the limited categories of mathematics and physics can help him to get far in this direction. The use of the higher categories of life and soul bring him still further along the path which leads to the discovery that the reality and actuality of nature are simply intelligence. The final result, achieved only when the whole series of the categories is made use of, and their full application realised, is the disclosure that the truth and very substance of nature is to be sought in mind, which thus rediscovers itself in its own object.

It has been truly said that such a doctrine can only be convincingly presented if it is possible to exhibit it as a complete system, a system in which the three aspects of ultimate reality would appear somewhat as follows:—First, mind under the abstract aspect of its categories in their relation to each other; second, mind in the abstract aspect in which, as object in nature with attention abstracted from the work done by intelligence operating through universals even in bare perception, intelligence has appeared as externality; and, third, mind as the concrete and final activity in which not only do the categories and nature appear as but abstractions, so far as independent, but intelligence and volition disclose themselves as

one. In such a presentation, nature would figure as characterised by the feature of atomism, in other words self-subsistence, and mutual exclusion of its components. For it would be distinguished from its counter abstraction, intelligence taken *per se*, only by appearing as not-thought, the background against which intelligence is distinguished and made conscious of itself as in appearance other than nature. This distinction falls within the self-consciousness, in which each side of it is but a moment, nevertheless the distinction is essential to self-consciousness, although thus produced within it. A complete system of Philosophy would set intelligence the task of tracing its own movement in the detail of the various forms implied and contained within the concrete and final reality of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness would at the end stand disclosed to itself as Reason, aware of itself as such, and with a complete view of the entire logical chain of its own categories and their distinctions, and of the dialectic through which these distinctions were related. Now it is no part of the purpose of these Lectures to attempt the display of the movement of Reason in such a system. My observations form but an introduction to Philosophy, to the thinking about these things of the great minds in the history of speculative thought. Their purpose is merely to try to help towards an understanding of what the function of speculative thought has been, and of the work which it has accomplished.

He who wishes to go beyond the limits of these discourses, and, having travelled the pathway which leads to reality, to approach yet more closely to the problem of its nature, will find guidance waiting for him in both Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Plato and Aristotle between them have given to the world attempts at a systematic display of the work of Reason. In modern times Hegel has done the work still more thoroughly. How far he has succeeded is still matter of controversy. But just as no one can properly count himself a mathematician who has not mastered the calculus, so no one is properly equipped as a philosopher who has not subjected himself to the hard work necessary for the understanding of the Hegelian system as a whole. Hegel is very hard to read. For that matter, so are the books on the higher mathematics. Yet people do not turn aside from the books on higher mathematics on that account, or pronounce their contents nonsense. They know that the reason of their difficulty is that their own imagination is not yet familiarised with a wholly novel set of conceptions about quantity, or freed from the superstitions which are adequate for everyday life. The incrustations of common sense are hard to break through, but in every science we have to break through them, and we cheerfully set about the task. Why in the case of Philosophy should it be different! There is not likely to be any royal road here any more than in Science. The incrustations which have to be

removed by patient study and reflection are not less but greater. Conceptions of the nature of ultimate reality, which are the outcome of the labour of successive generations of men working through two thousand years, are not likely to prove easy to grasp without preparation. When we are told by the most distinguished thinkers in this country, on the Continent, and in the United States, that they get more from Hegel than from any one else, and when we see how profoundly his teaching has modified studies such as those of history and of logic, to mention no others, it seems as though the main preparation for the would-be philosopher must still be to find out what Hegel really meant, and to learn to read him. The best assurance that I can give you of my own conviction on the subject is to tell you that all that is in these Lectures I have either taken or adapted from Hegel, and that in Hegel there is twice as much again of equal importance which these Lectures cannot even touch. We may not to-day be satisfied with all the details of the dialectic of the notion as set out in the *Encyclopædia*. Perhaps no single intellect, not even the gigantic intellect of a Hegel, could be equal to the task of displaying in its totality the inmost movement of Reason. We may think that the meagre and inadequate knowledge which Hegel possessed of Science, as Science has since his time become, has made his attempt to trace the presence of the reflection of universals of thought in nature, their correlation and counter-

part, in large measure a failure. We may be dissatisfied with some points of the system, and feel that the development of nearly a century since the *Encyclopædia* was written necessitates its being rewritten and the doing of much of the work anew. We may be grateful for the work which remarkable men of our own time, men such as Mr Bradley and Professor Royce, have done in recasting many of the Hegelian results. But none the less are we bound to realise that in labouring through the text of the *Encyclopædia*, with its unfamiliar terminology, as unfamiliar and as uncouth as the terminology of the calculus, we are in face of the greatest master of speculative method that the world has seen since the days of Aristotle. It often happens that Hegel will not pause to give the struggling reader kindly help in places where he needs it badly. He is no enthusiast like Fichte. He holds close to the concrete. He damps and disappoints the student by successive and deliberate refusals to fire his imagination. Himself a master of rhetoric, he seems to despise it even where it would serve to give relief by lightening for a moment the pressure of the iron chain of his logic. He is at times, to all appearance, deliberately obscure. He will not stop to explain that questions with the answer to which he likes to play, are questions to which he has no answer to give, for the simple reason that they are, from his point of view, irrational. He prefers in such

cases to amuse himself by assuming the part of a humorist. Herr Krug thinks that Hegel ought, if his philosophy were true, to be able to deduce his, Herr Krug's, pen. Hegel only hints a doubt whether the pen be worth deducing. So with the question as to the difference between the idea and the reality of a hundred dollars; the difference does not matter. Yet it is not the language which Hegel uses that is the real difficulty. It is the mode of thinking. If we have once grasped his fashion of thought, the language presents but little difficulty. We come to see that it is in the nature of things that it should be special, special as is and must be the language of the mathematical calculus. The Hegelian Philosophy will always be difficult. Its truths do not lie on the surface of the pictorial aspect of things, but beneath it. You have to break up that surface in order to get at what this great mine of Philosophy holds buried beneath a terminology necessarily novel, but not necessarily as difficult as its creator has chosen to make it. None the less no one else has so much to tell to the searcher after truth who will make the effort to grasp what he has to say. No other is so helpful.

Far away, across the German Ocean, there is a quiet spot shut off from the busy traffic of the streets of Berlin. You go along the Invaliden Strasse, and turn through a gateway which leads into the now deserted cemetery

of the old Dorotheen Kirche. There, under a simple stone, lie the mortal remains of the greatest master of abstract thought that the world has seen since the day when Aristotle died.

BOOK III

ABSOLUTE MIND



PREFACE TO BOOKS III AND IV

THE lectures which this volume contains were delivered consecutively, the first six in October 1903, and the last four in the following January. As in the case of the earlier series, published last year, they were, for the most part, not written. It had been suggested to me from the first that the plan of talking instead of reading, with the aid of a note just sufficient to fix the general sequence, was likely to prove less burdensome to the audience than an endeavour to rivet their attention to written and therefore rigid discourses on topics which were largely technical. The proposal suited my own circumstances, and, at least in the case of a layman, seemed admissible. The scheme of the lectures I had for some time past been thinking out, in the intervals of different avocations. But binding engagements, public and private, did not facilitate writing. Indeed, the delivery of the lectures contained in this volume had to take place in the intervals of utterances of other kinds. Possibly there has, as a consequence, been carried into what follows something of an atmosphere which is not strictly academic. At all events, by the terms of my

engagement to the Gifford Trustees, I was bound to publish the lectures as I gave them, and on reading over the transcript I felt that it contained things which I wanted to say, and which I was not likely to have another opportunity of saying. What is here printed is simply a carefully corrected copy of what a most competent shorthand writer took down day by day. To the lady who undertook this duty I must here express my gratitude for the skill with which she spared me much of what is often a wearisome burden of correction. Here and there I wrote out passages, and these I used where I could. But in the main I relied on the capacity of the reporter, even where the points were technical and obscure. The only exception to this was in the last part of the first lecture, and in the whole of that which comes seventh in order. These were written during a holiday in Germany.

Such a method of producing a metaphysical book has defects. Stern critics may say that no man has the right to publish anything of this kind put together in such a fashion. I admit the weight of the criticism, and I throw myself on the mercy of the critics. I also plead that the Gifford Trustees insisted, somewhat against my will, on my accepting their Lectureship, and then bound me to publish what I should say. I am not by profession a philosopher, and as I had no reputation to lose, I agreed to do what they wished. They allowed me time—and time, as has been observed by persons of great authority, is infinitely long. Then there

were some things to be considered on the other side. I had spent in these investigations a good deal of my life, and it seemed to be permissible for me, finding myself in such a situation, to try to say how the world seemed to one whose occupations necessitated his living in it. Again, my plan, the only possible one for a busy person, was not wholly without its advantages. In the first place, he who is going to speak *ex tempore* has to make a determined effort not to allow the trees to prevent him from seeing the wood as a whole. I think I may say that I have not spared myself in the effort to do this. The writer who shuts himself up with his lamp in his study is sometimes in peril of getting lost in his details. He is tempted to think as he expresses himself, instead of thinking before he expresses himself. He does not easily, such is the force of habit, reflect as he walks through the market place. And yet the market place has its own kind of stimulus for those who have to be constantly striving to pull themselves together, a stimulus which is not to be felt to the same extent either in the pulpit or the chair. Moreover, upon the whole, experience shows that the spoken word is better for teaching purposes than the written manuscript. It leaves the lecturer free to follow into their perplexities the minds of those who are his hearers. Finally, the circumstance that he has but talked, leaves the talker with a sense of liberty remaining to him. It was, I think, Renan who

somewhere declared that to write a book was to limit oneself. If, however, the author has but expressed his thought in language which owed its form to the audience and the hour, the sense of self-limitation is less oppressive.

In my earlier volume the chief topic was the complete relativity of our knowledge, in everyday life and in physical science. The nature of reality was subjected to a scrutiny which ended in the recognition of a boundary line to such knowledge. Beyond that boundary line it appeared to be impossible to pass in the absence of an interpretation of mind, and of its relation to the Universe, more definite and more extensive than that which is current in everyday usage. In this volume I have done what I could to find the interpretation needed, and, with its aid, to cross the line. I have tried to find the answer to the question what we are really striving to express when we speak of God and of Freedom and of Immortality. It has seemed to me that, in the two thousand years which have passed since Aristotle taught on these topics, progress in our knowledge has been made, but progress in the main on certain lines which he laid down.

The first volume of this book had a reception more generous than one who is to be reckoned with laymen was entitled to look for. Only of two criticisms which were made on it, do I wish to say anything. One was that the book was a mere reproduction in modern form of what had

before been taught by Aristotle and by Hegel. On this I will merely observe that the criticism cannot carry the critic far. I believe it to be true, and have already said so. But my assertion depends for its validity on the accuracy of my interpretation of the doctrine of these great men. Now of what is a very difficult doctrine the interpreters have been many, and as various as they were many. They have not seldom reproached each other with liberties taken with their gospel. Accordingly I will endeavour to disarm hostility by frankly confessing here that in both volumes I have freely used the method of what theologians call exegesis. Some, for whose judgment and authority I have the deepest respect, have shaken their heads, and have told me that, whether or not I have interpreted Aristotle aright, I have not truly followed the teaching of Hegel. I have laid, as they think, too little stress on the abstract element in knowledge and on the dialectical character of knowledge as a system of universals. I can only answer that what I have done has been done after deliberation, and that in the present volume I have sought to justify it. I have thought for long that metaphysical investigation has had its credit seriously impaired, not only in Germany but in this country, by a too narrow view taken of the nature of mind. This word has been used by certain writers as meaning either the process of relational or discursive thought, in its essence of the character of what is universal, or else something—no one seems quite to know

what—considered somehow to exist apart from time, and to be that of which thought is the activity. The next step has been to put the process (or the activity, as the case may be) in contrast with feeling. Thereupon has come the splitting of the philosophers into camps, in some of which it is sought to reduce feeling to thought, and in others to reduce thought to feeling. In short, people have fallen into the way of insisting on construing the concrete riches of the world of the actual, as if they must be reduced either to universals of reflection or to particulars of sense. To me the dilemma appears to rest on too narrow a view of the nature of mind. With mind, if there be any truth in the doctrine of these lectures, *we must begin.* It *is* the actual, what lies nearest to hand, and it is also the ultimate, beyond which we cannot get, and which can only be described in terms of itself. Universal and particular seem to me, following Aristotle, to be but abstractions, made in the process in which it is actual by the subject which has before and within it its experience and itself. That subject, with its experience and its self-consciousness, is the actual concrete fact in which all knowledge has its starting point. Such a starting point is concerned with what is singular and individual, and it is within what is thus in its actuality singular and individual that the universal and particular, which can emerge only as abstractions, have reality. The grounds for this opinion, which appears to me to have been that of Aristotle and Hegel, and to have been

dropped out of sight by some of their interpreters, I partly set forth in the earlier lectures. In this series I have returned to the attack from another side. I am unable to assent to a narrow use of the word which would confine thought to a particular mode of thinking that is itself the mere outcome of abstraction. Yet this identification seems to me to be frequently made by writers whose aim it is to interpret from the standpoint of idealism. That Hegel himself (of Aristotle it is hardly necessary to speak) would have repudiated this form of idealism, appears from his express declarations.* The warnings have been disregarded, and the result has been something of a breach and much of confusion in the camp of the idealists. A striking incident has been the departure of Mr F. H. Bradley from the headquarters of orthodox idealism, and his adoption of a separate position. He has intimated his decision that thought, relational and discursive as, in the sense in which the late Mr Green and others have used the word, he finds it to be, has no capacity to reach final truth or to penetrate beyond appearance. Yet is Mr Bradley's view of thought sufficiently wide? One asks how, if thought be merely what he takes it to be, he gets as far as he does. Is not his scepticism self-destructive! And is his Absolute any better than "the night in which all cows look black"; an unknowable *substance* of which we may say,

* See *Werke*, Band vi., p. 5, and also the final part of his *Religions-Philosophie, passim.*

"*De non apparentibus et de non existentibus, eadem est ratio?*" Mr Green himself seems to have had misgivings about this use of the word thought. In one passage he even protests against it, blaming Hegel, as I think, not quite justly.* For myself I prefer to believe, what the facts seem to me to demonstrate, that the scope of the activity which is of the essence of mind, is wider than the limits of relational or discursive thinking. It follows that abstract reason has no monopoly of the means of access to reality, although I hold it to be the only competent guardian of the pathway. It seems to me that relational thought and feeling are alike aspects which arise by distinctions which are really abstract, within the ultimate reality which we call Self-consciousness or Mind or Spirit, and which is in its nature singular and all-embracing. In this volume I have accordingly pressed the point that if by the word thought we wish to indicate the activity in which mind consists, we must interpret it as extending to every form of that activity, and not in the contracted sense in which it is sometimes used.

For these and other reasons which are set out in the lectures that follow, I have assigned to Art and to Religion parts as important as that of Philosophy in the search after truth. That, like Philosophy, Art and Religion can aim at reaching nothing short of the reality that is ultimate, I cannot doubt. The difference is one of method and

* See Works of T. H. Green, vol. iii., p. 142.

of symbol. It is no function of Art or of Religion to bring us to scientific results. It is just because the scientific aspect of the truth is the aim of Philosophy that its language is abstract and that its methods have the defect of their quality. Its results can never be for our minds wholly sufficing. At our plane of intelligence the tendency to frame abstractions, and so to separate what are but aspects in a single reality, the Beautiful, the Good, and the True, is too powerful. Yet the content of our minds will not the less on this account always be more than abstract thought. And this leads me to add a final observation to this preface.

If any one should say that the name of Goethe occurs too frequently in the pages of what purports to be a metaphysical book, my answer will be, that my way of looking at things made it impossible not to turn frequently, in the course of an investigation such as this, to the greatest critic of life that has spoken in modern times. Should I, in the course of these lectures, have succeeded in helping any one to realise more fully the depth of meaning in the precept of that great genius :—

> ". . . Im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen
> Resolut zu leben,"

I shall feel that I have been well repaid for the little that I have been capable of doing.

CLOANDEN, AUCHTERARDER,
1904.

LECTURE I

I HAVE to resume these lectures at the point at which I laid down the thread in January last. My task, as prescribed by Lord Gifford, is to inquire into the nature of God. For that task he also prescribed the spirit in which its execution was to be carried out. It was to be executed impartially, and in a scientific fashion, without fear and without favour. I have endeavoured in the course of the lectures which I have already delivered to look to the truth and the truth only as my goal, and I shall seek in the course which I have now to commence to observe the same principle.

In the last series I began by pointing out that to inquire into the nature of God must be to inquire into the nature of Reality, and I examined at some length the meaning of such words as *Reality* and *Truth*. These lectures, which have since been published, were of necessity critical rather than constructive. I had to prepare to build, and for that purpose it was necessary that I should clear the ground before I could endeavour to place upon it a structure. I have now to try to carry out the constructive portion of my undertaking; but before

I enter upon it I wish to remind you of the substance of what has already been done.

We were confronted in the beginning of our inquiry into the nature and meaning of Reality with this fact, a fact which looked formidable, that the world as it seems around us presents an aspect which is apparently alien to mind and impenetrable by thought. We had to consider what I called the hard-and-fastness of that world as it is presented to us, and to endeavour to trace to its source the reason of that characteristic. You will recall that I traced that characteristic back to its source in the limited ends and purposes which govern us men and women in *thinking* our experience. I pointed out to you that this hard-and-fastness, this impenetrability of the object world, owed its significance to a certain "setting" in which our knowledge was placed by the dominating influence upon that knowledge of ends and purposes of a limited character, necessary for our social lives, but which yet were not of a nature sufficiently far-reaching to guide us in the search after ultimate truth. Analysis showed that these ends and purposes were neither final nor exhaustive, and in this conclusion we found ourselves in the company of a number of people who had approached the subject from different points of view, but who had converged on something like the same result! Men so different as Berkeley, Mill, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and the later Germans, had all pointed out that it is the way in which we think things that gives rise to

much of what we take to be the objective universe in which we live.

Put shortly, it may be said that it is ends and not causes which fashion that universe, and thus we get to the conclusion that knowledge is, in a deeper sense than that in which the expression is commonly used, relative. The relativity of all our knowledge is a relativity which depends, not upon the fact that there is something hidden behind, for there is no warrant for the belief in any hidden thing-in-itself, but upon this, that the ends and purposes which dominate and control our thinking are not final or ultimate ends and purposes.

Now the inquiry which I have summarised, and which occupied the last ten lectures, led us to take warning against certain perils which beset the searcher after truth. One of these perils arises from the habit into which we readily fall of using, in such an investigation as we are engaged in, metaphors and similes which are appropriate for everyday purposes, but which are wholly out of place in regions which are not akin to the regions from which they are drawn. Thus men and women have been led to torture themselves and to cause themselves endless perplexity by trying to conceive the mind as a *thing*. If it be a thing, how natural to look upon it as operated upon by mechanical causes, and as incapable of freedom, in any sense in which meaning can be given to the word! Yet we found that the notion of the mind being a thing, was a notion which rested upon metaphors which

were wholly inapplicable when we were treating of the nature of the mind.

Let me take a second danger which the last course of lectures was designed to illustrate. We are, as I have just said, prone to bring to bear upon the subject matter into which we are inquiring conceptions or categories which are wholly out of place, and that is a danger which besets not only philosophers but people whose work is, in the special sense of the word, scientific. For example, as we saw in the last series, in physiology the insistence upon a mechanical way of looking at things has affected the researches which from time to time have been undertaken, in such a fashion as to lead, not only to confusion of thought, but to a good deal of deflection of experiment into channels which are not the natural channels.

And this carries with it further consequences which arise from the misuse of categories. We are very apt, when we get a view of experience and fix it as a particular aspect, to take that view, that aspect, as exhaustive of the whole. But such a conclusion speedily carries Nemesis in its train, because we find, as I showed you in detail in the last four lectures of the former course, that we fall into endless contradictions when we do anything of the sort. Therefore a criticism of categories is essential in philosophy. We must know what is the relation to one another of the conceptions of which we make use, and what is the limit of their validity.

Then there is a third peril to which I had to allude in some detail before, and which is of quite a different character, although in its source it is akin to the two others. Philosophy has got into disrepute by the carelessness of philosophers in the use of language. It is not possible to be always accurate in language, especially when you are carrying into a region of research which is quite different from other regions of research, words and phrases which are taken from the usages of every-day life. But still it was not necessary for thinkers — and even very great thinkers have been to blame here—to have led the world to suppose that philosophy tries to do what it ought never to try to do. For example, it has been common to suppose that idealism meant that somehow the professor of idealism would show how thought *made* a thing, instead of simply showing what the meaning of being a thing is, and in what its reality consists. Even the great Kant has not been wholly free from this reproach. But I pointed out to you that thought cannot properly be said to *make* things.

The word "make" is a metaphor, drawn from the regions of space and time, and is wholly inadequate to express the relation of thought to its object. None of the great thinkers have really preached the heresy in question, particularly not those whose names are, in the popular imagination, most associated with the doctrine. Aristotle and Hegel are really wholly free from the imputation,

nor does their language, when properly scanned, lend countenance to the notion that they taught the heresy.

Well, so much for the negative part of the earlier set of lectures. The conclusion at which I asked you to arrive with me was this, that God's nature could not be of a quality less than the quality of Ultimate Reality, and that the metaphors and images of ordinary theology are wholly inadequate as a description of God's nature. Now it is useless to do what a considerable, and, I fancy, for the moment, a growing school of theologians are seeking to accomplish. They are trying to bring us back to an everyday view of the nature of God, away from the regions in which metaphysics has taught us to search. Those who imagine that they are rendering a service to the permanent character of theology by going back to feeling, by limiting what ought to be accurate description to the ordinary metaphors of everyday life, are really rendering no service. They are sowing no seed. They can expect no fruit. They are ploughing the sands. If the nature of God is to be investigated, it must be investigated in the light of a searching criticism of the categories implied, otherwise we shall encounter the danger expressed in the now trite saying of Goethe, "Man never knows how anthropomorphic he is."

While the analysis of the last set of lectures began with the view of things which we traced to the domination of those various limited purposes of

which I have spoken as the source of a considerable amount of error, I pointed out that the ends and purposes which dominate have their origin in the necessities of everyday life; that they come from this, that we men and women, in our intercourse with one another, must speak on the basis of a common foundation. That common foundation comes to be largely expressed in phrases which owe their origin to the social ends which we have in view, ends which by degrees pass in our minds into the appearance of being the only ends with which we are concerned. I pointed out that this was so in the sciences, just as much as in everyday life, only that in the sciences what is done is done consciously. In the sciences what we do is to take an aspect of things, a particular aspect; to concentrate on it to the exclusion of other aspects, and, by the clearness of thought which we thus obtain, to get, by means of reasoning, beyond what is immediately present to the senses. In geometry, for example, we abstract from everything excepting the relations of space, and we construct figures with a clearness and a concentration of mind which enables us to get far beyond what the senses could tell us. But these figures are ideal. The concrete riches of the universe have, for the purposes of the inquiry of the geometer, been put out of account—rightly put out of account—for they are not relevant to that inquiry, but yet put out of account in a fashion which makes the investigations of geometry a guide to only a partial aspect of the truth. Now,

what is true of the abstract conceptions of geometry is true in a varying degree of every other science. We traced the process, in our account of the special sciences, down to the abstractions of psychology in the method of what is called Presentationism. It is the procedure of science to exclude those aspects which are not germane to the ends which the man of science has in view, in order to concentrate with greater clearness and greater insight on the particular aspect which *does* concern him. In that fashion the man of science reminds one of the procedure of everyday life, where the ends and purposes which guide us in thinking our experience are ends and purposes which often shut us out from what may prove to be a deeper insight into its character.

As the result we found that all that is or can be conceived has meaning only as expressing distinctions which fall within the mind itself. Even space and time are distinctions, have meaning and existence only as distinctions, which fall within self-consciousness. These distinctions are distinctions which are before or for the mind, and in them phenomena get their setting and their significance. The Ultimate Reality we therefore found to be mind and nothing else, to be subject rather than substance, although even the expression "subject" is one which we cannot use without a certain amount of explanation. For the word "subject" suggests what is called subjective idealism, suggests the return to the notion of the mind as a thing

constructing or building up its experience—a view which got some countenance in Kant's division of the mind into faculties, a division which suggested that the mind could be put, as it were, upon the table, and dissected into component elements.

Now, there is no *making* of things by thought in that sense. The "window" theory of the mind represents one extreme of untruth, the theory, namely, that things have an independent existence, and that somehow knowledge is a streaming from them into the interior of the mind as into a vacant chamber. On the other hand, it is equally untrue, as I showed you, to try to exhibit experience as a piecing or putting together by the mind of what is to be thought of as a magic lantern picture which the mind projects, and which, compared with what projects it, is unreal. My self-consciousness is not a thing that makes its object, for object and subject equally fall within it. My self-consciousness is feeling just as much as thought, and thought just as much as feeling, and the separation of the two arises from a distinction which falls within it. Self-consciousness is in form reflection, within which the whole meaning of existence falls, and within which all existence emerges. Later on in these lectures we shall have to consider what is the meaning of the word "my" in this connection, and to ask whether it is not true that there too we have a distinction which falls within self-consciousness. But feeling and thought—this is the point of my observation—are not two elements which exist separately, the one

from the other. They are rather related as the particular and the universal which have no independent existences, but are merely moments of concrete reality in the individual, actual, and concrete singular of direct experience, within which they are only separable by abstraction. Behind consciousness I can neither go nor find meaning in trying to go. That consciousness is before itself as *my* consciousness is a fact which, as we shall find later on, makes no difference.

If one has to characterise reality one must characterise it as, in the sense I have indicated, individual. The real is always something singular, unique, having nothing else like it. It is always a "this." So is self-consciousness itself. And it is equally true that self-consciousness, when I reflect that time is itself but a relation or distinction falling within self-consciousness, may be characterised as having for the form of its existence an eternal "now." There is a great phrase of Hegel: "Dem Begriffe nach einmal ist allemal," "In the notion once is always," and that is a saying on the significance of which I shall have to dwell a good deal in the course of these lectures. My point is just now that, as all existence falls within self-consciousness, and as all existence emerges within self-consciousness, a thesis which I developed at length in the earlier course of lectures, so self-consciousness is not in the nature of a set of abstract universals, nor yet in the nature of any particular of feeling, but is itself just an indi-

vidual "this," the centre to which all else falls, unique and singular in its character, and eternal in the sense of being that for which time is. All knowledge is accordingly nothing else in its real nature than the making explicit what is implicit. It is true that when we think in time distinctions, as the ends which fashion our intelligence force us men and women to think, sense seems to come first, and completed knowledge last. But when you scrutinise reflectively and more deeply the nature of what you there have, you find that in the earlier and simpler stages of knowledge, even in the particulars of sense, there is implicit the whole of what comes into clear consciousness later on in time, but is in reality implied from the first. That is the necessary consequence of the nature of self-consciousness.

The Ultimate Reality is Mind, and the nature of God cannot be less than that of the Ultimate Reality. God must be Mind. Is He personal? What is His relation to the finite forms in which self-consciousness appears, for example, in man? These are questions which I shall have to consider with you in what follows.

Well, I have sketched the idea of the ten lectures on which I am now entering, and I have summarised what has already been accomplished. I fear that many of you have found the pathway to reality, so far as we have yet trodden it, hard and stony. It is beset with many difficulties, and in the region upon which we are now entering, as we

cross the borderland, we shall find the pathway that lies before us not less hard and not less stony. We have to ascend precipitous places; we have to go along the very brink of abysses of thought; but yet, if we have faith in the great teachers, the half-dozen great teachers who, in the two thousand years which embrace what is greatest in the history of the human mind, have trodden the road before us, we shall find that they have cut steps in the rock which are of an enduring character, footholds which will enable us to get from point to point. As the outcome of their work, they have left us certain great results which form their common contribution, results which they have expressed in varying language, and which are our inheritance and our strength and our guide in our toil.

I have so far brought you to a point at which it is evident that what we have to do is to build upon the ground which we have cleared, to get some definite notion of the nature of Mind. For if God be the Ultimate Reality, and if the Ultimate Reality be Mind, the problem with which we have to deal is obviously, What is the nature of Mind? Now the great difficulty in lecturing upon a topic of this kind is not a difficulty which applies only to the lecturer. There is a difficulty which rests with the audience. There are many of the points in an inquiry of this kind which have not emerged in the minds of some of you, and yet, until these points emerge, until you become conscious that there are problems that have to be solved, and realise the

nature of these problems, it is hard for you to make progress. That is why we read a book so much better when it deals with some topic on which we have reflected and about which we have much concerned ourselves, until the book has, so to speak, come to our rescue. And so it is in the most pre-eminent degree with the study of metaphysics. It seems barren, it seems in the air, unless you have realised the intensity of the difficulty with which the metaphysician sets himself to grapple, and this has always been so in the history of philosophical teaching. That is what the Greeks meant when they used to talk two thousand years ago of *wonder* as a necessity for the beginner in philosophy. He must have learned to ponder over the difficulties which beset him, and, before he has learned that, he must have become conscious of these difficulties. And it is not merely wonder as to abstract theory, but it is *moral* wonder which is essential in the undertaking. There is a saying of Erdmann which I will quote, making the preliminary observation that it is not until we have passed a certain point in the evolution of the spiritual as well as the moral nature of man, that such an inquiry as is the subject of the Gifford Lectures attains the fascination that is characteristic of it. "The task," writes Erdmann at the beginning of his *History of Philosophy*, "of apprehending its own nature in thought can only tempt the human mind, and, indeed, it is then only equal to it, when it is conscious of its intrinsic dignity." We may add that it was only

after Christianity had raised humanity to the full consciousness of the infinite worth and importance of the individual that these inquiries attained their deepest meaning, and that the old commandment "Know thyself" got its full significance.

Well, we have to try to find light upon a problem that is of supreme importance to all of us, and our conclusions about which must profoundly influence our conduct. I cannot undertake always to succeed in using the language which is most apt, or to be always clear and lucid. That will be partly my fault, but it will be in a yet greater measure the fault of the topic with which I have to deal.

It is, indeed, a reproach often directed against those who speak about philosophy that their language is obscure. The complaint is almost invariably directed at some supposed shortcoming of the speaker. Those who make it rarely pause to ask whether it be not possible that the nature of the subject is the real reason of the obscurity. Philosophy has to deal with the meaning and nature of Ultimate Reality, and what is ultimate is rarely easy to get at. You and I can readily see through the water of a babbling brook when we cannot see to the bottom of the lake into which the waters flow. If the waters of philosophic reflection had resembled those of the brook we should have long ago known what underlay them. Lord Gifford would not have founded a Trust; libraries would not have been filled with volumes of controversy.

The obscurity lies really in the topic of discourse. Feeble as may be the capacity of the lecturer, it is not his feebleness that is the chief head of offending. There have been those who have attempted, with the aid of great gifts of exposition, to set forth solutions of the problems of metaphysics in language that was apparently clear as noonday. But one after another their attempts have failed. The language was clear, because it was the language of everyday life where the problems in question had simply been ignored. The pictorial images of this language were admirably adapted for the display of that which they resembled. But the region of philosophy is not a region of pictorial images. Rather, as I showed you in the lectures of the last series, is it a region where such similes and metaphors have sadly misled those who have set out on the search after truth in its deeper meaning. It is just because it has to get rid of the misleading associations of language which belongs to a plane of reflection other than that at which it has to place itself, that philosophy requires its own special and technical terminology. Therein it resembles mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and, indeed, every science which has to try to get beyond appearances to their significations. Why these other sciences should escape the reproach in question, and philosophy have to encounter it, is not apparent. Yet the reproach against philosophy is common even from the lips of educated people. "It is," observes Hegel in the Introduction to the

Encyclopædia, "the generally accepted view that to make a shoe requires study and experience, notwithstanding that every man has a model in the shape of his own foot, and has in his hands the natural instruments for the work which he has to do. It is only in the case of philosophy that learning and study and hard work are taken to be unnecessary. This comfortable opinion has, in recent times, been strengthened by doctrines about immediate or intuitive knowledge." Had Hegel lived to-day he would have added to these strengthening causes the easy avenues to truth, which our popular writers on science and on theology seem never to tire of describing.

But in point of fact there are no royal roads to this kind of learning any more than to other kinds. If philosophy is to be studied to any purpose, and especially to the purpose of enabling the student to work out his own intellectual salvation, it must be studied in systematic form. The pathway is hard and stony. Lectures like the present may help you over the slough of preliminary despond and through the wicket gate. They may lead you to a place from which you may have some view of new regions. But more than this they cannot do. When you reach these regions you must pursue your own way, and nothing short of hard toil will bring you any distance into these unfamiliar places. When you get to them the only guides that can help you are the great thinkers, those who have been great, not merely in the history of speculative

philosophy, but in the history of science, of literature, of art, of religion, of all that has raised the intellectual level of mankind. There is no short cut. There is no epigram in which it is practicable to shut up what can be set forth only in a system. The language, too, must be language which has expressions for metaphysical conceptions. That is why French is a poor medium for this kind of science, and English not very much better. There is a story which is sometimes told of Cousin and Hegel, but, I think, it is properly told of Madame de Stäel and Fichte. The brilliant lady is said to have called on Fichte in Berlin, and asked that he should sum up for her his system succinctly and in French. "*Ces choses ne se laissent pas dire succinctement, surtout en français,*" is said to have been Fichte's response.

But our generation is not the only one that has suffered from a widespread desire to take short cuts in philosophy. The Greeks had to protest against the same illusion. In the Seventh Book of the Republic, Glaucon says to Socrates, "Say then what is the nature and what are the divisions of dialectic, and what are the paths which lead thither; for these paths will also lead to our final rest."

"Dear Glaucon," I said, "you will not be able to follow me here, though I would do my best, and you should behold, not an image only, but the absolute truth, according to my notion. Although I am not confident that I could tell you the exact

truth, I am certain that you would behold something like the truth."

"Doubtless," he replied.

"But I must add that the power of dialectic alone can reveal this, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences."

"Of that assertion you may be as certain as of the last."

"And certainly no one will argue that there is any other method or way of comprehending all true existence; for the arts in general are concerned with the wants or opinions of men, or are cultivated for the sake of production and construction; and, as to the mathematical arts which, as we were saying, have some apprehension of true being—geometry and the like—they only dream about being, but never can they behold the waking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the conclusion and intermediate steps are constructed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a conventional statement will ever become science?"

"Impossible," he said.

"Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle, and so the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make certain of them; the eye of the soul, which is literally buried in an outlandish slough, is by her taught to look upwards; and she uses as hand-

maids, in the work of conversion, the sciences we have been discussing. Custom terms them sciences, but they ought to have some other name, implying greater clearness than opinion, and less clearness than science." . . .

"Dialectic, then, as you will agree, is the coping-stone of the sciences, and is placed over them; no other science can be placed higher—the nature of knowledge can no further go."

Glaucon then asks who ought to study dialectic, which in this context means just philosophy, and what qualifications he should have. Socrates replies, "Such gifts as keenness and ready powers of acquisition; for the mind more often faints from the severity of study, than from the severity of gymnastics." "Further, he of whom we are in search should have a good memory, and be an unwearied solid man who is a lover of labour in any line, or he will never be able to undergo the double toil and trouble of body and mind. The mistake at present is, that those who study philosophy have no vocation, and this, as I was saying before, is the reason why she has fallen into disrepute; her true sons should study her, and not bastards. Her votary should not have a lame or one-legged industry—I mean that he should not be half industrious and half idle; as, for example, when a man is a lover of gymnastic and hunting and all other bodily exercises, but a hater, rather than a lover, of the labour of learning, or hearing, or inquiring."

It seems, then, as though it had been recognised since Plato's time, that philosophy must remain the most difficult of sciences, and as though the fact were one which it were useless to try to disguise by using language which lacks in precision and meaning, in proportion as it gains in popularity. Such language is no help but rather a hindrance. It is not really lucid. It is better to keep boldly and without apology to the well-worn terminology, clumsy as much of it is. As Seneca says: "Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et consuetudo sermonis antiqui quædam efficacissimis notis signat." Bearing this in mind let us once more, before recommencing our journey, take stock of our equipment for it.

I will begin by summing up, in fresh language, the conclusion of the first set of lectures. From the point at which they concluded I have to try to carry you yet a stage further, a stage which we must travel if we are to get a clear grasp of the theory, not merely of knowledge, but of practice. And this we cannot get unless we keep before our minds the result of the analysis of Ultimate Reality. That analysis brings us to the conception of Mind, present to itself in changing aspects, but, under whatever aspect, as the sole reality within which distinctions fall and change takes place, as singular, as individual, as unique, as all-embracing.

Knowledge is a supreme and ultimate fact. It is not to be explained as a phenomenon brought about by physical and physiological causes. The

facts of physics and physiology arise through distinctions drawn in knowledge. We ascend from matter to mind only to discover that it was in mind that matter first of all attained to meaning and existence.

The real world within and without me is individual, is always the unique, singular "this," and the individual, in which thought rests, is reality. Thought never passes beyond the singular, all-containing fact of reality, however it may transform it. Even when I pronounce one fact in experience to be different from that other, what I have done is to make a distinction *within* the subject of my judgment. The individual immediacy has been so far transformed by reflection that *within* it has been established a numerical distinction, and the true individual, the subject to which my next judgment will attach a predicate, of which it will proclaim a fresh "what," is the whole of that reality inside which a separation of a really abstract character has been established as a qualification of the original aspect of reality. If my experience is of myself as contrasted with what is not self, in like manner it is within the unique, all-inclusive, self-sustaining totality of the presentation by the mind of itself to itself that the contrast is established. A new aspect has emerged, that is all. Because the individual of experience is mind, and its nature is to be activity, it is never still, and the only fashion in which the varying aspects are fixed and held still is, as philosophers from the time of

Heraclitus to that of Mill have pointed out, through the abstractions of reflection. So only is the system evolved in which we must think our experience—so only does our Universe rise before us. It is not in so-called causes, but in the ends or purposes which the mind has before it in so reflecting, and in nothing short of these, that the reason is to be sought of the fixity of the appearance of the world as it seems, and of us as part of it. We are what we are in virtue of ends set before it by the Mind in which we live and move and have our being. Therein lies the reason why reality presents itself as set in just these and no other aspects. With the ends the aspects vary. As each end is real for mind, so does each aspect equally belong to reality. If ends co-exist, so must aspects co-exist. Every aspect of the world as it seems is real, if and so far as the end which is realised in it is real. The degrees of reality depend on the relation of the ends. If an end is superseded by a deeper purpose, the aspect to which the former gave being sinks to the level of mere appearance.

I know how hard all this is to grasp, and those of you who find it unintelligible I must refer back to the first six of the old lectures, where you have it worked out up to the point to which I now come. This point is that just as when we want to find out the nature of a particular science and the meaning of what it teaches, we must inquire into its method and categories, so it is in the

case of practice also. If we would know what the artist really says and does, or the good man, or the godly man, we must find out what his method is, and what are his dominating conceptions, and the ends which move him to act under them. Beauty, goodness, godliness, are all aspects in the world as it seems, aspects under which mind presents itself, aspects forming varying phases in which its individuality discloses itself to itself in what we call experience. The beautiful, for example, is an aspect in which experience comes to us, an aspect which we fix and preserve in universals of reflection. Can we then hope to be able to resolve it into such universals? Certainly not! Beauty is an aspect in which reality, always in form individual, discloses itself, and this unique individuality cannot be resolved into the universals which exist only in it and are separated out merely in abstraction. Beauty is one of the forms in which Mind recognises itself, and it belongs to the region of fact. Before reflection had played its part in isolating and fixing it, beauty was without meaning. A pig or a dog seems to know nothing of beauty. As Hegel has pointed out, it is only in so far as we *think* that we are capable of art, or morality, or religion. The extent to which each of us is capable of appreciating beauty depends on our capacity for conceptions and for the ends which lead us to choose them. The height to which mankind in general can rise in grasping the true, the beautiful, the good, depends on what

are the ends and capacity for conceptions of mankind. That is why the Universe appears as it does to us human beings, and not otherwise. The limited character of the ends which, in practice as in theory, our nature leads us to choose, divides us not only from God but from the world as it is for God. If we would get as near as we can to Him we must seek the highest forms of which human experience is capable. For these will point us beyond themselves, not to other human forms, for of these there will be none beyond, but to reality that lies beyond and gives them deeper meaning as stages towards such reality. We may be satisfied if we find that, in the light of a deeper understanding, what has troubled us, what has separated us from God, has been nothing that separated us wholly from Him, nothing with a self-subsisting and independent nature, but a set of distinctions which fall within our own selves, which have their hard-and-fast appearance because of our mental and spiritual limits, and which, whether they assume the aspect of our weakness or that of the grave that closes on us, are but appearance relatively to the reality which comprehension of the deeper meaning discloses. In the Ultimate Reality such appearances can be but transient, and it is only the finiteness of our powers of reflection that has made us fix them into a system from which we see no escape. This system is the system of what we call the actual. What is actual is experience. Experience is neither the universal nor the particular, but the combination

of the two in the individual presentation. Presentation gives us the actual. Now in presentation, and therefore in the actual, the transforming work of reflection, without which the individual presentation cannot be fixed for thought, operates in varying degrees. At times, as when we see colour or feel pleasure, the particular element of sensation predominates. At other times, as when we recognise as facts confronting us the institutions of the family or the state, the element of sense recedes, and what gives its meaning to reality is the dominating conception. Objectivity is here very plainly what we are forced to think. It is the feeling which is highly qualified through reflection that binds the parent to the child, and the citizen to the state. A family and a state may be objects in experience, actual individuals in direct presentation, but it is only for a thinking being that they are so. For a low type of intelligence and among low types of intelligence they are meaningless and do not exist. A cow may conceivably have some sort of self-consciousness, but watch the expression of its face and you will readily satisfy yourself that it has no religion, no sense of citizenship. The higher the capacity for thought, the wider the limits of what is actual, and the more apparently is it rational.

There appears to be also a varying limit at the other boundary, in the region of feeling. The capacity of our senses, the field of consciousness, may be much enlarged by sufficient suggestion to the subliminal self. Many of the phenomena of

hypnotism illustrate this. Such experiences as those of telepathy and thought-reading seem to depend on the relaxation of the normal inhibitions which restrain the capacity of the self for sensation. Yet the records of these phenomena and the little they assist us towards knowledge of the higher kinds, strikingly suggest that what we are overstepping is only the lower limit of feeling, within which the normal inhibitions of the self confine it, and not the upper limit of capacity to think. It is the shortcoming of mysticism that it takes feeling as such, with its barrenness of intellectual effort, to be sufficient as a form of reality. The strength of mysticism is its directly present particular of feeling. But this yields at best but the emotion which is no guide to truth, which has no basis in reflection or justification in reason. Mysticism has the defects of its qualities. Its power lies in its simplicity, the readiness to hand of its material. But valuable as is the sense of reality which that material brings, it is wanting in the depth and solidity which only a systematic form can give. And a systematic form can be the outcome of reason alone. The great fact of family life has its foundation in passion, passion transfigured, but yet in its origin sexual and sensual. It develops on a basis that is largely one of feeling and of instinct. But its deeper meaning, the form which pervades and moulds it, is one which depends upon a dominating end and conception, the organisation of the family in which parents and children alike

realise their lives in a social whole that is itself individual, as real as the individuals which are the members, as real as the cells for which the body forms the organic whole. To the eye which possesses sight, as well as to the eye of faith, the family is just as real a phenomenon as is the human body. Both are directly presented. When I say that I have met the *Fairchild* family, I mean something that I have seen, and not a mere succession or group of particular people. In the same way, when I say I have seen a living body, I mean more than a mere aggregate of cells. It is only relatively that the one is less directly presented than the other. The senses of a gnat might see in a human body only an aggregate of cells appearing to work in mechanical harmony of purpose. The coarse senses of the inhabitants of Brobdignag, directed upon Lilliput, might find the family more difficult to break up into its constituent members than a gnat may find the human body. Here, as in an infinity of other instances, the distinctions which occur in the field of perception, and which separate what appears as immediately given from what appears otherwise, depend on our particular measure of space and time. There is no hard-and-fast line of demarcation between what is directly and what is indirectly given. Nevertheless, there is for each of us a practical working line. Taking two phenomena, both of which lie on one side of it, the human family and the human body, while both are presented directly, they are presented with differing

degrees of distinctness. The former owes most to reflection, the latter most to sense, for beings at the same plane of intelligence.

There comes, indeed, not a definite point, for that never comes, but a region where we get from feeling the merest with which we start, to abstract universals of reflection which are never themselves presented as individual wholes, or as single or unique facts of experience. Such, as we saw before, are atoms and energy at the one end of the scale, and the Universe as a totality at the other end. Such are the past and the future by contrast with which the present is made definite in reflection. We become conscious even of our limits as individuals, and we thereby transcend them, by contrasting our presentation of ourselves as objects for ourselves with what we can construct in thought, but cannot directly experience. That which is so constructed is constructed abstractly, in universals only. Never does it present for us the universal combining with the particular to form the fact that is individual, unless, indeed, our inhibitions have been in some fashion and measure removed, and the region within which our faculty of presentation is confined has been extended. Why we are limited as we are we cannot tell further than this, that it is in virtue of our occupying just this definite plane in the self-comprehension of the absolute mind which is the foundation and final form of our reality. The ends which are in course of realising themselves, and in the self-realisation of which the plane of our intelligence

is a stage, are ends which our finite methods always hold out as lying beyond us, as to be reached by inference only, and when we do reach them thus inferentially we can describe what we reach only in either the abstract universals of speculative philosophy, or halting metaphors drawn from a lower sphere. We are what we are, and it is only at a level of intelligence that is incrusted with limitations arising from the finiteness of the purposes of our everyday life as men and women, that we reason at all. And yet reason takes us beyond ourselves, and in the highest phases of human self-consciousness tells us of much that lies beyond. Could we directly view the Universe *sub specie æternitatis* we should see beyond these limits. But if we could so view we should have become as God is.

Such is the conception, to which philosophy seems to have brought man, of the inmost nature of the content of his self-consciousness, of the world as it seems. That world lies between two limits, neither of which is, for man, reality. At the one extreme is what comes earliest in the time-history of our intelligence—feeling, feeling that cannot be defined, that is but material for the activity of intelligence to further fashion into the individual of sense. At the other extreme is what seems to be a sphere of mere reflection, the creatures of which exist only for abstract thought. Between these two limits lies the individual world of reality, never still and ever self-transforming, just because its

reality is mind the essence of which is spontaneous and self-originating activity. The aspects under which this world discloses itself vary in character according as they approach to the one limit or the other. But just because they are not self-subsisting things, numerically distinct, like marbles in a heap, but are aspects under which the real presents itself, they fall actually or potentially within the complex standpoint of human experience. Every phase of the world as it seems is real, though relatively to each other these phases are graded and possess degrees of reality. In the next five lectures we shall try to see something of their nature in such detail as space permits. To set out that nature fully would require a book no less great than the entire book of Life. But the outlines must disclose themselves, if the task of these lectures is to be accomplished. It is for Philosophy to pursue her narrow path to the summit, and there to join hands with Art, and Morality, and Religion. The accomplishment of this is for her the test of success. It is only when he finds that the world as it seems to the artist, to the good man, to the godly man, seems real to him also, that the philosopher has done his work.

In the first and second books of these lectures I showed you how the various ends after which knowledge in its different forms is striving, transform the real world. I carried the account down to the process of selective attention in the conscious human being. Now, just as in our consciousness

the appearance of our world is determined by our ends, so are we determined in our characters and actions as individuals by the ends which we seek to realise. The artist, the good man, the religious man, are what they are in virtue of the purposes which are constantly being embodied in their practice. On the distinction between these purposes depends the distinction between the worlds of these men. Just as when we know, what we know is fashioned by the conceptions under which we have organised our knowledge, so, when we act, what we do takes its character and significance from the ends which we have striven to realise in our actions.

Mind which is free in its choice *acts* under conceptions which it freely chooses, just as it *reflects* under such conceptions. "By their works ye shall know them." It is in works that Faith attains to life. It is in action that the spirit realises itself. In such action man may be an intelligent being as completely as in his thinking. Just in so far as his action is the embodiment of thought does it disclose itself as the individual in which reality is attained in the union of what is universal, so long as it remains in the region of mere purpose, with what is particular in the concrete execution of that purpose. Conduct which is moral embodies both end and means. It is not the having an idea that is wrong, it is the giving effect to it, even if such giving effect assumes only the form of allowing the mind to dwell on it.

It is of the nature of man as a thinking being to realise himself in a twofold fashion. The first of these fashions is theoretical. He seeks to organise the world of experience, as we saw in the first series of lectures, under conceptions in such a fashion as in the end to abolish its foreignness. He endeavours to find its reality in the *law*, which lies behind and gives meaning to phenomena, by dragging to light the universal which gives the individual its meaning and existence, and enables the mind to find itself even in the apparent externality of nature. The second fashion is that in which he alters his surroundings by what he *does*, and so stamps on them the impression of his personality. He may do this by making his surroundings, including his fellow-men, subordinate to his purpose of accumulating riches. He does it when he turns the material that is to his hand into clothes for himself, or makes others clothe him. Or he may do it, as the artist does, by making marble, or colour, or musical sound, or language the medium in which his self bodies itself forth. In all such cases the essential feature which gives its character to reality is the embodiment of purpose, the realisation of mind in the transformation of its material, its object world, into forms which are its own. In practice as in theory the task of mind is to find itself. In practice as in theory the completeness with which this is done depends on the capacity for thinking. It is, therefore, in their purposes, or the ends which they seek to realise,

that the distinctions between the various forms of practical activity must be sought. And these purposes or ends must be investigated, and their relations to each other established, by reference to the conceptions which govern them. In the world of action, no less than in the world of science, a criticism of categories is essential for clear knowledge.

We have an illustration of this truth in Art. The artist is essentially practical. What he wills and what he accomplishes is just a transformation of experience. His mastery over the sensuous forms, whether of sound, or of outline and colour, or of bronze and marble, or of language, enables him to set individual reality before us in new aspects. In these aspects we have the work of his will. He gives us an experience which he has himself fashioned, and its importance is that in it he enables us to have before us the individual as it is presented at the plane of his own mind. A scene in nature has in it an infinity of detail which is far beyond the reach of the brush, even of a Turner. But the artist does not copy nature. He presents nature as *he* has comprehended and set it in his own mind, and thereby he lifts us for the moment to his own level, a level at which the greatness of his mind becomes apparent to us.

Again, in a moral action we are conscious, as before us, of a plane of purpose which goes beyond that of the brute—purpose, it may be, which goes beyond that of the brute just in so far as it inspires

man to act on the footing of being more than a mere isolated and self-regarding individual, and as finding reality in a social whole of which he is a member.

So again in religion attention is concentrated on the relation of man to God, and the religious man is he whose will is constantly striving to give effect to purposes which are fashioned by this relationship. It is the old problem that confronts us, the problem of how the various aspects of life as it seems stand to one another. Just as in the earlier lectures I had, after defining the nature of Ultimate Reality, to set forth its phases as they appeared in the various sciences, so, later on, I shall have to try to touch upon its phases as they appear in the region of practice. But, as was pointed out in the tenth of the earlier lectures, the distinction between theory and practice is only a relative one, and its importance becomes less the deeper we penetrate into the meaning and nature of reality. For certain practical purposes we contrast thinking and willing, knowing and being. But the contrast exists for practical purposes only. That is to say, in thought as in action, the essence of what we do is to alter the individual fact of experience from which we start by giving it a new form, by introducing through the judgment, of which, in practice as well as theory, it is always the subject, a new qualification within its limits.

The task of philosophy, in this stage of the search after truth, is to express in language which

is as nearly as possible scientific what is implicitly present to the mind that reflects, but has been obscured by the incrustations that arise from habitual immersion in the language and metaphors of a lower plane. Even at that lower plane the man of the world finds himself confronted by :—

> "Those obstinate questionings
> Of sense and outward things,
> Fallings from us, vanishings,
> Blank misgivings of a Creature,
> Moving about in worlds not realised,
> High instincts before which our mortal nature
> Did tremble like a guilty thing surprised.
> But for those first affections,
> Those shadowy recollections,
> Which, be they what they may,
> Are yet the fountain light of all our day,
> Are yet a master light of all our seeing,
> Uphold us, cherish, and have power to make
> Our noisy years seem moments in the being
> Of the eternal Silence; truths that wake,
> To perish never;
> Which neither listlessness, nor mad endeavour,
> Nor man nor boy, nor all that is at enmity with joy,
> Can utterly abolish or destroy."

Deep down in the hearts and brains of even those who seem to be most of all of the earth earthy, lie the impulses that make them men and women in a higher sense than any they express in words. In the surroundings that have slowly but surely grown up about us, in the manifestations of our corporate life as a nation, in the institutions without which no race of human beings counts itself civilised, we have the intimations of the existence that is more than one of rivalry in the assertion of

the individual will to live. The picture galleries, the schools, the hospitals, the Courts of Justice, the Parliament Houses, these and the like bear witness to the larger meaning of the life that is ours, and the deeper meaning that gives form to its experience. It is the Mind which is the foundation of that experience, and the various forms which that experience assumes under control by categories of thought which we have not yet examined, that must be the subject of the next five lectures.

LECTURE II

To-day I have to start from the position that the Ultimate Reality is mind, and I have to ask you to go with me in an investigation of what the nature of mind is. Now this is perhaps the very hardest part of our task, and this lecture may prove the most difficult to follow. But it is a part of the undertaking which must be faced, and through which I must carry you as well as I can. Let us try to get together our materials, and let us begin by doing, what is always a useful thing when you want to find the meaning of a word, by trying to see what mind is not. Now mind is not—this is perfectly clear if the reasoning up to this stage be right—a *thing*. It is not a thing that is somewhere in the brain and is worked by the nerves or works the nerves. It is nothing with a locality, because it is that to which everything, not excepting the forms of space and time, presents itself. If we were to assume that mind was a thing having a locality in space and a place in time we should be driven to one of two conclusions. We should either end in materialism, or, at the other extreme, we should fall into what is even more difficult to

get out of than materialism, that which is called solipsism, the doctrine that existence is merely the being a set of the impressions or ideas of a particular individual object called the self. Bishop Berkeley, as Hume afterwards showed, got very near to this position. For him the mind was something which was acted upon by God, a mechanical God really, who operated upon it *ab extra*, and produced the impressions which made up the Universe of which the self was conscious. Well, it is clear that mind cannot be a thing with a locality in space and time.

Again an equally imperfect account of it is to describe it as a subject with an object of a foreign nature confronting it. By an object of a foreign nature I mean an object which does not fall within the mind itself. If you take that point of view, you will find it wholly impossible to explain how mind and its object ever get together, or how the object can have any meaning excepting in virtue of distinctions which obviously are the work of the mind itself. The characteristic of the mind is to be self-conscious, is to be active, is to be more like a life than like an inert substance. Its nature is self-conscious activity, and it is within that activity that all that is and all that can be falls.

Now, another misapprehension which we have to avoid is the exclusive identification of mind with any particular phase of mind, for instance, feeling. It is only by abstraction that feeling is put on one side and thought is put on the other. Mind is just

as much feeling as it is thought, and it is just as much thought as it is feeling, because thought and feeling, as here distinguished, are merely two of the aspects in which the living self-conscious individual mind manifests itself as activity. It is in reflection only and for purposes that are special that we break up the activity in which mind consists, activity that is final and ultimate, into the contrasted aspects of the discursive thought which relates terms, and the supposed immediacy of particular feeling. Idealism has been brought at times into disrepute by want of attention to the fact that the distinction is an artificial one.

Now we come to another point. All the phenomena which are before the mind appear before it as successive and so in time, and many of them appear also as in space. But it is plain that these phenomena present that aspect only *for* the mind. In our everyday conversation we ignore the relation of the mind as subject to its object. We speak of the object world as if it were something self-subsisting, and that is how we come to talk of time and space as if they were self-subsisting and finite forms of reality. It is quite right that we should do that for everyday practical purposes. You and I live in this world, and we have to deal with each other as human beings, as citizens of a state, as members of a family, as lecturer and audience. In these relations we have to contemplate ourselves from a standpoint where it is necessary to make clear the distinction between our personalities, and

so it is that for social purposes we come to make distinctions which lead us to treat ourselves as if we were so many different minds and so many different living things. That is a standpoint which represents truth, measured by the purposes which we have in view, but it is not a standpoint from which the final word can be said about the nature of reality. The phenomena of the mind are phenomena which are there *for* the mind, and the general relations in which they appear, space and time, are just relations of what comes before the mind, and are therefore themselves distinctions which the mind itself makes, and which exist only in so far as the mind presents things to itself.

Now, to some extent we see that this is so when we look at even very familiar illustrations. What is called the "tempo" of different kinds of mind, the measure of time, is different. We can conceive beings for whom a thousand years is as one day, and beings for whom one day is as a thousand years. Take an animal with very fine senses; for example, a gnat in all probability possesses such senses. To a gnat an explosion may seem to occupy a definite time, whereas to a creature with a less finely organised sense of hearing the explosion may seem to occupy but an instant. There are some ingenious calculations by Von Baer on the effect of differences in the amount of duration felt, and in the fineness of the events that may fill it. If we were able, within the length of a second, to note ten thousand events distinctly instead of ten as

now; if our life were then destined to hold the same number of impressions, it might be one thousand times as short. We should live less than a month, and personally know nothing of the change of seasons. If born in winter, we should believe in summer as we now believe in the heats of our carboniferous era. The motions of organic beings would be so slow to our senses as to be inferred, not seen. The sun would stand still in the sky, the moon be almost free from change, and so on. And now reverse the hypothesis, and suppose a being to get only 1000th part of the sensations that we get in a given time, and consequently to live 1000th times as long. Winters and summers will be to him like quarters of an hour. Mushrooms and the swifter growing plants will shoot into being so rapidly as to appear instantaneous creations; annual shrubs will rise and fall from the earth like restlessly boiling water springs; the motions of animals will be as invisible as are to us the movements of bullets and cannon balls; the sun will scour through the sky like a meteor, leaving a fiery trail behind him.*

Now I come to another point. If time be a relation in which things are presented for the mind, if it be, as it were, just the form of such presentation, then thought must take account of another relation in which the contents of the mind stand to one another. It is conceivable, for instance, that what is first in time may, in a deeper view of

* *See* James' *Principles of Psychology* vol. i., p. 639.

reality, become logically last, and conversely that what is logically last may become, in the deeper sense, first in time. Take the notion of the mind in comprehending phenomena as successive. One phenomenon comes after another, and we trace the connection, and if we are psychologists we trace the succession of forms back to their origin as suggestions of the senses and as constructions of the intelligence. But it is plain that, although in this way we get last of all to the mind, the mind must have been presupposed as the very condition without which that succession of phenomena, which are there as its object, could not have taken place. Our very psychological analysis leads us to see that the mind must be presupposed before there can be any possibility of such succession; and, therefore, in the deeper meaning of things, in the fuller view of truth, the mind must come logically first, although it is reached last as a presentation in the psychological analysis which only takes account of the history in time. In that way there comes to be a fuller view of things, and a view of things in which we see mind as the ultimate truth, and the ultimate truth in the sense that things presuppose mind instead of mind presupposing things. If the activity of thought be the condition without which it is impossible to attach any meaning to the notion of the object world of phenomena, presented as arranged in space and as successive in time, then mind must be logically first, whatever the nature of the time series, and the final view of things must be the

view in which they owe the very meaning of their reality to the mind.

In the course of these lectures I have tried from time to time to illustrate to you metaphysical truths from the insight—and often it is very great—of the poets and the artists, and I have quoted to you various illustrations of how the poets in particular have seen, as it were by an intuition of genius, into the very metaphysical conclusions which we have been straining after with so much difficulty. This is true of the topic with which I am now engaged. I am going to quote to you, not a poet in the technical sense, but one who was a poet in a very real sense, I mean Carlyle. In *Sartor Resartus*, in his chapter on "Clothes," Carlyle makes Teufelsdröckh say:—"With men of a speculative turn there come seasons, meditative, sweet, yet awful hours, when in wonder and fear you ask yourself that unanswerable question: Who am I; the thing that can say 'I' (*Das Wesen das sich Ich nennt*)? The world with its loud trafficking retires into the distance; and through the paper-hangings and stone walls, and thick plied tissues of Commerce and Polity, and all the living and lifeless integuments (of Society and a Body) wherewith your existence sits surrounded—the sight reaches forth into the void Deep, and you are alone with the Universe, and commune with it, as one mysterious Presence with another."

"Who am I; what is this Me! A Voice, a Motion, an Appearance;—some embodied visualised

Idea in the Eternal Mind? *Cogito ergo sum.* . . . Has not a deeper meditation taught certain, of every climate and age, that the Where and the When, so mysteriously inseparable from all our thoughts, are but superficial terrestrial adhesions to thought; that the Seer may discern them where they mount up out of the celestial Everywhere and Forever; have not all nations conceived their God as Omnipresent and Eternal; as existing in a universal Here and everlasting Now? I think, well, thou too wilt find that Space is but a mode of an human sense, so likewise Time; there is no Space and no Time; we are—we know not what; —like sparkles floating in the æther of Deity.

"So that this so solid-seeming World, after all, were but an air image, our Me the only reality; and nature, with its thousand-fold production and destruction, but the reflex of our own inward Force, the 'phantasy of our Dream'; or what the Earth Spirit in *Faust* names it, *the living visible Garment of God:*

> 'In Beings floods, in Actions storm
> I walk and work, above, beneath,
> Work and weave in endless motion!
> Birth and Death
> An infinite Ocean;
> A seizing and giving
> The fire of the Living;
> 'Tis thus at the roaring Loom of Time I ply,
> And weave for *God the Garment* thou see'st Him by.'

Of twenty millions that have read and spouted this thunder-speech of the Erdgeist, are there yet

twenty units of us that have learned the meaning thereof!"

Well, if Mind be that into which all these distinctions, including the distinctions which go to the making of presentation in space and time, fall, there is a deeper view of evolution than any with which people are ordinarily familiar. If the process of succession in time be but a process that falls within the sphere of presentation by the mind to the mind, and if the last in time be nevertheless the first in logic, then if we would comprehend the true meaning of evolution we must seek it in the ends which the mind realises in its processes. We must seek it in the stages of comprehension, or rather of self-comprehension, of the mind. It is only another way of stating all this to say that it is just as set in the universals of reflection, as Aristotle long ago showed, that the particulars of feeling have existence. I quoted to you in the first lecture last year Mill's analysis of existence into the permanent possibilities of sensation, an analysis which he extended to the mind just as he had applied it to the external world. It is these permanent possibilities, the universals in which the particulars are set, and in union with which, they alone come to reality, that give its true meaning to existence. Not that the universals and the particulars can be separated — Aristotle long ago showed that they have no existence independent of one another—but they are moments, factors in the ultimate reality, and it is only in reflection that we come to dis-

tinguish them. Yet in reflection we *do* distinguish them; we do distinguish feeling, for instance, from thought. The psychologist Münsterberg, in a book which I quoted to you last year, shows that the method, or one of the methods of his science, is what he calls Presentationism, the seizing upon feeling and by a sort of abstraction converting it into a self-subsisting phenomenon divorced from the movement of reflection which gives it its meaning. Just as you may hypostatise feeling by abstraction, so you may hypostatise thought by abstraction. Hegel points out that it is the doing this which has caused one of the chief difficulties which people experience in trying to understand the method of philosophy. They *will* imagine, following the tendency to make hard and abstract distinctions which is so prevalent in everyday life, that thought is something which can be taken apart from its content, that thought and feeling, for instance, can be separated as two different existences, whereas the truth is that it is only in reflection that the distinction emerges. The objective system in which we perceive reality is neither the one nor the other, but the reality in which both attain their meaning, and it is not possible to separate the one from the other except in abstract reflection.

Now, another conclusion to which one comes in this connection is that mind as the ultimate factor, the ultimate reality within which all these distinctions fall because it has itself made them, can only be described in terms of itself. That is one of the

difficulties we have in trying to give an account of mind. We are dealing with what is the ultimately real and cannot be expressed in terms of anything lying beyond itself, and therefore it is that we must go back and simply set our own mind to observe itself and record its observations in a fashion which is free from the hypostatised abstractions and metaphors which pass current in everyday life. The mind is obviously that which makes its own distinctions, and it is its essential character to make these distinctions. It must make its own distinctions, and make them, not as a mere movement of universals, but as a concrete living reality, whose very nature is to be active, and whose characteristic it is to be always setting, as it were, its own forms, its own activities, and so giving them an air of having an existence fixed in independence of each other; while, at the same time, it comprehends them in a larger whole in which they are seen to be there only as factors or moments. I shall get to that point presently, and I wish merely to make it at the present stage.

Now let us see how this fact has been recognised, not only by the metaphysicians, but again by the poets. I have quoted to you Carlyle, as showing how a person of great imaginative insight had come to the conclusion, not as matter of speculation but as matter of direct insight, that the ultimate reality of existence was to be sought in mind, and therefore had not that hard-and-fast character which is so baffling to the persons who

want to penetrate beneath the hard crust of this world of appearances. But you have got the same truth set forth by those who are in the stricter sense the poets. I quoted to you once before Wordsworth's Sonnet on the River Duddon. I will quote it again, because it shows how Wordsworth, who had a fine metaphysical insight, saw that what was real and distinctive in his vision of the stream, was not the particular particles of water which floated by—the actual water was always changing—but the form in which the stream was comprehended as a whole :

> "For, backward, Duddon, as I cast my eyes,
> I see what was, and is, and will abide.
> Still glides the stream, and shall for ever glide;
> The Form remains, the Function never dies."

It is only for the mind that is capable of contemplating the stream as a whole that it can present that form and function. But there is a poet who has had a finer insight even than Wordsworth into the deeper nature of phenomena, that nature which discloses them as constantly changing and as presenting their continuity only in the wholes into which thought binds them. Goethe in his poem, "Eins und Alles," says :

> "Nur scheinbar steht's Momente still,
> Das Ewig'regt sich fort in allen;
> Denn Alles muss in nichts zerfallen,
> Wenn es im Sein beharren will."

> "Only in seeming stands the moment still,
> In all the Eternal is in motion,
> For all that is must change to nothing,
> If to existence it would hold and be."

Well, the poets and the philosophers have come to the same conclusion about this matter. There is no more difficulty in rising to the conception of the real nature of things as falling within the mind, and as possessing its characteristics, than there is in topics which we have to examine every day. For instance, I have already discussed the difference between life and mechanism. You cannot express the nature of a living body in mechanical terms. You must speak of it in words which recognise a whole that controls its parts, not as from without, but as what determines the behaviour of the parts from within, and makes the cells of which the organism is composed more like soldiers in an army with a common purpose, than like the wheels and cranks of a machine which are external to one another and only held together by outside compulsion. In the organism you are lifted into a new set of conceptions which were wholly foreign when you were dealing with mere mechanism, and so, when in mind you are lifted to the conception of that which presents itself to itself, to what has meaning only in terms of distinctions which it makes for itself, you are not really dealing with anything more extraordinary than you were dealing with when you made the transition from the machine to the living organism.

We found in the last set of lectures that the old chase after the meaning of the self proved a hopeless one, so far as the method of psychology was concerned. We found that in the pursuit of the

self we baled out part after part of the content until we could find nothing that we could say really belonged to the self. Where we emerged nearest to it, where we seemed to get something which expressed the self although it was not the self or even what was popularly called the self, was in the soul. But, when we came to examine the nature of the soul, we found that the soul was nothing but what we had before regarded as the body, though in a different aspect. That did not cause us apprehension of being landed in materialism, because we had got away from the notion of these two things as substances, of the one depending upon the other for its existence in some mechanical fashion. We found in the soul, first an aspect of that which in a different aspect was called the body, and then we discovered that it implied body just as much as body implied soul. These two presentations rather seemed to be two elements or factors which were required in order that in comprehending them we might get to the notion of a self of which they were the expression, and which was their truth. The self, in so far as we can get near it psychologically, that is to say, by looking into our own bosoms, seems to imply a soul and a body, and yet these two, the one of which hampers the other—for the body is never adequate to the soul—get into a sort of contradiction and prove difficult to harmonise. The body is more than a mere living organism. There is something more that is characteristic of it as a body than there is in a mere external living

thing. It is a living organism that feels, that behaves intelligently, and when we say that it feels and behaves intelligently we mean that it is the manifestation of a self. The soul is just that aspect of the body in which it feels and behaves intelligently. The body and the soul are of course in time, the body at least in space also, and that means that they are presentations made by the mind. But the mind does more than merely present them to itself. In so far as it recognises them as sentient and as intelligent it recognises them as its own, as aspects of the individual of reality within which emerge all the distinctions which are made within self-consciousness.

Now this conception arises really as the result of the deeper kind of evolution of which I spoke before, the logical chain in which the first in time is the last in thought. The order in time is here the inverse of the order in Logic. It may well be, and analysis shows that it is so, that the distinction of soul from body and the distinction of the self from the not-self are distinctions which exist only for the mind, and because they are *for* the mind are made by the mind. As self-consciousness is discovered to be the larger whole in which these are moments, we get a view of things in which we see that the relation of our own soul and body is a relation which perplexes and puzzles us merely because we have grasped it in abstractions and distinctions which we have made hard, because for practical purposes it was necessary. that we should make them hard.

Now this point is worth spending a moment or two in elaborating. The soul seems to be that aspect of our experience as persons in which we do not yet fully contemplate the content of the mind from the standpoint of self-consciousness, and in which we have abstracted from the freedom and power of detachment which are the characteristics of self-consciousness. It seems to be distinctive of full self-consciousness that it should be recognised as able to extrude and exclude any particular part of its content. That is why it was that we found that we could never get psychologically at the notion of the self. In the soul we have the body on its ideal side, separable from the body only in abstract reflection. The body as such is its vehicle, and it may be said to be in a sense a function of the body. They are factors, each of them, or moments, which go to the making of the conscious self, since they are only *for* that self. The more they are made the expression of that self-consciousness the more they disclose themselves as inadequate, as lacking in that quality of being above and beyond change which belongs only to the self as subject, as no more than presentations destined to be superseded in a larger comprehension by the consciousness *for* which space and time, and body and soul as in space and time, are. Death is inherent in them just because their nature is to be transient, to belong to a world of phenomena where birth and growth and decay and dying, are not only the natural but the necessary features of an existence

that more and more exemplifies the contradiction that discloses itself, wherever mere life as object in a space and time world is taken to be the ultimate aspect of reality. The real existence out of time begins not beyond the grave but on this side of it. The self, conscious of itself as the subject for which the world exists, solves the contradiction, the want of harmony between the soul and its imperfect vehicle, body, in that it is aware that both exist merely as relational and as forms within its own object world.

Now this process of soul and body, existing in change and always working out, as it were, the contradiction between them, is exemplified in the course of life. A child starts with a sense of something that is foreign to it, that resists it. As reflection dawns in its soul, it begins more and more to exercise self-control and to act rationally. More and more it makes its body conform to and express the purposes of its mind. As it grows up it becomes aware of itself as a rational being in rational society and with rational surroundings. But although the course of life is just, as it were, the equation of the child's body to its soul, and of both to the surroundings, you find that, as the result of the habit into which the struggle and the victory over obstacles crystallise, a certain deadening inevitably ensues. And the course of life is just that the activity of the child more and more assumes the form of habit, until in middle age and still more in old age, soul and body tend to become inert. The sense of

foreignness which was the spring of exertion is gone, with the consequence that there is less vitality, less activity, than there was in the period of the early struggle. Thus we pass through middle age and old age to our natural end as objects in a world of change.

In a fine passage in his *Philosophy of Mind* Hegel shows how the process is exemplified in the life of man, and how that life works out under the governance of an end. "He begins with *childhood*, the mind wrapped up in itself. His next step is the fully developed antithesis, the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjective (as seen in ideals, fancies, hopes, ambitions) against his immediate individuality. And that individuality marks both the world which, as it exists, fails to meet his ideal requirements, and the position of the individual himself, who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play (that is to say, *Youth*). Thirdly, we see Man in his true relation to his environment, recognising the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it—a world no longer incomplete, but able in the work which it collectively achieves to afford the individual a place and a security for his performance. By his share in this collective work he is first, is *somebody*, gaining an effective existence and an objective value (that is to say, *Manhood*). Last of all comes the finishing touch to his unity with objectivity; a unity which, while on its realist side it passes into the inertia

of deadening habit, on its idealist side gains freedom from the limited interests and entanglements of the outward present (that is to say, *Old Age*)." *

You will find in connection with this matter a great deal of literature which belongs to the province of anthropology, and I will not follow it out further at this stage, but the point is illustrative of the main topic of this particular lecture.

Well, as the outcome of that way of looking at things, one is driven to the conclusion that self-consciousness is the larger whole in which body and soul are what I have called moments. In other words, it is in the union of these two aspects in the reality which they attain in the mind which is more than mere soul, because mind is that *for* which soul and body are, that you get to reality. And the question which arises is whether, if it is of the nature of self-consciousness that it should be something more than mere soul, just as it is something more than mere body, if it is the *truth* of the two, these moments are or are not so preserved in it that self-consciousness itself bears the impress of the particular human personality which the body and soul expressed? Now, in the relationship of two notions such as *being* and *not-being* you find that the one implies the other; and further, that, as we shall see presently, the whole out of which they are

* Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind;* Wallace's Translation, p. 17. See also Erdmann, *Leib und Seele;* and Bosanquet, *Psychology of the Moral Self;* the *Natur-Philosophie* of Hegel contains in its final section a discussion of this point.

broken up, and in which they attain reality, is *becoming*. Becoming, which assumes the form of qualified being or *there-being*, is a notion which has not wholly destroyed and got rid of these two earlier moments, but preserves them as factors or moments in itself and shows the traces of them. Well, upon that there turned at one time a tremendous controversy. Do not the two moments of our individuality, what make us just *this* particular person in the world, do not the particular body and soul, that seem to be essential moments in the self just as being and not-being are preserved in becoming, show themselves as implied and as kept alive in that larger whole of the conscious self which is their truth? Now this controversy is a very important one. A modern writer, Professor Royce, puts it that no meaning which has once been in the mind of God can ever be lost. He says that it is only when you are dealing with the sphere of space and time that you can talk of loss, of perishing, of passing away, and that when you are talking of what is out of time, of mind as the eternal, even the moments which are implied in its self-expression, and which give particularity to its meaning, are moments which must be said to be, not preserved by, for that is no better than to speak of them as having a beginning in time, but essential elements in the mind which is presupposed as the very condition of the beginning and is independent of the end.

As Royce puts it, "Can any meaning which has once been in the eternal mind be otherwise than

eternal?" Can any mode of self-consciousness which enters into the truth and reality of the self be otherwise than of the nature of the eternal? Now, all I wish to say at the moment on this is that it recalls a long-forgotten battlefield. After the death of Hegel there was a tremendous controversy between the Hegelians of the Right, the theological Hegelians, and the Hegelians of the Left, over this very point. Those of you who are curious about it —and it has, as we shall see better later on, a bearing upon the question of immortality—will find an account of it in the last part of Strauss's *Dogmatik.** As far as I can judge, Hegel himself regarded the controversy as really irrelevant and founded on failure to grasp the subject in its full bearing. He seems to have looked upon the problem as based upon dilemmas arising out of a too narrow standpoint. For him the whole controversy apparently had its origin in mistaken metaphors drawn from the sphere where there are beginnings and ends, the sphere of time.

Well, we come back to consider further what we mean by the self. Another characteristic of the self to which I must now pass is this, that it is undoubtedly presented for us men and women as finite. By finite I mean limited by or confronted with something else. When in thinking we fix an object in thought and try to preserve a clear view of the distinction which has been made, we effect

* Published under the title, *Die Christliche Glaubens-lehre*, in 1841; see vol. ii., pp. 727-739.

an abstraction, that is to say, we regard our object as if it were something self-subsisting and distinguished from what is not itself. The finite is that which is confronted by another which is conceived as having existence only relatively to yet another, and it is this mode of thinking, really abstract in character, which gives us the notion of the finite self, the notion namely, that we can talk of self as we do for practical purposes, and regard it as something which has a fixed and immovable nature, and which is different and distinct from the not-self.

But you will notice that it is always *my* not-self that I distinguish myself from. It is a not-self which is determined in its conception by the marks by which I characterise it for the social purposes of everyday life. We, of course, must make these distinctions, but they are really abstract and they are the outcome of reflection which might theoretically have been of a nature quite different. And it is the self looked upon in this finite fashion, that is to say, as confronted with another, that gives rise to the notion of the self as a substance, and so to the Berkeleian notion of a thinking thing. Now this notion of the mind as a substance brings us into solipsism. There is no escape from it if the mind is really a thing in space and time. But, to make these abstract distinctions, as we undoubtedly must do, is only one side of the activity of thought. What it divides it also puts together. If it recognises a limit and fixes a limit, it also transcends

that limit. If you watch the movement of thought it is always fixing something in reference to something else, and yet, in recognising it as distinguished from something else, it implies that there is a higher standpoint from which the two may be contemplated. It posits, as it were, in distinction, and then the distinction which it has made it recognises as having its truth in a deeper meaning, and the distinction comes in that way to be put past or sublated.

Now thought can combine these two functions, because its nature, the very essence of its nature, is to be active. The mind, which is neither abstract thought nor bare feeling, but which is just concrete living mind, is never still. It is always producing by the contrasts it establishes some aspect of what is actual within itself, and it has its very existence in making these distinctions, overcoming them, and presenting the whole in a further series of aspects. The illustration which I gave you before of the inseparability, save in abstraction, of being and not-being, is a good one on this point. A great many people, like the late Mr G. H. Lewes, fell foul of Hegel for saying that being and not-being were the same thing, and, of course, they are, *for practical purposes*, different things. But when you are investigating the nature of the movement of thought in the distinctions which it makes, it is pretty evident that the conception of the thing only has meaning in contradistinction to the alternative that the thing is not. When you take the process of

growth, of change, of what is called becoming, it is plain that you have just these two notions in combination. In every definite kind or form of being you have got these two conceptions of being and not-being implied. All distinctive quality involves them. The reality of the mind is its activity, and the activity is an activity which posits or sets these distinctions and then overcomes them.

Now that brings me to what I must say a word about, the distinction between what have been called reason and understanding. Reason is the way of looking at things which *comprehends*, while understanding merely *apprehends*. They are not two different faculties. It is only darkening counsel to speak of them as though they were. They are two different modes of thinking about things, determined in their differences by the purposes which we have in view. If I want to make a hard-and-fast distinction it is, of course, natural that I should express myself in a way that makes the distinction very definite, hypostatises it, if I may use the expression. But if, upon the other hand, what I want to do is really to see how this distinction looks from the point of view of the mind which made it, and which, just because it made it, is capable of expressing it, then I look from the standpoint of the comprehension which seeks to resolve the differences. Reason is, therefore, a way of looking at things which is larger than the mere understanding which made and set fast the differentiation. Reason and understanding are not thoughts of two

different natures, two faculties. They are thought pursuing different ends. We make our own experience present different appearances according as our ends differ. That is a very familiar observation. Long ago Montaigne put it in one of his Essays, that on Democritus and Heraclitus, in very simple language. "Wherefore," he says, "let us no longer excuse ourselves by laying the blame on the quality of external things. It belongs to us to give ourselves an account of them. Our good and our evil had no dependency except from ourselves. To ourselves let us make our offerings and our vows, and not to fortune. She hath no power over our character. On the contrary, character draws fortune in its train, and moulds her to its own form." In other words, what to the man whose spirit is cast in a narrow mould seems final and irresoluble in ill-fortune, may seem to the man of larger comprehension a very different thing. It depends on our end and purpose, it depends on whether we are at the standpoint of comprehension or merely of apprehension in difference, how the things present themselves.

Well, the essence of understanding is to separate. If I look at marbles in a row my purpose is to count them, to enumerate them, and therefore I am seeking to apprehend them, each in its difference from the other. If I am trying to comprehend I do not dwell upon the distinctions, but I search for the larger whole, the unity in which the differences are comprehended. Now for apprehension, for

understanding, the leading mode of operation is distinction in space and in time. Between space and time there is a considerable difference. In space things are regarded as just as completely independent of one another as they can possibly be. The very essence of space is mutual exclusion of parts. You have got the very hardest of distinctions there. But in time the now only has meaning as distinguished from a past and from a future. These never co-exist. The essence of them is that the one should be actual and real in contrast with the other two, the past and the future, which are not actual. Therefore in time you have got a stage on towards comprehension, towards the comprehension of the past, the present, and the future as in a unity in which they are not independent but related, and which is more than any one of them. Just so in a piece of music you have the notes, no doubt capable of being taken in their separation, but also getting their meaning, and each one getting its meaning, from the musical whole which is the form in which full comprehension appears.

Now the truth about space and time is that they are modes in which the mind presents phenomena, space the hardest and most abstract form of distinction, time the form in which that distinction is less hard and abstract, but is still one in which separations are made. But it is plain, if the view of thought which I have been presenting to you is right, that thought not only must have, but actually has, other and higher forms, from the

standpoint of which presentation in space and time is deficient and inadequate to the truth. Such a view of space as one among a multitude of other relations in reality contrasts a good deal with that with which those of you who have read Kant are familiar. Kant looked upon space and time as two forms which had an existence independent of the matter of sensation, the raw material of sensation, which was fitted into them by reflection. The raw material, and the space and time, and the thought which operated in the arranging raw material in space and time, he at least spoke of as if they were separable elements. But if the true view be, not that the mind thinks things as though arranging them *ab extra* in the forms of space and time, but that the forms of space and time are merely stages or aspects in the mode of self-comprehension by the mind within which the whole of reality falls, then it is plain that it is not quite accurate to talk of space and time as specially forms. They are not separable from the other modes in which the mind arranges its contents. Their position is just like that of other modes of presentation in the mind. In the mind, understood as mind, taken from the standpoint of comprehension, we cannot fail to be struck with this, that it is present in everything it does, and yet that everything it does, the whole of its activity, only has meaning as part of the entirety of the mind. Whole and parts are not separate, as they are even in the organism, where the realisation of the whole in the parts is

never quite complete; but in the mind its activity in any particular mode is an activity which implies the entire mind. Look, for instance, at the thinking of things as cause and effect. You cannot separate these two. If you apply the match to the gunpowder it seems as if there were two separate things, one cause and the other effect, but it is not so when you come to scrutinise closely. What you have done in applying the match is to release the potential energy which is stored up in the gunpowder, and if it is said that the match is the true cause of the explosion, the answer is that the dryness of the powder and a host of other indispensable conditions might, with equal truth and untruth, be selected for the distinction of being pronounced the cause.

Cause and effect, as I showed you in detail in the earlier lectures, are conceptions which are separable only in abstraction. The cause in point of fact passes into the effect, and the effect is just the cause in another form; that is to say, the mind makes a distinction which turns out to be a vanishing one as the purpose changes. The conceptions in which the mind works are always in a sense vanishing. They are never really separate from one another in a hard-and-fast fashion. The nature of the mind is to be active, to posit its distinctions and then to resolve them, and the result is that every one of its conceptions involves every other. If I say that a thing is, I mean that it is in contrast to the possi-

bility that it is not. If I say that a thing is growing or becoming, I imply that not-being has become superseded in a higher stage of its being. The essence of the mind is a form of activity in which each conception implies the other, and in which the conceptions or categories under which the mind arranges and gives meaning to its experiences, the universals in which the particulars are grasped in the individual, are a logical chain in which the first presupposes the last and the last is its presupposition and its truth. Therefore a great task of theoretical philosophy, when dealing with the meaning of these conceptions of the mind, must be to set them out in a system.

Now the relation to each other of these conceptions, when they are set out in such a system, is, as I have pointed out to you, not the relation of dead inert separation, but the relation of conceptions each of which implies the other, and, as we are dealing with thought and the distinctions made by thought, each of which in that sense passes into the other. We find that thought never stands still. It is always active, even its fixing of distinctions is activity. Its characteristic has, therefore, been said to be *dialectical.* Dialectic is just the movement which thought exhibits in the passing from one position to another. Plato's *Parmenides* is the Dialogue in which he sets out the nature of thought, and pronounces it to be dialectical in the sense I have indicated, but just because he is dealing there with perhaps the most difficult part of philosophy,

the *Parmenides* is the Dialogue which it is hardest to summarise or give a short account of. Hegel does the same work much more closely in his *Logic*. He is not trying in his *Logic* to set out a picture of the world; he is not trying to show the world as rising out of thought, as people have wrongly supposed. He is isolating the abstract side of the actual. He is taking the modes in which thought operates in comprehending, and he is showing their relation the one to the other. He is really starting from the individual of reality and by abstraction exhibiting it upon its universal side. He does not mean that in his Logic you have got a series of logical forms, a sort of "ballet of bloodless categories" as Mr Bradley has named them, which exist by themselves and which give us, as self-subsistent, what, to use a phrase of his, is God as He was before the creation of the world. What he means is to take one aspect of reality, of the concrete individual entirety of reality, to separate it out by abstraction, and to exhibit mind in the aspect in which, just because it is the aspect of pure thought that he is here dealing with, the activity of the dialectic is most apparent. Hegel's categories are not, like Plato's, to be conceived as in some sense apart from our experiences. They are just what gives meaning to our experience, and it is only in reflection that they can be separated out from the concrete reality of experience. The linking of one to the other by the inherent dialectic of which they are the manifestation, Hegel calls the Notion,

and the entire system the Idea. This is the purest type of an abstract treatment of the movement of thought, and it forms the subject of the Hegelian Logic.

Hegel has been blamed by many people because they say he has not shown how he got from Logic to Nature. But the categories of his Logic do not form one thing, with Nature as another thing independent of it. Hegel was not trying to show a process of creation. He was exhibiting two partial and therefore abstract views of a deeper and fuller reality; he was setting out on its abstract side the ultimate reality which for him was mind in its concrete actuality. The element that pertains to Nature, the element that corresponds to the particular in its relation to the universal, is got at in another abstract way of looking at the real. To this he accords a separate treatment in his systematic account of the place of nature in mind, in the same way as he had separated out the antithetical abstract side in the Logic. Neither is actual independently of the other, and, therefore, to talk of a transition in time from one to the other, is simply to show that you have not understood the elementary meaning of the Hegelian system.

The nature of thought is, as I have several times said, to make distinctions and to reconcile them in a higher meaning. If we dwell on the distinctions abstractly, we get the finite. If we dwell upon the self in its distinction from other selves in this world, as we must do for our own

social purposes, we get the notion of the finite self. But the true notion of infinity is not an infinity which is numerically different from the finite self, but it is the self conceived as higher than the distinctions which go to the making of its finiteness, distinctions which therefore really fall within it. That view of infinity, the view of the self as that within which all distinctions emerge — that view leads us to the conception of mind as the ultimately real, and of the finite self as one only of the stages at which mind comprehends its own content. It leads us to a view of mind in which we are beyond the category of substance, and are therefore delivered from the perils of solipsism. It brings us to living, concrete, self-conscious mind. The more exact relation of this to finite mind is what I shall have to deal with in the next lecture.

LECTURE III

To those of you who listened to my last lecture it will be apparent that I am not satisfied with a view of reality which would reduce it to intelligible relations. For it must seek its ultimate character in a form fuller than the finite form of relational or discursive reflection. It is only in the abstraction of such reflection that these intelligible relations, as they have been called, get isolated from the moment of the particular, the particular in combination with which they form the concrete living singular, which appears as the content of mind or as the self-comprehension of mind, according to the fashion in which we are approaching it. The activity of mind which is disclosed in the actual is one and indivisible. If we would arrive at the nature and character of mind we must therefore start with this activity as being not only the final truth about the mind, but as being that which in reality is the first, the *prius*. The contrary view is a view which is associated in the history of philosophy with the great name of Kant, because more and more people are coming to see that what Kant really did was to set the actual

upon the rack, so to speak, and tear it to pieces. If the view of things which I have been putting before you is the true one, all mind can do is, starting with what is in reality itself, to make explicit what is implicit. Now according to Kant knowledge was a process which could be dissected and broken up. He took the unity of ultimate reality and he sought to resolve it into constituent elements. He seems to have put the wrong question. It should not have been the question, "What is the process of perception in which reality is put together," but rather "What is the meaning of reality?"

Well, the result has been a very considerable reaction from the standpoint of ordinary Idealism within our time, and I think that it is not too much to say that this reaction has been due to the repellent influence of Kant on some who are not Kantians. In this country one of the most strenuous of those who have advocated what is a view inconsistent with that of Kant is Mr F. H. Bradley, a very great thinker. In Mr Bradley's view mind is the final form of reality, but he is unable to come to the conclusion that its nature can be comprehended by thought—thought being for him, as he holds, relational only, that is, its function being to establish relations between terms that are not in themselves reducible to mere thought. He holds that it is impossible that thought should tell us the final truth about reality. He apparently believes that it is conceivable that there should be other

elements in the activity of mind besides thought—for example, feeling. Now if I am right in what I have been saying to you, feeling is nothing apart from thinking, just as thinking is nothing apart from feeling. In each you certainly have the dialectical character of the activity of mind bodying itself forth. The dialectical *nisus* is apparent whichever aspect you take, and that is owing to the fact that this dialectical *nisus* or activity is of the very essence, the very inmost nature of mind itself. It is possible that the scepticism of Mr Bradley is the outcome of the splendidly thorough piece of work he has done in subjecting the notion of thought, as it is treated in *ordinary* logic, to a complete revisal and overhaul. But it seems as if the scepticism—for scepticism it is—in which he apparently ends is hardly more consistent with itself than was the scepticism of the Greeks and of Hume. For after all what question, even about the limits of the capacity of thought, can be raised excepting upon the basis of thought itself? It would seem as though Mr Bradley's view of thought was too narrow, as though his conception of it was that limited conception which Hegel, in a passage which I referred to yesterday, points out. Hegel says that much of our difficulty arises from taking thought to mean merely the "reflective thinking which has to deal with thoughts *as thoughts*, and brings them into consciousness." * A few sentences further on in the same book, Hegel sums up the

* Hegel's *Logic*; Wallace's Translation, p. 5.

substance of the matter by declaring that the contents of our consciousness "remain one and the same, whether they are felt, seen, represented or willed, and whether they are merely felt, or felt with an admixture of thoughts, or merely and simply thought." Feeling, perception, thought itself, are for him merely the *forms* into which the mind throws itself in making itself its own content or object.

Mr Bradley's Absolute is, therefore, that of which he can give no direct account. The ultimate reality it must be. But it is got at in a fashion which seems to imply a gap in the capacity of reason, and consequently it comes to us rather suddenly. To use two metaphors which Hegel applied to the Absolute of Schelling, Mr Bradley's Absolute seems as though it were "shot out of a pistol," or, in the language of the other metaphor, "like the night in which all cows look black." We know very little about it save that all disappears in it. But we owe a great debt to Mr Bradley. He has done the work of the great metaphysicians over again in a fashion which is unparalleled in recent times for its thoroughness and acuteness, and he stands at the very head of the philosophical world. He has been fortunate in finding a colleague in the leadership of that peculiar movement away from Kant with which his name is associated, a colleague who is, perhaps, less of a sceptic than himself, and whose work has been, what his own really is, not only critical but constructive.

When I see your new Professor of Moral Philosophy * sitting before me in the audience which I now am addressing, I confess I feel a little like an evangelical preacher who stands in front of a congregation containing an archbishop. I can only say that a study of his books has made me feel nearer to what I think is his standpoint than to that of any other living thinker, and I commend those of you who have listened to these elementary lectures on Idealism to a study of his great books on Logic, on Æsthetics, and on the State.

Well, there is another modern thinker who is the very antithesis of Bradley, I mean Professor Royce of Harvard. Now, Royce does not commit himself upon the point of his exact historical position. He may be, for aught that appears—and I rather think he is—a disciple of the school which in its broad significance I have endeavoured to put before you as founded by Aristotle and carried to its full development by Hegel. In Royce the dominant note is ethical. The will and its purposes bulk largely. The real with Royce is that in which purpose rests satisfied, with a sense of no further incompleteness left. The criterion of reality in his view may therefore, in a sense, be said to be ethical. But with him, of course, the will and the intelligence, and this is necessitated by his standpoint, are not separated as they are separated, for example, by Schopenhauer. With Royce the Absolute is conceived as an individual living Self, expressing itself

* Professor Bosanquet.

in particular forms, particular meanings, living forms of its intelligence, which are the foundations of finite personalities that have the basis of their Reality in the Absolute Mind. There are some things in Professor Royce's work which seem to me to be of great value. There is his investigation of the nature of time in relation to the will, and, as the outcome of this, his investigation of the nature of the general forms of time-series.

Now, the notion of a series is one which has always given rise to a considerable amount of discussion. You have the series in music, in the sonata, for example, in which you have a succession of musical sounds which is a great deal more than a succession of isolated units unconnected with one another. The meaning of each arises from its relation to the whole of the conception, and the musical whole is present in every part of the sonata.

Take, again, a more purely mathematical series. Suppose I start with unity and add to it a half, and then a fourth, and then an eighth, and then a sixteenth, and so on. I am making an addition, I am extending in a series which has no end; that is to say, I can go on for ever doing this without coming to a termination at any particular point. But at the same time, taking a fuller view of the relation of the members of the series, I find that they embody a law which points to a limit. Further than that limit they cannot go, and the limit is, of course, in this case the number two. And that is because each member of the series is something else

than a mere isolated unit. It is something that embodies in itself the law of the series. By the study of this conception of series Royce has been brought to certain views, which must have attention, of the nature of infinity. He appears to have been greatly influenced in his work by a German mathematician, Dedekind, who in 1887 published an Essay which came into my hands several years ago, before I had seen Royce's book, and I noticed its metaphysical character at the time. Dedekind investigated the nature of series as Royce has investigated it, and referred it back to the peculiar character of the mind which is to be wholly present in its expressions or manifestations. In the mind there is no externality of the whole to the parts or of the parts to the whole. The activity of the mind is constantly comprehending its whole self in its expressions.

Dedekind got hold of that in his little book, "*Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen*," and treated it in a way that almost anybody who has reflected on these things at all can understand, because there is really much more of what is metaphysical in it than there is of mathematical technicality. Now Dedekind seems to have suggested to Royce what the latter insists upon as the true nature of series, and what he has since developed. It is very interesting to contrast the *perfervidum ingenium* with which Royce goes into the matter, with the sceptical way in which one could picture to oneself Bradley approaching it. Of course Royce has not

escaped a good deal of criticism on his view, but still it is a very remarkable investigation which he puts forward in the Supplementary Essay appended to the first volume of his Gifford Lectures, *The World and the Individual.* He insists that the mathematical inquiry of which I have spoken shows that there are series of such a kind that the whole series, though infinite, though endless in the sense that it can be extended without limit, can yet be viewed as given in its entirety in its definition, and consequently as implicit in each member of the series.

You will see what that means from the illustrations I have given you. Take the second one first, the mathematical series. In the relationship of each member of this series to the others you have got the law of the whole that enables you to sum it up, and to show that the number two is the limit to which it approximates. In the case of the sonata you have, in like manner, the musical whole manifesting itself in the relation of the parts, and in that way, Royce argues, you have got the series in a form in which it can be viewed as given in its entirety in its definition, and implicitly given in its entirety in every member of the series. Such a series he calls self-representative. Next he applies, just as Dedekind did before him, this conception to the self. He finds that the number series is a purely abstract image of the relational system that must characterise an ideally completed self; that is to say, a self that does not merely pass from ex-

ıssion to expression, but comprehends the rela- to each other of these expressions. The system ıought, so far from consisting in the bare con- ;tions which are characteristic of appearance, ıelf-representative in that it is present as a ıle in every thought in the series.

Let us take an illustration. "To-day is ırsday." That is one of my thoughts. Yes, this last reflection, the reflection that to-day is ırsday, is also one of my thoughts. So is further reflection that I made the reflection to-day is Thursday, and so on. The infinity this system consists, not in the fact that can go on indefinitely extending it, but in characteristic that every one of its members lies a corresponding reflective thought which ıs turn is to belong to the system. The true or tive infinity of the system lies in its capability ıeing adequately represented in the one to one espondence with its constituent parts. Thus, ce holds, in opposition to Bradley, that thought comprehend the infinite, because thought f the character of a self-representative series, ıble of comprehending the totality of the series in ı member. He says that thought is not merely tional, but that at each stage it comprehends series as a whole, and that there you have got llustration of the capacity of thought to com- ıend the infinite. That is his point of depar- from Bradley.

From this standpoint the series is for Royce

a *totum simul.* The entire determined series of thoughts, in the instance above given, would be a self, completely reflective regarding the fact that all of these thoughts were its thoughts, and containing their entire genetic principle. The reason of the fission, which is typical of the act of judgment, the establishing of a relation between the subject and the predicate, between the thought and the mind which is productive of the thought, is therefore not, as Mr Bradley thinks, due to the impotence of thought, but to the self-representative character of its relational system. The Absolute must be such a system, and yet it must have the form of a self fully present in each act of thought.

Now I cannot linger over the further development of this, but I should like to go on to its application. What is real, according to Royce, is individual, unique, singular, the resting-ground of satisfied meaning or intellectual purpose. Of course, he concludes from that that there can only be a single absolute reality. Finite forms, where they assume the forms of personalities or of objects, arise only by distinction within this unique entirety, distinctions which arise from the finite purposes which the absolute mind contains within its activity. He puts the matter in this form: Time is for him the form of the will. But, consistently with his view of the nature of intelligence as a self-representative system, time presents two aspects. We are aware that each element of the succession excludes the others from its own place in time.

We are also aware that the series of successive states of experience is presented as an entirety, as a whole. The other, the complement that the finite being seeks, is not merely something beyond the present, is not merely a future experience from which it is distinct. It is inclusive of the very process of the striving itself. For the goal of every finite life, he says, is simply the totality of which this life is a fragment. When I seek my own goal I am looking for the whole of myself. In so far as my aim is the absolute completion of my selfhood, my goal is identical with the whole life of God. In all our strivings the attainment of the goal means more than any future moment taken by itself could ever furnish. For the self in its entirety is the whole of a self-representative system, and not the mere last moment or stage, if such there could be, of the process. And this can only be so because in God we possess our individuality. It is as a meaning in the Absolute Mind that we have existence. Our very dependence is the condition of our freedom and of our unique significance. The lesson of philosophy is the unity of the finite and the infinite, of temporal dependence and of eternal significance, of the world and all its individuals, of the one and the many, of God and of man. Not in spite of our finite bondage, but because of what it means and implies, we are full of the presence and of the freedom of God. Personality, Royce goes on to declare, is an essentially ethical category. A person is a conscious being whose life, temporally

viewed, seeks its completion through deeds; while this same life, eternally viewed, consciously attains its perfection by means of the present knowledge of the whole of its temporal strivings.

You will observe that Royce's view of such a conception does not abolish time any more than the conception of the self abolishes the distinction between body and mere substance, or any more than in becoming you have the abolition of being and of not-being. These conceptions are taken up as moments, to use the technical term, into the larger whole, which in its comprehension of them and in its self-comprehension preserves them in itself, but preserves them as put past, as having another significance in which they are no longer the final form of reality but only a logical stage towards it. Therefore, with Royce, the conception of the will, striving in time and yet conscious of the entirety of the system in which it strives, is not a conception in which time is abolished, in which God is reduced to a mere "now," the vanishing point into which everything collapses, but time is preserved in it as the form in which the will in one aspect strives, while that aspect is seen not to be final, but when more fully comprehended to be but a moment put past in the larger view of the process. God's life is the infinite whole that includes the endless temporal process, and consciously surveys it as one life, God's own life. God is thus, for Royce, a person and self-conscious, because the self of which He is conscious is a self whose eternal perfection is

attained through the totality of these ethically significant temporal strivings, these processes of evolution, these linked activities of finite selves.

Now you will observe that the way in which Royce puts the matter is a way which is not remote, by any means, from the view of reality which I have been putting before you in the course of these lectures, and the reason is that Royce, and for that matter, Bradley, have the origin of their views in the doctrine which Aristotle long ago, and Hegel more recently, worked out of the true relation of the particular and the universal. One comes back to Hegel because, after all that has been said against the Hegelian doctrine, in his writings you have a systematic form and an unflinching thoroughness which are not to be found elsewhere. His system is presented with a fulness of detail and a largeness of scale which are unrivalled. There is a passage in Jowett's Introduction to Plato's Dialogue the *Sophist*, in which he gives an estimate of Hegel which, speaking for myself, I should unhesitatingly adopt. "Hegel," he says, "if not the greatest philosopher, is certainly the greatest critic of philosophy who ever lived. No one else has equally mastered the opinions of his predecessors, or traced the connection of them in the same manner. No one has equally raised the human mind above the moralities of the common logic, and the unmeaningness of mere abstractions, and above imaginary possibilities, which, as he truly says, have no place in philosophy. No one

has won so much for the kingdom of ideas. . . . He shows that only by the study of metaphysic can we get rid of metaphysics, and that those who are in theory most opposed to them are in fact most entirely and hopelessly enslaved by them."

Well, we must not in this world of ours stand still, if we would avoid degenerating into sterility, we must always be doing the work over again. As Goethe says in the second part of *Faust:*

> "Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben
> Der täglich sie erobern muss."
>
> "'Tis only when we daily strive to conquer them anew,
> That we gain life and freedom for ourselves."

And so it is in the study of philosophy. You cannot stand still by the side of any one personality, however great. You must try, however humbly, however inadequately, to do the work over again for yourself, and thus, notwithstanding the debt which the world owes to Hegel, we have each of us in this generation to try, if we would comprehend the true meaning of his teaching, to think it all out for ourselves, in the light that he has given us, but still for ourselves. Otherwise we shall not really make any progress. The first series of these lectures has incurred a two-fold criticism. Some people said it was too Hegelian. Others, for whose opinion I have a great respect, said it was an altogether unorthodox interpretation of Hegel. Well, there is nearly as much strife and disputing about the interpretation of Hegel as there is about the interpretation of the

Scripture. Yet the fact of the strife over the interpretation of the Scripture does not make the Scripture any the less excellent, nor does the strife over the interpretation of Hegel make Hegel any the less a good teacher. Therefore I am content to say what he himself said to the orthodox of his time, "I am a Lutheran and wish to remain so." I am content to say that I am a Hegelian and wish to be called so. There are reservations implicit in both declarations.

Now I go back to my text. Like Bradley and Royce, I feel that it is impossible to be content with a definition of the Real in terms of the mere intelligible relations which, in reflection, are separated from feeling as being something different and apart from it. We start, I repeat, from within the concrete, living actuality of mind, outside of which we cannot get, even in thought, and of which the plane of the human intelligence is only, after all, an intermediate plane or stage. Human thought, dominated as it is, to an extent of which we are largely unconscious, by human ends and purposes, comprehends at a level which is not the fullest or the highest. Our minds are before consciousness in pictorial distinctions, in which we figure to ourselves these minds as belonging to bodies which go about separately in this world. That view is not the final view, but it is none the less a necessary view, and as such is true and representative of the degree of reality to which it belongs. The social purposes and ends which have to be fulfilled in the presenta-

tion of the world in the aspect of a society in which personality is related to personality—in which men and women are not isolated but are dependent on each other in the family and in the State—give rise to pictorial conceptions which do not come upon us by accident, but are the outcome of phases in the deeper self-comprehension of the Absolute Mind. How that comes about and its meaning I shall try to explain to you in later lectures. At present it is enough to say that its effect upon us is to dominate our thinking, to throw it into the distinctions which give rise to finiteness, and to make the self-comprehension of the human being pursuing his ordinary avocations only an imperfect stage in self-comprehension. Finiteness arises from the fashion in which we conceive the mind in ourselves; that is to say, the fashion in which the mind conceives itself in us.

Like Berkeley, we have to put a new question. We have to ask what is the meaning of Reality? And our answer must be that it means being contained in and comprehended by mind, and has, as an essential element in it, being *for* mind, or *before* mind. Antithesis and distinction, such as reflection is always giving rise to, are essential for clear knowledge. Hence it is that the understanding, the business of which is to produce clear and definite knowledge without reference to the question whether it embraces the whole of the aspects of Reality or not—hence it is, I say, that the understanding makes these distinctions in their sharp

forms by means of its abstractions. But, in truth, even the conceptions which the understanding makes use of are, as we shall see presently, in their nature dialectical; that is to say, their opposites are inherent in them. They refer beyond themselves; they refer to their opposites and to their union with these opposites.

Mind as the Ultimately Real, as what is truly actual, is, by reflection and by the abstraction which reflection brings in its train, separated into the aspect of mere thought, upon the one hand, and the boundless hard-and-fast contingency which baffles thought, upon the other. The distinction is a distinction which emerges within mind, and it gives rise in the study of mind to two aspects which have to be considered in their separateness, but which, having been considered in their separateness, have to be recognised as arising only by the distinction which reflection makes within mind, a distinction which, after all, is a vanishing one when more fully grasped. On its abstract side self-consciousness discloses itself as the movement of thought in forms, in conceptions, in what are called categories, which are related to one another dialectically; that is to say, each of which not only implies the next of them, but implies the whole series and finds its completion and truth only *in* the entire series. You get in that way what Hegel called "Logic," the metaphysical view of thought distinguished abstractly as pure thought, put in contrast to what is not so distinguished. Its

antithesis, that with which it is put in contrast, is a counter abstraction, Nature, which again is simply an aspect within the concrete totality of Mind. This is the truth of the two, and therefore their *prius*. And again I say to you, what I said yesterday, that to me there seems no more vain or foolish controversy than the controversy as to how Hegel made the transition from nature to mind. He was not talking of transitions in time, nor was he talking of making or constructing. He was simply displaying his system as a whole, and the only way to do that was to show how it is of the nature of thought to make abstractions, correct them by dwelling on their contraries, and comprehend the two sides as merely distinctions within the larger and final conception of mind or spirit which embraces both as moments within itself.

If one analyses one's own self-consciousness one finds that in the apprehension of the self, in the endeavour to fix it, one distinguishes it from a not-self which is other than the self. It is *my* not-self that is distinguished from my self. But in so concentrating on myself I have made it an object which ceases to present the aspect of the mind which apprehends. If I endeavour to fix thought again as something which I can isolate and consider in contrast to what is not thought, I have made it an object, as it were, external to my self, and so I get into the endlessness of Royce's series. But the true view is the recognition of the dialectic of thought as the inherent movement which is of

the very nature and essence of mind. And when you have studied that movement by simply observing it as it does its own work, you discover that you have the very characteristic of mind in the activity which in *apprehension* produces these distinctions, and simultaneously reconciles them by *comprehending* them as belonging to a higher unity. In that way the method and the subject-matter to which the method is applied fall together in a fashion that obtains in no other department of human knowledge, because in every other department of human knowledge the mind is in reflection distinct and regarded as essentially distinguished from the object which it is contemplating. And so when we get to the most thoroughgoing investigation of all, the metaphysical investigation of the nature of Ultimate Reality, a unity the highest of all emerges in our comprehension, and in that way we escape from what would otherwise be an infinite or unending progress. The true infinite is discovered just in the recognition of the nature of the movement. So soon as you have realised the nature of mind you find that you do not reach infinity by merely heaping item on item, but only by getting the law of the series which each member of the series must obey, and so disclosing the difference between the members and the series as a difference which has been called into being, but has none the less to be put past.

The reason why mind makes these distinctions is a reason which I shall deal with in a subsequent

lecture, and I shall show you that it is of the very essence of mind that it should do so. But I wish simply to point out here that this train of analysis leads us straight to what must be the conception of God in which it terminates, God as the finally self-comprehended Reality of Mind—the Last that is really First, Mind at its highest plane of self-comprehension. Our own human plane of reflection is the outcome of the reflection of the Absolute Mind in those finite forms which are the steps or stages or moments in its activity. The logical process can only be set forth in a system, and it would take me far beyond the limits of these lectures were I to try to give you an account of the attempt —whether it be more or not we need not discuss here—which Hegel has made to set out in systematic form the movement of mind in its self-comprehension.

I have pointed out to you that the endeavour to make these things appear as simply movements of abstract thought, to set out the movement of such thought in its abstract forms, however useful, however valuable—and it is both useful and valuable—is capable of throwing light on one side only of reality, and that when you come to the other side, the counter abstraction of nature, the other aspect of mind which is equally embraced in its fuller self-comprehension, you find a different aspect of the activity of thought. You find reflection there operating by making sharp distinctions. The unifying influence of thought is not looked

for there, because the purposes and the ends which the mind has before it in the contemplation of nature are purposes and ends which are foreign to that unification and do not require it. The purpose which we have before us when we are face to face with nature, I mean the habitual and thus unconscious purpose which dominates our way of conceiving it, is to contemplate it without reference to the subject. We abstract from the fact that nature is there only for the mind which perceives it, or as object for the subject. We shut out that aspect of the truth as completely as we can, and the result is that we get nature, characterised as it is by sharp and clear distinctions, in forms in which separation and isolation are the order of things. For instance, the apprehension of nature as in space is a mode which displays things as at the utmost possible stage of isolation from one another. In time, as I showed you before, you get a little nearer to establishing some sort of unity among them, because, while the present excludes both the past and the future, it yet has meaning only in relation to the past and the future. Therefore in time you have got nearer to the unity which comes only from comprehension as distinguished from mere apprehension, from reason as distinguished from mere understanding. A yet more developed application of reflection under the domination of the same kind of end gives you the aspect of nature as mechanism. The finiteness of such conceptions as the understanding here makes

use of is exhibited in the cause, which shows its inherent contradiction by passing over into the effect, and becoming indistinguishable from the effect when you think it out. In the law which the man of science finds when, putting aside the mere crude appearances of phenomena, he fixes upon what is essential, what underlies, is a principle in which he passes beyond mere particulars of sense, and abstracts in a manner which, though finite, brings him to conceptions in which the foreignness of things, the separation of things in space and time, is, in a large measure, overcome. In the higher aspects of nature this is strikingly so. For example, as I showed you earlier, you set before the mind in the perception of the living organism the conception of a whole which shows itself through the metabolism of the parts, and dominates the parts, more as soldiers in an army are dominated by their common purpose, than as marbles are held together in a heap.

It is only the understanding in its abstraction that shuts out the fuller comprehension which would come to us if we had before our minds that nature is there only for mind which perceives it. Of course, I do not mean that our minds make nature. We are in one aspect parts of nature. I explained that very fully in the last set of lectures, and how it came about that we arrived at our conception of our minds as particular things which contemplate nature as through windows. But the fact remains that nature is there only as the object of mind, and only *for* mind; and if you com-

prehend that relationship fully you will have got rid of the apparently absolute character of the hard-and-fast relations of nature and its boundless particularity. Even in nature as the man of science regards it you see the manifestation of dialectic. Take the quantities of the mathematician. Take quantity as you have it in the measurements of space and time. Take the old puzzle of Achilles and the tortoise. Just as quantity always has two sides, a discrete and a continuous, the discrete the side which is dealt with in arithmetic, and the continuous that other side which is the subject of the calculus; so in the puzzle of Achilles and the tortoise these two sides appear. You remember how Achilles sets out to overtake the tortoise, but the tortoise has gone a little way by the time Achilles gets up to the point from which it started. By the time Achilles arrives at the next point the tortoise has gone a little farther, and so on, and Achilles, in this view, never overtakes it. But just as we can sum up the series by showing the law of its growth, the relation of its parts, so we can show that there is an ascertainable point at which Achilles must overtake the tortoise. The fallacy is the passing from the view of space in which it is discrete to the view of space in which it is continuous without being aware of the transition, and the mixing up of two abstract aspects passing under the same name. But the fact that you have the discrete and the continuous side apparently co-existing, shows that the movement of thought

is inherent even in the particularity of nature, and that fully comprehended nature discloses the dialectic which is characteristic of every aspect of reality.

Thought never stands still, except in the abstractions of reflection, and it is characteristic of philosophy that it has been occupied greatly with pointing out the antinomies or contradictions which we find at every turn even in our most everyday view of things. Nature is never fully known until it is comprehended in its relation to self-consciousness. When it is so comprehended, and is grasped as arising by distinctions which fall within self-consciousness, its foreignness is overcome, put past. That is how we come back again, by whatever road we travel, to mind as the ultimate form of reality.

I have now got some way in my analysis, and I shall go on in a subsequent lecture to develop the meaning of the finite quality which characterises our human minds.

LECTURE IV

My task in the earlier series of these Gifford Lectures was to set out the proof of the thesis that the nature of ultimate reality is mind. In the first three lectures of the present series, and particularly in the second and third, I have endeavoured to put before you some account of the characteristics of mind and of its content. In this fourth lecture I have to endeavour to show you how mind comes to present itself as finite, and the consequences of this.

When Spinoza in the second part of his Ethics has completed his demonstration that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God, he pauses and says, rather pathetically, "At this point many of my hearers will, no doubt, stick fast and will think of many things which will cause delay, and therefore I beg of them to advance slowly, step by step, with me, and not to pronounce judgment until they shall have read everything which I have to say." Something of Spinoza's depression is upon me. If the pathway is difficult it is not, however, my fault any more than it is yours. It is the nature of the subject that makes it so. My

task is to set before you, as intelligibly as I can, a great conception, the work of a succession of great men, a conception which we have inherited from past ages, and which in their own fashion these great men have dealt with in its different aspects. But for those who would profit by the work that has been done by the intellectual giants who have attacked the problem of the nature of reality in the past, it is essential that they should have some clear realisation of the difficulties which were present to the minds of these men.

Above all things, a sense that there *is* a problem is necessary, and that sense is not one which is very easily awakened. I have pointed out to you that the great hindrance to the grasp of what one may call the conception of reality which has been the common conception of these great thinkers—because, as I think I have already shown you, it has varied more in language and in form than in substance in the hands of those who have fashioned it—is the irrelevant and unmeaning metaphors which we carry with us as a burden on our backs. This, I say, is the chief hindrance to getting hold of what the great thinkers have put before us. This was apparent, I think, yesterday, when we had to try to scale the precipitous cliffs which have to be surmounted if we are to attain to a view of the nature of mind. We felt then the extraordinary difficulty of shaking ourselves clear from similes and analogies, drawn from regions of inquiry which were wholly foreign to the regions in which we

were painfully toiling, and that burden it is which presses upon those who have to climb with difficulty from point to point of these almost inaccessible rocks, with the constant sense of being dragged back. Nevertheless our duty is to clear ourselves by careful criticism as far as we can from the effect of that burden. The footholds are there firm enough, if we would only look for them as they have been cut by the great thinkers of the past. After all, if people make it a reproach against philosophy that it is difficult, there is an answer. Philosophy is not necessary; it is not even a help to everyone. Only to those is it a necessity whose minds have been disturbed by thought. The gulf which thought makes thought alone can bridge over, and for those who have once become conscious of the problem and of the difficulty of its solution, there is no other way but the hard toil of the thinking consideration of things.

Well, to-day I shall have to deal with the problem of the forms of finitude in mind. Now the relation in which man stands to the mind within which his reality falls in ultimate analysis, must remain an inscrutable mystery if we cannot free ourselves from the domination of the category of substance, an unnecessary and unnatural category when we are investigating the nature of mind. Of course if we start from this, that what is must be a *thing*, a *thing* which, if we thought out our conclusions about it, could have no meaning except as existing in space and in time—if that be the ulti-

mate conception by which thought is hemmed in, then it is impossible to represent God in any other light than as a substance, or to find any intelligible relation between Him and the finite mind.

But God is a Spirit, and those who seek Him must seek Him in spirit and in truth. It is not the methods of mechanism, the methods which are applicable to the externalities of space and time, that can help here or that are in place. My self-consciousness is an ultimate fact, and yet in its finiteness, as characterised in the concept of my particularity, it appears as *my* self-consciousness. Now one pauses here to observe that at this point there is a problem to be solved. What we mean by the element of particularity, what we mean by self-consciousness as *my* self-consciousness, as distinguished from somebody else's self-consciousness, is a matter which is not thought out in the usages which guide us when we employ this conception in everyday life. A necessary conception it is, and one which represents the truth from our everyday practical standpoint. It is not only useful, but without it we could not get on, and, indeed, it is the consequence of our view and experience of the social whole of which we form a part. We stand in relation to other selves, and yet there is something to be thought out. Taken simply so, it is plain that self-consciousness has not fully comprehended its own character, and one has to see what is the nature of the distinction which it has made within itself, and which gives rise to its

finite quality or appearance. There can be no doubt of the conclusion to which the train of reasoning which we have been pursuing leads. There can be nothing outside self-consciousness. The universe, when we reflect on it and do not leave it in abstraction, is a universe that is there for us as object for a subject, and its meaning and development must be a meaning and development within the field of the object-world of consciousness.

As Hegel somewhere puts it: "The universe as it is *in and for itself*"—observe the phrase—"is the totality of existence; outside it there is nothing." That is to say, you cannot escape from the closed circle of the mind and its content. There is no meaning in even raising a question of anything outside. It is on the basis of the mind itself that any such question would be raised. Yet to take a short-cut and to assert that because I am self-conscious, and because all the distinctions which go to the making up of the universe fall within my self-consciousness, therefore, I am the absolute God—to assert this is not only startling, but one feels instinctively that it is an assertion which no one has a right to make. It is absurd to say such a thing of a mere particular man, a link in a chain with a beginning that stretches back endlessly into the past and will stretch forward endlessly into the future. Such an assertion seems to mean one of two things. Either the universe is a mere appearance, the projection of a mind which

is taken as being something here and now in space and time, and that possesses knowledge as a quality. In this case the universe can be nothing more than the projection of a mind that is a finite thing. In such a light the universe has no more reality than have the pictures which a magic-lantern throws upon a sheet. Such a conclusion, of course, is revolting to common sense, and must fail to bear scrutiny. Or, on the other hand, the assertion may be taken to mean that in truth the ultimate form of reality is a correlation of substances, and that the mind and its object and God Himself, so far as they are taken to be anything else, are mere appearances, mere misinterpretations of a reality which consists in the mechanical connection of substances. Such a conclusion is equally incapable of being stated self-consistently. Both of these views are, moreover, pronounced by the heart, whatever the intelligence may say, to be blasphemous; for they are the denial of the truth of that spiritual significance which throughout history has been the profoundest moving force in the souls of men. The conviction of this truth it is that has done more than anything else to arouse men to the effort to solve the problem which reason has raised, and that has awakened the human mind to the necessity for a careful criticism of its categories.

Well, one comes back to scan again, in the light of these difficulties, the final fact of one's own self-consciousness as manifestation within which both the universe without and the universe within

disclose themselves. What is the meaning of its finiteness? We have seen that such finiteness cannot consist in this, that the mind can really be a thing here in space and now in time. Let us see whether we can get on any better by trying to image it under another form; let us try to reflect upon it, to think about it as mind, as subject if you please, in that large and full significance of the word that it gets when we purify it as far as we can from similes drawn from the region of the external world. If you do your best in this direction, you will find that you are inevitably led back in your investigation to the self as the final and ultimate reality, but not possessing its final and ultimate form in the finite self, as it appears when, after the fashion of John Locke, we dive into our own bosoms. In that finite self you find at every turn the evidences of incompleteness of comprehension, and the suggestion that arises, as you pursue your path, is that if the phenomenon of the finite self were more completely thought out, the difficulties which you meet with would prove to be difficulties due mainly to the inadequacy of your own procedure.

"The truth," says Hegel in a daring sentence, "is that there is only one reason, one mind, and that the mind as finite has not a real existence." Of course, he does not mean to say that the universe collapses under reflection into a mere point, into an inert *simultaneum*, or to deny to it the movement that characterises mind as mind. What he means

is just what I have been putting before you, that the true view of mind is the view which goes beyond that limited aspect in which it appears as one among many, or even as my own particular mind. The relationship of being one among many, the relationship of being mine as distinguished from yours, belong to that aspect in which mind presents itself to itself as a phenomenon falling within its own object-world, as a phenomenon which arises because mind has made abstraction from the fact that it is itself setting up the very distinctions which it is contemplating.

Now in our daily practice we find some confirmation of the extent to which these difficulties vanish when we confront them from a higher standpoint. It is when we rise above the contemplation of minds as related to each other as *things*, that we get rid of the difficulty of explaining to ourselves why we prefer at our best the well-being of our neighbours to our own. But even in daily practice the same difficulty occurs. Man is often tempted to feel that though as a free personality he has the power of choosing the right, and is responsible if he does not choose it, yet that temptation is too much for him, and it is unnatural that his choice should be otherwise than the choice of what is lower. This is a frame of mind of which we have only too familiar experience. But, on the other hand, the saint, the man who lives at the highest level, finds, just because he lives at the highest level, and his conception is one which

raises him above the particularism of these temptations, that they are no serious temptations to him. The greatest saint may lapse; when he lapses it is not because he has ceased to be free, but because for the moment he has done what any human being may do, he has lowered his standpoint. At his highest standpoint the man who is really holy is free from temptation, because temptation presents no attraction to him, looking at it as he does.

Well, just in the same fashion if you have once actually got the speculative point of view, these difficulties which seem so great, because they afflict you as his temptations afflict the saint who cannot always live at the same high level, yet will come to seem less, because they are vanishing difficulties from the point of view at which you have learned that you can contemplate them. In practice as in theory there are stages or degrees in reality, and when we once have reached to a higher stage in our view of reality and are sticking to it, whether it be practical life or whether it be speculative contemplation that we are concerned with, troubles that we thought insuperable at a lower stage cease to be troubles at all, because they cease to exist. We see how they arose, we see how they presented themselves, but we also see how that presentation can be superseded in a larger view.

I have had to dig down to the foundations, in order to get at the nature of reality, through the covering soil to which the current abstractions and

metaphors and similes have imparted an adamantine hardness. Other aids than philosophy may assist the faith that underneath there lies a foundation which can be reached. You can all be helped by Art and by Religion. Your Goethe, your Carlyle, your Wordsworth, your Browning, yes, and your New Testament, all these give the sense of the things that are unseen, a sense that may be strong enough to carry you over these difficulties. There you will find aids of another kind to faith, the faith of the doctrine that it is not in some remote other world that the truth is to be looked for, but just in this world, seen and comprehended at a higher level. And it is not even necessary to turn to the poets and to literature for this sort of aid. Some of the finest natures, perhaps the very finest natures, do not need that.

> "If thou appear untouched by solemn thought,
> Thy nature is not therefore less divine,"

writes Wordsworth, and so it has been at all times. And yet the vindication of the truth, if the truth must be vindicated, can only be given by Reason. Art and Religion can do much. They can bring before us vivid images, can lead us into moods which humanity with a thousand voices proclaims to represent the truth and the impress of reality. But it is only the iron logic of philosophy that can break through the hard incrustations beneath which lies buried the full truth, the completed scheme.

When completely thought out, reality dis-

closes its hidden nature, in the light we have now got, as self-conscious mind completely self-comprehensive, whose characteristic it is to be active, and being active, to be actual. I have now to show you that it is of the very quality of such mind to throw itself into finite forms, and so to make the distinctions and create the aspects which in everyday life are familiar to us, but the unstable and merely relative character of which appears when we take things from the standpoint of what has been called reason as distinguished from understanding. That mind is self-conscious as well as conscious is, when we think the matter out, a mere tautology. If you analyse the simplest form of consciousness, for instance the sense of feeling, there is implicit in it a reference to self, because it is "I" who feel. It is only by an abstraction, by the cutting-off of reflection, that you ignore the fact for the moment that it is "I" who feel. The full truth is that a feeling is always referable to a self. It is legitimate to speak in another sense only if we know what we are doing. For instance the psychologists tell us about the threshold of consciousness, and they point out, and point out with justice, about the aspect in which it discloses itself under their methods, that there is such a thing as a subconscious self, and that there are antecedents to sensation which do not cross the threshold of consciousness. That is quite true if you are looking at the soul from the standpoint of what I described to you, in the earlier lectures,

as presentationism, where the whole content of consciousness is set out as though it were a series of discrete events in time. But that standpoint, useful and legitimate as it is for its own purposes, and constantly as we employ it not merely in psychology but in daily life, is only a very limited one. In it abstraction is made, and is necessarily made, from the higher unity of the self, *for* which the history in time, which presentationism gives, exists.

To be conscious is to be conscious of *my* self as comprehending. There is no such *thing* conceivable as mere consciousness that is not also self-conscious when it is thought out. I call it "thing" because such a consciousness, if we could attach any meaning to it at all, would be a thing, would belong to the region of what was external, and not properly to the self as self. Even if we desire to be sceptical we can only raise our scepticism as the reflection of an "I" that comprehends.

Self-consciousness is the logical *prius* of every effort of thought and of every phase of feeling, even the lowest. The task of thought is to make explicit what is implicit, and it only fails to do so when it takes things in abstraction. Grasp them in the fulness of their comprehension, and you find that self-consciousness is the presupposition of every conceivable form of experience. Well, that carries with it an important consequence. If God be mind, if His nature is to be mind, He must be *in some sense* self-conscious. One has here to

guard oneself, because the idea of self-consciousness is infected by many metaphors drawn from the everyday world. What I mean is that the nature of mind is to be actual in its distinctions, and to comprehend these distinctions and itself as their source. This characteristic of consciousness is of the essence of mind, and therefore is of the essence of God. We come to that conclusion as soon as we find that the function of thought is to do something more than merely establish relations between things that are given to it. As soon as you become aware that there *can* be no distinction excepting upon the basis of thought, and that beyond thought there is nothing, because it is only on the basis of thought that we can even speak of anything beyond thought, you are forced to the further conclusion that mind must in every phase be self-conscious.

In self-consciousness we apprehend the self. It is of the essence of self-consciousness that it should distinguish the self from what it puts before it in distinction from the self. That is to say, at the ordinary level at which we men and women reflect, we think of the object-world from which the self is distinguished as one object and the self as another object. In other words, when we apprehend the self, when we present it to ourselves as distinguished from its object-world, we apprehend it as understanding does, in separation from something else which is correlative to it, and in this way we give it the character of finitude. That is how the finite arises. It is the work and the

apprehension of thought which takes even the self and fixes it, so to speak, in contradistinction from the self, abstracting from the unity of comprehension in which the two are held. Just as I apprehend my object-world as "there and then," so I apprehend myself as "here and now," the centre, as it were, of the universe.

Well, there again you have in still further development the notions of the finite. They spring up upon you the moment you begin to think at this plane, the plane at which you are encouraged to think by the social purposes which you have to fulfil as members of society. These are all modes of what we may call the relation of *otherness*, which is the quality of the finite. If I fix myself, for example, in reflection, as one among many, I get the notion of a plurality of selves isolated in time and for that matter in space, and so I am brought very far into the region of the finite. And the occasion of my making these distinctions is my purpose of leading a social life, of living among my fellow men and women, of profiting by my experience, by my memories, by my relationship to my family, by what I have done, by what I may be, by that chain of connections which binds me up in a whole with those about me. The purpose of realising myself in that world makes me insist on these distinctions, and as these distinctions are distinctions all of which belong to the region of the finite, the characteristic of finitude penetrates deeply into my notion of myself. Of course this kind of

apprehension, however necessary, is a narrow and limited one, because it ignores the larger view of mind as the subject within which all these distinctions take place.

Mind not only has for its task to make explicit what is implicit, but it must do so, because as I showed you before, the character of its activity, the activity which posits itself, so to speak, in conceptions, is dialectical. That is to say, each conception is posited in such a fashion that it is made at once to involve a correlative, a correlative linked to something beyond, and the whole is found to form a chain in which the imperfect is taken up by the movement of thought into what is more perfect and more complete. Thought is always active, and therefore it never can and never does rest content in any single finite aspect. The consequence is that the world in which we live, the world as it seems, has an infinity of aspects. It has the aspect of beauty and of morality, it has the aspect which is dealt with in mathematics, the aspect which is dealt with in political economy. All these aspects of the world as it seems are equally real, and what we have to do is to determine their relations to one another, and to be careful that we do not confuse the standpoints at which these different aspects arise, and misapply the conceptions which have led to their separation. They are the outcome of the finite purposes which guide our reflection on our own experiences, and they are the necessary outcome of these purposes.

Well, the nature of thought is not to rest satisfied with any one of these aspects or with any one of the conceptions under which they arise. From the very beginning the ultimate nature of thought, the ultimate goal which it has to realise, can be nothing short of its complete comprehension of itself, and the reason is of course that only in the fully comprehended system of the mind within which all these distinctions have been made, can their relation to one another, and to the end which they presuppose, be adequately shown. That is where, what I told you of in an earlier lecture, the new and deeper view of evolution comes in. It is not only in time that you have evolution; you have evolution in thought, in the stages of comprehension, and evolution in which what comes last in time is first in thought, because all the stages that precede it in time are really only fragments of it isolated by the abstractions of reflection. The completed totality is the truth of the whole movement of the process. But to say that is not to say that the nature of mind is to deny the reality of all those lower stages and to make them naught. The passing through these lower stages is part of the very activity of mind. Its essence is to *posit* itself, so to speak, in abstract distinction, and then, in its fuller comprehension, to overcome that distinction, to show it as one which has been made only by the abstraction of the understanding, an abstraction made for the purposes of self-realisation in the

form of clear and distinct knowledge. In geometry we deal with figures in which we have abstracted altogether from colour, from beauty, from weight, from everything else except consideration of the purest kind in space, and thereby we get clear and distinct knowledge, because the mind can concentrate in this kind of consideration. Such illustrations show that it is the work of the mind to make abstract distinctions in understanding in order to enrich knowledge, and afterwards to take up the distinctions so made in the larger unities which thought reaches as it comprehends still more fully.

Now I want in this connection to follow out the illustration which we have of this in the case of time. Time is a relationship or form which belongs to the object-world, the world in which we image either things as outside us, or the stream of our mental states as within us. Time, as Hegel says in the *Natur-Philosophie*, is the presentation of becoming, of what is there just inasmuch as it ceases to be there. Now see what is implied in that. The event which is in time is there just inasmuch as it ceases to be there. The reason is that the now is always ceasing to be the now. The now is nothing that you can lay hold of; before you can do so it has passed into the then, and the next instant becomes the instant which you characterise as the now. That instant is made what it is by its relation to a future which will be but is not yet. Therefore you have in time this

combination of being and not-being which giv to succession the character of the presentatio or rather the attempt at a presentation, of wh becomes, of transition. You cannot have any fix image of time. Time has always got this co tradiction within itself, that it is in the *relatio* of the elements in it, the past, present, and futu that time consists. It is in the deepest sense relation of finitude.

Hegel points this out in a passage in which says that it is not because things appear in tir that they are finite; it is because they are fini that they appear in time.* In other words, tir is just the abstract form of the characteris which finite things have of being in a state of flu As Heraclitus pointed out, all things are in state of flux, and so it is with the finite wor There is no distinction which remains permane What appears is always altering, for the i dividuality of reality is always disclosing a n and fresh aspect. It is in comprehension thought that you get the stability, the unity, t element that is permanent, because it is out time in the sense that time is in reality for it.

Well, as inherent in its nature, time has got curious contradiction within itself, a contradicti which exhibits itself in the fact that time h always two moments, the moment of the discr and the moment of the continuous. You fix tin the moment, as now, but in so fixing it you fi

* Hegel, *Natur-Philosophie*, p. 54.

that what you are really fixing on is something with a continuous flow which causes it to be gone as soon as you think you have grasped it, and so it is that in all investigations of time you have got these two sides confronting you. In arithmetic, which is founded in large measure upon time, you have an illustration of this. I discussed with you yesterday, the series, the self-representative series. Let it be the mathematical series which we took as an illustration, $1+\frac{1}{2}+\frac{1}{4}+\frac{1}{8}$, and so on, extending without end, but yet having a limit in the number 2. In that series you have got this curious result, that the series is endless, that you can always go on adding to it a diminishing fraction, and yet, on the other hand, that it has got an end because even if you were to project it into infinity it never could exceed the limit of 2. Now there you have the characteristic which time discloses, that the moments in it are not really exclusive one of the other. When the series is self-representative, as such a series is, and as the series of my thoughts is, you have the characteristic of each member of the series in this that it represents the whole. In this characteristic lies the contradiction which is only explicable if you understand that the form of time is really a form in which the self comprehends itself, and grasps what it comprehends as the self for which time is, and which in that sense is out of time. The self belongs to eternity in the true sense of the word, but yet posits itself in distinctions which are superseded in its comprehension of them.

It is the nature of mind that it is free from the dilemmas that affect the object-world, and that it neither stands still nor is mere change. Its nature is to be permanence in change and change in permanence. The whole mind is present in every act of the mind, and every act of the mind implies the whole mind. It is not a process on which you can get any light from metaphors and similes drawn from the object-world, because it is what lies at the foundation of the object-world itself. You can, perhaps, get at it best if you keep in mind the contradictions which appear in even such familiar features of the object-world as the time sequence. But just because there is the phase of presentation on the part of the mind of itself to itself, the element of exclusion by which one phase is distinguished from another is a real phase. Yet it is not all. It is a phase whose nature is to be forthwith put past, and taken up into a higher comprehension.

Now, the effect of that is to give us some light upon what the nature of time must be when contemplated from the standpoint of Absolute Mind. It cannot as so contemplated be non-existent. Rather it must be there as taken up, preserved in a more complete comprehension. The endless aspect of the series is in contradiction with the fact of its limit, and therefore a higher standpoint, for the purposes of which the lower standpoint is inadequate, is necessary for the solution of the contradiction and the comprehension of the whole. And when you set to yourself the problem of how the

universe in time must seem to God, the answer is that as God is Mind and as it is of the nature of Mind to realise itself in these distinctions which go to make up among other things the time series, God must in His self-consciousness include these distinctions, and yet preserve them, not as a mere time series, but in a higher conception in which they are comprehended in the entirety in which the series is summed up, and summed up in a fashion of which even that expression gives no proper analogue. Now, this is a consideration which throws some light on the problem of immortality, a problem on which I shall have to touch in later lectures, because it shows that existence in time is not the whole of existence as fully comprehended. For the mind of God the world must appear as no mere *simultaneum,* no mere negation of change, but as the time series summed up and comprehended in the fullest grasp of thought. It is only from such standpoints as those of geometry and mechanism, in which we set the distinctions in their characteristic abstraction, that the spectres which trouble us appear as more than spectres.

These abstract conceptions have their place. The movement of thought which makes them renders possible the riches of the self-comprehension of mind. But it is mind that we are dealing with, and mind is not inert. It posits itself in difference and gathers itself up at a higher level than that from which it started. Its very nature is to be present to itself in finite forms. That it must

do in order to fulfil the nature of its being, to realise its own end. There you have the *why* of the process of finitude.

It is into the forms of finitude that the Absolute Mind goes forth in the process of its self-realisation. How plain it is that if we would contemplate the nature of God, we must, as in worship, contemplate in spirit and in truth.

Hegel

LECTURE V

In the last lecture I showed you how the forms of finitude originate in the mind. Their origin we found to be finite ends, and the result was an illustration of the truth that the attempt to comprehend the universe ought to be a search after ends and not after causes; a very important distinction.

We got some way towards a view of the Absolute Mind as not only self-conscious, but as requiring and so conserving the finite forms which it sets up and transcends in the act of setting up. Following this out, we begin in the present lecture to get something like an idea of what must be the relation of man to God. I may now attempt, on the basis of what I have already said, a definition of God which may serve us provisionally as a starting point for the rest of the lecture.

God means Absolute Mind conscious of itself as completely realising the highest ends. He is the completed consciousness which comprehends itself in its completeness as the *prius* and source of the whole of the movement that forms its content. Do not forget what I pointed out to you in examin-

ing the nature of the self-representative series in a former lecture. Both moments in the time series, the moment of exclusion, and the moment of the implicit presence of the whole in each member of the series, are if transmuted yet implicit in the character of Absolute Mind. That is to say, in endeavouring to contemplete the Mind of God it is plain that we are not to think of time as having ceased to have meaning, but are to look upon it and its two aspects as merely superseded in the higher standpoint from which He must contemplate Himself. No pictorial image of such a mind can be adequate, for all pictures are based on relationship in time and space, and they are never complete. They always suggest what lies beyond in time and space, and therefore it is not to pictorial representation that we can turn, unless we are prepared to bear in mind that the picture, however admirable, can only be a symbol of what is to be adequately expressed in nothing short of the highest categories of thought.

Now let us, furnished with this definition of God, turn to the nature of man. It is plain that man is finite mind and that as finite his mind is realising itself at a level of comprehension that is not the highest level. Man's ends are finite ends. Thus his categories, the conceptions which his ends call into use, are finite categories, and his world and himself also are presented as in separation from mind, as in *hetereity*, the form of what people have called "otherness." By reason of the

domination of these finite ends, and the consequently self-limited action of reflection in the form of understanding, the content, cut off in this way in abstraction, gets a semblance of permanence, of being fixed. We thus become apt to take truth to consist merely in that which we all think, instead of having a foundation to be sought in an answer to the deeper question, Why and How we all think it so.

Philosophy ought to be able to show the relationship to each other of the ends that are finite, how they arise, what is their order, what is their position in the scheme in which the activity of mind manifests itself. If this is shown in an abstract form we get what is called "Logic" in Hegelian terminology; that is to say, the abstract forms which belong to the content of the Idea, the subject-matter of the first part of the Hegelian Encyclopædia. This conception goes deeper down than would be possible in any picture of mere *creation*, because creation, after all, is a word which carries with it the association of an image in time, of something brought into being, it may be out of nothing, but at all events *ab extra;* whereas we are here dealing with activities of thought dominated by these ends which are and must be the *prius* of any such picture.

The Hegelian doctrine, no doubt, identifies human self-consciousness with the consciousness of God, but it does not conversely identify the consciousness of God with human self-consciousness.

The greater contains the less and is not contained in it here any more than elsewhere. Because it is *mind* that we are dealing with, no real difficulty arises, as we shall presently see, over such problems as that of evil. One of the great objections which has been urged against all systems of absolute idealism, all systems that would identify the mind of man with the mind of God, is this. It is said, if they be true you must attribute evil to God as something falling within His nature. Well, if we were dealing with what is to be conceived as a substance that would be so, but we are dealing with what is of the nature of mind, and I shall be able to show you presently that the difficulty is not a difficulty which arises, if we will only be in earnest with the notion that what we have got before us is not substance but subject.

Equally it is true that the forms of history belong to the finite. That is another reproach which has been urged against the standpoint of the German idealists, that they identify God with Spirit as it discloses itself in history. But the forms of history are finite, just as the forms of human mind are finite. It is even conceivable that there may be finite forms higher than any that disclose themselves in humanity or in history, and which, just because they are finite forms, must turn out to be inadequate to the conception of God. The lesson one learns, the deeper one digs down into this ground, is the complete relativity of human knowledge, in a more thorough-going sense of the expression than

that which has been current. The way of looking at things of our everyday standpoint leads us to anthropomorphism in a fashion which is still more menacing to the desire to reach the truth than is ordinarily conceived. We have to be in earnest with the view that God is mind, and nothing short of mind, if we are to make any progress.

Now, I shall digress for a few moments from this very abstract and difficult line of thought to some parallel teaching. It is always interesting if one finds that what one has been searching for and thinks one has arrived at has something corresponding to it in the conclusions that have been reached by other men at other times. First of all I will take you back over two thousand years, and I will tell you what Aristotle said, as the result of his consideration of this very problem. I am going to quote to you a passage from the XIIth Book of the *Metaphysics*, 7th chapter, and the rendering which I shall offer you is a rendering of a passage so obscure that I should have but little confidence in my translation, but for some extremely competent assistance which has been given to me. Not only have I had the advantage of comparing the versions given by Bonitz and by Schwegler, but Principal Donaldson and Professor Burnet have been so good as to make suggestions as to the rendering.

"The intelligence," says Aristotle, "which is complete in its own nature is the intelligence

which has for its object that which is good in its own nature, and the absolute intelligence has for its object what is absolutely good. But the mind thinks itself when it comprehends what is intelligible; when it comprehends, and so, as it were, is in contact with what is intelligible, it becomes intelligible to itself. So that the mind and what is the mind's object are one and the same. For the capacity to grasp the intelligible that is the substance of reality is mind, and mind realises itself or becomes actual in doing so. For what of divine the mind seems to possess consists in its actuality as distinguished from its mere potentiality, and what is most agreeable and best is the realised act of contemplation. If what is divine is eternally as blessed as we at times are, this is worthy of admiration; if it is blessed in a higher degree, yet more worthy. That, however, is the real characteristic of the divine. It has life in it, for the activity of mind is life, and mind is activity. Pure and absolute activity is its most perfect and its eternal life. Thus it is that we come to say of God that He is an eternal and most perfect living being. Life is His, unbroken eternal existence, for that is of the essential nature of the divine." You will appreciate at once how closely that approaches to the Hegelian view which I have been putting before you in these lectures. It is remarkable, looking over the sea of time that separates us from Aristotle, how clear a vision we get of a great intellect

working out the very same problems that we have to-day, and working them out to similiar conclusions.

Now I pass from Aristotle to another great mind of a very different order. Perhaps the profoundest critic of life that ever existed was Goethe; certainly his was one of the most comprehensive intellects that the world has seen. Now Goethe was not nominally a metaphysician; indeed he might rather be said to have laughed at all philosophy. Many of you will recall the passage in *Faust* in which Mephistopheles interviews the student and says to him:

> "Grau, theurer Freund, ist alle Theorie,
> Und grün des Lebens goldner Baum."

Well, but although Goethe was not a professed metaphysician, and may be said, indeed, to have professed *not* to be a metaphysician, he was far more of one than people generally think. That great mind missed nothing. It had the power of taking in the most different aspects of things, and setting them together in great conceptions. There is a metaphor which Mr Gladstone once used of a great Parliamentary orator of his younger days. He said of him that "his oratory took in as vapour what it gave back in torrent." You may say of Goethe that he absorbed in their most abstract form the theories of science and philosophy and poured them back in the concrete riches of his poetry. For Goethe this question of the

nature of God was one which was profoundly interesting. If you wish to see how closely he had given his mind to it you have only to turn up the Correspondence, which is published in two volumes, between him and Schiller, and to read some of the letters in the beginning of the second volume. There is one in particular which was written from Weimar to Schiller, who was then at Jena, on the 6th of January 1798, from which it is plain that Goethe had been studying very closely the teaching of Schelling. It is also plain from the letters written about that period that Schiller had been urging on him the study of Kant, and that Goethe had applied himself to Kant and also to some of the writings of Fichte. Goethe also, as we know from the Eckermann Conversations, saw a great deal of Hegel. To what extent he was influenced by the younger men we are not told, but in his writings there are things which very plainly point to the influence on him of Spinoza and also of the great school of German idealists. There is one well-known poem of which I will give you a rendering which has been furnished to me, a poem which very strikingly illustrates the artist's grasp of the very conception which I have been pressing on you throughout these lectures, that God is to be sought not in some distant world, there and then, but here and now, in what is present to us, but comprehended in larger and fuller conceptions than any that ordinarily pass current.

I will quote first the English rendering, and then I will read the poem to you in the German.

"In His name who hath Himself created,
And through eternity createth still;
In His name who summoned into being
Faith, Love, Strength, Activity, and Will;
In name of Him whom each man calls upon,
But Whom in essence no man ever knows:

As far as ear, as far as eye can reach,
All that we know is in His image shown,
That image and that likeness which suffice
The spirit's highest inspiration.
It speeds thee on, impels thee forward still,
And where thou wanderest all is fair for thee,
No longer shalt thou mark or reckon time,
But measureless shall every footstep be.

What were a God who ruled as from without,
Who let the world about His finger spin?
Should He not be in Nature self-revealed,
And move and guide us rather from within?
That all things which in Him exist and live,
May fail in naught of what His power can give.

Also there is a Universe within,
And thence the goodly custom which arose,
That every man should hail as very God,
The highest and the holiest thing he knows,
Shall yield both Heaven and Earth unto His sway,
Should fear Him, yea, and love Him where he may."

Some of you who know your Goethe will recognise at once the first poem in the collection which he published under the title of "*Gott und Welt.*" I will now give it in German, because

you have it there in a way which even the best English version cannot reproduce.

"Im Namen dessen, der Sich selbst erschuf
Vor Ewigkeit in schaffendem Beruf;
In seinem Namen, der den Glauben schafft,
Vertrauen, Liebe, Thätigkeit und Kraft;
In jenes Namen, der so oft genannt,
Dem Wesen nach blieb immer unbekannt:

So weit das Ohr, so weit das Auge reicht,
Du findest nur Bekanntes, das Ihm gleicht,
Und deines Geistes höchster Feuerflug,
Hat schon am Gleichniss, hat am Bild genug;
Es zieht dich an, es reizt dich heiter fort,
Und wo du wandelst, schmückt sich Weg und Ort;
Du zählst nicht mehr, berechnest keine Zeit,
Und jeder Schritt is Unermesslichkeit.

Was wär' ein Gott der nur von Aussen stiesse,
Im Kreis das All am Finger laufen liesse,
Ihm ziemts die Welt im Innern zu bewegen,
Natur in Sich, Sich in Natur zu hegen,
So dass, was in Ihm lebt und webt und ist,
Nie seine Kraft, nie Seinen Geist vermisst.

Im Innern ist ein Universum auch;
Daher der Völker loblicher Gebrauch,
Das Jeglicher das Beste, was er kennt,
Er Gott, ja seinen Gott benennt,
Ihm Himmel und Erden uebergiebt,
Ihn furchtet, und wo möglich liebt."

Well, I will quote to you finally yet another great man, and again of a very different type. Luther, in his *Commentary on the Book of Daniel,* has given us his definition of God, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say his test of what is a

real conception of God. "A God," he says, "is simply that .whereon the human heart rests with trust, faith, hope, and love. If the resting is right, then the God is right; if the resting is wrong, then the God, too, is illusory." *

Now all these definitions by men of such different minds as Aristotle, Goethe, and Luther, are interesting in this, that they fix upon us the imperative necessity of beginning with the *here* and *now* if we would get to the nature of God. We must look within ourselves. We must take mind as it is and see what abstractions, what contractions, our plane of comprehension has brought about, and if we find that by criticism we can free ourselves from these abstractions, then the way lies open to getting a plainer conception of what it is that we are in search of. And so it comes about that not only the metaphysicians but the poets have been able to throw a light upon what, after all, is the most profoundly absorbing problem which can occupy humanity.

I now go back to the point at which I had arrived. I have shown you what is the relation of man to God, that it is the relation of mind comprehending itself at a lower level to mind comprehend-

* "Verum cum in Scriptura etiam idola aliquando Dii vocentur, cumque Deus nihil aliud sit quam id, cui cor humanum se credit, in quod spem omnem reponit, in quo fiduciam fixam habet, quod amat. Si fiducia pia ac bona est tum et Deus verus est. Si fiducia illa erronea ac falsa est, tum et Deus nihil est." —Luther, *Commentarius in Danielem Prophetam* (Frankfort 1556), p. 200 *recto*.

ing itself at the highest level. Now if that be true man must be at once in union with and in separation from God. If man's mind be just the infinite mind comprehended at a lower plane, then it is evident that you must have all the indications of unity in combination with difference. And this is because of the very character and nature of thought, as I have already set it out before you in the earlier lectures of this series. The nature of the mind is to be activity, and not only activity, but dialectical activity; that is to say, activity which is always seeking to realise itself in a higher truth, in which it takes up aspects which it had before fixed upon and set. One finds evidence of this in the recognition made in all ages of the necessarily progressive nature of the human mind. You see it, for example, in the doctrine of the Fall, and of the Atonement. In the pictorial representation which is given of man's early condition you have the state of childlike innocence, from which there was first a parting and then the return back to a state of childlike innocence, but not until after much that was disastrous had been passed through. But there is a difference between the state of mind of Adam before the Fall, and the state of mind to which man is represented as brought back in the scheme of salvation. In the mind of Adam you have childlike innocence, no doubt, but it is the innocence that comes of ignorance. In the course of man's redemption you have a mind brought back to God after having travelled along devious ways,

but ways which lead on to a higher level, until in the end the new dispensation is seen to be a higher dispensation than the old. And the reason of this is just that the mind of man has been in all ages recognised as having this double nature, the tendency to alienate itself from God, and the tendency, not less strongly marked, to bring itself back again.

Man is conscious of separation from God in that he is conscious of evil. But that is only one side of man's nature. He is finite spirit, and in his finiteness lies the possibility of the alienation. But he is free finite spirit, for freedom is of the very essence of spirit in whatever form you find it. Man can choose evil or he can choose the return to God. He is therefore responsible. He only does choose evil when he abstracts from his real relation to God, and so ignores and shuts out his higher nature.

Now much speculation has been concentrated in theological commentary upon the meaning of what is called the sin against the Holy Ghost. It is pretty plain that the idea underlying that sin is simply the idea of the man who shuts himself out from his higher nature, concentrates upon the moment of alienation and excludes the moment of return. It is a sin which is unforgivable in the sense that there can be no talk of forgiveness for the mind which does not seek forgiveness, which does not seek by surrender of its finite ends to free itself from the alienation. That has always seemed

to me to be the idea which underlay the thoughts of those who laid stress upon the peculiar and baffling nature of this sin.

But now look at the other side of the picture. Man is conscious of separation from God; that is to say, he is conscious of evil. But he is also in potential union with God. He is conscious of the capacity to lift himself towards God; that is to say, he has religion. When he renounces the will to live, his private will, the will which seeks his own finite ends, he has made the first step towards his reconciliation with God; that is to say, towards the transcending of the separation which has divided him from God, because, as we have seen, it is these very finite ends, which by hypothesis he is now renouncing, that have so coloured his view of things, so dominated his self-comprehension, as to throw his mind into the form of evil, of alienation. The consciousness of the possibility of identity with God is the consciousness of the higher side of his nature. Man dies to his private self in order to live, when he renounces his private will. His ends now become God's ends. Religion is an affair of the will, of a choice of ends, of an identification of the will with the divine will. It is therefore not theoretical but practical; it belongs to the sphere of the will.

The consciousness of this potential identity, of the significance of the renunciation which is necessary if we are to transcend the endless chase which is the characteristic of every process in

time, including the effort, however strenuous, at self-realisation in a social life in the world, is just religion. But, as in the case of the self-representative series which we discussed before, the life in this world, the life in *hetereity*, is an essential moment in the process without which the higher could not come to be. We have to die that we may live, and we equally have to live that we may die. The old dispensation is essential for the accomplishment of the new dispensation.

One understands better, in the light of these considerations, why it was that the chase of psychology after the self, which I traced out for you in the old course of lectures, proved so vain. The self of man in ultimate analysis discloses itself as free finite spirit. It cannot be got at as spirit, as subject, by the abstract and presentational method of psychology. This was found to consist in the fixing upon an aspect of the mind which was artificially set by itself and preserved in rigid self-identity. The method of presentationism, as explained and criticised by Professor Münsterberg in the book which I quoted to you so much in the last lectures, consists in the taking of the mind as though it were but an object, fixing it in thought as if it were but a series of feelings succeeding one another in time, and regarding the conception so obtained as an adequate conception of the mind. So it is for the purposes of psychology; you must treat it so if you are to get that possibility of measurement which

first becomes open to you by connecting the series so obtained with the physical events to which the modern physiological psychologist attaches so much importance. But that is not a final notion of the mind, and it is not a notion which can ever lead you to any adequate grasp of the self. The self we can get at, but only after we have found that the process of psychological analysis is of no use for our purpose. If you take the two moments in the presentation of the individual, body and soul, and seek for the conception in which alone they cease to be self-contradictory abstractions, you find it in the conception of the finite self as free finite spirit. Because the comprehension of the free spirit is here finite, its self-comprehension does not wholly overcome the externality in which it appears before itself, if I may use an expression that I have used before. Because his plane of comprehension is imperfect nature appears to man as a series of facts in mutual exclusion. It discloses a want of rationality and a certain contingency, inasmuch as he cannot bring these mutually exclusive events into any relationship which will rid them of the foreign aspect which they present to thought.

But it is only for finite mind, the mind which operates under finite categories and by understanding, as distinguished from the comprehension of reason, that nature appears thus hard-and-fast. Hegel points out in a passage in his *Philosophy of Religion* that "Nature enters into a relation with man only, and not on its own account into a relation

th God, for nature is not knowledge; God is ›irit, but nature knows nothing of Spirit." *

Now, that is a very remarkable piece of ticism. What Hegel says is that, for the know-lge of God, nature does not appear as it does us, and that it is real only at the plane of self-mprehension of the finite mind. In a higher ıd of knowledge nature would not appear as does to us, would not exist in the fixity and ntingency which characterises it for our finite ıne of reflection. The form, he says, in which u find nature arises only in and through the ite mind. It is only for the spirit that is limited the categories of finiteness that the vision of ture as external, irrational, and irresoluble by ;elligence, exists, just as in the same way it is ly for the finite spirit that evil exists. The man ıo could always remain at a high plane would t be tempted. It is only when he lets himself ›wn to the lower level that he is apt to make the oice of what is evil. And so it comes that it is ly for finite spirit and because of the freedom of ıite spirit that evil exists. Evil has no direct lation to God any more than nature has. Both ›pear only in the relations of finiteness and for the irit that is finite.

There is another very important passage of egel which occurs just a few sentences above the ıe which I have quoted to you from the *Religions-*

* Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, English Translation, vol. iii. 42.

Philosophie, and I will read it, because it may now throw light for you on what we have been discussing :—

"Another question," says Hegel, "or what is partly the same question with a broader meaning, is raised when it is said that the world or matter, inasmuch as it is regarded as having existed from all eternity, is uncreated and exists immediately for itself. The separation made by the understanding between form and matter lies at the basis of this statement; while the real truth is that matter and the world, regarded according to their fundamental characteristics, are this Other, the negative which is itself simply a moment or element of posited being. This is the opposite of something independent, and the meaning of its existence is simply that it annuls itself, and is a moment in the process. The natural world is relative, it is appearance; *i.e.*, it is this not only for us but implicitly, and it belongs to its quality or character to pass over and return into the ultimate Idea.

". . . The Idea is manifested, but its content is just the manifestation, and consists in its distinguishing itself as an Other, and then taking back this Other into itself, so that the expression taking back applies equally to what is done outside and inside. In nature these stages break up into a system of Kingdoms of Nature of which that of living things is the highest. Life, however, the highest form in which the Idea exhibits itself in nature, is simply something which sacrifices itself and whose essence

is to become Spirit, and this act of sacrifice is the negativity of the Idea as against its existence in this form. Spirit is just this act of advance into reality by means of nature; *i.e.*, Spirit finds its antithesis or opposite in Nature, and it is by the annulling of this opposition that it exists for itself and is Spirit. The finite world is the side of the difference which is put in contrast with the side which remains in its unity, and thus it breaks up into the natural world and the world of finite Spirit."* There you have in Hegel's own language the substance of what it has taken three lectures to set out before you.

Now I have discussed how it is that we come to appear to ourselves as though our mind had a local position in space and time and were a product of natural evolution, because that is the meaning of what we have been considering, the appearance of nature as something which limits the mind, as the *other*, to which the mind stands in relation. The understanding fixes exclusively upon the moment of antithesis in the logical process. It fixes upon the limitation of the mind which is characteristic of the finite standpoint, discovers the other of the mind in nature, and then proceeds to set in contrast to mind the nature which confronts it. One aspect becomes dependent upon the other and cannot be separated from it. The finite mind is conscious of itself as belonging

* Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, English Translation, vol. iii., p. 40.

to the object world, and so as related to nature, and not only to nature in the sense of mere externality in space and time, but to other finite minds which it conceives as having, not only a connection with nature, but a local position in it, as having position in space and as being, like itself, the product of evolution in time.

The finite mode of looking at things never completely transcends the appearance of externality that is characteristic of its finiteness; indeed, if it did, our knowledge would be not the knowledge of finite men but as God's knowledge. Yet its concepts, its concepts even of itself, are altering, developing concepts. In the finite mind you have as its characteristic the dialectical movement, the process of self-comprehension and, in that sense, of self-evolution, just as markedly as you have it in the absolute mind, but with the stages less perfectly separated out. If you take the finite mind as it manifests itself to itself in externality, the consciousness of a child, let us say, and trace it psychologically, you find that this is so. As I showed you in the first set of lectures, the true view of the way in which a child's mind grows is not to look on it as a process of piecing together ideas which exist in independent completeness and are as it were brought in and put together like a tesselated pavement in the child's mind. The true view is that there is a development from what is indefinite to what is definite, the differentiation of what begins as a psychological *continuum* into

more definite form. All this has been worked out by Professor Ward in his great article on "Psychology" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica;* and I do not go back to the matter because I discussed it pretty fully in last year's lectures. The point of it is that the child's mind differentiates itself through the course of its experience out of what is indefinite.

Now if that be true we have in it just the imperfect picture in time of what takes place in thought. In thought you have what comes first, implying, as what gives meaning to it and gives it reality, the larger conception which it may reach only at the end of a process in time, but which was implicit from the very beginning. In nature we see stages in the evolution of logical conception. We have such stages in number, the externality of which is transcended in the categories of mechanism, categories which import and imply something more than rigid externality. Yet these are themselves transcended in life, where you have got rid of the indifference to each other of the parts in mechanism, and have reached the whole which realises itself in and controls the parts and yet is nothing outside or distinct from them. In like manner you have the spectacle of what is a progressively fuller self-comprehension on the part even of the finite mind. We can see how that arises not only in our individual selves but in our social consciousness. Take my relation to other people in the world in which I live. My conscious-

ness of myself and the meaning which I attach to my own personality are a consciousness and a meaning which grow as grows the definiteness of my conception of the other persons. The one reacts upon the other. The comprehension of the identity of the self with that other who is recognised as equally a self, bound together with me in a common social whole, is one of the instruments by which I work out my own self-comprehension. The notion of such a whole is larger than the notion of the particular self from which I start, because it is freer from the exclusiveness of externality. If I think of myself merely as *M* or *N* confronted by a mechanical world, I think of two objects which I separate from each other as substances. When I think of *M* or *N* as in a social world with duties and obligations and common ties with other inhabitants of that world, then I have got to a larger and higher conception, and one at which I am above the externality of nature.

In his book on *Philosophical Theory of the State*, Professor Bosanquet has worked this out very fully. He shows how the reflection of the action of our own selves in the action of other men and women does much to stimulate and to develop our own consciousness of self. He draws the inference that every social group, the family, the city, the state, is the exhibition in space and time of the totality of the corresponding mental systems of individual minds. The social group or whole, he points out, must be a whole gathering

into itself psychical dispositions and activities, answering to one another in indeterminate ways. The social whole is therefore of the nature of a continuous or self-identical mind pervading a system of differences and realised in them. It differs from a machine, and even from a living organism, in that the whole is present in every part, not merely for the observer, but, through the nature of consciousness, in some degree, at least, for the part itself. It is not the less real because it is in a plurality of natural individuals that it is realised. And, like all the conceptions of reason, it contains the potentiality of its own supersession in a yet deeper and fuller conception. Purpose, the seeking to fulfil definite ends, has brought it about. Deeper purposes and larger ends point us to a continuation that goes beyond it.

Now that is the analysis of a philosopher. Let me contrast it with the same conclusion reached by one who was not a professed philosopher and whom I have quoted before, Carlyle. I shall just take a few sentences from *Sartor Resartus*, because they very strikingly illustrate the way in which Carlyle had come to much the same view of the nature of the relation of man to the social whole as has Professor Bosanquet, and as have those who have maintained the thesis which is the subject of these lectures.

"Of man's Activity and Attainment," says Carlyle in the 8th chapter of the Second Book of *Sartor Resartus*, "the chief results are aeriform,

mystic, and preserved in Tradition only: such are his Forms of Government, with the Authority they rest on; his Customs, or Fashions both of Cloth-habits and of Soul-habits; much more his collective stock of Handicrafts, the whole Faculty he has acquired of manipulating Nature: all these things, as indispensable and priceless as they are, cannot in any way be fixed under lock and key, but must flit, spirit-like, on impalpable vehicles, from Father to Son; if you demand sight of them, they are nowhere to be met with. Visible Ploughmen and Hammermen there have been, even from Cain and Tubal-Cain downwards: but where does your accumulated Agricultural, Metallurgic, and other Manufacturing *Skill* lie warehoused. It transmits itself on the atmospheric air, on the Sun's rays (by Hearing and Vision); it is a thing aeriform, impalpable, of quite spiritual sort. In like manner ask me not, Where are the *Laws;* where is the *Government?* In vain wilt thou go to Schönbrunn, to Downing Street, to the Palais Bourbon: thou findest nothing there but brick or stone houses, and some bundles of papers, tied with tape. Where then is that same cunningly devised almighty *Government* of theirs to be laid hands on? Everywhere yet nowhere: seen only in its works, this too is a thing aeriform, invisible; or if you will, mystic and miraculous. So spiritual (*geistig*) is our whole daily Life: all that we do springs out of Mystery, Spirit, Invisible Force; only like a little Cloud-image, or Armida's Palace, air-built, does

the Actual body itself forth from the great mystic Deep." *

Well, there you come very near to language which might be the language of any metaphysician, and yet it is the language of one who was observing in the concrete, and expressing merely the reflections which a historian, who was at the same time a poet, would make upon what passed before him.

I will conclude this lecture by quoting to you, in his own words, something else that Professor Bosanquet has said, because it is something that points us to what lies beyond even the ends and purposes which are embodied in the social whole.

"We have taken," he says, "Society and the State throughout to have their value in the human capacities which they are the means of realising, in which realisation their social aspect is an inevitable condition (for human nature is not complete in solitude), but is not, by itself, in its form of multitudes, the end. There is, therefore, no breach of continuity when the immediate participation of numbers, the direct moulding of life by the claims and relations of selves, falls away, and the human mind, consolidated and sustained by society, goes further on its path in removing contradictions and shaping its world and itself into unity. Art, philosophy, and religion, though in a sense the very life-blood of society, are not and could not be directly fashioned to meet the needs and uses of the multitude, and

* Carlyle, *Sartor Resartus*, Book II., Ch. 8.

their aim is not *in that sense* 'social.' They should rather be regarded as a continuation, within and founded on the Commonwealth, of the work which the Commonwealth begins in realising human nature; as fuller utterances of the same universal self which the 'general will' reveals in more precarious forms; and as in the same sense implicit in the consciousness of all, being an inheritance which is theirs so far as they can take possession of it." *

* Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State*, pp. 332, 333.

LECTURE VI

I WILL begin this lecture by answering a question which has been put to me by one of my audience. I am asked to explain how I understand self-consciousness to exist apart from actual physical brain-cells, changes within which are to be held responsible for all mind activity. Well, I dealt with that question at some length in the first six lectures of the last series, and the point of the answer which I then gave was this. All competent thinkers agree that you cannot stop with the mere picture of thought as a function of the brain. The brain and the whole of the external world as it appears in space and time are only there, in the deepest sense at all events, in the mind or *for* the mind that perceives them. That was what Berkeley and Mill taught, and what men like Mr Herbert Spencer teach, and the true controversy that arises is as to what brings about the appearance of objectivity or reality which this picture presents. I took Mill as my text in the lectures to which I allude, and I showed you how Mill brings you to the conclusion that it is in the fact that we *must* so think these things that we find what we mean by their reality.

I pointed out to you that this analysis was one which did not go deep enough, but that it at all events dispelled the notion that thought could be regarded merely as a function or product of the brain. It is quite true that in a certain way we do regard and must regard our minds as in time and as conditioned by a body which exists in space and time, but that view of the relationship belongs only to the picture which we have, as it were, painted for ourselves, and it is the hard-and-fastness of that picture which these lectures were directed to explain. I took an illustration, which perhaps is not a bad one upon this point, the illustration of the stereoscope. You look through the stereoscope at a flat piece of paper, and the lines which have been arranged on it stand out as if they were in three dimensions, instead of merely in two as we know they are. Now, everybody who looks through the stereoscope has the same conviction, that the lines are standing out in three dimensions. That is because everybody who looks through the stereoscope under the influence of suggestion thinks things in the same way, but abstracts from the circumstances in which his knowledge arises. He ignores the relation which would account for that abnormal presentation, and that is how he falls into the mistake of taking it to represent reality. In other words, he has not fully comprehended what is the object of his contemplation. Well, in the same way we form a picture of the mind as dependent on and contained by a body, a picture

the origin of which we do not fully comprehend. It is quite right that we should form such a picture; it is the picture which we have to form in order to fulfil the purposes which are ours in our everyday intercourse with our fellow human beings. But the picture of the world that is ours and our fellow human beings' is a picture which has grown in its definiteness in a fashion akin to the picture which we get through the stereoscope. Therefore my answer to my questioner is that while this view is not only a legitimate one for everyday life, but the view which we adopt in psychological investigation, it is a view which is abstract, and that its abstractness arises from this, that the mind in making it has not fully comprehended its own operation. I should like to be able to follow out this topic, but were I to do so it would land me in anthropology and psychology, and it would take six lectures at least to trace out the whole of the reasons why the mind comes to present itself to itself in the form of something conditioned by a body. I have touched on it in some of the lectures in this series, but those of you who wish to follow the subject further, and who read German, cannot do better than turn to a book—a short book of about 130 pages—which was written by Erdmann on the subject, under the title *Leib und Seele*, and which has been re-edited by a Dutch professor, Professor Bolland. It is plain from Professor Bolland's Introduction to that book that whether Hegelianism is alive in Germany or not it is very much alive in Holland, and the book, to

which he has contributed some valuable notes, is the most modern exposition I know of the Hegelian position on this point.

Now I come back to my topic. In the last lecture which I delivered I pointed out to you that great thinkers of the most various types had been in accord with the conclusions to which I was leading you. I showed you that Aristotle and Goethe, approaching the subject in entirely different fashions, had arrived at what was in substance a common result. Now, to some of you it may seem depressing that after two thousand years of work we should be going back to Aristotle, and discovering that he had found out these things long ago. But there is another side to that reflection. It is comforting to think that the truth is nothing so buried away that the human intelligence has not been able to get at it. It is a satisfaction that the great thinkers, in their diverse investigations into the meaning of reality, have arrived at substantially the same result as to its ultimate nature. That gives you the sense that the ground is more solid than people sometimes make out. There is another consideration which must be borne in mind by those who think that there ought to be the same sort of progress in philosophy that there is in science. In science the results which are reached by one generation are often superseded by the further results obtained by a subsequent generation. Much of what even Newton taught us is no longer sufficient, for mathematics and physics have now got

further than Newton had got. But that arises from the character of what science has to deal with. Science investigates—I am taking science in its narrower sense—the relations of things in space and time, and because it is carrying out the investigation of relations in space and time it is dealing with a field in which an endless progress is inevitable. There is no limit to space, there is no limit to time, considered as stretched out before us, and therefore there is no end to the possibilities of an inquiry conducted progressively into the content of that world which is stretched out in space and in time. You are always adding to your knowledge, and your method cannot sum up the series.

But there is another department of the mind where what you meet with is quite different in character. In art you deal with the concrete immediacy that confronts you. You do not try to break things up into abstract relations; you try to grasp what is highest in the world as it seems, and to present it at the highest level that the human mind is capable of. That is done, not by analysis, but by the insight of genius, when you have art in its highest form, and the result is that it is done once for all. We do not expect that the progress of another two thousand years will enable the human intelligence to produce anything greater of its kind than a Dante, or a Shakespeare, or a Milton has given to us. They have shown us what the *aperçu* of the human mind at its highest can amount to. We do not ask that what they have done should

be superseded, because we see that it is individual and cannot recur.

Well, philosophy stands midway between science and art. It too, like art, is not concerned with the endless progress of space and time relations. But, unlike art, its business is to comprehend in the forms of abstract thought, and consequently it occupies an intermediate position, a position in which it has, as it were, to deal with a series, but to deal with it upon the side of its summing up. And in that way philosophy, while it discloses progress, can disclose it only in the form of an increasingly complete grasp of the conception of reality which its great founders have fashioned out.

The history of philosophy is indeed no vain succession of system succeeded by system and thrown aside as if it had not been. We witness in this history the progressive deepening of the grasp which the human mind has got upon the nature of reality; we see the evolution of a conception in which past systems are not left behind as they would be on a journey through the world, but in which what is true in these past systems is taken up and preserved in those that succeed them.

Well, that is a reflection which may give some comfort to those who despair of philosophy. Philosophy is really the study of the self-comprehension of the mind, and its subject is neither the endless progress which you have in science, nor the immediacy and individuality of the sense pictures with which art deals.

Now I want to sum up, because I think it may make a little more clear to you what I have been doing, the result of the standpoint which I have been seeking to suggest to you, in other words than my own, and I am going to take a passage—or rather two passages—from Hegel and to give you in his own words what his view of the work of philosophy is. "The world," he says, "into whose depths *thought* penetrates is a supra-sensuous world, which is thus, to begin with, erected as a beyond over against immediate consciousness and present sensation; the power which thus rescues itself from the *here* that consists in the actuality and finiteness of sense, is the freedom of thought in knowledge. But the mind is able to heal this schism which its advance creates; it generates," and here he is speaking of a particular phase of it, "out of itself the works of fine art as the first middle term of reconciliation between pure thought and what is external, sensuous, and transitory, between nature, with its finite actuality, and the infinite freedom of the reason that comprehends." *

Then he goes on in a passage later in the same book to say this :— †

"The modern moralistic view starts from the fixed antithesis of the will in its spiritual universality to its sensuous natural particularity, and consists, not in the completed reconciliation of these contrasted sides, but in their conflict with one another,

* Hegel, *Introduction to Philosophy of Fine Art*, Bosanquet's Translation, p. 13. † *Ibid.*, p. 101.

which involves the requirement that the impulses which conflict with duty ought to yield to it. This antithesis does not merely display itself for our consciousness in the limited region of moral action; but also emerges as a fundamental distinction and antagonism between that which is essentially and in its own right, and that which is external reality and existence. Formulated in the abstract, it is the contrast of the universal and particular when the former is explicitly fixed over against the latter, just as the latter is over against the former; more concretely, it appears in nature as the opposition of the abstract law against the abundance of individual phenomena, each having its own character; in the mind as the sensuous and spiritual in man, as the battle of the spirit against the flesh, of duty for duty's sake, the cold command, with the individual interest, the sensuous inclinations and impulses, the individual disposition as such; as the hard conflict of inward freedom and of natural conception—empty in itself — compared with full concrete vitality; or of theory and subjective thought contrasted with objective existence and experience.

"These are antitheses which have not been invented either by the subtlety of reflection or by the pedantry of philosophy, but which have from all time and in manifold forms preoccupied and disquieted the human consciousness, although it was modern culture that elaborated them most distinctly, and forced them up to the point of most unbending contradiction. Intellectual culture and

the modern play of understanding create in man this contrast, which makes him an amphibious animal, inasmuch as it sets him to live in two contradictory worlds at once; so that even consciousness wanders back and forwards in this contradiction, and, shuttle-cocked from side to side, is unable to satisfy itself *as* itself on one side or the other. For, on the one side, we see man a prisoner in common reality and earthly temporality, oppressed by want and poverty, hard driven by nature, entangled in matter, in sensuous aims and their enjoyments; on the other side, he exalts himself to eternal ideas, to a realm of thought and freedom, imposes on himself as a *will* universal laws and attributions, strips his world of its living and flourishing reality, and dissolves it into abstractions, inasmuch as the mind is put upon vindicating its rights and its dignity simply by denying the rights of nature and maltreating it, thereby retaliating the oppression and violence which itself has experienced from nature. Such a discrepancy in life and consciousness involves for modern culture and its understanding the demand that the contradiction should be resolved. Yet the understanding cannot release itself from the fixity of these antitheses. The solution, therefore, remains for consciousness a mere ought, and the present and reality only stir themselves in the unrest of a perpetual to and fro, which seeks a reconciliation without finding it. Thus the question arises, whether such a many-sided and fundamental

opposition, which never gets beyond a mere ought and a postulated solution, can be the genuine and complete truth, and, in general, the supreme purpose. If the culture of the world has fallen into such a contradiction, it becomes the task of philosophy to undo or cancel it, *i.e.*, to show that neither the one alternative in its abstraction nor the other in similar one-sidedness possesses truth, but that they are essentially self-dissolving; that truth only lies in the conciliation and mediation of the two, and that this mediation is no mere postulate, but is in its nature and in reality accomplished, and always self-accomplishing. This intention agrees directly with the natural faith and will, which always has present to the mind's eye precisely this resolved antithesis, and in action makes it its purpose and achieves it. All that philosophy does is to furnish a reflective insight into the essence of the antithesis in so far as it shows that what constitutes truth is merely the resolution of the antithesis, and that not in the sense that the conflict and its aspects in any way *are not*, but in the sense that they *are, in reconciliation.*" *

Well, there you have the substance and essence of what I have been saying put in another form. It is a summing up of the method which thought must resort to if it is to get rid of the gaps and the antithesis which itself has created. The nature of thought and reality cannot be got at psychologically

* Hegel, *Introduction to Philosophy of Fine Art*, Bosanquet's Translation, p. 101.

by the presentationism which isolates thought from feeling and gives it a relational and what is sometimes called a discursive appearance. Great difficulty has been caused in the understanding of idealism by the notion that things exist, on the one hand, out there in their hard-and-fastness independently of the mind for which they are what they are, and on the other hand, that thought is something that we can isolate and distinguish from the other faculties and contents of the mind as if it had a position by itself. In grammar we break up the language which embodies thought into different parts, the subject, the predicate, and the copula, as though the copula were something which had existence apart from the other two which it unites. It is grammar and the old division of logic, based upon a scheme which Aristotle who founded it probably used for a special purpose and not as a guide to what he was teaching his pupils of the nature of reality, that have led to much of the difficulty that we often experience to-day. Just as in psychology we fall into presentationism—to use Münsterberg's phrase which I have so often used before in these lectures—the setting of feeling as not, what it is in reality, a part of the continuous flow of the content of the mind, but as something which can be isolated and treated as though it had an independent existence apart from the other contents of the mind, so in ordinary logic and psychology we are very apt to do the same with thought. We do it for some purposes, and it is right that

we should do it for some purposes, just as in psychology it is necessary to resort to the method of presentationism, but when you come to talk of the nature of reality and when you are inquiring into the meaning of things by the methods which we are using here, the conception of thought in which it is presented as an element existing apart from feeling is not only a narrow one, but a false and extremely misleading one.

Of course, thoughts do not make things. It is ridiculous to suppose that thought, in that narrow sense, can give you the meaning and nature of reality as consisting in what is reducible to such thought. The ignoring of the fact that thought has a wider meaning in which it embraces the entire activity of the mind, has led to a vast amount of confusion and fallacious reasoning.

Yet it is by asking what to be means, and by purifying our notion of the work of the mind, which bodies itself forth in reality, from the abstract fashions of regarding it which are useful for every-day purposes, that we make progress. The plane of our degree of reality in the self-development of absolute self-comprehension is what we have to clear our minds about. Our self-comprehension, the self-comprehension of finite mind, is only partial, just because mind in that form has imposed on itself the categories of what is partial, the conceptions of finitude. But we cannot entertain the notion that such limitations are final in the mind that fully comprehends itself as that within which all reality falls.

For the absolute mind and in the absolute mind to think must be to create. It is obvious that in saying this I am taking the word "thought" in the wider sense. To think is to create; in other words, for this is the other side of that reflection, intelligence and will must fall together. If we were at the plane of absolute self-comprehension, relieved from those categories of finitude which are always imposing upon us the necessity of conceiving everything as having reference to another beyond it, something foreign to itself, we should comprehend the world as God comprehends it.

Now, this idea of complete self-comprehension is no new idea. You find it in the poets. I go for illustration to another poet, a speculative poet, yet one who was less speculative than Goethe. Most of you here know Tennyson's little poem, a very short one, on the flower in the crannied wall:

> "Flower in the crannied wall,
> I pluck you out of the crannies;
> Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
> Little flower—but if I could understand
> What you are, root and all, and all in all,
> I should know what God and Man is."

Well, God as self-consciousness, the basis and presupposition of even our capacity to reflect about Him, must have an object from which He distinguishes Himself. I showed you in a previous lecture that even a sceptical question could only be raised upon the basis that it was an "I" that reflects, that to be self-conscious was the very characteristic

of mind, that the very nature of mind consisted in being self-conscious. But in self-consciousness we distinguish the self from something else. This is of the essence of the conception of self, and that characteristic must in some sort be the characteristic of Absolute Mind, as it is of mind at the plane of finite comprehension. If the Absolute Mind must have, as is implied in the fact of self-consciousness, an object, it is plain that that object can only be itself. For the Absolute Mind nothing can have any meaning, outside itself. Its object must fall within itself, can only be within itself. It must find the necessary distinction from itself in an Other that is just itself. The mind of God must have in its Other itself, and must recognise in that Other just Himself in the form of otherness.

Now that is not a modern conception. That is a conception which was embodied by Aristotle in his famous definition of God, the infinite intelligence, as the *νόησις νοήσεως*, "the knowledge of itself by knowledge." Absolute Mind can only think itself, and can only find the necessary distinction from itself in the Other which is just itself. That Other is *for* it, and the only finitude that comes in is not, and cannot be, finitude as belonging to the Absolute Mind as such, but to the Absolute Mind as Other to itself. It must recognise in its object itself, and itself as having assumed as object the form of finitude which for the Absolute Mind is thus an aspect in its own self-comprehension. Just because the other, the object of which the Absolute

Mind is conscious, is mind itself, the other must appear as a mind which knows, but knows having assumed the form of finitude. The Absolute Mind, of course, does not as such comprehend under the form of finitude, but its object, which is just itself as subject known as such in knowledge, appears as mind which has imposed upon itself the form of dependence on another to which it stands in contrast, and therefore knows under finite categories.

Now, if that is so the Absolute Mind has before it in the mind which is its object a mind for which nature and evil, which cannot be for it directly, can arise because of the nature of finitude, and these therefore touch the Absolute Mind only indirectly, in an aspect only of its self-comprehension. That is how the Absolute Mind realises itself in the process into which it is necessary that it should go in order to the enrichment of its self-consciousness. Without an object there could be no self-consciousness; without these distinctions there could be no content for the Absolute Mind; and yet in making these distinctions it must comprehend them as falling within itself, and as created by itself.

That is how God's nature is eternal activity, how He, so to speak, goes out into series and yet remains as the sum of the series—an eternal *now* which is not distinguished from but is the inclusion in itself, in a superseded and transmuted form, of the moments of past and future. In an ordinary time series we distinguish past, present, and future as three moments

which are related to one another, and are not wholly mutually exclusive like parts in space, yet we never transcend wholly the foreignness which time presents, the externality to each other of the members of its series for thought. But in such a series as I have been describing to you the whole of the series is summed up in an eternal *now* which does not make time unmeaning, but must transmute and supersede the notion of the past and the future as facts which limit or make finite the now, the eternal now of perfect comprehension.

Well, the purpose of the Absolute Mind, the end which it seeks to realise, must be self-comprehension in its utmost fulness. Self-consciousness must go into otherness in order to enrich itself, and it must return into itself, so to speak, in order to be the self-consciousness of the Absolute Mind. That is to say, just as we found that the nature of thought was a triple movement, that mind posited itself in difference and then comprehended its unity with that difference in that the difference turned out to fall within itself and to form one whole with itself, so we have the same movement of thought, the same dialectic of the notion, when we come to the characteristic of Absolute Mind. Just because we are dealing with mind of which the nature is to be activity and dialectical activity, you must have these three moments in the Absolute Mind: the first, the aspect from which you proceed, that of mind which we may speak of as mind in itself in so far as we abstract in reflection from the movement;

then the mind setting itself in antithesis to itself as the condition of self-consciousness; and then the self-consciousness, the complete self-comprehension, as the totality which embraces the two. And it is obvious that we are not here describing a process in time; we are describing a whole in which the first two appear only as aspects, and in which the richest conception is the conception of the totality of the other two moments.

You get in this way three phases: Absolute Mind in itself; Absolute Mind in its hetereity or otherness, under the distinction which it has set up of itself from itself; and Absolute Mind in synthesis, a synthesis which is the real *prius* of the other two. If this is the true nature of mind, its dialectical character must show itself not merely in the abstract language in which metaphysics describes it, the difficult language which I have been using, but also in much more concrete forms. You have it in art. You have it in such poems of Goethe and Wordsworth as I quoted to you, where you witness recognition of dialectic as the real characteristic of the world when that world is closely enough scrutinised. And you have it also in religion. Now, religion is the side of things in which the relation of man to God is realised, not in abstract terms, but in feeling and in acts of will. The nature of God, the nature of Absolute Mind, is to exhibit the triple movement of dialectic, and so the nature of God, as conceived and presented in religion, must be a triplicity, a Trinity. The doctrine of the

Trinity is by no means a specially Christian doctrine. You find it in other religions. You find it in Greek thought; you find the traces of its foundation in the *Dialogues* of Plato. It penetrated deeply into the way of looking at things of the Neoplatonic School of Alexandria, and through the Neoplatonists it came to influence the early theologians in a very marked fashion. It is not merely in philosophers like Philo and Plotinus that you find the beginnings of this doctrine. You find just as definitely the same sort of doctrine appearing in teachers like Justin Martyr and Athanasius, who were much under the influence of Plato and at the same time prominent Christians.

The creeds have always spoken in pictorial language. That is essential, because religion is something which deals not with abstractions, with what is mediated by thought, but with the immediate, with feeling, with direct consciousness. The creeds speak in pictorial language, and because truths which can be represented only in metaphysical language and abstractly are thus put into pictorial conceptions, there is constantly strife arising over the pictures which the mind frames of the ultimate aspects of reality. As it is stated in the creeds the doctrine of the Trinity is essentially a doctrine which can be adequately expressed only in metaphysical language. It belongs to reason as distinguished from understanding. I mean, of course, by reason the attitude of mind which comprehends, as distinguished

from the mental attitude which merely apprehends. And just because a doctrine which belongs to reason has been seized on by understanding, much strife and much obscurity has arisen.

Hegel makes the observation that "those who oppose the doctrine of the Trinity are men who are guided merely by their senses and understanding." But he goes on to point out that the advocates of the doctrine have used images and metaphors which are responsible for the confusion. The apparent incomprehensibility arises simply from this, that people will try to express in images which belong to the region of space and time what belongs to a higher level than that of mere space and time relations. There can be no incomprehensibility in the doctrine of the Trinity if our view of the nature of thought be true, the view, namely, that the difficulties with which thought has to cope are difficulties of its own creation, which it must therefore be adequate to deal with.

Well, let us see whether we can compare our metaphysical result, the result which we have reached in these lectures, as to the nature of mind, with the theological expression of the doctrine to which I have just made reference.

The Gospel of John begins with this sentence:— "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." Now, the Greek which is translated "word" is "Logos," and it is evident that the expression "word" is a very imperfect translation of what is conveyed by

"Logos." Logos is an expression which you find early in Greek philosophy, and it was a familiar expression in the School of Alexandria. It may well be that this sentence is an interpretive sentence which was inserted into the Gospel of John by somebody of a more metaphysical mind than its original writer. One might possibly paraphrase the first verse of John's Gospel, rendering it in metaphysical language, thus: "In the beginning was the concrete actuality of Spirit, and this concrete actuality of Spirit stood in relation to God, and one aspect of God was the Spirit which was so related." That, of course, is a paraphrase, but it is a paraphrase which comes very near to what seems to be the metaphysical meaning.

You have in the New Testament the recognition of the three moments on which metaphysics lays such stress. You have, first of all, that which in philosophy would be the aspect which belongs to what Hegel calls "Logic"—I mean the aspect which represents Mind taken in itself and apart from its consciousness of itself in another. Mind in itself may be said to represent what in theological language is described as the Father. In the element of the Son you have mind gone into otherness, hetereity, finite mind, the nature of which is conditioned by the externality which, as we saw, is only for and through the finite mind —God, in other words, imposing on Himself the limits of man's finitude, and so only, in this fashion alone, coming into direct relation with

nature, with evil, and with death. Then there is the third moment in the movement, the return of the Absolute Mind into itself in the fulness of its self-consciousness, the Holy Spirit, the aspect in the Trinity which is in reality the logical *prius* of the two other aspects, aspects which are separable only in abstraction.

Now, if you take into account that these three aspects of one reality, although they are three, are yet one, and, although they are one, are yet so in the unity of an Absolute Mind which distinguishes itself and expresses itself under these three aspects, the difficulty of the doctrine of the Trinity turns out, as Hegel has said, to be due to the tendency of man to look at things always in the light of his abstractions of the understanding, instead of from the standpoint of reason which comprehends and so transcends its own distinctions.

Turning back to John's Gospel I may observe in passing that the view of the nature of Ultimate Reality which I have been suggesting, throws light on a point on which there was a great controversy in the early Church. If it be the case that the true conception of the nature of absolute mind is that it implies the contemplation of itself as in otherness, as having taken upon itself the guise of finiteness, and as at the same time being reunited with itself in the completeness of self-conscious spirit,—then the third, the complete actuality in which the others are separable only by abstraction, is a third which implies the union of the other two.

The actuality of self-conscious mind has, as its moments, not merely the first aspect in the antithesis, absolute mind, taken by itself, nor the second taken by itself, but the two in combination. Now what was in the thoughts of the early theologians of the School of Alexandria is not easy to determine. But they had inherited the Platonic view of the dialectical nature of reason, and it is evident that they ascribe such a nature to God as they conceived Him. It seems, therefore, that those who succeeded them were right in invoking their authority in support of the doctrine that the Holy Spirit must be taken as proceeding from the Son as well as from the Father. If so, the weight of authority in a great controversy of the Christian Church is with those who argued in the sense in which the Western Church ultimately resolved it.

The Logos, as I have said, was a familiar word to students of Greek philosophy. The Platonic doctrine of the dialectical relation of the one and the many had profoundly influenced the School of Alexandria. Now, the translation of this first sentence in John's Gospel is very difficult. It is discussed in a very learned and scholarly work which I regret to think is out of print, but which I have had the advantage of consulting in the preparation of these lectures. I refer to Principal Donaldson's *Critical History of Christian Literature and Doctrine from the Death of the Apostles to the Nicene Council.* Principal Donaldson points out

that the words in the verse in John are not just what some of the interpreters have taken them to be. The words are in Greek, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος, not καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. To translate θεὸς as "God" seems therefore to go too far; to render it as "divine" seems too little. That is why I have suggested the true translation as being that the Logos was an aspect of the divine, a rendering which would accord with the current tradition of the Alexandrian School. It seems as though what was meant was to indicate, not numerical identity, but a different aspect of one reality. Especially suggestive, as showing the frame of mind from which that expression may have originated, is Principal Donaldson's account of the teaching of Justin Martyr, who lived in the second century. Justin Martyr was a close student of Plato. He explains that he wishes to call himself a Christian "not because the teachings of Plato are different from those of Christ, but because they are not in all points like." He believed that his teacher, Plato, had learned much from Moses, and that in Plato there were even anticipations of the doctrine of the Cross. Now, the influence of the Platonic doctrine of the one and the many, which was very prominent in men like Justin Martyr, certainly did not diminish as the Church grew. Athanasius was Bishop of Alexandria, and his name is associated with a great creed. Two things are certain, the one that Athanasius had been brought largely in contact with Neoplatonism; the other, that Athan-

asius had nothing whatever to do with the Athanasian Creed. That document was composed very much later. It probably did not emerge in its completeness until the seventh century, and Athanasius, who lived in the fourth century, obviously could have had no direct connection with it. But the name of Athanasius was a name of great renown, and it may well be that those who constructed the Athanasian Creed thought that his was a suitable name, having regard to the nature of his teaching, to give authority to a doctrine which seemed to accord with what tradition associated with him.

On the question of the nature of the Athanasian Creed and its position in Church history, I do not, of course, feel competent to speak, but Harnack, whose *History of Dogma* is the source of most of such information as I have upon the subject, in the fourth volume of the English translation discusses the origin of this Creed, and defines it as "the transformation of the doctrine of the Trinity as an article of Faith to be inwardly appropriated, into an ecclesiastical legal statute on the observance of which salvation depends." He states that the Athanasian Creed was apparently a Gallican Rule of Faith explanatory of the Creed of Nicæa, and that, probably as early as the fifth century, it began with the famous phrase "Quicunque vult salvus esse." By degrees it grew into its position as a Confession in the eighth or ninth century. Now the Athanasian Creed is the Creed which settled once and for all

the controversy over the "filioque" clause. Those of you who have read Church history know that the "filioque" clause was the clause which affirmed that the Procession of the Holy Ghost was from the Son as well as from the Father, and that over this question the Western Church and the Eastern Church were divided. The Athanasian Creed, which declares that "The Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son; neither made, nor created, nor begotton, but proceeding," pronounced for the Western view, and of course became the Creed of the Western Church. It asserts that "Unity in Trinity and Trinity in Unity" is what is to be worshipped, and it thus lays down a doctrine, obviously of Platonic origin so far as its language goes, which accords with the metaphysical view which I have been setting before you. The Athanasian Creed has been much abused, but at least it has the merit of showing a speculative insight much more profound than that of the other creeds. The history of the "filioque" clause controversy illustrates how much more of resemblance than of difference we find between old thoughts and new, when we take the trouble to try to understand the context and the circumstances in which the old thoughts were expressed. As Hegel, in his *Proofs of the Existence of God*, says: "The consideration" (of the relation of the mind of man to Absolute Mind), "is a matter at once of the deepest and most elevated kind, and just because of this it is the most difficult of tasks. You cannot carry it on

by means of finite categories; that is, the modes of thought which we employ in ordinary life and in dealing with contingent things, as well as those we are accustomed to in the sciences, don't suffice for it. The latter have their foundation, their logic, in connections which belong to what is finite; such as cause and effect; their laws, their descriptive terms, their modes of arguing, are purely relations belonging to what is conditioned, and which lose their significance at the heights where the Infinite is. They must indeed be employed, but at the same time they have always to be referred back to their proper sphere and have their meaning rectified." *

"The fact," he goes on, "of the fellowship of God and Man with each other involves a fellowship of Spirit with Spirit. It involves the most important questions. It is a fellowship, and this very circumstance involves the difficulty of at once maintaining the fact of difference, and of defining it in such a way as to preserve the fact of fellowship. That Man knows God implies, in accordance with the essential idea of communion or fellowship, that there is a community of knowledge; that is to say, Man knows God only in so far as God Himself knows Himself in Man. This knowledge is God's self-consciousness, but it is at the same time a knowledge of God on the part of Man, and the knowledge of God by Man is a knowledge of Man

* Hegel, *Proofs of the Existence of God*, English Translation, p. 303.

by God. The Spirit of Man, whereby he knows God, is simply the Spirit of God Himself." *

Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion*, from the last part of which I have quoted these words—for the *Proofs of the Existence of God* are an Appendix to his *Philosophy of Religion*—is one of the most important parts of his system. It fills up several gaps in his teaching. And in the *Philosophy of Religion* you have, in addition, the exhibition of a rich and reverent mind letting itself go freely into the task of trying to bring order and clearness into the comprehension of the most difficult of all problems.

Well, religion is related to philosophy, to abstract knowledge, in a way which marks it out as, on the one hand, necessitating that abstract knowledge for orderliness in its own doctrines, and, upon the other hand, as containing in itself something which no abstract doctrine can supply. The forms of religion vary. Their expressions of the truth differ in different ages and with different minds. But in the highest forms of religion there is a common content or substance. Faith always means the sense that the true reality of the world lies in the unseen; not in that which is merely hidden from sight, in the ordinary sense, but in aspects which require the use of higher categories than those of everyday social life for their grasp.

The central doctrine of the Atonement illustrates this, for it implies the potential identity of man and God in *a single subject of knowledge.*

* Hegel, *Ibid.*

Excepting on this footing, it is hardly intelligible. What it signifies is the return into identity from difference, the conception which, throughout the history of thought, has underlain the profoundest forms of speculation. In the religious consciousness this return appears as an exercise of the will—as a dying to live and that others may live. Thus the deliverances of the religious consciousness, in its broad interpretation, converge, as do those of the æsthetic consciousness, towards the same result as the teaching of philosophy gives.

I have completed with that observation the first six lectures of this course. What I have done in them is to try to build up an affirmative conception of what philosophy means by the expression "God." The result of my attempt has been to define God as mind that comprehends itself completely. Within such mind all reality—of whatever character or degree—must fall. It is a deduction from the definition that mind as it is in Man is this same self-comprehension, but at a plane or stage which is imperfect. I have shown you, further, that it is the nature and level of the purpose to be realised that determines the nature and level of the comprehension, and that thus it is in ends and not in causes that the explanation of the Universe is to be sought.

In this set of six lectures I have thus endeavoured to deal with the nature of what is Divine. My remaining four lectures will be directed to the nature of what is Human.

BOOK IV

FINITE MIND

LECTURE I

THE discussion of the nature of mind which occupied the last six lectures brought us to the conclusion that complete self-comprehension is the characteristic of mind, in the sense in which it is the equivalent of final and ultimate Reality. Such complete self-comprehension is, as I showed you, only possible in a consciousness where the categories, which are the forms of what, for want of a better expression, I will call its life and movement, are present in the entirety of their system and full relationship to each other. If mind concentrates under certain of these categories to the exclusion of others, and of their real relationship to these others and to the whole, imperfect self-comprehension is the characteristic of consciousness. Yet the very nature of reflection is to concentrate, in this partial and abstract fashion, as the logical preliminary to more complete self-realisation. Thus the finite is a necessary moment in the true infinite, but a moment only. So it is that mind as it is in man is mind that knows itself as known, and as known yet knows, a form into which Absolute Mind throws itself, in the attainment of the full

fruition of the riches of its self-comprehension. Such is the necessary outcome of the dialectical nature of thought. Like the men of science, whose procedure we discussed in Book II. of the first series of these lectures, we men and women have to limit ourselves that we may fulfil the ends for which we exist, and these ends themselves exist because they form part of the scheme of the Divine Mind.

Thus the self-comprehension of the human mind has the defect of its quality. Only in so far as its quality is what it is can that mind be human. In so far as it is human it is defective, and must remain so, in self-comprehension. That self-comprehension has to take place under time distinctions, in a process which is unending, because its essence is to recognise what is as qualified by what is not, inasmuch as, being not yet presented, the latter lies beyond. There is for us nowhere an aspect of reality which is not in contrast with another aspect, actual or possible. Did we not conceive our lives under such distinctions we should be untrue to the very basis of our existence, such as it is.

Even thought, which we are always seeking to abstract and present as other than its object, and to contrast with feeling, is thus characterised for us by finitude. It is natural that we should apply to it a method of investigation which gives us, indeed, clear knowledge of a kind, but clear knowledge purchased at the cost of our being obliged to treat thought abstractly, as if relational

and discursive. But the relational and discursive aspect turns out quickly to be but an aspect in which thought can present itself to itself. The fashion of such presentation implies a violent abstraction. That thought can itself correct this abstraction is apparent from the very fact that it is aware of the shortcoming and does correct it. The more closely self-consciousness is investigated, the more apparent it is that the distinction between subject and object is made by and falls within it.

Now you and I may expect, as we proceed to look in the next four lectures into the nature of finite mind, that we shall find this tendency to self-correction on the part of reflection everywhere apparent. Complete comprehension of self in its object there can never be, for the reason that I have so much dwelt on. But there can hardly be a limit assigned to the progress towards it. We shall expect, if we scan closely enough, to see in an ordinary view of the world about us lower aspects being displaced by higher ones, in a process that is unending in the sense that no limit can be assigned to it. *We* may not be able to sum up the series, but our study of the nature of consciousness may assure us that it can be, and is, summed up for a mind that is at a higher plane than ours. Just as the aspect of life was found by us to be freer from the abstractions of finitude than that of mechanism, just as consciousness in like manner proved to be, even for presentationism, an aspect of reality fuller and truer than that of life, so we

should expect to find aspects of the world as seems in which that world expresses a nature t is greater than the nature of finite self-hood, w the distinctness in which it crystallises what appe in it. Now such aspects we seem to discover ly ready to hand in what is characterised by beau and indeed in the entire world as it is for the art and especially in the forms in which he recrea it. Let us try to find out what these aspects m for him.

The most obvious characteristic of exter nature is the mutual exclusiveness of its appe ances, and the stubbornness with which they re the attempt of reflection to attribute to them a p vading rational significance. But in the recognit of beauty in nature we have before us a relations which transcends this hard-and-fastness of ext nality, and which is there, not for the pig or sheep, but only for the being that reflects. Yet reflection does not make things, and as, on the ot hand, things have no meaning or existence exc in reflection, beauty must belong to those form reality which fall within the individuality which universal and particular combine to form. It m be an aspect within the individual as object, as as any other aspect of the world as it seems. If its character must be that of the individual—in ot words, neither that of a universal of reflection, that of a mere fleeting particular of feeling. It m be complete in itself, and an end in itself.

Let us try to find out what are the charac

istics of the beautiful. In the first place, the senses through which we perceive beauty are the senses which are in the highest degree the handmaids of intelligence. We do not get any definite idea of beauty through the senses of taste or smell or touch taken by themselves. It is through sight and hearing that we perceive beautiful objects, and through these senses almost exclusively. This fact seems to indicate that it is only for a reflecting mind that what is beautiful exists. For a dog or a horse it is there, at the most, only in a very slight degree. On the other hand, it is clear that beauty is no abstraction, and cannot be resolved into concepts, however much its perception may vary with the capacity to form concepts. An object that is beautiful, whether for sight or for sound, is beautiful in so far as it is *expressive.* It must embody much more than a mere mechanical relationship, however perfect, much more than mere attainment even of a purpose. What then is it that such an object must express? If we go beyond the mere beauty of Nature, and turn to Art, we seem to get the answer to this question. The mind of the artist has the characteristic quality of mind: it is essentially *free.* It can mould and sever or combine its materials as it pleases. It can, therefore, in its various forms of activity, construct sensuous images which are in the highest degree expressive, expressive of the highest meaning which the mind is capable of grasping.

"The beauty of Art is the beauty that is born —born again, that is—of the mind, and by as much

as the mind and its products are higher than Nature and its appearances, by so much the beauty of Art is higher than the beauty of Nature." *

A sunset in Nature is infinitely richer in material and in brilliancy than a sunset painted by Turner. But the reason why a picture by Turner is in an extraordinary degree valuable is twofold. In the first place, in the picture we see nature as Turner saw it—in other words, we get an expression and a quality of expression which we cannot get otherwise. In the second place, although the expression is embodied in only a few poor patches of paint on a canvas, it is embodied in permanence, and not in the fleeting fashion in which nature generally embodies an expression. The true artist is therefore no copyist. His material, that which his technical skill enables him to mould, is, nothing abstract, but the individual in sensuous form. Yet in the sensuous material which he so moulds, mind is apparent. He is "nearer to mind and its thinking activity than is mere external unintelligent nature; in works of art mind has to do but with its own." † The immediacy of nature is in its character boundlessly contingent and transitory, and the tendency of reflection is to erect over against it an abstract realm of universals which, rational and permanent as is their nature, are yet inadequate to the concrete riches of this chaotic

* Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Fine Art*, Bosanquet's Translation, p. 5.

† Hegel, *Ibid.*, p. 22.

and fleeting spectacle. "But the mind is able to heal this schism which its advance creates, it generates out of itself the works of fine art as the first middle term of reconciliation between pure thought and what is external, sensuous, and transitory; between nature with its finite actuality, and the infinite freedom of the reason that comprehends."* . . . "Art liberates the real import of appearances from the semblance and deception of this bad and fleeting world, and imparts to phenomenal semblances a higher reality born of mind."† The work of art is what it is for sensuous apprehension. But it is no mere sensuous object. It addresses itself to the mind which is meant to be affected by it, and to find satisfaction in it. It is not for its *use* but for its *truth* that we turn to an object of art. But the truth to which we turn is not truth in a scientific or abstract form, but the truth which consists in the recognition of expression in an individual and sensuous form.

Many passages might be quoted from great art critics which bring out the point that I have been so constantly trying to insist on, the point that the individual is no mere symbol of abstract knowledge, no mere means to an end, but an end in itself, a true individual in which the mind rests satisfied as with something complete, self-sustaining and unique, something which leaves no sense of purpose unsatis-

* Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Fine Art*, Bosanquet's Translation, p. 13.

† *Ibid.*, p. 15.

fied. In our appreciation of his work the artist raises us to his own plane of comprehension. This is most plainly so in music, and the reason is easy to find. In music we are in feeling lifted away from the hard externality of nature which confronts us in even the most perfect definition of external form which painting or sculpture can give us. The centre of reality is no longer the not-self with which the self is confronted as with something foreign in which it has to seek a meaning, but feeling which belongs essentially to the region of the self. The externality of time and space is, as it were, abolished while we listen and realise ourselves anew in the sound that has transformed our world. Schopenhauer states this in another way when he points out that in music, as in all art, we are carried away from the desire to assert our individuality in the world of time and space, away from the plane at which we *will*, and at which we suffer pain because we suffer hindrance from the *Other* which confronts us. He speaks of the sense of unutterable depth in music "by virtue of which it floats through our consciousness as the vision of a paradise firmly believed in, yet ever distant from us, and by which it is so fully understood and yet so inexplicable." "This," he says, "rests on the fact that it restores to us all the emotions of our inmost nature, but entirely without reality, and removed from their pain." * In music we may say that we

* *World as Will and Idea;* English Translation, vol. I., p. 341.

are lifted to a plane which is above that of every-day life, in so far as the hard-and-fastness of our everyday standpoint melts away. A new standpoint emerges in which feeling predominates, which is characterised by very little abstract conception, but in which we none the less recognise that mind has lifted itself above the plane of the differences which really fall within it and are not final. The incrustations and inhibitions which hold down the "subliminal self" are in part, at least, removed, and there arises a new order of certainty. But just as I showed you in the earlier lectures that the revelations of the subliminal self were no safe guide by themselves, and must be made the servants of reason and not its masters, so the emotions which music awakens do not all stand on the same footing. Between the strains of a valse and a sonata of Beethoven there is a great difference, which cannot be referred to any difference in strength of feeling. It can only depend on the extent to which mind is bodied forth in the latter as distinguished from the former. We may derive satisfaction from the sonata even though badly executed. But perfection in execution cannot make the valse appeal to us in the same way. Technique is of high value and importance. Without it the greatest artist could not express his mind. But it is rather a means to an end than an end in itself. It is only mind that can satisfy mind, whether in music, or painting, or sculpture, or poetry. Mind seeks to find itself here, just as it does in other aspects of the world

as it seems. This is why the "own composition" at a concert is often so wearying to those who do not belong to the class of listeners who go there in search of technique only.

What I have been trying to set before you is still more apparent in poetry. The greatest quality of poetry is, as has often been said, that of "size." In other words, a really great poem must express a really great mind. In poetry, as in music, it is not an abstract conception that we look for. It is an individual reality complete in itself and depending on no meaning outside itself. The universal and particular moments in this individuality are not broken up by reflection, as is the case in science or even in everyday experience. Reflection is, of course, operative; otherwise in poetry we should be without permanence of expression, the contrast to the fleeting particulars that the actual perception of nature rescues only for the instant. But the permanent moment in poetry does not take the form of an abstraction, existing out of time and space. It may be a sensuous image, provided that what gives its characteristic and significance to the image is its embodiment of mind, its presentation of what is only for mind, and is therefore mind itself presented in this form. This is why art is the form of the individual which gives us the middle term between nature as essentially external, and thought as essentially above time and space. We cannot reduce beauty to principles of thought, or to relations of space and time. Beauty and the

object world of art constitute a realm by themselves, a realm complete in itself, an aspect of the world as it seems which is real, as every other aspect is real, because it is an aspect in which mind presents itself to itself, is for itself, a phase which cannot be explained away or melted down, because it is one among the ultimate forms of reality.

That poetry exists only in the reflective consciousness is clear when we consider what a poem is. On paper it is but a series of marks made with printer's ink, and it has no other significance either to the dog that chews the paper, or to the foreigner who knows not the language. To a person devoid of sense of poetic form it is but a series of somewhat obscure and ill-framed sentences. But to him who finds in it poetry it is very different. For such an one the poem is an individual fact of experience, but differs from other individual facts of experience in, among other qualities, its permanence. However often the book is shut, when it is opened the same thing is perceived. The ink may have faded, the paper may be torn, but the expression never changes. This is even more apparent in the case of music. The sounds in each performance are different, and, as unique individuals of experience, are there for the first time. The execution may vary greatly. But the impression made is the same, because what is expressed is not of the transient character of events of space and time, but belongs to a higher plane of mind, yet a

plane which has no existence except as embodied in the sensuous form which the art of the musician has created. All forms of art have this characteristic as their essence—that the moment of universality in them lifts their creations above the transitory and fleeting nature of the instant in which they are apprehended, and detaches them from the relationship of place in the Universe. The object whose nature is so transformed may be a very simple one. A Dutch landscape painter has placed before us, say, a peasant's cottage and some animals. Any one who cares is attracted and moved by the picture. Why? However minute and careful the work, it is but patches of paint on a canvas, and the material is far inferior to that of the original, nature. Yet it moves us as nature cannot. The reason is that the artist has detached and fashioned the scene in such a way as to lift us above the merely sensuous. A sense of aloofness from the contingency of our surroundings comes to us, and of aloofness from the particularism of ourselves. The moment ceases to interest us, to be important. The peasants, the cottage, the cattle, have long since passed away, nay, they never were! But they express and engross us in that stillness and peace of nature which they do not symbolise as a word symbolises a concept, but embody as a universal in individual form. They lift us towards a view of the world from the platform of those who are spectators of all time and all existence. In this fashion, Art mediates

between thought and sense, and so fulfils a special function which can be fulfilled by no other form of spiritual activity.

What has been said may serve to cast some light on the famous saying, "Art for Art's sake." For it follows, in the first place, that in the concrete fact of Art we can never separate form from matter. We can never value a poem merely for its cadence, or only for its meaning. It is an end in itself, and is to be valued for its own sake and not for that of some end or standard beyond. In the second place, Art can never be explained in terms of anything else, for that would mean that as a form of reality it was derivative only, and not self-subsisting. We may, indeed, show its place among the planes or stages from which Mind comprehends what is in ultimate analysis Mind. But, just because it is equally real with every other plane or stage, every attempt at a definition of it is tautologous. To define a poem as "the succession of experiences—sounds, images, thoughts, emotions—through which I pass when I am reading as poetically as I can"—is, not to define, but to point to a "this" beyond which I cannot get. The poem, like the picture and the sonata, is no copy of nature; its appeal is to the imagination which is contemplative, and not to that which is merely reproductive. In the whole which the poet creates neither form nor matter can be abstracted or altered. The parody, which can make the hero of the poem into a ridiculous figure, depends on this fact. Where form is less obviously

essential than it is in verse, as, for instance, in th novel, parody becomes easy, as in Thackeray parodies of Scott and other novelists of th romantic school. There, by an alteration of form the significance of the whole is transformed fro what is serious into what is ludicrous. This more difficult with verse, where form predominate but it has often been done. On the other hand, th form may be reproduced apart from the matter i the parody, and then the result is uninteresting fo want of content, and is merely a *tour de force.*

It can hardly be too much insisted on that, i the work of art, form and content are reall inseparable. What would *Hamlet* or *Paradise Lo* be without the presence of both? The combinatio is what gives these poems their "size." And th combination is no addition of elements that ar independent of one another. The gift of the artis is not to be a thinker, or to set before his mind a abstract conception, and then to see how he ca embody it by virtue of his technical skill. His gi is rather that of creative imagination, in the forma tions of which his qualities are indissolubly fuse just as the qualities of form and content are indi solubly fused in his work. It is so that we get i the creation of the artist something that appeals t us far more vividly than the reasoning of th philosopher. I remember reading in the news papers that someone had written to Cardina Newman to ask him to state precisely what he ha in his mind when he wrote "Lead, Kindly Light!

The Cardinal was said to have replied that he did not know. Of course, he did not know! The verses were the work of an artist, not of a theologian, and that is what was not realised by an excellent clergyman who tried, without consulting their author, to improve them by adding a verse setting forth their theological significance.

The present Professor of Poetry in Oxford University has put this so admirably, in the course of an inaugural address which he delivered not long ago, that I will quote his words: "Pure poetry is not the decoration of a preconceived and clearly defined matter; it springs from the creative impulse of a vague imaginative mass pressing for development and definition. If the poet always knew exactly what he meant to say, why should he write the poem? The poem would, in fact, already be written. For only its completion can reveal, even to him, exactly what he wanted. When he began, and while he was at work, he did not possess its meaning; it possessed him. It was not a fully formed soul asking for a body: it was an inchoate soul in the inchoate body of perhaps two or three vague ideas and a few scattered phrases. The growing of this body, its full stature and perfect shape, was the same thing as the gradual self-definition of the meaning. And this is the reason why such poems strike us as creations, not manufactures, and have the magical effect which mere decoration cannot produce. This is also the reason why, if we insist on asking for the meaning of such

a poem, we can only be answered, 'It means itself.'" *

In his *Conversations with Goethe*, Eckermann describes how Goethe instructed him in what to look for in the works of art that were shown to him: "We then opened the portfolios, and proceeded to the examination of the drawings and engravings. . . . Goethe in such matters takes great pains on my account, and I see that it is his intention to give me a higher degree of penetration in the observation of works of art. He shows me only what is perfect in its kind, and endeavours to make me apprehend the intention and merit of the artist, that I may learn to pursue the thought of the best and feel like the best. 'This,' said he, 'is the way to cultivate what we call taste. Taste is only to be educated by contemplation, not of the tolerably good, but of the truly excellent. I therefore show you only the best works, and when you are grounded in these you will have a standard for the rest which you will know how to value without overrating them. And I will show you the best in each class, that you may perceive that no class is to be despised, but that each gives delight when a man of genius attains his highest point. For instance, this piece by a French artist is *galant* to a degree which you see nowhere else, and is therefore a model in its way.'

"Goethe handed me the engraving, and I looked

* *Poetry for Poetry's Sake*—An Inaugural Address delivered on 5th June 1901—p. 28. By Professor A. C. Bradley.

at it with delight. There was a beautiful room in a summer residence, with windows looking into a garden, where one might see the most graceful figures. A handsome lady, aged about thirty, was sitting with a music book from which she seemed to have just sung. Sitting by her, a little further back, was a young girl of about fifteen. At the open window behind stood another young lady holding a lute, upon which she seemed still to be sounding. At this moment a young gentleman was entering, to whom the eyes of the ladies were directed. He seemed to have interrupted the music, and his slight bow gave the notion that he was making an apology which the ladies were gratified to hear. 'That, I think,' said Goethe, 'as *galant* as any piece of Calderon's, and you have now seen the very best thing of the kind. But what say you to this?' With these words he handed me some etchings by Roos, the famous painter of animals; they were all of sheep, in every posture and situation. The simplicity of their countenances, the ugliness and shabbiness of the fleece, all was represented with the utmost fidelity, as if it were nature itself. 'I always feel uneasy,' said Goethe, 'when I look at these beasts. Their state, so limited, dull, gaping, and dreaming, excites in me such sympathy that I fear I shall become a sheep, and almost think the artist must have been one. At all events it is wonderful how Roos has been able to think and feel himself into the very soul of these creatures, so as to make the internal character

peer with such force through the outward covering. Here you see what a great talent can do when it keeps steady to subjects which are congenial with its nature.' 'Has not then,' said I, 'this artist painted also dogs, cats, and beasts of prey with similar truth; nay, with this great gift of assuming a mental state foreign to himself, has he not been able to delineate human character with equal fidelity?' 'No,' said Goethe, 'all that lay out of his sphere; but the gentle grass-eating animals, sheep, goats, cows, and the like, he was never weary of repeating; this was the peculiar province of his talent which he did not quit during the whole course of his life. And in this he did well. A sympathy with these animals was born with him, a knowledge of their psychological condition was given to him, and thus he had so fine an eye for their bodily structure. Other creatures were, perhaps, not so transparent to him, and therefore he felt neither calling nor impulse to paint them.'"

In a passage a little further on Goethe points out the difference between science and art. In science the treatment is nothing and the discovery everything. In art the idea is common property. It is the power of embodying it in a concrete work that makes the artist, it is this power for which we look in him. In his *Laocoon* Lessing expresses the same thought: "The aim of science is truth; the aim of the arts, on the contrary, is to give artistic pleasure. The artist need not copy or even be true to nature. He may achieve his aim in repre-

senting the commonest objects." For that aim is not mere nature any more than mere thought. It is rather, to use a phrase of Schopenhauer's, the Idea, and therefore the Ideal, with which he concerns himself, and to which he moulds matter and form alike.

The work of art is not to instruct, not to expound abstract conceptions. It has always to bring its content before the mind's eye, not in its generality as such, but with this generality made individual and sensuously particularised. When Byron says :—

> "I live not in myself, but I become
> Portion of that around me, and to me
> High mountains are a feeling,"

he is expressing the standpoint of poetical emotion from which idealism is embodied in feeling about nature. The conception which qualifies such feeling could never be expressed abstractly with the same vividness, perhaps it could never be *expressed* at all so to seem real. But the poet makes us *feel* its truth. It is the function of genius to lift us, in the medium of what is particular and immediate, to a higher plane, and so to set the world in a new light. The spectator is, as it were, lifted up, so that he feels himself above and beyond the hard-and-fast distinctions which are, at a lower plane, assumed as reality. But the ideal with which he is brought face to face is not in contrast with a reality that is hard-and-fast. It is just that reality raised to a higher plane. The world as it is for art is what it

is in virtue of thought, which, as it were, shines through a sensuous garment. But the garment that shines is just as much a part of the world of reality as was the garment before it shone. In the world of art we are still in the real world, in the same way as the man of science who has passed from the phenomenon to its law is still in the real world. He looks at the water before him. He thinks of the law of its chemical constitution out of oxygen and hydrogen atoms; yet it is still water for him, though its meaning and the nature of its reality have become enlarged for him. The particular concerns him less, the universal more. So with the artist: he sets reality in a new light for us, a light which removes us farther from particularism :—

"Art may tell a truth
Obliquely, do the thing shall breed the thought,
Nor wrong the thought, missing the mediate words.
So you may paint your picture, twice show truth,
Beyond mere imagery on the wall,—
So, note for note, bring music from your mind,
Deeper than ever the andante dived,—
So write a book shall mean, beyond the facts,
Suffice the eye and save the soul beside." *

It is time to turn again to the significance of Art from the speculative side. We have approached sufficiently near to the nature of the beautiful to get some inkling of this significance. The topic of the meaning of Art and the divisions into which Æsthetics fall is one so vast, and so surrounded with materials which generation after generation

* Browning, at the end of the *Ring and the Book*.

has piled up, that nothing short of a treatise is sufficient to contain an account of it. Those of you who wish to pursue this topic further must turn to such books in this department as those of Hegel and Bosanquet. But with even the glimpse we have got of the nature of the beautiful it is possible to get some understanding of the place of Art as a stage towards reality.

Let us imagine that we can present to ourselves a view of the world as exhibiting no relations which go beyond those of externality to each other of events in time and space. Let us suppose, if we can, that the mind passively receives a series of impressions which assume in consciousness the form of a stream of isolated feelings. Let us try to imagine, further, that the mind which is passively conscious of these feelings reasons about them in a fashion which neither imparts to them nor takes from them any portion of the system in which they are real. The conceptions which the mind forms, and its purposes in forming these conceptions, will be abstract and separate from the concrete feelings about which the reasoning takes place. Now in the real universe we find no analogue of such a process. We saw that the mind and its object cannot be separated. We found that even in our everyday experience that experience was continuously moulded through the ends and purposes which determined the percipient in organising knowledge. But I told you in the end of the third lecture I delivered here last year,

how Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, had failed to realise this, and how he had tried to treat experience as something that could be peeled into layers like an onion, as something that consisted of elements, contributed by sense and understanding respectively, which were in some fashion self-subsisting and independent of each other, and which could therefore be considered as separable in fact. The result was that for Kant the real world was limited by what could be expressed through the conceptions of substance, cause, and reciprocity. On the other side of the gulf which reason had discovered lay a partly subjective world in which the Ideas of our practical reason, of the moral world, lay. To this unreal world must for him be relegated such ideals as those of God, Freedom, and Immortality, abstract conceptions which the constitution of reason compelled us to believe to be realisable somehow, but never here or now. It became obvious to Kant that this huge gap between the faculties of the mind as well as between their objects must in some sort be shown as bridged over, if we were to be capable at all of understanding how it was the world seemed, as it did seem to us, to present all these aspects, and not only the first kind. He had divided the mind into three faculties, that of Conception, that of Judgment, and that of Reason. The first gave us reality, but reality as but mechanical. The last gave us the ideal, but the ideal as separated from the real world by a gulf. If, then, the apparent

continuity of our actual attitude towards life was to be accounted for, there must be a faculty which produced the semblance of ideality in the region of direct perception, and the semblance of direct perception in the region of the ideal. This faculty was that of judgment, and its work was examined and its limits defined by Kant in his *Critique of Judgment.*

It is a tradition in the philosophical world that the Critique of Pure Reason influenced the development of speculative thought less than did the Critique of Judgment. The truth which underlies the tradition is that in the latter book Kant came very near the position which was common to Aristotle and the German thinkers of the early part of the nineteenth century. Here he set out a view of the individual in which the universal of reason and the particular of sensation were no longer divorced, as was, at least to a considerable extent, the case in the other parts of his system. It is true that the union is allowed to possess reality only of a subjective kind, as a regulative principle in judgment about experience, which experience thus comes to *seem* as though it contained individuals of beauty and organisation in which the ideal cannot be regarded as abstract merely, or otherwise than in indissoluble combination with sense. Still, so far as he allowed to such individuals any reality at all, they formed a true feature of the world as comprehended by us, a world from which we could not get away. For him the beautiful was a fact,

and it was quite different from the merely pleasant, which was what it was because it satisfied a purpose of a particular mind, and was therefore merely subjective. It was also different from the good, because this was what it was in virtue of being means to an end. For Kant beauty and life were the points at which two regions met, where reason was represented in the world of sense, and sense was represented in the world of reason. Only in abstraction could the beautiful and the living be broken up into their moments. For in them there was no division between means and end.

But Kant, as I have told you, while he declared that this was so, stopped short at admitting that it was so otherwise than *sub modo*, for a particular faculty only. He never got away from the artificial antithesis, which pervades his system, of subjective thought and objective things, of abstract universality and sensuous particularity. Of the Critique of Judgment, Hegel says: "This criticism forms the starting-point for the true conception of artistic beauty. Yet this conception had to overcome the Kantian defects before it could assert itself as the higher grasp of the true unity of necessity and freedom, of the particular and the universal, of the sensuous and the rational. And so it must be admitted that the artistic sense of a profound and, at the same time, philosophic mind, was beforehand with philosophy as such in demanding and commanding the principle of totality and

reconciliation, as against that abstract endlessness of reflective thought, that duty for duty's sake, that intelligence devoid of plastic shape, which apprehend nature and reality, sensation and feeling, as a mere *limit*, and as an absolutely hostile element. For Schiller must be credited with the great merit of having broken through the Kantian subjectivity, and having dared the attempt to transcend these limits by intellectually grasping the principles of unity and reconciliation as the truth, and realising them in art. Schiller, in his æsthetic discussions, did not simply adhere to art and its interest without concerning himself about its relation to philosophy proper, but compared his interest in artistic beauty with the principles of philosophy; and it was only by starting from the latter, and by their help, that he penetrated the profounder nature of the beautiful. Thus we feel it to be a feature in one period of his works that he has busied himself with thought—more, perhaps, than was conducive to their unsophisticated beauty as works of art. The intentional character of abstract reflection and even the interest of the philosophical ideas are noticeable in many of his poems. This has been made a ground of censure against him, especially by way of blaming and depreciating him in comparison with Goethe's straightforwardness and objectivity. But in this respect Schiller, as poet, did but pay the debt of his time; and the reason lay in a perplexity which turned out only to the honour of that sublime soul and pro-

found character and to the profit of science and cognition." *

Schiller, though penetrated by the theoretical teaching of the Critique of Judgment, was not dominated by it, and he was able, as Hegel points out, to carry matters a stage further on. Jena, in the early years of that century, was a fruitful place. There Schiller and Goethe not only met each other but met Schelling and Hegel. The skeleton of the theory of art became clothed with living flesh and blood. Hegel himself there learned the lesson which taught him to seek to gather together in his hand the strands of which he had such ample opportunity to lay hold. For him the region of the beautiful, the region too of the other forms that belong to art, was the region in which Mind, the Idea, exists, not as philosophy conceives and sets it forth in abstract terms, but "as developed into concrete form fit for reality, and as having entered into unity with this reality. For the idea as such, although it is the essentially and actually true, is yet the truth in its generality which has not yet taken objective shape; but the Idea as the beautiful in art is at once the Idea when specially determined as in its essence individual reality, and also an individual shape of reality essentially destined to embody and reveal the Idea. This amounts to enunciating the requirement that the Idea, and its plastic mould as concrete reality, are to be made completely adequate to one another. When reduced

* *Philosophy of Fine Art*, Bosanquet's Translation, p. 116.

to such a form the Idea, as a reality moulded in conformity with the conception of the Idea, is the Ideal." *

Carlyle in his own way puts it in words which I may quote to you :—

"Another matter it is, however, when your Symbol has intrinsic meaning, and is of itself *fit* that men should unite round it. Let but the Godlike manifest itself to Sense; let but Eternity look, more or less visibly, through the Time-Figure (*Zeit-bild*)! Then is it fit that men unite there; and worship together before such Symbol; and so from day to day, and from age to age, superadd to it a new divineness.

"Of this latter sort are all true Works of Art; in them (if thou dost know a Work of Art from a Daub of Artifice) wilt thou discern Eternity looking through Time; the Godlike rendered visible. . . .

" . . . Highest of all Symbols are those wherein the Artist or Poet has risen into Prophet, and all men can recognise a present God, and worship the same; I mean religious Symbols. Various enough have been such religious Symbols, what we call *Religious;* as men stood in this stage of Culture or the other, and could worse or better body forth the Godlike: some Symbols with a transient intrinsic worth; many with only an extrinsic. If thou ask to what height man has carried it in this manner, look on our divinest Symbol; on Jesus of Nazareth, and His Life, and

* *Ibid.*, p. 141.

His Biography, and what followed therefrom. Higher has the human thought not yet reached: this is Christianity and Christendom; a Symbol of quite perennial, infinite character; whose significance will ever demand to be anew inquired into, and anew made manifest." *

Thus in the picture gallery of Art we have Reason which is intuitive, the complete fusion of the universal and the particular, the individual in a form in which thought and feeling have in this, as elsewhere, fallen together, the true relation between Logic and Nature. The here and the now are transcended. The fleeting impression is rescued from the flux of time and the relativity of place. It receives immortality from the spirit which it embodies, a spirit which, in its turn, only in this embodiment gains its unique and incomparable character as concrete fact. The words of an Aristotle or of a Newton may cease to be for us lasting and final words. The words of a Homer or a Shakespeare are imperishable. For as men and women we cannot transcend the plane at which they represent the most that is possible in immediate presentation.

* Carlyle, *Sartor Resartus*, Chapter on Symbols.

LECTURE II

I SPENT my time yesterday in examining the human mind in phases in which it touches the infinite. In the earlier lectures of this second course, I began by approaching mind from the side on which it presents an aspect that is absolute. In this latter part of the course, I am starting from the aspect in which mind is finite, and working up to the level at which it attains to the infinite. Yesterday I took that phase of the human mind in which its perception is immediate, and in which what it perceives yet represents knowledge that is absolute. I took the immediate as it appears in Art, and I showed you that in Art the mind transcends its own finite forms. In Art it is quite true that that with which we are in contact is in its nature something that has a locality in space and a position in time. It may be but the vanishing patches of paint upon a canvas. But what the mind really has before it in Art is, not the patches of paint upon the canvas, but itself, directly revealed in the highest form. Art is no matter of inference; Art is not something to which we come mediately. It is that which is directly presented,

but presented, as it were, in a sensuous form through which it shines. Absolute mind as disclosed in Art is not something which is *behind* the sensuous form, but is *in* the sensuous form, and gives its meaning and character to that form. Therefore, although the patches of paint are but patches of paint, and although the canvas is but canvas, what is represented by the hand of genius is something, as I showed you, which is above time and space in the sense that time and space are indifferent to it. The meaning for us of what is in the landscape of the Dutch painter remains, although the figures have no reality, and although the scene belongs to a period of time which is past, or even never was. The significance is one which transcends the particularism of the observer and the observed, and in it you have the directly revealed manifestation of that side of mind in which it is no longer finite but has transcended the limits of its own finitude. In other words, you have, in what is represented in the picture, mind comprehending itself in its fulness.

Now that is one phase of mind in which it discloses itself in immediacy, and there is another phase of mind in which, even for us men and women, the higher aspect is disclosed in a different form of immediacy. Religion is something just as real as is Art. In Religion you have an aspect of the human mind in which it is in contrast with the human mind as you have it in ethical relations. In Ethics you are always confronted with this, that

beyond the deed that is done lies another deed which has yet to be accomplished. In the duty which you have to another person to treat him as a person, as you yourself would be treated, you are still in the relationship of the one and the many. That other person is, like yourself in that relation, finite, and beyond him and you, beyond even the society of which you both form members, there are levels which you have not reached, and which, if you did reach them, would still leave you confronted with something beyond, separating you from infinitude. In Ethics, in other words, you are capable only of endless progress, in which the self never reaches its own goal or its own self-comprehension. But in Religion, the essence of which is the surrender by the self of its finite ends and the acceptance of the ends of God in place of these finite ends, you have the transcendence of that relation of finitude in which the self is always confronted with another beyond. In Religion the self finds its true life in the life of God, and in that way the contradiction which manifests itself at every turn of its finite action is overcome.

In Religion you have got reality, but reality manifested, like reality in Art, only in immediacy. You have it in the sense of the surrender by the will of its finite purposes. In Religion, as in Art, you are dealing with what is immediate. It is in feeling, not in abstract conception, that Religion dwells, and it is in that act of will which assumes the form of the surrender of the

purposes that are not final that the essence of Religion consists. Therefore in Religion, as in Art, what you are dealing with is not abstract conception. I do not wish you to understand me as conveying to you that one ought to, or indeed that one can, separate Art and Religion and Thought from one another as though they were the manifestations of three different faculties of the mind. On the contrary, what I have been insisting on throughout the whole of these lectures is that we must start from the mind itself as final reality, and that Art in the form of feeling, and Religion in the form of the consciousness of an act of will completed, and Thought as the other form in which the activity of the mind manifests itself, are three forms, but three forms which are only separated and isolated from one another by the act of the very self-consciousness to which they belong, and within which they are merely phases of one activity. Nevertheless, when we are dealing with that aspect with which Religion is concerned, we are dwelling upon that which concerns the will, as distinguished from that which belongs to the sphere of the beautiful or to the sphere of contemplation.

When we take a man of devout character who is also a thinker, when we take, for example, the personality of such a man as Spinoza, "the God intoxicated," we recognise in him a holy man, not on account of his thought, but on account of his attitude of will, the attitude of will which manifested

itself throughout his work, the resignation of the will to live, and the acceptance of absolute purpose. Nevertheless we are always aware that in the contemplation of such a character we cannot separate off the will from the intellect, but that the one profoundly influences the other. The purpose of the religious man is to die to self, as it has been said, in order to live in God; that is to say, in the exercise of the freedom that belongs to him even as finite spirit, to cease to will finite ends and purposes. The medium in which his religious consciousness embodies itself is thus acts of will and phases of feeling. Scientific knowledge belongs to another sphere, and the ends which scientific knowledge seeks to realise are apart from the ends which are sought after in Religion. Between Science and Religion, so understood, there is no conflict, simply because the two do not aim at the same thing, and accordingly we must bear in mind that the deliverances of the religious consciousness, in so far as they travel outside their sphere of immediacy, must always be symbolical, and can never in themselves and of themselves be guides to scientific conceptions.

By the reflective phase of that initial activity of mind, which only in abstraction is separated into the different forms which I have mentioned, I mean the power which the human mind has to become in contemplation conscious of its own limits, and in this consciousness to transcend them. Now that consciousness is not immediate, as is

the case with Art and with Religion. It is only in reflection that the human mind can transcend the limits of its finitude, and that reflection takes place in the form of inference. Not only does it take place in the form of inference, but the inference is the inference of finite mind conscious of itself as finite. Nevertheless reflection does often assist the finite individual to bear with and even rise above the limitations of his finitude. I have never wholly agreed with Shakespeare that a philosopher could be no better than anybody else at bearing toothache—

> "There was never yet philosopher
> That could endure the toothache patiently,
> However they have writ the style of gods,
> And made a push at chance and sufferance."

He ought to be better able to bear it, if he is not. But the philosopher, even in his philosophising, certainly does reflect on the footing of being a finite person, and his medium never can be more in itself than the universals of reflection which reflection detaches from their setting in reality, in just the same fashion as does reflection in geometry detach the universal from what is in its nature individual. The method of philosophy is therefore abstract, and although thought, which is the instrument of philosophy, can lift the human mind to the contemplation of itself as more than finite, it does not give that direct, rich, concrete sense of immediate contact which you have in the case of Art and in the case of

Religion. Thus it comes about that while Philosophy can aid Art and Religion, and is, as I have said before, the only proper guardian of the truth in these matters, it cannot, like these, give immediate presentation. What it does, is to show us that in all of what is said to be immediately present to the mind there is implicit, as the very condition of its possibility, knowledge of a higher kind, which in ultimate analysis becomes disclosed as creative knowledge in absolute mind. As I have already shown to you, it is the finiteness of our human ends which makes us abstract from the presence of this deepest aspect of reality. We do not get rid of our finite ends in our philosophising, but Art and Religion show us, even in our human lives, those deeper aspects of reality, which are in their nature ultimate, as forming the very basis of our finite existence, and they show us that directly. It is only in the distinctions made by finite spirit, in its freedom to follow the limited purposes which are of its essence as human, that the object world of finite mind becomes immediate, and its really mediate and derivative character is left out of sight simply because it is veiled by the abstractions of understanding. In other words, in so far as we are finite, and are therefore dominated by ends and purposes which are not the ends and purposes of absolute mind, we drop out of sight what it is that has made the world as it seems to us wear the aspect which it does. It is thus that there is hidden from us the reality which is disclosed in the highest forms of Art and of

Religion, and which is disclosed in the abstract reasoning of Philosophy. And this reality we are apt, when we give ourselves up to the domination of the purposes which make us human beings, to leave out of account and at times almost passionately to protest against as unreal.

There are striking illustrations of this in literature, of the most varied kinds. One there is, remarkable in its combination of simplicity with subtlety, in a well-known poem, Fitzgerald's "Omar Khayyàm." Omar Khayyàm, the Persian poet, is not, like the men of a still more remote Eastern land, overwhelmed by the consciousness of the infinite. He is aware that there is an ideal to pursue, but, strong in the sense of the direct presence of finite purpose, he holds it futile to make the effort to pursue an ideal—

> "For '*Is*' and '*Is-not*' though *with* Rule and Line
> And *Up-and-down without* I could define,
> I yet in all I only cared to know,
> Was never deep in anything but—wine."*

He speaks, however, as no common cynic in that somewhat sceptical utterance. He is dissatisfied with the endless progress of the world of finite ends, with the Beyond reached only to disclose yet another Beyond. But he will lay hold of what seems to be here and now, and try to put from him the consciousness of its unreality, regardless of whether or not he is consistent with himself in the effort

* Fitzgerald's "Omar Khayyàm" (1st ed.).

he is making. In a verse just before, he has exclaimed:

> "How long, how long, in infinite Pursuit
> Of This and That endeavour and dispute?
> Better be merry with the fruitful grape
> Than sadden after none, or bitter, Fruit." *

The same thought is expressed by Browning, in language less cynical, but putting the same point:

> "Better ends may be in prospect,
> Deeper blisses (if you choose it),
> But this life's end and this love-bliss
> Have been lost here."

None the less the history of humanity, and above all, the history of what has been recognised by humanity as highest and most real, proves beyond question that in a different attitude multitudes in all ages have found the apparent dilemma to be no dilemma. It is the business of philosophy to tell us how and why this has been so.

The problem which confronts philosophy is why even the best in the world of the finite should be transitory, should have an end as it has had a beginning, and the topic on which this most directly arises is the topic of death. I have already in part considered the nature of death in the earlier lectures. I pointed out to you that the finite and particular self is what it is to itself by contrast with nature. It recognises itself as confronted by nature, as limited by nature, and therein lies its finiteness. I examined the question of why that was so, and

* *Ibid.*

how it comes that self-consciousness can look upon itself as arising in time out of the world by which it finds itself confronted, and I also pointed out to you that in the knowledge which embraces that world in experience we have different stages or degrees of reality in that experience. We start, for example, with what is most alien and impenetrable to mind, the relation of things as external to one another in space, and again with what is nearly, though not quite, as alien and impenetrable, the relation of things as succeeding one another in time. In that succession you have an endlessness which is mindless and wearisome. But you get to other conceptions in nature which transcend what can be expressed in terms of space and time relations, and there you find you have risen above mere endless succession as well as above mere externality of parts in space. In life, in the organism, you are conscious of the presence of the whole as controlling the parts, and yet as having in space and time no existence separate from the parts. The whole is here in the parts, and the parts are what they are only in so far as they belong to the whole. In other words, the externality of space and time is in large measure, though not altogether, transcended, and you have passed in some degree from the endless exclusiveness of things as outside each other in these two relations.

But there is a further stage at which the mind arrives, and that is where it takes in that the object world is what it is only *for* the mind which per-

ceives it. In other words, you there see that the very externalities of space and time, the relationships of being outside each other and of being successive to each other, are relations which fall within the mind itself, and are what they are only for mind that perceives. These distinctions turn out to fall within self-consciousness, and so you find yourself getting a step further towards recognising mind as what is ultimately real through the various stages which become manifest in nature. Above and beyond the notion of life in the physical organism there confronts you the fact of the organism as sentient, as even intelligent, as displaying those characteristics which can only be displayed by a body which gets its significance from a soul, and displays its higher aspects in the form of a soul. And so it comes that in the human being, the being that presents the aspect of soul as well as that of body, you have got away from mere endless succession in time; you have got above even the notion of the whole which is in the parts and controls them, notwithstanding that the organism in one aspect belongs to externality, and you have got nearer to the notion of mind as that which embraces reality within itself. But just as you have got away from mere succession and endlessness, just as that aspect is seen to be not the only aspect but one which dominates only in knowledge of a limited kind, so you get to a further but still imperfect presentation of the self; this you have in the picture which you frame to yourself of the

individual which has soul and body. Here you are still conscious of defects in your presentation. In body and soul you have the manifestation of mind, but it is mind still thought of as *for* the self which perceives, and as under the domination of relations of space and time which have only been partially transcended. Taken in their abstract presentation, soul and body are in time, and as in time, although they have transcended the mere endlessness of succession, they transcend it only in so far as they have a limit or an end. I pointed out to you how in the mathematical series the notion of the limit, that is of a notional end to the apparently endless succession, was really the key to the conception of a whole which gives the series its truth and its existence. Well, so it is in the nature of the organism. There is here something that corresponds to the limit, which raises the process above mere unending succession, and that is the course of development of the organism in which it attains the fulness of its reality. In so far as that follows a course of growth and then decay, in so far as there is a development to be accomplished which is the key to the very meaning of the organism, there is implied a beginning and there is equally implied an end. Life is impossible except on the basis of development, and development must be of what is born, comes into existence, grows, and finally declines to a natural end; because the complete conception of life is only attained when we recognise that the individual is a member

of the species, and that it is the law and life of the species which give law and life to the individual. The species cannot continue, cannot maintain its vitality, unless the individuals which have become old and useless to it pass away, and consequently you see how in nature the individual being passes away for the benefit of the species. That is part of the great conception of evolution, and that is how the life of the world, taken as a whole, goes on. Thus it is that the notion of death is not merely implied in the meaning of the life of the individual, but is a notion which is so completely correlative to those of birth and of life that without it these two would not be intelligible.

Now let us, in the light of this truth that death is an event which is required for the completion of the life of the individual taken as a mere living organism, and is necessary for the life of the species, let us, I say, in the light of this reflection, examine the contrast between life and death. Death is a natural event, and in it you have, in point of fact, the reconciliation of the conflict of interest between the particular organism and the species. If the particular organism were as enduring as the type the type would suffer, and it is for the benefit of the species that the particular organism, having done its work, should die and pass away. When you turn from the mere biological point of view at which that is true to the point of view of psychology, where you have the soul as individual, as sentient, as reflective, as capable of

volition, you have other phenomena not altogether dissimilar from those upon which I have been touching. In the soul you have in childhood, as I pointed out once before, the characteristic of great detachment on the part of the mind. Its bodily surroundings, the world that confronts it, are something strange and foreign which it has to dominate and mould to its purposes, and in childhood you have the greatest sense of the freedom of soul life. Habits have not yet been formed. As you go on in life, and more and more make your body the servant of your will, and more completely dominate your surroundings, the real power of the soul increases, and by degrees, as old age approaches, the soul succeeds in so moulding its surroundings and its body to itself that it establishes courses of conduct and habits which lead to still greater facility in the realisation of its own activity. But that activity is gradually deadening into habit, and the deadening into habit which is characteristic of old age points to an end to that kind of external life of the soul, just as essentially involved in the completion of the existence of the soul as death is in that of the psychical organism.

Well, whether we take it from the point of view of animal life or of physical life, the death of the particular living creature appears as natural and necessary, and is the more seen to be so the larger and more complete the outlook and comprehension of the process which takes place. It is only when we fall into the abstractions of the understanding,

which take what is presented in their own distinctions as final, and as representing complete truth and complete reality, that we rebel against this view. If we are dealing simply with the side of things in which they belong to nature, we do not rebel against the notion of death or take it as unnatural. I shall show you presently that the rebellion arises out of this, that people unconsciously assume that the higher aspects of the life of the spirit must be taken as subordinated to the law of the physical. But in the meantime I am dealing only with what I may call the physical side of the soul itself, the side which belongs to nature; and the point is that, if you keep to simple animal life, you do not find any contradiction in the notion of death, or the rebellion against it which you find at a higher stage, where you are really contemplating something higher than animal life.

Dealing first with mere animal life, I am going to quote to you the description, given by an American writer who is a keen observer of animal life, of the death of animals. This is what he says, after a great deal of study of the facts:—*

"How do the animals die!—quietly, peacefully, nine-tenths of them. . . . The vast majority steal away into the solitudes they love, and lay them down unseen where the leaves shall presently cover them from the sight of friends and enemies alike.

We rarely discover them at such times, for the

* *The School of the Woods*, William J. Long. Chapter on "How the Animals die!" p. 352.

instinct of the animal is to go away as far as possible into the deepest coverts. We see only the exceptional cases, the quail in the hawk's grip, the squirrel limp and quiet under the paw of the cat or weasel; but the unnumbered multitudes that choose their own place and close their eyes for the last time, as peacefully as ever they lay down to sleep, are hidden from our sight.

"There is a curious animal trait which may account for this, and also explain why we have such curious, foolish, conceptions of animal death as a tragic and violent thing. All animals and birds have a strong distrust and antipathy for any queerness or irregularity among their own kind. Except in rare cases, no animals or birds will tolerate any cripple or deformed or sickly member among them. They set upon him fiercely, and drive him away. So when an animal, grown old and feeble, feels the queerness of some new thing stealing upon him, he slips away, in obedience to a law of protection that he has noted all his life, and, knowing no such thing as death, thinks he is but escaping discomfort when he lies down in hiding for the last time." . . . "In short,* unless the animals are to live always, and become a nuisance or a danger by their increase, Nature is kind, even in her sterner moods, in taking care that death comes to all her creatures without pain or terror. And what is true of the animals was true of man,

* *The School of the Woods*, William J. Long. Chapter on "How the Animals die!" p. 360.

till he sought out many inventions to make sickness intolerable and death an enemy. . . . The vast majority of animals go away quietly when their time comes; and their death is not recorded, because man has eyes only for exceptions. He denies a miracle, but overlooks the sunsets. Something calls the creature away from his daily round; age or natural disease touches him gently in a way he has not felt before. He steals away, obeying the old warning instinct of his kind, and picks out a spot where they shall not find him till he is well again. The brook sings on its way to the sea; the waters lap and tinkle on the pebbles as the breeze rocks them; the wind is crooning in the pines—the old sweet lullaby that he heard when his ears first opened to the harmony of the world. The shadows lengthen; the twilight deepens; his eyes grow drowsy; he falls asleep. And his last conscious thought, since he knows no death, is that he will waken in the morning when the light calls him."

Goethe died with the words "More light" upon his lips, expressive, apparently, of just such consciousness of a simple natural life and of something that was coming simply and naturally.

Well, I have described how death appears natural when taken from the point of view of mere life, as distinguished from that of self-consciousness, and I will now take, as an illustration of a yet higher attitude in which death is contemplated as natural, the diary of a man of science who passed

from the world only some three years ago, Professor Pettenkofer of Munich. He was one of the greatest living authorities of the time on Public Health, and, among other things, it had always been in his mind that the question of how the infection of cholera was conveyed was one which could be answered only by experiment, experiment which might prove fatal, but which must be performed before the truth could be known. His view was that the mere presence of the cholera germ in drinking-water was not sufficient to account for infection, unless there were other conditions also present. Accordingly, finding himself in infirm health, he made up his mind to test his theory by experimenting upon himself. He had resolved that he would swallow a cultivation of the cholera bacillus in water, and this is the description, afterwards found in his diary, of what happened:—

"On the 7th of October 1892, in the presence of witnesses, I took the cholera drink, which tasted like the purest water. Some of my friends were concerned for me, and asked that if I were now determined that the experiment should be made, they might be allowed to sacrifice themselves in place of their old teacher; but I wished to act in accordance with the old maxim, *Fiat experimentum in corpore vili!* I have the right to consider myself a *corpus vile.* I am seventy-four years old, I have suffered for years from glycosuria, have not a single tooth left, do not even use my artificial teeth in

eating, but only when I have to speak long and clearly; and I feel also other burdens of old age. Even if I were mistaken, and the experiment endangered my life, I should look death calmly in the face, for it would be no thoughtless and cowardly suicide. I should die in the service of science, as a soldier on the field of battle. Health and life, as I have often said, are very high earthly gifts, but not the highest for man. The man who wills to stand higher than an animal must be ready to sacrifice even life and health for a higher ideal good."

Well, he made the experiment successfully, and, by surviving it without serious damage, proved that so far he was right. The story remains simply illustrative of this, that, with a sufficiently firm conception that death is a perfectly natural occurrence when a certain condition of the organism has been reached in natural course, a man of strong mind can subordinate the conception of death so completely as to have no fear of it of any sort or kind. This is possible in so far as we look at it as an event in nature, as the example of Professor Pettenkofer shows. But we do not take nature to be the ultimate form of reality, or merely *submit* ourselves to death as a final end to be attained.

Bacon says of death, that

> "Revenge triumphs over it; Love slights it;
> Honour aspireth to it; Grief flieth to it;"

and we have the same feeling expressed in other

and better known words: "Oh death, where is thy sting? Oh grave, where is thy victory?"

The acceptance of death seems to be there regarded as a step towards the attainment of something higher, not represented as something to come later in time, but as that which is in itself higher, and in comparison with which the reality of death disappears. This acceptance of death seems now to mean an attitude in which death itself becomes unimportant and unreal. Observe the contrast. Mere endless succession of time, with its blankness, is at the one extreme; at the other extreme is the life which is, in the only true sense, called eternal as being above time, the life which, when reached, is the highest form of reality. Between these there is a gap which has to be bridged over, a gap bridged over only in the expression of itself by mind, an expression which may assume the form of acceptance of physical change, or of the fulfilment of physical law, even if it assumes the form of the death of the organism. And yet this is only tolerable upon the footing that death itself and the intermediate stages to which it belongs are themselves unreal, compared with this highest form of reality.

Now let us pause and inquire a little what we mean by this. We do not mean merely to prefer to life as it is now a life which is subsequent in time. The notion of mere endless succession in time is a notion which altogether belongs to the finite. What is in the mind is rather the refusal

to regard the present life in time as more than relatively real. The mind looks for the truth about those things as to be got, not so much by setting up something beyond, as by breaking down the reality of what is here and now, so as to transform what is appearance here and now into the presentation of another and a higher aspect. Taken abstractly, we put life and death in sharp antithesis; but, as I have shown you, if we examine the matter from the point of view of the mere natural life of the organism, the antithesis seems not to be real, any more than in other cases where one has traced the origin of an antinomy to the action of the understanding in putting things in sharp abstraction. The formula of the understanding is that something is either this or something else, and yet we are constantly finding in reflection that the "either, or" and the dilemma based on it, are not exhaustive, and that there is a higher conception through which the sharp antithesis disappears.

The contrast, after all, between life and death is a contrast which is made within self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is not itself an event in time. It is that within which the world of events in time falls. This does not mean that the contrast between life and death does not exist. It does exist, but it presents its appearance of finality only for a comprehension which is not complete, and which therefore corresponds only to a degree in reality.

Now that is no point of view which is peculiar

to philosophy. With the instinct of a man of genius, Goethe rejected the old Roman maxim, *Memento mori*, "Remember that thou art dying," for the larger maxim, *Memento vivere*, "Remember that thou art living." The meaning of Goethe's *Gedenke zu Leben*, I take to be this:—"Think of life as something more than a mere present with a past behind it and a future in front of it. Think of thy present as a present which, fully understood, taken at its highest significance, pertains to the eternal, to the infinite self that makes within itself the distinctions out of which has arisen the contrast between past and present and future. Think of the instant, think of the moment in which thou livest, think of the deed which thou doest, think of the merest daily act, all as having eternal and infinite significance. Think of spirit as that which gives reality to what is, was, and shall be, as that within which what is, was, and shall be, falls." In other words, in his "instant made eternity," Goethe lays down the great truth, that, if you would find the highest aspects of reality you must seek them, not in some world beyond, but in the world as it is here and now, only fully comprehended and taken in its complete relation to mind. This does not mean that death has no place, still less that eternal life signifies endless duration and continuance *in infinitum* of the present life of the physical organism. Such a view would be repugnant, not only to the conception which Goethe puts before us, but to the best thought of the ages.

Jesus, when rebuking the Sadducees, tells them, as is recorded in the 22nd chapter of Matthew's Gospel, that they err, not knowing the power of God—for in the true resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven. God, he says, is not the God of the dead, but of the living. Again, in John 17th, he defines eternal life: "This is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent."

The religious man, as Professor Edward Caird has pointed out in his Gifford Lectures,* believes in a future life for himself and mankind, because he believes in God, and does not believe in God because he believes in a future life or another world. In a remarkable passage † in his Lectures he goes on to say:—

"The belief in immortality may easily become an unhealthy occupation with a future salvation, which prevents us from seeking for salvation for mankind here, unless it be that natural spring of confidence in its own supreme reality, that unbelief in death, which seems to be the necessary characteristic or concomitant of true spiritual life. If it be a consequence of the intellectual conditions under which we live in the present day, that the empirical evidences of a future life that seemed most sure and certain to our fathers have for some of us lost

* Prof. Edward Caird, *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. ii, p. 242 (3rd ed.).

† *Ibid.*, p. 243.

their controlling power, this, in a religious point of view, may not be altogether a loss. It is possible even that the spiritual may gain all that the supernatural has lost"; an observation which, I think, is as remarkable as it is true.

How certain it is, that the repugnance which is awakened in our minds by such books as *Letters from Heaven* and *The Gates Ajar* is due to this cause—the feeling that the picture of a continuance in time of a life in all material respects resembling our own, and only quantitatively different from it, affords us no satisfaction. Those of you who recall Swift's biting description of the "Struldbrugs," of the people whose lives continue without cessation, and the consequent misery which he depicts in *Gulliver's Travels,* will remember what depths of unhappiness the contemplation of such a state of things can disclose. The picture of a physical life which does not obey the ordinary course of nature, the law which bids life to have a beginning, and bids it equally naturally to have an end, that is not any key to what we desire when we pray for eternal life. Eternal life gains nothing, but loses much, when it is represented as the persistence of a physical organism. It is only the abstract character of understanding which has led people so to symbolise it.

Well, in this lecture I have endeavoured to prepare the way for the more complete consideration to-morrow of what I think we are now in a position to enter upon—the true signification of

eternal life and the meaning of its reality. I shall endeavour in what follows to investigate the real nature of that life and its lesson. I am aware that the problem is one which man never will leave where it lies. The longing for "the touch of a vanished hand, and the sound of a voice that is still," will always forbid us to be satisfied with any doctrine that cannot redeem itself from the reproach of bidding us be content with an abstraction. We cannot accept stones in place of bread. We have therefore to see whether a conception of eternal life be possible which will free it from the reproach of offering stones in place of bread.

LECTURE III

I DEVOTED my time yesterday to the consideration of death looked at as an event in time, and I endeavoured to show you that the conception of an organism, preserving its life and pursuing its course of development from birth to death through the metabolism of its material, was less abstract and therefore higher than the conception of a mere endless succession in time. The presentation of such an organism, implying as it does transcendence of complete mutual exclusion of parts, belongs to a higher stage in nature, and the knowledge of it would seem to be a further step towards the self-comprehension of mind as what alone proves in ultimate analysis to be the real. In fact the pathway to reality would seem to be a pathway through stages of knowledge, each one higher than that which preceded it, to that complete self-comprehension by mind of itself which exhibits mind as containing all reality within itself. One of these stages of knowledge is the recognition of life as an intermediate stage in the comprehension of itself by mind. Yet in life we are still in the sphere of nature. And a life that did not in death

naturally fulfil its purpose as an individual member of the species, but on the contrary continued endlessly, would be unnatural and miserable; as, indeed, Swift showed in the illustration I quoted to you yesterday of the "Struldbrugs," and as we all instinctively feel when we read pictorial accounts of another world.

Eternal life must then mean something quite different from this, and to-day I propose to take up the problem of that meaning. My purpose is to begin by considering the question with which I closed the last lecture—the question why we are dissatisfied with the mere assurance that the forms of time have no application to self-consciousness, as a substitute for what people call the living personal sense of continuance beyond the grave. Now I want, in considering this, to see first what light metaphysics can cast upon the problem. There are two extremes, two forms in which we can think reality, each of which is abstract, and each of which is divided from the other by a considerable gulf. To begin with, the notion of mere endless succession is a barren notion, and one which is incomplete. If I take a particular, say unity, and count it again and again and again, I feel, not only that my task is in point of fact without an end, but that there is no reason in the nature of what I am doing why it should come to an end. The future is uninteresting and indifferent to me because it does not lift me in any sense beyond the present. That is one extreme.

The other extreme is such a logical conception as the abstract one of mind, as that within which all space and time and all distinctions within them fall. If that is set up merely in the form in which abstract thinking gives it to us, we feel that it also is shadowy and that it is not adequate to reality.

Well, these are two extreme views; they are in their different fashions abstract, and in order to see what they mean one has got to consider whether they do not represent mere planes of knowledge, bearing in mind that, as we saw before, knowledge, even absolute knowledge, only attains reality by collecting itself, as it were, out of the differences in which it has expressed itself. You have got, on the one side, abstract succession; you have got, upon the other side, the fixed notion of a self which is timeless because time falls within it. But the concrete riches of human life are between these two. They are like the individual in which just such abstractions attain reality for our finite knowledge. No life is sufficiently pictured under the conception of one antithesis or under that of the other. Real life contains within itself the elements of the two, and one comes to see that the difficulty and the antithesis have been caused by taking extreme views in a highly abstract form as representative and sufficiently descriptive of the facts with which we have to deal. Life has the side of succession in time in it; life also has its meaning as falling within self-consciousness, and getting its significance only through self-consciousness.

Between these two different kinds of knowledge there are, intermediate, other forms of knowledge; for example, our experience of the organism in which life determines parts that are always changing, and yet is not anything separate from these parts. The conception of the whole, which you have there, carries you beyond the mere externality to each other of the units which you find in a mere endless succession in time. Again, the course of life from birth to death, the development which that life pursues, the purpose which it realises, not only on its own account but for the sake of the species, and which ends with its death just as naturally as it commenced with its birth—these disclose that you are dealing with life and with knowledge at a higher plane, and therefore with reality in a higher degree, than what you find when you are dealing with the mere succession of events in time.

Now, bearing that in mind, let us see what light we get on the problem which confronts us when we cannot reconcile our individuality as part of nature with the sense which we have that in one aspect our lives rise above mere succession in time. Life, on one side of it, *is* succession in time. Life, on another side of it, finds its reality in the self-consciousness *for* which succession in time is. Therefore if we take the life of the individual and deal with it abstractly as a mere event in time, deal with it by the method which the geometer

space relations in order to get clear knowledge, we reach a conception which is not adequate to what we are trying to express by it. If life is necessarily something more than the mere indifferent succession of unit to unit, it cannot be expressed merely as an event. Life, with its reference, its intrinsic reference, to self-consciousness as its highest meaning, imports more than any mere fact in that object world which is *for* self-consciousness, and, consequently, when we endeavour to get the clear knowledge which is essential for the purposes of our everyday social intercourse by speaking of a person as if that person could be labelled as a mere fact determined by space and time relations, we get a contradiction which presses itself upon us. We quite see how we come to regard the person in that light, but we also feel that that light is quite inadequate, and therefore unconsciously we proceed to determine the life, which we have thus abstractly conceived, as finding its completion, the higher truth which we have the sense, and rightly, that it must have, in something that lies beyond. Now that something our imagination, which presents pictures that succeed each other in time, causes us to present to ourselves as another period into which life enters in time after its termination as an event here. But, when we come to look at that pictorial future, it turns out to be just as inadequate as was the first pictorial presentation of the present from which it started.

What we mean is simply this, that in conceiving

life simply in the light of an event in time, we have conceived it too abstractly, and therefore inadequately. Our picture has not been a true picture. Our knowledge has been imperfect, and we have endeavoured to correct that imperfection by setting up a Beyond which is again imperfect and inadequate for just the same reason; and therefore, while we are forced to conceive of a future life, that conception of a future life as a mere succession in time to the present is itself imperfect, for just the very same reason that the first was imperfect. In that way an antinomy arises.

Now what an antinomy is most of you know. Take a famous one. The world has either got a first cause or it has not got a first cause. It must have a first cause, because as you go back and back you must come to something which is the cause of all that is. On the other hand, it cannot have a first cause, because as you go back you find that each cause in its turn appears to be just an effect, and there is no end to the series of causes presenting themselves as in their turn merely effects. Well that is an antinomy which arises because we have made use of categories which are not adequate to their subject matter—the universe conceived as a totality; and so the difficulty about the future life, the dilemma that the individual must either perish with the events of time, in which case his nature is not accounted for, or that he must have a future life, in which case that future life is impossible to reconcile with what we know about this one, is a

dilemma which arises out of a similar inadequacy of the conceptions applied. The more you look at it and the more you examine it, the more you see that the pictorial conception of immortality is one which is forced on us because we are bound to determine the life of the self as meaning more than a *mere* external event, and it is equally clear that the more you try to picture to yourself that future life, the more you get into hopeless contradictions. That point is, I think, one which is just as capable of being worked out in philosophy as are the antinomies about which there has been so much discussion—antinomies of which this difficulty is no more than a specimen.

What I have suggested to you has not been very much touched on in philosophy, but it has been put by Hegel in a passage in which he discusses a kindred topic, in the latter part of his *Philosophy of Religion.** He points out that the subject is certain of its own infinite, non-sensuous substantiality; that the form of its self-consciousness consists in an endless yielding up of its particularity, and finds its infinite value only in what he calls the Love which consists in infinite sorrow and arises out of it. "This," he says, "is a quality and a life which is beyond time and what is transitory, and since it is also in antithesis to its finite and conditioned mode of existence in the present, its necessity of eternal self-realisation determines itself as future. The

* Hegel, *Werke*, xii. p. 313.

infinite demand to see God, that is, for the mind to become conscious of His truth in this temporal present, is not yet satisfied for percipient consciousness."

Well, that is putting the very point in another form. It is because life is more than a mere fact of externality, that we are forced by the action of reflection to determine it as having a future beyond the grave; and yet that determination, because it takes what is really an abstract view, is inadequate, and lands us in contradictions and difficulties. We have got to work ourselves out of that antinomy, and we can only do this by finding a higher conception which gives us what we want without the contradiction arising. So long as people think of life at its highest as a spectacle in time and, as in this aspect, a final fact of reality, so long will they be driven to long for its continuance beyond the grave in just that form, and to think that they are shut up to the alternatives of its either ending here or continuing beyond the grave. They take, do these people, two mutually exclusive views, and alternate necessarily from one to the other. And yet, so often as they try to picture this continuance, just so often will they be driven to fall into self-contradiction and inexplicable difficulties. The antinomy is a real one, and it must be solved by a deeper and more thinking consideration.

We have already in the course of these lectures had to discuss several antinomies. A remarkable

one was that which we had to deal with in the case of life and mechanism. It is obvious that you cannot give an adequate account of life in terms of mechanical conceptions. I will not labour that again, because I have dealt fully with it before; but out of the tendency to express everything in mechanical terms, there arose a theory which was called Vitalism. Vitalism of the old order declared that the only way to account for the fact of organic life was to suppose that there was some kind of vital force, different from ordinary physical forces, which conserved the organism and gave it its life. Well, that of course was just introducing a new mechanical conception to redress the difficulties of the old physical conception, and Vitalism—the old Vitalism—fell, because of its mechanical view, into just as great contradictions as did the theory which it was meant to improve.

Now the ordinary notion of a continuance of this life after death is subject to just as great difficulties as was the old Vitalism, but that does not drive us into saying that the soul and the self are to be conceived as something which comes to an end with the grave, any more than it would be right to infer from the failure of the old Vitalism that the mechanical interpretation of life was the true one. The truth in this case is that the difficulty which you have to face arises from the basis upon which you have started, and it was because it was an altogether inadequate conception of the soul to take it as a mere thing in time,

that you were driven to set up a correction of that conception by supposing a continuance in time beyond the grave as the only way of getting out of the dilemma in which you found yourselves.

In other branches of knowledge, interpreted in the large sense in which I have used the word in these lectures, the problem solves itself without difficulty. In Art, for example in the pictures which Art gives us of the lives of great men, we are not troubled with the notion of their deaths. Not only do we see in them minds that have risen above the fear of death, but we see that in their deaths the completion of life often lies. In, for example, the death of Cæsar, or of Nelson, Art can draw for us pictures which symbolise what we feel to be the highest modes of completion that we could have desired for these lives as it interprets them for us. We would not have them end otherwise—nay, it could not have been otherwise without destruction to the greatness of the story. "*Selig der den Er im Sieges Glanze findet,*" is an expression which you find occurring over and over again in different forms in the history of literature. So it is in yet a deeper sense with the life of Jesus. It was not the continuance of that which was, indefinitely, it was its culmination in a scene in which past and present and future were gathered into one that was the truth of that life. Not in the mere temporal succession of the events of these great lives, but in action in which duration in time became of merely secondary importance, existed for

them and for us the culminating instant which became eternity.

Well, in the lives of such men we find the expressions of their personalities, of their self-consciousness, in forms that are for sense. Art has the power of presenting in sensuous form what is more than sensuous. In it mind finds itself again. The world that appeared for them, as it appears in identical forms for us who contemplate their careers, was a world which included, in what was necessary to its history, their own deaths. But, together with all its events, its beginning and its end, for them as for us that world arose and ended within self-consciousness and was in that self-consciousness transcended.

Art expresses these things for us symbolically, and when it tells us the story of the lives of great men it leaves us with no sense of difficulty in grasping the story. For Religion, which embodies analogous truths in its consciousness of free-will acts of self-surrender, these are *felt* to be the truths that are absolute. Faith, the sense of the reality of what is above and beyond that which is seen, makes them its substance. In Religion we are conscious of difficulties smoothed away for us, not by scientifically constructed pictures, but by the sense we have of truth attained in self-surrender, in the adoption of purposes which are greater than our own finite purposes; and in the consciousness of that we get what is called faith, the sense of the things that are more than seen. Problems and

difficulties disappear, and men and women are sustained by a sense which lifts them up. That sense accompanies acts of will and arises out of acts of will. But Religion,—Religion as it takes form in the Church, as it takes form in the intercourse of the human beings whom it binds together,—Religion is assisted by the pictorial forms into which in the human mind it naturally passes. These pictorial forms do not give scientific truth, but they are, as it were, the symbols in which religious feeling expresses itself. We have the sense of Absolute Existence, of God, as of Someone from whom we are separated and whom we can therefore worship as lower beings worship the highest; but we also know and have the sense of our union with that highest form of mind in a single subject of knowledge, the knowledge in which the universe is sustained, and it is that relationship which enables us at once, in the exercise of our freedom as free though finite spirit, to be apart from God and to assume to Him the attitude of those who may pictorially regard themselves as separated from, and at the same time as returning to Him. Of these things, Religion, as I have said, can give no scientific pictures, but it can give us an assurance arising out of that sense of certainty which accompanies the act of the surrender of its particular existence by the will.

Metaphysics has for its business to put those things into scientific form, and it does so in its teaching about degrees of reality, and the eternity of self-consciousness as essentially above

time. It is when we lapse from the metaphysical standpoint, and try to express what is as though we could completely describe its nature in space and time relations, that we get into difficulties. Space and time relations are necessary; they represent reality when we regard things under certain conceptions adopted for limited purposes; but if we wish to get at the truth about such a matter as eternal life, we have to resort to conceptions of a higher kind, and only when we resort to conceptions of a higher kind are we delivered from the dilemma that this life either ends with the grave or continues beyond the grave. The grave and this temporal present, taken as events, turn out, from a higher standpoint, to be appearance merely, and not to be representative of reality. The antinomy has arisen in a form that seems at first sight insoluble simply because of the limited basis we have adopted, and what we have to do is by analysis to break down what appears as hard-and-fast, and not to set up and insist upon a counter abstraction.

Let us try to follow this out in a concrete illustration. A child dies. Its parents are overwhelmed with grief. As time goes on, their grief remains. The touch of a vanished hand is missed, and the tender grace of a day that is gone never returns to them. Now, try to follow what it is that is in their minds. They do not really desire a reunion on the footing that they,—changed it may be, by the lapse of twenty years' time, changed in

circumstances, in character, in age,—should meet again the child stereotyped, as it were, at the moment of death; nor do they desire that they should meet again a being developed in another world in surroundings far away from all the associations of this one, a being whom they would encounter as almost a stranger. What binds them to the child is something deeper. It is a relation, not of external event to external event, but *of spirit to spirit.* The physical organism of the child was but the symbol which expressed the higher meaning of its personality to them, just as in the patches of paint upon a canvas, which at one standpoint are mere patches of paint, we are able at another standpoint to discern as symbolised the higher meaning, the higher expression. The love of the parents for the child is not a relation of physical organism to physical organism. It is, as I have said, a relation of spirit to spirit, and it is only spiritually that it can be interpreted. The parents do not desire to have restored in another life, unaltered and without development, the being that was taken from them. Apart from growth, apart therefore from change, without a course of life which must have its termination just as it had its beginning, temporal existence in this or any other world which resembled it would be intolerable. It is only in a deeper and more adequate conception that we can find that relation of spirit to spirit which is really desired in our aspirations to immortality.

Now, that view of the nature of the individual is not a view which has been confined to philosophy. There are two little companion poems of Goethe, one called "Eins und Alles" and the other "Vermächtniss," in which this thought was expressed by him in words which are worth while quoting here:

"Im Grenzenlosen sich zu finden,
Wird gern der einzelne verschwinden,
Da löst sich aller Ueberdruss;
Statt heissem wünschen, wildem wollen,
Statt läst 'gem Fordern, strengem Sollen,
Sich aufzugeben ist Genuss."

"In what is infinite to find himself again
Will who is finite gladly pass away;
There to be free from what oppresses,
There free from burning wishes, wild desire,
There free from grinding pressure, keen ambition,
In self-surrender blessedness to find."

And then, again, in the other poem we have the companion verse:

"Kein Wesen kann zu nichts zerfallen,
Das Ew'ge regt sich fort in allen,
Am Sein erhalte dich beglückt!
Das Sein ist ewig; denn Gesetze
Bewahren die lebend 'gen Schätze,
Aus welchen sich das All geschmückt."

"No being can to nothing pass away,
In everything 'tis clear the eternal moves.
In Being steady, then, thyself in joy,
Being eternal is, for laws conserve
The living Treasure
From out of which stands clothed in life the Whole."

There you have a poetical presentation of the

spiritual aspect of the individual, an aspect which rises beyond the mere organism and the mere notion of life as giving its significance to individuality.

Now in human affection it is clear that what is loved is no abstraction fixed by the understanding in universals that are unchanging. It is the concrete embodiment of the spirit which though finite is free, and which is but symbolised in the bodily forms in which it expresses itself, and in the changes in which the working out of its own destiny is imaged. The love of the parent, of the husband, is just like that of the patriot, of the artist, of the saint, is like that of God Himself. It is a relation, not of what is external to what is external, but of spirit to spirit. "When," writes Hegel,* "we say God is love, we are expressing a very great and true thought; but it would be unreasonable merely to take this in such a simple way as a simple characterisation of God, without analysing the meaning of love. For love implies a distinguishing between two; and yet these two are, as a matter of fact, not distinguished from one another. Love, this sense of being outside of myself, is the feeling and consciousness of this identity. My self-consciousness is not in myself but in Another; but this Other in whom alone I find satisfaction and am at peace with myself, and I exist only in so far as I am at peace with myself, for if I had not this inner peace I would be the contradiction which

* Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. Tr., vol. iii. p. 10.

breaks itself up into parts—this Other, just because it is outside of me, has its consciousness only in me. Thus the two are represented simply by this consciousness of their being outside themselves and of their identity, and this perception, this feeling, this knowledge of the unity, is love."

Love, in other words, is the bond, the highest bond, which you find between mind and mind. In whatever form it takes, whether it originates in some natural relation, whether it originates in sense, whether it originates in the relation of citizen to his country, whether it originates in the relation of man to God, the highest of all these forms, it gets its meaning from a higher and deeper conception than anything that can be expressed in mere external relations. Love is the highest relation of spirit to spirit. With that conception you are still in the sphere of the one and the many, but you have got to the highest point, the point at which in the relation of one to another there is the consciousness of identity in the deepest sense.

Now if that be so, the real foundation of the love of the parents for the child that is gone, being a relationship of spirit to spirit, must be assigned to an aspect of existence in which the present is something more than a mere relationship to a past and to a future, each of them as transitory and unsatisfactory as itself, and in which the real nature of spirit may be sought in a region where the mutual exclusion that characterises events in time does not obtain. It is clear that at one

extreme we can describe to ourselves in abstract language, in abstract conceptions, a self within which time and space fall, because it is the subject for which all knowledge is. And if reality have degrees, and if therefore the knowledge in which reality consists have degrees, then it becomes apparent that a deeper and fuller view of things than the view which fixes life as an event midway between a past and a future is the view which would interpret life as in truth transcending the succession of these three different moments in the time relation. And so it comes that it is not on our own account, nor for their qualities, but because in their personalities our own lives really centre, that we love those around us. It is in form the consciousness of identity in difference, a relation which transcends that of mere externality, and belongs to a higher degree of reality and to a different standpoint. And if this be so, we seem to be near to the key to our problem. It is no longer of any use to put the dilemma that we must either again see or not again see those from whom death separates us. The antinomy of the abstract understanding raises the dilemma, but it is not an exhaustive dilemma. It is not, even at this present moment of life together, a question of *mere seeing*. If death is transcended, if it ceases to be more than appearance when you get to the completed comprehension of the conscious self, it is transcended and is unreal in the love which is the manifestation of the inmost nature of the conscious self, that inmost nature

which the physical organism, in its nature transitory, only symbolises. Neither the self nor that in which it recognises identity with itself fall within the sphere of transitory and self-abolishing appearance. If one goes, the other goes. If one is not so affected, the other is not so affected. Could we think out life, or even a particular event in it, completely, there were no room for the abstract antithesis of death. We are more than mere facts in time, and time cannot bar us off from one another if we are all of us more than mere facts in time. It is not by setting up a beyond, but by breaking down the false and hard-and-fast semblance of reality in the present, that we solve the problem that confronts us. Just as we found God, not in some remote region, but in the world as it is here and now, so in the here and now, in this present more completely comprehended, and more completely brought into that relation to mind which is the key to all reality, do we find the true immortality, the immortality of the soul, not regarded as a substance, but looked at as subject related, in the consciousness of identity called love, to subject and not to substance.

Doubtless there are many aspects in which death, to use the language of the East, is the Separator of persons and the Terminator of delights. These aspects are aspects which confront us very closely at our everyday social level. When we read an account in the newspaper of a railway accident, these are the aspects which are engaging

our minds. For the executor and the undertaker, there are no others that occupy their attention. But these are not really the aspects which occupy us when we find ourselves longing for the touch of a vanished hand and the sound of a voice that is still. It is the relation of spirit to spirit which then engages us. If we will but look at it from the point of view of spirit, if we will but remember where the pathway towards reality leads us to, we shall find that the dilemma that confronts us in our everyday conceptions is a dilemma which no longer presents itself as exhaustive.

In life, as I have pointed out often, there are in each moment implicit diverse standpoints at which reality is possessed of diverse meanings and degrees. There is no experience but implies more standpoints than one; perhaps every experience contains an infinity of standpoints and conceptions. And it is with the higher standpoints that the questions of immortality and of love and grief are truly concerned, and not with the abstractions which are the outcome of the lower standpoints. It is the Veil of Maya which the understanding is ever weaving for us that conceals the truth. For us, whose picture world arises under the finite forms of our finite knowledge, a direct presentation of the unreality of death can never be accomplished. Yet as symbols of more than they can express for abstract knowledge such pictures are of use to us. The dying man may have before his mind the pictorial spectacle of himself as passing away in a

world which he and others image as continuing after him. It does not disturb him, for in some form or another he has a deeper sense. He may be filled with a simple faith that assures him that his Redeemer liveth—or a faith may be his that in yet a different form tells him that it is within his own self that the world and himself as in it are passing, and that in his grasp of the fact he is above it, and is at one with the eternal. What is the insight that sustains him in these deep waters? Wherein does he comprehend and see what those do not who look at him and mourn? In this, perhaps. For him as for them the world is there, with its present, its past, and its future. The present is determined only through the future and the past, but equally the past and the future exist only as distinctions made within the present. For this present has a supreme reality that enables it to be grasped, by the mind that has sufficient insight, as that which possesses, beyond the appearance with which it is invested by the finite forms of reflection necessitated by the ends of workaday life, a higher degree of reality that belongs to the Eternal. At this level his present embraces within itself no less than the entire universe, and the separations that other purposes have hypostatised into what seems final and unyielding sink into mere appearance. The present contains within itself, for him who by faith or by knowledge is lifted above and away from purposes which pertain but to the passing moment, the entirety of what was, is, and will

be. His insight, the outcome it may be of the faith that in religion comes with the voluntary surrender of the self to God, or the outcome of a knowledge that may be rarer, but not the less brings peace, has disclosed to him supreme reality. Dimly, perhaps, yet certainly, he knows that he himself, those about him, the world which one and all have been used to take as foreign to themselves, as the Other that confronts them, are included and exist only in a self-consciousness that now emerges into the light as containing within itself every event that exists for it, even the spectacle of the passing of a life that, not the less because it is his own, in one aspect belongs to Nature. He sees all things in God, and this is not the less his faith because he may not know what it signifies in abstract knowledge, nor be able to express it. Not the less on this account does the true reality of his universe sum itself up in a Now that comprehends all change within itself, and is so beyond the reach of the all-severing wave of time. For those who stand by his bedside, if they have not the insight which he has, and their very health and strength immerse them in interests which make this hard of attainment, he is but part of that Nature the destiny of whose creatures it is to come to maturity and to pass away. Not for the mere Understanding that fixes in difference, in obedience to finite necessities, but only for the Reason that completely comprehends, can the full meaning of the scene be made manifest, and

appearance give place to reality. By Reason the limits of the finite may be transcended in knowledge, as for the dying saint they are in practice, and men may be certain that, could they comprehend as God comprehends, they should see the Eternal made manifest through the fleeting shadows of time. For there is but one Single Subject within which all knowledge and all reality fall. With and in that Single Subject philosophy and faith alike assure us that we are one. And so when his simple creed, pictorial it may be, but symbolical of the deeper meaning of reality, bids the humblest soul in his greatest and last extremity be assured that his Redeemer liveth, it may be that there has come to him an insight in form only different from that of the profoundest thinker.

Such a conclusion is not the mere outcome of mysticism. It is the outcome of the reasoned system which Aristotle founded and Hegel developed, and the method of which it has been my endeavour to set before you in these lectures as the only one that can cast the light of knowledge on the nature of ultimate reality.

The question therefore is a practical one, whether after all we must not frankly recognise that these aspirations, the "intimations of immortality," as Wordsworth has called them, from which we cannot escape, are in truth representative of degrees of knowledge in which the mind, though still at the standpoint of the finite, is raised above the ordinary dilemmas of everyday

knowledge. It may well be that between the extremes of mere duration on the one hand and being above time on the other, we can analytically construct the conception of a life which understanding cannot present as existence in mere temporal sequence, but which, while it preserves in love the differentia of otherness and individuality. is yet not necessitated to present itself to itself, even in immediacy, as a passing phenomenon. It may be right to recognise that such phases of consciousness belong just as much to what is reality as do phases in other kinds of knowledge. In such phases I can conceive that consciousness may be still finite, and yet as much above and beyond my consciousness as mine is beyond that of my dog, for whom the appearance of this world, as I pointed out to you in the lectures of last year, must be very different from what it is for me. Just as there are degrees in reality, so there seem to be degrees in the ends and standpoints of knowledge—degrees above those of our ordinary knowledge and yet short of the knowledge that is absolute. At such standpoints the categories of the one and the many may still apply, and separation in time and space yet appear unreal. In other words, it seems as though it were conceivable that mind should have, even in finite contemplation, a direct experience, more perfect than any that is ours, of a relation of itself to the world in which the passing of that world would not seem to imply the passing of the mind which in one aspect appears in it. In

even our human experience it is plain that the mind can triumph over death; and that should not surprise us, who realise that in social relations which are characterised by finitude, by a sense of something always beyond, even when the moral law is being obeyed, we are ever conscious that we are more than physical organisms, more than finite, that we are what we are only upon a basis that is absolute.

I will sum up what I have been trying to express of the teaching of philosophy about the future life. That life is represented as future only on the footing of taking the present as having no meaning save in reference to what is beyond in time—a limit, as it were, not more on the side of the future than on that of the past. But the present, so taken, is no adequate picture of reality. Along with the past and the future to which it refers us beyond itself, it belongs to the world of appearance only, seems as it does only in virtue of abstraction by the understanding. At a plane of fuller comprehension that present turns out to fall within a consciousness of self which is eternal, because only within it can time and the other distinctions which mind constructs arise. So comprehended the now is an eternal now, within which past and future arise as constructions of the mind. It is only on the basis of eternity and within it, that change has any meaning. Goethe's maxim, *Gedenke zu leben*, bids us think of life as greater than anything in it. Here we have the same truth, but in

a different form. Life now stands for us as intelligible only when contemplated from the standpoint of the eternal. Here and now is God, here and now is freedom, here and now is immortality. It is the old difference between appearance and reality, between the world as it seems at different planes of knowledge. The teaching of philosophy may to our minds, which even in the best thinking are dominated by the finite ends that make our thinking abstract, and ever leave us conscious of contrast with Another beyond, appear attenuated and shadowy. Yet none the less has appearance been penetrated and overcome by the wonderful might of thought which can rest satisfied only in the ultimately real. Thus it is that we turn quite naturally to Art and to Religion for the *direct* sense of the presence of what is truly closer to us than breathing and nearer than hands and feet. In Art, in its widest and highest significance, and most of all in Religion, with its deliverance from the sense of unending progress that characterises even the noblest of moral lives, does the spirit find freedom. The theoretical basis of this freedom I have tried to set before you in this lecture, and I should like to quote to you before I sit down, the analysis given by Hegel (who as usual deals with these things more powerfully than other men), of the peace which such a standpoint as that of religion can give—a peace based not on the mere negation of the will to live, as Schopenhauer conceived it, but on the reality which is attained in

the acceptance of ends which are God's ends, in the place of ends which are finite.

"All the various peoples," says Hegel,* "feel that it is in the religious consciousness they possess truth, and they have always regarded religion as constituting their true dignity and the Sabbath of their life. Whatever awakens in us doubt and fear, all sorrow, all care, all the limited interests of finite life, we leave behind us on the shores of time; and, as, from the highest peak of a mountain, far away from all definite view of what is earthly, we look down calmly upon all the limitations of the landscape and of the world, so, with the spiritual eyes, man, lifted out of the hard realities of this actual world, contemplates it as something having only the semblance of existence, which, seen from this pure region bathed in the beams of the spiritual sun, merely reflects back its shades of colour, its varied tints and lights, softened away into eternal rest. In this region of spirit flow the streams of forgetfulness from which Psyche drinks, and in which she drowns all sorrow, while the dark things of this life are softened away into a dream-like vision, and become transfigured until they are a mere framework for the brightness of the Eternal. This image of the Absolute may have a more or less present vitality and certainty for the religious and devout mind, and be a present source of pleasure; or it may be represented as something longed and hoped for, far off, and in the future. Still it always

* Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. Tr., vol. i. p. 3.

remains a certainty, and its rays stream as something divine into this present temporal life, giving the consciousness of the active presence of truth, even amidst the anxieties which torment the soul here in the region of time. Faith recognises it as the truth, as the substance of actual existing things; and what thus forms the essence of religious contemplation is the vital force in the present world, makes itself actively felt in the life of the individual, and governs his entire conduct. Such is the general perception, sensation, consciousness, or, however we may designate it, of religion."

I have now shown you that it is only for mind as finite that the hard-and-fastness of nature and its forms arise. For mind at a higher level it is put past. As mind we exist, in the deeper meaning of our reality, at that higher level. For the plain man the deliverance from the fear of death, which he finds directly given to him in the emotions which Art and Religion awaken, is a true deliverance. It is the task of philosophy to demonstrate by reasoning the foundation of this deliverance in the nature of mind. Herein lie the reconciliation and the identity of knowledge and faith, and the substance of things unseen.

LECTURE IV

THIS morning I approach the conclusion of these lectures. You will have observed that in the twenty discourses, of which this is the last, I have sought to draw near together Philosophy and Art and Religion. The reason is that in actual life, life as it is for us whose forms of knowledge are characterised by finitude, Art and Religion are the highest forms in the object world which, from our finite standpoint, we presuppose as confronting us within and without. That world we conceive, in our daily ways of looking at things, to be finally and immediately presented, and not to owe its construction to reflective mind. This conception I have shown you to require careful consideration. It has within it no permanence; it is, like all that depends on individual presentation, a vanishing one. It is in the conceptions of thought, notwithstanding that for us they will always be abstract, that permanence is after all to be sought. For the intellect of God the conceptions of philosophy can be no abstractions; for us, they always will be such.

The work of philosophy must therefore embrace

the critical examination of the symbols of Art and of Religion, the highest forms of what for finite intelligence is concrete and directly given, with a view to determining what in them is representative of ultimate reality. This is the task which I set myself in these Gifford Lectures. You will observe that I have guarded myself. I have been careful to point out that the images of the artist and of the saint are not to be looked upon as expressions of scientific truth. Nevertheless they are not on that account contradictory of scientific truth. The field of scientific truth has turned out to be a limited one. Dilemmas only arise when Art and Religion assert that their language is expressive of truth and reality as they appear at a standpoint which is not the standpoint of Art and of Religion. Of the standpoint of even what is called Naturalism I am the last to wish to question the value and importance. It is as a man of the world that I have come here to speak to you, to speak with a full sense of the value of concrete things. But because, when we stand still, we wish to feel solid ground under our feet, it does not follow that we should despise wings. Art and Religion fall into trouble when they speak the language of Understanding, but what they teach can be expressed in that of Reason. Into such language I have tried in these lectures to translate their teaching. We have found, as the result of our journey of discovery, that the pathway to reality leads us to look at the nature of what is ultimate

as mind completely comprehending itself, and that finite mind is this same mind in imperfect forms of self-comprehension, self-determinations on the part of the Absolute Mind that are but phases of the activity in which it creates and gathers up the full riches of its concrete self-comprehension. It is only relatively to an insight which is not fully attained in finite self-consciousness, but which is yet presupposed as its foundation, that space and time are abstract and insufficient forms. They have their meaning as distinctions made in the course of its self-realisation by the consciousness within which all reality falls, and whose vocation it is at once to distinguish in comprehension and to comprehend in distinction. It is to the doctrine of degrees in reality and in the knowledge in which the nature of reality lies, that we have to look for the key to the way out of the perplexity.

Yet how little trouble do people take to find this key. There is a passage in Hegel, the last of the many which I shall have quoted to you in the course of these lectures, to which I should like to call your attention at this point:—

"If we recollect," he says in his *Philosophy of Mind*,* "how intricate is the knowledge of the divine mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought—at first only rationalising reflection, but afterwards, as in duty bound, to speculative comprehension, it may almost create surprise that so many, and

* Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, Eng. Tr., p. 176.

especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these ideas, have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. And nothing serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. To know God as spirit—to apprehend this accurately and distinctly in thoughts—requires careful and thorough speculation. It includes, in its forefront, the propositions that God is God only in so far as He knows Himself; His self-knowledge is, further, His self-consciousness in man, and man's knowledge *of* God, which proceeds to man's self-knowledge *in* God. . . . When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded, God is, in point of content, the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit, while in point of form He is, first of all, presented to consciousness as a mental representation. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of His content, on the one hand, a separate being, making them presuppositions towards each other, and phenomena which succeed each other; their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories. But, on the other hand, such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realises one spirit, and in the devotion of worship."

With this extract I pass from the topic of the speculative conception of God. Before I sit down, I wish to say a few words about a subject to which I have made but little allusion in the course of

these lectures—I mean that of which we hear so much to-day under various appellations, one of which is Spiritualism. It would be the sheerest bigotry to pass by or ignore the work of the distinguished men of science who are engaged in investigating its phenomena. Names like those of Lodge, Crookes, Sidgwick, Gurney, Myers, are names that must appeal to us all by the weight of their authority. And yet it does not follow; because we listen with respect to what these men have to tell us, and because we recognise the remarkable work they have done in investigating and sifting certain phenomena, that we must accept their interpretation of their facts. For that interpretation appears to go far beyond what is strictly science. If these lectures have truth in them, mind is not a *substance*. The great difference is not between the *things* that we know, but between the *modes* in which we know them. By many adherents of spiritualism, on the contrary, it appears to be assumed that our experience may be interpreted as though the pathway to reality could lead to a region where minds will be discovered to be substances upon which other substances make impressions. Now this may for some purposes be a useful way of looking at our experience, but, as I showed you long ago in another connection, it is a way of looking at things which can at best be but provisional. Such a mode of inquiry as the Society for Psychical Research pursues may indeed enlarge the narrow

limits of a too narrow view of matter and of energy. It may also—and here I think it may be that there is very great value in the investigations of those who are looking into the phenomena of spiritualism —give us a fuller and more complete conception of the physical organism. Such work as has been done by the men whom I have alluded to, such work, too, as that which was done in their book, *The Unseen Universe*, by Professor Tait and Professor Balfour Stewart—is work which is full of interest, in so far as it tends to warn us that we are apt to come to the investigations of physics and physiology with presuppositions which are too narrow a mode of approach to what has to be looked at. It may be that the teaching of spiritualism will decisively show that we have hitherto excluded from our comprehension a large field of phenomena of nature which require close attention. But no such investigation can be any guide to the character of the ultimately real, as metaphysics defines it, and as I have sought to show you that it *must be* defined, in these lectures. Spiritualism and all cognate methods seem to tumble into the category of substance in just the same fashion as did the old pre-Kantian philosophy. Their standpoint seems to be dogmatic in the very sense in which Kant used the expression.

Now in order that I may not misrepresent a way of looking at things which I feel I may have failed fully to grasp, I wish to give it to you in the words of one who is recognised as having been

among its most distinguished exponents. There is no more complete or thorough work in this field than that recorded in the book by the late Mr Myers which bears the title, *Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death;* and I will quote to you from the First Volume his summing up of the standpoint which he has reached as the result of his inquiry:—

"To me at least," he says,* "it seems that no real explanation of hypnotic vitalisation can, in fact, be given except upon the general theory supported in this work—the theory that a world of spiritual life exists, an environment profounder than those environments of matter and ether which in a sense we know. Let us look at this hypothesis a little more closely. When we say that an organism exists in a certain environment, we mean that its energy, as one part thereof, forms an element in a certain system of cosmic forces, which represents some special modification of the ultimate energy. The life of the organism consists in its power of interchanging energy with its environment,—of appropriating by its own action some fragment of that pre-existent and limitless Power. We human beings exist in the first place in a world of matter, whence we draw the obvious sustenance of our bodily functions.

"We exist also in a world of ether;—that is to say, we are constructed to respond to a system of

* F. W. H. Myers' *Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death* (1903), vol. i., p. 215.

laws,—ultimately continuous, no doubt, with the laws of matter, but affording a new, a generalised, a profounder conception of the Cosmos. So widely different, indeed, is this new aspect of things from the old, that it is common to speak of the ether as a newly known environment. On this environment our organic existence depends as absolutely as on the material environment, although less obviously. In ways which we cannot fathom, the ether is at the foundation of our physical being. Perceiving heat, light, electricity, we do but recognise in certain conspicuous ways—as in perceiving the 'X rays' we recognise in a way less conspicuous—the pervading influence of ethereal vibrations which in range and variety far transcend our capacity of response.

"Within, beyond, the world of ether,—as a still profounder, still more generalised aspect of the Cosmos,—must lie, as I believe, the world of spiritual life. That the world of spiritual life does not depend on the existence of the material world, I hold as now proved by actual evidence. That it is in some way continuous with the world of ether, I can well suppose. But for our minds there must needs be 'a critical point' in any such imagined continuity; so that the world where life and thought are carried on apart from matter, must certainly rank again as a new, a *metethereal* environment. In giving it this name I expressly imply only that from our human point of view it lies after or beyond the ether, as metaphysic lies after or beyond physics.

I only say that what does not originate in matter or in ether originates there; but I well believe that beyond the ether there must be not one stage only, but countless stages in the infinity of things.

". . . In my view, then, each man is essentially a spirit, controlling an organism which is itself a complex of lower and smaller lives. The spirit's control is not uniform throughout the organism, nor in all phases of organic life. In waking life it controls mainly the centres of supraliminal thought and feeling, exercising little control over deeper centres, which have been educated into a routine sufficient for common needs. But in subliminal states—trance and the like—the supraliminal processes are inhibited, and the lower organic centres are retained more directly under the spirit's control. As you get into the profounder part of man's being, you get nearer to the source of his human vitality. You get thus into a region of essentially greater *responsiveness* to spiritual appeal than is offered by the superficial stratum which has been shaped and hardened by external needs into a definite adaptation to the earthly environment. Even thus the caterpillar's outside integument is fashioned stiffly to suit larval requirement, while deeper in the animal, unseen processes of rapid change are going on, in obedience to an impulse not derived from larval life."

For Mr Myers, then, the soul, and for that matter the self, would appear to be a physical and external fact, something extended in space and de-

veloping in time. The categories of mechanism are the categories which he uses as adequately descriptive of its existence. After all, this leads us to something very like a higher form of materialism, because, take it as you will and twist it as you please, whenever you attempt to describe mental life in terms of the categories of cause and of effect and of substance, to materialism, in some shape or form, you come back. Such a standpoint gives the go-by to the criticism of modern philosophy. I do not presume to examine the scientific methods of this new school, or to ask whether their standards of testimony are wholly complete or sufficient. Certainly the material which they have got together is, much of it, very striking; while again, there is more of it which, according to the criteria of the physicist, or, for that matter, according to the standards which are applied in courts of justice, would require a great deal of consideration before we could accept it. Nevertheless their field of investigation is a novel one and their task a very difficult one, and far be it from any of us to be otherwise than grateful for investigations to which the splendid public spirit has been devoted which is shown in the work of Mr Myers and some of those who have collaborated with him. Still, I could wish that the adherents of this school had shown more consciousness that many of the conceptions which they use freely had been subjected to scrutiny by modern philosophy, and shown to be very full of what is misleading. Even to go

no further than the philosophy of Kant, no one ought to undertake an investigation into the field covered by Mr Myers' book without first making himself cognisant of the criticism to which Kant subjected the dogmatic use of the categories which Mr Myers so freely employs. In the difficult regions where such inquiry moves, a careful criticism of categories is absolutely essential.

But one does not need to go to metaphysics to find this out. The acute mind of the Professor of Psychology in this University of St Andrews, Professor Stout, has been directed recently to an examination of a phrase which Mr Myers and his colleagues have employed, the "subliminal self." Had they confined themselves to using that term as simply a convenient one for embracing certain classes of mental phenomena, Professor Stout would have offered no objection; but what they have done is to go further, and to give to the subliminal self an existence co-ordinate with that of the ordinary self of consciousness, and upon this point Professor Stout parts company with them. He subjects their conception to a close scrutiny, and comes to the conclusion that ordinary psychological method has at all events the capacity of accounting for all the phenomena with which they deal, without bringing in such notions as that of a subliminal self in the sense in which the phrase is used by the adherents of the school of spiritualism.

Now, Professor Stout examines the whole

matter in a critical but kindly spirit. A more hostile attack is made by Mr F. H. Bradley, in his book, *Appearance and Reality*, and while, as I have already told you, I am unable to go the whole length of Mr Bradley's scepticism in various matters with which I have had to deal in the course of these lectures, Mr Bradley's scepticism is so thoroughly reasoned, and consequently so valuable, that no one can deal with these matters who has not considered its foundation. And in no region is this more apparent than in his investigation of the phenomena of psychology. Mr Bradley is not only a great metaphysician, but also a great psychologist, and among other things he subjects the conception of the self, which Mr Myers deals with so freely, to a scrutiny which no one ought to ignore who is considering these matters. In his book, *Appearance and Reality*, he deals with the conception of the self, especially in the two chapters on the "Meanings of Self," and the "Reality of the Self." His general conclusion is the necessary outcome of his view of the merely relational character of thought, its necessary infection with the abstractions and isolations of the understanding. For reasons already given I cannot wholly accept his view, but his criticisms are none the less valid against all psychological attempts, based on presentational methods, to detect the self as anything approaching to a physical fact or substance. For him the self, as ordinarily spoken of, turns out to be appearance merely, no doubt the highest

form of experience we have, but for all tha not a true form. It certainly cannot be describe as a merely discrete or discontinuous succession of isolated experiences. For even introspection carries us further than this, and shows that a long as there remains in the self, sought to be distinguished from the rest of the universe, a certain basis of content ideally the same, so long may the self recall anything once associated with that basis And this identity of content, working on the principle of redintegration, and so bringing up the past as the history of one self, is what the facts give us. It shows, says Mr Bradley, that self-sameness exists as an apparent fact, and that hence *somehow* an identical self exists; but *how*, according to him, we cannot tell. We cannot, he thinks, define what we mean by personal identity. Psychology shows us the importance of memory in the practical view of everyday life; but it shows us this besides, that a self is not thought to be the same, merely because of apparent continuity of memory, but only so when that memory is regarded as not being deceptive. Memory, he points out, depends upon reproduction from a basis that is present, a basis that may be said to consist in self-feeling. Hence, so far as this basis remains the same through life, we may recall anything once associated with it. As this basis changes, so does its connection with past events appear different. The basis may even be so altered that the very condition required for reproduction of our past life is gone, and if the

basis alters back and forwards, our past life may appear to us so differently that we seem to be different selves alternately, selves which have never really existed in the past, such as the selves conceived under the influence of hypnotic suggestion.

Observe how this psychologist shows that it is not only altogether unnecessary, but that it is a misconception, to resort to the notion of an outside self, a different thing, taking possession, so to speak, of the physical organism of the hypnotised subject and directing it. What he points out is that the identity on which we rest our view of our continuity rests upon the basis of memory, and if this basis be shifted—whether by suggestion, or by illness, or by whatever other means—the result is that we may enter upon a totally different view of our past and therefore of our present, and that we may appear to ourselves to be even different personalities. Thus, he concludes, mere memory is not the basis of a true personal identity. Some sort of continuity of existence is required, but what sort we cannot say. And in a remarkable illustration he observes: "He who is risen from the dead may really be the same, though we can say nothing intelligible of his ambiguous eclipse or his phase of half existence. But a man wholly like the first, but created fresh after the same lapse of time, we might feel was too much to be one, if not quite enough to make two." *

* F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 2nd ed., p. 85.

That is a kind of criticism which you really cannot ignore in the investigation of these phenomena; and until modern spiritualists equip themselves better with a knowledge of what has been done in the sphere of psychology, they cannot expect their investigations to receive the attention and the consideration which they would otherwise receive.

I agree with the attitude of Professor Stout in his recent article on Mr Myers' book in the *Hibbert Journal*,* in which he says that we have to listen attentively and gratefully to what is told us by the distinguished men who are inquiring into the phenomena of telepathy and hypnotism and the so-called subliminal self. They may be able to establish facts which will require the closest investigation, and their investigation may lead to an enlargement of the field of observation greater even than that which the progress of modern chemistry is rapidly effecting. But on the problem of the nature of ultimate reality, or on the problems of free-will and immortality, and of the relation of the divine mind to the human, it does not appear to me that their methods are capable of throwing light. If they succeed in showing, as it is at least possible that they may do, that our conception of the physical organism has been too narrow, this may have important consequences for physics and biology, and even for anthropology. But its interests can hardly extend beyond the region of these

* Professor Stout, *Hibbert Journal* for October 1903.

sciences into these other regions where the categories of externality are not applicable.

I pass therefore by the gate where they stand and beckon us to follow them down a different path from that which we have been treading in the course of these lectures. Their road leads to no region in which we could have found light on the deeper problem with which we are concerned. Accordingly I now bring you to what, so far as these lectures are concerned, is the close of our journey. From the place where we have come to stand we see lying beyond us new regions, the gate to which is now open to us. We have learned that not then and there in some other and different world, but here and now in just this one truly interpreted, is to be sought Reality. Such knowledge is but abstract. Not to philosophy alone can we look for deliverance. Philosophy, more than any other kind of science, more than even the science of the mathematician, enables us to survey the world from above the level of our finiteness. But it is not the abstractions of the scientist, nor even the system of universals in which philosophy herself moves, that can *set* for us the concrete riches that we find without as within ourselves. The poets and the artists, the men of goodliness and the men of godliness, they, too, have learned to see existence *sub specie æternitatis*, and they, too, must be our teachers if the spirit is fully to comprehend itself. The metaphors which they use may be inadequate, but their speech is to the heart,

and from the heart the head can never wholly be separated. They touch our emotions, and make, as no mere reasoning can,

> "Our noisy years seem moments in the being
> Of the eternal silence; truths that wake
> To perish never."

But still in the end it is to the history of philosophy that we must turn, if we would gain an abiding insight into the nature of Reality. To Reason the problem is due, and Reason alone, as I told you at the very beginning of these Gifford Lectures, can heal the wounds which Reason has made. Mind there may be, at a higher level than ours, and yet finite, that can find itself in the world as it seems, with less labour and more immediate certainty than can mind as it is in us men and women. Only by difficult analysis can the spirit penetrate beneath the hard crust of appearance and there discover itself as the reality that is final. Yet, in the struggle to raise ourselves to the level of speculative thinking, we have this comfort, nothing once gained can ever be wholly lost. Insight into its own nature by the mind that is conscious of its own potential greatness, brings with it deliverance, and freedom of the spirit. Man learns the lesson that the true home of his soul is eternity. "In the notion once is always."

> "All that is, at all,
> Lasts ever, past recall;
> Earth changes, but thy soul and God stand sure,
> What entered unto thee,
> That was, is, and shall be;
> Time's wheel runs back or stops; Potter and Clay endure."

I have now completed my task, how imperfectly I well know. Under the sun there is nothing new. The real searcher after truth seeks not to unearth some isolated particle, nor is he eager for the joy of labelling it, when found, with the name of his own small personality. He seeks rather to make his own what the great minds have brought to light of the true nature of Reality in Art, in Religion, in Philosophy. For to comprehend is to pass beyond. He tries to add to the common stock what he has got, even if it seems to him but a fragment broken from the infinity of God's Truth. At least, he can fulfil that most sacred of all duties, to strive to be helpful.

Yet in the end each must do the work for himself and in his own fashion. Only in solitude can the hardest part of the pathway to reality be trodden :—

> "Space is but narrow—east and west—
> There is not room for two abreast."

No one of us is like any other, either in his needs or in the mode in which these needs must be satisfied. Every man bears the impress of his finitude, with its infinite variety of form. Hardly less is that impress borne by even the greatest and highest expression in which the truth is told to us. Yet if that truth be hard to reach—nay, even if the most genuinely strenuous effort to reach it must ever remain incomplete, and the work have to be done over again by each one for himself, we have on justification for despair, or for sitting in idleness

with folded hands. For in the search for truth, as in all the other phases of our activity, we only gain and keep our life and freedom by daily conquering them anew.

There is a passage in Spinoza, with which I will conclude these lectures. He ends the final Book of his Ethics with these words:—

"I have finished everything I wished to explain concerning the power of the mind over the affects, and concerning its liberty. From what has been said, we see what is the strength of the wise man, and how much he surpasses the ignorant who is driven forward by lust alone. For the ignorant man is not only agitated by external causes in many ways, and never enjoys true peace of soul, but lives, also ignorant as it were, both of God and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer ceases also to be. On the other hand, the wise man, in so far as he is considered as such, is scarcely ever moved in his mind, but being conscious, by a certain external necessity, of himself, of God, and of things, never ceases to be, and always enjoys true peace of soul. If the way which, as I have shown, leads hither, be very difficult, it can nevertheless be found. It must indeed be difficult, since it is so seldom discovered; for if salvation lay ready to hand, and could be discovered without great labour, how could it be possible that it should be neglected almost by everybody! *Sed omnia præclara tam difficilia quam rara sunt;* but all noble things are as difficult as they are rare."

INDEX

Abiogenesis, 182, 240
Æsthetics, 235
Alexia, 288
Amœba, the, 270
Aphasia, 288
Appearance and Reality, Mr Bradley's, 125, 589
Apprehension and Comprehension, 384, 385, 410
Aristotle, 11, 36, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62, 65, 89, 98, 99, 100, 121, 123, 129, 144, 169, 308, 326, 329, 369, 443, 468, 475, 478; Logic of, 157, 161
Arnold, Matthew, 76, 102
Art, 354, 357, 469, 514, 515, 521, 523, 525, 529, 557, 573, 577
Association, 30, 153
Athanasian Creed, 488, 489
Athanasius, 487
Atoms, 219, 220, 225 *et seq.*
Atonement, the, 450, 491
Avenarius, Richard, 86
Avogadro, the law of, 230

Bacon, 161, 253, 541
Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J., 48, 125
Beauty, 347, 498, 499
Beethoven, 503
Being and Not-being, 379, 383
Berkeley, Bishop, 23, 31, 37, 39, 45, 52, 138, 305, 326, 362, 408, 465
Berthelot, 81
Biological Science, 240
Body, the, 286-292, 374, 376, 377, 466, 539; organism of, 42, 43
Bois-Reymond, Paul du, 219 (*note*)
Bolland, 467
Bonitz, 443
Bosanquet, 142, 146, 379, 397, 460, 463
Boscovich, 220
Bradley, Professor A. C., 509, 510
Bradley, F. H., 48, 143, 145, 146, 310, 321, 394, 396, 401, 402, 587
Brontë, Emily, "Last Lines" of, 75
Brown, the Botanist, 248
Browne, Sir Thomas, 274
Browning, 74, 426, 514, 531
Burnet, Professor, 443
Byron, 513
Bywater, Ingram, 50

Caird, Professor Edward, *The Evolution of Religion*, 545
Carlyle, 367, 371, 461, 521
Categories, the criticism of, 169 *et seq.*
Category, 328
Cause, the conception of, 20, 37, 104, 181, 212, 214, 234
Cause and Effect, 388
Cell Theory, the, 246 *et seq.*
Cells, life, 239, 242, 270, 271
Chemistry, 225 *et seq.*
Childhood, 377, 378, 458
Christianity, 338

Churches, the, position of, 3, 4
Commentary on the Book of Daniel, Luther's, 449
Common sense, 41
Comprehension, 384, 411
Conduct, 355
Consciousness, 123, 126, 127, 149, 150, 279 *et seq.*
Conversations of Goethe, Eckermann's, 510, 511, 512
Cooke's *The New Chemistry*, 228 (*note*)
Cousin, 341
Creeds, influence of, 4
Critique of Judgment, Kant's, 17, 273, 517, 520
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant's, 17, 516, 517
Crookes, 580

DARWIN, Charles, 144, 186
De Animâ, Aristotle's, 57, 99
Death, 531, 535, 541, 567
Dedekind, 144, 399
Determinism, the theory of, 65
Dialectic, 343, 389
Diels, Hermann, his *Herakleitos von Ephesos*, 50, 51
Disease, 274
Dogmatik, Strauss's, 381
Dogmatism, 13
Donaldson, Principal, 443, 486
Dutch landscape, 506

ECKERMANN, 510
Encyclopädie, Hegel's, 126, 127, 128, 309, 310, 340
Ends, 326, 327, 346
Erdmann, 337, 379, 467
Eternal Life, 547, 549
Ethics, Spinoza's, 417
Euclid, 206, 208
Evil, origin of, 451
Evolution, 432
Experience, 46, 49, 86, 87, 88, 92, 110, 118, 120, 122, 123, 148, 190, 295, 326; Kant's view of, 86, 92

FAITH, the origin of religious, 5, 355, 491
Fall, the, 450
Faraday, 220
Faust, Goethe's, 368, 406, 445
Fechner, 235
Feeling, the value of, 6, 370
Fichte, 310, 341
Finitude, 391, 419, 430, 438, 439, 440, 493
Fitzgerald, *Omar Khayyâm*, 530, 531
Form, as distinguished from Matter, 55
Fraser, Professor, 23
Free Will, 64, 65, 66, 177

GEOMETRY, 331
German Thinkers, 140, 177
Gifford, Lord, 6, 7; purpose of, in founding the Gifford Lectureship, 3, 14, 34, 325
Gladstone, 445
God, and Man, 133, 452
God, What we mean by, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 36, 37, 124, 189, 330, 335, 348, 358, 380, 403, 420, 437, 442, 477, 479, 492, 559; Hegel's view of, 129; definition of His nature, 439; as Mind, 335, 403; His relation to nature and evil, 454, 455; His relation to reality, 325
Goethe, 113, 136, 197, 250, 323, 330, 372, 406, 445, 447, 448, 449, 510, 519, 539
Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister*, 15; *Faust*, 92, 368, 406, 445; *Gott und Welt*, 447; *Eins und Alles*, 372, 562; *Vermächtniss*, 562
Gravitation, 221

Greeks, the, metaphysical speculation of, 50, 98, 178
Green, Thomas Hill, 48, 161, 322
Gurney, Edmund, 580

HARNACK, *History of Dogma*, 488
Hegel, 11, 12, 36, 58, 61, 62, 89, 118, 123-129, 132, 144, 169, 183, 185, 186, 187, 308, 309, 310, 311; his *Logic*, 109, 113, 126, 321, 329, 334, 339, 347, 370, 378, 379, 381, 395, 405, 410, 421, 423, 434, 455, 471, 485, 489, 490, 491, 500, 518, 520, 573, 574, 578; the foundation of his Philosophy, 121, 454, 455; his definition of Life, 267
Hegelianism and Personality, 121, 124
Helmholtz, 144
Heraclitus, 27, 28, 169, 199, 346, 434; the teaching of, 50, 51, 52
Herbart, 141, 142, 143
History, 442
History of Philosophy, Hegel's, 11
Holy Ghost, sin against the, 451
Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death, 582
Hume, 11, 36, 45, 108, 148, 153, 362, 395
Hypothesis, the method of Philosophy, 10

IDEALISM, the thesis of, 69, 143
Ideas, the association of, 30
Imponderables, the notion of, 228
Individual, the, 53, 54, 62, 66, 67, 68, 90, 101, 106, 120, 163, 170, 255, 259 *et seq.*, 305
Individuality, 61
Instinct, the phenomena of, 285
Intelligence, 117, 264, 307; as distinct from Will, 127, 128, 285
Intimations of Immortality, Wordsworth's, 359
Introjection, 86

JAMES, Professor, 5, 6, 76, 106, 125, 138, 141, 145, 152
John, Gospel of, 483, 486
Joule, 144
Jowett, Professor, a saying of, 49; on Hegel, 405
Judgment, 161, 294, 345
Justin Martyr, 487

KANT, 11, 13, 18, 36, 58, 86, 87, 88, 89, 141, 142, 161, 248, 250, 301, 326, 387, 393, 516; his *Critique of Judgment*, 17, 233, 517; his *Critique of Pure Reason*, 17, 516; his definition of Life, 267
Kelvin, Lord, 144, 220
Knowledge, 108, 142, 160, 178, 344, 364; of the Child, 147

LANGUAGE, 80, 105, 199
Laws of Nature, 356
Leibnitz, 202, 203, 204
Leib und Seele, Erdmann's, 379, 467
Lesage, 221
Lessing, 512
Life, the phenomenon of, 236, 238 *et seq.*, 261, 267
Life and Mechanism, Controversies about, 16, 241, 242-245, 260
Lobachewski, 144
Locke, 23, 233, 423
Lodge, Sir Oliver, 580
Logic, formal, 293
Logic, the Science of, 143, 146, 156-162, 475
"Logos," 483, 484, 486
Long, *The School of the Woods*,, 537, 538
Lotze, 122, 123, 124, 141, 142, 143
Lucretius, 219
Luther, 448, 449

MAN, 189; the relationship of, to God, 15; the personality of (see Personality)

Manhood, 378
Man's Place in the Cosmos, 121, 125
Materialism, 361
Mathematics, the Science of, 197
Matter, the conception of, 37, 38, 55, 56, 218 *et seq.*, 244
Maxwell's *Matter and Motion*, 212 (*note*)
Maya, the Veil of, 567
Mechanism and Life, the gulf between, 17, 42, 43, 284
Melody, a, the nature of, 45
Metabolism, 43
Metaphors, 327, 339
Metaphysics, as distinguished from Psychology, 146, 162
Michelet, 186
Mill, John Stuart, 24, 28, 30, 31, 37, 39, 40, 47, 51, 58, 326, 465; and "Permanent Possibilities," 72
Mind, the conception of, 28, 29, 30, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 64, 65, 80, 100, 101, 108, 123, 127, 131, 158, 162, 189, 262, 263, 289, 301, 335, 336, 360, 361, 366, 370, 371, 374, 392, 403, 409, 457, 478, 481
Molecules, 226 *et seq.*
Montaigne, 385
Morality, 354, 357
Motion, 212
Müller, Johannes, 144, 246, 247, 253
Münsterberg, 145; on "Presentationism," 370, 475; his *Psychology and Life*, 88, 149, 150, 151, 370, 453
Music, 386, 502, 503
Myers, F. H., 580, 582
Mystics, the, 18

NATURE, the object world of, 304, 391, 413, 414, 415, 416, 454
Nature, the realm of, 174
Natur-Philosophie of the Germans, 184-188; Hegel, 379, 434
Neoplatonism, 482, 486, 487
Newman, Cardinal, and the "Science of God," 3; his "Lead, Kindly Light," 508
Newton, 186, 203, 204, 219

OBJECT, the relation of, to Subject, 32, 37, 38, 57, 79, 98, 305
Objectivity, meaning of, 58
Old Age, 379

PARODY, 507, 508
Pattison, Professor Pringle, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 135, 137, 145
"Permanent Possibilities of Sensations," 26; Mill's system of, 72, 158
Personality, 130, 131, 133, 279, 403
Pflüger, Professor, 251
Philo, 482
Philosophical Theory of the State, Bosanquet's, 463
Philosophy, 80; the progress of, 10, 11, 12, 110; the aim of, 13, 63, 114, 354
Philosophy of Fine Art, Hegel's, 471, 474, 500, 501, 520
Philosophy of Mind, Hegel's, 379, 578
Philosophy of Religion, Hegel's, 455, 457, 491, 574
Physical Science, the conceptions of, 211; the field of, 229
Plato, 11, 36, 52, 89, 169, 308, 326; the *Theætetus* of, 51, 189; his *Republic*, 341; his *Parmenides*, 389
Plotinus, 482
Poetry, 505, 507, 509
Poetry for Poetry's Sake, A. C. Bradley's, 510

"Presentationism," 151, 332, 370, 453
Principles of Psychology, James's, 365
Projective Geometry, 209
Proofs of the Existence of God, Hegel's, 489, 491
Protagoras, 51
Protoplasm, 252
Protozoa, 272
Psychology, the advance of, 5, 143, 146 *et seq.*, 332
Psychology of the Moral Self, Bosanquet's, 379
Psychophysics, 148
Purposive action, 256, 285
Pythagoreans, the, 205

QUANTITY, 200 *et seq.*, 235
Quasi-purposive action, 252, 257, 285

REALITY, the nature of, 3 *et seq.*, 77, 80, 135, 332, 345, 361, 393
Reason, 7, 8, 57, 73, 99, 125, 137, 138; essential to religion, 132
Reasoning, the process of, 296
Reflection, 84; the source of our knowledge of the object world, 27, 131, 171
Reflex action, the phenomena of, 285
Relativity, 327, 364, 365
Religio Medici, Sir Thomas Browne's, 274, 275
Religion, 354, 358, 452, 524, 525, 529, 559
Ring and the Book, Browning's, 514
Royce of Harvard, Professor, 145; and idealism, 69; and reason, 132, 133-136, 310, 380, 397, 401, 402

Sartor Resartus, Carlyle's, 367, 461, 521
Scepticism, 73
Sceptics, the, 36
Schiller, 446, 519
Schleiden, 144, 249, 251
Schopenhauer, the influence of, 140, 141, 397
Schwann, 144, 248, 249, 251
Schwegler, 443
Science, 190; the progress of, 4; the methods of, 174, 192
Self, the, 106, 107, 108, 130-136, 148, 154, 159, 283, 286, 374, 391, 397, 403, 453, 454, 587, 589
Self-comprehension, 369, 496
Self-consciousness, 112, 113, 129, 236, 307, 332, 333, 375, 409, 428
Sensations, the, 24, 25, 26; the nature of, 27, 28, 29
Series, 398, 399, 400, 401, 410, 435, 479; self-representative, 400, 402, 435
Shakespeare, 186, 528
Sidgwick, 580
Sigwart, 143
Simultaneum, idea of a, 437
Socrates, 341
"Solipsism," the doctrine of, 24, 382
Sophist, Jowett's Introduction to the, 405
Soul, the, 264, 286, 287, 290, 374, 375, 376, 377, 539; origin of the life of, 153, 155
Space, 197, 368, 386, 387
Spencer, Herbert, 267, 465
Spinoza, 129, 417, 526, 594
Spirit, 80
Spiritualism, 580, 581
Stäel, Madame de, 341
Stirling, Dr Hutchison, 124
Stout, Professor, 586
Strauss, 381
Subject, meaning of the expression, 21, 57, 79
Substance, meaning of the expression, 20, 37, 39, 382

Superstitions of common sense, 118, 173

TAIT, Professor, 185; his "Recent Advances in Physical Science," 230 (*note*); his *Unseen Universe*, 581
Tempest, Shakespeare's, 74
Tennyson, 477
Theism, Professor Pringle Pattison's, 125
Thing, 327, 329, 333, 361
Thought, 48, 49, 84, 85, 109-111, 120, 125, 158, 293, 297, 298, 300, 301, 355, 370, 384, 391, 409; its relation to Beauty, 347; its relation to Things, 329
Time, 197, 363, 365, 366, 368, 386, 387, 402, 433, 434
Trendelenburg, 121
Treves, Sir Frederick, 274
Trinity, doctrine of the, 482, 485, 489
Truth, nature of the standard of, 8, 9, 10
Turner, 357, 500

UNIVERSAL, the, 52-56, 59, 60, 80
Universe, the nature of, 48, 49

Varieties of Religious Experience, the, 5
Virchow, 250, 251
Vitalism, 241, 556
Von Baer, 365
Vortex rings, the theory of, 220

WARD, Professor, 86, 459
Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen, Dedekind's, 399
Will, 141, 298
Will and the Intellect, distinction between, 127, 128, 133, 285
Willing, 297
"Wonder," the source of Aristotle's, 7
Wordsworth, 19, 170, 372, 426, 570; *Intimations of Immortality*, 359, 570
World around us, the, reality of, 22, 30, 31, 58, 119, 145, 214, 326
World and Individual, Royce's, 400
World as Will and Idea, Schopenhauer's, 502
World spirit, the, 122

YOUTH, 378

PRINTED BY OLIVER AND BOYD, EDINBURGH

VISCOUNT HALDANE'S NEW VOLUME

HUMAN EXPERIENCE

A STUDY OF ITS STRUCTURE

6s. net

"All students of philosophy will find it full of that quiet scholarship, sound reasoning, and swift mastery of a problem which are characteristics of everything that this distinguished author writes."—*The Daily Telegraph.*

"Given the concentration to which every serious study is entitled, 'Human Experience' will yield a rich reward of fruitful ideas."—*The Daily Chronicle.*

"The book shows a wide acquaintance with the best work in many fields of inquiry, and a true striving for the synoptic vision . . . it is amply worth the effort for which it calls."—*Glasgow Herald.*

"Students of philosophy will not fail to recognise in Lord Haldane's latest book an uncompromising statement of the great philosophical tradition against which realism is primarily a revolt. . . . It will no doubt be widely read and is sure to arouse much interest."—*Manchester Guardian.*

"A clear and vigorous discussion of one of the most important recent phases of objective realism."—*Liverpool Post.*

"A most interesting volume which on its merits claims attention not only from philosophers but from thoughtful people generally."—*Birmingham Post.*

"The book will be welcomed by students of philosophy."—*Law Times.*

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, LONDON, W. 1

BY VISCOUNT HALDANE

THE REIGN OF RELATIVITY

Fourth Edition. 21s.

"There is no doubt that Einstein's theory is very disturbing. It has div the scientific world into at least two camps, it has perturbed philosophers bewildered newspaper readers. Lord Haldane's volume gives us fresh h He is not a mathematician; he is a philosopher and as a philoso he undertakes to explain to us the theory of relativity. He more: Einstein's theory is to be exhibited as merely a special case much more comprehensive principle which shall serve also to illumi the problems of philosophy, of statesmanship, and of the citizen's daily l —*The Times.*

"Lord Haldane has done for contemporary philosophy what he is speci qualified to do—he has taken in hand an enormous mass of intricate, o contradictory, sometimes apparently irrelevant, evidence, and compose considered judgment in which we admire the beauty and unity whole."—*The Sunday Times.*

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMANISM

AND OF OTHER SUBJECTS. 12s.

"A valuable and remarkable sequel to his 'Reign of Relativity.' demands concentrated attention, but whoever is prepared to give this find the exposition singularly clear."—*The Sunday Times.*

"No one can lay down Lord Haldane's latest book without hear admiration."—*Observer.*

THE CONDUCT OF LIFE

AND OTHER ADDRESSES. Contents:—THE CONDUCT LIFE—THE MEANING OF TRUTH IN HISTORY—THE CI UNIVERSITY—HIGHER NATIONALITY. 3s. 6d.

UNIVERSITIES AND NATIONAL LIFE

Four Addresses to Students. Contents:—The Soul of a Peo —The Calling of the Preacher—The Dedicated Life—Gr Britain and Germany: A Study in National Characteristics. Third Edition. 3s. 6d.

"The subjects dealt with in these papers are of far wider scope than wc be imagined from this title. So far as it is possible to summarise the les which they [these papers] teach, they may be said to describe from vari standpoints the ideal character, and to sketch out the best methods developing it."—*The Spectator.*

HIGHER NATIONALITY

A Study in Law and Ethics. An Address delivered before American Bar Association at Montreal on 1st September 19 Second Impression. 1s.

THE LETTERS OF QUEEN VICTORIA

SECOND SERIES. 1862-1878. PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY OF HIS MAJESTY THE KING. EDITED BY GEORGE EARLE BUCKLE. TWO VOLUMES WITH SEVENTEEN PHOTO-GRAVURES. **£2 12 6 NET**

"We have the Queen before us as she was to an extent that we scarcely have any other great personage of history. The correspondence of British statesmen and ecclesiastics, of Continental Monarchs and personages of rank, in which the Queen's own letters are set, unrolls like a great historical panorama."—*The Times.*

"Force of character it is what gives unity to the extraordinary diversity of affairs, dynastic, political, religious, and social, that crowd the pages of these massive volumes."—*The Times Literary Supplement.*

"Full of historical importance, and throw a very strong light on the Queen's character and mental abilities. All the great affairs of the world and all the great personages come within the scope of the Letters and Diaries."—*The Spectator.*

"A book that is full of all the multitudinous exciting human interests which distinguish a metropolis. There are many priceless documents in this valuable book."—*The Outlook.*

"An extraordinary wealth of historical documents. A vivid portrait of the greatest Victorian starts into life as we study the confidential documents here presented."—*Morning Post.*

"Politicians will study these letters, and not in vain, for new light on the now historic rivalry of Disraeli and Gladstone and on the personal relations of each to his Sovereign. But the heart and core of these two big volumes is Victoria herself, herself as woman no less than as Queen."—*Daily Telegraph.*

"An historical event. It brings the personality of the great Queen nearer to posterity and enables her peoples to see into her very heart. Except Napoleon and Nelson, none of the famous sovereigns and leaders of the nineteenth century has been subjected to so close a scrutiny."—*Daily Mail.*

"You can see that this is a very human book. Indeed, it is a library of books covering a most important period of history, domestic and foreign, as seen through the eyes of a very remarkable human being."—*Daily Graphic.*

"In this correspondence we have the unfailing clue to her character. Here we may watch its singular development as it responds to experience, from the timid, anxious young Queen whom Melbourne tutored so devotedly, to the assured sovereign who rebuked Palmerston for his lack of deference, or to the solicitous parent who gave advice to a somewhat headstrong son."—*Daily Chronicle.*

"Apart from countless touches showing the life of the Royal family, there is an immense amount of material for the historian and the student of politics."—*Daily News.*

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, LONDON, W.1

STEWART HEADLAM. 10s. 6d. net.

A Biography. By F. G. BETTANY. With Portrait. Partly autobiographical, in so far as it is based on conversations covering the main phases of a stormy career, which were taken down by the author and corrected by the subject himself. A brief unfinished MS. memoir of Headlam's own composition is also drawn upon, as well as family diaries throwing light on his parentage and childhood. Headlam's Eton days, association with Maurice, curacies at Bethnal Green and elsewhere, quarrels with his Bishops, his two guilds and his newspaper, *The Church Reformer*, his Fabian connections, his work for Shakespeare and his School Board and County Council activities are fully described.

"SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL" 18s. net.

Experiences of a Military Attaché. By Brig.-General W. H. H. WATERS, C.V.O., C.M.G. With Illustrations and Maps. As military attaché in Russia and Germany at times of high tension; as British representative with the Russian army in Manchuria in the Russo-Japanese war, and subsequently as commander of the British troops in North China; as attaché to a Russian mission in important negotiations with our Government in the Great War and as part of the Imperial staff in Russia, General Waters has had many interesting and unique experiences. He has had intimate dealings with kings and emperors, ambassadors, foreign ministers, generals, leaders of Society and even political prisoners in Siberia.

BENJAMIN DISRAELI 10s. 6d. net.

A Romance. By the Rt. Hon. Sir EDWARD CLARKE, K.C., Author of "Selected Speeches," "The Story of My Life," etc. There are many lives of Benjamin Disraeli, but the romance of his actions, his rise to fame and of his career affords almost inexhaustible interest. Sir Edward Clarke has special advantages in presenting this new version of the story. He entered Parliament so far back as 1880 by winning the seat at Southwark, which had an unusual effect on the politics of the day, and he was thus a member of Parliament during Lord Beaconsfield's life-time and has personal knowledge of the spirit and circumstances of the time.

IMPRESSIONS AND MEMORIES 15s. net.

By BARONESS DEICHMANN (Hilda de Bunsen). With Illustrations. Few people have had better opportunities of associating with celebrated persons of many nationalities than Baroness Deichmann. She has been on terms of friendship with the three German Emperors; with Bismarck and his family; with Carmen Sylva, Queen of Roumania, and most of the leading German and English Families, and her book contains reminiscences and anecdotes of them, as well as of Deans Liddell and Inge, Joseph Chamberlain, Count Moltke, Prince Münster and many other British and foreign celebrities.

CAMP AND CHANCERY IN A SOLDIER'S LIFE 10s. 6d. net.

By Major-General Sir LEOPOLD SWAINE, K.C.B., C.M.G., F.R.G.S. Sir Leopold Swaine was Military Secretary to the G.O.C. Expeditionary Force in Egypt in 1882 and again in 1884. The most interesting part of his career, however, lay in his work as Military Attaché in Petersburg, Constantinople, and Berlin. He became the intimate and trusted friend of the Emperor William II. He met M. de Lesseps in Egypt in 1882; he relates anecdotes of Prince Gortschakoff and Lord Beaconsfield; he knew Prince Bismarck and Count Moltke and describes several incidents connected with them; and has something to say about Mr Gladstone and many other British men of note of the day. His book does not profess to be a formal autobiography but rather a record of incidents and episodes in which he has taken part in the course of his life.

BERNADOTTE: PRINCE AND KING, 1810-1844

By the Rt. Hon. Sir DUNBAR PLUNKET BARTON, Bt., P.C., K.C., Author of "Bernadotte: The First Phase," etc. Illustrated. 12s. net.

This is the last volume of the trilogy on the romantic and almost unique career of Bernadotte from Gascon bourgeois to reigning sovereign. It is a very remarkable story, ably, authoritatively, and very attractively told.

LIFE AND LETTERS OF WILLIAM BOYD CARPENTER

By the Rev. H. D. A. MAJOR, D.D., Author of "Reminiscences of Jesus by an Eye-Witness." 16s. net.

MEMORIES AND HOPES

By the Rev. the Hon. EDWARD LYTTELTON, D.D. With Illustrations. 16s. net.

REMINISCENCES

By the Hon. EMILY KINNAIRD. Illustrated. 5s. net.

E. T. BUSK: A PIONEER IN FLIGHT

With a Short Memoir of H. A. BUSK, Flight-Commander, R.N.A.S. By MARY BUSK. With Illustrations. 7s. 6d. net.

MEMORIES OF FORTY-EIGHT YEARS SERVICE, 1876-1924

Covering Campaigns from the Zulu to the Great War. By General Sir HORACE SMITH-DORRIEN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., D.S.O., Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour. Maps; Illustrations. 2nd Edition. 25s. net.

MEMORIES

By the Rt. Hon. Sir ARTHUR GRIFFITH-BOSCAWEN. 10s. 6d. net.

OUT OF THE PAST

By MARGARET SYMONDS (Mrs W. W. Vaughan). This volume is devoted to John Addington Symonds' home life. Illustrated. 16s. net.

EMPTY CHAIRS

By Sir SQUIRE BANCROFT. Photogravure Frontispiece. 2nd Edition. 10s. 6d. net.

A PRIME MINISTER AND HIS SON

Correspondence of the Third Earl of Bute and of General Sir Charles Stuart, based on the Stuart Correspondence at Highcliffe Castle. Edited by the Hon. Mrs EDWARD STUART-WORTLEY. Illustrated. 16s. net.

MARY HAMILTON

At Court and at Home. Edited by ELIZABETH G. ANSON. Illustrations. 16s. net.

THE REIGN OF KING EDWARD VII

By the Author of "The Victorian Age." 5s. net.

This sketch of King Edward's reign is intended to convey to the reader a general view of that short period in a small compass. A briefer record and survey of the outstanding features and events of the time, may be of use to many who wish to gain fuller knowledge of the reign but have not sufficient leisure for more lengthy study.

THE PRIME MINISTERS OF BRITAIN, 1721-1921

With a Supplementary Chapter to 1924. By the Hon. CLIVE BIGHAM. Portraits of 39 Ministers. 10s. 6d. net.

"A history of British politics for the last two hundred years in a series of pen portraits. . . . How many well-educated persons could even name the thirty-nine Prime Ministers since 1721, much less give any account of their characters and careers."—*Morning Post.*

THE CHIEF MINISTERS OF ENGLAND, 920-1720

By the Hon. CLIVE BIGHAM. With Portraits of 28 Ministers. Cheaper Edition, 10s. 6d. net.

"Mr Bigham has produced a book it would be difficult to overpraise; rich in the fruits of reading and research, written in a most lively and interesting style, sober and just in judgment."—*Sunday Times.*

WILLIAM BENTINCK AND WILLIAM III.

(Prince of Orange.) The Life of Bentinck, Earl of Portland, from the Welbeck Correspondence. By MARION E. GREW. With Portraits. 21s. net.

"Mrs Grew originally intended to write a life of Bentinck alone, but the many important diplomatic negotiations he undertook for the Prince of Orange gave it a setting of history impossible to ignore. The book has consequently a greatly enhanced value. . . . A human document of extraordinary interest."—*Graphic.*

THE CONQUESTS OF CEAWLIN, THE SECOND BRETWALDA

By Major P. T. GODSAL. With Maps. 10s. 6d. net.

The author gives a coherent account of the Conquest from the coming of the West Saxons in the year 514, to the death of Ceawlin in 593, and thereby throws an entirely new light on this obscure chapter of our history.

THE CHALLENGE OF ASIA

By STANLEY RICE, late Indian Civil Service. 7s. 6d. net.

"It was a task well worth doing, and it could hardly have been better done than in this thoughtful and thought-provoking book."—*Punch.*

SHELTERED MARKETS

A Study of the Value of Empire Trade. By F. L. M'DOUGALL. With a Preface by the Rt. Hon. Sir ROBERT HORNE, G.B.E., M.P. 5s. net.

The solution of the Empire problems of "Men, Money, and Markets" is here shown to be of greater economic importance to industrial Britain than even to the Dominions and Colonies themselves.

INDEPENDENCE DAY

By PHILIP GUEDALLA. With Illustrations. 12s. net.

Mr Guedalla presents impressions of the men who, positively or through blundering, were responsible for the independence of the United States :— George III., Lord North, Chatham, Burke, Burgoyne, Cornwallis, Louis XVI., Washington, Franklin, Adams, Hamilton, and Lafayette. The book is an important addition to the literature of the period from the pen of one who has been aptly described as "the hope of literary history, the paladin to whom we look to deliver us from the dragon of historical dreariness."

ISLAM AND THE DIVINE COMEDY

By MIGUEL ASIN, Professor of Arabic at Madrid University. Translated and Abridged by HAROLD SUNDERLAND. With an Introduction by the Duke of Alba. 12s. net.

The mere title of this book is enough to stimulate the interest of the vast company of the lovers and students of Dante. Don Miguel Asin examines various Mohammedan legends, compares them with certain incidents in the Divine Comedy, and suggests that Dante found in Mohammedan tradition more sources of his inspiration than has been recognised hitherto.

HUMAN EXPERIENCE

A Study of its Structure. By VISCOUNT HALDANE, Author of "The Reign of Relativity," etc. 6s. net.

This book is meant for the general reader not technically trained in philosophy. But, notwithstanding the popular form into which it is thrown, it contains a philosophical investigation. In the principle of grades or degrees, foundational in both knowledge and reality, the author thinks that light is to be found on problems of the deep order, which, to-day, are perplexing in practical life.

IDEALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY

A Study of the Relations of Great Britain with France and Germany, 1860-1878. By A. A. W. RAMSAY, M.A., Phil.D. 21s. net.

"Miss Ramsay's able and brilliant study will take high rank among recent contributions to political history."—*Aberdeen Press and Journal.*

LAYMEN & THE NEW ARCHITECTURE

By MANNING ROBERTSON, A.R.I.B.A., F.R.A.S. With Illustrations. 12s. net.

"Mr Manning Robertson has done a service not only to architecture but to the arts at large."—*Architect and Builder's Journal.*

CLASSICAL STUDIES

By J. W. MACKAIL, LL.D. 7s. 6d. net.

"Dr Mackail is not only a literary critic of the first order, but he is also a scholar in touch with the modern world and its educational requirements; this double qualification gives him such a right to speak and to be heard as few men may claim."—*The Times.*

RELIGION & THE RISE OF CAPITALISM.

By R. H. TAWNEY. Prefatory Note by BISHOP GORE. 10s. 6d. net. The question whether religious thought has any light to throw on problems of industrial organization and social policy is one which is often discussed to-day. In this book Mr R. H. Tawney supplies the historical background against which it must be considered. In addition to describing shortly the origin of some of the main movements which produced modern economic civilisation, he gives an account of the views on social ethics held by mediæval Churchmen, reformers on the Continent and in England, and the Puritans.

WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHINA 10s. 6d. net.

By RODNEY GILBERT. Very few Europeans have really grasped the nature of the problem that has to be dealt with in China: the character and habits of the Chinese, the absence of central power, the dishonesty in finance, and various other questions of the kind which have played an important part in producing the present state of affairs. Mr Gilbert has spent fifteen years in the country as a newspaper correspondent, and knows it thoroughly. In this book he sets forth in a very bright and lively way a statement of the foregoing questions, and of the problem which the Great Powers have to face.

SAHARA. 21s. net.

By Captain ANGUS BUCHANAN, M.C., Author of "Out of the World North of Nigeria," etc. With Illustrations. In this deeply interesting story of the world's greatest desert, by one who is intimately acquainted with it, we are taken off the beaten track into an outdoor wilderness of infinite strangeness. All who read this book will lay it regretfully aside with the feeling that they have turned the pages of a permanent record that has brought the Sahara vividly into view and revealed a land of extraordinary character and absorbing interest.

THE SACRED 5 OF CHINA. 24s. net.

By WILLIAM EDGAR GEIL, LL.D., Author of "The Great Wall of China," "A Yankee on the Yangtse," etc. With numerous Illustrations and Maps. This is the last work of Dr Geil, the well-known authority on China. "The Sacred 5" are the five pilgrimage mountains of China. Dr Geil made all the pilgrimages himself, and in this book gives a wonderful amount of information on Chinese history, legends, religions, and folk-lore, all told in characteristically unconventional and attractive style.

RAMBLES AND REFLECTIONS 10s. 6d. net.

By A. C. BENSON, Author of "The House of Quiet," "The Thread of Gold," etc. A selection of characteristic essays chosen (with two exceptions) from the unpublished work of Dr Benson, as representing the various facets of his personality. His delicate, fastidious mind, his observation, sympathy, humour, and good judgment are sharply portrayed in these colourful discussions on men and affairs.

THE SPELL OF MUSIC 3s. 6d. net.

By J. A. FULLER-MAITLAND, Author of "The Musician's Pilgrimage." The sub-title of this book, "An Attempt to Analyse the Enjoyment of Music," indicates its scope. As a critic of many years' experience Mr Fuller-Maitland had many opportunities of observing the effect of music upon listeners in different stages of appreciation, and the book will be helpful alike to those who "only like the music they know," and to those who would follow the modern developments with intelligence.