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MENTAL LIFE

ETHICAL PROBLEMS

AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS
FOR HOSPITAL NURSES AND
SOCIAL WORKERS

BY

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WITH A PREFACE BY

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PREFACE

I HAVE been asked by the author to write an introductory note to her book on *Ethical Problems*. I understand the chapters are expansions of lectures given to International Nurse Students reassembled at Bedford College for Women, University of London, in July 1928, to follow the Course of a Summer School.

I greatly appreciate the honour that has been done to me, in my position as a nurse, and I rejoice to have the opportunity of thanking the author for her sympathetic understanding of our work, and for the helpful and wholly admirable way in which she has simplified for us the difficult language of Ethics and applied its principles to our working life and conduct. She has interpreted us to ourselves and given expression to what we have felt and thought but have never realized the need to voice.

No nurse who reads these delightful and inspiring chapters can fail to admire the practical grasp the author possesses—so unusual in one outside the profession—of all that goes to the making of a nurse: her obligations as well as her rights; her privileges as well as her duties; the sanctity of her close intimacy with the patient; the peculiar relationship with the medical profession; in fine, the building up of a character around a personality infused with the spirit of service.

I would like to quote from the chapter on vocation what seems to me to be an epitome of the rich store we may garner from this book:

' In considering character we may claim generally that the higher the character the greater the value of the service which nurse or social worker can render

through her own personality. Where there is vocation the nurse or worker will give of her best, and this best is something for which professional skill and knowledge is not enough. In the thoroughly trained nurse or worker we may take efficiency for granted. Character supplies that something more which makes the nurse or worker a power for good in the service to which she is devoted.'

A. LLOYD STILL

Matron, St. Thomas's Hospital

Superintendent, Nightingale Training School

March 1929

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

MY aim in this text-book has been to give a concise statement of ethical principles and to apply these principles to some of the problems that arise in the professional work and life of the hospital nurse and social worker.

This treatment of the subject, although primarily addressed to nurses and social workers, will nevertheless furnish a suitable introduction to Ethics for any student who finds a psychological survey of conduct and a study of concrete problems a helpful approach to moral philosophy.

I am greatly indebted to Miss Lloyd Still for finding time to read the book in proof and for generously attaching to it her commendation and expression of goodwill. I should also like to thank Miss L. S. Stebbing for reading the proofs.

BEATRICE EDGELL

April 1929

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PART I
PRINCIPLES

ETHICAL PROBLEMS

PART I—PRINCIPLES

INTRODUCTION

AS members of a community, be it large or be it small, we realize that we have obligations and claims or rights in relation to other members. We have obligations to accord certain treatment to others and we have claims to certain treatment from others. We realize further that these two facts are interdependent. If we have rights we *ipso facto* have obligations, and if we have obligations we *ipso facto* have rights. As tenant in relation to landlord I have obligations to pay rent, to keep certain interior fittings of the house in their present situation, but I also have claims for certain outside repairs from the landlord. I have to give him so many months' notice before leaving, but then, equally, he has to give me so many months' notice before turning me out. If the relations in which we stand to any section of the community are complex or peculiar our obligations and rights will be peculiar also. The relation of a nurse as a member of a hospital staff to the governing body of the hospital, to the matron, to the medical staff, to other members of the nursing staff brings in each case its own obligations and its own rights. Relation to some nursing organization brings similar obligations and rights. Special and peculiar in a high degree is the relation of a nurse to her patient. There is perhaps no other relation in the scheme of social relationships like that between nurse and patient. In its intimacy and one-sided dependency

it resembles in some respects that of parent to child. It therefore carries with it peculiar obligations and rights.

When we look at social obligations and rights we recognize that many of them are regulated by legal provisions, others again by long-established custom and tradition, others, of restricted scope, are regulated by custom or usage which holds only within the sphere wherein the obligations and rights are exercised ; such limited custom we term ' etiquette '. The relation of a nurse to the governing body of a hospital will illustrate obligations and rights regulated by law. There is a contract ; the nurse can claim certain salary, certain training, etc. ; she is obliged on her side to give service, to work for a certain length of time in that organization. There is, further, tradition and custom, regulating her relations to the governing body, to the matron, and to the medical staff. There will also be ' etiquette '. In some respects this may vary from hospital to hospital, but it will regulate obligations and rights within its own sphere.

SPHERE OF MORAL OBLIGATION

Where rights and obligations are fixed by law or by custom or by etiquette it may seem as if ethical problems have no place. Lines of conduct are plainly laid down. In the case of legal obligations and rights there are penalties attached to their evasion. The very name ' etiquette ' points to the labelling of what should, and what should not, be. Can we from these considerations reach an indication of the sphere of moral obligation and of the region where ' ethical principles ' apply ? We may ask, Is it concerned with those rights and obligations which are left untouched by law on the one side and tradition (wide or narrow) on the other ? It is evident that moral issues for the individual often do lie in just this region. ' What ought I to do ? ' ' Is that morally

wrong?' are questions which frequently arise in situations where we find no guidance from fixed usage and are not confronted with any legal enactment. But although it is true that this middle realm of social relation may supply us with the greater number of our ethical problems, its boundaries do not delimit the sphere of Ethics. Behind all the rights and obligations marked out by law or by custom there lies a question. We can ask, 'Is the line of action laid down as legally obligatory, morally right?' 'Is this custom what ought to be?' 'Is it right or is it wrong?' If the question in each case is not meaningless it is clear that we are bringing into it some idea different from that of 'legal obligation' or 'traditional custom', otherwise we are asking, 'Is this legal obligation legally binding?' 'Is this traditional custom traditional?'—tautology. We are not asking whether the obligation *has been* prescribed or the custom *has been* followed, but whether it 'ought to have been prescribed', 'ought to have been followed'. It is the business of Ethics to examine the character of this 'ought' or obligation, and such an examination will be relevant not only for the practical issues of what we have described as the middle sphere, but also for those lines of conduct laid down by law or by traditional custom. Ethical principles are in this sense wider than those of law or custom. We may perhaps make this clearer if we go on to point out in this connexion the difference between Ethics and any historical or sociological study. It is the business of Sociology to trace out how certain customs grew up, e.g. burial customs among a certain people. It may show how the customs of one group influenced those of another, trace the diffusion of culture from people to people, but in so doing ethical questions are not raised. There is no evaluation. We are not asking, 'Ought this custom to have been followed?' 'Was it morally right?'—we

are determining what actually happened. In contrast to the *positive* attitude of science or history, which strives to describe facts as they are observed to be, to classify them, to discover the relations between them, Ethics is a *normative* study.¹ It is evaluating and regulative. It is concerned with constraining value. We change the scientific or the historical attitude to an ethical one when we inquire whether this custom was justifiable, was right, instead of describing the custom in question, how it arose, how widespread it was among people, what they were led to do or not to do in consequence of it. We shall have again to touch upon the relation of Ethics to Sociology in a later chapter.

However closely obligations and rights may be bound up with the particular character of social relations and may vary as these vary, the ethical principles upon which these obligations and rights ultimately rest do not thus vary. There are no ethical principles peculiar to the relations of landlord and tenant; nor, to take wider instances, are there ethical principles peculiar to commerce, peculiar to law, peculiar to medicine. The *application* of ethical principles may give rise to special difficulties owing to the complexity of social relations, but this is always the case when general principles are applied to particular instances. We must guard against the belief that there are varieties of Ethics. It is no more correct to speak of 'Nursing Ethics' than to speak of 'Coal Mining Ethics' or 'Teaching Ethics' or 'Dressmaking Ethics'. What such a phrase presumably is meant to indicate is the application of ethical principles to the practical problems which are likely to arise in the profession of nursing. But the ethical principles which have to be applied here

¹ Latin *norma* = carpenter's square. In Greek τὰ ἠθικά meant 'that which had to do with character'. It was used as a title to describe Aristotle's treatise wherein the excellence and defects of character were considered.

are the same as those which have to be applied in any walk of life.

In Part II we shall discuss some of these problems and the kindred ones that arise in social work. But before attempting to consider problems in the light of ethical principles we must strive to arrive at some understanding of these principles themselves. In Part I, therefore, we shall try to do this, taking the moral judgment as the central topic of Ethics, and focusing our questions round it. We have three questions to answer. We have in the first place to consider what it is that the moral judgment—'This ought to be done', 'This is good'—refers to. We must next ask what the judgment means, and thirdly, we must inquire how that meaning is determined.

To what, then, does the moral judgment refer? What is it that is pronounced obligatory, or good, or evil? A first rough answer is 'Conduct'. Whenever there is a moral pronouncement the conduct of human beings, or of animate creatures treated as human beings, is under consideration directly or indirectly. It is directly under consideration when we are dealing with individual agents, and it is indirectly under consideration when we are concerned with institutions. We may follow Professor Hobhouse in describing an institution 'as the whole or any part of an established and recognized apparatus of social life—whether of the community as a whole or some special part of it';¹ e.g., marriage is an institution, slavery is an institution, so is the Church when considered as an organization of social relations with specific rites and ceremonies and not as an association of individuals. As apparatus for social life an institution is the medium for conduct, and when it is judged morally it is judged in this respect and pronounced 'good' or 'evil', 'right' or 'wrong'. In the

¹ Hobhouse, *Social Development*, p. 48.

limits at our disposal we do not propose to discuss the reference of the moral judgment to institutions.

Conduct is too general a term to satisfy a careful inquiry into the reference of the moral judgment. How wide is the sphere of conduct to be? Is it to include the actions which are the outcome of instinctive impulses and appetites, the flight from danger, the quenching of thirst? Are the expressions of emotion, the wringing of the hands in grief, the curl of the lips in scorn, conduct? If we answer 'No', then we may ask whether all these unintentional performances lie outside the sphere of Ethics? Is the reference of the moral judgment restricted to intentional action, or even more narrowly, to action which is the outcome of choice? It is here that a psychological preamble to ethical principles is called for, and it is with this that we shall begin.

CHAPTER I

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROLEGOMENA : BEHAVIOUR AND CONDUCT

THE relevant chapters of psychology for our purpose are those that deal with behaviour and conduct. We need to trace the stages of development that link simple reflexes to voluntary action. We need to see in outline the course of development that lies between recoil from a prick and recoil from a crime.

NATIVE AND CONDITIONED REFLEXES

The psychologist begins his study of human behaviour with the study of the simplest responses made to the environment, viz. *reflexes*. These are actions called forth directly by the stimulation of the nervous system. They are facts of physiology rather than of psychology. In many reflex responses there is no conscious experience of the movement made in consequence of stimulation, e.g. the contraction and dilatation of the pupil of the eye to increase or decrease in intensity of light. In other cases the individual only experiences the response when it takes place under unusual conditions, e.g. breathing in a rarefied atmosphere. Some reflex responses are always experienced, e.g. sneezing in response to irritation of the membrane in the nasal cavities.

The repertory of reflexes, native or original to the organism, is characteristic of the species to which an animal belongs. It has recently been shown that the native responses of an organism can be extended by a

process termed *conditioning*. It is possible to make an animal respond to a stimulus that originally or naturally evoked no response. Thus, if a stimulus B naturally called forth the reflex response X, an inadequate stimulus, A, can be made to do so by a process called conditioning. To achieve this result A is repeatedly given as the immediate predecessor of B. After a certain number of repetitions A alone without the presence of B will evoke the response X. Such a response is called a 'conditioned reflex'. An illustration may make this clearer. If the bare foot be given a faradic stimulation the foot will be withdrawn. This is a native reflex occurring without any wish or previous experience on the part of the individual stimulated. No such reflex response would be made to the sight of a red lamp. Suppose, however, that the red light is switched on just before the electric shock is given, and this order of events is given repeatedly, then in time it will be found sufficient to switch on the red light without giving the electric current. The foot will be jerked away as soon as the light appears. This reflex response is a 'conditioned' response to light, whereas it was an 'original' response to the electric stimulus.

Much work on conditioning of reflexes has been done by the Russian physiologist Pavlov. He has performed many experiments with dogs. As a physiologist he has been interested in studying the number of repetitions necessary to establish the reflex, the circumstances which interfere with conditioning, the length of time for which the conditioned responsiveness will endure, the circumstances under which it will disappear and a reconditioning become necessary. As a physiologist he has not been interested in asking what part the conscious experiencing of the stimuli and response plays in the whole process. He speaks, however, of the 'what-is-it?' attitude of the dog on receiving the stimuli.

This expression implies that conscious experience has its part in the conditioning process. The line between physiology and psychology is hard to draw, and in drawing it one may be dogmatic, but such dogmatism is unavoidable. For the psychologist, if conscious experience be admitted, conditioning is a form of 'learning from experience', and this makes the designation 'conditioned reflex' seem a misnomer. The psychologist would look at the affective side of experience in studying the process of conditioning. Thus to take the type of case carefully examined by Pavlov, viz. the saliva reflex of a dog to the sight of food. A dog's mouth waters at the sight of a tasty morsel. If this sight follows the sound of a bell, or if the sound of the bell continues while the meat is seen, the sound of the bell alone will, after a due number of repetitions of the two stimuli, condition the flow of saliva. The psychologist would consider that the pleasure value of the food situation was acquired also by the sound which preceded or entered into that situation, and that it was this acquirement of meaning and value which rendered one stimulus a substitute for the other and conditioned the response.

All this may seem remote from Ethics and the moral judgment, but the first steps in *regulating behaviour* are important. To explain learning and regulation of behaviour the psychologist would claim that certain sense experiences are pleasant, others unpleasant. In such pleasantness and unpleasantness there is a beginning of *value* in the individual's world. By **value** we want to denote the character of any object in virtue of which it arouses an affective or conative attitude in a subject or knowing individual—value is thus objective. It is something possessed by situations, things, and ideas, in so far as they awaken some affective or conative experience in any animal or human being. The sting

that hurts, the rose which gives pleasure by its scent, the memory that makes me ashamed, the plan that arouses my impatience—these objects all have value to me.

INSTINCTIVE BEHAVIOUR

It is now customary to claim that man has instincts as part of his native endowment. Instincts have always been recognized as part of the native equipment of animals, and it was a commonplace to contrast the behaviour of animals and the conduct of man: the former the manifestation of instinct, the latter of reason. Psychologists no longer accept the rigid antithesis which this description suggests. It is easier, however, to study the characteristics of instinctive behaviour in animals before coming to the question of instinct in man. When it is claimed that an animal does this or that from instinct, it is implied that when the animal is in a certain situation he makes a 'serviceable' response, and, further, this response is made spontaneously: it has not been learned or acquired from the animal's previous acquaintance with the situation. The description 'serviceable' response indicates that the response considered in relation to the situation is of service to the animal. Instincts, indeed, may be classified from the services they fulfil. There are (a) the instincts which procure food, (b) those which defend the animal from enemies and danger, (c) those which secure a mate, (d) those which protect the young of the species.

The fact which impresses the biological student of instinct is the bodily mechanism which enables the animal to make the serviceable response to the environmental situation. The animal is preadapted for the behaviour required. Take, for example, the procuring of food: the animal is receptive to just those stimuli which arise from a food situation appropriate to his

species, and in his body he has just the right tools for the execution of the response. The hawk has eyes which can sight his quarry from on high ; he has wings, beak, and talons to execute the flight and kill.

From the onlooker's point of view there would seem little or nothing to differentiate these responses which are termed *instinctive* from the 'serviceable' responses which are reflexes. Like reflexes they are original or native responses, and many biologists have regarded them as being fundamentally the same, the only difference being in complexity. An instinctive response is frequently not one action but a series of actions all serving a single purpose. Nevertheless, degree of complication is not the whole of the difference. The instinctive response is much less fixed in character than the reflex. It will be an action for which the animal's bodily equipment fits him, but it is not always the same action. It will be, say, an action of defence, but it will be varied, and the variations appear to stand in relation to the animal's experience of the situation and to the progress of events. Moreover, the animal shows persistence in its response. If one action fails to fulfil the purpose, another effort is made. *Persistence with varied effort* has thus been singled out as the most striking characteristic of instinctive response. This characteristic in the response leads to two inferences about the animal's mental experience in instinctive behaviour : (a) that the animal appreciates the difference between success and failure and regulates his behaviour accordingly, and (b) that the animal experiences a continuous impulse or urge to act until satisfaction is experienced or until he is incapable of further action. So far as we know, consciousness of success or failure and a conative urge are lacking in reflex response. Reflexes are 'serviceable' to the organism, and yet, as we have seen, many reflexes are not accompanied by

any conscious experience. Even when consciousness is present, it appears to make no difference to the response. The response is not modified or varied in relation to success and failure. Given the stimulus, action takes place unless interfered with or unless totally inhibited by some conscious control, e.g. inhibition of the reflex blinking of the eyelids to a touch stimulation. The reflex response will be repeated as often as the stimulus is given or until the organism is exhausted. Such blank repetition shows nothing of the 'try, try again' character of instinctive response. It is repetition and not persistence with varied effort due to the experience of failure. It is from the psychological side rather than from the purely biological that we are justified in differentiating an instinctive response from a reflex.

The bodily and mental organization which lies behind such a response is part of the animal's native endowment, and it is this organization which is termed Instinct. Professor McDougall has given great prominence to the topic in recent psychology, and we may cite his definition: 'An inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive and to pay attention to objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a peculiar quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or at least to experience an impulse to such action.'¹ We have stressed the fact that in animals the bodily organism furnishes the instruments necessary both for reception of the stimuli and for the execution of the response movements. These instruments have been gradually evolved by the species and are now part of the congenital endowment of every member of the species. The physical side of the disposition referred to by Professor McDougall is thus in evidence. This renders it easier to

¹ *Social Psychology*, p. 25.

recognize the responses which can appropriately be labelled 'instinctive'. When we turn to man we find little indication of the innate dispositions on the physical side. Man's congenital equipment, both for reception and for execution, is characterized by its range and plasticity. It does not furnish any clue of definite preadaptation to specific responses in specific situations.

If we are to claim that man has instincts we must base our claim on congenital mental organizations. Man is preadapted to become aware of certain situations, to be affected by them, and to respond to them. He will perform any action of which he is capable and which is serviceable in the given situation. It is difficult to draw up a list of human instincts. The biological ends or purposes—defence, procuring food, etc.—may be served as well by intentional and deliberate conduct as by instinctive responses, so that these purposes in themselves do not furnish a good basis of classification. Different psychologists offer different lists. Some include appetites (responses to recurrent bodily situations, e.g. hunger, thirst), others exclude these. Some include only those instances of impulsive behaviour wherein both situation and response possess a specific character—Specific Instincts. Others include behaviour which is impulsive, but which can only be described very generally as response to a situation of a certain broad type—General Instincts. Thus 'fear' is a specific instinct. Independently of the teaching of experience the child shows a disposition to hide or to shrink or to flee when in certain definite situations, viz. when experiencing sudden change of equilibrium, when hearing loud sounds, when seeing quick-moving objects. As an example of a general instinct we may name 'imitation'. We can give no description of the situation which will call forth imitation. We can only say that it is more likely to be evoked by persons than by things.

We cannot lay down the form imitation will take. It may be talking, it may be gesture, it may be posture, it may be walking, running, etc. The very generality of these tendencies seems to disqualify them from being regarded as Instincts.¹

The feature of instinct that is important for ethical considerations is *interest*. Instincts manifest the congenital interests of man. Man becomes interested in certain situations. This term denotes not only that he has an innate tendency to become aware of certain objects but that these objects have value for him. He is affected—pleased, pained, or emotionally stirred—and experiences an impulse or urge to action. In relation to congenital interests, then, stand *primitive values*. We may re-state the theory of instincts in man in terms of value. There are certain situations which have value for the human species. Man has a congenital endowment which makes him interested in these situations. He is affected and experiences an impulse to action. The resultant behaviour is termed instinctive. It is from these situations that man receives the first experiences of satisfied or unsatisfied conation. When satisfied the 'striving' (in the case of appetites a better description is 'craving' or 'want') comes to an end. The situation which gives rise to conation has been changed in consequence of the impulsive behaviour, e.g. a child who in a danger situation runs to its mother and by this response satisfies the fear impulse. The situation is altered; it is now sheltering and protective. The child who cries and makes restless movements through hunger is satisfied when he sucks his bottle.

¹ We append the following list of Specific and General Instincts drawn up by Professor Drever (*Instinct in Man*, p. 169, Cambridge University Press): *Specific*: (Emotional) Fear, Anger, Hunting, Acquisitive, Curiosity, Gregarious, Courtship, Self-display, Self-abasement, Parental. *General*: Play, Experimentation, Imitation, Sympathy, Suggestibility.

This example serves to bring out the incorporation of a reflex in an instinctive response. Sucking is a reflex to contact with the teat of the bottle ; here it is the end movement in an instinctive series of movements. Such incorporation of reflexes in instinctive responses is frequent.

Instinctive behaviour is, as we have seen, serviceable. The responses which satisfy are not only endings, terminations of striving—they may also be viewed as 'ends' in the sense of goals. There is, however, this great difference between the 'ends' of instinctive responses and the 'ends' of intentional conduct—the former are not aimed at by the individual. It is not foreknowledge of the end, even where this is present, that brings the instinctive response about. The urge comes from the value of the given present situation. Instinctive action is often contrasted with intentional action as 'blind' action. It is not wholly blind. Each movement made and each ensuing change in the situation prompts the next movement. The 'next' urges on to 'the step beyond', and, as we have already insisted, there is 'persistence', a continuity in the conational experience. We might liken the blindness of instinctive action to that of a man walking along an unknown road by the light of a lantern. He will keep moving, and he adapts his movements to the character of the pathway just ahead of him shown up by the light of the lantern. One who acts intentionally with foresight might be likened to a man walking in full daylight with the sight of his goal before him and full knowledge of the ups and downs of the path that leads him there.

We can review the position we have reached. We have seen that man in virtue of the constitution of his nervous system makes reflex responses to his environment, and also we have granted that he makes instinctive responses (impulsive behaviour) to situations

possessed of 'primitive' value for the species in virtue of his native endowment. We have now to ask how he comes to be moved to action by situations which do not possess 'primitive' value. Study of young children has led some psychologists to infer that individuals are interested in situations for which no primitive value could be claimed. Moreover, individuals show a facility for learning along the lines of these interests; e.g. one child is interested in machinery, another in music. No one claims that machines or music constitute situations that appeal to the human species as such. These lines of interest and facility in learning which characterize individuals must either be regarded as due to individual congenital endowment or as acquired very early from the physical or social environment. We must leave it as an open question in the present state of knowledge. We may, however, stress this point, that the interrelation of knowing, being affected and experiencing an impulse, is the fundamental fact of mental life. The organizations which we term instincts and regard as innate are only certain definite forms of this basic relationship, forms which have been built up by the history of the species. It is for this reason that we prefer to restrict the term 'Instinct' to the Specific Instincts and to regard the so-called General Instincts as expressions of the basic interrelation of cognition, feeling, and impulse. We regard man's capacity to feel pleasure and pain from sense-given situations as wider than his organized instinctive endowment. It is this capacity which leads to such actions as those broadly described as play or experimentation. It is to the interrelation of sense experience, feeling, and impulse that we shall look in our effort to explain the development of new values for the individual.

ACQUIRED VALUE

(a) We may notice first 'transference' of value. In referring to the learning implied in conditioned reflexes we said that the conditioning stimulus acquired the value of the original stimulus. We require a psychological explanation for this transference. When we as psychologists consider the environment in which an animal or child finds itself, we readily analyse it into a number of discrete objects; a single object or thing we regard as possessing a number of distinguishable qualities, colour, shape, size. We are apt to overlook the fact that for the animal or child the situation to which the stimulus belongs is an unanalysed totality. It has its own character as a totality, and the value it possesses likewise belongs to it as a totality and not to this or that feature of it. Thus if sound be present in a totality wherein there is sight and smell of food, the sense situation for a dog is still a totality having a 'pleasure' value and will call forth the flow of saliva as response. The total situation and the response constitute a pattern. The oftener the totality is repeated the better will the pattern be fixed. So definite will it become that in time a part only of the totality is sufficient to reinstate the pattern. We are tempted to write 'A part stands for the whole.' This statement would be wrong; it implies too much. The distinction of part and whole is not present to the animal. It would be truer to write, 'The part is the whole.' This example illustrates what for the psychologist is transference of value from a totality to a part.

We may equally well have a transference of value from one whole to another through a common part. The value of one unanalysed totality is found in another which is experienced as like it. To the psychologist who sees each totality as an analysable whole the

likeness is due to the presence of some common part, but to an animal or very young child this analytic realization of likeness is impossible. We may see recognition of unanalysed likeness in the following incident. A baby who had been taken week by week to a clinic to be weighed and had hitherto given no sign that the process possessed any fear value, one week suddenly showed that it had acquired this value: he clung to his mother when she tried to hand him to the nurse for weighing. Between this visit and the previous one he had been taken to a hospital and had had his gums lanced. The pain value of that danger situation had been transferred to this. It may have been the common feature, smell of disinfectant; it may have been sight of a white-capped nurse, which had given the one totality the value possessed by the other.

(b) We may next take the acquirement of meaning and value through response. By **meaning** we want to denote here whatever an individual is aware of in a stimulus situation. We have seen that response changes the stimulus situation for the individual. When a stimulus situation recurs again and again, and the same response is made each time, the stimulus situation, the response, and the consequent change come in time to make one totality. Retentiveness is responsible for the integration of the response situation into the pattern. But the response situation gives a new meaning and value to the stimulus situation that is one with it. The burnt child fears the pretty flame; the pretty-touch-me situation which called for the response is one totality with the painful burnt finger. The situation has a new meaning and a new value from the pattern that has arisen. We might be tempted to say that the stimulus situation now 'stands' for, or is a 'sign of', the response situation. The expression, however, implies an analysis of events which in all probability has

no place in the consciousness of an animal or young child.

(c) We have value acquired through intelligent analysis and associations of past experience. In the beginning of life transference of value and acquirement of value is largely dependent upon the play of external circumstances; but with growth of intelligence and increasing scope of memory this is no longer the case. The totality of a stimulus situation becomes a true whole. The different features that constitute it are discriminated from one another; there is analytic recognition of likenesses and differences. A given 'this' is compared with a remembered 'that'. The meaning of the situation as a whole can be distinguished from the meaning of separate features that enter into it. Similarly, the value of the whole and the value of distinguished parts within the whole can be different. Taken as a whole a situation may have a fear value, but the presence of a certain person may neutralize this value. Thus a child may be reassured by the presence of his mother. Her protective value outweighs the terrifying darkness of a tunnel. This analysis of situations leads to greater diversity of values. The mosaic of experience grows more varied in meaning and consequently richer in value. Situations can be analysed now in this connexion, now in that, resolved into parts, re-synthesized into new patterns on the lines of past experience.

(d) Suggestion is a further source of new values. Intercourse with others furnishes occasion for the acquirement of new meanings and values. Imitation of another will often introduce a child to a new domain of action and to new situations. In the normal child's world there is a conspiracy among the adult members to tempt him into new paths of adventure. Every exhibition of the appreciation of value by one person is

suggestive to the observer. This is seen in its simplest form in what is termed 'contagion of emotion'. A situation which has no fear value for an individual will become an occasion of terror upon an exhibition of fear by others. The same influence is at work when a speaker by his tone of voice or manner shows his own emotional attitude towards the theme he is speaking about. He makes the topic seem impressive or worthless. He imparts not ideas only, but values. The process begins in the nursery. Mother or nurse convey values by their behaviour, by their tone of voice. 'This' becomes 'horrid', 'that' becomes 'attractive'. New values and new interests arise in the child's world. Some of our first moral values come by suggestion.

If we restrict the term 'instinctive' behaviour to actions prompted by primitive values, we may use the wider denomination 'impulsive' for all behaviour which is the outcome of value in a sense-given situation, no matter whether the value is congenital for the individual or acquired through experience. It is the given present which impels the individual to act.

INTENTIONAL ACTION AND DESIRE

Side by side with this enrichment of the world in meaning and value and enlargement in the scope of impulsive behaviour there is developing a new form of conation. The individual is moved to act by *what may be*, by the idea of the situation his action will bring about when performed. This is action *consciously directed towards an end, and done for the sake of that end*. It is memory of past consequences of impulsive action that makes this possible. The child remembers what has been. He wants to enjoy again something that has had pleasure value or to avoid something that was painful. He is lured on by the idea of what his action

will bring to pass. In impulsive action the drive or impulse came from the value of the present situation, from what was given. In intentional action the urge comes from value attached to the idea of what may be realizable through action. In impulsive action there is a *vis a tergo*, in intentional action there is a *vis a fronte*. We might use our previous example of the burnt child fears the fire to show the difference between impulsive and intentional action. Where fire is just simply a fear-giving situation the avoidancy is impulsive *vis a tergo*. It was as a situation with this acquired value that we considered it. Avoidance of fire might also be an intentional action. If the child clearly remembered how he was burnt he might act now with caution in order to avoid the accident that happened before. He acts with an end in view: *vis a fronte*.

Extension of interest through the multiplication of value situations fosters the growth of intentional action. The values that *are*, the values given in the present situation are few in comparison with the values that *may be*, the values given not in the present stimulus situation but in idea. When such values are not at once realizable by action we have the state known as **desire**. An example will make this clear. A toy pistol in a shop window does not constitute a 'primitive' value situation and evoke an instinctive response, but to the human boy such a sight is interesting. It has an 'acquired' value. He has learnt, perhaps by suggestion, that the possession of such an object gives joy. The situation then has a drive, and if the pistol were his for the taking, like a bird's nest in a hedge, then his taking it would be an impulsive action. But it is not there for the taking. It must be purchased. The possession of the pistol is now an end only to be realized by the act of purchasing. Suppose our boy to have the money in his pocket and to go into the shop and to buy the pistol, his

action is intentional, for there was an end given in idea—possession. Yet from the promptitude and ease with which this end is accomplished the whole action differs little from an impulsive one. In many cases where we falsely claim to have 'acted on impulse' the situation is of this type. There is the idea of an end, but it is suggested directly by the given situation and realized by some simple action. But let us now suppose that our schoolboy had not the requisite money in his pocket. The end—possession—cannot be at once realized and will become prominent in consciousness, and should the conation persist, there arises the state—desire. In desire we can distinguish (a) the idea of the end, (b) striving, often accompanied by bodily restlessness, and (c) 'the pain of shortcoming'. The present situation is unsatisfying. Such expressions as 'burning desire', 'longing', emphasize this aspect of the whole condition. Upon desire will ensue a review of the means requisite to realize the end, the steps that must be taken and the way in which the end can be accomplished. It is at this stage that many desires die out. The means are seen to be impossible or the steps to be taken impracticable. Desires that die so quickly may be more aptly termed 'wishes'. They never come into the realm of practical politics. The schoolboy might remember that his pocket-money is pledged for the rest of the term and that he had prised open his money-box and spent the contents last week. He would give up the thought of possessing the pistol as hopeless. In other cases though the means are not impossible they are difficult. Speculation as to whether 'the game is worth the candle' arises; the end is desired less and less the more closely it is considered in relation to the means required for its realization. Consideration of the means is not all. The end has to be brought into relation with the self. The end is not merely a desired end, but it is *my* end or

an end *for me*. This consideration may show the end in a new light. Something may awaken desire ; yet when we come to look at it closely, and to think of ourselves as realizing that end, we may find it unsuitable. One may desire to undertake a sea-voyage and then realize that such an enterprise is unsuitable in one's present state of health.

Should the desire endure while means are thought out, and should the end be recognized as an 'end for me', then there will ensue the 'I will', the 'fiat', which is the act of volition. There is the belief that the end will be realized so far as that realization depends upon me. The act that follows on such volition is a voluntary act. The actual bodily movements are not in themselves part of the volition. Willing is complete with the fiat.

We have regarded desire as the prologue to volition. Can we have volition without desire? The idea that rouses desire has value ; it is in virtue of its value that it excites conation ; it is the value of the end that makes the present by contrast unsatisfying. *Can a bare idea apart from value and desire evoke volition?* We can answer this question in the negative.

Such an answer may seem to overlook the claim of so-called ideo-motor actions. Here action is said to follow on the vivid idea of the particular movement to be performed or on the idea of the result which would follow from such action. The examples usually cited fall into two types, though the difference between them is overlooked. First, there is action of the *idée fixe* type. An individual is said to perform some action in consequence of the fascination of an idea, e.g. to fling himself down a cliff because the idea of doing so was ever in his mind. Second, there are the actions carried out quasi-mechanically when an individual is thinking about something else, e.g. in talking to a friend one may pick a thread of cotton off her coat. In both

types the alleged cause of action is inadequate. Actions of the first type border on the pathological. The *idée fixe* belongs to the same group of phenomena as obsessions, phobias, compulsion neuroses. The power of the idea which dominates consciousness is derived from its setting, and this setting is repressed. Such repression involves dissociation from the current ideas of the individual's reflective life. The *idée fixe* is isolated. It cannot be opposed by other motives. It is impervious to the criticism of reason. Action in accordance with the *idée fixe* is frequently carried out against the volition of its victim. He cannot be held morally responsible for the action. But such repression and dissociation find their explanation in emotional and instinctive tendencies. It is therefore from these that the impulsive power of the idea is derived. It moves the individual not *qua* idea, but *qua* dissociated idea having a value due to repressed associations. Actions of the second type are at bottom simple impulsive actions. They are familiar everyday actions whose performance offers no difficulty, and they occur when the main stream of conscious experience is concentrated on some other enterprise. If we like to stretch the term beyond its proper meaning we may say that here also there is 'dissociation' of consciousness. The division is only one between 'marginal' and 'focal' consciousness. What really matters is that there is absence of all inhibition; a very slight impulsive value in the given situation will be sufficient to bring about the familiar kind of action which is characteristic of this type of ideo-motor response. Has not the thread of cotton such a value? Lying there on the coat it is out of place and is provocative to the unoccupied hands. It is a thing to be picked off. Its removal satisfies. Were our hands occupied the situation would have no value; were our thoughts not otherwise engaged they might inhibit the

impulse. As it is, the situation has a value to our idle fingers. Professor James gives as a parallel illustration the action of taking fruit at intervals from a dish while carrying on an interesting conversation after dinner. Here again the action seems to be a straightforward impulsive one awakened by the sense-given situation. The appeal may be to our hands or to our eyes and hands—say the fruit in question is a dish of cherries. It may be as a scrunchable thing or as a sweet thing that chocolates tempt us. The pleasure value of the stimulus situation is provocative and the satisfaction ensuing on action is marked. Idly scribbling while listening or thinking is another case of the same type. The presence of a pencil and paper prompts to action. It has value to the empty hand, and the action is satisfying. In all these instances the major occupation is one where comparatively little bodily activity is called for. The disengaged state of the mobile parts of the body renders the individual open to values which otherwise would not influence him. One may generalize and say that the value of these situations is always a value derived from movement. This is not the same thing as saying that the action is called out by an idea of movement. We do not first imagine what we are going to do and then in virtue of this idea perform the action. We have a direct incentive to action from the given situation. It is for this reason that we call this type of so-called *ideo-motor* actions impulsive.

MOTIVE AND INTENTION

In voluntary action 'end' awakens desire, and it does so in virtue of some value. An end present in idea and regarded as having *value for me* is termed a **motive**. It moves me to will its realization. The action by which this end is to be realized and any other actions relevant thereto constitute part of **intention**, the part that may be

described as **purpose**. Intention embraces all that we foresee as bound up with the performance of these actions, their consequence, and attendant circumstances. This may be illustrated by an example. The idea of a spring holiday in Holland appeals to me from the reports I have heard of the beauty of the tulip-fields, or of the novelty of travel by canal-boats. It may appeal to me by the fame of the art collections and churches. The idea then awakens desire ; it has value. I begin to turn over ways and means, to consider the idea in all its bearing as an end for me. I will go to Holland in the spring. What is my motive ? I might give the end in one or all its values. My motive in going to Holland is to see the beauty of the tulip-fields, to visit the famous galleries, to travel by canal-boat. Being artistic the tulip-fields have value for me, loving pictures the galleries have value for me, etc. What is my intention ? I intend to journey to Holland in April and to visit tulip-fields, galleries, etc. That is my purpose. But I intend far more than this. I intend to be economical all the winter, not to go to any theatres or dances. I intend to read up the history of the towns I am going to visit. The sphere of intention is wider yet. If I go to Holland I cannot go to Devonshire and pay my usual visit to an old friend. This omission may possibly give offence. I intend to take this risk. I intend to go through all the discomfort that I know the crossing will entail for me. It is obvious that the sphere of intention is much wider than that of motive. The points just enumerated are not those that move me to go to Holland. Some writers would have us distinguish between *direct* and *indirect* intentions. The former are immediate consequences bound up with the end ; the latter are further consequences following from these or contingent upon them. More important is the distinction between the intentions a man realizes clearly

when he wills and those that he does not. In the foregoing example the omission of the customary visit to Devonshire and its contingent consequences is probably only glimpsed when making the voluntary decision. A negative intention, what we shall *not* do, is more easily overlooked than a positive one. A further distinction is that between *inner* and *outer* intentions. This distinction is applicable to motives also, and here becomes of ethical importance. In considering an act we can view it in relation to its outer (objective) consequences or in relation to its inner (subjective) consequences. We can look at the change it would bring about in the world of people and things (outer), or we can look at the change it would bring about in the affective life of the actor. To use our previous example. So far as it is my intention to go to Holland to visit this place and that my intentions are 'objective', so also is my motive. We said my motive was seeing the beauty of the tulip-fields or travelling the waterways or visiting the galleries. This again may be called 'outer' or objective. We might look at the matter differently. We might say what we intend is to bring about an enrichment of our knowledge of art, heighten our appreciation of colour, widen our outlook on life. We might claim that our motive is to satisfy our desire to travel by waterway, to have the pleasure of looking at the coloured fields, the art collections. Undoubtedly in many actions we aim at both subjective and objective purposes, we are moved by objective and by subjective ends. Usually, when this is the case, we are more conscious of the one than of the other.

INTERESTED AND DISINTERESTED MOTIVES

Failure to recognize the dual character of motives has given rise to difficulties. In Ethics it has given the

problem of disinterested and interested motives. Whenever an individual aimed at producing some condition of his own affective life he was said to act from an interested motive. Whenever, on the other hand, he had an objective motive, he was said to act disinterestedly. Some Ethical writers have denied the possibility of objective or disinterested motives and have narrowed all subjective or interested motives to two: pleasure and pain. The only ends recognized are experience of pleasure and avoidance of pain. Thus J. S. Mill writes: 'Desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful are . . . in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact . . . to think of an object as desirable (unless for the sake of its consequences), and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing; . . . to desire anything except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility.'¹ This doctrine is called 'Psychological Hedonism'. It is clear that the existence of disinterested motives is a crucial question. If they are psychologically impossible, then it is not possible to desire virtue for its own sake or to desire another's pleasure at the expense of our own.

The doctrine of Psychological Hedonism was due to confusion of ideas, which in its turn was due to inadequate psychological analysis. When Mill says that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant are two names for the same psychological fact, what does he really mean? The psychological fact that he had in mind probably was the fact that every satisfaction of desire is *ipso facto* pleasant and every thwarting of desire is unpleasant. This fact will not warrant the statement that, whenever we desire, what we desire is the pleasure of having our desire satisfied. Sometimes it is a fact that what we

¹ *Utilitarianism*, chapter IV.

want *is* the pleasure of having our desire satisfied, but very often it is not so. In our more primitive desires it is rarely so. What we desire is the object that does in the outcome satisfy us. We desire food, companions, shelter. These objects, because they satisfy us, will give pleasure ; but it is the objects that are desired in the first instance. We can distinguish cases where the motive is objective or outer from cases where it is subjective or inner, and this distinction enables us to recognize the existence of disinterested motives. The motive that induces me to part with my three-year-old coat to the carter's wife may be interested : I may desire the pleasure of knowing that she will be less likely to suffer from cold ; or it may be disinterested : I may desire to prevent her suffering cold. Very probably if I cross-examined myself fairly I should discover both motives influencing my action.

We must notice that sometimes if pleasure is made an end the very possibility of its occurrence is destroyed. It is often necessary to be single-hearted in the pursuit of an objective end in order to enjoy the pleasure arising from satisfaction of desire. In a game a man must play to win if he is to enjoy the pleasure of victory. To enjoy the satisfaction of a neatly accomplished task we must concentrate on the task itself. Whenever doubt is cast on the purity of a man's motives, the implication made is that interested rather than disinterested motives have influenced his action.

CONFLICT OF MOTIVES

Study of motives leads us to recognize that very often they may conflict. The ends by which a man is moved cannot both be realized. He must adopt as his end this *or* that. Conflict between objects of desire paralyzes action for the time being. The conflict can

only be solved by the dominance of one of the motives.

(a) Sometimes external events happening during the conflict change the relative value of the ends or alter the ease or difficulty of the steps which lead to them. Such a change may result in the dominance of X over Y. Suppose the problem of the individual to be acceptance of a better-paid post under a different society or continuance in his present work where chances of promotion are indefinite. The problem is solved when it is learned that one of his seniors is retiring and that thereby prospects of promotion are improved. The new better-paid post is now definitely less attractive than the old one.

(b) When extraneous events cause no change in value the solution lies with the individual. Sometimes a change in his emotional mood brings about a change in values parallel to that effected by external circumstances. In a strenuous mood X and Y are rival ends; but when the individual relapses into indolence X ceases to attract by reason of the difficulties that attach to it. 'I gave up the idea—it was too difficult to manage', is the statement that may express a change in mood and not a reasoned judgment. An impatient mood yields a solution which removes the action from the plane of deliberate action altogether. The relative value of X or Y is not worked out; the impatience to act somehow is too great to allow of deliberation. Whichever of these two ends is in the forefront of consciousness at the moment when this impatience reaches its height, this is the end adopted. If X was in consciousness at 'the psychological moment', X was the end realized. The hackneyed phrase, 'the psychological moment', is here used with its true significance. Such action is deliberate in appearance only; it is truly impulsive. The drive comes from impatience, not from the value of ends X and Y.

(c) Different from either of the above is Choice after Deliberation. The rival ends are compared, the means necessary in each case, the consequences following on each line of action are all taken into account. Such weighing of pros and cons is only possible at the level of development where sustained thought is established. The rival ends demand analysis; they need to be considered in their various aspects. Any impatient urge to action must be inhibited while each is being reviewed as an 'end for me'. Shall I or shall I not give my name as a support for Mr. A in this election? The candidate Mr. A may appeal to me on many grounds. I may have personal sympathy with many of his views and a respect for his downrightness. On the other hand, I may be able to see in him the strain of fanaticism that his opponents fear, and I may foresee the errors of policy into which his narrowness of outlook may lead him. As a private individual I might support Mr. A without much hesitation, but as the representative of a Society which prides itself on its broad views I am in doubt. The decision when made will be a deliberate choice. In this example the two ends involved the alternatives of doing something and not doing something. This enables us to point out that abstention from action may itself be a voluntary act. It should be obvious that not doing, or abstention from action, is the realization of an end only when there is a motive. There is no choice unless there is a conflict of motives. A simple volition such as is expressed by 'I will go to town to buy some rose-trees' is not a choice between going to town and not going to town, unless there was some motive for the latter course. The mere possibility of not acting does not give us a right to say that in every volition we choose between acting and not acting.

The above example of deliberate choice serves to

illustrate the importance of the 'me' in choice. The ends are weighed as 'ends for me'. The conception of the self that is before the person helps to determine his decision. The ethical bearing of this we shall consider in a later chapter when treating of character.

RESOLUTION AND HABIT

We have said that the volition is complete with the fiat and the belief that, so far as in us lies, the end shall be realized. The actual execution of the movements is not part of the volition. Should some outside interference prevent the execution, the act of willing would none the less be complete. 'Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer' may have a literal truth, though the man lay no hand on his brother. Yet deeds are the only criteria we can have of another's man's volition, and to some extent even of our own. Before volition is put into execution we may change our decision. The actual difficulties of realization may deter us even as we are taking the first step towards it. 'There is many a slip 'twixt the cup and the lip' applies to the execution of our own will as well as to the fulfilment of our expectations by others. Persistence in a volition in spite of difficulties or enforced delay in execution gives a fixity of purpose that is termed firmness or *resolution*. As soon as opportunity offers effect will be given to the decision which has been made. The grounds on which the decision was reached will only justify adherence to that decision so long as there is no material change in the situation. New evidence, new facts affecting the value of the end call for re-deliberation. It is no mark of resolution or firmness of will to persist in a decision when the situation has changed. Such persistence is obstinacy or pig-headedness, and is often rooted in the pride of self-love.

Just as the repetition of any particular action tends to make that action into a habit, so the repeated pursuit of certain ends tends to facilitate such lines of conduct. Habit in its simplest form is seen in the performance of some movement which repetition has rendered automatic. The action is mechanical, carried out with a minimum of consciousness. Movements that form the basis of many skilled performances are of this type. They occur now with the ease of reflexes, but originally they had to be learned and were carried out with full intention and consciousness. Less mechanical but still quasi-automatic are the tricks of speech and mannerisms that are characteristic of individuals. They also have been acquired but are usually not the outcome of intentional action. There has been repetition but no intentional practice. Imitation or the recurrence of given situations has established the action as a habit. The daily round of life gives scope for the formation of many habits that are less automatic than the above. The actions are performed easily in response to given situations, although not quite removed from the control and guidance of the main current of consciousness. Through repetition many impulsive actions become so facilitated that the individual is unconscious of any drive in carrying them out. To many persons eating and drinking at a given time is little more than an automatic response to the mealtime situation. There is no zest of hunger. Similarly, actions which originally were carried out with intention are now performed almost unreflectingly. Daily 'chores' are examples of habits which are not wholly removed from the guidance of intelligence. The action will be checked or modified in accordance with the requirements of the moment.

When we speak of 'habitual lines of conduct' we have something still further removed from the mechanical movements of the first category of habit.

The pursuit of the end is in no sense of the word unconscious. The particular form which the line of conduct takes may vary from occasion to occasion. Its execution may always require attentive consciousness. All that the term 'habit' can mean here is facilitation. The pros and cons are more easily seen with reference to this kind of end; the difficulties in the means more readily recognized. Principles that have been applied before in viewing an end in a given perspective can be applied again with less hesitation. Thus preference for one end over another becomes a matter for little hesitation. The whole setting is familiar and thus choice is easy. It is in this sense that we can speak of given lines of conduct becoming habitual. The late Professor Sully suggested the term 'habitude' for the type of facilitation we are here considering. The term is useful and distinguishes this effect of repeated decisions from the narrower effects of repetition that we call habit.

The importance of 'habitudes' will be seen more clearly when sentiments and character have been discussed.

CHAPTER II

THE REFERENCE AND THE MEANING OF THE MORAL JUDGMENT

THE REFERENCE OF THE MORAL JUDGMENT

WE come back to the ethical questions and ask again, 'What is the reference of the moral judgment?' It may well seem to the moralist that (the moral judgment is exclusively concerned with intentional action involving motives and is particularly concerned with acts of choice) He would probably be right if action could be split up into watertight compartments. (The very urgency of instinctive and impulsive actions appear to put them out of court in questions of moral obligation) It may be claimed that instinctive actions are part of man's mental constitution, as much a part of his make-up as the physical features of body. It may be said they belong to what is, not to what ought or ought not to be, and should fall outside the moral judgment. If instinctive and impulsive actions could be divorced from intentional actions this line of argument would be forceful. Taken in themselves they do lie outside the moral judgment, but, as we have seen, conduct is all of one piece; the desires of intentional action have their origin in the experiences gained through instinctive or impulsive behaviour and react on the latter. Further, it is one of the functions of intentional action to regulate instinctive and impulsive behaviour; to check this, to reinforce that. These modes of action, (then, ^{they} cannot be entirely excluded from the reference of the moral judgment, even though we admit that (the stress falls on intentional

conduct.) It is difficult on psychological grounds to draw a line between simple volition and volition involving choice. What is in appearance a simple volition may be in reality a preference of 'this' over 'that'. It needs subtle analysis to detect the complexity of motives.

When (we have accepted intentional conduct as the sphere of reference) we have next to ask on what aspect of intentional conduct does the moral judgment fall? (a) Viewed as an agent whose deeds must be considered in relation to the society of which he is a member, (is it a man's *action and its consequences* to which the moral judgment refers?) Such is the view held by writers who stress the application of Ethics to that middle region of conduct between law and custom. J. S. Mill (1806-1873) and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1842) both take this line. Thus Mill writes: 'We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow-creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience.'¹ In making the act and its consequence the centre of reference these writers emphasize primarily *intended* consequences. 'The morality of an act depends entirely upon the intention, that is, upon what the agent *wills* to do.'² This is the part of intention we have called Purpose. They distinguish between the foreseen consequences—intention—and the motive. Thus Mill goes on in the passage quoted, 'But the motive, that is the feeling that makes him will so to do, when it makes no difference to the act, makes none in the morality.' As we have already seen, Mill, being a psychological hedonist, recognized only pleasure and pain as motives. (b) To other writers *motive* seemed everything in conduct. 'The approbation and dis-

¹ J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, chapter V. ² *Ibid.*, chapter II.

approbation we feel towards human actions is directed upon them as personal phenomena. . . . Their moral character goes forward with them out of the person, and is not reflected back upon them from their effects. Benefit and mischief are in themselves wholly characterless, and we neither applaud the gold mine, nor blame the destructive storm. . . . What we judge is always the *inner spring* of an action as distinguished from its outward operation.'¹ 'Virtue does not consist barely in acting, but in acting upon such motives and to such ends.'² (c) Others again regard moral judgment as directed to character. 'Any act of will is the expression of the man as he at the time is.' 'The actions which ought to be done . . . are actions expressive of a good will, in the sense that they represent a character of which the dominant interest is in conduct contributory to the perfection of mankind. . . . We cannot say with *complete* truth of any action . . . that it has been what it ought to have been, unless it represents such a character.'³ 'The moral law . . . has to be expressed in the form, "Be this", not in the form, "Do this".'⁴

Just as we said it is impossible to carve out from the whole of life intentional conduct and set it in isolation as a theme for moral judgment, so here again we regard it as bad psychology to attempt to separate the deed from the doer or again to divide motive from intention. It is still worse to treat either apart from character. (The moral judgment cannot fall exclusively on any one of these aspects of conduct). We may consider a concrete case to illustrate (the interdependence of intention, consequences, motives, and character in the reference of the moral judgment). Let us suppose a nurse to give

¹ Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, vol. II, book I, chapter I, p. 22.

² Butler, Correspondence with Clarke, Letter VII.

³ T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, pp. 179 and 359.

⁴ Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, chapter IV, § 16, p. 155.

a patient a wrong drug in error and the patient's condition to be rendered very critical as a consequence. If moral judgment falls simply on the deed and its consequences, the judgment must be that the act is wrong and it merits condemnation. On Mill's view the act merits punishment. Looked at from the point of view of intention only, however, the act is blameless. What was done was not what was intended. The nurse intended to give a dose from bottle A. She in fact gave one from B. Looked at from the point of view of motive the act is blameless. The nurse's aim in acting was to forward the patient's cure, or to carry out orders. The consequences were unforeseen, they were not intended and there was no evil motive. Is there then nothing blameworthy in the agent? We may approach an answer by looking at a case where the consequences are not the direct outcome of the agent's action. Suppose at a party one guest offered a chair to another and that this chair collapsed, the person in consequence breaking a leg. The collapse of the chair is not the agent's action in the sense in which the preparation of the wrong dose is the nurse's action. It is a consequence for which the person had no responsibility. It is not the function of a guest to test the chairs provided by his hostess. (The nurse's responsibility, however, cannot be ignored. It is her office to give the ordered dose and she is blameworthy not for intention or motive but for a quality of character revealed in the execution of her office.) (She was in some measure careless.) It may be that this quality is not one which is 'characteristic' of her in general. It may be exceptional, its presence may be capable of explanation on this occasion. It may be due to fatigue, or preoccupation with a personal anxiety, but whatever the explanation it is a blameworthy trait of character in relation to responsibility, and as on this occasion it

influenced the carrying out of her motive it is regarded as a quality belonging to her. The situation would be different if a rigorous self-examination revealed as motive, not only the general end, execution of doctor's orders, or the patient's well-being, but some particular immediate end, e.g. to get through the duties as quickly as possible with a view to keeping a social engagement. The motive behind the performance of the nurse's work is now judged blameworthy. It will also be judged in its relation to character. It is or is not 'characteristic' of the person to put outside interests before her work.

It is customary to distinguish between actions that are *objectively* right and those that are *subjectively* right. An action is objectively right when motive and intention are right and all reasonable precautions are taken to carry the intended action into effect. An action is subjectively right when though the motive and intention are right, all reasonable care is not taken to secure the fulfilment of the intention.¹ The nurse's action in the case supposed is subjectively right, but not objectively right. 'Reasonable care' is a qualification that involves traits of character, and the distinction between 'subjectively right' and 'objectively right' disappears if the reference of the moral judgment includes the character of the agent. We conclude then, that conduct cannot be satisfactorily partitioned off into sections, consequences, intentions, motives, character, and that the moral judgment refers to the whole of the personal side of conduct.

THE MEANING OF THE MORAL JUDGMENT

We have to turn to a bigger problem, 'What does the moral judgment mean?' What does 'That is right', 'That ought to be done', 'That is good', state?

¹ *Materially* right describes an effect judged apart from agent

As a preliminary let us say that there are many judgments in which the terms 'ought' or 'right' occur that are not moral judgments at all. We often use these terms with reference to impersonal events with no moral significance whatever. 'It ought to be fine to-morrow with such a high barometer.' 'Ought' here merely states an expectation that is reasonable in view of the conditions; a certain sequence of events may be reasonably expected—'This timber ought not to shrink, it is well seasoned.' Again, the 'ought' indicates reasonable expectation. It often has this meaning even when human action is under consideration—'You ought to be able to do that correctly after a few lessons.' Here as before there is no moral obligation. 'Ought' expresses a probable or expected sequence of events. The word 'right' is also used with no direct reference to conduct. It is used to express suitability or fitness for given uses—'That colour is not right.' It is also used to indicate correctness or incorrectness with reference to some standard. 'The answer to the sum is not right.' 'The perspective in the drawing is not right.' This reference to a standard does bring these judgments nearer to normative judgments, but the standard in question is not a moral one. We must recognize, therefore, that many judgments containing the words 'right' or 'ought' are not moral judgments at all.

The easiest method of arriving at the meaning of the moral judgment is by eliminating the specious meanings that might be thought to belong to it, and which indeed have been thought to belong to it, but which fail to give its essential characteristics.

(a) The moral judgment does not merely express the individual's approval or liking (with corresponding disapproval or dislike) for the conduct which he pronounces 'ought to be', 'is right', 'is good'; or 'ought

not to be', 'is not right', 'is not good'. (X's judgment, 'White slave traffic ought to be abolished', is not merely a statement of X's dislike of the traffic, his feeling of disapproval.) "If it were it would be of the same order as his pronouncement that he liked ice creams, or disliked stiff collars. It would be the expression of (an emotional attitude towards a situation) and nothing more. Everyone will probably agree that the (moral judgment does express more than the emotional attitude of an individual. One would not labour the point but for the fact that the words (Moral approbation) are very often used as a synonym for moral judgment—first because (an emotional attitude approving or disapproving conduct is) the *normal* accompaniment of moral judgment. It is this that leads us into mistaking moral approbation for moral judgment. As soon as an individual has reached fixed principles of conduct, recognized certain virtues and vices, he will also have built up moral sentiments, love of truth, of fair play, hatred of cruelty, and so on. When the conduct on which moral judgment is pronounced involves these sentiments an emotional attitude is necessarily aroused; e.g. the judgment, 'A man ought to be ashamed of deceiving a simple old woman', probably expresses indignation as well as a judgment that the conduct referred to ought not to be. We shall recognize this relation of moral sentiments and moral judgment in Chapter IV. The second reason why subjective approbation and moral judgment are likely to be confused) is the use of certain proverbial expressions: 'It takes all sorts to make a world', 'What is one man's meat is another man's poison', 'It is all a matter of taste'. These expressions all agree in stressing the 'subjectivity' of opinion. By 'subjectivity' is meant dependence on the particular ideas of the individual thinker. When such proverbs are understood (wrongly) as expressive of the subjectivity of the moral judgment,

the true nature of the moral judgment becomes misunderstood. Emotional attitudes vary from person to person. (What is disgusting to one person is of scientific interest to another. What irritates one man may not disturb the serenity of another.) (Variation in emotional attitudes is mistaken for variation in moral judgment. The word 'taste' in the expression, 'Is it not all a matter of taste?' is a pitfall, because it includes a covert reference to judgment as well as to emotional attitude. In such phrases as 'Canons of good taste', 'A man of taste', there is a reference to a standard—to something objective beyond the individual's own private likes and dislikes.)

(b) Supposing it to be clear that the moral judgment does *not* mean the approval or disapproval of the one pronouncing the judgment, may we substitute for the individual society at large, the civilized world? Such a view will at least free us from the subjectivity of the previous doctrine. When X judges, 'This ought to be', 'This is right', 'This is good' is he meaning that people in general will approve it? If this is the true meaning of the moral judgment, there is no real difference between the judgment, 'Society ought to approve of this' and 'Society does approve of this'. Now, doubtless, in civilized communities where standards of conduct are fairly high a moral judgment will carry with it the implication that society does approve or does disapprove of this or that line of conduct, just as we have seen it carries the implication that the individual has an emotional attitude of approval or disapproval. But is this really the fundamental meaning or import? If it is, Ethics has no justification as an independent branch of learning. Moral judgments are records of historical fact. It will be for the anthropologist and sociologist to join hands with the historian and trace out how these universally approved lines of action have arisen; how

it is that men have come to condemn head-hunting, infanticide, and so on. Ethics should be replaced by a history of civilization. Clearly there is the greatest possible need for such a history ; but when it is compiled, when anthropology, sociology and history have said their say, the real ethical problem would still remain. We could still ask whether one custom was worse than another, why one *ought* to have disappeared and another to have spread, and such questions would not be nonsense. If this is so, (the essential meaning of the moral judgment is *not* universal opinion or the agreed attitude of the civilized world.) Let us acknowledge at once that in many cases this is all that is in our minds at the moment of pronouncing a moral judgment. Behind this temporary or superficial meaning, however, our reason recognizes a more fundamental one.

(c) The two previous discussions will have paved the way for the discussion of the third meaning attributed to the moral judgment. (The moral judgment) as we have seen, (is not necessarily) nor even normally, in conflict with (the approval of the individual) or with (the approval of civilized opinion.) Similarly, there need be no conflict between the moral judgment and the commands and prohibitions of a particular religious creed. None the less the moral judgment, ' This ought to be ', or ' This is good ', does *not* mean ' This is in accordance with such-and-such a creed '. Some one may say, ' For a Buddhist, or for a Christian, it does mean this is in accordance with *my* creed.' For the believer his creed enjoins or prohibits such-and-such conduct, and this is what the moral judgment expresses. This is true, and yet such a doctrine does not bring out the full meaning of the moral judgment. We may try to show where the difference lies by approaching the question from another angle. We recognize that religion is not first and foremost a rule of life. The most essential fact in religion is worship.

There is belief in the existence of some God or Gods, and there is the approach of man to God with attendant rites and ceremonies. A rule of life, things enjoined and things forbidden, gathers round the worship. The great religions of the world stand out by reason of the rule of life which each of them possesses. Now let us ask this question : Can we compare these rules of life and declare one better than the other ? If we do, what is the meaning of such comparison ? The Christian may claim that the rule of life enjoined by Christianity is higher than the rule of life laid down by Mohammedanism. If challenged as to why he makes this claim he cannot simply fall back on the answer, ' Because it is Christian.' Such an answer takes us nowhere. Or, again, supposing we claim that we have a higher conception now of the meaning of the commands and prohibitions laid down by Christianity than the mass of mankind had in the thirteenth century. What do we mean ? What is our standard of a *higher* conception ? Again we cannot answer ' Christianity ' It is Christianity we are judging in two of its realizations. Such considerations will lead us to recognize that there are ethical principles behind the rule of life enjoined by a religion, and it is by these very principles that the rule of life itself is judged.

Ethical principles are, then, more fundamental than the particular commands and prohibitions of a creed, and when we pronounce the moral judgment ' That ought to be done ', ' That is good ' we are not stating that the conduct in question is in accordance with the rules of life laid down by a creed. Here, as in the last case, we must add that very often we do mean no more than this, but we recognize that behind this meaning there is another which is truer and broader.

(d) The last meaning which we can rule out as non-essential does not offer any great difficulty. ' This ought to be done ', ' This is good ' does *not* mean ' This is

expedient'. When we refer to 'the expedient' we always have the consequences of an action in view. We have seen that there are ethical writers who hold that the primary reference of a moral judgment is to the deed as intended, and such writers must, of course, if consistent, hold that the moral judgment is a declaration about the act and its intended consequences. If, however, we use this fact as a justification for the claim that (the true meaning of the moral judgment is) a declaration that the consequences are expedient or at least harmless, we shall have fallen into a confusion of ideas: we shall have confused a dependent predication about intended consequences with the moral judgment whereon such a predication depends. We can put it another way. Conduct is expedient if it leads towards a state of affairs which is viewed as an end, or, negatively, it is harmless if it does not hinder that end. But of the end itself we shall want to know whether 'it ought, or ought not, to be'. The significance of the moral judgment as a pronouncement on means to ends is derived from its significance as a pronouncement on ends. We cannot therefore regard 'expediency' or 'freedom from harm' as the true analysis of the meaning of the moral judgment.

Having cleared away interpretations which do not give the essential meaning of the moral judgment, we must attempt a constructive analysis. We have given the moral judgment in three forms without attempting any explanation of the variation. These three forms serve to bring out different aspects of the meaning of the moral judgment. 'This ought to be done', with its corresponding negative, presents the moral judgment as an imperative, a command or prohibition addressed to the individual. Its outstanding characteristic is *authoritativeness*. The second form, 'It is right', asserts that the conduct in question satisfies some pattern or requirement. A third form attributes a quality to the conduct,

'It is good'. In the first form the claim on the individual or doer is explicit. His desire or willingness receives no recognition. In the second form there is implicit reference to the justification of the conduct. In the third form an appeal to the will of the individual is implicit.)

The first authoritative form also expresses the *ultimateness* of the moral judgment. The command or prohibition leaves no opening for conditions. It is not 'This ought to be done if you wish to attain such and such a result'. The philosopher who emphasized this feature of the moral judgment was Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). He distinguished between hypothetical imperatives and the categorical imperative. The former are commands or prohibitions which only hold good if some end or goal is accepted, e.g. 'A man ought to study mathematics if he wishes to become an engineer.' If a man does not wish to become an engineer but a farmer, the study of mathematics is not imperative. The **categorical imperative** holds without conditions. The 'ought' is ultimate. 'It concerns not the matter of the action, or its intended result, but its form and the principle of which it is itself a result.'¹

The same ultimate character is brought out by the third form, 'This is good.' There is no wider class to which we can refer 'good' in order to bring out its meaning. This is sometimes expressed by describing moral good as 'intrinsic good'. The force of the term lies in its opposition to 'extrinsic'. An extrinsic good owes some of its value at least to another object. A tool may be good as a tool for a special purpose; an act may be good as a means. It is 'good for' rather than 'good'. The opposition, however, is not fundamental. In one sense all value is 'value for'. We shall take up this point in the next chapter.

¹ Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 39.

When the second form of moral judgment is used the ultimate character of the judgment is thrown back a step ; a pattern or a standard is suggested as justification of rightness. We shall see in the next chapter that the pattern or standard required in conduct must itself have authority ; it must be ultimate. The first and second forms of moral judgment are closely related.

We have rejected a subjective meaning for the moral judgment. (It is *objective* and *universal*. (In terming the moral judgment objective and universal we are claiming that it is not relative to the individual who pronounces it. It is a judgment that is valid for all thinkers.) 'It cannot, without error, be disapproved by any other mind.') It is, however, relative to the situation judged.) It is important to be clear about this. We have seen that the primary reference of the moral judgment is to intentional conduct. 'This ought to be' or 'This is good' applies to a concrete situation, and it relates to all the conditions of that situation. It is just these concrete conditions that make the moral judgment in a *certain sense* relative. 'It is abundantly clear that the morality of one time is not that of another, that the men considered good in one age might in another age not be thought good, and what would be right for us here might be mean and base in another country, and what would be wrong for us here might there be our bounden duty.'²) We shall have to refer to the relativity of moral judgments in this sense when we discuss duties and practical problems. We may perhaps bring out the relativity of the moral judgment by considering the statement, 'This is right for A but wrong for B.' In what sense is this true and in what sense would it be *entirely false* as a moral judgment ? It is true if it means : the situation so far as A is concerned with it is morally right ; the situation so far as

¹ Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, book I, chapter III.

² Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, second ed., p. 189.

B is concerned with it is morally wrong. It is a false moral judgment if it is interpreted as meaning: it is possible *for one and the same situation* to be judged correctly by A as morally right and by B as morally wrong. The moral judgment cannot vary with the one pronouncing it. If A's moral judgment is the true one, it will hold for B as much as for A.

{ The meaning of the moral judgment is authoritative, ultimate, objective, and universal. }

CHAPTER III

DETERMINATION OF THE MORAL JUDGMENT DUTIES AND VIRTUES

WE have considered the reference of the moral judgment and the import or meaning of the moral judgment. We now come to the question how is the 'ought', the 'good', the 'right' determined? Let us be clear what it is we are asking. We are not asking how do I know on some particular occasion of some particular act whether I ought or ought not to perform it, whether the act is 'right' or 'good'. Such questions are asked when we strive to apply ethical principles. We are here concerned with the principles themselves; practical problems will concern us later. Our present question is an ontological one concerning the reality which gives the moral judgment the characteristics we have claimed for it.

MORAL LAW

We have called attention to the different forms in which the moral judgment is expressed. The first form 'ought', and also the second form 'right', give the moral judgment the character of a law. (Moral judgments are moral laws.) This mode of stating ethical principles common among all Western peoples is due to two facts: (1) The Christian rule of life, Christian Ethics, is built on Hebrew Ethics. The law of Christ was constructed on the basis of the law of Moses. The Hebraic conception of 'the law' and a Divine Lawgiver has moulded the ethical thought of all European nations possessing the Bible. It has given moral law its place as

something lying behind the law of States. (2) Secondly, in the West civilization spread from Rome. Law rather than culture was the great gift which Rome gave to the countries she conquered. Roman law and jurisprudence influenced the orderly relations of man to man in all the communities that acknowledged her authority. This, then, was another factor serving to make the conception of law the leading one in any reflections on conduct. Thus the determination of the moral judgment has figured in the history of moral philosophy as a search for the source of law.

(a) *A Divine Being.* It may be claimed that the source of all law is a Divine Being and that moral laws are the prescriptions of a Divine Will } that these laws have been revealed to man through His prophets, through sacred writings. Bound up with the conception of a Divine Lawgiver, whose ordinances govern the world and the life of man, is the conception of sin as a breach of the law. Such breaches of law demand atonement, sacrifices. We cannot do more than touch on these points, but it is easy to realize how far-reaching has been the influence of Hebraic teaching—the teaching of the old dispensation—in fashioning our thought on moral questions.

We have already in the previous chapter touched upon what is the root difficulty in this conception of a code of Divine Law, viz. that it does not serve to explain how we are able to apply our moral judgment to the laws themselves. We may notice further that for an ontological account of the reality of the moral judgment some independent justification or proof of the existence of God is necessary.

(b) *Nature.* A source of law has been sought in Nature. Natural law has been used as the basis for moral law and for law in the narrow sense of legal enactments. Morality as 'life in accordance with

nature' is a cry that has been raised more than once in the history of philosophy. The great Stoic School (founder, Zeno, 340 B.C.) taught that men should strive after wisdom. They should study the order of things in the universe and from this derive their practical ethics. As the Stoics interpreted it Nature was a manifestation of a Divine orderliness; thus in principle this ontology does not differ from the foregoing.

(The modern school of Evolutionary Ethics also takes Nature as its ontological basis.) Writers at the latter part of the nineteenth century believed that by tracing the course followed by evolution the pattern of life towards which man was tending could be descried. It was in accordance with this pattern that man should regulate his conduct. Thus Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) writes: 'Life is a continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations.'¹ 'Acts are good or bad according as they are well or ill adjusted to ends. . . . Evolution tending ever towards self-preservation, reaches its limit when individual life is greatest, both in length and breadth; and now we see that leaving other ends aside, we regard as good the conduct furthering self-preservation, and as bad the conduct tending to self-destruction.'² We have already by anticipation criticized this school of Ethics. (Natural laws may determine what has been and may forecast what will be the development of human beings, but it cannot determine the 'ought to be'. When Spencer comes to a discussion of what constitutes fullness of life 'both in length and breadth', he has to examine not only adaptation to ends but also the relative value of the ends themselves. For this evaluation of ends evolution furnishes no guidance.) Life at its 'greatest' is not interpreted in terms of quantity; it implies qualitative differences. It is life at its 'highest'. Spencer conceives

¹ Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, p. 19.

² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

of a perfect life, wherein there would be perfect adjustment of internal relations to external relations. The perfect life for an individual demands a perfect social environment. This is an ideal which the actual condition of man and society is far from approaching. But whence is derived the conception of such an ideal? Not from natural law. Adjustment of relations when used to measure progress presupposes moral standards. Is not 'divine discontent' to be rated higher than dull apathy? Yet the latter shows more 'adjustment' to external relations than the former. Spencer himself offers us, as criterion of adjustment, pleasure and pain: 'Pain is the correlative of some species of wrong—some divergence from that course of action which perfectly fulfils all requirements. . . . The conception of good conduct always proves, when analysed, to be the conception of a conduct which produces a surplus of pleasure somewhere.'¹ In so far as pleasure and pain are made the criteria for moral value the determination of the moral judgment is not being sought in natural law but in a good. Spencer's theory has much in common with Hedonism.

In many of the ethical systems which preach life according to nature we find a confusion of two very different beliefs: (i) a belief in a Golden Age wherein man lived in a state of nature unfettered by the control of rulers and political laws, (ii) a belief that man's relations to his fellow-men are governed by laws comparable to the laws which govern the physical universe and that these laws are laws of his being *qua* rational creature.

(c) *The Self.* (1) Closely allied to the view of natural law is a view of the self as the ultimate source of law. The highest part of man's nature is the rational. In virtue of his reason the individual participates in Universal Reason, and it is Reason which prescribes

¹ Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, p. 261.

the moral law. This is Kant's teaching. Practical Reason is the source of the Categorical Imperative. 'Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is, according to principles, i.e. have a will.'¹ In framing a moral judgment the individual does not judge as the individual A or B, but judges in virtue of that Reason which is Universal. Thus the moral judgment can have no reference to the particular character of a given situation, as it is for A or for B, but views the action as it is for Reason. Kant tells us, 'Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a Universal Law of Nature'. One of Kant's own examples will show the force of this imperative. A man in necessity borrows money, promising to repay it. He knows that he cannot keep this promise. He could not will that the principle that he is following, making a false promise when in a difficulty, should become a universal law. It would contradict itself. No one would believe in promises if all men made false promises just when they were in difficulties. The man has not obeyed the categorical imperative. By this criterion of Universal Law we can see that the moral judgment will not only be, as we have said, objective and universal, but it will also be 'absolute'. It will not be relative to the nature of the concrete situation. Under no conceivable circumstances can duties vary or the 'ought to be' change. This view of the moral judgment renders it abstract, and has laid Kant's ethics open to the charge of formalism. Duties become formal schemata of conduct out of touch with the everyday life of the individual. None the less, as emphasizing the objectivity and universality of the moral judgment, Kant's doctrine brings out a fundamental truth. It separates moral judgments from any form of the judgments of expediency.

¹ *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals.*

(2) A very different view of moral law was taken by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). In *The Leviathan*, Hobbes shows us man by nature seeking his own preservation, his own pleasure. Every action is directed to the heightening of vital action, which is pleasure. Egoism or self-interest is thus the supreme principle of conduct. For Hobbes a state of nature is not a Golden Age but a state of war; every man for himself. Duties towards other men have no foundation in man's nature. They can only exist and can only be reasonable when there is an authority to enforce rules for the common benefit. Man's fear of death and desire for commodious living will drive him to seek peace and ensue it. His reason will suggest articles of peace and covenants, and thence will arise the ordinary ethics of society, an ethics based on law in the narrower sense. Hobbes does, however, recognize in man's nature a source of obligation. Man has the duty of self-preservation. He *ought* to take every step he can to defend his life. It is this fundamental law which drives him to make contracts. Hobbes leaves side by side and unreconciled the obligations which rest on man's nature and those obligations which he regards as having existence only when there is an authority to enforce them.

(3) In Joseph Butler (1692-1752) we have yet another view of man's nature as the source of moral law. This view is set forth in a series of sermons entitled *Human Nature*. (Virtue consists in following nature. Butler sees in human nature the capacities and possibilities which the Creator of man intended to be realized. 'There is therefore ground for an attempt of showing men to themselves, of showing them what course of life and behaviour their real nature points out and would lead them to.' Preaching from the text, 'For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a

law unto themselves' (Romans ii. 14), he analyses in a psychological manner man's nature in order to show how by nature we are a law unto ourselves. The supremacy of a reflective principle—conscience—is established. 'Had it strength, as it had right; had it power, as it had manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world' (Sermon II). One may say that the obligation to give it strength and power, in other words, to fulfil the Divine intentions of our Creator, rests upon belief in Divine Law, and that therefore this justification of moral law would fall more properly under our first heading.

MORAL END

When we turn to the other formulation of the moral judgment, 'This is good', we find a different line of determination. Morality is not conceived as the fulfilment of law but as the realization of an end. Life is a quest for the highest good. (Duties and virtues will follow from a determination of the highest good or end for man.) This point of view whereby the practice of the good life becomes an art contrasts sharply with the view of the moral life as the fulfilment of obligations. It is the view which comes to us from our heritage of Greek culture. We said that Christian Ethics were built on the foundations of the Hebraic conception of the law of Moses. We must add that Christian Ethics have also been influenced by Greek philosophy. The Christian life can be portrayed as the quest of an end just as readily as it can be shown as the fulfilment of a law. St. Paul's epistle to the Galatians manifests to us this re-casting of the ethics of law into the ethics of end.

(Two great ethical systems have been dominated by the conception of an end, the Ethics of Hedonism and the Ethics of Self-Realization.)

(a) *Hedonism* regards happiness as the highest good

for man. Universal Hedonism (more often called Utilitarianism) sets forth the greatest happiness of the greatest number as the aim of the moral life. Egoistic Hedonism takes as the end the greatest happiness of the individual. Both alike identify happiness with pleasure and thus make the quest of pleasure and avoidance of pain the basis of all man's duties. Egoistic Hedonism takes the whole of man's life into account and holds it to be obligatory for a man to seek his greatest pleasure on the whole. It based its theory of the highest good on what it regarded as a psychological fact, viz. that a man in acting sought his own pleasure and that this was the sole motive of action, the doctrine of 'Psychological Hedonism'. We have already seen that the actual psychological fact which gives plausibility to this doctrine is not that man always seeks pleasure, but that whenever he achieves an end he experiences satisfaction and is *ipso facto* pleased. But this pleasure of satisfaction is not necessarily the end aimed at. Men aim at many ends besides pleasure. So-called 'Psychological Hedonism' will not serve then, as justification for Egoistic Hedonism, still less for Universal Hedonism. Even if it were true, it is difficult to understand how a law of our being which required us to seek pleasure could be used as a foundation for an ethics that taught that the end to be aimed at in conduct was our greatest pleasure on the whole, taking all parts of our life into account.) If we seek pleasure in *every* action how come we to sacrifice the pleasure of the moment in order to gain a greater pleasure later. That we should ever sacrifice our own pleasure in order to seek the greatest pleasure of the greatest number, as Universal Hedonism requires, seems even more against the supposed psychological doctrine. Writers made great use of transference of pleasure and association of ideas in their efforts to explain 'disinterested' actions. And, as a

matter of fact, both systems were driven to seek some other ground whereon to establish pleasure as the highest good for man. Professor Sidgwick (1838-1899) stands out among Utilitarians by his explicit recognition that the fundamental truths on which Hedonism rests are intuitive beliefs. These beliefs are . a belief 'that whatever action any one of us judges right for himself, he implicitly judges to be right for all other persons in similar circumstances'; a belief 'that the Hereafter as such is to be regarded neither less nor more than Now'; a belief that 'the good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view of the universe, than the good of any other'; lastly, a belief that 'its conduciveness, in one way or another, to the happiness of sentient beings' is the ultimate test we apply to anything we term 'good'.¹ These beliefs are 'intuitive or direct'. They cannot be demonstrated. The utmost that can be done is to confirm them by comparing deductions from them with the common-sense judgments of men. This comparison Sidgwick carries out. He shows further that the duties and virtues which follow from Universal Hedonism are such as are generally recognized in the higher forms of society.

There is something clear-cut in the ethics of Utilitarianism which has given it a great hold on men. We have seen the stress laid by the Utilitarian writers, J. Bentham and J. S. Mill on the intended consequences of action. To the lay mind it appears simple to test the intended consequences of an action by the question, 'Do they or do they not promote the greatest pleasure of the greatest number?' As a method, such an Ethical System seems to provide a practicable rule. Historically it is the system that has been behind many movements of social and political reform. To the early

¹ Cf. Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, book III, chapters XIII and XIV.

Utilitarians, since pain is a deterrent motive, the aim of punishment was prevention of crime. It should be adequate for this purpose but not greater than is required for the good of the community. For the criminal punishment should also be reformatory, preventing further crime. Penal reform is one of the most conspicuous results of Jeremy Bentham's teaching. The greatest good of the greatest number furnished a watchword against monopolies and special privileges, and a war cry for reform in education and the Poor Law.

Criticism of Hedonism is not directed to the positive content of duties and virtues which follow from its adoption, but to its claim that happiness, interpreted as pleasure, is the sole good for man. This claim is challenged.

(b) *Self-Realization.* (Some writers seek 'the highest good' for man in a state of his own being, his own perfection. The end for man is viewed as self-realization. The complement of such a view is a metaphysical theory of the nature of the self. Such a metaphysical theory was offered by Professor T. H. Green (1836-1882). Every individual is, for Green, the vehicle for a principle of Divine consciousness.) His life story is the story of the extent to which he has realized in his intellect and in his character this spiritual self. 'Given this conception, and not without it, we can at any rate express . . . the nature of man's reason and man's will, of human progress and human short-coming, of effort after good and the failure to gain it.'¹ Whenever man desires an end, this end is determined by his character, and hence by the spiritual principle so far as realized therein. Every act of will may thus be regarded as an act of self-realization. (The moral of life is one of progressive development. The more the spiritual self is realized the higher become the ends in which it finds

¹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 174.

satisfaction.) ' We know enough of ultimate moral good to guide our conduct ; enough to judge whether prevailing interests which make our character are or are not in the direction which tends to realize the capabilities of the human spirit.'¹ No individual could develop his spiritual capacities if his progress involved the hindrance of the spiritual principle in others. The good for man must be a common good. It consists not in material goods but in ' a state of mind or character of which the attainment . . . by each is a contribution to its attainment by every one else.'² ' The only true good is to be good.'³ Green would accept Kant's dictum ' nothing can possibly be conceived in the world or out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will '. There is a close relation between the doctrine of self-realization as the end for man and the doctrine of Practical Reason as the source of moral law.)

Of the two lines of determination that which looks to end is the more fundamental. If the authority of law is derived from an extrinsic source, e.g. God, an independent justification of this source and of its power over human beings is required. If the source of law is sought in Nature the generalizations deduced therefrom may be scientific but are not normative.) Writers who, like Kant, seek the source of law in Reason presuppose an end. The categorical imperative is authoritative because it is the command of Reason as Will, namely of the Will that ' can be called good without qualification '. Man in virtue of the exercise of this Will is himself an end. Kant expresses this in one of the alternative forms in which he writes the categorical imperative: ' So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only.'

The psychology of conduct leads us to regard all

¹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 172. ² *Ibid.*, § 245. ³ *Ibid.*, § 244.

conduct as the realization of ends. The authority of the end is derived from its value. We have seen Kant's distinction between Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives. For the force of an imperative to be categorical the end on which the imperative rests must be one whose acceptance leaves no room for a hypothesis ; it must be one which cannot be rejected. Practical Reason for Kant had such a value. In Chapter II value has been treated as ' objective ', i.e. as in situations, but we said that situations only possess value in relation to individuals. They only possess value in so far as they are such as will awaken affective or conative experience. From this it will follow that we cannot seek value in situations or objects *per se*. Thus if we say an object is beautiful, has aesthetic value, we mean that the object has the character of objects which give rise to aesthetic enjoyment. Apart from its suitability to give rise to aesthetic enjoyment the object would not possess aesthetic value. The value of ends must be considered in relation to the self that realizes them.

We must look to the conception of ' self ' and ' person ' to furnish an indication of the highest ends for man, i.e. to furnish a scheme of ' goods '. Of a moral Self we may claim that the ends it accepts will not rest on private circumstances which would render them unacceptable to any other self in similar circumstances. As rational it will be influenced by value that arises not from a particular situation but from a system of situations. A moral Self will stand in social relations to others, and its well-being will be bound up with the well-being of others. For the delineation of a moral Self we accept Sidgwick's three intuitive beliefs which he termed the principles of justice, prudence and benevolence respectively (quoted p. 59). These furnish a foundation for a classification of duties and virtues, and may be compared with Plato's classification given later. We cannot,

however, accept as intuitive Sidgwick's fourth belief which makes pleasure the ultimate test for the value of ends. This test obliterates the relation of value to the character of the Self. Beauty, Truth, Pleasure, Moral Excellence are cited as 'dominant goods' by writers whose view of value differs from that given above. Such goods may be taken here as expressive of the directions in which a moral Self will find value. It is from such ends that arise the specific imperatives of the moral judgment.

DUTIES AND VIRTUES

(The two forms in which the moral judgment is expressed find their parallel in two categories recognized in everyday life, duties and virtues. From the conception of moral obligation and moral law are derived typical lines of conduct as norms generally recognized in the conduct of individuals: *Duties*. From the conception of end or good follows the recognition of certain excellences in conduct: *Virtues*.)

It is the act with its consequences that is prominent in duty. When the personal relations involved in the action are used as a basis for classification, duties can be classed as (a) duties to a Divine Being, (b) duties to fellow-men, (c) duties to the self.) Such a classification will serve to link up duties closely with the institutions whereby the particular relation is served.

(a) Duties to a Divine Being will be linked up closely with the institution identified with that set of relationships—a church or priesthood. It may be said that in so far as all moral law is regarded as the command of a Divine Lawgiver all duties are duties towards God. But something more specific is meant by the phrase here. Man is regarded as having special obligations to fulfil towards a Divine Being or to a Divine order in the universe. As a participant in Divine purposes or in

a Cosmic order man must promote these purposes, Worship and service are duties under this heading. The rites and ceremonies of the church embody these duties of man to the Divine.

(b) Duties to others include the widely recognized duties of Just-dealing, Truth-speaking, Obedience. Duties to others are embodied in the many institutions which comprise what we term Law. Citizenship, Marriage, Property, Family Ties, are other institutions wherein such duties find formulation.

(c) Duties to the self include the care of, and provision for, the body and the mind—Temperance, Thrift, Education. Here too duties are closely related to the institutions of social life.

It has been customary to speak of duties of perfect and imperfect obligation. This is in effect a non-ethical distinction. It corresponds roughly to the things we praise a man for doing but cannot blame him for not doing, and those which we blame him for not doing and do not praise him for doing. Works of supererogation are 'perfect' duties. Such a distinction is only possible when deed and consequences are considered apart from motive and character. An example often used is the action of Grace Darling. No one could have blamed her for not going to the rescue of the shipwrecked men. It was no part of her work to take out the boat. But from Grace Darling's own point of view there was no such line between perfect and imperfect duty. As she saw the situation she had a clear call to go to the rescue.

It is this relation to character and motive which should be prominent in a classification of virtues. Duties and virtues are often treated as identical. They are indeed like the two faces of one coin, faces which are often indistinguishable. (The four cardinal virtues, Courage, Temperance, Wisdom, and Justice,

were widely recognized in Greek moral reflections prior to Plato.) But it was he who in the *Republic* brought them into systematic relation with one another. He recognized three parts in the soul of man. To each part he assigned its own work or function, and in respect of its function it had its own excellence or virtue: Temperance the virtue of the appetitive functions, Courage of the spirited functions, and Wisdom of the functions of the rational part of the soul. This gives an inner unity to the virtues. The treatment leads us to consider the attitude of the soul that is temperate or courageous or wise, as well the deeds to which such an attitude leads. It is still from deeds that the conception of the virtue was mainly derived. It is valour in war that gave the pattern of courage. It needed a more subjective analysis of the virtue than was possible at that time to recognize that the same attitude of mind could be found in the man who faced sickness and misery as in the hero who faced death at the hands of an enemy. In Plato's treatment of Justice, however, we can see there is recognition of an inward principle of unity. Unlike the other three virtues, Justice is not the excellence of any one part of the soul; it is due to the harmonious working of all three. 'The just man will not permit the several principles within him to do any work but their own, nor allow the distinct classes in his soul to interfere with each other, but will really set his house in order.'¹

'The State like the soul of man has its sections each with its own function: the artisan class, the soldiery and the rulers. In relation to the governing or ruling section the artisan section must be restrained, and for this relation the virtue of temperance is needed. The soldiery need courage, the rulers need wisdom. Justice is that fourth principle in every child and woman, in every slave, freeman, and artisan, in the ruler and in the

¹ *Repu'lic*, IV, 443, Davies and Vaughan's translation.

subject, requiring each to do his own work, and not meddle with many things.'¹ Justice will be manifest in just acts; yet it does not consist in just distribution of goods nor in just retribution for evil, but is a state of mind. The same teaching is found in Aristotle's doctrine of virtue as a mean. He finds in the soul of man a rational and an irrational part. The latter is divisible into that which carries out purely nutritive functions and lies altogether outside reason, and that which though not itself rational is yet amenable to reason. The excellences of this irrational soul constitute the *moral* virtues, while the excellences of the rational soul constitute the *intellectual* virtues. Aristotle gives a longer list of specific virtues than Plato, but the list lacks any principle which would guarantee its comprehensiveness. All virtues alike are dispositions or habits of mind 'involving deliberate purpose, choice, being in the relative mean, determined by reason and as the man of practical reason would determine. It is a middle state between two faulty ones, in way of excess on one side, and defect on the other.'² Excellence in conduct reveals an attitude of mind, a disposition to act in conformity with reason, a disposition that the individual has acquired by modelling his actions on those of the man of practical reason. Aristotle holds that virtue can be taught; it can be acquired by practising virtuous actions. For this reason he terms it a habit or disposition.³ The conception of virtue as that which avoids excess or defect, which reveals a sense of the fitness of things, is in keeping with the Greek's attitude towards life. A good life must have the qualities of a work of art, harmony, proportion. Aristotle works out his doctrine of the mean more

¹ *Republic*, IV, 433, Davies and Vaughan's translation.

² Aristotle, *Ethics*, book II, vi, 15, Chase's translation.

³ Cf. 'Habitudo', p. 36

successfully for the moral virtues, courage, liberality, truthfulness, etc., than for the intellectual virtues of wisdom, art, science, good sense, and intuitive apprehension.

(In later Christian Ethics seven virtues were enumerated (parallel in number to the seven deadly sins). These were the Platonic four cardinal virtues and the three Pauline graces, faith, hope, and charity.) The cardinal virtues were regarded as 'natural', bearing on man's relation to the world, while the Pauline graces bore on man's relation to the spiritual world. A classification of virtues is at the best unprofitable unless it is based on some psychological or philosophical principle. Philosophically this list has little to commend it. Justice as Plato conceived it covered much that is described as Charity in St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians. The spiritual graces cannot satisfactorily be taken as addenda to the Greek virtues. The change they imply is a change in outlook. This change is well expressed by T. H. Green: 'It is not the sense of duty to a neighbour, but the practical answer to the question, Who is my neighbour? that has varied.'¹ 'The moral judgment at its best in any age or country—i.e. in those persons who are as purely interested in the perfections of mankind and as keenly alive to the conditions of that perfection as is then possible—is still limited in many ways by the degree of progress actually made towards the attainment of that perfection.'² This brings out the relativity of the moral judgment referred to in Chapter III. With moral development duties and virtues take on new guises. We may regard the recognized duties and virtues of our age and society as embodying the lines of conduct and attitudes of mind which gives concrete expression to the moral judgment.

¹ Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, book III, chapter III, § 207

² *Ibid.*, § 266.

We may therefore rightly look to recognized duties and virtues for guidance in conduct, but we must at the same time realize that such duties and virtues are the 'limited' expression of the moral judgment. The content of the 'ought' and the 'good' will develop in response to our understanding of moral law and our quest for the ends of the moral Self. 'While there is a sense in which moral ideas must precede practice, there is another in which they follow and depend upon it.' ¹

It is indeed just this reciprocity between social and moral progress which has misled writers into believing that a history of civilization furnishes a theory of morals. It supplies the concrete story of the values men have recognized and have sought, but as a history it is not concerned with the problem which lies at the core of ethics, the problem of moral value itself, be it as law or as good.

¹ Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, book III, chapter III, § 266.

PART II
APPLICATIONS

PART II—APPLICATIONS

CHAPTER IV

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROLEGOMENA: THE SELF, SENTIMENTS, CHARACTER, AND FREE WILL

BEFORE entering upon the application of ethical principles to conduct it is necessary to turn again to consider the psychology of conduct, in particular the psychology of character. Only so can we understand the bearing of the moral judgment on practical problems.

To trace the development of character would be to write a complete psychology not only of conation but also of cognition. The development of the field of values marches *pari passu* with man's intellectual development. No explanation can be given of the one without reference to the other. We saw that trained reason and clear-sightedness was essential for the survey of remote ends, and that the inhibition of more immediate impulses might depend thereon. In this connexion there are two interrelated lines of development that require fuller treatment in view of their importance for Ethics; these are the growth of the conception of the Self or 'Me' and the formation of sentiments.

THE SELF

At the level of instinctive and impulsive behaviour 'me' is little more in meaning than 'my body'. My satisfaction and my dissatisfaction is bound up with the satisfaction and dissatisfaction of the bodily organism. Of all the objects in his world his body is one of the

most interesting to the young child. This can be made to move or to stop moving, and upon these movements depend success and failure, satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Experiences due to intero-organic events are present in all emotions and form a constant background to all perceptual experiences. Memory and imagination supply the developing individual with memories and fancies of a 'me' which is not the visible bodily 'me' of the present moment. This 'me' tends to be treated like the intero-organic experiences as a bodily self dwelling within the organism. Its needs and satisfactions influence those of the moment, and it is to all intents and purposes a part of the bodily 'me'.

Knowledge of the bodily self is bound up with knowledge of others, and every new aspect of knowledge of the 'me' entails a new aspect in knowledge of others, and vice versa. The social environment by its treatment of him holds up a mirror in which the child sees himself. The use of his name, and reference to his possessions, to his actions, to his likes and dislikes, to his wants, awaken a new 'self-consciousness', as does also the imputation of knowing this and that. The child reflects on his own experiences and becomes aware of himself as a person, a member of a community, having his own place therein. By this same process he necessarily becomes aware of other selves as persons. They too have memories and projects, likes and dislikes, wants and wishes that clash or co-operate with his own. He realizes that they and he influence each other by speech and action.

Such reflection on self as a person is deepened by the growing organization of knowledge. The conception of self includes the individual's various fields of intellectual interest and his practical abilities. He is the person who knows the French irregular verbs, who can swim, etc. The self will also include the possessions that are

instrumental to his life as this or that person. Such a conception of self is personal, but it is a manifold. The individual is many persons belonging to one and the same bodily 'me'. The late Professor James wrote: 'A man has as many selves as there are people who recognize him.' Each individual in his intercourse with another expresses a certain facet of his own personality, while reflecting a corresponding facet from the personality of the other. Suggestion and contra-suggestion are at work in personal relations. One whose speech and manner betokens suspicion and exaction is met by caution and grudging service, and another who makes use of exaggerated graciousness evokes a curtness bordering on rudeness.

SENTIMENTS

Modifying Professor James's phraseology, we may claim that 'a man has as many selves as he has **sentiments**'. We owe the use of this term in a technical sense to Mr. Alexander Shand.¹ He uses it to stand for an organization of emotions round a central object in the service of ends relating to that object. He claims that the four simple emotions, joy, sorrow, anger, fear, have an innate interconnexion. Any impulsive tendency when it is satisfied arouses joy, when it is frustrated sorrow, when opposed anger, and when either frustration or opposition is anticipated fear is experienced. These four simple emotions may therefore be linked with any object that gives rise to impulsive behaviour. An object that is the frequent occasion of behaviour is thus likely to acquire over and above its original value, whatever this may have been, derived values from the four simple emotions for which it may be the occasion. Such an object has an enhanced value. It is 'interesting' in a high degree and furnishes

¹ *The Foundations of Character.*

the nucleus for a sentiment. We may say at once that if Mr. Shand is right in his claim for the interconnexion of joy, sorrow, fear, and anger, the foundation of enhanced interest may be laid just as simply by intentional action as by impulsive. What is essential is that one and the same object should by being an occasion for action give rise to the interconnected emotions.

Sentiments are divided by Mr. Shand into two types—the love type and the hate type. The difference turns on the relation of the ends of action to the central object. In a sentiment of the love type the various ends of action will all be connected with what may be described in general terms as the promotion of the well-being of the object, or with its maintenance in close relation with the self. In a hate sentiment the ends are connected with the injury or destruction of the object. The terms used to denote sentiments vary. 'Passion' is appropriate to both love and hate sentiments when the emotions and desires occurring in relation to the object are intense. 'Likes' and 'dislikes' may be used as appropriate for sentiments of a mild complexion.

Mr. Shand regards parental love as a sentiment having an instinctive basis. The offspring furnishes situations arousing instinctive responses. It is an object to be fed, to be protected, to be fondled. It makes incessant demands on the parent, and in executing them the emotions of joy or sorrow, etc., will be experienced. These emotions are incidents within the whole organization and arise in connexion with ends all of which may be said to concern the well-being of the offspring. The name 'love' indicates the whole organization and not any single emotion. A mother's love may be shown as much in her anger, in resentment of criticism of her offspring, as in her tenderness in fondling it. Her love of the child affords an abiding possibility for these

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and other emotions. Similarly, Mr. Shand claims an instinctive basis of self-preservation for the sentiment of self-love. The earliest occasions for joy, sorrow, anger, and fear occur in relation to the weal and woe of the body. The bodily 'me' thus becomes the object of an organization which develops into self-love.

Persons, and things treated as persons, are the objects round which the early sentiments centre. It is persons who do most to aid or hinder action, who make situations into which they enter yield satisfaction or dissatisfaction to the child. We may take it as a rough truth that the person who is a frequent source of pleasure or joy tends to become the centre of a love sentiment. Similarly, the person who is a frequent source of frustration, or pain, tends to become the centre of a hate sentiment. We may notice that to a certain extent there is an inversion of the emotions experienced within love and hate sentiments respectively. Whereas the loss or injury of a beloved object occasions sorrow or anger, in a hate sentiment it occasions joy. There is sorrow and fear at the absence of a beloved object, there is joy in the removal of one that is hated.

Classes of things, groups of persons, kinds of occupation, become objects of sentiments in much the same way as particular persons and things. Thus one man will love china, another hate cats, another be a devotee of racing. In each case there will exist an organization into which emotions and desires enter, all of which centre round the object in question. The devotee of racing will be fearful of any occurrence that threatens to come between him and a race-meeting. He will arrange his half-holidays to secure as many opportunities of participating in this sport as possible. He will be angry with those who decry it, and will resent their criticism.

Sentiments are also formed for abstract qualities and

conditions. Such sentiments are only possible when intellectual life has reached its higher stages of development. Love of truth, love of beauty are types of these abstract sentiments. Of peculiar importance for the understanding of ethical problems is the group we may term moral sentiments, love of justice, hatred of cruelty. These all relate to qualities of conduct and character, and we shall consider them again later.

Mr. Shand bids us notice that every sentiment tends to include in its system all those emotions that are of service to its end, and to exclude all those that are useless or antagonistic. Thus the tender emotions, sympathy, pity, gratitude, find their place in a love sentiment but not in one of hate. It is further important to notice that as with intellectual development the scope of sentiments is enlarged, the occurrence of emotions that are not 'episodes in the life history of a sentiment' becomes rarer. A man who develops a passion for birds may never be moved by curiosity in relation to any other object. Or, again, a man may never show anger save when he is thwarted in pursuing ends within one or other of his sentiments. The spontaneous emotions of childhood and adolescence become less frequent. This means that the primitive or acquired value of any situation becomes more and more dominated by relevance or irrelevance of the situation to some sentiment. A sight which is disgusting to a layman may evoke no such emotion in a pathologist. It may be an occasion of joy as affording evidence to confirm some theory.

As sentiments influence values so necessarily they shape desires. Desires, like emotions, become organized more and more within the several sentiments. When sentiments have extensive scope, sporadic desires, like sporadic emotions, become infrequent. Such desires when they occur have little to do with character ; they

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are by-play in the drama of life. Our many-sidedness as persons depends upon our many sentiments. A man may be a collector of engravings, a despot in the office, a *bon vivant* at the club, and a tender nurse to a cripple child at home. In each *persona* there is a sentiment determining conduct, a characteristic 'me' whose love or hate is manifest in the ends of action.

CHARACTER

What, then, is character? We said that a man has as many selves as he has sentiments. How is there to be any conception of a true self, a central 'me' to which all the various 'me's' stand in relation? Perhaps we may say truly that there are persons who have no sense of unity and to whom it is difficult to ascribe any character. They are unstable, moved now by desires relative to this 'me', now by desires relative to that 'me', while between the 'this' and 'that' little connexion is discoverable. But for most persons there is a sense of unity. Despite many-sidedness there is one personality, and there is character. Among the sentiments there are differences in strength, some sentiments being stronger than others. There are oppositions and co-operations. We may view sentiments as forming a hierarchy, and the hierarchy as determining character. It determines also the *persona* which is to be regarded as the real 'me'.

When we say that the sentiments of any individual form a hierarchy we are not claiming that among sentiments there is a fixity of order that knows no change. We are not claiming that in a given individual love of family, say, is always superior to love of sport and always subordinate to love of self. The character of an individual is expressive of the general trend of the sentiments and not of a static system of relationships.

SELF-LOVE

The place of any sentiment in the hierarchy is important for its influence on conduct. Many writers have regarded self-love as the supreme and dominating sentiment. We have seen that Mr. Shand thinks that this sentiment has an innate basis in the instincts of self-preservation. The first self to be loved is the bodily self and its well-being is a constant object of solicitude throughout life. Here, as in its other guises, 'me' includes 'mine'. 'My' food, 'my' clothes, 'my' armchair, are extensions of the bodily 'me'. 'My' friends, 'my' class, 'my' property, 'my' work, 'my' reputation, are extensions of the personal self. The self is a permanent centre of value and a background for all the purposes of conduct. None the less the claim that self-love is necessarily the supreme sentiment is based on inadequate analysis. The confusion here is parallel to that which we pointed out as lying at the root of Psychological Hedonism. Every end in deliberate action is viewed as an 'end for me'. It is considered in relation to some aspect of the self. But the claim that all ends are ends in relation to the self does not warrant the assertion that, therefore, the self-regarding sentiment presides over all voluntary action. An end can be an 'end for me', although it does not promote that well-being which is the objective of my self-love. Let us grant that in any inventory of the ends sought by a given individual the item 'self' would occur with great frequency, and let us grant further that the self has many guises. Even so, against the name of the greatest of egoists there would be entered in the recording book ends other than 'self'.

Pride and shame are important emotions in self-love. Self as a person enjoys the approbation and suffers from the censure of others. Pride and shame arise from

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awareness of such approbation and censure. Self-approval and self-criticism similarly foster these emotions. Social approbation and social disapprobation affect the value of ends. The force of social approbation or disapprobation varies with the kind of social relationship that exists between an individual and a group, or between one individual and another. Social relationships offer three broad possibilities : there may be equality between X and Y, a give-and-take basis of intercourse ; there may be the domination of X by Y ; there may be the subordination of Y to X. The value of an end for me, the inferior, may be very different from what it is for me, the superior, and such difference in value is largely due to the approbation or censure of the social environment.

The place of pride in self-love and the influence of social relationships may be seen by studying Shakespeare's delineation of the character of Coriolanus. He is the mother's only son, brought up to think of himself as the descendant of a noble house, as a proud servant of his country. Her pride in his physical strength and martial success is reflected in his own pride. Her approbation has from his earliest years influenced the value of all enterprises for him. He has taken the values she has put on situations and relied on her judgment. Intellectually he is a straightforward honest thinker, but he is wanting in imagination and is devoid of subtlety.

With his equals he is on terms of good fellowship and shows no hint of patronage. He has the sentiment of class loyalty, he seeks to preserve the well-being of that class to which he himself belongs.¹ To Menenius, the old man who has fathered him, he shows kindly patience

¹ Galsworthy's play *Loyalties* furnishes an unequalled study of this sentiment, that centres round personal relations and has as its end the well-being essential for the preservation of a given relationship.

and gentleness. To his wife he is faithful and affectionate. It is with his inferiors that the pride of self-love is evident. By word and manner he shows his contempt. He despises their stupidity, greed, and cowardice. He is incapable of discrimination, the people are all alike to him, *inferiors*. To lay aside this attitude and court their suffrages is to depart from his own standards of conduct. To display his wounds and boast of his deeds in war is to shame him in his own eyes. It is abhorrent to him that this mob should have official protectors and spokesmen. Contributory to his hatred of the people's leaders is patriotism which sees them as a menace to the State. Both patriotism and the resentment of personal pride may be behind his indignation at the 'absolute shall' of 'this Triton of the minnows'. But it is the pride of self-love that cries, 'No, I'll die here. Let them pull all about mine ears . . . yet will I still be thus to them.'

There is war between self-love and love of his mother. He is puzzled to realize that in this matter her judgment is at variance with his own. Pride makes him declare, 'I will not do it, lest I surcease to honour my own truth.' But at her appeal all the habits of dependence on her judgment and of responsiveness to her praise and blame are stirred anew. These prove stronger than pride; self-love is conquered. 'Pray be content, Mother, I am going to the market-place.'

Later when he departs into exile, Coriolanus declares to his mother, wife, and group of friends, 'You shall hear from me still, and never of me aught but what is like me formerly.' These words express a truth we might miss. In what comes hereafter, Coriolanus' change of front, the transformation of love to hate and hate to love, we have nothing but the consistent development of the pride of self-love. 'A dissension of a doit', 'Some trick not worth an egg', which makes friends into enemies and converts enemies into friends, owes its potency to its

bearing on self-love. Coriolanus is bitter, he hates those who have insultingly rejected him. He will avenge his wounded pride by proving how right he was to despise this rabble. There is no touch of shame or of remorse ; by the standards of self-love he is justified.

It is not as a suppliant but as one who can bestow a gift that he approaches his old enemy. After the compact has been made, the old attitude remains. The final tragedy is due not to the failure to take Rome but to his pride of bearing towards his partner in the enterprise.

When once more the battle comes between self-love and love of his mother, it is self-love that again is vanquished. He is not moved by reasons, but by the unrecognized values of the sentiment that binds him to his mother. 'There's no man in the world more bound to his mother.' 'O mother, mother ! What have you done ? . . . You have won a happy victory to Rome ; but for your son—believe it, O, believe it, most dangerously you have with him prevailed, if not most mortal to him. But let it come.' There is no remorse, but there is shame. He is conscious of, and as a soldier, is cut by, the censure of his Volscian partner and former enemy. Yet in the issue it is not shame that he feels when before the Volscian nobles, it is bitter resentment and fierce anger at the insults and accusations of the man he has beaten in open fight. As he faces death it is the wounded pride of self-love that cries out in agony at the taunts of his accuser.

CONDITIONS DETERMINING THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF SENTIMENTS

Any light that psychology can throw on the factors which determine the relative strength of a sentiment is valuable for ethical problems. The question has

received little study in spite of its great importance. The factors involved are very complex and analysis is difficult.

(a) We may accept it as a general truth that a sentiment will be very powerful if formed round an object that possesses also a primitive value in relation to an instinct. Love sentiments that embody a sex interest illustrate this. Such sentiments have the intensity for which we said the word 'passion' was appropriate. Similarly, an appetite may furnish a nucleus for a sentiment that approximates to a passion. Love of drink is an example.

(b) The place that an object occupies in the normal scheme of life is significant. An object that is bound up with many issues in life will be the centre of an influential sentiment. A good illustration is the love of money. Money has value as the essential tool for many operations. Without it a man is debarred from things that have basic value for life, food, clothing, shelter, and also from things which have acquired value through his education and upbringing, books, music, travel. That which is the key to so much becomes loved for its own sake. Money is always cited as a typical instance of 'transferred value'. The miser loves his gold and no longer cares for the objects that it will procure. His joy, sorrow, fear, and anger centre round money itself. He has joy in counting it, fingering it, fear of losing it, etc. In few individuals does the transference become as complete as this, but for many money is something that is loved for its own sake.

(c) A sentiment whose ends are fulfilled will increase in strength. The achievement of any end relating to the object of the sentiment tends to raise the value of this object. Not only so, but any given deed may open the door to new possibilities of action and give opportunities for new desires. 'The more you have the more

you want ' is a saying which illustrates such increasing power in a sentiment.

(d) The better organized any sentiment is the stronger it will be. This is probably the most important condition determining the strength of a sentiment. We have to recognize that organization is shaped by both *unconscious* and *conscious* factors.

The value both of people and of things is coloured by incidents in which they find a place. Such incidents may not attract much notice when they happen and are not recalled save under special circumstances, yet they help to give ' *unconscious* ' direction to desires and aversions within a sentiment. ' Forgotten ' associations influence the course taken by a train of ideas. Strictly speaking they are not forgotten, but introspection may fail to detect them unless specially directed in a meticulous search. There is often an unanalysed background of ' past experience ' recognized as giving the acquired meaning and value of some situation or object, but often not credited with all the influence which its ramifications merit. In the unconscious organization of a sentiment must be included the influence of instinctive tendencies. It is the very ease with which these operate that renders their influence ' unconscious '. The individual does not recognize how much the value of this or that object rests upon its connexion with a primitive value. A man may champion the cause of some one who has in his view been unjustly treated. Justice is the principal object of the sentiment, but the fact that the injured person is a pretty woman may help to shape the organization. We must also include habits. Personal habits and habitual performances whether skilled or unskilled may be turned to account in the service of a sentiment, although they were not originally acquired in that service. The habits instilled by naval training will play their part in the naval officer's sentiment for the trim homestead to

which he has retired. He will hardly notice how large a part this habit of keeping things 'ship-shape' plays in the enterprises he undertakes or refuses to undertake. When an organization of sentiment type is formed with no clear recognition of its central object or of the general direction of the ends of action, the organization is termed a *complex*. It may need the plain talk of a candid friend to make one realize that one is hating a certain person who is a rival, and that one is steadily seeking to injure and annoy this person on various pretexts and in diverse ways. When all the 'i's' are dotted and the 't's' crossed and a whole series of past incidents arranged before one, recognition of the organization is inevitable. The much-talked-of 'inferiority complex' is a good illustration. Here self-love is the root sentiment. The individual has built up a pseudo-belief in his own incompetence in some particular direction. The grounds for the belief come from other people's treatment of him as incompetent or unsuccessful. He has never critically examined this belief or the grounds for it, but he allows it to be dominant, and self-love is resentful. This will affect behaviour in one of two ways. He will either strive to act as if trying to make the belief true—be diffident and unwilling to accept any responsibilities, or he will act as if wishing to prove it false—be boastful, over-officious, resentful of any criticism of his performances and capacities. We can only term the organization 'unconscious' in the sense that there is no clear understanding by the individual of what he is aiming at and why he is aiming at it.

The '*conscious*' intellectual organization of the sentiment is of great importance ethically. Reflective thought brings out the interrelation of facts. Trains of ideas which have been disjointed or fragmentary are systematized and seen in new settings. All intellectual organization carries with it some ordering of the ideas

entering into sentiments, and thus influences the sentiments themselves. Reflection allows the end of the sentiment as a whole to be recognized and distinguished from the ends of the various separate actions that fall within the sentiment. It recognizes the incompatibility of some of these ends, compares this with that as more or less comprehensive. Given the central object and the end of the sentiment, it is necessary to inhibit all desires that conflict with this and to foster all such as promote it. From this arises what Mr. Shand has termed the **relative ethics of the sentiments**. Under the immediate influence of the end of the sentiment certain values will displace others. In a love sentiment that which would otherwise evoke anger may fail to do so because it is displaced by tenderness. Similarly, the fear value present under the influence of hate may render a situation incapable of arousing pity. But for the most part it needs a conscious effort of thought to keep the end of the sentiment in view and to realize the bearing of desires and emotions on that end. We thus arrive at 'imperatives' which Kant would have termed 'hypothetical'. 'If I am to maintain my friendship with X I must be patient with his slowness of thought.' 'If I am to succeed in abolishing this cruel practice I must keep my temper in debate.' Thought will lead us to recognize the virtues and the duties which the end of the sentiment makes necessary if that end is to be achieved. Thought can do more, it can show us what emotions stand as hindrances or as aids to certain desires. It can teach us with reference to these emotions what situations to seek and to avoid either in overt behaviour or in idea. We can dwell on remembered insults if we wish to fan the flames of indignation, we can remember an old kindness if we wish to feel some tenderness. Self-approval at obedience, and self-disapproval at disobedience to the

hypothetical imperatives of the sentiment are factors that contribute not a little to conscious organization.

Further, thought can compare the end of one sentiment with the end of another. It can see conflict or co-operation between sentiments, reason out the consequences which will follow from the dominance of the one or from the dominance of the other. The influence of such inference on the respective sentiments is not nil. We say love is blind but the blindness is in a double sense 'partial'. Love is clear-sighted in respect of what affects the well-being of the loved object. It sees plainly where the end of some other sentiment will trench on this well-being. Comparison of ends will show the relative scope of the sentiments. To recognize that logically the width of one sentiment is narrower than another will influence not only the hierarchy of sentiments but the internal organization of the sentiments themselves. Local patriotism takes on a new guise when seen in relation to the interests of a wider sentiment, say, well-being of the country as a whole. The ends within each sentiment may have their relative values affected by such contact.

We may seem to be overrating the influence of reason in shaping sentiments, particularly as of late there has been a tendency to exalt the influence of the unconscious factors at the expense of the intellectual and conscious. Both must be looked for. What is perhaps not sufficiently recognized is that in studying a collocation of ends it may need as painstaking an analysis to trace out the cogitation of reason as to detect the fermentation of the unconscious.

The better the intellectual and conscious organization of a sentiment fits in with the unconscious, the more compact and powerful the sentiments will be. Discord between the two renders the sentiment ineffective. Thus into a love sentiment may enter unrecognized a

tendency to treat the loved object as a child. Mingling with the desires of the tender emotions are desires to arrange life for the beloved object, to think and act on his or her behalf, 'to manage'. This is a parental attitude and it may be at constant war with the intellectual control which recognizes that undue solicitude and superintendence is distasteful to the person concerned and wounding to her pride. Such a love sentiment will suffer from inward conflicts. Where a love sentiment is formed for a person of different race or social class or even different *milieu*, the prejudices, habits, likes and dislikes of the individual may form a background which conflicts with the conscious control of his love sentiment. Similarly, 'natural affections' may militate against the organization of a hate sentiment towards one who is bound to the individual by ties of blood. The background of unhappy experiences in childhood may be another source of unconscious factors which war with conscious organization.

MORAL SENTIMENTS

As we have already said these are sentiments belonging to the group labelled abstract, having as their objects not persons or things but qualities of character and conduct. Such sentiments imply ability to abstract qualities from the concrete incidents in which they are embodied and to treat them as centres round which emotional attitudes may organize. The end of the moral sentiment is promotion of the quality loved and destruction of the quality hated. Like the aesthetic sentiment a moral sentiment seeks opportunities for enjoying the quality loved. It cannot be regarded as creative in the sense in which the love of beauty is creative, but one may claim that both aim at encouraging the formation of similar sentiments in others. The man who loves

justice seeks to make others love justice also. This characteristic of 'propagation' is peculiar to moral, aesthetic, and religious sentiments.

The qualities of character or conduct which form the objects of moral love sentiments are all qualities which are approved by the moral judgment of the individual ; those that form the objects of hate sentiments are disapproved by the moral judgment. Moral judgment and moral sentiment should thus run side by side. We have, however, already pointed out that the moral judgment cannot be understood as meaning that a love or hate sentiment for a given line of conduct exists. What we want to emphasize now is that the moral judgment is essential for the existence of the sentiment. Love of justice depends on the judgment justice is good, right. Hatred of deceit depends on the judgment deceit is bad, wrong. The moral judgment on qualities of character and conduct may be present without the sentiment, *but not the sentiment without the judgment*. We may state it more explicitly this way: it is the judgment of the quality as morally good or the reverse that renders the quality valuable and so capable of being the centre of a sentiment. Such values, then, may be termed moral values in a special sense. Every value is a moral value in the sense that it can call forth action which may fall under the moral judgment. A fear evoking situation has a moral value. Should the judgment change with moral progress or deterioration, but the sentiment remain as a habitude, it is termed a quasi-moral sentiment.

We shall see in the next chapter that there can be conflict between the moral judgment and various sentiments. There is never, however, a conflict between a moral sentiment and the moral judgment of the individual. In everyday speech the word **conscience** is sometimes used for the moral sentiment, sometimes for

the moral judgment. It is perhaps more often used in the latter sense. Thus conscience may be said to condemn a quality in conduct, when no dislike for that quality is implied. There is a moral judgment but no sentiment.

Before leaving this topic of moral sentiments we must notice what we have referred to in a different connexion, viz. that our conception of moral qualities in character and in conduct changes. We are influenced by the ideas of our age and our immediate environment as to what constitutes courage or cruelty. It is possible to hate cruelty yet enjoy watching a bullfight or following the hounds. We may remind ourselves again of the sense in which the moral judgment is relative. Adapting Green's words, we may say: 'It is not the recognition that cruelty is wrong but the practical answer to the question, What is cruelty? that has varied in the last four hundred years'. A Spaniard sees no cruelty in a bullfight, an Englishman sees none in fox-hunting.

RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS

The sentiments whose relation to the moral sentiments are of great importance are the religious sentiments. These sentiments depend upon belief in the Divine, they are not dependent upon the moral judgment. It is the belief in some Power or Spirit over and above the world of finite beings that inspires worship and love for what appertains to this Spirit. If the belief is belief in a personal God, the most powerful of religious sentiments will be love of the Divine Person. The outstanding end for such a love sentiment is to be in communion with the Divine and to be the instrument of His Will. Love for the things of the Spirit is dependent upon belief in their Divine origin. 'Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of

lights.' Whether or not hate sentiments can form part of the group of religious sentiments we may regard as an open question. The character of the belief held must be taken into account. The ends of hate sentiments are destruction and injury ; such ends may be incompatible with the highest conception of communion with the Divine. For the Christian the admonition to abhor evil is coupled with the exhortation, 'Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good.'

The characteristic noticed in the aesthetic and moral sentiments, viz. the desire for the presence of like sentiments in others, is present in religious sentiments. They are the spring of propaganda.

For those who hold that the Divine is the source of the highest good and the source of moral law, the religious sentiments will be more comprehensive than the moral sentiments, and the latter will be derivative from the former. For those who do not hold this view the two groups of sentiments are distinct, though the ends pursued by the one will be in harmony with ends pursued by the other. This harmony in ends viewed as deeds or concrete actions must not blind us to the difference in the ends viewed as motives. The sentiments to which they belong are different. For the everyday conduct of life few may feel any call to differentiate between the moral and religious sentiments. It is in the crises of life that the difference is apparent to the conscientious. The ends of the religious sentiments will touch the inmost springs of their being for those who are in communion with God. It is from such communion that the ends derive their value, not from the pronouncement of the moral judgment, 'That is good', 'That is right'. The value which such a pronouncement would give is additional. It is out of place here to do more than mention the function of prayer

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and thanksgiving in the service of the religious sentiments.

FREE WILL

Supposing a man's character to be what it is at any time, i.e. with a given trend in the hierarchy of the sentiments, will this hierarchy determine the issue of choice? This is the problem of free will from a psychological point of view. No one now contends for freedom of the will in the old sense of 'unmotivated choice'—Libertarianism. We do not regard 'will' as the name for a special faculty. It is not a detached power of mind that can be brought to bear on a conflict of motives, and, with complete disregard for the strength of these motives, decide the issue this way or that. Such a free will would render choice caprice. A man's decisions would have no intelligible relation to his past decisions and no bearing on his future ones.

No one, again, contends that voluntary action is necessarily determined by the relative strength of the competing desires, such strength being measured in terms of pleasure and pain. This doctrine was the corollary to Psychological Hedonism. Such hedonism saw in reward and punishment the make-weights whereby the balance might be tipped this way or that. Reward would add an increment to a pleasure value. Punishment would counteract pleasure by adding an increment on the side of pain.

When Psychological Hedonism was discredited this form of the doctrine of Determinism had likewise to be abandoned. In its place came the doctrine that choice was determined by the strongest motive and that strength of motive depended on character: the doctrine of Self-determinism. The doctrine is liable to be misunderstood. In considering the strength of a motive we may confuse the value of the end with the

urgency of desire. Or, if free from this error, we may assume that the urgency of desire measures the value of the end for me. This assumption is without foundation. The urgency of desire or the pain of shortcoming largely depends upon the relevance of the desired end to the present situation. Being as I am in this situation, that end has a given suitability, and the urgency of desire depends upon this suitability. Any condition wherein the end supplies a need will serve as a good illustration of 'suitability'. Say I do not possess a typewriter and my work requires one, then a typewriter is highly suitable as an end. Suppose I am offered one on the hire-purchase system, the urgency of my desire for it will be great. But the value of this end *for me* is not necessarily measured by this urgency. The value of the end depends on the relation of the end to me, and this 'me' is not merely the 'me' of the moment, but what I am to myself in deliberation. Say I am a cautious person little prone to take risks, the typewriter as an end for me may have a value which is not equal to the urgency of my desire but considerably less. Being *as I am* I desire it strongly, but being *what I am* the strength of the end as a motive is not great. The desire to be on the safe side in money matters is less urgent, but the end has more power as a motive. The doctrine of Self-determinism, then, is not tantamount to the doctrine that the strongest desire determines choice.

We may approach the question from another angle. The question, Can reason be a motive? is often asked. The answer given may be an uncompromising 'No, the function of reason is confined to tracing out means and consequences'. Psychological evidence would seem to confirm the negative answer, but not the limitation of function. We have dealt with the question of ideomotor action already in Chapter II. Ideas as knowledge have no power to move the will. When we say that the

knowledge of certain facts moves us, we are unintentionally omitting part of what is taking place. It is not the knowledge but the way that knowledge affects us which moves us. In other words, it is 'value' and not 'meaning' that renders knowledge a motive. Reason can only be a motive in so far as it influences the value of ideas. But does reason influence the value of ideas? Indirectly it does. An end is always an end for me; the 'me' in question is relative to the sentiment involved, and the sentiments are organized in part at least by reason. There is an appropriateness in the expression 'rational conduct' which is independent of its reference to fitness of means or to foresight of consequences. 'Rational conduct' will signify conduct wherein the rival ends have been formed under the influence of reason. The 'me' in such volition is not the 'me' of the moment. The strongest motive draws its strength from the sentiment to which it belongs, and the relative strength of this sentiment is measured by its place in the hierarchy.

The seeming exceptions to such Self-determinism are cases where volition follows strongest desire in the sense explained. These, strictly speaking, are impulsive actions, the drive being the pain of shortcoming. They simulate the form of actions due to motives. The resolution of a conflict of desires through impatience is a case in point. It is not the value of the rival ends, but the urgency of the desire to do something that makes the individual 'choose' whatever is in mind at the psychological moment.

When we consider that we have chosen against the strongest motive we are often under an illusion. As Professor Stout has pointed out, when a choice has been made and we are launched upon a line of action, we come face to face with all the actual difficulties, both those we foresaw and those we did not. The difficulties

belonging to the other course of action which we did not choose are present only as ideas. Well then may it seem to us in our struggles as if we had chosen along the line of greater resistance, and that the strongest motive lay behind the alternative we did not choose.

CHAPTER V

ETHICAL PROBLEMS

ARRIVING AT A MORAL JUDGMENT

IN Chapter III we were concerned with the determination of the moral judgment. We now turn to the psychological question of the way in which we arrive at this judgment on any given occasion.

Does the individual in each particular case of conduct pronounce the moral judgment, 'This is good' or 'This is right', without any reference to anything save the particular instance? Or does the individual refer each particular case to some general principle; does he see 'this' as an instance falling under some 'dominant good' or some recognized law? In the great majority of cases the individual probably does neither. He does not exercise a 'moral sense', and he does not reason back to first principles. By saying that he does not exercise a moral sense we mean that he has not any immediate experience of the moral qualities good, evil, right, wrong, comparable to the immediate experience of sound or colour.

The moral education of the individual begins with particular instances and is usually in terms of law, of 'ought' and 'ought not' or 'right' and 'wrong'. He soon becomes aware of a rule embedded in the particular injunction or prohibition. He gains from his social environment the current opinion of what actions are duties and what qualities virtues. His moral judgments are echoes of the accepted opinion of *those whom he has learned to respect*. It is only the last words of this sentence that indicate the feature which renders *these*

'echoes of accepted opinions' moral judgments. They are only moral judgments if they embody some recognition of the accepted opinions as 'authoritative'. In everyday matters the individual has no difficulty in recognizing what ought to be done, what is good, what is evil. Each instance is of a recognized type. We may compare such recognition, if we will, to the perceptual recognition of things—this is fir-tree, that is larch—and call it moral perception. The judgment is particular, but in so far as each act is typical of its kind, a universal is implied.

When the individual for any reason begins to question, 'What ought I to do?' 'Which is the better course?' he usually falls back on maxims and generalizations which can apply to this particular situation. For these *axiomata media* he knows there is some further justification, but he does not make the grounds of justification explicit or examine their applicability to the present use of the maxims. For example, he accepts such-and-such a course as 'right', on the ground of the maxim, 'The simpler course is more honest', or of such a maxim as 'Better to err on the side of generosity'. Should a problem call for further analysis, or should the issue be seen to be of great moment, then there is a steady attempt to reason out a moral judgment from general principles, to arrive at values which stand in relation to something recognized as a dominant good. In Chapter III we took up the position that ideal ends (or, if one will, 'dominant goods') regulate moral values, and that it is upon ends that moral laws depend.

In what follows we are taking up some of the difficulties that arise in coming to a decision on moral questions. Some of these are primarily intellectual difficulties, difficulties of *knowing* which is the right course; others are primarily difficulties of *volition*, of *willing* the good.

CONFLICTING DUTIES

In taking up the question of conflicting duties we are entering upon ethical casuistry, the application of ethical principles. Of two or more lines of conduct, one and one only can be truly in accordance with the moral judgment. Conflict arises from the claims of the different courses to be that one. For simplicity's sake we will assume that the conflict arises in relation to lines of conduct neither of which is yet realized. When it arises in relation to conduct where one line has already been followed, the data for solution of the conflict are different. On the one hand, consequences that have or have not fulfilled intentions, have to be weighed against intended consequences which have not met the test of realization. The question of motives is complicated by this difference in the status of the intentions. Though the principles which lie behind the solution of conflict are the same, it is simpler to discuss them in relation to conflict between two unrealized lines of conduct.

(a) There is the conflict that arises from ignorance or inability to reason things out, from lack of insight. We often realize that the inferior or superior moral claim of one line of conduct in comparison with any other would be apparent if we knew more. We are morally baffled because we are intellectually baffled. The conscientious voter may find the casting of his political vote a moral problem. On the facts as he knows them he can see no clear ground for preferring X to Y. We may again be unable to work out the bearing of the alternative courses of action, be unable to see their influence on our own life or on the lives of others. In social work such difficulties frequently confront us; e.g. to countenance or discountenance birth-control. These are cases where the first obligation is delay, inhibition of action, and a search for

enlightenment. It may be urged that not merely delay but abstention from action is the right course. Passivity is not always possible and may on occasion be itself an evil.

Such cases constitute those wherein recourse may be had to *authority*. In everyday affairs when we lack knowledge or insight we seek the advice of some one whose opinion we respect. We consult some one who, we have reason to believe, can see farther into the problem than we can, or who has expert knowledge. It may be objected that in making a moral decision the case is different ; that if we follow authority we are not deciding for ourselves, and the line of conduct followed is not our line of conduct. This is not strictly true. We are premising that the individual is interested in the decision, that he desires to decide for the best. If this be so, he will be in earnest in his endeavour to find the solution. He will choose the best advice he can. He has the moral responsibility of doing this, and further, of making clear to his counsellor where his difficulties of solution lie. To this extent, then, the solution is the outcome of his action.

Supposing that the advice received does not satisfy the inquirer, what ought he to do ? There is more than one possible meaning in this question. In what sense is the advice 'unsatisfying' ? We start out with an intellectual difficulty, and we must not slip into a difficulty which arises not from inability to see the solution but from the unacceptable character of the course directed. In the latter case the advice is contrary to some desire that the person privately holds. It is easy to be self-deceived about the nature of a moral conflict and to believe that there is a conflict of duties when in truth there is a conflict between the categorical imperative and some desire arising from a sentiment. In other words, it is easy to mistake a difficulty of *willing* for a difficulty of *knowing*. The only sense in

which we can say here that the advice is 'unsatisfying' is that it fails to satisfy our intellect. The inquirer is unenlightened, he does not see the force of the arguments. In such a case he may seem to stand where he was, and in following authority he may be said to act blindly. That is so, but we may not say that he acts 'irrationally'. We have assumed that he recognizes the trustworthiness of the authority he consults. That, we have said, is his moral responsibility in consulting it.

(b) It may, however, happen that the opinion fails to satisfy for a different cause. In consulting authority the inquirer may have cleared his own intellectual vision. Putting the case to another may have made the case itself clearer. The solution which now is apparent to him is, however, not the line of solution recommended by his adviser. When this happens we have very real difficulties of moral judgment. Many 'cases of conscience' are of this type. Authority advises X and conscience says Y. Which shall a man follow? It is perhaps not unreasonable to treat commands and prohibitions differently. To go forward with some particular line of judgment against one's own moral judgment may well be wrong. One action leads to another and the agent becomes committed to much. To refrain from some line of conduct condemned by authority, but in conformity with one's own moral judgment, may be prudence. Much will depend upon the clarity of the individual's own judgment. If the imperative is a clear call it will be as immoral to refrain from action as it is to act against an inhibitory judgment. Stress as we may the inalienable individuality of the moral agent, he cannot be separated from his social environment, the ideals of his age and the institutions in which these ideals are embedded. The justification of the agent's decision to follow or resist the guidance of authority must ultimately rest on his

judgment of its enlightenment in comparison with his own. If he judges it to express a higher morality than he personally realizes in his own conduct, he is well advised in following authority, even if it conflicts with his own decision on the present occasion. If, on the other hand, he detects prejudice, conventionality in the moral judgment of authority, then he must follow his own light.

Such a conflict may often arise within the exercise of professional duties. Consider the case of a nurse ordered by a doctor to take tests on a patient at prescribed intervals. The patient is dying, he has suffered greatly and is now lying in a semi-conscious condition ; in order to take the prescribed test it will be necessary to stimulate the patient and bring him back again to a consciousness of pain. What ought the nurse to do ? She does not know the purpose of the test and cannot judge of the importance or unimportance of a record from this particular patient. She cannot make any enlightened decision. She has to choose between loyalty to a professional code and loyalty to the patient, not as a hospital 'specimen' but as a bit of suffering humanity whose weal or woe is in her keeping. It is difficult, of course, to disregard her own emotional distress at being the occasion of suffering, but if it is truly a conflict of duties this emotional factor must not weigh in the scalepans. It is a conflict between obedience to a professional code and the duty of a nurse to a patient.

We may consider an instance where the principles recognized by the individual come into conflict with those held by the institution or professional body to which he belongs. The situation may be complicated by the fact that though the individual judges the institution to be wrong in this particular instance, he recognizes the value of the code it professes and the importance of such a code for society. Such is the

position of a doctor called upon to administer an anaesthetic for an operation of manipulative surgery by an unqualified practitioner. The skill of the operator, the success of the operation and its benefit to the patient may each be beyond question in his mind. His professional interest and his skill as an anaesthetist prompt him to undertake his part in the work. Healing is a duty, but on the other hand his professional code forbids his assisting an unqualified man. Humanity or loyalty, which shall he choose? Emotional appeals are present, but behind such appeals there is also the conflict of duties. The doctor may sincerely believe that his own ideals of medical service, which would make him accept the manipulative surgeon as a colleague, are higher than those laid down by his profession. His moral judgment of the act would be: 'It is right.' But he cannot consider this particular deed only. He has to weigh the rightness of departing from a code which on the whole he believes to be good and important for the well-being of the general public. To realize the exact nature of the conflict let us contrast it with the case of the same doctor invited to take part in an illegal operation and offered a high fee for his services. Let us suppose that he is a poor man and that the offer on monetary grounds is important, let us add that he feels pity for the woman and believes her to be a victim more sinned against than sinning; yet if he is a straight man there will be no conflict of *duties*. The conflict in such a case is between duty and desires springing from sentiments, love of family which makes money precious, or championship of the weak which makes him pitiful. His own moral judgment is in entire agreement with the code of his profession. He accepts its judgment on such cases as the right one.

It is impossible to give a stereotyped answer to the question, When does the recognition of right require that

a man should throw over the recognized standards of institutions which he, on the whole, judges to be good? Many a young man had to face this problem in the war. Some decided it one way and some another. Many who joined up were conscientious objectors, but decided that their duty lay in the acceptance of the current standard of their fellow-countrymen rather than in following their own view of war as evil. The highest good, the moral law, are not abstractions in this life. They have to be sought and followed in complex conditions. What a man may judge right under certain conditions may not be right under the conditions which actually confront him. The moral judgment is relative to the situation but not to the one who judges. The individual has the obligation of choosing the best so far as he sees it, the right so far as he recognizes it. But he cannot honestly believe that a judgment other than the one he makes is the true moral judgment on the situation as he sees it.

(c) We have distinguished between duties and virtues, making the former consist in lines of conduct recognized as in accordance with moral law and the latter in excellences of character, fixed dispositions of mind. This distinction sometimes makes itself felt as conflict. Conduct viewed from the two angles presents different faces to the moral judgment. Viewed in relation to consequences conduct may call for one judgment, viewed in relation to character it may seem to require another. This kind of conflict is implied by such sayings as 'Never do evil that good may come of it', 'The end justifies the means'. If what we do is really evil, good will not come of it. If the end is really good, the means cannot be evil. The opposition presented by these sayings is a superficial opposition. The evil may lie in the motives, the seeming good in consequences. Or good be in the agent's motives, evil in the steps whereby

they are fulfilled. If a closer scrutiny is taken evil will be seen in the consequences as well as in the motive. The antithesis of means and end is artificial. An end linked to evil means cannot be itself a purely good end.¹ 'Never do evil that good may come of it' may seem applicable as a maxim to the difficulty which may confront a nurse when she is torn between truth and mercy.

We recognize truth as a duty, a line of conduct between man and man in their intercourse one with another. It stands in relation to many social institutions—contracts, barter, etc. We may, if we will, view it from the standpoint of character, truthfulness, a disposition of mind towards one's fellow-men. It is a form of benevolence and fair dealing which falls under Plato's virtue of Justice. To tell a patient a lie about his condition or about the condition of some one related to him, considered abstractly, presents no ethical problem. A lie is wrong, truth-speaking is right. But taken in a concrete situation truth-speaking may give rise to a problem. Suppose a patient's recovery to depend upon peace of mind. He has been brought into hospital seriously injured in a motor collision and his first question on regaining consciousness is, 'Was the other man killed?' To answer 'Yes' is to jeopardize the patient's chance of life. To answer 'No' is to tell a lie. Does the maxim hold here? Shall the nurse adhere to truth or shall she save life? Some one may answer, 'The end justifies the means'. That is to assume exactly as the other maxim assumes that the lie here is evil. If we go into the duty of truth-speaking wherein does the evil it is opposed to, consist? The evil of deception rests on the social relations of man to man. Suppression of truth in our own interests is a breach of moral law. To lie in order to promote the well-being of one at the expense of another is clearly a

¹ Cf. J. Laird, *A Study in Moral Theory*, chapter III.

sin against justice. But where is the injustice in the case supposed? The motive behind the lie is the patient's well-being. If the truth be told it will defeat its own moral end, justice. The patient's well-being will be sacrificed to an abstract code, perhaps even to a personal pride in conscious rectitude. If the good of the end be fully accepted then the evil of the means is apparent only and not real. Any moral judgment that is to oppose the telling of the lie must do so by recognizing evil in the end as well as in the means. This will be more apparent if we consider truth-speaking and betrayal of trust.

(d) If the relations existing between two persons are based on the belief that each can trust the other in certain assigned respects, for instance in this very matter of speaking truthfully, then the duty of speaking the truth stands on a different footing. It is not a derivative consequence of just dealing and benevolence, it is essential to the relationship between the persons A and B. To betray the trust each has in the other is to destroy that relationship. If a conflict arises, it is this relationship that has to be weighed against the conflicting duty. To take an instance as nearly parallel as possible to our previous one, let us suppose a patient has confidence in a nurse and trusts that she will truthfully answer a question about the findings of an operation or examination; suppose further that both patient and nurse realize that trust has been given and accepted. The conflict of truth or mercy arises. As before it may be claimed that a lie would be for the patient's peace of mind and is to be told in the interests of benevolence. There is, however, here a very definite evil which will spring out of the lie, the loss of trust. A definite relationship between nurse and patient, based on mutual confidence, will be destroyed. In social work one may be confronted with a similar dilemma. Betrayal

of trust may involve losing the whole basis upon which work with a particular person is possible, a basis which has only been won by patience and goodwill. An answer to an official inquiry demands a truthful answer. Shall the worker betray the individual or the family by a truthful answer? In this as in other cases it is difficult not to confuse the emotional with the moral issues. If betrayal of trust in this case is judged wrong it is not fear of the subsequent distress of a broken friendship that makes it so, any more than it is the unpleasantness of telling the truth that makes this the right course. The rightness or wrongness lies in the line of action considered in relation to its setting and to the agent's motive and character.

One might perhaps interpolate at this point a comment on unpleasantness and right. In our sober moments we do on the whole distrust the pleasant course of conduct and regard the unpleasant as probably the right course. Why do we make this association of rightness and unpleasantness? We have rejected Psychological Hedonism and do not view pleasure and pain as the sole motives to conduct, nor even as the commonest motives, but this does not explain the general distrust of the pleasant primrose path. Common sense finds in the unpleasantness of a course of action a test that our motive is not merely an interested one. The unpleasantness of an action does not in the least contribute to, or test, the rightness of an action, but it does guarantee that the course is being followed for some other motive than our own immediate pleasure. So far as it goes, this may be to the good. The danger to the moral judgment arises when we are led by confusion of ideas to mistake this *negative test* of motive for a test of rightness or goodness.

Betrayal of trust may, of course, take other forms than that of giving a false answer to a direct question,

but it always involves some definite social relationship, and the morality of breach of trust will be bound up with that relationship. From the point of view of society the solidarity of relations intentionally entered into between members of an association is fundamental. We recognize it even when the association itself may not be a very desirable one, e.g. honour among thieves, debts of honour. Where a situation is triangular the moral problem is often very great. Betrayal of the trust of A to B may involve change in the relation of A or B to C. Take, for example, the position of a sister who is in a relation to (a) the matron, and (b) the nurses in her ward. Both relations involve trust. The matron relies upon her to fulfil certain obligations. It is her duty to make reports, to uphold regulations. The nurses rely upon her also to fulfil certain obligations towards them, to uphold their rights, to protect them from unauthorized criticism and complaint. It is a counsel of wisdom to say no sister should accept obligations under (a) which can possibly conflict with those under (b) and vice versa. For notwithstanding wisdom and care in entering upon positions of trust, an individual may find herself in a situation where she is faced with breach of trust towards (a) or (b). She may feel she has to choose between being false to one or other of the parties who put trust in her. It is a type of conflict that comes to all who hold any position of authority and who are also responsible to a higher authority, e.g. a worker under the Charity Organization Society or County Council. When such a conflict occurs it is important to distinguish clearly between obligations that belong to an official relation, e.g. sister to matron, sister to nurse, worker to fellow-worker, worker to head, and obligations that are due to a personal relation. In coming to a decision the difference in type of relation must be recognized, otherwise the relative weight of the

two claims cannot be appreciated ; e.g. the conflict in deciding whether one's obligation to the authorities requires one to enforce a new order which one considers grossly unfair to the nurses whom it affects, is of a different type from the conflict in deciding whether to make or not to make to the matron a report that will involve the dismissal and damage the career of a nurse who has accorded to the sister a dog-like devotion. In the latter case the sister sees clearly that the report is just and that the matron has a right to know the facts it would reveal. Sometimes one may find the claims irreconcilable and be forced to resign one's position in order to be released from obligations which cannot be fulfilled and neither of which can be sacrificed to the other. Is repudiation of one side or other justifiable ? If any machinery exists by which the justice of the obligations laid on the person in authority can be examined that machinery ought to be used. If it is possible for, say, the sister, to discuss with the matron or sub-matron the difficulties in which some requirement places her, it would seem a first duty to make use of such a possibility. Similarly, if it be possible to make clear to her nurses the difficulty which some action of theirs throws upon her as the sister-in-charge, this also should be done. But supposing in the last resort these steps fail of effect, or supposing they are steps which cannot be taken, what is to be done ? Ought the sister to rebel against authority, to refuse to carry out some obligation ? A social worker may have a similar problem. If she is in an administrative position she may be confronted with recommendations for promotion which she considers unfair to workers under her supervision. Ought she, as an administrator, to ride roughshod over those below her and carry out an order which infringes their rights ? This is, after all, the same problem as that discussed above. It is a case of

conscience to decide when to follow one's own light and when to accept the guidance of others. One thing can be laid down as undesirable, and that is the tacit repudiation of trust. If either (a) or (b) is content that certain obligations involved in their relations should not be fulfilled, then those obligations should be openly discarded. This applies particularly to rules and regulations. Rules that every one breaks and whose breach is generally recognized, should be repealed. A recognized breach has a weakening effect on the obligations which are not repudiated, while the rules themselves are a constant source of embarrassment to the conscientious members of the community.

(e) Conflict between justice and benevolence is perhaps more apparent than real, since benevolence is an aspect of justice. Hastings Rashdall writes: 'Benevolence asserts the value of goods, justice asserts the value of persons.'¹ The word 'benevolence' literally, of course, expresses the willing or purposing of good; to us it connotes, in particular, the willing or purposing the good of others. We cited the intuitive principle laid down by Sidgwick: 'The good of any one individual is of no more importance from the point of view of the universe, than the good of any other.' This is the principle that links benevolence with justice. Justice asserts the claim of persons *qua* persons to their place in the social whole. For Plato, justice both in the individual and in the State was the harmonious fulfilment of function without interference between one power and another. One may distinguish between distributive and retributive justice. Distributive justice requires a fair distribution of goods and of opportunities for acquiring goods. Retributive justice includes both reparation and requital of desert. It is plain that both are

¹ Hastings Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil*, book I, VIII, p. 268.

concerned with rights and obligations. The rights and obligations recognized by the State are the affair of law. It is distributive justice combined with benevolence that leads to Bentham's axiom, 'Everyone to count for one and nobody for more than one in his claim on the highest good.' From this point of view it may well seem as if the duty of benevolence and the duty of justice could never clash and yet in concrete situations such a clash is experienced. It is easy in theory to postulate equality in distribution and in retribution, but 'equality' is in practice a difficult concept to apply. We may question whether it is strictly true to claim that the good of any individual is of no more importance than the good of any other. The good of the good man to the society in which he lives, may well be of greater importance than the good of the man of middling virtue. If we remember Plato's teaching of justice as harmonious fulfilment of function, we may doubt whether any absolute equality in distribution of goods, or rather of opportunities for acquiring dominant goods, is compatible with justice. Hastings Rashdall holds that the equality to which each has a claim is equality in the right to consideration. 'What particular legal rights, in certain conditions of time or place, best conduce to each man being equally considered in the distribution of well-being, must be ascertained by experience.'¹

'An equal right to consideration' sets a hard problem. A conflict arises from our ability to appreciate the claims of some and our inability to appreciate the claims of others. The disposition that purposes the good of others and which we term the virtue of benevolence often carries with it some tinge of affection or attraction towards those whose good is in question. This emotional setting makes the appreciation of claims to consideration a very difficult one and brings benevolence

¹ Hastings Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. II, p. 22.

and justice into conflict. In regard to particular people whose good we have at heart we understand and excuse shortcomings, we find extenuating circumstances, and this without any conscious bias in favour of their claims as against the claims of others. Again, we realize the importance or value of certain opportunities for acquiring a dominant good in the case of some people better than in the case of others. We can appreciate the gifts or abilities that these people possess and may fail to appreciate the gifts or capacities of persons of a different type. It is thus often difficult to lay aside the class prejudice and the personal taste which renders us 'benevolent' towards some persons rather than others. Justice demands equal benevolence, and when benevolence falls short of this, there is conflict. The emblematic figure with the bandaged eyes and the scales typifies the demands of Justice, fair weighing and blindness to all the considerations that are irrelevant. It is the sifting of relevant from irrelevant which renders the execution of distributive or retributive justice difficult. We may not disregard anything that is relevant to the function to be fulfilled, we may not disregard anything which is relevant to the liberty of others to fulfil their functions. It is in the conflict of benevolence and justice that we find some of the most striking instances of the logic of sentiments. This will concern us later. The importance of justice can hardly be over-rated. It is the foundation for all the social virtues. If we think of it as belonging to the head rather than the heart, we should remember that it is that which makes the exercise of benevolence possible. Unless we valued persons *qua* persons, there could not be any disposition to seek their good. The schoolboy who styled his headmaster a 'just beast' paid him the highest tribute. It is the excellence of character one would place first in estimating the qualities desirable in a person holding any administrative office.

(f) Conflict of 'other-regarding' and 'self-regarding' duties involves the fourth cardinal virtue, temperance, or better, self-control. As benevolence concerns the good of others, so self-control concerns the good of the agent. We can only fulfil the moral law or realize the ends of the ideal self by carrying out certain obligations. We have to do this and this, or, as we said, 'Be this and this'. At times the lives and interests of others may bulk too large on our horizon and a conflict may arise between our duty to them and our duty to ourselves. We may realize that by promoting the well-being of some particular person or group of persons we may be shaping our own lives by principles which we should otherwise reject. It is difficult to break off an intercourse which threatens to warp our moral standards when the intimacy presents itself as essential for the good of the friend. We may realize that if we lessen the intimacy the other person may relapse into bad habits which by association with us he has partially overcome, Or we may realize that our withdrawal will throw the other person into the society of associates whose influence is bad. Yet we may know that the intercourse itself hinders our own moral development, rendering us less clear-sighted in distinguishing good from evil and undermining our self-respect. Often a third person can estimate the balance of claims more justly than either of the persons concerned. The one who seems to lean on the other is claiming too much and is doing so at the expense of his own character. The apparent gain in better habits has to be weighed against loss of independence in judgment. The seeming relapse into old ways and intercourse with old associates may have a compensating gain in realization of responsibility.

The physical weakness and dependence of a patient on a nurse may easily lead to a mental dependence. More may be demanded by the patient and more yielded by

the nurse than is consonant with the self-respect of either. Unwise confidences are given, calls upon sympathy made and responded to, which later may be an embarrassment to each. It is difficult for a nurse to maintain a certain detachment which will check an outpouring of personal grievances and griefs while preserving the patient's goodwill. If justice is based on respect for persons the nurse owes justice to herself. She has to maintain respect for her own personality both in herself and in others. She cannot allow others to abuse the relation of service by breaking down the reserve which is essential for the development of personality. When the relation of patient and nurse is used as a basis for personal relations between a man and a woman which have no place inside the hospital or sick-room, it is clear that each is infringing on the social rights of the other. The nurse as nurse must place the claims of self-respect above any claim to indulgence to which the patient as patient is entitled, when the patient himself steps outside the only relationship within which he has a claim to her consideration. The difficulty which may confront any woman in her social relations with a man who stands in some official position towards her is particularly acute for the nurse. She has to distinguish between the lack of self-control that may be forgiven in the patient and the trading on professional relations which cannot be forgiven in the man.

Another direction in which the nurse is called upon to maintain respect for her own person is in the matter of gifts. Gratitude is a natural emotion in a patient who owes much to the devoted service of a nurse. That he or she should wish to make some return for such service is right and proper, so long as the return made does not trespass on the personal rights of the nurse. To be offered a gift out of all proportion to the services rendered is embarrassing. The gift *qua* gift calls for

acknowledgment, but the gift as an expression of the patient's gratitude is humiliating in that it fails to recognize what was done as service in the fulfilment of professional duties. It treats as a personal favour much that is impersonal in character. When further the gift is recognized as symbolizing not so much the patient's gratitude as the patient's purchasing power to future services, the problem of refusing it or accepting it becomes more difficult. The claim over her personality which the acceptance may seem to imply calls for repudiation ; the gift *qua* gift calls for acknowledgment. It is easy for a gift either by its character or by the manner of its giving to be an insult. To give, even as the expression of gratitude for services received, is a privilege and it can only rightly be exercised within the relation wherein the services were rendered. Embarrassing gifts and favours call for the exercise of great self-control in the manner of their acceptance or rejection in order that the integrity of personal rights may be preserved. The relation between giver and receiver must be such as to warrant a mutual exchange of rights and obligations. It is only to one to whom one can surrender a right and be under an obligation without loss of self-control that gratitude can be expressed, and it is only from such a one that gratitude can be received.

CONFLICT OF SENTIMENT WITH DUTY

We have pointed out when dealing with conflicting duties that we were not considering the conflict between a line of conduct recognized as a duty and a line of conduct which was in agreement with some particular desire. It may be useful to examine the kind of conflict that does arise between a duty and some desire that has behind it the weight of a sentiment. It is a conflict that often simulates the form of a conflict between duties.

It is with the duties covered by the Greek conception of Temperance—or to put it generally, duties of self-control—that such conflicts most frequently occur. The sentiment of love or of hate brings about a duel between the self of the sentiment and the rational self that accepts the moral judgment formulated in the duty. The self that loves or hates is moved by the values which belong to that sentiment. The conceptions of value characterizing the sentiment may be at war with the ethical values prescribed by moral law or, to use the other phraseology, accepted by reason as desirable for a moral Self. In conflicts of this type we can echo the Latin saying, 'Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor'. Plato and Aristotle never clearly recognized the type of conflict we are here studying. Since they regarded the good as the desirable, recognition of any end as 'good' was for them a sufficient motive for action. They thus attributed all moral failure to ignorance of, or blindness to, the character of the good. Although metaphorically we can call moral failure 'blindness', such failure is not always due to ignorance in the common acceptance of the term, lack of knowledge. In conflict we have to reckon with the thoughts and logic of a sentiment as well as with its emotions. Every sentiment supplies 'grounds' or reasons for the ends it pursues. We have no difficulty in finding arguments in support of the aim we strive to achieve for the sake of some beloved person. In moral conflict it is often such an end which has to be confronted with the end of a duty, and it is the reflective comparison of the two ends which is difficult.

We have said that the moral judgment has the character of universality. We believe "that what I judge to be right" or "what ought to be" must, unless I am in error, be thought to be so by all rational beings who judge truly of the matter'.¹ The situation may be

¹ Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, book I, chapter III, § 3.

concrete, specific, but the moral judgment relative to the situation may not be relative to the individual judging. Now the judgment of a sentiment may be, and frequently is, relative to the sentiment itself. It is in matters that touch us deeply that the conflict between the end of a sentiment and a duty is likely to arise. Unless there is a clear realization of accepted duties and virtues and the grounds therefor, together with a steadfast determination to bring moral questions to the bar of reason, self-control in the highest sense will be replaced by the pseudo self-control of a single sentiment. In social relations between men and women the desire of a love or hate sentiment may paralyse the motives that lie behind temperance. Knowledge alone, as the Latin saying points out, is powerless to combat the desire of a sentiment whose logic is in opposition to the moral judgment. Sins against chastity on the part of doctors, medical students or nurses cannot be described as sins of 'ignorance'. Sentiment must be met by sentiment. It is true that love of right for right's sake, an intuitive sense for, and love of, moral beauty are not sentiments that we can attain to in a day. But it will suffice for moral progress if we can form any sentiment capable of supplying grounds for action in conformity with the duties and virtues recognized by the moral judgment.

Although reference has been made to temperance exhibited as chastity it is obvious that the same conflict between a desire backed by a sentiment and a duty or virtue will arise in other directions. Self-love, love of power, love of money, hatred of trouble (of 'making a fuss'), hatred of opposition, hatred of change—each sentiment can supply desires which conflict with the dictates of the moral judgment and can furnish as grounds for its ends reasons which may wear the guise of moral arguments.

REMORSE, PUNISHMENT, MERIT

It is from the defeat of duty by sentiment that an individual experiences the greatest poignancy of **remorse**. This emotion can only arise as a consequence of self-condemnation. The individual recognizes that he has failed to obey a moral imperative and that the grounds of failure lie in himself. There may be remorse when some impulsive action usurps the place of deliberate choice. 'I ought to have thought', 'I ought to have realized' are cries which reflect self-condemnation. But bitterer by far is the remorse which follows on the acknowledgment that in spite of our knowledge of the better we chose the worse. We recognize then the logic of the sentiment and declare it fallacious, and just because the sentiment is an aspect of self the pain of self-condemnation is great. We may deplore the occurrence of unforeseen consequences, be ashamed of impetuosity and impatience, but the recognition that we have yielded to temptation is something deeper. It is the consciousness of sin, of having fallen short of our own conception of moral law. This is the great difference between 'shame' and 'remorse'. Shame may arise from awareness of the condemnation of others; we may perhaps passively acquiesce in their judgment, we may perhaps question it. But in remorse self-condemnation is all that weighs with us. We may be quite indifferent to what others think of us. Their exoneration or their condemnation does not touch the emotion. Shame may accompany remorse, since it is one aspect of self-condemnation. In remorse there is not only shame and the pain of failure, but the burning desire to refashion the past. The sense of guilt is not enough to constitute remorse, there must be penitence. There is the desire to bring again the self that chose the wrong into relation with the self that recognized the right. The first steps

that follow knowledge of wrongdoing may be efforts at self-justification, excuses, explanations. These have their worth as indicating a consciousness of sin, but in themselves they do not manifest the desire for reparation and atonement. The fuller expression of self-condemnation brings remorse and with it this desire to undo or remake the past.

Punishment can be considered in relation to remorse. We have seen that for Bentham and the Hedonistic School the purpose of punishment was twofold. It was to act as a deterrent and to contribute to the reformation of the criminal. It served to readjust his scale of values. From the point of view of self-condemnation punishment is reparation. It is the just penalty incurred for the breach of moral law, it is the consequence of failure in realizing a higher end. Remorse and penitence will regard punishment as the logical outcome of shortcoming. This is the conception which underlies penance. Punishment as administered by the State makes use of all three conceptions. The arbitrary 'forty-shilling fine' is an example of a deterrent punishment. Consignment to a Borstal institution is reformatory punishment. Exaction of compensation and damages exemplifies the notion of reparation and retribution.

Just as the yielding to temptation furnishes the occasion for remorse, so does the triumph of duty over a desire backed by a sentiment furnish the occasion for **merit**. The greater the temptation overcome the greater the personal merit of the agent. We are using the term here with reference to character, not with reference to desert or reward. From the point of view of moral progress there may be more merit in a sinner's resistance to temptation than in a saint's. 'For I know how far high failure overleaps the bounds of low successes'. It is the inner drama of struggle, not the tale of good works, that reveals the merit of an agent.

PROBLEMS OF COMMUNITY LIFE

(a) We have recognized the problem of balancing self-regarding and other-regarding duties. This difficulty lies at the bottom of many problems of community life. In trying to reach 'the mean', the social unit within which the adjustment has to be made must be taken into account. We may begin by asking whether self-sacrifice is an excellence in and for itself. It is a form of self-control, an attitude of mind which is ready to forgo a lower for a higher good, to yield up a particular desire for the sake of a duty. It is an attitude of mind which is praised, and rightly so, for the willingness to forgo a lower for a higher is a test of love of the good, of obedience to the moral law. As ordinarily understood self-sacrifice means a readiness to forgo our own good for another's. The self that is to sacrifice its ends is, of course, not the moral Self; it is the particular individual Brown or Jones. Self-sacrifice does not always carry the implication that the good given up is lower or less than the good pursued. Is self-sacrifice an excellence unless this is the case? Comparison of goods is difficult. Unless we accept the hedonic calculus whereby all good is measurable in terms of pleasure, goods are incommensurable. We have to consider them as ends for a moral Self. The relationship existing between A who gives up and B who benefits must be taken into account in any attempt to answer the question. Self-sacrifice that would be irrational between strangers may be universally acclaimed when the persons involved are mother and child. Consider the case of a man X who finds himself in a Swiss mountain hotel with another guest Y, who is taken ill. That X should give up a much-needed holiday by remaining shut up in the hotel with an invalid who is an entire stranger to him, may seem irrational self-sacrifice. At the end of his holiday

he will return to his work more fagged out than when he left it, and it is easy to see that his self-sacrifice for the stranger may end in injury to his fellow-workers. Change the situation a little by saying that the sick man was a fellow-countryman, that he was unable to speak to, or to understand, the hotel staff, and that the hotel was more or less isolated, outside help being unavailable. Factors come in that give the sick man a claim on the fellow-traveller. There is a bond between them that both would recognize and this brings X's good and Y's good into a common unit. It is not as Y but as a fellow-countryman that Y appeals to X. Y may be rather an unpleasant person in himself; it is in virtue of something beyond himself that he has a claim on X. X's self-sacrifice is not merely a surrender of a personal end for the good of another individual, but the surrender of a personal end in virtue of a recognized relation in order to promote the well-being of the whole which that relation represents. Similarly within a family one member may sacrifice his or her good to the good of another member. It may be in itself the sacrifice of a greater to a lesser good, judged from the standpoint of the spectator. But the sacrifice is not merely a sacrifice to this particular brother or sister, it is rather a sacrifice of an individual's end in order to preserve the strength of family ties, such ties being seen as important for the well-being of the community and essential for the realization of the ends of the moral Self. It is only when it is thus interpreted that self-sacrifice can be appraised. Having granted this, we may stress the worthlessness of self-sacrifice where no such good is promoted, and where there is no relation to justify the surrender of a higher or greater to a lower or lesser good. Self-sacrifice for sacrifice's sake is a perverted end and leads to the evils of self-martyrdom and vainglory. Unless the good of the whole is promoted, self-sacrifice on the part of an

individual member in a community may well be wasted. So far as material goods are concerned, food, articles of comfort, some individuals may gain by the self-sacrifice of others while the good of the whole is unaffected. If we consider goods of the soul it is easy to see that the community will gain or lose by the self-sacrifice of any member in so far as this improves or damages the character of others. Where self-sacrifice encourages selfishness in others, community life is injured; where it fosters devotion to the claims of the community it will promote the general well-being.

(b) As member of an organization each person has rights and obligations. To recognize the right of others to pursue their own ends so long as they do not fail in their obligations often demands from us much forbearance. The ends pursued may seem so foolish and so inferior to the ends we should desire them to seek. We saw that the basis of justice was recognition of the value of persons and it is the sanctity of personality that has to be remembered in living and let live. 'To suffer fools gladly' is a hard lesson, but so long as the fool does not fail in his obligations we have no case against him. Even the fool has rights. Toleration, however, is no justification for servility. If aggressiveness is an extreme, so too is servility. In common speech meekness has come to connote lack of spirit and the beatitude, 'Blessed are the meek for they shall inherit the earth', is not one which those who live in a community echo with any conviction. The word used in the Greek might be translated as 'gentle'. It is interesting to notice that it is the same word which is used by Aristotle for the 'mean state having as its object-matter anger'. 'The excess may be called an over-aptness to anger. . . . The notion represented by the term gentle is the being imperturbable, and not being led away by passion, but being angry in that manner and at those things, and for

that length of time which Reason may direct.' Aristotle points out that 'gentleness' is apt to lean towards the defect, incapacity for anger, and of this he says. 'To bear scurrility in one's person or patiently see one's friends suffer it, is a slavish thing.'¹ What the Greek conception of gentleness did not include but what the virtue of the beatitude must include, is a readiness to forgive. Community life cannot flourish unless there is a readiness on the part of the members who constitute it to forgive trespasses on rights and failures in obligations. There is no place in an organized community for revenge and petty spite against offenders. In so far as these are present the individuals exercising them place themselves outside the whole. Punishment and penalties for offences should only come through the authority constituted by the community.

(c) Straightforward dealing in the matter of goods or in the matter of ideas involves many conflicts between motives of self-interest and motives of benevolence. The virtues involved would fall within the old Greek conception of Justice. Property is one of the institutions of present-day society. It is a basis for contract and brings with it duties of honesty and veracity. Where ownership is absolute and individual the rights and obligations connected with it are clearer than where ownership is partly communal. Theft of money is recognized clearly as what it is, dishonesty. Thefts of personal possessions, such as articles of clothing, books, ornaments, usually present no ethical problems. Such infringements of the rights of the individual are clear. To participate in the fruits of another's labours, even to the exclusion of his own enjoyment in them, is not so widely recognized as 'unjust'. In essence it is theft. It is easy in community life to take an unfair advantage of the work done by others. This may occur in relation

¹ *Ethics*, book IV, v.

to purely personal labour, but it is more likely to occur in relation to labours performed for the community as a whole. It is easy for individuals to benefit by the labours of others without contributing their share to the tasks that benefit all. Shirking of time on duty, a readiness to pass work on to others, an unwillingness to exchange times, or to pay back in work the work undertaken by others, are all sins against justice.

(d) The duty of veracity rests on justice and benevolence and this should lead us to recognize dishonesty in words. To twist the words of another person knowingly so as to give them a meaning which the original words did not bear and which we recognize they were not intended to bear, is dishonesty. We rob the person of his own intended meaning and put another in its place. Usually we do more than this ; we damage his relation to some one else, we infringe rights. Scandal or tale-bearing is an even more direct form of theft. We may destroy reputation, change social relations, even break down friendships, by an unfaithful description of another's behaviour. With the best will in the world it is difficult to be accurate in a description of what another person did or in a report of what he said. It is difficult to discriminate between what we actually observed or heard and the interpretation we put on what we observed or heard. As we know from the psychology of sense-perception we are always reading meaning into the data of sense. We are always reading in what we think the person is intending to do or intending to say. Thus if we are prejudiced, if we are convinced that so-and-so had some sinister purpose, we see in his behaviour features which an unprejudiced observer would never see. We interpret his words with a meaning which the bare words themselves did not convey. Respect for personality requires us to be very careful in description and to err rather on the side of charity than on the side

of malice. Caution in accepting any report not based on direct observation is a corollary from this. Inaccuracies are multiplied as reports go from person to person. Omissions and additions render the description less and less faithful to fact.

The conditions of such community life as that of a hospital staff or nursing-home association are often monotonous, there is a staleness and a weariness of routine. One craves something new, something exciting, and thus any rumour which offers an interest outside the regular course of events, is seized on eagerly. The psychological conditions of suggestion explain how exaggeration and distortion creep into a report and how a rumour spreads. There is a rumour that ABC was seen coming in through a window after 12 o'clock ; that she had been out without leave ; that a man helped her to climb up the window, etc. The foundation for it all is that ABC leant from a window, and fished for a sponge that had fallen to the ground from the sill where it had been set to dry. Hobbies and outside interests serve as a corrective to the staleness of mind that finds an interest in personalities and scandal.

(e) We have spoken of the conflict that occurs when loyalty to principles is opposed to loyalty to authority ; such a conflict demands wisdom and moral courage for its solution. Wisdom and moral courage are called for in like manner when an individual finds it a duty to resist what the majority of the community accept. It may be that it is the duty of resisting some practice which the majority follow, it may be it is the duty of resisting some opinion that the majority agree in. To acquiesce would probably be easy ; to stand out, and still more to act or speak in opposition, is difficult. Here as in other cases the individual needs to be very sure that she is taking her stand on moral principles and not on personal likes and dislikes, and also that the good of

the community is at stake. It is not always easy to see clearly when toleration and respect for the opinion of others is called for, and when resistance is required. Supposing this to be clear, then in addition to moral courage we need wisdom. Wisdom to resist in the right way. There is need for that subtle understanding of people and situations which we label 'tact'. Only by wisdom may we hope to achieve our aim: 'to overcome evil with good'. If we lack wisdom, so far from promoting the well-being of the community we may sometimes wonder whether after all we have not been 'overcome of evil'. We have been overcome, not perhaps of the particular evil we set out to resist, but of the evil of enmity and strife. Planting thorn hedges will not help either ourselves or others to keep to the straight path of duty.

CHAPTER VI

VOCATION

WHAT is implied by the term 'vocation'? We recognize that there is something in vocation which is over and above professional training and professional skill. It is possible for a person to be highly trained and skilful without having any vocation for the profession he follows. Work only has the character of vocation when it awakens a fundamental response in the worker. The worker is called by the work, and just in virtue of this fact he is also realized or fulfilled by the work; the work responds to a need in him.

Both nursing and social work may be vocations, the latter more rarely than the former. If we look at the native endowment of an individual and ask which instinctive impulses can be the source of a need which the work of nursing fulfils, we shall see that it appeals to the parental instinct. We referred in the introduction to the intimacy of the relation between nurse and patient and to its one-sided dependence. It is in this that it resembles the relation of mother to child. The work of nursing gives scope for the group of emotions—pity, sorrow, sympathy, gratitude, each of which may be coloured by 'tenderness'. These are emotions characteristic of the relation between parent and child. The satisfaction of personal service, of ministering to the patient's well-being, the joy of seeing progress as a result of such service is in its essence the satisfaction of the parental instinct. To this, of course, is added the satisfaction which arises from knowledge and training, the satisfaction of carrying out a skilled piece of work. There is professional pleasure in any task well done.

Such professional skill and pleasure, however, will not render the work in question a vocation. A man might be a successful and clever engineer without ever finding in his work the fulfilment of a fundamental need. Many men follow professions, even more follow occupations, because of some derived or secondary interest. The work offers a livelihood, certain amenities, a chance of making a name, etc., but is not a vocation.

The appeal of social work is complex. The parental instinct may play a part in it, but more important is the interest in one's fellow-creatures. This interest is possibly a form of the gregarious instinct. Certain it is that there arises in some men and some women a passion for humanity. This love sentiment like the parental instinct is in close association with the tender emotions, sympathy, pity. It finds satisfaction in personal service. Throughout the history of civilization there have been men and women who have found their deepest needs satisfied in serving their fellow-men. The service has taken different directions, ministering to the poor, ministering to the sick, to those in misfortune, to the young. Looked at thus, nursing is a special direction of social work. It is perhaps in virtue of its specialized character that it appeals to many as a vocation. In social work the relation of the worker to 'cases' is not that of parent to child and the satisfaction derived from social service lacks the specific character present in ministrations to the sick. In both, however, the demand is for 'personal' service and it is in virtue of this call that both may be vocations.

Because the call is for 'personal' service both vocations make great demands on personality and character. We may ask, then, What sort of personality and what qualities of character should be possessed by individuals following these vocations? Let us recognize frankly that many persons will take up both kinds of work who

have no call whatever. They train to become a nurse or to undertake some form of social work without any strong desire to do so. They must do something, they do not want to do x or to do y , and so by a method of elimination they arrive at nursing or social service training. Some are attracted to nursing because the training will bring them into the society of other people of their own age. There is also the association with members of the other sex ; the life promises to be a sociable one and it has a certain romantic glamour, nurses have a special place in the community. Social work offers less attraction on either of the above grounds, but against this may be set the fact that the training demanded is shorter and less strenuous. Whatever may be the motive with which the novice enters upon her training, there is nothing in it to preclude a recognition of vocation coming later. As the work itself becomes known it may cast its spell on the learner.

To arrive at some idea of the personal traits desirable we may turn to features of native endowment and consider them as a basis for training. Unfortunately our knowledge of *temperament* is still very indefinite. We may define temperament as ' that part of the innate constitution of the mind which is different in different men so far as this refers to their feelings and perhaps also to their wills '.¹ Understood in this sense, temperament is something that lies behind the emotions and instincts as part of our native endowment as human beings. It will be temperament which will serve to determine the degree to which, and the readiness with which, we experience our native emotions and instinctive impulses. If we remember Aristotle's advice for arriving at the mean, viz. to keep away from the extreme which is more contrary than the other to the mean and *to take into consideration our own natural bias, which*

¹ Shand, *The Foundations of Character*, chapter XIII.

*varies in each man's case*¹ we shall recognize that, did we possess it, a knowledge of temperament would be of value for character-building. It has been held from early times that a given temperament is accompanied by certain physical characteristics of body, and it may be that further work on biochemistry, in particular work on the ductless glands, will enable us to recognize physical and temperamental types. Work along these lines has already been done by Kretschmer.²

The old classical doctrine of four temperaments has a certain rough and ready value. It is perhaps most satisfactory in its opposition of the Sanguine and the Bilious or Melancholic temperaments. The person of sanguine temperament is described as cheerful, as one who experiences joy readily, who is an optimist, but dwells on the surface of things and is thus not tenacious of purpose. We recognize joy as one of the great influences in building up love sentiments. Through his susceptibility to joy the sanguine person's sentiments will be numerous rather than deep-rooted. The Bilious or Melancholic on the other hand experiences his emotions less readily but more profoundly. He is regarded as tenacious of purpose, inflexible. He is ambitious and prone to experience sorrow. This will render his love sentiments deeper than those of the sanguine person.

The next pair of temperamental types, the Choleric and Phlegmatic, are often contrasted as quick and slow in the movement of ideas as well as in emotional response. The Choleric man as the name denotes is regarded as prone to anger. He is also regarded as sensitive to emotional situations in general, vivacious and quick-witted. The Phlegmatic is slow to feel emotion, slothful and of dull wits. Different authors describe the detailed characteristics differently. While admitting these discrepancies we may claim that broadly speaking the four

¹ Cf. *Ethics*, book II, ix.

² *Physique and Character*.

types do present us with recognizable characteristics, found with a certain degree of constancy. It is impossible to say that any one temperament is better fitted for the vocation of nursing than another. From the patient's point of view a 'sanguine' nurse might be the most desirable, provided that the patient's case did not call for long and persistent perseverance of treatment. For this the 'bilious' nurse would be more suited. Neither the Choleric nor the Phlegmatic temperaments seem at first sight to have much to commend them. A phlegmatic temperament may be less wearing to the nurse herself than the nervous excitable temperament of the choleric person. Such a person often carries on activities beyond the due limit of his physical powers, is apt, as we say, 'to live on his nerves'. For the trials of social work the phlegmatic or the sanguine temperament might be claimed as essential. Self-knowledge of temperamental tendencies may be helpful to the individual, but one cannot say more with our present inadequate knowledge.

In relation to conation we may consider the two types distinguished by Professor James. The *explosive* type and the *obstructed* type. The explosive type is impulsive, all the instinctive urges are experienced strongly. As James puts it there is exaggerated impulsion. This often goes with great emotionality. But explosiveness may also be due to lack of restraint, weakness in inhibition. The obstructive type is weak in the impulsive drive of instincts. Inhibition is strong, and is reinforced when training and reasoning introduce motives for deliberation. The former type is more likely to develop into the prompt and ready, the latter into the slow, patient and cautious actor. It is perhaps more difficult by training to make good the lack of impulsive drive in the obstructed type than to curb the too-ready action of the explosive type.

Allied to a classification of temperaments, but wider in range, is the classification of types given by Professor Jung. Professor Jung recognizes two great types, the extravert and the introvert. These represent two typical general attitudes of an individual subject to his world. The way the individual takes in the sense facts of his environment, the way he feels towards them and the way he reasons about them are all concerned in Jung's typical attitudes. The extravert stresses the character of the object, thing or person, his own subjective processes in relation to it are of secondary importance. The introvert finds his interest in subjective processes, the object known or felt or thought about is of secondary importance. 'Just as Darwin might possibly represent the normal extraverted type, so we might point to Kant as a counter-example of the normal introverted thinking type. The former speaks with facts; the latter appeals to the subjective factor. Darwin ranges over the wide fields of objective facts, while Kant restricts himself to a critique of knowledge in general.'¹ 'Feeling in the extraverted attitude is orientated by objective data. . . . It agrees with objective values. . . . The personality appears to be adjusted in relation to objective conditions. . . . Nowhere is this more clearly revealed than in the so-called "love-choice"; the "suitable" man is loved, not another one; he is suitable not so much because he fully accords with the fundamental character of the woman . . . but because he meticulously corresponds in standing, age, capacity, height, and family respectability with every reasonable requirement.'² 'Introverted feeling is determined principally by the subjective factor. . . . It strives after an inner intensity, to which at most objects contribute only an accessory

¹ Jung, *Psychological Types*, p. 484.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 448, 449.

stimulus. The depths of this feeling can only be divined—they can never be clearly comprehended.’¹

This is obviously a classification which will cover the whole of mental life, and although it may have its basis in native endowment it is also largely influenced by training. It may be worth discovering whether one is prone to be an introvert or an extravert in order to correct bias, but the classification is not very clear-cut and allows of cross-divisions according to the aspect of life considered. On the whole it may seem that the extravert type is more likely to prove efficient both in social work and in nursing. The patient and his symptoms are the objects to which the nurse directs her interest. Some interpretation of his inner experiences, however, in terms of her own mental life may be salutary for her understanding of his condition. Introversion is, therefore, needed to a certain degree. In social work there is every call to be interested in the affairs of others. It is their interests, their difficulties, their needs which have first claim on attention. But without imagination based on personal experience there will be a lack of sympathy and of understanding. Introversion has its function here also but the dominant attitude will be that of the extravert.

Leaving temperament and type aside we may turn to the instinctive endowment in which we all share, and consider what features it presents that are of special value and what features are likely to require repression by training. We may follow for this purpose Professor Drever's list of specific instincts and emotions, using them as a clue to what we described as primitive values. We may take first situations arousing fear and disgust. A nurse has to learn to repress any instinctive shrinking from the sight of pain and suffering and from the spectacle of death. She must overcome fear. Similarly

¹ Jung, *Psychological Types*, pp. 489, 490.

she must learn to repress shrinking or repulsion at sights and situations which the ordinary man or woman finds disgusting. She has to overcome nausea, face dirt, bad smells, and conquer loathing. To many the sight and smell of blood must be both a source of fear and of disgust. The situation presented by the first days in an operating theatre must be such as to force the nurse to seek aid in derived values—scientific interest, service, professional pride. In social work also there is need to repress fear and disgust, fear of opposition, rudeness, personal abuse, disgust at dirt and squalor, frowzy rooms, and frowzy persons. But whereas the nurse has the satisfaction of making personal war on dirt, the social worker may have to tolerate it and carry on.

The situations which Professor Drever regards as calling forth curiosity and pugnacity are not perhaps more frequent in social work or in nursing than in any other walk of life. Neither the nurse nor social worker needs to stimulate or repress her curiosity and pugnacity more than her sisters carrying on a different calling. The social relations of her work do, however, make special demands on what Drever terms 'self-abasement' and 'self-display'. The discipline of a hospital and the requirement of unquestioning obedience in the early years of training must make great demands on self-abasement and call for much repression of self-display. To be blamed for what is not one's own fault, to accept criticism for an action done for a good reason without explaining that reason, to stand aside and refrain from doing what one is capable of doing and itching to do, must need much training in control. To learn to be just a cog in the wheel of the machine and to put the concerns of the machine before the concerns of self is to learn the same lesson as the soldier. But on the other hand there is the complementary training. One has to learn to take responsibility, to exercise control over others,

and here it is self-abasement or shrinking that has to be repressed and positive self-feeling or self-display encouraged. One may not take shelter behind some dominating personality, one may not be 'self-conscious' to the point of inefficiency. Extremes in either of the two emotional attitudes are detrimental to a nurse's work. 'Bossiness' is as undesirable as a shame-faced diffidence. This holds not only of social relations within the hospital staff but also of relations between nurse and patient. No patient wants to be nursed by some one who seems to be apologizing for her existence, and no patient welcomes the nurse who acts like a dragoon. There is further a special need for the cultivation of what can be termed 'sociality', the give-and-take attitude. The nurse needs to cultivate the 'clubbable' spirit. She needs it in her relations to fellow-nurses and she needs it in her relation to her patient.

We have said that the relation between nurse and patient resembled that between parent and child. The recognition of the similarity in the relationship must not lead one to regard the relation between mother and child as the standard by which to model a nurse's behaviour to her patient. Such a conception leads to 'sentimentality'. A nurse gives service to her patient and her relation to the patient need not be entirely uncoloured by tenderness. The emotions: pity, sympathy, and sorrow, like gratitude, are all tinged with that emotional character of 'tenderness' which reaches its fullest expression in 'love' when this term is used for an emotion, not for a sentiment. The nurse has occasion for pity, sympathy and sorrow. It is, however, impossible for her to be as concerned with the well-being of the patient as a devoted mother is with the well-being of her child. A nurse would hinder her own efficiency if she allowed her own personality to be so far merged with that of her patient. To carry devotion to

such a pitch would be physically and mentally exhausting. This brings up the wider question of sympathy. How far should a nurse cultivate 'feeling with' her patients? Does she for her own well-being and self-control require to preserve a hard-heartedness which will allow her to be unmoved however profoundly her patients are moved by emotions? One may answer that *sympathy* must never become *empathy*. In Aesthetics 'empathy' means putting our own feelings into the object contemplated, e.g. reading motion into the curve of a line. There is a danger that understanding the situation in which another finds himself, we shall read into that situation not *his* feeling but our own. It is one thing for a nurse to know and be moved by the emotion of her patient, but it is another for her to experience an emotion herself and project that emotion into the situation. She will thereby have (a) the reflection of the patient's emotion, and (b) a further emotion, probably of like character to his, but based on the situation as she sees it and projected into the situation. Emotionality in this sense is to be avoided.

Social work makes great claims on the personality of the worker. The complementary instinctive tendencies—self-abasement or shrinking and self-display or mastery—will be important in her training. There is nothing in this training quite equivalent to the discipline of a hospital, but there is working under orders, waiting on the convenience of officials, and on the findings of committees, putting up with delay, making the best of inadequate information. In all this there is inhibition of self-assertion; the worker learns to put the work first and her own feelings and activities second. Like the nurse she has to learn to take responsibility, and to stand on her own feet. She has to hold her own both with those among whom she works and with the society or council for whom she works. She

has less to help her to attain to self-confidence than the nurse. Her work is not confined to one institution with recognized traditions. Her status is marked by no badge or uniform. There is nothing in her working conditions to ensure prestige. She has to make her way with those among whom she works by her personal qualities, unaided by any backing from the social environment of colleagues. Like the nurse she must avoid a too masterful attitude ; indeed she will have less opportunity than a nurse to exercise masterfulness. If she is to help those among whom she works she must on the one hand overcome any tendency to an overbearing manner, intolerance of the opinions of others, and on the other hand she must fight any tendency to shrink away at a rebuff and to accept failure as inevitable. She, too, needs the attitude of give-and-take, sociality. While the sympathy of a nurse is usually called out by physical suffering, the sympathy of a social worker must be available in many and diverse situations. Like the nurse, she has to avoid sentimentality ; her emotions must not overflow at every tale of woe or scene of distress. She has to learn to discriminate between genuine distress and humbug, to let sympathy wait on understanding.

Having considered instinctive and emotional endowment we may go on to a topic closely related to emotion, imagination. How far should the nurse or social worker cultivate an ' imaginative nature ' ? Should she be one who sees visions ? In everyday life we are apt to oppose the visionary and the practical as incompatible types. We think of the one as the dreamer and the other as the doer ; the one as finding satisfaction for their desires in dreams, the other as satisfying their desires by some action in the physical environment. So long as we keep to this opposition both nurse and worker would, one may suppose, be chosen from the class of doers rather

than from the class of dreamers. Their work lies in practical performance. The antithesis, however, is not fundamental. It is not even applicable to the very class of persons contemplated by the expression 'dreamers', artists. The artist must give expression to his dream, in words, in music, in stone, in colour. He too is a doer. It is imagination that introduces the touch of romance into the workaday world, that enables us to look beyond the immediate task and its accomplishment to its significance in a larger setting. This kind of vision changes humdrum work into service. Without it there is no vocation. Further, without some cultivation of imagination there can be no participation in the higher forms of play. There can be no appreciation of art and little of literature. We referred to the fostering of an unhealthy interest in personalities as one of the dangers of a monotonous routine life; a cultivated imagination safeguards the individual from this by opening the door to wider interests and enabling her to get outside the immediate environment. The imagination that is feared by those responsible for the training of nurses or workers is the untrained imagination that wanders hither and thither at the bidding of a passing emotion, whose only goal is the satisfaction of an emotional need. The severely practical may urge the use of imagination solely in the service of 'practical' ends, purposes whose utility for the material needs of the work is obvious. Such persons would wage war on all cultivation of imagination which strays beyond the useful, as they conceive it. Such a condemnation of imagination may be the result of a limited education. The stimulus that the exercise of imagination gives to thought cannot be appreciated by those who have never cultivated it in themselves. So far, then, from fearing that a nurse or worker with a cultivated imagination will be an idler, a dreamer who will fail in a practical emergency,

we should rather expect such a person to have resources within herself that will lift her above boredom and enable her to rise to difficulties and new situations.

•In this connexion one can touch on habit. How far should habit be cultivated? We know from psychology the advantages and dangers of habit formation. To render certain performances or ways of behaviour habitual is to economize effort. These performances are facilitated, attention is no longer required for their successful execution. On the other hand, the more habitual they become the more difficult it is to change them. In respect to this manner of responding to our world we become set, we are machines rather than thinking human beings. Will such automatic behaviour kill initiative? There is a very real danger that it may. Owing to the ease of the habitual response we may become insensitive to change in the situation and continue to give the old response to what is in fact a new demand. Lack of adaptation will bring loss of efficiency, until finally the 'response' becomes not a response but an idle gesture. One sees this in individuals and in associations of individuals. An old routine is carried out which has lost its point and serves no purpose. In the individual we have what James labelled 'old fogyism', in the association we have atrophy. The other side of the picture is found by dwelling not on the routine actions themselves but on the freedom afforded by their facilitation. There is time and energy to face new tasks. Regarded from this point of view habit formation is the foundation for initiative. New problems can be tackled and new methods tried on the strength of the stabilized basis of routine action. No one taking up a new post would begin trying experiments and inventing new methods until she felt sure ground under her feet in certain directions. Even if she is convinced that the administration of which she is

in charge requires overhauling from top to bottom, she will not try to change everything at once. Habituation to one set of performances will precede the initiation of further change.

Both nurse and worker may be required to exercise the qualities of leadership. In his book *Psychology and the Soldier*, Mr. F. C. Bartlett in an acute chapter on 'Leaders and Leadership' distinguishes three types of leaders—the institutional, the dominant, and the persuasive. The first rely on the prestige of their office, and their power is in their post. They uphold the dignity of the office and are punctilious in preserving customs and privileges belonging to the group of persons over whom their office makes them leader. They are aloof from the group in virtue of their office. The second type lead by personality. Self-assertiveness and sheer capacity give this leader sway over the group. 'The dominant leader is never much afraid of making mistakes. He knows that his power resides not in what he does but in himself . . . he is far more able than the institutional leader to initiate new movements and to bring about radical changes in his group.'¹ The third type, the persuasive leaders, lead in virtue of understanding people. This type is quick to react to hints and suggestions. So far from being aloof from the group the leader is necessarily in it and of it, and is able to formulate and express in words what the group as a whole is feeling.

There is place for each variety of leadership in nursing and in social work. The three types of leaders have each their own functions, and only the 'dominant' and 'persuasive' would seem incompatible from the point of view of personality. An 'institutional' leader may be one who has been 'dominant' or 'persuasive' before being promoted to the office which bestows leadership

¹ Bartlett, *Psychology and the Soldier*, p. 143.

by rank. Such a leader should have a thorough knowledge of the history and status of the group of which she is the chief. In any negotiations with outside bodies she must uphold the traditions and champion the rights of her own institution. Personal qualifications worthy of the dignity of the position are necessary. Though by position apart from the group, the leader must be one in whom the group can take pride.

The dominant leader is probably, as Mr. Bartlett suggests, 'born' rather than 'made' by training. She is self-assertive with the attitude of the extravert, absorbed in schemes and interests, but little given to speculating how they strike others or to self-misgiving. Genuine efficiency in some one direction at least seems requisite in such a leader. The woman who is to lead by sheer personality must inspire confidence, she may or she may not be sociable and hail-fellow-well-met with those she dominates. More often she is on good terms with a small circle only, and her influence radiates from them and through them to others. She has imagination but may not be far-sighted. If of good character the dominant leader may be a great influence for good, but if she has no fixed principles her influence in an institution is detrimental. What she champions to-day may be wholly inconsistent with what she champions next week.

The 'persuasive' leader Mr. Bartlett describes as more complex and subtle in nature. The woman who leads by understanding must be partly an introvert. She is not absorbed in schemes to the exclusion of the reaction they awaken in the persons concerned, nor is she self-confident. Such type of leadership requires far more 'vision' than the other two. Mr. Bartlett holds that this type of leader, like the dominant, is 'born' rather than 'made'. Training, however, will do much in quickening sensitivity to the feeling and thoughts of

others. The primary requisite is an interest in their feeling and thoughts. This should not be outside the capacity of any nurse or social worker. If it is, nursing or social work is not her right place. Training can do much in enabling the individual to formulate and express what otherwise would remain inchoate, vaguely sensed. Like the dominant leaders women of the persuasive type are powerful. Their influence is even more constant and general. When a situation calls for delicate handling, when reconciliation of interests is at stake, the persuasive leader excels either the dominant or the institutional type. Mr. Bartlett regards it as a type that plays a greater and greater part as social life develops. It is certainly a type that is needed in every large association of civilized people, be it a hospital or a home or a society. Whatever the type of leadership for which an individual is suited by gifts and training or the type to which she is called by appointment, character is the bedrock upon which will depend the use she makes of it.

In considering character we may claim generally that the higher the character the greater the value of the service which nurse or social worker can render through her own personality. Where there is vocation the nurse or worker will give of her best, and this best is something for which professional skill and knowledge is not enough. In the thoroughly trained nurse or worker we may take efficiency for granted. Character supplies that something more which makes the nurse or worker a power for good in the service to which she is devoted.

If one looks at the list of excellences set forth by Plato and Aristotle one can recognize two virtues whereof full and abundant measure is required by the nurse or social worker. These are courage and wisdom. We have spoken of the inhibition of fear, fear of pain, of

death, of rough words, but what is intended here is the fixed habitude of moral courage. It is the courage that is prepared to face whatever may come in following out the work one finds to do. The social worker or the nurse who is working outside the walls of a hospital is confronted with many situations that call for the greatest moral courage. She may have to tackle 'difficult' people, she may have to track down and show up old abuses. In much of her work she may meet with resistance and will need both courage and patience to overcome opposition. With the cultivation of courage should go the cultivation of wisdom. Wisdom is hard to define. It is not knowledge, although it presupposes knowledge; it is rather ability to apply knowledge in the right way and at the right time. It implies knowledge of persons as well as knowledge of some branch of science or general learning. Inasmuch as it is ability to recognize when and how to use knowledge, wisdom requires much experience; for this reason we associate wisdom with age, and hope to grow wiser as we grow older. To size up a person or a situation, to realize what can or cannot be done, when it is useful and when useless to speak, demands judgment, and such judgment is based on much past experience. Mere experience will teach nothing unless there is reflection thereon, comparison of this and that, a noting of consequences and circumstances. No one requires wisdom more than the social worker who is called upon to act and advise upon all sorts of situations. The difference between her work and that of the nurse makes itself felt very sharply on occasion. The professional training of the nurse arms her for many of the situations she will meet both within and without a hospital. It is difficult to provide such an adequate preparation for one who is going to undertake social work. It is well-nigh impossible to foresee the difficulties she will have to face.

For this reason it is all the more essential that she should have wisdom. The more she has reflected on what she has learnt both in her training and through her own experience, the more likely is she to deal wisely with new and unprecedented events. Both nurse and worker need to be clear about general principles, to have ideals, a sense of the direction in which they wish to go. If they have taken their general bearings well they will be more able to judge correctly of the significance of any particular episode. Wisdom will ensure a sense of proportion, and under the shadow thereof a sense of humour may flourish. Love of one's fellows and the desire to serve them is sweetened by a sense of humour. Humour is in truth the adjunct of wisdom.

Whatever virtues the character of the nurse or social worker may include there is one quality which it is essential should run through them all and that is the quality of *sincerity*. Where there is true vocation there will be sincerity, and when this is lost, all sense of vocation is lost.

At the present time owing to the high public estimate in which a nurse is held in this country certain qualities both in her personally and in her work are apt to be taken for granted. In itself this is a great tribute to the nursing profession. It may also be a pitfall for the individual nurse. So ready is the public to believe that she is thus and thus and that her work is thus and thus, that she may be too easily content with a semblance that satisfies public expectations but falls far short of reality. There is a temptation to sacrifice persons to things. The whole art of ministering to the sick may become formal, an elaborate artifice impressive to the mere spectator but lacking in any true spirit of service. The social worker is confronted with the same temptation. Public opinion expects certain machinery and public bodies require reports and statistics. Figures

showing increase in this direction and decrease in that direction may satisfy such demands, while in themselves they express nothing of the realities amid which the worker lives. If she is to run machinery but not herself be run by it, the worker must be capable of renewing her sense of service and of recapturing the singleness of heart which is essential to her calling. Neither in nursing nor in social work is there any place for empty show. Sham efficiency is the curse of bureaucracy and the enemy of progress. For the 'good' nurse and 'good' worker *esse quam videri*.

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