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
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THE PALESTINE PROBLEM



Palestine To-day

THE
PALESTINE PROBLEM

by

RICHARD WILLIAMS-THOMPSON



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PALESTINE is a land of three. Three races—The Arab and Jewish inhabitants and the British Mandatory Power. Everywhere there are the signs of the bitter desire of the Arabs and the Jews to keep at all costs their own national characteristics, languages, cultures and religions. And there is the sign of the British attempt to compromise. In Palestine there are three religions practised—Christianity by the British and some of the Arabs, Mohammedanism by the majority of the Arabs, and Judaism by the Jews; all three religions with separate holy days. Three languages are spoken. The signposts and street names bear witness to this.

How are these conflicting races, languages and religions to be moulded in together so that the Arabs and Jews can live at peace with one another? Can they ever be moulded in or is it an impossible task? That is the Palestine Problem.

"The Semites have no half tones in their register of vision. They only know truth and untruth, belief and unbelief without our hesitating retinue of finer shades."

LAWRENCE OF ARABIA.

This is true of the Arabs and also of the Jews from Eastern Europe. They do not understand compromise.

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"*The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*"—T. E. LAWRENCE.

"*Zionism and Palestine*"—SIR RONALD STORRS.

"*The Jewish Fate and Future*"—ARTHUR RUPPIN.

"*Report on Palestine*" (*Readers' Digest*)—FREDERICK C. PAINTON.

NOTE.—I strongly recommend to those who wish to make a study of Palestine that they should read the "Palestine Royal Commission Report" (or as it is better known, the PEEL Report. The Chairman of the Royal Commission was Earl Peel). It is an excellent work—detailed and yet easy to read. I have constantly referred to it, particularly in Chapters II and III. The Report produced by the Royal Institute of International Affairs is also excellent (it goes further than the Peel Report which only goes up to 1936), and I have in Chapter IV adopted the same chronological sequence of events as the Royal Institute Report.

PERSONALITIES

FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT ALLENBY	Conqueror of the Turks.
LAWRENCE OF ARABIA	The genius of the Arab uprising.
HUSSEIN, SHEREEF OF MECCA, and his sons :	} Leaders of the Arab uprising.
FEISAL, THE LATE KING OF IRAQ	
ABDULLAH, THE EMIR OF TRANSJORDAN	
ALI, ONE-TIME KING OF SAUDI-ARABIA	
ZAID	
DR. CHAIM WEIZMANN	Brilliant Jewish Scientist and President of the Zionist Organisation.
SIR RONALD STORRS	First Military Governor of Jerusalem.
SIR HERBERT SAMUEL (1920-1925)	} The High Commissioners of Palestine.
LORD PLUMER (1925-1928)	
SIR JOHN CHANCELLOR (1928-1931)	
SIR ARTHUR WAUCHOPE (1931-1935)	
SIR HAROLD MACMICHAEL (1935-1944)	
FIELD-MARSHAL LORD GORT (1944-45)	
LT.-GEN. SIR ALAN CUNNINGHAM (1945-)	
LORD BALFOUR	Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1917
SIR HENRY MCMAHON	High Commissioner for Egypt, 1915.
M. GEORGE PICOT	} Diplomats of the First World War.
SIR MARK SYKES	
SIR MOSES MONTEFIORE	} Eminent Jews and Founders of Jewish Colonies in Palestine before 1914.
BARON EDMUND DE ROTHSCHILD	
BARON MAURICE HIRSCH	
MR. THEODOR HERTZL	Founder of the Zionist Organi- sation.
LORD ROTHSCHILD	Recipient of the Balfour Letter.
PRESIDENT WILSON OF THE U.S.A.	} Supporters or "architects" of the National Home in its conception.
FIELD-MARSHAL SMUTS	
LORD ROBERT CECIL	
MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL	
&c.	

PERSONALITIES

Haj Amin Eff. El Hussein	}	One-time Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and President of the Supreme Moslem Council. A guest of Herr Hitler during the war.
THE HUSSEINI	}	Rival and powerful Arab families whose members are Arab leaders.
THE NASHASHIBI		
DR. HUSSEIN KHALIDY	}	Other Arab Leaders.
ABDUL LATIF BEY SALAH		
YACOUB EFF. GHUSSEIN		
AUNI BEY ABDUL HADI		
DAVID BEN-GURION (Chairman, Executive Committee)	}	Jewish Agency, Palestine.
MOSHE SHERTOK (Head of Political Dept.)		
THE STERN GROUP		Jewish Terrorists.
DR. MAGNES		A Palestine Jew who believes in a bi-national State.
MR. ALTMAN	}	Leaders of the "Revisionist" Jews who want not only all Palestine but Transjordan as well.
THE LATE MR. JABOTINSKY		

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

ON E very hot night in the summer of 1944 I was sitting with some acquaintances in an Arab hotel in Amman (the capital of Transjordan) drinking some of the inevitable Turkish coffee and discussing, of course, the Middle East. One of these acquaintances was a British doctor who had been with the Arab Legion for some years; another was a Foreign Office official on leave from Cairo. The conversation started with a comparison between Lawrence and Wingate, the latter being well known to the doctor, and then quite inevitably led on to the problem and future of Palestine. After a few minutes my Foreign Office acquaintance delivered this judgment: "I dislike all the Arabs and I dislike all the Jews; in fact I dislike everybody living in the Levant, by which I mean the country from Turkey to and including Egypt!"

I open this book with the foregoing incident because it is an example of an attitude often adopted by many of the British. The majority are either bored by the Palestine problem or else quite ignorant of it. The Arabs and Jews are fully aware of this lack of interest and lack of understanding. I was very conscious of it. I spent several months of 1944 in Palestine and tried whilst I was there to get a good grip of the problem from all points of view. My military colleagues regarded me for this as being rather odd. Whenever they saw me reading reports and books on Palestine it was the occasion for wisecracks! I made no apology then, and make none now, for the fact that I found the Palestine problem fascinating and absorbing.

I must say that I agreed with the Arabs and Jews in their alarm at the indifference or intolerance with which the majority of the British who have been to Palestine during the war regarded the Palestine problem. Since 1939 thousands have been stationed in or passed through Palestine and they have missed a great opportunity. They are the voters who elect the Governments of the British Empire. Palestine is a British Mandate and its fate lies in the hands of the British Government. During the last twenty years British policy has fluctuated and wavered over Palestine. I contend that this is not only due to weak governments but also—and largely—to outcries after each announcement of policy; outcries, started by biased and interested people, involving much larger numbers of an ill-informed public and, I fear, a number of ill-informed officials. Since I have returned home the lack of interest in Palestine has been brought even more forcibly to my notice. People just do not know the facts and do not realise the seriousness of the situation. I have often been regarded as a scaremonger when I have said that a false move by Britain would probably mean a war in Palestine, and that unless Britain is thoroughly prepared in Palestine a war may come there anyway. However, such statements as "the restraining hand of constitutional Zionism cannot be exercised much longer—it is clenching angrily in common with the whole

Jewish people," by Dr. Bernard Joseph, of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, end "the Moslem religious leaders cannot afford to keep quiet about the serious statements suggesting the division of Palestine or the establishment of a Jewish National home there—a holy war might be provoked in defence of the Arab Holy Land of Palestine" are recent proofs of my forebodings. Fortunately, in recent times, Palestine has been "in the news" and many papers—chiefly *The Times*—have had articles on the situation. This and the interest being shown by President Truman will bring Palestine to the fore. But I fear that the lack of facts and knowledge of the situation remains.

Palestine is a country slightly smaller in size than Wales yet it is of world-wide importance. The progress of the National Home is carefully watched by powerful and influential World Jewry. Millions of Moslems are vitally interested in the fate of their Arab brothers in Palestine. Can the Christian World remain indifferent to the fate of the land in which Christ was born, taught and was crucified? Obviously the future of Palestine is not a localised affair—it has world-wide implications.

During my stay in Palestine I had the opportunity of long talks with many Arabs and Jews and I got to know well many Arab and Jewish families. I met Government officials and I stayed with the High Commissioner at Government House in Jerusalem; I visited Jewish settlements and Arab villages. I discussed the problem with members of the Palestine Police and also with British and foreign soldiers, and civilians with experience or views on Palestine. This book is my summary of all these talks, experiences and visits. I have mentioned no names as I have no wish to cause my friends any embarrassment or be the cause of recrimination against them. Palestine is not an easy or happy country to live in and many people gave me their views privately—they could not afford to do otherwise. I expect to be criticised by many experts and economists who will say I have skimmed the subject. My answer is that this book is not written for them. For any who want to delve more deeply into the economic or technical questions, I recommend both the Peel Report and the Chatham House Pamphlet—"Great Britain and Palestine," both of which give excellent surveys of the problems, and to which I have referred a great deal. I have quoted many people's views on Palestine and extracted from numerous articles on the subject. It has made the book lengthy in parts but I found it necessary to give all sides to the many controversial points. There are also a number of books written by intelligent Jews which deal most fully with economic aspects.

For many generations before the last war Palestine was part of the Turkish Empire. Its people were, by Western standards, very largely backward, simple and illiterate. The first World War brought them hopes of emancipation and freedom from Turkish rule. After that war there started into Palestine an influx of Jews. They came by right as a result of the Palestine Mandate granted to Great Britain by President Wilson's League of Nations. The Jews were, by Western standards, highly intelligent and well educated. The Arabs in their awakening were pitted against an influx of a very advanced people. So from the very beginning this tremendous contrast between the Arab inhabitants and the Jewish immigrants spelled danger. Yet I am convinced they would have got on well together had the situation been well handled. The Arabs and Jews are both of the Semitic races. The few thousands of Jews who had remained

in Palestine since ancient times had got on well with Arabs for hundreds of years. And yet the history of the Palestine Mandate has been written in blood and unhappiness. At the moment there is a deadlock and most people despair of finding a solution which will satisfy both parties. There is hatred between Arab and Jew and neither of them have much faith in the British rule. The war temporarily put Palestine out of the limelight, except for a series of unpleasant bomb outrages committed by Jewish extremists. Arabs and Jews both wanted to impress the Government with their good behaviour in war time. However, the period of "rest" has given the parties time to think and to prepare for further activities. Without doubt there will be great trouble in Palestine—both Arab and Jew will fight against each other and against the Government. I say "will fight" unless we are fair in our decisions and strong, very strong, and just in putting them into action. Whatever course we decide on, the Arabs and Jews must be made to feel we intend to carry it through. In the past so much trouble has been caused by changing our stated policy whenever one of the parties objected strongly.

Palestine may be a bore and a nuisance but it is of immense strategical importance to the British Empire; it has great commercial potentialities because of its position *vis-d-vis* air routes from the Western to the Eastern Worlds. At the moment it is an unhappy country torn by peoples in conflict, and a great source of danger. The solution to the Palestine problem has to be found by the British Government. The British Government is elected by the British peoples. These peoples must have a knowledge of the Palestine problem to be able to give fair and just opinions on it—and what is more—to back up the Government in the firm application of the solution against what will almost certainly be widespread protest.

It is for these people I have written this book.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF PALESTINE UP TILL 1914

IT is necessary, I think, to consider very briefly the history of Palestine from ancient times up till the commencement of the Great War of 1914. It is a history fraught with interest and written in blood and suffering. There are points in it which have direct bearing on the case to-day. Palestine is a country of distinct geographical features, which have, in the past, and still do to-day, greatly affect its history.

The greater part of Palestine, the southern part, is desert-land adjoining the Sinai Desert. Through the centre of Palestine runs the barren hilly country—the hills of Samaria and Judea, the mountains of Gilboa and the hills of Galilee. Between the hilly country and the sea is the fertile Maritime plain, in places very narrow. On the other side of the hills flows the River Jordan through that geographical freak the Jordan Valley. The Jordan flows from the north through Lake Hulea into Lake Tiberias (the sea of Galilee) and finally into the Dead Sea, and is there always below sea-level.

Alexander the Great, Napoleon and AUnby, all fought battles in Palestine—which is, and always has been, of vast strategic importance. In the Plain of Esdraelon more battles have been fought than in any other place in the world. This plain, which lies east of Haifa, is surrounded by hills and is entered by a few passes. It has figured greatly in Arab-Jew struggles and I refer to it later on.

Palestine, a country smaller than Wales, has been occupied by many races and subjected to many conquests. The first known trace of occupation was during the Second Millennium B.C. In those days the lands on the eastern seaboard of the Mediterranean were subject to frequent "raids" by Semitic tribesmen pressing seawards across the Arabian desert from the north. Those tribesmen who "invaded" Palestine became known as Hebrews. One of their tribes subsequently claimed descendency from Abraham of Ur and called itself the "Israelites," after Abraham's son, Israel. The tribulations of these people, their migration to Egypt and their return to the "Promised Land" are all described in the Old Testament of the Bible. By 1100 B.C., after their return to Palestine from Egypt, they had occupied most of the hilly country. Other tribes living there at the time were the Phoenicians (or Philistines) who lived on the coast, and the Semites who lived in the desert on the other side of the River Jordan. The religious views of the Israelites even in those days made a marked difference between them and the idolatrous polytheism of the other tribes. The Old Testament describes fully the trials and tribulations of the Israelites amongst themselves and with their neighbours. Resulting from these was the establishment of a Monarchy under David (c. 1010-970 B.C.) of Judah. David and his son and successor Solomon (c. 970-930 B.C.) succeeded in uniting the tribes of Israel and defeating the Philistines. Their kingdom stretched from Egypt

in the south to Assyria in the north. After Solomon's death there was a decline which resulted in the formation of two separate kingdoms—the northern tribes who broke away and formed the Kingdom of Israel around Samaria; whilst the Kingdom of Judah remained centred around Jerusalem and its temple (built by Solomon), which remained the focus of Hebrew culture and religion. Also at this time the peoples of the coast recovered their independence. These separations made Palestine subject to danger but it was not for 200 years, i.e., till about 720 B.C., that the Kingdom of Israel was incorporated in the Assyrian Empire after much sacking of its lands and deportation of its peoples. The Kingdom of Judah "survived" for a few generations by "agreeing" to the rule of the Assyrians. In about 585 B.C. Judah was conquered by Nebuchadnezzar, King of the Babylonian Empire which had replaced the Empire of the Assyrians in what is now Iraq. Judah suffered in the same way as Israel had done—Jerusalem and other towns were sacked and a great many of the peoples removed to Babylon.

Shortly afterwards in 539 B.C. Cyrus, the founder of the Persian Empire, occupied Babylon. In the following year he permitted the Judeans to return home. Most of them did, although some remained—the 100,000 Jews in Iraq to-day are the descendants of those who remained behind in 538 B.C. The "Men of Judah," or Jews, who returned home rebuilt the temple and started again their national life.

For the next three or four centuries little is known of Jewish history, except that for a period they were part of the 5th Satrapy of the Persian Empire and afterwards under the Ptolemaic successors of Alexander the Great.

The Jewish troubles began again with the conquest of Palestine by the Seleucid rulers of Syria. This conquest resulted in the first persecution of the Jewish faith. Every effort was made to force the Jews to adopt Greek gods and the Greek way of life. Under Judas Maccabaeus and John Hyrcanus the Jews revolted. They revolted very successfully, not only regaining independence but, from 150 B.C., regaining also almost all the territory they had possessed in the great days of David and Solomon.

However, the mighty Romans were abroad and the Jewish independence lasted only for a short while until, in 63 B.C., Pompey took Jerusalem.

Never since then has Palestine been an independent state. For the past 2,000 years it has been continuously subject to bondage, captivity, or overrule of one sort or another.

The relationship between the Jews and the Romans varied considerably. Palestine was a Roman Province although some native rulers (Herod, for instance) were allowed to call themselves "Kings." On the whole the rule of the Romans was hard and extortionate and they found it difficult to keep the peace owing, without doubt, to the great national spirit of the Jews. In A.D. 64 revolt broke out which was only put down in A.D. 70 when Titus took and sacked Jerusalem. (The Temple of the Jews, their last place of resistance, was burnt to the ground.) However, the Jews rebelled again in A.D. 115 and A.D. 132. Rome decided, as a result of the success of the latter rising, that her "patience was exhausted" and there must be no more risings, so in A.D. 135 Jerusalem was destroyed. Many of the Jews were put to death or carried off to slavery. Only a few thousand remained in Palestine. Those who had been carried off, or fled to safety, spread and multiplied, in the years that followed, in other parts of the world. Before the 1939-45 war there were 17,000,000 Jews all over the world.

The history of Jewish Palestine ended in A.D. 135. This is a big point—there has not been a Jewish majority in Palestine since that time, over 1,800 years ago. Jewish claims of to-day are based on something which finished 1,800 years ago. Memories and beliefs may have lingered on; the desire to return again a second time to the Promised Land may have remained throughout the centuries; but the hard cold fact of 1,800 years remains.

In that period of Jewish history two particular things of great importance happened:—

- (a) The development of the great Jewish religion from the old crude worship of Jehovah, and the gift—of such importance to the world—of Hebraic prose, poetry and culture in general.
- (b) The birth, life and teachings of one Jew—Jesus Christ, who was finally crucified by his own people.

But the history of Palestine did not end in A.D. 135. For 500 years Palestine remained under Roman rule. In the seventh century A.D. the Arabs conquered Palestine. The Arab conquests had been inspired by the rise of Islam (the third great monotheistic faith—the others being the Jewish and Christian faiths—to be started in that territory between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf). Between A.D. 632 and A.D. 713 the Arabs conquered, occupied and settled in Syria, Iraq, Persia, Egypt, the whole of the North African coast line, and finally Spain. The Arabs succeeded the decaying Roman Empire which, having split up into the Western and Eastern Empires, finally fell. The Arabs started to penetrate farther into Europe but were stopped in the East in A.D. 678 and A.D. 717 by the resistance in Constantinople, and in the West in A.D. 732 by the victory of the Franks at Poitiers.

This was the great age of the Arabs. They had great land and sea power; they were the leaders of civilisation; the scholars of Europe came to Arab universities, and it was through the Arabic translation that the classics of previous civilisations were handed on.

In all this Palestine did not play a great part. The Arabs rebuilt Jerusalem and started a university there. But it was not one of their great interests or cultural centres. In only one aspect did it achieve greatness from the Arab point of view. Towards the end of the seventh century they built a magnificent mosque in the centre of the wide stone platform which had once borne the Jewish Temple. (One of the causes of present-day religious antipathy between the Jews and the Arabs.) This mosque is called the "Dome of the Rock."* "On that sacred platform the Haram esh Sharif, beside the Dome of the Rock stands the Mosque al Aqsa, whither Mohammed is recorded to have been conveyed by God, and Moslems believe that from the Rock itself the Prophet took flight on his magic steed to heaven. The Haram esh Sharif, therefore, ranks with Mecca and Medina as one of three paramount *Holy Places' of Islam."¹

During the next 300-400 years the Arabs began, as Hitler would have said, "to become decadent." The Arab Empire crumbled. The Arabs, except for some whose descendants remain to this day, evacuated Spain. But they remained almost everywhere else in the countries they had originally conquered, and were conquered themselves. This happened to the Palestine Arabs who were conquered by the Seljuk Turks.

¹ *Palestine Royal Commission*, Chapter I, pages 5-6.

From 1095 onwards Palestine was subjected to the Crusades, a series of intermittent invasions from Christian Europe (inspired partly to free the Holy Sepulchre from "the heathens" but mostly by the thought of material gains), which succeeded in maintaining a very precarious Kingdom of Jerusalem till the end of the twelfth century. (After this the Crusades did hold certain points, e.g., Acre, Athlit, etc., on the coast for another century.) Palestine from the end of the twelfth century was, with Syria, under the Mamluk Dynasty of Egypt. In 1517 it was conquered with Syria and Egypt by the Ottoman Turks. It remained in the hands of the Ottoman Sultans at Constantinople, except for the few months of Napoleon's invasion (eighteenth century) and the few years of Mohammed Ali's occupation (early middle nineteenth century) till the first Great War. During all that time from A.D. seventh century till now, the Arabs have lived, tilled the soil, worked and died in Palestine. They have always been the majority of the people. For twelve centuries the Arabs of Palestine have had their home in Palestine, overruled for the greatest majority of the time, it is true, by the Turks.

On 4th August, 1914, Great Britain declared war on Germany. On 1st November, 1914, Turkey was considered by the Allies to have placed herself on the side of Germany. Another phase in the history of Palestine had begun.

CHAPTER III

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARABS AND JEWS
BETWEEN 1914 AND 1918

THE fate of Palestine was settled during the first Great War by three separate series of negotiations. These were as follows:—

- (A) The negotiations between the Arabs and Great Britain.
- (B) The negotiations between the Jews and Great Britain.
- (C) The negotiations, conducted in secret, between Great Britain, France and Russia, which dealt with the "portioning out" between those three countries of territories liberated from Turkish rule.

These three separate series of negotiations were apparently carried on at different times during the war without, it would seem now, any co-ordination from Whitehall and without reference to a decided policy by His Majesty's Government. As a result many of the arrangements made and statements issued were contradictory. This unsatisfactory state of affairs undoubtedly contributed greatly to the later troubles in Palestine. People were disappointed; felt they had been cheated; believed promises had not been kept—all because of a number of misleading, unco-ordinated and badly worded series of documents. I will deal briefly with each of the negotiations in turn, and the histories surrounding them.

(A) *The negotiations between the Arabs and Great Britain*

For many years before 1914 the Arabs, in what are now the countries of Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, had been getting restless of Turkish rule. A great deal of interest in Arab history and culture, long dormant, had sprung up in the middle of the nineteenth century. This "awakening" gave rise to the formation of a number of Arab nationalist movements which were particularly strong in Syria. However, little was achieved, apart from occasional outbreaks by the more spirited tribesmen, till 1908. In that year "the Young Turks," led by General Enver Pasha, made a *coup d'état* in Turkey. It was thought that this would result in greater freedom throughout the Arab Peninsula, because a constitution was wrested out of the despotic Sultan of Turkey. It was not to be. "In the first Parliament the Syrian Arabs were greatly under-represented in the Lower House and they only had three out of forty seats in the Upper House, and it was soon plain that the hopes of autonomous Arab Provinces, free to develop Arab life and culture to the full, were to be disappointed. The efficient Turkish Committee of Union and Progress stood for centralisation, not local "home rule"; for "Turcification" rather than an Arab renaissance."¹ So the Arab nationalistic movement was driven underground with secret societies in various capitals. In 1913 an Arab Congress was held in Paris. It became generally known that if a favourable opportunity

¹ *Palestine Royal Commission, Chapter II, page 16.*

occurred there would be a general Arab uprising with the idea of forming one Arab State, free from outside rule, and with its capital at Damascus. The* Turkish Government was aware of this and did what it could to suppress it.

On 1st November, 1914, the Turks entered the war. It seemed that the "favourable opportunity" had arrived. What could be simpler? The Allies wanted the help of the Arabs to fight the Turks in the Middle East, and the Arabs wanted independence. Looking back the issues appeared clear cut. Surely it was just a question of an Arab uprising and in return we were to give the Arabs independence? However, if the issues were clear cut, there were many complications in other directions. There was a religious complication. The Sultan of Turkey was also the Caliph. The Caliph (meaning "deputy") was the head of the Moslem religion. When Mohammed died one of his disciples had been appointed Caliph. This was objected to by certain members of Mohammed's family and a war resulted. Afterwards the election of the Caliph was always a business fraught with jealousies and rivalries. Eventually, when the Ottoman Empire succeeded the Arab Empire the Sultan of Turkey "arranged" that he and his descendants should automatically be the Caliph. Hence as Caliph the Sultan of Turkey had tremendous power over the Moslem world and he might have succeeded in making the war into a Jihad (Holy War), thus rallying all Moslems to fight the "infidels." That the Caliph did not succeed was due to Hussein, Shereef of Mecca. Hussein, a descendant of one of the sons of Mohammed, was the hereditary Guardian of the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina. He had four sons—Feisal, Abdullah, Ali and Zaid. Hussein and his family had had, like the Syrian Arabs, ideas of ridding themselves of Turkish rule. The Turks had been aware of this and had kept certain members of his family as hostages in Constantinople. When the Turks entered the war the British Government intimated to him that if he helped the Allies he might achieve his wishes. When the Caliph declared the Jihad in November 1914, Shereef Hussein forbade it to be preached in the mosques in Mecca or Medina; but he did nothing else. Quite obviously the Arabs would not openly rise until the Allies were looking at least as though they had a reasonable chance of winning the war. A rising against the Turks at a wrong moment would not help the Allies and would bring severe reprisals against the Arabs.

Palestine and Syria were of immense strategical importance. From there a German-Turkish attack could be made on the Suez Canal, in those days a main artery in the bloodstream of the British Empire. British troops were concentrated in Egypt to meet this threat. The help of the Arabs in harassing the Turks could be invaluable.

In June 1915 British policy over Arabia proper was made clear. A proclamation was issued in Egypt, the Sudan and Arabia to the effect that at the conclusion of peace the independence of the Arabian Peninsula would be assured. However, this left out the Arab Provinces of the Turkish Empire in the Levant. Other countries besides Great Britain were interested here. France stated that she would claim control of Palestine and Syria. A Government Committee reported in June 1915 "that although the French claim to Northern Syria should be conceded, owing to the world-wide importance of the Holy Land, Jerusalem and part of Palestine should be reserved for international administration."¹

¹*Palestine Royal Commission*, Chapter II, page 17.

While all this was happening Allied War prospects in the Middle East looked fairly bright as the Turkish-German attack on the Suez Canal in February 1915 had been decisively beaten off, and in April the Allied attack on Gallipoli began and with it the rumours of the fall of Constantinople.

The Arabs in Syria decided to throw in their lot with Shereef Hussein and the secret Nationalist Committee in Syria decided to reject the promises of independence made to them by the Turkish and German Governments. So there started a correspondence between the Shereef Hussein and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt. This correspondence has become known as the "McMahon Letters." In a letter of 14th July, 1915, Shereef Hussein informed McMahon of the terms on which he was prepared to co-operate with the Allies against the Turks. The terms went far beyond the promised independence of the Arabian Peninsula. McMahon however sent a friendly reply but stated it was premature to discuss boundaries. Just about this time the Allies suffered a considerable set-back in the Middle East. On 10th August the British attack on Sari Bair from Suvla Bay had broken down and the fall of Constantinople seemed a long way off. In his second and much cooler letter of 9th September Shereef Hussein brought up again the question of boundaries. Also at this time McMahon was told of negotiations going on with a representative of the Syrian Nationalist Committee who made it clear that the decision as to whether the Syrian Arabs would come down on the side of Germany and her associates depended on the guarantees from Great Britain as to the future independence of the Arab countries. This representative stated, however, that although the Arabs wanted all Arab countries to be free, the Arabs were prepared to recognise British interests in Iraq and French interests on the Syrian Coast. They insisted on the independence of the Syrian interior, i.e., the districts of Damascus, Aleppo, Hama and Homs. (The map on page 22 shows the Turkish Administrative Districts in those days.)

THE MCMAHON LETTER

24th October, 1915.

"I have received your letter (of 9th September) with much pleasure; and your expressions of sincerity and friendliness have given me the greatest satisfaction.

"I regret that you should have received from my last letter the impression that I regarded the question of the boundaries with coldness and hesitation; such was not the case, but it appeared to me the moment had not arrived when they could be profitably discussed.

"I have realised, however, from your last letter, that you regard this question as one of vital and urgent importance. I have therefore lost no time in informing the Government of Great Britain of the contents of your letter; and it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their behalf the following statement which, I am confident, you will receive with satisfaction :—

"The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Horns, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries. With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs we accept these limits and boundaries, and in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:—


"Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sheriff of Mecca. Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognise their inviolability.

"When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories.


"On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officiate as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.

"With regard to the vilayets of Baghdad and Baera, the Arabs will recognise that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special measures of administrative control in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local population and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.

"I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubts of the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her traditional friends, the Arabs, and will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate results of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the freeing of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke which, for so many years, has pressed heavily upon them. . . ."



Palestine (pre-1914 Turkish Administrative Districts)



The Middle East, 1946

McMahon passed all this information with the Shereef's letter of 9th September to Sir Edward Grey, then Foreign Secretary. He was authorised to reply on certain lines and this he did in his letter of 24th October to the Shereef. It is this letter (shown on page 21) which has been the cause of so much misunderstanding with the Arabs. I have italicized the vital sentences. Was Palestine excluded from the districts? The Arabs say it was. The British Government said it was not. The word "Palestine" itself was, of course, never mentioned, the reason being that it never existed then. The map on page 22 shows how the whole territory was divided by the Turks into three administrative areas, the vilayets of Aleppo, Syria and Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem.

After the war Palestine was made up of the sanjak of Jerusalem and the southern part of the vilayet of Beirut. How the other vilayets were split up is shown in the map on page 23, which gives the modern boundaries of Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon.

The McMahon letter of 24th October the Arabs regard as their Charter. The Shereef accepted our terms in that letter after some preliminary arguments over the vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut. He stated they were mainly Arab but did not wish to cause friction between Great Britain and France "and would not ask for what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts till after the war."¹

The whole crux of the matter is this: can Palestine, as it is now, be regarded as being in the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Hama and Aleppo? It is without doubt open to argument. The McMahon letters were never published till 1937. Sir Henry has stated since the end of the last war that he intended Palestine to be included in the area lying to the west of Damascus, etc. When Home Secretary, in 1922, Winston Churchill issued a statement that Palestine was definitely included and was not therefore one of the Arab parts of the Turkish Empire to which freedom after the war was promised. Also in 1918 a Commander Hogarth, on behalf of the British Government, visited Hussein and made it clear then that Palestine was one of the areas included in the proviso laid down in the McMahon letter. It is said the Shereef acquiesced. It is also said that in the early days Feisal, one of Hussein's sons, stated "Palestine for its unusual character should be left on one side for mutual consideration of all concerned". On the other hand, Feisal in 1921 made a claim (which he later withdrew), in a conversation at the Foreign Office, that Palestine had been included in the area where Britain did recognise Arab independence. So, unless you believe that the Government of that day and Sir Henry McMahon were all liars, it is fair to assume that the Government *did mean* to include Palestine in the area not for Arab independence. However, despite whatever may have been stated later, unfortunately the Arabs did believe it to be excluded at the time and the Shereef gave his support to the Allied cause on the basis of the McMahon letter.

There are two further points of interest.

Firstly, the brunt of the fighting by the Arabs was done by Shereef Hussein's Arabs. None was done by the Palestine Arabs and only a little by the Syrian Arabs. However, it is only fair to say that desert uprisings were easier to effect **than** ones where the Turks had garrisons. The Arab campaign was a fascinating

¹ *Palestine Royal Commission, Chapter II, page 20.*

one and has been fully told in the stories and histories of Lawrence of Arabia. It was a magnificent campaign and it contributed greatly to the success of the main campaign of General Allenby. Jerusalem was entered on 9th December, 1917, and the Turks were driven out of the rest of Palestine in the next autumn.

Secondly, the fate of Hussein's four sons. Abdullah became, and is still, Emir of Transjordan. Feisal became King of Syria until he was driven out by the French when he was made King of Iraq by the British. His little grandson is the present King. Ali for a short while succeeded his father as King of the Hedjaz. Hussein's relations with the British had not developed happily, chiefly, it is believed, because Hussein was jealous of Feisal (who was so popular with Lawrence), and shortly after the war was deposed. Ali did not long survive his father's deposition. Ibn Saud, the present King of Saudi Arabia, drove him out and the Hedjaz Kingdom is now part of Saudi Arabia. Zaid, the youngest son, still lives.

(B) *The negotiations between the Jews and Great Britain.*

There is a word which for centuries has meant a great deal to the Jewish people. It is the word "Diaspora". The Diaspora was the dispersion of the Jewish people over the world. It first began with those Jews who did not return to Jerusalem in 538 B.C.; it was completed in A.D. 135. Between those two dates flourishing Jewish communities had been set up and had been "assimilated" in Iraq and Egypt. As a result of the Roman massacres, etc., in A.D. 135 Jews from Palestine went to join their brethren in Iraq and Egypt and also settled in Syria, Germany, Greece and Italy.

When the great Arab conquests began a few centuries later Jews followed the Arabs along the African coast and into Spain. In Spain the Jews enjoyed life to the full and apparently got on well with the Arabs and indeed were the leaders in Arab Spain. Here again the Jews were "assimilated," like their Egyptian and Iraqi brethren before them, in everything except religion.

The Jews who had emigrated to Greece and Italy eventually moved on through central Europe and even into England. It was in the "Dark Ages" of Europe that Jewish persecution began—not by Arabs or the Moslem world, but by the Christians. Ever since the Romans had accepted Christianity, Christians suspected Judaism. "In feudal Europe of the Dark Ages the immigrant Jew could find no place on the land or in the industrial guilds; he inevitably became the middleman, whether merchant or pedlar. And since usury was forbidden to the Christians by the Church, the Jew inevitably also became the money-lender—an unpopular profession."¹ So the Jews gradually became urban and drifted into commerce and banking. They were useful but unpopular.

This unpopularity came to a head at the time of the Crusades, when it was as much the fashion to kill Jews in Europe as Turks in the Holy Land. In England and France, and later on in Spain, the Jews were brutally persecuted and driven out. This time the Jewish flow was reversed—the Jews from Spain went from West to East and settled in the Eastern Mediterranean in Asia Minor and the Balkans. In the Near East they were fairly safe.

During this time in Italy and Central Europe they had not suffered so badly but they were compelled to live together in quarters known as "ghettos" and

¹ *Palestine Royal Commission*, Chapter I, page 8,

sometimes had to wear distinguishing badges. However, many of these, with those expelled from England and France, immigrated to Eastern Europe. At first they were protected in Poland but later, in the seventeenth century, they were limited to a vast ghetto from the Baltic north of Warsaw to the Black Sea near Odessa. The idea was to stop the flow into Russia.

After this began a period of improvement, and during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Jewish emancipation took place in most countries in Europe. But there was a revulsion against them towards the end of the nineteenth century. It began in Germany, and the Dreyfus case in France showed "anti-Semitism" had a strong hold in France. But it was worst in Russia. They were expelled from Poland and Russia—not only expelled but brutally persecuted. The Dark Ages for the Jews there had come again. Between 1880 and 1910 over three million Jews fled Eastern Europe and resettled in Britain and her Empire but chiefly in the U.S.A. In 1870 there were 250,000 Jews in the U.S.A. To-day there are approximately 4,500,000. In the days of their happiness in Spain there may have been 4,000,000 Jews in the world; in 1700 there were 1,500,000. (In 1939 the number of Jews in the world had risen to approximately 17,000,000. In 1945, of the Jews in Europe, 6,000,000 had perished; murdered and slaughtered by the Nazis and Fascists. A ghastly, appalling fact.) It is amazing that they have survived all the wretched journeys, and miserable, brutal persecution. In those days they clung together, herded in the ghettos, but surviving. Two things survived with them—an intense if unhealthy national feeling, and a desire to return to the Promised Land, "Eretz Israel"—the Land of Israel.

The permanent link with Palestine was not only a religious or cultural one. Ever since A.D. 135 some Jews have lived there. Under the Arabs Jewish communities thrived. During the Crusades and the Mongol invasions they were nearly—but not quite—made an extinct race. "Under Ottoman rule they slowly recovered. Fresh immigrants arrived from time to time from Spain in the sixteenth century, and from Eastern Europe in the seventeenth century."¹ However, the numbers dwindled again as a result of raids from marauding tribes, and in 1895 there were only 12,000 Jews in Palestine. It is of great interest that these Jews amicably lived with and were almost undistinguishable from the Arabs except in their religion. It was to this remnant of Jewish greatness in Palestine that the miserable Jews in the sordidity of the ghetto looked with hope—they sang of them in their psalms as they sang also of the return from the Diaspora.

The rise of anti-Semitism towards the end of the nineteenth century was the beginning of the great Jewish revival of the return to Palestine; the idea of revival of Jewish life and culture; the return of the Jews to the land. All this was known as Zionism. In 1855 Sir Moses Montefiore founded the first colonising estate near Acre. This was the beginning. Between 1855 and the end of the century Baron Edmund de Rothschild helped Jewish people to settle in Palestine. In 1881 Baron Hirsch founded the Jewish Colonising Association for settling Jews all over the world. This society took over, about 1900, the administration of the Jewish "Colonies" in Palestine started by Baron Edmund de Rothschild.

¹ *Palestine Royal Commission*, Chapter I, page 11.

In 1897 a very important Jewish event occurred. Zionism entered politics. In that year a Jewish playwright and journalist—Theodor Hertzl—convened a Congress of World Jewry at Basle. It was the first World Jewish Congress and he was its first President. His aim was to get from the Sultan of Turkey a Charter for Jewish settlement in Palestine. He failed, because the Sultan had become very suspicious of the small but gradual Jewish infiltration into Palestine. However, the Zionist organisation continued to infiltrate and settle small numbers of Jews.

In 1903 the then Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, through Lord Lansdowne, offered the Zionists a portion of British East Africa as a Jewish Colony. (This was done because, after his rebuff from the Sultan, Hertzl had turned to Britain and asked her to use her influence. Britain had not done this but made this counter-offer, urged on by a group of powerful Jews and their friends.) A number of Jews were in favour of accepting this remarkable offer, but it was turned down—the eyes of Zionism were riveted on Palestine.

Infiltration continued and in 1914 there were between 85,000 to 90,000 * Jews in Palestine. The bulk of the immigrants settled in the towns of Jerusalem, Haifa and Jaffa but over 12,000 of them lived in forty-three "settlements" or colonies. These immigrants were quite different from the Jews who had lived in Palestine for centuries and who were undistinguishable from the Arabs. The new Jews had come to form a new life—a life of their own.

At the outbreak of the war the Zionist Organisation realised their chance had come. The war meant Palestine might pass out of Turkey's hands. One serious obstacle existed—the Tsarist Russian Government were still violently anti-Jewish.

In 1917 the Tsarist Government fell, whilst the success of Allenby's invasion of Palestine seemed assured. Negotiations between Zionists and the British Government, and similar negotiations between the Italian and French Governments, came to a head on 2nd November, 1917. The Zionist Plan was "approved" in a letter from Mr. Balfour, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Lord Rothschild. This letter known as the "Balfour Declaration" is shown on the next page. It is the Jewish Charter.

This declaration met with great sympathy in the United States. World Jewry was informed of the Declaration by leaflets dropped all over Jewish communities in Germany, Austria and in the Jewish belt from Poland to the Black Sea.

This rallying of Jewish sympathy to the Allied cause, apart from any genuine feeling for the Jews, was a strategical decision of war. Lloyd George has since admitted this.

Did we intend Palestine eventually to be a Jewish State or not? The British Government, off their own bat, could not commit itself to the formation of a Jewish State, but it would seem:—

- (1) They did foresee an eventual Jewish majority in Palestine.
- (2) If things went well the ultimate formation of a Jewish Commonwealth was not precluded.

So it was understood elsewhere. "I am persuaded," said President Wilson, on 3rd March, 1919, "that the Allied Nations, with the fullest concurrence of

¹ *Royal Institute of International Affairs "Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939."*

THE BALFOUR DECLARATION

2nd November, 1917.

"I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His Majesty's Government the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish aspirations, which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet:

'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.' *

"I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation."

our own Government and people, are agreed that in Palestine should be laid the foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth." General Smuts, who had been^p a member of the Imperial War Cabinet when the Declaration was published, speaking at Johannesburg on 3rd November, 1919, foretold an increasing stream of Jewish immigration into Palestine and "in generations to come a great Jewish State rising there once more."

In addition, "Lord Robert Cecil in 1917, Sir Herbert Samuel in 1919 and Mr. Winston Churchill in 1920, spoke or wrote in terms that could only mean that they contemplated the eventual establishment of a Jewish State. Leading British newspapers were equally explicit in their comments on the Declaration."¹

The Jews claim that the promises made in the Balfour Declaration have not been kept.

(c) *The Negotiations over the "Spheres of Influence" to be allotted to various Powers on the break-up of the Turkish Empire*

Britain, France, Russia and Italy were all interested in the territories which were to be liberated from Turkish control. It was obvious that the French and Arab interests clashed. So Sir Edward Grey in November 1915 instructed Sir Mark Sykes to carry on negotiations with a M. Georges Picot, representing the French Government, with a view to obtaining a settlement. (These instructions were given just after McMahon had written his famous letter!). Sir Mark Sykes consulted the Russian Government over these negotiations, which were conducted in secret. The French had demanded that the whole of Syria down to the Egyptian frontier should be administered by France. Eventually Picot agreed to the Syrian interior being administered by the Arabs under French administration. Further difficult negotiations culminated in May 1916 in what is known as "the Sykes-Picot Treaty." This dealt with the Arab territory north of the Arabian Peninsula as follows:—

- (1) A coastal belt from a little north of Haifa to a little west of Mesina to be controlled by France.
- (2) Southern Iraq from the Persian Gulf to a little north of Baghdad, together with a small enclave round Haifa, to be controlled by Britain.
- (3) With a view to securing the religious interests of the Entente Powers, Palestine, with the Holy Places, is to be separated from Turkish territory and subjected to a special regime to be determined by agreement between Russia, France and Great Britain.
- (4) The rest of the territory under discussion was left to "the Arab State or Confederation of States." In the Syrian interior such advice and administrative assistance as were wanted by the Arabs would be supplied by France in Northern Iraq and the country east of the Jordan by Britain.²

This treaty was kept secret till November 1917, when the Bolshevik Government announced it to the world. They had found a copy of it in the old Tsarist regime Foreign Office. Its publication astounded the Arabs. Shereef Hussein is reported to have asked Lawrence of Arabia which he was

^pPalestine Royal Commission, Chapter II, pages 24 and 25.

* Palestine Royal Commission, Chapter II, page 21.

to believe, the McMahon Letter, or the Sykes-Picot Treaty. Lawrence, who was unaware of the existence of the treaty, is said to have advised Hussein to believe whichever the British published last!

That concludes the history of the three series of negotiations over the future of the Arab territories under Turkish control which were to be liberated by the Allies.

This chapter will have shown that the birth of the new Palestine was really a miscarriage. The Arabs felt that they had been cheated; the Jews have since felt that they had been let down. The former because certain boundaries, and implications arising from definitions of boundaries, were never properly stated and explained in one letter. The latter owing to the unfortunate wording and, again, lack of clear statement of a certain sentence in another letter. A most unfortunate pair of letters. One is left with the impression that in both cases the British Government was trying to be too clever. It was a great pity. Had those letters been properly and clearly worded to leave no doubt in the minds of the recipients, had the writers made it quite clear to the recipients exactly what they had in their minds—then I believe that the Palestine Problem would not exist to-day.

REPORTS ON PALESTINE

- 1920 .. *Military Commission of Enquiry (Unpublished),*
- 1921 .. *Haycraft Report.*
- 1922 .. *Churchill Memorandum.*
- 1930 .. *Shaw Report.*
- 1930 .. *Hope-Simpson Report.*
- 1930 .. *Government's "Statement of Policy".*
- 1937 .. *Peel Report.*
- 1938 .. *Woodhead Report.*
- 1939 .. *Government's "Policy for Palestine".*

****A great deal of paper !****

In addition, *The Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry on Palestine* is due for publication.

CHAPTER IV

PALESTINE — THE YEARS BETWEEN THE WARS

THIS chapter deals with the period between the fall of Damascus and the complete liberation of the Arab world from Turkish rule, till the commencement of the second World War, when after twenty years of misery and bloodshed Palestine again slipped—temporarily—into the background.

The chapter is divided into two sections:—

- (a) 1918-1927. The Mandate—the opening years.
- (b) 1928-1939. The period of trouble.

(a) 1918-1927. *The Mandate—the opening years*

At the Peace Conference Feisai said that he thought Arabs and Jews could well live together as the Jews were "close to the Arabs in blood and there was no conflict in character". Feisai stated that he could only guarantee his help if Britain fulfilled her promises to the Arabs. (He later maintained that they had failed.) Feisai met Dr. Weizmann in January 1919, and they got on well together but neither, unfortunately, represented a "body sovereign" in Palestine. They were, respectively, a very distinguished Arab and a very distinguished Jew. Feisai could speak for his father, King Hussein, whose leadership in Syria had been accepted and who imagined then that Palestine was to be part of Syria. But Feisai could not speak for the Palestine Arabs if Palestine was to be separate from Syria. However, it would seem that Hussein and Feisai were then prepared to help the Jews get Palestine if, in return, they got one large unified Arab State. They did not get it. The French, who had never been bound by the McMahon Letter, were completely against the establishment of an independent Arab State under Feisai. This period of negotiations between Feisai and Weizmann was, however, the one moment of harmony in the whole Arab-Jew relationship over Palestine. Had Great Britain not given way to France, but insisted on the establishment of one large Arab State, I doubt if Palestine would be the unhappy country it is to-day. As it was, the Arabs, frustrated and disappointed over their main ambition, were not in the mood to help over Palestine.

(When France was given the Mandate for Syria, Feisai, urged on by popular feeling, decided to oppose France, and in March 1920 he had himself proclaimed, by a congress of Syrian noblemen, King of Syria and Palestine. But by the end of August the French had expelled him and a year later he was—at the instigation of the British—crowned King of Iraq. During this time his brother Abdullah had become Emir of Transjordan. Thus the Hussein family had done fairly well, but the Syrian Arabs had been divided from the Palestine Arabs; they had lost their united State and thus the conditions for the success of the Feisai-

Weizmann agreement had been destroyed. In 1920 and 1921, when the Arabs attacked the Jews for the first time, it was obvious that an unhappy Palestine lay ahead.)

Feisal and Lawrence of Arabia both had felt the necessity of one of the great powers acting as a "great trustee" to the new Palestine and they favoured Great Britain, as did the Zionists. President Wilson sent out two Americans, H. C. King and C. R. Crane, to find out whom the Arabs wanted as the "great trustee". Their report, which was very interesting, was not published till 1922. The Arabs were strongly in favour of an independent Syria, to include Palestine, and if a "great trustee" were really necessary they first preferred the U.S.A. and secondly Great Britain. In 1920 the Mandates for Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq were handed to Great Britain, at the same time as France was given the Mandate for Syria. From 1918 to 1920 Palestine had remained under military occupation. This period was comparatively free from trouble. The first sign of trouble was on Easter Sunday, 1920, when the Arabs raided the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem resulting in some loss of life. A Military Commission of Enquiry was set up to investigate but the findings of this Commission were never published. It is believed that the reason was that at that time the U.S.A. were withdrawing from the Peace Conference and thus any hopes of their being the Mandatory Power for Palestine were disappearing. On 1st July, Sir Herbert Samuel—now Lord Samuel—was appointed the first High Commissioner for Palestine. (Although a Jew, as High Commissioner, Samuel was regarded by the Arabs as a very fair man.) On 20th September, he published the first Jewish immigration Ordinance, and in the first year 16,500 Jews entered Palestine. On 1st May (Labour Day), 1921, there was a clash between Arabs and Jews at Tel Aviv with the Arabs definitely the instigators. An inquiry into this outbreak, conducted by Sir Thomas Haycraft, Chief Justice of Palestine, aided by officials, resulted in a report which showed for the first time to the public the strength of Arab opposition to the Jews.

"The fundamental cause of the riots and the subsequent acts of violence was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration, and with their conception of Zionist policy as derived from Jewish exponents."

On 24th July, 1922, the draft Mandate for Palestine was confirmed by the council of the League of Nations (see Appendix "A"). In 1917 little had been known (or appeared to have been known) of the peoples in Palestine, and the Balfour Declaration had spoken of "existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine". However, by 1922 it was quite clear:

- (a) That the majority of the Palestinians were Arab, spoke Arabic, and were Arabic in outlook.
- (b) That this Arab population was violently opposed to Zionism and was capable of violent attacks against the Jews.

The violent opposition to Zionism showed itself in February 1922 when an Arab delegation informed the Colonial Office (which had been made responsible for the Mandated territories) "that the people of Palestine could not accept the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate and demanded their national independence". As a result of this the then Secretary of State for

the Colonies, Mr. Winston Churchill, published in June 1922 a statement of "British Policy in Palestine" (known as the Churchill Memorandum) which* included the following interpretation of the Balfour Declaration:—

"During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organisation for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew Press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious and social organisations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact 'national characteristics'. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognised to rest upon ancient historic connection.

"This, then, is the interpretation which His Majesty's Government place upon the Declaration of 1917, and, so understood, the Secretary of State is of opinion that it does not contain or imply anything which need cause either alarm to the Arab population of Palestine or disappointment to the Jews."

It has sometimes been taken that the above definition of the National Home precluded the establishment of a Jewish State. Mr. Churchill has since stated that this is not so. In 1922, with the comparatively small number of Jews in Palestine, a Jewish State seemed a remote possibility. In 1938 it was a definite possibility as the number of Jews had reached the half-million mark.

Sir Herbert Samuel had, in October 1920, nominated an Advisory Council which consisted of ten British officials, four Moslem and three Christian Arabs, and three Jews. This council functioned with a certain amount of success for two years, and it was Sir Herbert Samuel's intention, when the Mandate was ratified by the League, to try to advance towards self-government in the form of a Legislative Council in place of the Advisory Council. He had planned that the Legislative Council should consist of the High Commissioner, ten British officials and twelve elected members (eight Moslems, two Christian Arabs, and two Jews). The Arabs, however, decided to boycott this Legislative Council and so Sir Herbert Samuel was forced to return to the Advisory Council.

One by one the Arabs deserted even this, thus prohibiting the Jews from sitting on it, with the result that since 1923 the Council has been composed of the ten British officials only !

In October 1923 the High Commissioner offered the Arabs a complete Arab "opposite number" to the Jewish Agency, i.e., an Arab Agency. They refused and the words of their refusal are remarkably interesting:—

"The object of the Arab inhabitants in Palestine is not an Arab Agency analogous to the Zionist Agency. Their sole object is independence. The Arab owners of the country cannot see their way to accept a proposal which tends to place them on an equal footing with the alien Jews."

This, I think, was the first really clear sign after a very few years of comparative peace that the Arabs were not going to acquiesce in, or co-operate with, the National Home. It was a sign for all British politicians to see. It meant that future immigration of Jews to Palestine was fraught with danger and that there was little hope of the Arabs and Jews living in peace together.

It is interesting to note that the French in Syria, despite the large measure of self-government given to the Arabs, were having great difficulty in maintaining order. A considerable uprising took place in 1925 which, although put down, did not prevent guerrilla warfare continuing. In Palestine it was the Mandate, the embodiment of the Balfour Declaration, which stood in the way of Arab independence. In Syria it was the French Mandate which stood in the way. The Syrian Arabs were then, and always have been, greatly in sympathy with their Palestine brothers. In 1946 their desire for unity is just as marked. It should be noted now—it was very strongly noted by Syrian and Palestine Arabs in 1925—that by 1925 Iraq (with Feisal as King) had ceased to be a British Mandate. Instead Britain had signed a treaty of alliance with her and she was "a free and equal member of international society, with an Arab constitutional monarchy and an Arab cabinet responsible to an elected Arab Parliament."¹

A similar state of affairs existed in Transjordan which, by 1925, was an independent government recognised by the British Government, who merely maintained a British Resident and a few British officials in Amman to advise but not to govern.²

The years 1925-1928 are notable for two things :—

- (a) A period of lull and peace.
- (b) A general economic depression in Palestine affecting, in particular, the National Home.

The two events are closely related. In 1925 there was a collapse in the Polish currency which resulted in currency restrictions in East Europe generally. This greatly impoverished the immigrants who came from that part of the world (about one-half of the total immigrants came from there) and resulted in a sharp drop in immigration.

¹ *Palestine Royal Commission, Chapter III, page 60.*

² *Note.*—The High Commissioner for Palestine was, and still is, also the High Commissioner for Transjordan. His connection with Transjordan is remarkably slight and there is no connection in the dual role. The Mandates were always separate, the Mandate for Transjordan being without the clauses referring to the National Home.)

	<i>Jewish Immigrants</i>	<i>Jewish Emigrants</i>
1925.	33,801	2,151
1926.	13,081	7,365
1927.	2,713	5,071

It will be seen that in 1927 nearly twice as many Jews left as came in. On top of this there was an increase in unemployment from approximately 400 at the beginning of 1925 to approximately 5,000 at the end of 1927. During this period the Arabs remained quiet because they saw the National Home going through bad times and saw a great drop in Jewish immigration. They thought the National Home had failed. Unfortunately for them, it had only received a considerable set-back.

(b) 1928-1939. *The Period of Trouble*

Soon after the opening of 1928 things began to look up for the National Home. Depression passed away and unemployment decreased. At the same time, the National Home received great moral strengthening.

The dispersion of the Jews all over the world, as I have already mentioned, is known as the Diaspora. When the Balfour Declaration was announced it was not welcomed by all Jews of the Diaspora, and one powerful group had been definitely opposed to it. They were the Jews who had been assimilated in the countries in which they had settled. These had no desire to leave and start afresh in Palestine. This opposition had weakened with the years and the non-Zionists were becoming supporters of the National Home even if they did not wish to go to it. It was obviously desirable for the National Home that the rift between Zionists and non-Zionists should be closed. As a result of a series of conferences, "a new constitution was adopted giving representative non-Zionists an equal number of seats with Zionists on all bodies which controlled the development of the National Home."¹ This arrangement, which was confirmed by the Zionist congress of 1929, made the Jewish Agency in Palestine a much more representative Jewish body. They were able to mobilise the wealth, sympathy and resources of, for example, the Jews in the U.S.A. and Great Britain, which were centres of non-Zionism. (It is interesting to note that even to-day some Jewish dislike of Zionism still strongly exists. This was shown in evidence given by the non-Zionist Jewish Fellowship before the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine. The spokesmen of this Fellowship, claiming to represent the majority of non-vocal Jews in Great Britain, firmly repudiated the idea that the Jews were "a nation of exiles in other countries awaiting repatriation to a Jewish State". They maintained that they, and, in their opinion, the majority of Jews, regarded themselves as only a religious community, and that on the national plane they were just citizens of the various countries in which they lived, owed no other allegiance and did not want to have a national State. In their opinion, the Zionist conception of the Jews as a nation was unreal and the establishment of a Jewish national State for a section of Jewry would cause serious prejudice to the status of the vast majority of Jews as citizens of the countries in which they lived.)

¹ *Palestine Royal Commission, Chapter III, page 63.*

The Arabs saw all this and at the same time realised that the National Home was recovering. On 24th September, 1928—the Jewish Day of Atonement—an incident occurred in connection with the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. It will be remembered that the Moslem Mosque, the Haram esh Shereef, sacred to the Moslems, is built on the original site of the Temple and is therefore sacred to the Jews. The Wailing Wall is particularly sacred to Jews because it was once part of the Temple Exterior. It is Moslem property but since the Middle Ages the Jews have had the right of access to the narrow pavement at the bottom of the wall. They go there to "wail" their prayers, moaning the loss of the Temple. The Moslem authorities had insisted that "no chairs, benches, screens, etc." were to be put up on the pavement. The Turkish authorities had always agreed to this and the British Administration—quite rightly—had maintained the *status quo*. (Quite rightly, under Article 13 of the Mandate.) However, on 23rd September, the Jews erected a screen on the pavement so that on the Day of Atonement the Jewish women could pray, screened off from the men. The Jews were ordered to remove it and failed to do so with the result that the police removed it forcibly during the ceremony.

This incident may seem small but it created a tremendous stir among the Arabs, who regarded it—or pretended to regard it—as the beginning of a Jewish attempt to regain the whole of the Temple and to turn the Arabs out of the sacred Mosque. There can be no doubt that all Jews would be delighted to regain the Temple area, and there can also be no doubt that a number of Jews in the National Home had—and have—active thoughts of regaining it.

The next few months were full of "incidents"—the Jews maintaining that the Arabs were trying to interfere with Jewish worship at the Wailing Wall¹; the Arabs saying the Jews were encroaching on sacred Arab religious ground.

During August 1929 there were Jewish demonstrations and processions to the Wailing Wall, followed by similar Arab demonstrations. These were followed by disturbances all over the country. The Arabs made savage attacks on Jewish synagogues and hospitals. The Jews retaliated. In all 133 Jews were killed, 339 were wounded and six Jewish colonies destroyed. So far as is known 116 Arabs were killed and 232 wounded. As a result of these disturbances a Commission of Inquiry under Sir Walter Shaw was sent to Palestine. They issued their report in March 1930. The following points from or about the report are of interest :—

(a) *Cause of Outbreak*

"There can, in our view, be no doubt that racial animosity on the part of the Arabs, consequent upon the disappointment of their national and political aspirations and fear for their economic future, was the fundamental cause of the outbreak of August last."

(b) *The National Home*

"A National Home for the Jews, in the sense in which it was widely understood, was inconsistent with the demands of Arab Nationalists while the claims of Arab Nationalism, if admitted, would have rendered impossible the fulfilment of the pledge to the Jews."

¹ (Note.—The Wailing Wall problem was solved when a League of Nations Committee which sat in 1931 announced that the *status quo* should be maintained, i.e. the Arabs had won the day over the Wailing Wall.)

(c) Jewish Wealth

Commenting on Jewish wealth which, compared with Arab standards? seemed inexhaustible:

"To the Arab it must appear improbable that such competitors will, in years to come, be content to share the country with them. These fears have been intensified by the more extreme statements of Zionist policy and the Arabs have come to see in the Jewish immigrant not only a menace to their livelihood but a possible overlord of the future."

(d) Main Recommendations of Report

- (i) "The issue of a clear statement of the policy which His Majesty's Government intend to be pursued in Palestine . . . with the least possible delay," including a definition of the meaning of the passages in the Mandate which purported to safeguard the interests of the "non-Jewish communities".
- (ii) "A revision of the methods of regulating immigration to prevent a repetition of the excessive immigration of 1925 and 1926 and to provide for consultation with non-Jewish representatives with regard to it."
- (iii) "The initiation of a scientific expert inquiry into the prospects of introducing improved methods of cultivation in Palestine and the regulation of land policy in accordance with the results."
- (iv) "A re-affirmation of the statement made in 1922 that the special position assigned to the Zionist Organisation by the Mandate does not entitle it to share, in any degree, in the government of Palestine."

(e) Results of the Report

- (i) The Government did issue a statement of policy,
- (ii) Sir John Hope-Simpson was sent to report on land settlement,
- (iii) Sir Herbert Dowbiggin was sent from Ceylon to reorganise the Palestine Police. (The outbreaks had shown that British defence measures and garrisons were quite inadequate.)

Whilst all this was going on the Arabs were carrying out a thorough boycott of Jewish goods. The Jews were doing the same with Arab goods. The two races were drifting further apart.

The Shaw Report, on the whole, was favourable to the Arabs.

The Government Statement of Policy was published as a White Paper on 20th October, 1930, accompanied by the Report issued by Sir John Hope-Simpson. Briefly, the Hope-Simpson Report contained the following main points, which are rather important.

- (a) Up till the time of the Report it had been taken for granted that there was plenty of land available for Jewish colonisation without interfering with the Arabs. In fact the Zionists had estimated a figure of as much as 16,000,000 Dunums (Dunum is approximately *i* acre), whereas the Commissioner of Lands had put it at 10,592,000; but Hope-Simpson put it as low as 6,544,000. (It should be noted that these last two figures are not including the Beersheba area which, it has been said, *might* be cultivable, if irrigated.) From his figures Hope-Simpson stated:—
 - (i) If all the cultivable land in Palestine were divided up amongst the existing Arab agricultural population there would NOT be enough to provide every family with a decent livelihood.

- (ii) Until further development of Jewish lands and of irrigation had taken place and the Arabs had adopted better methods of cultivation, there was no room for a single additional settlement if the standard of life of the Arab *fellaheen* was to remain at its present level. Similarly, on State lands there was no room, pending development, for Jewish settlers.

Hope-Simpson recorded his own personal belief that with a thorough development of the country there would be room both for the existing agricultural population to enjoy a higher standard of life and also for not less than 20,000 families from outside.

- (b) Hope-Simpson also dealt with Arab unemployment and the undesirability of bringing in Jewish labour from outside whilst this unemployment existed. He did, however, add a rider (dealing with the entrance of Jewish capital with Jewish labour) which made the entrance of Jewish labour—despite Arab unemployment—justifiable. (The principle of "derived demand".) This went a long way to meeting the Jewish point of view.

As can be imagined, the Hope-Simpson Report was not popular with the Jews—but they liked, even less, the Government's White Paper. The White Paper dwelt on the following:—

- (a) The Government would not, by pressure or by threats, be diverted "from the path laid down by the Mandate". It confirmed the Churchill Memorandum of 1922. It considered that neither the Arabs nor the Jews had been helpful in trying to make the Mandate work.
- (b) It increased the armed forces necessary for security.
- (c) It stressed the necessity of Constitutional Development and it considered that the time had come for a measure of self-government for Palestine.
- (d) It dealt with the need of Social and Economic Development. The most knotty problems were land settlement and unemployment.

N.B.—It adopted almost entirely the Hope-Simpson Report, but without his two riders, the one on development of the land which made the land capable of taking a further considerable increase of immigrant families, and the other on the employment of Jewish capital.

In addition to para. (d), which was unfavourable to the Jews because of the omission of the two Hope-Simpson riders, the language of the Paper, as the Peel Report says, "betrayed a marked insensitiveness to Jewish feelings".

The result was a Jewish protest, including the resignation of Dr. Weizman, the President of the Jewish Agency, and two of its members, Lord Melchett and Mr. Warburg.

In addition, the Conservative opposition leaders created a storm of protest. (The White Paper was produced whilst the Labour Party was in power, and had been discussed in the House of Commons by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald.) In October 1930 Mr. Baldwin, Sir Austen Chamberlain and Mr. Amery wrote a letter of protest to *The Times*. The Government weakened and invited, on 14th November, 1930, the Jewish Agency to confer with them. The result of their deliberations took the form of a letter from the Prime Minister to Dr. Weizman. This letter "explained and interpreted" the White Paper and was more favourable than the uninterpreted White Paper! The result on the Arab world was electrifying. They maintained that the official inquiries

and reports had been in their favour and yet Jewish influence in the Western World had been strong enough to alter the decision. To this day they call the Prime Minister's letter "the Black Letter"!

After the turbulence of 1929 the next six years passed in comparative quiet. The National Home prospered and many more Jews immigrated. There was a very limited amount of co-operation by "un-official Jewish and Arab members on Government Departments. In July 1931 Mr. French (formerly of the Indian Civil Service) was made Director of Development (an outcome of the Hope-Simpson Report). He was supposed to have both an Arab and a Jewish assistant. Both parties refused to nominate anybody, and after many disappointments French resigned at the end of 1932. This experiment in Land Development was not, therefore, a success.

The 1930 elections were postponed but the High Commissioner announced in 1932 that the Local Government Ordinance was to be started in 1933. Both Jews and Arabs condemned it and it did not begin until 12th January, 1934. At the beginning of 1935, however, there were twenty-five newly elected councils in being, and the one in Jerusalem, consisting of Jews and Arabs, worked quite well.

However, despite all this apparent quiet, the trouble was still there. Not, unfortunately, getting better but getting worse. There were constant reminders of this in the minor outbreaks of 1930 and 1931 and the disturbances of 1933.

About 1935 the Arabs were sinking their family and political differences and their leaders united to protest against the British Government's policy in Palestine and to present a memorandum to the administration demanding the following points:—

- (a) Establishment of a Democratic Government.
- (b) Prohibition of Transfer of Land to Jews and the enactment of a similar law as the five Feddan Laws in Egypt (i.e., Lord Kitchener's Homestead Exemption Law of 1912 which gave small cultivators protection against expropriation for debt).
- (c) The stoppage of Jewish immigration and the formation of a competent committee to determine "absorptive capacity" of the country.
- (d) Legislation to require all lawful residents to obtain and carry identity cards.
- (e) Immediate and effective investigation into illicit immigration.

In February 1936 the Colonial Office replied to these demands as follows:—

- (1) Their request for a Democratic Government had been answered by the Government's proposal for a new constitution which had been announced in December 1935. The High Commissioner had proposed a Legislative Council to consist of:—

5 officials	
2 commercial	representatives
8 elected	}
3 nominated	
3 elected	}
4 nominated	
1 elected	}
2 nominated	

with an impartial President from outside Palestine who would neither debate **nor** vote.

- (2) A law would be enacted preventing sale of land unless the Arab retained a "viable minimum."
- (3) The rate of immigration would be carefully gauged according to the country's capacity; and a new Statistical Bureau would be established to carry this out.

The Jews unanimously condemned the suggested constitution. These answers satisfied some Arabs but not all. The Government was greatly criticised for them in both Houses of Parliament, and Mr. J. H. Thomas had considerable difficulty in defending the High Commissioner. The Arabs again complained of Jewish influence in London.

In 1932 and 1933 Hitler and his Nazi Germany had begun the pogrom of the Jews. The Arabs saw this with its resultant increase in Jewish immigration into Palestine. They were beginning to feel that, with the tremendous "emotional and mercy" appeal the Jews were justly able to put forward for the Jewish sufferings under Hitlerism, nothing would prevent mass Jewish immigration into Palestine to escape the horrors of the Nazi hell. Nothing except force. This feeling grew with the years and on 15th April, 1936, the trouble began when two Jews were murdered by Arab bandits on the Tulkarm-Nablus road, and on the following night two Arabs were murdered not far from Petah Tiqva as an act, so the Arabs believed, of Jewish reprisal. Riots continued and on 8th May the Arabs commenced a general strike which lasted till 12th October. These 1936 disturbances, which caused numerous* casualties on both sides, resulted in:—

- (a) The appointment of a Royal Commission under Viscount Peel.
- (b) A considerable increase of British forces to keep order. Publication of the Palestine Martial Law Defence Order authorising the High Commissioner to take any measures necessary for public safety or to delegate powers to the G.O.C. It made clear that any further Arab terrorism would be forcibly suppressed.¹

The disturbances also showed that the other Arab countries and their governments were 100 per cent in support of the Palestine Arabs. The Royal Commission arrived in Palestine in November 1936. At first the Arabs completely boycotted the Commission. They said in effect: "We've given evidence before; the previous reports have been in our favour yet the Jews have got away with it, so what is the use of yet another Commission? The result will be the same." However, after pressure had been brought to bear on them by Arabs in other countries the boycott was called off in January 1937, twelve days before the Commission returned to England. Shortly after the Commission left the Arab parties, which had presented such a firm and united front to the Commission, split up. This was chiefly due to the jealousies of the National Defence Party (Nashashibi Family) who published a minority report of their own.

In July 1937 the Report of the Royal Commission was published. Suffice it to say that in a mass of recommendations their main recommendation was the Partitioning of Palestine. The Arabs were against the partitioning of their country into an Arab and a Jewish State. The Jews were probably not against it as the Twentieth Zionist Congress, in August of 1937, authorised its executive

These powers were transferred in 1938 to the Military Commanders and are still with them.

committee "to enter into negotiations with a view to ascertaining the precise terms of His Majesty's Government's proposed establishment of a Jewish* State".

In September of the same year the British Government received the League of Nations' authority to work out a partitioning scheme without being committed to carrying it into effect. So in October 1938 yet another commission went to Palestine to examine the three separate partitioning schemes suggested by the Peel Report. This commission, under a Mr. Woodhead, produced its report—known as the "Woodhead Report"—which dismissed all three partitioning schemes and suggested instead an "economic federation."

The riots had meanwhile recommenced in 1937 when a Mr. Andrews (the Assistant District Commissioner for the Galilee district) was murdered. On 1st October a communique was issued announcing the dissolution of the Arab Higher Committee and also that there was a warrant out for the arrest of six prominent leaders of the Committee. The Mufti (Haj Amin El Husseini) escaped and continued to direct Arab terrorism from outside Palestine. (During the 1939-45 war he lived in Berlin as a guest and aide of Hitler.) The other ^c leaders were sent to the Seychelles.

In 1938 the situation remained critical and the Government called a round-table conference of Jews and Arabs. Great difficulty was experienced in getting all Arab parties represented. The five prisoners in the Seychelles had to be returned first to Palestine, and only the intervention of Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, then Secretary of State to the Colonies, and General Nuri Pasha es Said, then Foreign Minister of Iraq, secured the representation of the National Defence Party (Nashashibi family). The Arab delegation finally consisted of representatives of all Palestine Arab parties and representatives from Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The Arab delegation was completely united and consistent in its views. The Arab and Jewish delegations both rejected the British proposals, so the Government announced its own policy for Palestine in its famous White Paper of 17th May, 1939 (see Appendix "B"). It had three points only, which are described more fully in other chapters. They are:

- (1) Future constitution of Palestine.
- (2) Limitation of Jewish immigration.
- (3) Division of land into three zones:—

Zone in which Jews could buy land.

Zone in which Jews could buy land subject to Government approval.

Zone in which Jews could not buy land.

The Arabs at that time protested violently at the White Paper. The Jews said they had been betrayed. The League's Mandate Commission rejected it as a negation of the Mandate. Mr. Winston Churchill, amongst hundreds of others, denounced it. Poor Government and unhappy White Paper! However, Hitler and the Second Great War intervened before the Government could change its mind! So the White Paper stands to-day.

STATISTICS

To complete this chapter it is interesting to look at certain statistics regarding Palestine during this period.

(a) Population

From 1922 to 1938 the population of Palestine had increased 90 per cent. Non-Jewish increase was 350,553. Jewish increase was 316,018. The non-Jewish increase was, however, approximately a 55 per cent increase on the original non-Jewish population, whereas the Jewish increase was 477 per cent, cent.

The Arab, i.e., "non-Jewish," increase in population was due to three things:—

- (i) Cessation of conscription. (Under Turkish rule between 10,000 and 20,000 Arabs went yearly.)
- (ii) Lower death rate due to activities of Palestine Health Department.
- (iii) Stoppage of emigration due to exclusion of Asiatics from Latin America. (In the past there had been considerable Arab emigration to South America.)

(b) Jewish Immigration from 1919-1937

	<i>From</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Poland		131,249	42
Germany		35,346	11
U.S.S.R.		30,718	10
Rumania		15,528	5
Lithuania		9,642	3
Yemen		9,181	3
U.S.A.		7,909	3
Others		73,457	23
		313,030	100

It will be seen that the great majority of the immigrants were from Eastern Europe. The reasons for this are firstly that of all the Jews in the world, two-thirds live in East and South-East Europe, and secondly, that the Jews of Great Britain, U.S.A. and France are rapidly becoming assimilated in those countries.

Finally, in the words of Sir Harold MacMichael, High Commissioner for Palestine, 1938-44, "We are reaping the tares sown during the past twenty-five years." Most aptly put—those twenty-five years of vacillating policy over Palestine have gained us the reputation of bowing to the loudest or most influential protest.

CHAPTER V

THE ARAB

IN the Western World the Arab means to most people either a dashing, handsome creature in flowing robes, riding on a fast steed, or else a dirty, backward, unambitious, thieving scoundrel. He is of course neither, although there are Arabs who fill both bills, particularly the latter. Without doubt, most people who have visited Palestine get the impression at first that the Arab is lazy, dirty, and not too honest. As they stay longer in the country this first impression doesn't fade, but they get to like the Arab more. Why is this? Most people agree that it is because they get to dislike the Jews more and more, and so, by contrast, they have not appreciated the Arab and the situation he is in now. The Palestine Arab is in a stage of transition. Thirty years ago he lived in a country which for hundreds of years had been ruled by the Turks. Except for the privileged few, there was no education and life and conditions were primitive and backward. Then suddenly his country was freed from his Turkish oppressor. Instead of gradual emancipation at his own pace, the Arab was thrown face to face with, and in actual opposition to, an influx of a race of highly cultured and intelligent people—the Jews. In addition, his country began to be governed by the representatives of a highly civilised Western power—Great Britain. In other words, a backward race, with all its antiquated ways of living, its complicated religious rules, was brought into sudden contact with the most modern way of life. The powerful farm tractor operated in the next field to the wooden plough manoeuvred by hand of man or pulled by oxen; the fast automobile used the same road as the camel and the mule; modern reinforced concrete buildings adorned the same landscape as mud and brick hovels; every advantage of modern science was pitted against the disadvantage of prejudice and custom. No wonder the Arab contrasts so miserably with the Jew in outward appearance and on the surface. In some countries (Egypt for example) where western civilisation has been kind enough to descend on a backward eastern world, it is unfortunately true that only the vices of the western world have been absorbed by the inhabitants. There was a great danger of that happening in Palestine. Fortunately—and it says a great deal for the character of the Arab—in the vast majority of cases, the Arabs of Palestine have avoided this disaster. Even if it has passed unnoticed by the majority of people visiting Palestine, I am convinced that the Arabs are in the process of their awakening. It is a great pity that, in their dislike of the Jews, the majority of visitors should not at the same time appreciate that the Arabs are not content to remain idle, dirty and backward.

In considering the Arab case one has to study six main points:—

- (a) The Arab Organisation.
- (b) The Land.
- (c) Education of the Arab.
- (d) Arab and Jewish immigration to Palestine.
- (e) Arab self-government.
- (f) Arab attitude to the British.

(a) The Arab Organisation

It is often said that one of the main difficulties the British Government and its High Commissioner in Palestine have had in dealing with the Arabs is that there is no central Arab organisation to represent the Arabs. This fact has undoubtedly presented considerable difficulties in the past. Under Article IV of the Mandate the Jews were entitled to set up an organisation to represent all Jews and Jewish matters in Palestine. This organisation, called the Jewish Agency, has always been the official body with which the High Commissioner dealt. What is more important, it was the channel through which all Jewish matters to and from outside Palestine went. Why was there no "Arab Agency" ? The following points may help to answer this question.

Before the British occupation, Palestine was an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, and although there were several Arab parties, no central Arab movement existed.

In 1919 the first General Syrian Congress assembled, attended by Arabs from Palestine. Six further Congresses met between 1920 and 1928. The Arab political movement was controlled by a committee elected by these Congresses and styled the Arab Executive Committee. From 1928 to 1934 this committee was itself represented by an office called "The Office of the Arab Executive Committee." During the Shaw Commission the Government recognised this committee as representing Arab opinion in Palestine. In 1934 the committee split up and a number of Arab parties were formed during that year and the next. To these parties I refer later.

In 1921 a Supreme Moslem Council was constituted for the management of Awqaaf and Shari'a affairs. (Awqaaf is concerned with the management of moneys or lands, donated or willed, from which the revenue is used for religious or social purposes; Shari'a law is the personal law of Moslem life.) The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem is automatically the President of the Supreme Moslem Council. Both this post and that of the Mayor of Jerusalem were held at that time by members of the powerful Hussein family. Subsequently a Mayor of Jerusalem was dismissed and replaced by a member of the rival Nashashibi family. The Mufti died in 1921 and after considerable difficulty, another Hussein, Haj Amin el Hussein, was elected. He continued in office and later became chairman of the Arab Higher Committee, to which I also refer later. After the 1936 riots and the subsequent breaking up of the Arab Higher Committee, he fled to Lebanon, and after this the position of the Grand Mufti was not filled. The Grand Mufti had held complete control of money accruing from Awqaaf funds and was accountable to no one. It was maintained that he used these funds to further the Arab cause and incite trouble. The Arabs have always been bitter about his expulsion. The Supreme Moslem Council was far from representative of all Arabs and did not speak as the united Arab voice. The Supreme Moslem Council was dominated by Haj Amin El Hussein, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, head of the very powerful Hussein family who were the driving force in one of the main Arab political parties, "The Palestine Arab Party." In Palestine there are the following Arab political parties:—

The National Defence Party (Nashashibi family).

The Palestine Arab Party (Hussein family).

The Reform Party.

The Istiqlal Party (Independence party).

The Arab Young Men's Congress Executive.

The National Block.

(These parties were formed after the splitting up of the Arab Executive Committee to which I have referred.)

These parties do not have widely different aims; they do not follow different political beliefs as do the Socialists and Conservatives in Great Britain. They have more or less the same policy, with slightly different ideas as to the ways of achieving their aims; but the real difference lies in the rivalry of the families controlling the political parties. The great rivals are the El Husseini family (Palestine Arab Party) and the Nashashibi family (National Defence Party). This system was, of course, the inheritance of a feudal system, and it is beginning (with increased education) very gradually to disappear. However, at the beginning of the Mandate it did not make for a united Arab front. There was also another reason why no Arab Agency was formed. The Arab attitude was: "This is our country. We will not form ourselves into the equivalent of a Jewish Agency and thus admit that the Arabs and the Jews are on equal terms in this respect". This was a very "neck in the sand" attitude and it still exists to a certain extent to-day. I argued with Arabs many times, pointing out the advantages they would have had, had they had an Arab Agency through which to deal. The majority of them disagreed and said that, by refraining all these years from forming an equivalent to the Jewish Agency, they had not compromised their case at all. In other words, they had never been prepared to admit that the Jews were on equal terms with themselves so far as Palestine was concerned. This attitude thwarted the several attempts made by the Government to form an Arab Agency. However, if the Arabs failed to get political unity, it does not mean they were disunited in their views. The contrary has at times been demonstrated to a marked extent. In 1936, when the Royal Commission sat, the Arabs refused at first to give evidence. They said that, of the many commissions of one kind or another that had visited Palestine, all of them had reported in favour of the Arabs and yet the British Government had taken the Jewish side. What therefore was the use of attending yet another commission? However, just before the Commission left, the Arabs changed their mind. They formed the Arab Higher Committee, which represented all Arab parties. The Commission reported that the Arabs were quite unanimous in their views, i.e.

- (a) Cessation of Jewish immigration.
- (b) Stoppage of land sale to the Jews.
- (c) Demand for an Arab State in Palestine.

But above all, a determined front against Jews and Jewish control of Palestine. This Arab Higher Committee did not last long, for two reasons:—

- (1) Soon after the Commission left there was a rift again between the Arab families and the Nashashibi left the Committee.
- (2) The Arab Committee was disbanded in 1936 after the continuation of the **Arab riots**.

However, something had been emphatically established: that the Arabs, whether Christian or Moslem, and of all parties, were quite at one in their views; and that they could, in a crisis, sink family and party differences to present these views.

In 1938 the Arab Delegation sent to Britain was completely representative and maintained a united front in London.

The 1939-1945 war tended to make the family differences decrease. In Palestine now the Palestine Arab Party has the support of 90 per cent of the Arabs who are slowly realising that with unity in their ranks they stand more chance of achieving their aims. But it is a slow process. However, I came across two very healthy signs. One was the Palestine Arab Workers' League. This only has about 30,000 members, but it is the beginning of good trade union movement. The other was the small, but virile Communist Party. With the growth of these, and other enlightened political movements, will come the gradual disappearance of the big inter-Arab family squabbles.

I have dealt above at length with the inter-family squabbles in Palestine and I have made it clear that it is a great weakness of the Arab case. But one should not imagine that this also applies as between the various Arab States, although a recent article by *The Times'* Special Correspondent infers that it does. Here is an extract from the article.

"The creation of the Arab League is a great achievement of British policy and a welcome step towards a general political and economic *rapprochement* of the countries of the Middle East. But, viewed from Europe, the speed of this process and the extent of common interests or even community of outlook between the Arab States can easily be over-estimated. When progressive-minded Englishmen turn their attention to the Arab world, they tend, perhaps unconsciously, to see those ideas of a continental federation, which were so sadly frustrated in Europe, at last realised in a different part of the world. But they also tend to ignore the fact that the difference in political, religious, and economic structure between, say, the Lebanon and Saudi Arabia is much more pronounced than between, say, Germany and France. Tribal, religious, and dynastic antagonisms are more embittered and fanatical in the Oriental than in the European world, and so far the Arab League has been more occupied with traditional eloquence than with the elaboration of constructive programmes. Arab unity in the sense of a Customs union, common currency, and centralised political and military action will doubtless be achieved in the future, but just now the main, if not the only, cohesive force within the League is an ingrained and traditional xenophobia, directed, according to circumstances, against the French, the British, or the Jews. This is a less censorious statement than it may seem, for in the whole course of history alliances between heterogeneous partners have mostly been directed against a third party, and the positive process of unification has frequently been initiated by negative (defensive or aggressive) interests. At present Arab politics are dominated by the desire to achieve the greatest possible immunity from European interference by following the way of least resistance—that is, by utilising the jealousies and clashes of interest, past and present, between the European Powers. It was this tendency which led to the Mufti's activities from Berlin, to his proclamation of a Holy War against the Allies

during Rashid Ali's Iraq revolt in 1941, (o certain internal complications in Egypt during and after the critical days of El Alamein, and to the more recent developments in Syria. The following quotation from an Arabic leaflet distributed during the recent troubles in Damascus is typical of the emotional tendencies at work:—

'If you wish to avoid further calamities, and
 If you have a noble Arabic heart in your chest and fresh Arabic blood
 in your veins, and
 If you are anxious to do your duty towards your country—then you
 must obey the following:
 No more *bonjour* or *bonsoir* or *au re voir* or *pardon*,
 No more French newspapers, or French magazines, or French culture,
 No more French goods.'

I think the Special Correspondent is wrong. Recent speeches at The United Nations Security Council have shown the determination—a just determination in my view—of the Arabs in Syria and the Lebanon to remove French domination. A similar situation exists between Britain and Egypt. This is all part of:

(a) Arab emancipation.

(b) Arab determination to achieve Arab unity.

Abdul Rahman Azzam Bey, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, said in Cairo just before he left, in September 1945, for a visit to Britain: "In the name of 40,000,000 Arabs I call for the evacuation of British, U.S., and French troops from the Middle East." He added that Tripolitania was ripe for independence. "The Arabs are prepared to resist any British, French, or Italian claim on that essentially Arab territory, if necessary by force of arms." The Egyptian Prime Minister also recently called for the evacuation of British forces from Egypt and the unity of Egypt with the Sudan. Some of this is wild talk but I am convinced that the Arab States in the Middle East mean to federate and will stand together. That has always been their aim, which was thwarted after the last war by the French Mandate over Syria and Lebanon, and the British Mandate over Palestine and Transjordan. As I consider this a matter of importance, I give below the reply of the Arab Office in London to *The Times*' Special Correspondent. "Lastly, your correspondent tries to damn the Arab League with a mixture of dubious praise and open accusation. He describes it as 'heterogeneous,' 'xenophobic,' and a 'triumph of British policy,' thus suggesting that the league is something artificially created by Britain with no inner reality of its own, which is certainly not the case. The oneness of the Arab world was a reality before the last war, and to preserve and express this oneness in modern political forms was one of the aspirations of the Arab movement from its beginning and one of the aims for which the Arabs fought in the last war. Nor is it true that the league is fundamentally negative and xenophobic. Seen in its true perspective as the natural culmination of the Arab awakening that started in the nineteenth century, the league is the expression of a positive aspiration—the desire of the Arab people to revive their community as an active and creative member of the family of nations." The letter was signed by Edward Atiyah. I agree with it. (The covenant of the Arab League was signed in May 1945 by seven Arab States, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan and Yemen as a move towards Arab unity.)

(b) WieLand

This is an extremely complex problem. It is probably the crux of the whole matter, for whoever owns the land in the long run holds the whip hand. If the Jews can buy, or gain possession of, the majority of the land, they can eventually force the Arabs out of Palestine. If, on the other hand, the Arabs can maintain the land, they will not only remain in Palestine, but limit Jewish immigration, because the land owned by the Jews can only support a certain number of persons. The Jews will obviously raise that number to the maximum, which may serve their short-term policy, but will react on them violently in the future. Up to the moment, the Arabs still own most of the land. Frederick C. Painton, in his "Report on Palestine," quotes the following interesting figures:—

- (a) The Arabs own most of the land, including 95 per cent of the olive groves.
- (b) The Arabs own 215,000 cattle against the Jews' 28,000.
- (c) The Arabs own 225,000 sheep against the Jews' 20,000.
- (d) The Arabs own all the pigs and camels.

There can be no question that the Arab stake is in the land. The theory that they are nomads is wrong, although possibly nearly 10 per cent are nomadic. (Nomadic Arabs are called Bedouins. In 1922 there were 103,331 of them. In 1931 there were 66,531.) But it should be realised that some of the Arabs of the normal variety are only nomadic because they have been forced off the land by Jewish purchase. However, there never has been a serious increase of nomadic Arabs due to Jewish purchase of lands, because so many of the displaced Arabs have gone into the towns and found employment.

When the Mandate began it did not find well-defined boundaries, registries of land ownerships, or records of previous surveys. Quite the opposite. Under the Turkish rule, land, so far as I could find out, fell into three categories:—

- (a) Land owned by wealthy Turks or Arabs.
- (b) Land held in common ownership.
- (c) Common or waste land.

Apparently in those days it was not considered a wise move to be recorded as a landowner. If you were, it meant that the men of the family were liable to be called up to serve in the Turkish Army. Hence the poor families preferred to farm a piece of land without claiming ownership of it.

The Mandate was thus faced with a very difficult problem when it commenced its job, as the only recorded owners of land appeared to be the wealthy and comparatively few influential families. The job was difficult because the Mandatory Power had to try to fulfil Article 6 of the Mandate:—

"... while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for further purposes."

This in itself is a contradiction, because it was difficult, if not impossible, to facilitate "close settlement" by the Jews without "prejudicing the rights and position of other sections of the population"! The **reason being that many**

families had farmed pieces of land for years, although they had never registered their claim (for the reason I have explained above). These lands were therefore government or even waste lands. How could we safeguard the interests of these Arabs and yet turn them off the land so that the Jews could be settled on it? So the initial settling of the Jews on these lands, owing to the lack of records of boundaries, ownerships, etc., was very difficult.

It is interesting to study very briefly the land held in common ownership, or the "Masha'a" system, as it is called in Arabic. Under this system the whole of an Arab village and its land is held in common ownership. Every two years the land is redivided up amongst the villagers or shareholders. Thus one family till and cultivate their portion of the land for two years. At the end of this period all the land is divided up again and the family starts to cultivate another piece of land. Obviously this is not a system which makes for getting the best out of the land. A family nearing the end of its two-year period will not plant fresh plants or trees, manure, or make improvements to the land, if they think that the next tenant will gain the benefit! Thus the land suffers. This Masha'a system predominated in Southern Palestine; I could not find many instances of it in the north. The Palestine Royal Commission reported that in 1923 56 per cent of the villages were Masha'a and in 1930 it had fallen to 46 per cent. The number has undoubtedly fallen further since then, but despite the obvious detriment to the land, many Arab villages have refused to depart from the system because they regard it as a safeguard against alienation of their land.

The Arab villagers are intensely poor. The majority of them are heavily in debt. They suffer from the fact that they are a mass of small individual farmers. The Jews, on the other hand, are highly organised and have very efficient co-operative societies to market their products. A number of Arab co-operative societies have started, but they do not compare with the highly efficient ones run by the Jews.

Thus the Arabs, for the improvement of their land, and for the betterment of the families living on the land, are dependent (as in the case of education) on the Mandatory Power. For better conditions the following changes are needed:—

- (a) Change in methods of cultivation, which goes hand-in-hand with increased Arab education.
- (b) Relief of the burden of the *fellaheen's* debt. (*Fellaheen* is the Arab farm labourer).
- (c) Proper irrigation systems.
- (d) Accurate recording of properties and tenancies.
- (e) Efficient centralised marketing and co-operative societies.

The question which is always asked is, "Why did the Arabs sell their lands to the Jews?" Apart from any waste or common land which the Jews have acquired under the Mandate, they have bought a great deal of land from the Arabs. Why did the Arabs sell? I was told, when in Palestine, that of all the land sold by Arabs, 90 per cent of it had been sold by the "absentee landlords". These "absentee landlords" are wealthy Arab landowners who do not live in Palestine, but who reside in great luxury in Egypt, Syria, or the Lebanon.

They have made large profits out of these deals with the Jews, whom I imagine were, and are, willing to pay excessive prices to get hold of the land. It is an unquestionable fact that these "absentee landlords" have been very bad Arabs. They still own land and selling continues to go on, although pressure has no doubt been brought to bear on them by the Arab countries in which they live, to stop these sales.

The wealthy Arabs can, and ought to, ensure:

- (a) That no more land is sold by the "absentee landlords."
- (b) That they do everything they can to improve the lot of the poor Arab tenants to whom they sublet their land. (The land is usually sublet on yearly tenancy, terminable by the landlord at will—which has many obvious disadvantages.)

I had several talks with wealthy Arab landowners living in Palestine. They had two methods of receiving payment for the land they sublet. One was an ordinary cash payment, and the other was a payment in kind. In the latter, the landowner took a certain percentage of the produce of the land from his tenants, and sold it or used it as he wished. There is a very marked difference in the way of living of the wealthy and the poor Arabs. (The wealthy and governing class of Arabs is known as the Effendi.) There appeared to be no middle class. The wealthy Arabs were very wealthy and cultured: the poor Arabs extremely poor. If the wealthy Arabs did more for their poor tenants, Arab unity would be much easier to achieve.

If 90 per cent of the land sold to the Jews was sold by "absentee landlords," what of the Arabs who sold the remaining 10 per cent? There were a number of reasons for these sales:—

- (a) An inability in the early days of the Mandate to realise the danger of selling land.
- (b) A poor landowner selling half his land, so as to reduce his burden of debt, and to carry out improvements on the other half of the land.
- (c) A desire to "get rich quick." This inevitably resulted in the Arab squandering the money obtained from the sale of the land, with resultant poverty. (This is a common Arab fault.)

The 1939 Government White Paper "zoned" off the land into three categories:

- (a) Areas where Jews could buy.
- (b) Areas where Jews could buy, but only with Government sanction.
- (c) Areas where Jews could not buy.

This has gravely restricted Jewish purchase of land. The Jews have therefore been strongly pushing the plan that all the Palestine Arabs should leave Palestine, handsomely compensated by the Government, of course, and settle across the Jordan in Transjordan. They point out that that country can support at least double its present population. This plan has also been put forward, or supported, by responsible bodies in Great Britain and the U.S.A. Anybody who imagines the Arabs will willingly leave their land, even if highly compensated, and go to start life afresh in an adjoining Arab land, shows a complete lack of understanding of the problem. Except for a very few, they will **not** go.

A landless Arab is despised, and one who had given up his land, with compensation, to make way for the Jews, would be regarded as a traitor to the Arab cause. If there is any question of forcing them to go, they will fight. I was amazed at the unanimity of all Arabs on this point. It has also been suggested that the other Arab States, in their desire for one Arab federation of States, would abandon Palestine, if offered the federation as a "compensation." This abandonment of Palestine by other Arab States would, it is suggested, go hand in hand with the mass Arab evacuation of Palestine into Transjordan. The fact is that the other Arab States would not agree to abandon Palestine. As one leading Palestine Arab said to me, "Do you think the Arabs would give up the soul to save the body?" This is an exaggeration, but, to the Arab world, Palestine is of very great importance because of:—

- (a) Its religious importance to the Moslem world. (After Mecca and Medina, Jerusalem is the third holy place.)
- (b) Its coast line on the Mediterranean.
- (c) The support the other Arab States have given to Palestine and intend to give in the future.

Any hopes that may be entertained of the Arabs willingly leaving Palestine, or the other Arab States abandoning Palestine in return for an Arab federation, are absolutely false. There is no question of these things being done willingly. If the British Government or the Allied Powers were to attempt to force the issue, i.e. move the Arabs out, whether they like it or not, such an action would be more in keeping with Nazi doctrines than with the spirit of the Atlantic Charter.

(c) *Education of the Arab*

Before the first Great War only about 10 per cent of the Arabs were literate. Now about 80 per cent are literate. The Arabs have realised that they owe this great change to the Mandate. What is interesting is that they do not consider the raising of educational standards is going fast enough, or that the educational standards attained are high enough. The educational system in Palestine is not, in my opinion, satisfactory, and it is one of the things that needs urgent improvement. Under Article 15 of the Mandate both the Jews and the Arabs are entitled to maintain their own schools, "for the education of its own members in its own language, whilst conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose."¹ This, to my mind, is one of the great blunders of the Mandate. The Mandate should have insisted that at least primary education should be in joint schools for both Jews and Arabs. The problems involved would have been difficult, but extremely worth while overcoming. Attention could have been paid to the teaching of English to both sides, so that all children leaving school would have had a common language. If this had happened, I am sure that by the time the first generation of "Palestinians" (Jews and Arabs), had grown up, the Palestine Problem would have been well on the way to a solution, instead of the deadlock it is now. However, as a result of Article 15, both sides have insisted on their rights to maintain separate schools. The number of Mixed Schools is relatively small and they are mostly run by the Anglican Church.

¹ *Palestine Royal Commission, Chapter XVI, page 333.*

They have been a success. But the majority of the children have, without doubt, grown up in their separate schools, fed on the policy of hatred of the other side.

Jewish education is largely autonomous. The Jews have the right to levy taxes on their own people. Out of these taxes they pay for Jewish education on the lines they require. The Jews, as a result of this, have received only a small proportion of the total yearly budget for education as provided by the Administration. (An example of this is the 1934-35 figures. The Jews spent £249,937 on education, whereas their Government Grant was only £28,000 out of a total Government Grant of £201,498 for education).

The Arabs, on the other hand, have, because of their general poverty, always received the lion's share. Otherwise there would have been very little Arab education, and the Arabs would have remained largely illiterate. Arab education is mostly paid for and controlled by the Administration.

The Jews have always complained of this "favouritism" in the grant to the Arabs. The Jews have produced an efficient system of education, but without doubt they have included in it a violent teaching of Zionism, and the Jews' "right" and determination to get Palestine. This is one of the most unpleasant features of the Jews in Palestine. It bears very close resemblance to the Nazi educational system.

The Royal Commission of 1936 recorded its disapproval of the fact that after seventeen years, the Administration had only catered for half the Arab demand for education. (At that time, out of an estimated number of 260,700 Arabs of school age, only 42,700 were then accommodated in Government schools.)

The Arab cry for education has always been a loud one. They realise that without education they can *never* compete with the Jews. This cry has been chiefly for primary education. The Government secondary school system is quite inadequate, even for the limited output from the primary schools.

The Government Grant for education during 1931-1935 was approximately 6 per cent of the total budget. In 1935-36 it fell to approximately 4 per cent, due without doubt to the increase in expenditure on defence precautions. I was told that in 1943 the grant for education was one-fifth of the money spent on defence measures!

I visited in 1944 several Arab schools run by the Government and I was very impressed with the tremendous enthusiasm of teachers and students. I was sure, when I saw this education of Arab youth, that they have great possibilities. I am convinced that, with an advanced and enlarged educational system, the whole Arab population could be changed. There is an immense wealth of material going begging. I have always believed that it is possible to educate backward races, and that it is worth while doing so.

If in an Arab village the Arabs wish to increase the size of the school, they have to pay for the building, provide the furniture, and possibly pay for extra teachers. Many Arab villages have collected sums of money to do this, but Government support has not been forthcoming. The Royal Commission noted this and expressed its disapproval. I found in 1944 the situation had not improved. In one particular Arab village I visited, they had two schools **and** were willing to provide money to increase the size of both schools. They **had** approached the Government several times, but without effect.

The crowning glory of Jewish Education is the magnificent Hebrew University in Jerusalem. I quote from the Royal Commission Report, "The University has departments of Jewish studies, Oriental studies, General Humanities, Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Botany and a number of allied sciences, also a special department devoted to Cancer Research." At the time of the Royal Commission Report there was a staff of twenty-seven professors, besides lecturers and junior staff. In 1935 there were 391 students, about 30 per cent of whom had received Jewish secondary education in Palestine, the balance having come from other countries, notably Poland. Since then the university has greatly increased its scope. The Hebrew University is an achievement of which the Jews have every right to be justly proud, but, as Freya Stark says in her book *East is West*, the Hebrew University "might have become a beacon for all if it had made itself bilingual, gradually to unite instead of dividing". This is a similar point to the one I make most strongly on the necessity for joint primary schools, with a common language for Jews and Arabs.

There is no equivalent of an Arab university in Palestine. Arab education has been primary education (insufficiently catering for the number of Arabs of school age), plus a few secondary schools. In addition, there are a few privately run schools for the children of wealthy Arabs. In fact, in the whole of the Levant, there is only one Arab university—the American University at Beirut, which has done wonderful work. Thus any Palestine Arab desiring advanced education has either to pay for himself to visit and study at universities on the Continent (a number of wealthy Arabs have done this), or else go to the American university, which means the burden of living expenses in Beirut. Either way the poor Arab is excluded from higher education—there have been very few exceptions.

Apart from the great need for extended Arab education, which I cannot recommend strongly enough, there is a magnificent job to be done by the British Council in Palestine. Their present work there is just nibbling at the problem. They have some very excellent representatives in Palestine, but they have not the money or the staff to do a proper job. If Palestine is to remain a "British sphere of interest," then it is worth spending money to spread British culture and to create both amongst Arabs and Jews an atmosphere favourable to Britain. Whether the Jews will ever have "an atmosphere favourable to Britain," I doubt. There is scope for it in the Arab world. At the moment we have neither.

I strongly recommend to the British Council that they should build and start in Palestine (and in other Arab countries as well) a number of small universities jointly for Arab and Jew.

The Palestine Problem is an acute one. I do not believe it can be solved without force and unhappiness in this generation, or in the generation just growing up. If it is ever to be solved, and if it is hoped in years to come that Arab and Jew will live and co-operate peacefully together, then the Government **MUST**, as soon as possible:—

- (1) Insist on mixed schools for Arab and Jew.
- (2) Increase greatly Arab education.

If the Government takes the bold step of insisting on mixed schools, they will reap their reward. I go so far as to say that if they do not, there is no hope of a solution, and only years of bloodshed and misery for Palestine lie ahead.

In connection with education, there is one matter which the Arabs themselves must attend to. This is the emancipation of Arab women. If the Arab is to advance, then Arab women must advance as well. Except in the very wealthy families, the Arab women are treated worse than servants, have no rights of their own, and go about wearing the traditional veil over their face (the Yashmak). The Arab men should remedy this backward state and prepare to give much greater rights to their women.

The Arabs have been avid for education and made the most of limited facilities. Sir Ronald Storrs, in reviewing Miss Freya Stark's book, remarks on the increased education and responsibility of the young Effendi of the Middle East of to-day. Miss Stark is full of admiration for "my friends the young Effendis, to whom this book is dedicated, wishing them well." She has appreciated their potential.

We, for our part, have got to realise that the whole of the Arab world, as a result of education, wireless and air transport, and to some extent because of the contacts with the Western World during the 1939-45 war, will in the next generation become a world force. We are still too apt to regard the white peoples as the only forces that count. What a sorry mistake we made over the Japanese! The Arabs, the Indians and the Chinese will all be playing important parts in world policy in the years to come. We must not ignore or overlook this fact, but rather help and encourage these peoples towards their destiny.

(d) The Arabs and Jewish Immigration to Palestine

At the beginning of the first Great War there were 80,000 Jews in Palestine. Now there are approximately 600,000.

The Arabs obviously have done everything they can to try to force the Government to stop Jewish immigration. They did not succeed at all until the Government's 1939 White Paper. This laid down that for five years from March 1939 only 10,000 Jews per year were to be admitted. In addition, 25,000 Jews were to be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner was satisfied that they could be absorbed as a help towards the Jewish refugee problem, which was particularly acute at that time. In total this decree meant that 75,000 Jews were allowed to enter Palestine by 31st March, 1944. The White Paper says: "After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it".

The war interfered with this programme and when I was in Palestine in 1944 only about half the number had entered Palestine. The Arabs then fully realised that the balance would have to be allowed to enter when circumstances permitted. By now circumstances have altered and the 75,000 figure has been reached. Therefore, the terms of the 1939 White Paper on Jewish immigration have been fulfilled. Nevertheless the High Commissioner recently decided to allow a further entrance of 1,500 a month pending the results of the Anglo-

American Committee on Palestine. He asked the Arabs to agree to this, but they refused—although their refusal, of course, made no difference to the High Commissioner's decision. This increase—small though it is—over the figure of 75,000 fixed by the 1939 White Paper, is another concession granted as the result of a popular outcry. Will the British Government be persuaded to go farther still, or will they implement the White Paper? (The Jews know the Arabs will not agree to the entry of any further large number of Jews although they will obviously have to agree to the entry of a few specialists, e.g., doctors, as required.)

I consider that the Arabs gained a great point in the White Paper, which virtually resulted in the limitation of Jewish immigration to Jewish population plus 75,000. Some Arabs told me they would not be content until the Government forcibly removed large numbers of Jews from Palestine. This I consider absurd. The Jews are *there*, and they will only leave at their own free will, which it is possible some may do now that the war is over and Europe is free of the Nazi terrors. The Arabs have got to settle down and realise that:—

- (a) The Jews are there.
- (b) The number of Jews will not increase if the Arabs do not want it to (i.e., if the White Paper holds).
- (c) A genuine attempt has to be made by the Arabs to live at peace with the Jews.

The Arabs would be foolish to demand more than the White Paper gives them. At first they opposed it but now most of the sensible ones realise that if Britain sticks by the White Paper they have gained a lot. Therefore, the tendency now is for the Arabs to support it—secretly, if not openly.

(e) *Arab self-government*

The Arabs in Palestine are very anxious to attain self-government. They look around and see that all the other Arab countries have either obtained a very great measure of self-government, or else have every hope of obtaining it soon. They feel that the coming of the Jews has prevented their attaining equal status with their Arab brothers in the neighbouring States. They are undoubtedly right, but as I said in the last section, the Jews are in Palestine and the Arabs have got to make the best of it. Therefore they must realise that Palestine can never be solely an entirely self-governing *Arab* State. This is reasonable, since Palestine will always be of world-wide interest because of its importance to the Christian and Jewish religions. However, in view of their numerical superiority, the Arabs will be politically dominant in Palestine as soon as the Mandatory powers consider that they are ready to commence self-government. On how they handle the Jewish minority in the opening phases of self-government depends the future peace, or otherwise, of Palestine. I deal with the Jewish reaction in another chapter. I fear that the Arabs, with a majority representation in whatever form the Palestine Parliament may take, may try to suppress the Jews and all they stand for. Some of the Arabs I spoke to were very obstinate on this point. I suggested that, owing to the bitter feeling between Arabs and Jews, all government documents and procedure should be **in English as a compromise. They insisted that they should be in Arabic. If**

they persist in this kind of attitude, it will do them no good, and what little chances there are of Jewish co-operation in a self-governing State will be very prejudiced from the outset. In my opinion the Arabs have far the greater claim to Palestine; therefore the greater tolerance must come from them.

Palestine, because of its Jewish population and international religious importance, can never—unless the Jews wish it also—become a hundred per cent partner with the other Arab States in an Arab federation, although it may co-operate with them economically. (This would not, of course, be true if Palestine were portioned off into an Arab State and a Jewish State in which case the Arab State would be free to join completely, if it were so desired, with neighbouring Arab States.) The Arabs must realise this fact and try to accustom themselves to it. After all, if Palestine as a self-governing State is a success, then Arab or Jew can be proud of saying, "I'm a Palestinian". A Pole who goes to the U.S.A. and settles there is soon very proud to call himself an American. It must be the same in Palestine.

However, the Arabs are not yet ready for complete self-government. This goes hand in hand with increased education for the Arabs. As soon as possible the Mandate must, having made clear its policy and indicating its intention to stick to it, commence on self-government on a limited scale in every village and town; and at the same time greatly increase Arab education. To every Arab village I would send a Jewish representative to help in the self-government of the village. Similarly, to every Jewish settlement I would send an educated Arab to sit on the Jewish council. This would undoubtedly be unpopular and have unpleasant results in many cases. However, in the long run I am sure it would pay.

The period of emancipation in self-government should be definitely fixed. I suggest fifteen years.

In the past twenty years the Arabs have refused to co-operate in attempts made by the Mandate to foster self-government. They must change this attitude.

(f) *The Arab attitude to the British*

I found the Arab attitude to the British very interesting. The Arabs have two main grievances against us:

- (a) They consider we have broken our pledges made in the first World War.
- (6) They feel that every report or commission on Palestine has "come down" on the side of the Arabs, and yet we have favoured the Jews because of their immense influence in the Western World.

The Arab despises weakness: he understands and respects a strong man. Our policy over Palestine has been weak and vacillating; therefore he despises us. On the other hand, he is grateful for the increase in literacy, although he is of the opinion we could have done much more.

Many Arabs told me that they were fully aware of the strategic importance of Palestine to the British Empire. (This is the one trump card in the Arab hand. The Middle East is a vital link in Britain's world strategy, *vis-a-vis* the route to the Far East, and Britain could not afford a hostile Arab Middle East.) They also told me quite frankly that they were disappointed in us and would not hesitate to look to another great power if there were one willing to sponsor their cause. In this connection Russia was often mentioned. She is conveniently near and obviously interested in the Middle East, In his admiration for the

strong man, the Russian methods in the war appealed to the Arab. I was convinced that, with the obvious growth of the small Left Wing Arab parties in Palestine, there were definite signs of a "looking towards" Russia by the Arabs in the future. They have been very much impressed by the realistic attitude of the Russians in world politics. Yet I believe most Arabs would be content to remain under the British aegis, provided they felt firstly, that they were going to get a square deal, and that, secondly, the British Government were going to adopt a firm, constructive policy which would not waver under Jewish pressure in London. If the Palestine Arabs feel they are not going to get a square deal, they will undoubtedly look elsewhere for a strong supporter for their cause. They have a good cause, and because of Palestine's strategical position, it would not be difficult to sell.

Summing up, the Arab case is, briefly:

- (a) The British have not kept their promises made to the Arabs in the McMahon letters.
- (b) The founding of the Jewish National Home has been carried out quite regardless of Arab interests.
- (c) The tenor and wording of the Mandate to Palestine has favoured the Jews. (The Arabs object very strongly to being referred to as "the non-Jewish communities in Palestine.")
- (d) The Jews, owing to their wealth and power in the Western World, can use considerable influence on the British Government. The Jews, by their lobbying in the British House of Commons and by their interests in the Press, can always present their case in the most favourable light. The Arabs, on the other hand, have no influence in the British Parliament or Press. They point out that not only is there no Arab member of Parliament in Britain (there are several Jewish ones), but there are no Arab voters to write letters to their M.P.s on behalf of the Arab cause.
- (e) The Jewish purse is bottomless, and the Arabs cannot compete against the wealth of World Jewry.
- (f) The Arabs have tilled, lived and died on the soil of Palestine for hundreds of years. The fact that the Jews left it long before the Arabs came, is no claim to the land.
- (g) The majority of Arabs were, in 1918, simple, poor and illiterate folk, who had been under Turkish domination for a long time. The Arabs say that because they were poor and simple is not a justification for turning them off their own land so that the Jews can make better use of it with their infinitely greater wealth.
- (h) The Arab believes that Palestine has absorbed as many Jews as the land can support. If any more are admitted, then despite all the Jewish wealth and modern methods of cultivation, irrigation, etc., the land will eventually become less productive. Frederick Painton in his report says, "The population is now 144.5 persons per square mile, as against 11.2 in Oregon for example—if you were to increase it to 5,500,000 by adding 4,000,000 more Jews, you would have a population density greater than that of Belgium, one of the most industrialised nations in the world",

- (0) The Jews claim that their reason for returning to Palestine was a desire to "return to the land". The Arab points out that by the Jews' own figures only 23 per cent of all the Jews in Palestine are on the land—the other 77 per cent are in the cities.
- (O) Owing to the great disparity in education between Arab and Jew, and the official recognition of the Jewish Agency, the Arab has always been at a great disadvantage in dealing with both the British and the Jews in Palestine.
- (k) The Arabs claim that the Jewish methods in Palestine are similar to those used by the Fascists or Nazis.
- (f) The Arabs claim that Arab emancipation is taking place at a remarkable pace, considering that only twenty-five years ago they were a subject race to the Turks. They say: "It is most unfair to compare us with the wealth and progress of the Jews and then say that we are backward with no desire to get on".
- (m) The Arabs in the neighbouring States are getting self-government and freedom, whilst those in Palestine have been held back by the foundation of the Jewish home.
- (w) Now that the war is over Europe is a safer place for Jews. There are no longer the same reasons for Jews to come to Palestine.

The Arabs admit that they have benefited by both the British Mandate and the establishment of the National Home, in the following ways:

- (a) Increased educational facilities.
- (b) Benefit of medical services. (In 1919 the Arab population was 600,000—it is now 1,000,000.)
- (c) Decrease in tropical diseases, e.g., malaria, due to clearing up of swamp-land for cultivation.
- (d) The introduction of European methods of cultivating land, forestry, etc.

The Arab cry is: Don't let the Jews buy or be given any more land. Don't let us be swamped out by Jewish immigration. Give us greater education so that we can be on equal terms with the Jews. Let us eventually become a self-governing country and obtain emancipation like our brother Arabs in the neighbouring States.

Before leaving the Arab case I think it is only fair to refer to the criticisms of the part they played in the war. The two outstanding events were, of course:—

- (a) The ex-Mufti's activities, directed from Berlin, and his proclamation of a Holy War against the Allies during Rashid Ali's Iraqi revolt in 1941.
- (b) Internal complications in Egypt during and after El Alamein and recent developments in Syria, (autumn 1945).

Considering the tremendous temptation to join the Germans in order to rid themselves of the Jews in Palestine—as their share of victory if the Germans won—which the Arabs resisted in Britain's dark days, I think it is only fair to give Freya Stark's reply to "Arab war effort" criticisms:—

". . . of Arab unfriendliness during the war. There is little solid substance behind it. Egypt, with large foreign and Axis elements, was partly isolationist; yet no one who was there in command would minimise the importance of her help. Arabia, except for an organised pro-German

clique in Iraq, and an isolationist Yemen, was all friendly; King Ibn Saud never missed an opportunity of proclaiming himself in so many words that echoed all over the Islamic lands. The Palestine Arabs chose the time of our difficulty to propose a truce which perhaps tilted the balance of the Middle East; in Syria it was the Vichy French and not the Arabs who helped the enemy; Transjordan never wavered in its alliance; and Sayyid Muhammad Idris al-Senussi, in August 1940, when France had fallen and the British Commonwealth stood alone, offered all he had in men and money to fight in the Western Desert."

Sir Ronald Storrs in reviewing Freya Stark's book says in confirmation of her view on the help given by Egypt, "an opinion individually confirmed by the two great Commanders concerned. And, in our darkest hour, there was no sabotage in Egypt." He also says, "across Libya you may find Arabs with notes scribbled by British soldiers whom they saved, fed, and befriended, when the battle was going against us, at mortal risk to themselves and without hope, or desire, of reward". This was, incidentally, also confirmed by several letters to *The Times* during September 1945, including one from Kennedy Shaw, one-time Intelligence Officer of the famous Long Range Desert Group.

I think it will be agreed that the criticisms are unfair and, for the greatest part, unfounded.

Finally, it has been suggested that Palestine is only one factor in Arab politics and that its importance to the Arab World may be exaggerated. *The Times'* Special Correspondent in an article dated 26 September, 1945, says:—

"Palestine is only one factor in Arab politics, and one whose importance may indeed be overstated. It may be an exaggeration to say, as a well-known Cairo wit put it, that 'if there were no Jews in the Middle East the Arab League would have to invent them'; but it is equally grotesque to contend that the Jews are the only stumbling-block in the way of Anglo-Arab understanding.* Eastern politics have always abounded in pitfalls and stumbling-blocks, and even if the 600,000 Jews of Palestine were removed by some natural or man-made catastrophe, political demagoguery would soon find a new hobby-horse. It has been suggested that if we consider the local Palestine population alone, right stands against right between Arabs and Jews. But if we widen the picture to include the Arab world as a whole, then Palestine shrinks to a bare 2 per cent of the total area inhabited by Arabs, while for the Jews it represents all their hopes of ever recovering a national home. There are signs that the leaders of the Arab League are aware of these facts and that, if partition were enforced they would confine themselves to vocal protests. Military intervention by the neighbouring States is, apart from its strategic absurdities, as unlikely as during Rashid Ali's revolt, the Mufti's calls for a Holy War, or the repeated Syrian insurrections of the last twenty years."

It is of course true that the Arabs have not got a great war potential. But who wants wars—even small ones—after six years of World War? I consider that *The Times'* Special Correspondent has seriously underestimated the strength and determination of the Arab World with regard to Palestine. It is not just an incident to be dropped if things do not turn out well for them, but a matter of vital importance.

CHAPTER VI

THE JEW

IF I had travelled direct from England or the States to Palestine, then my first impressions of Jewish Palestine would not have been so vivid. As it was, I arrived in Palestine after a year spent in North Africa. I had travelled via Tripolitania and Egypt. With remarkably few exceptions all the towns and villages had been dirty and the standard of living of the native populations remarkably low. On arrival in Palestine I was therefore very much impressed with the cleanliness and the modern architecture of the Jewish quarters. Also one seemed to have arrived into a western civilisation. There were shops, restaurants, cafés and cinemas; a great many of the Jews spoke English and they were all smartly dressed. There was also a distinct culture. Libraries full of good literature, musical societies and such things as the Palestine Orchestra. One seemed to have arrived—if not home—at least to a land where one felt at home, after the dirt and squalor of Africa.

In contrast to all this was the poverty of the Arab, his shabbiness and (usually) dirtiness, and the squalor of his dwellings.

I arrived in Palestine just vaguely interested—no more—in the National Home. On my arrival there I was immensely impressed by it. I became an admirer of it. I thought, "What a wonderful job they've done". I felt that they should be given every help to progress with the National Home. What right had the Arabs to impede them? The Arabs should be very grateful that the Jews are there, I thought. The past terrorism of the Arabs was disgraceful and if there were any further repetition of it, the Arabs should be harshly dealt with—after all, what could the Jews do to protect themselves against these attacks? My first "solution" to the Palestine problem, formed after a very short while there, was that the Arabs should be removed, compensated and set up in Transjordan or some other Arab country. There was plenty of room for them in Transjordan and they would be with their own people.

These first impressions were strengthened by the attitude of the Jews, who were immensely hospitable. They invited you to their homes and were only too glad to tell you of their struggles to get out of Europe and their struggles to start life afresh in Palestine. They all appeared to be well off.

They would arrange for you to visit Jewish settlements and see the work of the Jews on the land.

To get the Jewish point of view was easy. Not only were there the easily visible signs of the "Jewish case," i.e. modern buildings, etc., but there was also the important fact that one felt closer to the Jews than to the Arabs. By western standards the Jews were cultured; they liked good food and good living. All this, coupled with the fact that I had been in "backward Africa" for some months, persuaded me at first to the Jewish side of the Palestine Problem,

Yet after a short while I began to question my first impressions. Something seemed wrong somewhere. Perhaps it was because the Jews were too plausible; perhaps because I never heard of the "Arab case" that I began to think there

must be an "Arab case". This first stage of doubting the Jewish case came to me several weeks after arriving in Palestine. I would say straight away that it came to the vast majority of the thousands of British soldiers who have visited Palestine during this war. Their reactions must have been identical with mine. I have asked many who have been to Palestine, and I have not found any—except Jews—who have not reacted in the same way; that is, first an attraction to the National Home, then a gradual doubting, and finally a definite disapproval of the Jews and their case in Palestine. Is this anti-Semitism?—I do not know. I can say that before I went to Palestine I was definitely not anti-Jewish, and that, I believe, applies to the majority of the British people. They may have laughed at a Jew; they may have regarded him as mean; they may have regarded him as a very shrewd business man. But they did not hate him. In fact, they grudgingly admitted that he was cleverer than they—the Jews were always successful. Perhaps the reason for this lack of anti-Semitism was that we did not have many of them, and those we did have were regarded as British—I do not know. However, the fact remains that most of us who have visited Palestine came away very strongly anti-Palestinian Jew. It is a very great pity.

Whilst I was in Palestine I was determined that I would not draw my conclusions without making a study of both sides of the case. I am not pro-Arab: I have many more Jewish friends than I have Arab friends. It was not a dislike of the Jews that drew me to the problem. It was the fascination of a highly controversial issue, plus the feeling that the acceptance, on the surface, of the Jewish case was not sufficient.

In going into the "Jewish case" more thoroughly the following points emerged:

(a) *Relations between Jews and Arabs*

As has been pointed out already, the relationship between the Arabs and those Jews who had lived in Palestine for hundreds of years with them, had been very good until the National Home started. They looked alike and they lived alike. (This was particularly so in the country, but in Jerusalem one could hardly say that the ancient Jews, with their side-whiskers and peculiar clothes, resembled Arabs!) I remember having a long talk with a man in Haifa, whom I thought was an Arab clerk. He talked and spoke as one. It turned out he was a Jew from Safad, and his family had lived there for centuries. Without doubt most of these old-established Jews have not welcomed the coming of the modern, westernised Jews. It has made them take sides against the people they have lived with in harmony from time immemorial.

Had the Jews, on coming to Palestine, decided to take things easily to begin with; had they tried to work in with the Arab; had they been self-effacing and gone about their business quietly—to put it briefly and crudely, had they been cunning about their entry into Palestine, then Palestine would to-day have been theirs, with the Arabs on their side. But it is said that this would not have been Zionism, which was then, particularly, the desire of the Jews—to start a new life in a new land, and to live that life as they wanted to, in a land of their own. Zionism, therefore, did not permit a compromise with the Arabs. Zionism is a national feeling. Hundreds of years, at the best engaged in commerce, at the worst spent in the ghettos, demanded a new life in the land they were returning to after 2,000 years' absence. It was a great pity

from the Jewish point of view that they played their cards so badly on the return to the Promised Land. The Arab is so easy to bribe; in 1919 he was so backward. Had the Jews gone in quietly and made certain of not antagonising the Arab, instead of making him realise the Jewish menace by their intense nationalism and desire to possess land, Palestine would be theirs to-day. Their short-sighted policy of forbidding their settlements either to sell back land to any other but Jews, or to prevent their employing Arab labour, was madness. Cheap Arab labour is essential to the Jews to make their National Home a success. Yet they alienated the Arabs from the beginning.

I largely blame the Jews, therefore, for the impasse in Arab-Jew relationship. I consider that, having waited so long for the return to Palestine, they could have waited a few years longer, during which time, by a quieter but cleverer game, they might have obtained complete control of the country. The Arab, in his backward state, with his desire for money, would have been "easy meat". He would not have realised what had happened until it was too late. It might not have been a bad thing either if the Jews had decided to treat the Arabs well and look after them while at the same time, by subversive methods, "penetrating" Palestine. But that did not happen. They adopted other and less successful methods.

(b) Jewish Political Organisation

The Jewish political set-up is an extremely complicated one. Every "shade" of opinion is represented and every "shade" has its tones and half-tones. The Jews in Palestine are extremely politically-minded, and the bulk of them belong to and support the Zionist organisation. The largest group in support of the Zionist Organisation is the Labour Party, which comprises at least 50 per cent of the Jewish population. The main part of the Labour Party is the Jewish Federation of Labour, known as the Histadruth.^v In 1937 80 per cent of the Jewish workmen in Palestine belonged to the Histadruth—the percentage now is probably much higher. (In 1942 its membership was 140,000.)

The Labour Party (Mapai) is split into two wings or groups known as "B" and "G". Roughly, it can be said that "G" group is the party of the towns, whereas "B" group has most of its followers in the settlements and in the country. David Ben-Gurion, the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency, is leader of the Labour Party. Moshe Shertok, the head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, is also a member of the Labour Party, and both he and Ben-Gurion, who are two of the main driving forces of the Jewish Agency, are members of "G" group.

Apart from the Labour Party there are several other Left-Wing parties, e.g., Hashomer Hazair (which is very Left Wing), Poale Zion, etc.—they are too numerous to describe, but suffice it to say that they are all extremely active politically. All these parties have their representation on the Jewish Agency, and at the same time their members belong to the Histadruth, which is thus a very powerful organisation and is much more than a trade union as we understand it. The Histadruth manages co-operative societies, it organises labour banks and credit unions, and it helps to train young settlers. It is interesting to note that originally the Histadruth disagreed with Zionist policy for two reasons:

- (i) They wanted a progressive labour policy and stood for combining social reform with development of settlements and settlement schemes.

- (ii) They stood for a policy of comparative moderation towards the Arabs.

The leaders of the Histadruth once tried to organise Arab trade unions, particularly in the hope of raising the Arab standard of living. They had the sense to realise that by doing this they stood a chance of removing the Arab threat to their development. However, this spirit of co-operation with the Arabs was not part of the Zionist programme, and eventually the Histadruth had to come to heel.

As a socialist myself I was naturally very pleased to find the apparent Left-Wing tendencies of the National Home. I must frankly admit, however, that when I went into the politics of the National Home more deeply, I found many things about their "socialism" which I disliked. The party discipline was too strict to be natural, and in some things their attitude, far from being "left," was extreme "right," and smelt of dictatorship and national socialism.

There are a few other groups of interest. One of these is the "Revisionists," who are Right Wing. They do not belong to the Zionist Organisation, having withdrawn from it in 1935, when under their leader, the late Vladimir Jabotinsky, they formed the "New Zionist Organisation". The policy of the Revisionists is to gain control, not only of all Palestine, but of Transjordan as well. No one quite knows the size of the following of this party. The Revisionists claim that 17 per cent of the Jews belong to it, but the Zionists say only 5 to 10 per cent belong. I would say the Revisionists' guess is better, and it is also my guess that the party is growing.

On the extreme Right Wing there are the Jewish terrorists, known as the "Stern Gang," after their leader who was killed some time ago. They are a group of violent and savage assassins. Their theory is that the Arabs in the past have got their way by terrorist activity, so a little Jewish terrorism will not do the Jewish cause any harm. Their most recent outrages have included attempts on the life of a previous High Commissioner (Sir Harold MacMichael) and the murder of Lord Moyne. They are a most unpleasant gang and publicly denounced by Jews in and out of Palestine. When I was in Palestine they were attacking the Palestine police and blowing up buildings. The fact that they did not often get caught made me suspect they had a very sound organisation and could find hide-outs with some ease. Several friends of mine in the Palestine police confirmed this. I believe that they have more supporters than the Jews would like us to think. However, I am convinced the "Stern Gang" will not do the Jewish cause any good.

The Agudath Israel is a strictly religious and wholly non-political party. It is said that it consists of approximately 20 per cent of the Jewish population. They have remained outside the General Council of Jews (Vaad Leumi), but since 1939 they have co-operated with the Zionist organisation.

Lastly there is a Dr. Magnes who stands for an Arab-Jew bi-national State. He does not appear to have a great following.

The Zionist Organisation itself was founded in 1897 by Theodor Hertzl, as a result of obvious general anti-Semitism at the time of the Dreyfus case. In 1922, at the beginning of the National Home, a moderate centre party, with Dr. Weizmann as its leader, was in control of the Zionist Organisation. (At the 1921 Congress they had 306 out of the 445 delegates.) Weizmann lost Control in 1930 when the British Government published its White Paper. Many Jews then became convinced that "moderation does not pay," and leaned towards

the Revisionists. Dr. Sokolov was elected in place of Weizmann, who was however re-elected at the Nineteenth Zionist Congress in 1935 and again at the Twentieth Congress in 1937. However, Weizmann did not carry sufficient weight to get a vote in favour of Partition after the publication of the Peel Report. The reason was that although the Jews who had been persecuted in Europe agreed with the idea of a Palestine State, the influential and wealthy Jews in Great Britain and the U.S.A. did not, as they thought a "Palestine State" might entail their losing the much-valued citizenship of the countries in which they lived!

The Revisionist Group gradually began to lose the support it had gained in 1930 because:

- (i) The National Home had a prosperous period from 1930-35.
- (ii) The Zionist Labour movement was growing.
- (iii) A certain Dr. Arlosoroff, a labour member of the Zionist Executive Committee, was murdered at Tel Aviv in 1933. This was blamed on the Revisionists,
- (iv) The Revisionists broke away from the Zionist Organisation in 1935.
- (v) The Revisionists, during the riots of 1937 and 1938, perpetrated reprisals which won the disapproval of all but a hot-headed minority.

I have already mentioned the amalgamation of Zionist and non-Zionist Jews, and explained that they are equally represented on the Jewish Agency, which is the standing executive committee of the Zionist Organisation in Palestine. The President of the Zionist Organisation is automatically ex-officio President of the Jewish Agency. This at the moment is Dr. Weizmann. Mr. David Ben-Gurion is Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency.

The powers of the Jewish Agency under Article IV of the Mandate are considerable.

- (i) It negotiates with the Palestine Government,
- (ii) It governs the work of colonisation and settlement,
- (iii) It estimates the demands for labour which largely form the basis of the Government's immigration schedule,
- (iv) It trains and selects immigrants.
- (v) It governs the policy of Zionism's most important funds—Jewish National Fund and the Palestine Foundation Fund (which are discussed in the next section),
- (vi) It founds hospitals and schools, etc.

Some of the Jewish social services are now run by the Palestine Jews themselves, e.g., the education service. The Jewish community has its own assembly of representatives, elected on a wide franchise, which appoints each year the Jewish General Council—the Vaad Leumi. Since 1927 the Jewish communities have been granted a certain amount of self-government, including the right to levy taxes through the Vaad Leumi, for education and other communal purposes.

One is apt to get confused between the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi. The Jewish Agency is the "Palestine" Committee, representative of Jews all over the world, whose organisation is the Zionist Organisation. The Vaad Leumi is a council of local Jews, elected by local Jews, to run certain local affairs. It does not negotiate with the Government, as does the Jewish Agency.

Since the conception of the National Home there have, as I have already said, always been two schools of thought in the Jewish world. The Jews, led by Weizmann, who stand for moderation and also co-operation with the British. Their method is negotiation. The other side are more violent and impatient. That this rift still exists was shown by the resignation in early 1944 of Ben-Gurion, who is a leader of the side opposed to Weizmann. After negotiations and talks with Weizmann, he returned. This rift will continue, and I believe the anti-Weizmann party will gain the support of the majority of the Jews. This does not bode well for peace in Palestine.

However, despite this rift, the Jewish organisation is an efficient and disciplined organisation. It compares remarkably favourably with the Arab organisation.

(c) *Jewish Immigration*

From approximately 80,000 Jews in Palestine in 1914 to approximately 600,000 in 1944 is a remarkable increase.

"Since 1922 the criterion for the regulation of immigration into Palestine has been the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals."¹ This was laid down in the Churchill Memorandum of 1922, and was reaffirmed in the so-called "Black Letter" from the Prime Minister to Dr. Weizmann of 13th February, 1931. The Immigration Ordinance of 1933 is supposed to give effect to this principle, and under it Jews are admitted in the following categories:

- (A) Persons of independent means, i.e.:
 - (i) Persons with a capital not less than £1,000.
 - (ii) Members of liberal professions with a capital of not less than £500, if additional members of such professions are required in Palestine.
 - (iii) Skilled craftsmen with a capital of not less than £250, if they can be absorbed in their craft in Palestine.
 - (iv) Persons with a secured income of not less than £4 per month, exclusive of earned income.
 - (v) Persons with capital of not less than £500 who will have reasonable prospects of success in the trade they intend to adopt, and who will not create undue competition in the trade by their arrival.
- (B) Persons whose maintenance is assured, i.e.:
 - (i) Orphans, whose maintenance in or by public institutions is assured till they can support themselves,
 - (ii) Students whose education and maintenance is assured until they can support themselves,
 - (iii) Persons of religious occupations whose maintenance is assured.
- (c) Persons who have a definite prospect of employment.
- (D) Dependants of permanent residents in Palestine, or of immigrants belonging to categories, A, B and c.

"Capitalist" immigrants, i.e., Group A, with their dependants account for almost one-quarter of the total immigration. Another one-third are the "dependants" of Palestine residents. Practically the whole of the remainder consists of "persons coming to employment" and their dependants.⁸

¹ *Palestine Royal Commission*, Chapter X, page 282.

² There is also a provision for the admission of "travellers," i.e., a foreigner who does not intend to stay more than three months, or to take up employment in Palestine.

The Jewish Agency have made many complaints that the Immigration Ordinance is not broad enough and that it hampers the carrying out of Article VI of the Mandate. I consider it very fair.

As I have pointed out in some previous statistics, the great majority of the Jewish immigrants have come from Eastern Europe. This is not the only interesting fact about them. Firstly there are a remarkably high number of immigrants with independent means. Secondly they are of high intellectual standards.

The following figures show the extent of capital brought into Palestine by immigrants:—

<i>Year</i>	<i>Jewish Immigrants with Capital of 11,000 or more¹ (exclusive of dependants)</i>	<i>Percentage of Total Jewish Immigrants</i>
1936.	2,970	10
1937.	1,275	12
1938.	1,753	14

¹ *Usually considerably more!*

Nearly 75 per cent of these "capitalist" Jews came from Germany; the bulk of the remainder came from Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Of the high intellectual standard of the immigrants there can be no doubt. It is evident wherever you go. It was evident not only in the towns, but in the smallest of Jewish settlements. I remember one very small settlement whose total population was just one hundred, having a magnificent library. Their rest-room was complete with periodicals, *Life*, *Time*, *New Statesman*, *Economist*, etc. They were right up to date in their knowledge of world politics.

The Government placed no control on the entry of "capitalists" and "dependants," provided they fulfilled the conditions laid down. Only the persons who were entering for employment—approximately one-quarter of the total immigrants—were controlled by the Government. They came under the "Labour Schedule," which is the Government's estimate of the absorptive capacity of the country at the time. The numbers to enter in this category were determined every six months, beginning 1st April and 1st October. The Jewish Agency submitted its recommendation of the numbers the country could take for the next six months. The Government then considered their estimates and informed the Jewish Agency of the number they had decided on. The selection of Jews to whom the immigration certificates were issued, in accordance with the number laid down by the Government, rests almost entirely with the Jewish Agency. This has been criticised by many people because, it is said, and I believe with truth, that the Jewish Agency only admitted Jews who were politically "sound," i.e., who would support the Zionist cause once they were in. Criticism of this policy came from representatives of the Agudath Israel World Organisation, a universal body of Orthodox Jews, in giving evidence before the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine. They complained that 94 per cent of all immigration certificates had been allotted by the Jewish Agency to members of the Zionist Organisation and only 6 per cent to others. Figures showing the difference between the Jewish Agency's estimates and the Government's decisions on the Labour Schedule are shown below:—

Period	Estimates of Absorptive Capacity			Jewish Agency	Government
April-September 1935	19,160	8,000
October 1935 to March 1936	10,900	3,250
April-September 1936	11,000	4,500
October 1936 to March 1937	10,695	1,800
April-September 1937	11,250	770
October 1937 to March 1938	3,000	1,780
April-September 1938	—	1,000
October 1938 to March 1939	4,625	1,000

It will be seen that the Government figures were always—with one exception—below the Jewish Agency's, and this is one of the main Jewish complaints.

The Arab fear of Jewish immigration is that if it is not stopped, one day the Jews will be in the majority. There can be no doubt that that is the Zionist aim. The Peel Report gave some interesting figures on this.

Annual Rate of Jewish Immigration	Year in which Jewish Population is Equal to Arab Population
30,000	Mid 1960
46,000	Early 1954
50,000	Early 1950
60,000	Mid 1947

These figures were published in 1937, and as a result of the war are inaccurate. However, they suffice to show that if there were mass Jewish immigration to Palestine, the Arab fear would soon be a reality.

(d) *The Jews and the Land*

Geographically Palestine falls into four sections:—

(1) The hilly country of Galilee, Samaria and Judea in the centre—the "backbone"—one-third of Palestine.

(2) The five plains:

The Maritime Plain (which lies between the coast and the hilly country).

The Plain of Acre.

The Plain of Esdraelon (Emek Yesreel in Hebrew).

The Huleh Plain.

The Plain of the Jordan Valley (below sea-level).

(3) The Beersheba Area of S.W. Palestine.

(4) The arid desert areas in the S.E. of Palestine.

To what extent are these four "sections" capable of cultivation and development ?

(1) Very limited possibilities of development.

(2) The first four Plains are all very fertile. The fifth is possibly one-half cultivable. In the north it is very fertile and could be improved; in the south it is cultivable if it could be irrigated.

(3) Might be cultivable if irrigated.

(4) **Uncultivable.**

As I have pointed out in Chapter V, the actual proportion of land that is cultivable is a matter of controversy, and experts have varied considerably in their estimates. Ruppin in *The Jewish Fate and Future* states that of the whole area of Palestine (26,000,000 dunams, i.e., 26,000 sq. km. or 6,500,000 acres) half of it is cultivable, and one-third of it is actually under cultivation. In June 1939 the Jews owned 1,460,000 dunams, of which 90 per cent is cultivable. (In 1920 they owned 400,000 dunams.) Brig.-General Sir Wyndham Deeds, in his pamphlet *Palestine Shapes its Future*, says the Jews now own half a million acres, i.e., approximately 2,000,000 dunams. It will be seen that of the land the Jews own, the great majority of it is cultivable. For example, they own a great part of the Plains of Esdraelon and Acre—some of the most fertile areas in Palestine. When they bought the land in the early days, much of it was swamp-land and malaria-ridden, and the prosperous, attractive settlements of to-day on these Plains do them great credit. They make a great deal of their pioneering work and they undoubtedly did go through hard times. However, I am convinced from what I heard from "neutral" sources, that their work was not as martyred as they would like thought. However, the following figures given by Sir Wyndham Deeds, who is a great admirer and supporter of the Jewish cause in Palestine, illustrate the remarkable work done by the Jews on the land:

"Fields which yielded one poor grain crop, now yield six crops of forage or three vegetable crops; the yield per acre of wheat has been raised from 500 to 4,000 kilograms; the milk yield per cow, which used to average 600 litres per annum, is now ten times as much. Or take the citrus industry. In 1919 one million cases of oranges were exported; in 1939 fifteen million."

The Jewish plans for settling two million Jews in Palestine cannot work unless they can make something of the so-called "uncultivable" land. Having already obtained a large amount of the "cultivable" land, they must look elsewhere if they are to settle in really large numbers. Whether they believe they can achieve miraculous changes with the barren hills and the arid desert, I do not know, but they say they can. They point out that what they have done with the swamps of the Plain of Esdraelon and the marshes of the Huleh Plain (the land round Lake Huleh, into which the Jordan runs, north of Lake Tiberias) can be done in the hills and desert. However, reclaiming land from marshes and swamps is quite a different thing from irrigating and manuring, etc., rocky hills, sparsely covered with poor soil and hot, dry, sandy desert wastes. They have vast schemes which they say will work. A distinguished American "soil conservationist," Dr. Lowdermilk, has approved their most sanguine hopes of settling two millions Jews. He proposes a most ambitious scheme for harnessing the River Jordan, and diverting it to supply water to vast tracts of dry land. He also proposes a canal from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea to compensate for the loss of water caused by the diversion of the Jordan. (The salt Dead Sea needs water so that the valuable salts can continue to be extracted from it.) This canal would also on its way generate hydro-electric power. Dr. Lowdermilk claims this scheme presents "no greater technicalities" than did the schemes of a similar nature in America, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority. The scheme is to be called the Jordan Valley Authority, and he claims it will revolutionise the economics of Palestine. The scheme is certainly ambitious, it is undeniably interesting, but whether it is practical is quite another matter. Who is to finance it? Can you find two million more Jews who are willing to go and live in Palestine? The Zionists are naturally supporting and encouraging such schemes.

I believe it is possible, with all the aids of science and money that the Jews have, to make more of the land than the Arabs can. You can make the best of what little soil there is on the hills by "terracing" the hillsides, by planting certain shrubs and by manuring. It is possible to cultivate some land once thought uncultivable by irrigation, etc. But I doubt if it is possible to make large, vast, barren deserts and rocky hillsides capable of supporting two million Jews. However, here is an extract from an article by *The Times*'s Special Correspondent, which summarises the attitude of both Arabs and Jews in the matter.

"On the basis of what has so far been achieved, the Zionists argue that the further industrialisation of Palestine and the carrying out of the large-scale irrigation projects recently worked out by soil-conservation experts and engineers of the Tennessee Valley Authority need cause no disquietude to the Arabs of Palestine. The irrigation of the vast and practically uninhabited Southern desert and continued industrial development would, according to these authorities, create an absorptive capacity for another 2,000,000 to 4,000,000 people. This living-space would be created not by displacing the native population but by developing the country's derelict wastes and its industrial potential. It is, the Zionists argue, not a case of 'taking the house away,' but rather of adding new storeys to it. There is, indeed, no apparent reason why Palestine, which in Byzantine times supported a population of about 3,000,000, should not, in the age of industry and intensified agriculture, accommodate at least the same number. These are arguments which cover only the economic aspect, and leave out emotional reality. The image used above—the building of new storeys on an old house—contains in itself the essence of the Arab objection. There is hardly a nation in the world which would willingly acquiesce in new dwellers establishing themselves 'on top' of it. In private conversation Arab leaders admit the economic advantages derived from Jewish immigration; but they argue that no nation will sell its aspirations to independence and sovereignty for the sake of hospitals, schools and metal roads. The often emphasised fear of being 'swamped' by the Jews is not lessened by Zionist pledges that the Arabs will be treated as equals in the future Jewish State. Though such assurances are doubtless honestly meant, Arabs regard them as sheer derision. No economic advantages can counter these Arab fears or appease their violent xenophobia. 'We want neither their honey nor their sting,' is an Arab saying quoted to your Correspondent by a moderate Arab leader."

As I have stated before, the majority of the Jews live in the cities and not on the land. However, the settlement life of the Jews on the land is a remarkable social experiment. If Jewish Palestine achieves nothing else, their settlements in Palestine will have been of great social value. They have two kinds of settlements—Collective and Co-operative. In the collective settlements there are no wages paid, and all the members work the same piece of land. They eat communally and all the rest-rooms, libraries, etc., are communal. Each family has a sleeping-room of its own. Both men and women work in the fields—some on the land, some looking after the sheep, cattle and poultry. Women run the kitchens and laundries. Young girls from the settlement are sent to training-schools and come back to run the settlement nursery school, where the children are brought up. The nursery school enables the mothers to work

for the settlement during the daytime, but they have their children for a time in the evenings before they return to the Nursery School to sleep. I was told at one settlement that the cost to the settlement of bringing up each child from birth to about fifteen years of age was approximately £1,000.

All the produce of the settlement is marketed by a co-operative society. In a collective settlement all the clothes for the members are bought for them by the settlement. Each settlement elects a manager, treasurer, etc., from amongst the members, and they usually stay in office for about two years. Members are also chosen to run the sheep "department," the poultry "department," the kitchen, etc. Members are allowed a holiday each year, and for this they receive a fixed sum of money, as they do also if they travel on behalf of the settlement. The larger settlements generally have their own doctor and their own school. The smaller ones share these amenities between several settlements. All the members belong to the Histadruth and the political group which they favour. (The settlements, particularly the Collective ones, are nearly all "Left". According to their degree of "leftness" they are grouped together, into what appear to be three main political groups.)

Life on a Co-operative Settlement is less communal. Each family has its own house and own portion of land. Everything else, however, is co-operative. All the produce is co-operatively marketed; the shops are co-operative; the families share the larger and more expensive farm instruments.

How do these settlements begin and how are they financed? The beginning of a settlement varies, but one particular one that I have in mind is a good example. Some fifteen years ago a band of thirty-odd young German-Jewish city workers from Berlin decided to seek a new life in Palestine—they were ardent Zionists. On their arrival as immigrants they worked in the orange groves and learnt about farming. Some of them felt the life was too hard and fell out, but the majority persevered, married Jewish girls who had come out under similar circumstances, and they were joined by others. They felt after two years that they were capable of starting a settlement. The Jewish National Fund bought the land for them (This fund, subscribed to by Jews all over the world, is specially for this purpose.) The Palestine Foundation Fund, similarly subscribed to, bought for them the necessary farm implements and livestock. (The total capital outlay is paid back by the settlement at a very low rate of interest over a very long period of time.) To begin with the settlement ran at a loss and had to be supported by Jewish funds, but now it is showing a small yearly profit.

Having got their land, implements and livestock, the settlers went to the land, erected their tents and started work. As time went on they started building wooden huts to replace tents and so gradually with their own hands built up their own new life. I was very impressed when I heard that these settlers had often donated their private savings to the settlement.

There are two stipulations laid down for the formation of settlements with Jewish funds:

(1) No Arab labour to be employed.

(2) Land can never be sold or leased out of Jewish hands.

(This means that not only does the Arab lose the land for good, but he is barred for ever from working on it.)

Apart from settlements there are of course private farmers who have either started themselves off or been financed by Jewish funds.

Life on the land is hard; but it is not only a question of hard work. There have been years when Arab riots have been continuous; life was always in danger. Some have given it up, but the majority of the settlers have, I believe, stuck it out. They were able to do this because of their belief in their return to the land in two senses—"to the land" in the sense of an agricultural life, and "to the land" in the sense of their return to their spiritual home. These people came as Zionists. They must speak Hebrew and they want their lives to be Hebrew in tradition, manners and culture. It is very definitely nationalistic, and their belief in this return to the land has compensated them for the hardships. I remember one settlement where I discovered that all the men tending the sheep had held doctors' degrees of one kind or another in their past life in Europe. I wonder if there are many Jews left in Europe who are willing to come and toil on the land in Palestine. The majority (approximately 75 per cent) of the Jews who have come have adopted the easier city life; yet it is the settlers who have suffered the hardships, who have laboured, toiled and produced fine settlements, who are the great advertisement—the one really telling factor on the Jewish side.

(e) Can the National Home be a Paying Concern ?

"The Jews declared in 1923 that the Palestine homeland would eventually be self-supporting. Two decades later it is still an enormous philanthropic venture. The British say it is 40 per cent self-supporting; the Jews say 60 per cent. The United States alone, according to official documents, send \$5,500,000 into Palestine each year (of which \$500 is donated by Christians)."¹

To what extent the National Home is dependent on outside support I do not know, but that it is dependent is unquestionable. In my opinion 40 per cent is nearer the truth than 60 per cent. I am also convinced that the National Home will never be self-supporting if it continues on its present nationalist-Zionist basis, and refuses to co-operate with the Arabs. If Jewish immigration increases, it will be even less self-supporting.

Twice during its history the National Home has only just escaped disaster and has been saved by events quite unconnected with it. Firstly, the Hitler anti-Jewish purges gave to Jews in Europe (who were not necessarily Zionist) a violent desire to escape from Europe. Palestine was a resting-place, even if not so pleasant as either the U.S.A. or Great Britain. The Hitler purges also brought a wave of sympathy towards the Jews, and countries that, perhaps, did not want their Jewish population increased too much saw in the National Home a "way out" of the problem. This all happened at a time when things had been very difficult for the Jews in Palestine and it averted a real crisis.

Secondly, in 1939, when the economic position of the National Home was very unstable, another crisis was only averted by the outbreak of war, which brought employment and money into Palestine.

The standard of living of Jewish labourers is much higher than that of Arab labourers, which is only to be expected. But it is accentuated by the Zionist desire for the "good life in the new world". Unfortunately for them, the Jews cannot expect a high standard of living whilst they have to compete with the products of Egypt and Syria, where the wages and standards of living are very low. I cannot see—unless the Jews adopt a more tolerant attitude towards

¹ Frederick C. Painton, *Report on Palestine*.

the Arabs—Jewish goods ever successfully competing against similar goods produced in Egypt and Syria. The Jews have set up everywhere in Palestine new industries which were not seen before in the Middle East, e.g., diamond-cutting workshops, pharmaceutical laboratories and factories for optical precision instruments and for tinned goods. These "lighter" industries may economically weather the difficult transition from war to peace. But of the "heavier" industries in Palestine, the iron and steel factories, the cement works, and the building industries, I am more than doubtful. The Jewish factories are highly efficient and technique and methods are modern. Their products have been having a temporary success because of war-restricted commerce, but now the war is over they cannot hope to compete in world markets against British and American products, let alone those from Egypt and Syria. The Zionists will not be able to afford to go on paying high wages to keep up the very high standard of living. A slump and unemployment will follow, which will mean the emigration of Jews from Palestine, which is the one thing the Jewish Agency does not want as it means the bursting of the Zionist bubble. They particularly do not want skilled labourers (e.g., diamond workers and oculists, of which there are a number in Palestine) to leave.

Not only has the Jew a very high standard of living, but he has been the cause of raising the Arab standard of living. In Egypt an unskilled labourer gets ten piastres a day (a piastre is approximately 2id.), whereas in Palestine the rate is forty piastres. The rate for skilled labourers is, of course, much higher.

The citrus industry (i.e., oranges, lime, lemons, and grapefruit) was built up to the limit by the Jews before this war. They were exporting about 16,000,000 boxes a year. This industry has been seriously hit by the war. Again, however, I doubt if it will ever be increased beyond the pre-war limit, and I also consider the Palestine orange industry will have great difficulty in exporting successfully against, for example, Spanish oranges.

The Jewish picture of the National Home with at least 2,000,000 Jews is a series of seaside towns, like Haifa and Tel Aviv, surrounded by fertile lands (i.e., both the present "cultivable" land and the "uncultivable" land which such schemes as the Jordan Valley Authority are to make "cultivable"); backed by the exports from Jewish industry and a flourishing citrus trade. It would be surrounded by a hostile Arab world (which would then include the Palestine Arabs, moved out forcibly—but compensated presumably by the British taxpayers and not the Palestine Jews), much better equipped than they to compete in world export trade. This National Home can only exist if it is financed by charity donations from outside. The National Home, with its present population, is not economically sound, and an increased National Home certainly will not be. The question is: "Is World Jewry prepared to go on paying for its experiment?" I personally think that sufficient contributions are unlikely to be forthcoming to support the present National Home, let alone considerably increase it.

(J) The Jews and the British

The Jews go out of their way in Palestine to impress the British. I do not blame them for that. The Jews are most hospitable and I made a great many Jewish friends in Palestine. But I often felt that I was invited into a Jewish

home, not because they wanted to invite me, but because anybody who was willing to lap up Jewish propaganda ought to be invited! The Arabs did the same, but unfortunately for them their opportunities are much more limited. The Jews arrange tours to the settlements, where one has a very good time, plus a very good meal and as one leaves one is given some interesting pamphlets and photos, both on the particular settlement one has visited, and also, more generally, on the creation of the New Palestine by the Jews.

However, even if the Jews wish to impress us, they do not like us. There are exceptions, of course, but I found on the whole that the Jews have an intense dislike of the British. They naturally hate the 1939 White Paper and they think the British are anti-Jew. It is difficult to reconcile this with the Arab complaint that the Jews have so much influence in Britain and America!

This dislike of the British is sometimes concentrated on particular people. One person whom I found very unpopular with the Zionists was a previous High Commissioner (Sir Harold MacMichael). I thought it quite unjustified. I only had one long talk with him on Palestine, and I found him a very balanced and fair judge, apart from being a most cultured and humorous man. Government House is situated on one of the hills around Jerusalem and has on one side a fine view of Jerusalem—with all its historical interest—and on the other side the Jordan Valley with the barren hills in between. One Sunday morning, amidst this beautiful scenery and surrounded by the luxury of Government House, we discussed Palestine. He was neither anti-Jew nor pro-Arab. A remarkably shrewd man, he had the weaknesses and strengths of both parties at his finger-tips. He was equally frank in stating how difficult it was to get co-operation from the Arabs, as he was in his scepticism of the vast schemes of the Jews (e.g., the Jordan Valley Authority) for making the National Home a paying concern. He was very fair and yet the Zionists hated him. As I left Government House his A.D.C., Major Nicholls, asked me to regard our conversation as strictly confidential, as feelings run so high in Palestine. (Major Nicholls has since been badly wounded by a bullet from one of the Jewish assassins who attempted to murder Sir Harold MacMichael.)

If the Jews ever did get complete and effective control of Palestine they would not welcome any British interference, and relations between Jewish Palestine and Great Britain would be very strained. The majority of the Palestine Jews do not like us at all.

The Jews are very addicted to self-pity. They expect everyone to be full of sympathy for their very genuine sufferings in Europe. It was a theme they never hesitated "to play". However, I did not meet a Jew in Palestine who did not regard the sufferings in Europe as the complete justification for the Jewish cause in Palestine. However much the Jews may have suffered in Europe this does not give them, *ipso facto*, a right to Palestine. Yet many of the Jews I talked with were absolutely blinded by the Jewish sufferings in Europe, to Arab sufferings and injustices to the Arabs. The Palestine case must not be judged on Jewish sufferings in Europe—it must be judged on the rights and wrongs of the case in Palestine. I have always had the most sincere feeling for the Jewish sufferings—as have most British—and yet the Jews regarded me as hostile to them if I pointed out that two wrongs do not make a right, or asked them what they thought about the Arab case in Palestine. Their capacity for self-pity is immense and anyone who does not share it is regarded with suspicion and anger.

No one could feel more desperately anxious than I do to do something to alleviate immediately the sufferings of the Jews in Europe. By 1945 it was estimated that of the Jews in Europe, 6,000,000 had perished—and perished miserably in murder and concentration camps—and the living conditions of survivors are still appalling. President Truman received a report from Mr. Earl G. Harrison (U.S.A. representative on the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees) after the latter's visit to Germany.

"As matters now stand we appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis treated them, except that we do not exterminate them . . . generally speaking, three months after VE-day and even longer after the liberation of individual groups, many Jewish displaced persons and other non-repatriables are living behind barbed wire fences in camps of various descriptions built by the Germans for slave labourers and Jews. Their living-quarters include some of the most notorious concentration camps. The Jews are living amid crowded, frequently insanitary and generally grim conditions, in complete idleness with no opportunity, except surreptitiously, to communicate with the outside world, waiting, hoping for some word of encouragement and action."

Not a pretty picture. It was a report on the American Zone but that similar conditions existed in the British Zone was suggested by Mr. Silverman, M.P. It is altogether a very sad and sordid story, although the statements made a few months ago by Lt.-Gen. Morgan, the head of U.N.R.R.A. in Europe, must make one suspect that these conditions are exaggerated. This is very natural as the worse conditions appear the greater the propaganda value of the necessity for large-scale Jewish emigration from Europe to Palestine. Sir Herbert Emerson, one-time High Commissioner for Refugees under the League of Nations, and Honorary Director of the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees, said, regarding the movement of Jews from Poland :

"There has, I think, been a certain amount of organisation in the sense that I know there were regular offices set up, I think, in Cracow or Katowice, where the emigrants could get their forged papers and so on. Some of them, at any rate, got into Czechoslovakia under the guise of Germans who were returning to Germany and that did imply a certain amount of organisation, but it has never been very difficult for the last six or seven years for persons who wanted papers of that sort to get them."

He said this in evidence (in which he confirmed in general terms the statement made by General Morgan) given before the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry.

However, to ship thousands of unfortunate Jews from Europe, in their present weak state, to a land where they are not wanted by the Arabs and where they will meet hostility and bloodshed as a result of their coming, seems a cruel solution to the problem. Nevertheless everywhere the Jews are bringing pressure on Britain to accept immediately large numbers (100,000 is the usual figure given) of Jews in Palestine.

How high Jewish feeling is running with regard to the matter is shown by the following report of a meeting of the British Federation of Jews :—

"Dr. Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Federation and the Jewish Agency, speaking at an emergency conference of the British Federation held in private in London last night, said that since the disappearance of the Nuremberg laws, Palestine, under British mandate, was the only country in the civilised world where discrimination against Jews still existed in law. A policy which would refuse to the Jews the chance of rebuilding their full national life in their historic homeland was not one to which the Jewish people would ever submit. Two months had elapsed since the present Government came into office, yet the White Paper of 1939—condemned by the Labour Party as a breach of faith—was still in force. Immigration was at a standstill, and the land restrictions were being applied with full rigour. While the Jews had been killed in their millions, the world had stood aghast—but did, or could do, nothing to save them. Now, the so-called liberated remnants were continuing to deteriorate and go under, but still no rescue was at hand. To the scores of thousands of victims which the White Paper policy had claimed during the war new peace-time casualties were being added. The Government was apparently beginning to realise that it could not put off a decision regarding Palestine very much longer, but reports were such as to arouse the deepest anxiety about the nature of the decision."

Not only Jews share his view, and the following extract of a letter by Lord Horder published in *The Times* of 22nd September, 1945, is a very good example of the attitude which urges the immediate admittance of Jews to Palestine :—

". . . But while the pros and cons of the various solutions propounded are being weighed from the standpoint of equity and expediency, politics and strategy, the desperate plight of the Jewish survivors in Europe and the crucial urgency of their rehabilitation are liable to be overlooked. Yet these are matters of primary and grave responsibility.

"During the war, 6,000,000 Jews were put to death in Europe. This was the heaviest toll of life that any people has suffered, equivalent proportionately to the extermination of 33,000,000 of the people of this country. They were slaughtered far behind the enemy lines. No way was found of rescuing them from the jaws of death because we ourselves were engaged in a life-and-death struggle. But on the eve of the war we adopted, and throughout its course maintained, an extremely restrictive policy of immigration into Palestine, which paralysed capacity to rescue while rescue was still possible. It is thus unfortunately true that, had the doors of Palestine remained open, tens—if not hundreds—of thousands of those asphyxiated and burned wholesale, including very many children, might have been alive to-day.

"Does not this terrible catastrophe impose on us a supreme obligation towards the surviving remnants ? We hear poignant tales of the sufferings of the people of Europe, both defeated and liberated. But all these peoples, entrenched in the physical possession of their countries, have a **secure future**, however tortuous and hard the road towards it. Not so the Jews. Is it fair to **expect them** to rebuild their **shattered** lives **among** the tombstones of their fellows? Uprooted and homeless, where in liberated or conquered Europe are they to feel secure ? Is it not doubly incumbent on us to spare to ourselves and Jewry alike the ignominy of further suffering and death among the liberated Jews of Europe, if they can be avoided, by swift action ?

There is this further practical consideration, that already the number of refugees and displaced persons in Europe is proving an almost insoluble problem. The removal of 100,000 Jews would do something to ease the situation.

"The Jewish Agency for Palestine has, I think quite justifiably, urged that Palestine be constituted a Jewish commonwealth. At the same time the Jewish Agency has asked that the 100,000 immigration permits be immediately authorised to enable it to meet without further delay the most pressing needs. Cannot this request be satisfied as an urgent interim measure? Or is it really thought conceivable that the policy of 1939, to which we resorted in a moment of weakness, and which even at the time was condemned by the leaders of the present Government and by the leader of the Opposition, should be suffered to impede the salvation of the war's worst sufferers, now that victory is ours?"

I have known Lord Horder for a number of years. I admire him and I know that his views are completely sincere. But I think he is mistaken and I give an answer by Maude Royden Shaw to his letter, which *The Times* also published:—

"Lord Horder's appeal for action to relieve the dreadful tragedy of the Jews falls upon sympathetic ears. No one can be deaf to it. But his suggested response is a cruel anti-climax. Here are his words: 'Does not this terrible catastrophe impose on us a supreme obligation towards the surviving remnants?' and 'Is it not doubly incumbent on us to spare to ourselves and Jewry alike the ignominy of further suffering and death among the liberated Jews of Europe, if they can be avoided, by swift action?' No sooner have we answered that it does and it is then we are told that this 'supreme obligation' is to be cheaply discharged at someone else's expense and we are not to sacrifice anything at all. Our obligation is to be discharged by the Arabs who are in no sense whatever responsible for the tragedy.

"One can imagine the fury that would be aroused in this country if it were to be suggested that we should open our doors to 100,000 Jews 'as an interim measure' before admitting millions more. What country in the world would endure it? Let those whose consciences are most deeply troubled by the Jewish tragedy reply.

"That there are vast spaces in the world still practically empty no one will deny. Let all of us seek an asylum for the Jews which will be offered willingly and made with the consent of the country in question. The Arabs have never been asked whether they are willing to admit more Jews and have never ceased to protest against their large-scale immigration which aims at making the Palestinian Arab a minority in his own country. Before the outbreak of the second World War their indignation was such that Palestine was in a state of civil war. It is once more on the brink of it. The Jews, if they are mad enough to accept the assurances of the Zionists, will find themselves in a land where they are hated to the point of fury and which is surrounded by millions of bitter enemies far outnumbering them. We shall then be due for another Jewish tragedy '*"

I think she is right. Of course something must be done, and done at once to relieve the present conditions of the Jews still suffering in Europe. The various Control Commissions and U.N.R.R.A. should at once setup comfortable camps for these Jews where they can be nursed physically and mentally back to health. Good clothing and medical supplies, etc., for these special camps should be immediately forthcoming. The U.S.A. seems most anxious to help the Jews and therefore perhaps they would be willing to house and look after any Jews that the Russians in their zone might not be so willing to help. Then having got the Jews in properly run camps, having cared for them tenderly, they will be ready for emigration which at present I suggest they are not. Britain, the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. must all do something for the unhappy Jews in Europe. We must do it at once and what I consider is the first task—a task which can be done—is to look after them properly whilst they remain in Europe.

(g) *Will Jews Come to Palestine now that the War is Over ?*

To answer this question one must first distinguish "Jews*" from "Zionists," and, secondly, consider whether the Jews already in Palestine will want to stay there. I believe that of the "Jews" in Europe, not many will wish to emigrate to Palestine. (Although, according to Messrs. Earl G. Harrison and Silverman, I am wrong—but I maintain that I would be right if the present deplorable conditions of the Jews were remedied in Europe, which, as I have already suggested, is the first task to be carried out.)

Now that the Nazi horror has been removed, provided the Atlantic Charter operates there will presumably be no further Jewish persecution. This, incidentally, is one of the points the Arabs are now making quite strongly—"Surely," they say, "if you have abolished Jewish persecution in Europe, the Jews will not want to come to Palestine?" However, against this argument there is the possibility that many "Jews" will not want to risk a repetition of Hitlerism. These will prefer to emigrate to the U.S.A. or Great Britain, or, if these countries will not take them, they may then choose Palestine. On the whole, however, I do not think there will be a mass desire by the "Jews" to emigrate to Palestine. They must realise that it is not a country in which they are welcomed by the Arabs, and that life there is not going to be easy for them now that the war is over.

"Zionists" are different. With them the return to Palestine is a faith. The Nazi concentration and mass murder camps have killed many of them, but those who do go will go fervently.

Of the Jews in Palestine now, I estimate that approximately 20 per cent probably wish to emigrate. These comprise :—

- (i) Non-Zionists in Palestine who feel out of place there.
- (ii) Jews, whether Zionist or non-Zionist, who feel that Palestine is never going to be an economically "healthy" or a happy country. (I include in this class Jews who feel Jewish policy *vis-a-vis* the Arab will not work.)
- (iii) Professional men and their families who feel there is not room for them in Palestine (There is an abundance of doctors and specialists in Palestine. I believe there is approximately one doctor to every hundred Jewish persons!)
- (iv) Skilled workmen who can make a much better living in Europe (e.g. diamond workers),
- (v) Jews who have found the life and climate unsuitable to them.

I met many families who regarded Palestine as a stepping-stone between the hell of anti-Jewish Hitlerism and the new life in the U.S.A. I know several families who left Europe about 1937 and were just waiting to emigrate to the U.S.A. I remember one particular case where the mother and father had already emigrated to the U.S.A. from Palestine during the war. They left behind their grown-up children to follow on. Unfortunately the daughters had married Zionists and their husbands had already made it quite clear there was no leaving Palestine! A family, some of whose members were Zionists and some not, was, in my experience, invariably an unhappy one.

Summing up, I think that about 120,000 Jews (i.e., 20 per cent) probably wish to leave Palestine, and that during the next few years this exodus will be balanced by a demand for immigration, which will steadily decrease. Whether Palestine can support two million Jews or not, I do not believe that 2,000,000 Jews could ever be brought into Palestine without compulsion of some kind. If the Jewish immigration into and emigration from Palestine were absolutely without control, I doubt if the Jewish population would reach the million mark.

(h) *The Unpleasant Side of Zionism*

The unpleasant side of Jewish life in Palestine has been apparent to many people who have been there. Recently it has been given publicity by:—

- (1) Jewish terrorist activities, i.e., the "Stern Gang".
- (2) Articles in the Press (e.g., *The Much Promised Land*, by F. Lawrence Babcock, an article in the American periodical *Fortune*).

One has got to realise that the original settlers were violent Zionists. They came to form a new life—a Hebrew life. They intended to speak the Hebrew tongue and to live according to Hebrew custom and tradition. They were not prepared to compromise. When it became clear that the Arabs were not going to be submerged by Zionism, the Zionists became more than ever determined to stay in Palestine and follow their own mode of life there. Their children were educated on Zionist lines and you have now the first generation of Jews in Palestine to be brought up on rigid Zionist lines. This Zionist education resembles Nazi education in its thoroughness and its intensity. Zionism is a form of Nationalism and like any other form of Nationalism, it is unpleasant. The Zionists want all other Jews in Palestine to live a Zionist life. I came across several incidents of persecution of Jews who were non-Zionists. There were two youths who were apparently too outspoken about their desire to leave Palestine after the war. They were removed one day from their respective homes, taken to some lonely outbuilding and after some "third degree" questioning, which lasted for two or three days, were stripped nude, tarred and feathered and deposited in the main street of Haifa on a Saturday evening. I remember talking to a most charming old Jewish doctor and his wife, who confessed, after I had got to know them well, that they were on the black list of Jews known not to be Zionists. They admitted that they had to be very careful as to their behaviour and what they said, otherwise the Zionists made life unpleasant for them. Many Jews told me similar stories of the unpopularity of non-Zionists, who are regarded as traitors by the Zionists. In giving evidence before the Anglo-American Committee two British witnesses—Mr. Matthew and Miss Warburton, both representing the Church Missionary Society—drew attention to the growing similarity between extreme Zionism and Nazism and

said this similarity was felt by many Jewish parents who brought their children to the English schools in Palestine saying that they did not want to send them to the Zionist schools where "they would be turned into young Nazis".

The following two reports on the disagreeable side of Zionism bear out what I say. First, the following, written by Rex North, in the *Sunday Pictorial* of 7th October, during a visit to Palestine:—

"There is something very artificial about the laughter and song of this city (Tel Aviv, the holiday paradise that is the pride of every Jew in Palestine) now. You pass a café wrecked and closed. Why?

"The owners employed two Arabs to wash up in the kitchen. Along came the hoodlums from the Jews' underground National Military Organisation at the busiest time of the evening and tore it apart.

"Of course they weren't caught. They never are. Every onlooker is sublimely ignorant when questioned. Notice something else, too!

"Despite the fact that the streets are crowded with British troops, you can look around for a long time before you see one drinking or dancing with a Jewish girl.

"Why? I asked military policeman Charles Elliott.

"I had a very charming girl friend,' he said. 'We were going to a dance. I called at the house and she said she was sorry but she could not see me again. She had just received a warning letter from the N.M.O. to stop seeing me—or else. . . .'

"There is a shout from along the promenade and you find yourself running towards it. The Palestine police in their khaki uniforms and blue R.A.F. type hats are there. They are questioning two panting, bruised and battered British soldiers.

Now What?

"What happened? They saw a notice pinned to a lamp-post. On the top of it was a hand clutching a rifle, and underneath the words, 'Last warning to British police. Keep out of our way or you will be sorry.*' The soldiers reached up to snatch the notice down—and then, from the crowded pavements a dozen pair of fists slapped their arms down. 'Did anyone see who was responsible?' the police ask the crowd. But they are wasting their time. Of course not."

Secondly, in the *News of the World* Richard Wyndham (Special Correspondent in the Middle East) wrote on 7th October:

"It is not uncommon to hear a burst of machine-gun fire in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv: a short burst—perhaps only ten rounds—and then silence. There is no chance of shooting back.

"In England, next morning, you read that a British police constable, sergeant or officer, of the Palestine Police Force, has been shot dead.

"It would be wrong if I gave the impression that these men are complaining that their services are unrecognised; the day and night risk of being shot in the back is part of their contract.

"But there is one thing they resent—when certain British newspapers with Zionist sympathies insist that these murderers are 'a mere fraction of the Jewish population , . . just a handful of terrorists*."

"In this they had my agreement for I knew they had always been out-numbered. It was only when I applied elementary arithmetic, however, that I fully understood how misleading such statements are.

"The terrorist gangs number about 6,000, which is 1 per cent of the Jewish population. That does not sound much until you apply the same percentage to Great Britain.

"It would mean, roughly, 450,000 murderers at large; a body of terrorists twice the size of, and far better trained than, our pre-war standing army.

"A pretty 'handful' indeed, for our county and Metropolitan Police!

"Criticism in Britain for failing to make arrests does not bother the police—that has always been the policeman's lot—but that this criticism should also come from the moderate Jew in Palestine seems to them irrational.

"If the Jewish man in the street was prepared to assist us with information," Inspector-General Rymer Jones told me in Palestine recently, "we could have crushed terrorism out of existence. But these moderate Jews, however much they condemn, are not prepared to inform. That is my greatest difficulty—and I am speaking as an ordinary English policeman, which was my job. The English public are the best police in the world and the regular police force could not work without their assistance.

"In a sense the more successful we are, the more difficult our job becomes, because we drive the terrorists from the towns into their country hide-outs.

"That's where, in England, the little shopkeeper, the road-sweeper, or neighbours chatting at their cottage doors, would become amateur detectives and assist justice.

"If, as might happen, the policing of Palestine is handed over to the United Nations, and the Palestine Police Force disbanded, then these words of Viscount Gort, V.C., might well be their epitaph: 'Of any single unit in our Empire Forces, the Palestine Police Force must have the highest percentage of men deserving the Victoria Cross.'"

As I have said earlier on, I consider that about 20 per cent of the Palestine Jews probably wish to emigrate. Every effort will be made to prevent their going. Many non-Zionist Jews have told me this. From the Zionist point of view this is quite understandable, for one way of seriously undermining the Jewish case in Palestine would be by permitting a large Jewish exodus. (Incidentally another way would be—if a Jewish State is contemplated in Palestine—by insistence that all Jews everywhere are automatically "Jewish citizens" first. This would cause such an outcry from British and American Jews that support from them for Palestine would rapidly cease, and one would hear very little more of the National Home!)

The Zionists are preparing very thoroughly for the coming struggle. Just as the Arabs will fight if any attempt is made to move them forcibly out of Palestine, so will the Zionists fight to get their way in Palestine. They are making every effort to be ready. They are training men and hoarding arms—supposedly in secret, but it is known to everyone, including the British authorities, who seem completely unable to stop it. It is said that many Jewish settlements are just arms and ammunition dumps. Whilst I was in Palestine one settlement was raided and apart from a great quantity of small arms and

ammunition, two 25-pounder guns and a tank were found! A great deal of the arms, etc. now in Jewish possession have been obtained by various means from Allied armies in the Middle East. (The court-martialing of two British soldiers for arms-running, i.e. selling stolen arms to the Jews, created a big stir two or three years ago.) There is one way in which the Jews can legally possess trained men. Each Jewish settlement was permitted, after the Arab riots of 1929, to possess a small armed force, known as Settlement Police. These Jewish police were genuinely very necessary for the self-protection of the settlements. However, there are several "illegal" Jewish armies in Palestine. Firstly, there is the Haganah, which is between 50,000 and 70,000 strong, and is said to contain men both well trained and well armed. When I was in Palestine the Jewish Agency was supposed officially to know nothing of the Haganah, although many Jews told me, and I found it generally believed, that it was the private army of the Jewish Agency. However, it appears from the following notes by the Special Correspondent of *The Times* that the Haganah is openly recognised by the Jewish Agency. The description of its origin, and its relation to other Jewish "armies" to which I refer below are interesting.

"Among the three Hebrew para-military organisations, Haganah, by far the strongest, has a curious semi-legal status. Haganah means "defence," and the organisation began under Turkish rule, when Jewish settlers enjoyed hardly any legal protection and had to look after themselves. This necessity persisted after the British conquest. With the rapid expansion of Zionist colonisation, the isolated Hebrew settlements in the hills of Galilee or the Judean desert were constantly exposed to attack by Bedouins, robbers, and later by Arab terrorists. Thus Haganah grew and assumed virtual charge of the security of the Hebrew rural settlements and even of the more exposed quarters of the towns, becoming an illegal organisation tolerated by the Government. This toleration became open collaboration during the disturbances of 1936-1939, when Wingate recruited from the Haganah his Special Night Squads to fight Arab terrorists.

"After the disturbances, and with the inauguration of the White Paper policy in 1939, this collaboration ended and the police were given orders to arrest members of the Haganah and confiscate their arms. The war brought another change: in the days of El Alamein members of the Haganah were trained by the military authorities for guerrilla warfare in the hills of Palestine should the country be occupied by the enemy. A large number of leaders of the Haganah volunteered for special missions and were parachuted behind the German lines in the Balkan countries; other units carried out acts of sabotage in Vichy Syria and in the Libyan desert. Altogether 26,000 Palestinian Jews, mostly members of the Haganah, joined the forces. The corresponding figure of Arab volunteers is 9,000 which, taking total population figures into account, amounts to a percentage proportion of six Jewish volunteers to one Arab.

"Once the danger had passed the treatment of the Haganah reverted to that of the period just before the war. Arms searches were carried out in Hebrew settlements and arrests of Haganah members were followed by trials before military courts. The sentences were heavy. For instance, Eliahu Sacharoff, a member of the Haganah, was sentenced by the Jerusalem Military Court on 10th October, 1943, to seven years' imprisonment for the

The organisation called Palmakh, said to be not more than 2,000 strong, is the spearhead—or commando troops—of the Haganah.

The Irgun Z'vai Leumi b'Israel, or the National Militant Organisation of Israel, is said to be between 5,000 and 10,000 strong. This private army is an offshoot of the Revisionists, and presumably as such, is not openly recognised by the Jewish Agency. It will be seen that my figures as to the "strength" of this "army" differ from that given by *The Times*' Special Correspondent. This is not surprising as no doubt the Commanders want the strength to be a matter of speculation! But my source probably included the "sympathisers" to which *The Times*' Special Correspondent refers. But the "sympathy" is by no means passive! Of this "army" Richard Wyndham writes:

"This organisation was recruited originally in 1937 from the 'youth movement' of the 'Revisionist' Party, now called 'The New Zionist Organisation'. Its purpose, too, was the defence of farms, but its policy differed from that of the Haganah, who then only trained themselves for 'passive defence,' whereas the I.Z.L. believed in 'active defence,' countering Arab guerrilla warfare with 'eye for eye and tooth for tooth' tactics. It has now become an underground illegal body of some 5,000 well-armed men. The I.Z.L. is organised on strictly military lines, except that each unit only knows its leader, who, in turn, has contact only with his immediate superior, which is the principle of the Russian 'cell'.

"The Commander-in-Chief is Polish ex-officer Manamen Beigin, a lanky figure with spectacles and hatchet face. As his "operational chief" he had, until his capture, Merridor, who was generally supposed to be the brains behind the organisation. Their 'operational staff' is based on the 'Continental Division'.

"There exists an elaborate system of blackmail, extortion under threat, and robbery, for raising funds from the Jews—but no one dares inform.

"Their 'Intelligence Branch' is excellent, with secret agents from all walks of life employed in the main hotels, and even in our police headquarters.

"Finally, their discipline is as strict as that of any army in the world. They claim that they do not murder by 'firing from hidden places at accidental opponents,' but only "kill in battle". Their principal activities have been the dynamiting of public buildings, such as police-stations—activities which incidentally have led to the loss of many British lives.

"The fact that this organisation should again be active is an indication of how suddenly critical the position in Palestine has again become, for only six months ago this miniature secret army was crushed—'unless it could regain public sympathy and replenish its ranks'.

"The events which *had* to this situation are almost unique in history. Jew informed against Jew, and the young Zionists of the land, realising that terrorism would end in the wreckage of their cause, took the law into their own hands.

"They became kidnappers and men disappeared, to return two or three weeks later with changed views.

"For a few months our Palestine police, who had until now worked in complete darkness, received co-operation and information. As a result hundreds of terrorists were arrested, including Chief-of-Staff Merridor.

"Had this continued Commander-in-Chief Beigin might now be interned in Rhodesia instead of—through lack of evidence—walking the streets of Jerusalem.

"Activities were ended, not by the I.Z.L. but the British authorities on the p6dectly-correct ground that no one under British administration can be allowed to take the law into his own hands."

Finally the Stern Gang. It has often been suggested that this gang was financed by the Axis Powers. Of this gang Richard Wyndham writes:—

"These are 'terrorists' pure and simple, without any scruples over 'shooting from hidden places.' They have murdered a large number of British policemen, attempted to murder the last High Commissioner, MacMichael, and succeeded in murdering Lord Moyne and his driver, Gunner Fuller.

"Their original leader was a young intellectual, a student of history at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem by the name of Abraham Stern, who in 1941 was shot while resisting rearrest.

"The new youth of his movement call themselves 'The Fighters for Freedom of Israel'. Who their present leader is I do not know, nor do any members of the group except the very highest, for they work even more secretly than the I.Z.L.

"Their activities are not confined to Palestine: they probably have agents in London, and certainly in Egypt, where a considerable number are believed to have enlisted in the British Army.

"Their creed is murder—murder to shock the world for a cause and irrespective of the innocence of the victims. That is why Moyne died. His murder was "an act of warfare" against the British Government, whom he represented.

"These Sterns claim that they are not fighting the Arabs, with whom they have no quarrel—their enemy is England.

"And it will be important during the next few months or weeks to remember these words: 'You are mistaken if you think we want to change a bad government for a good government. Our aim is to pull it out by the roots and throw it away.'

"They were spoken from the dock in Cairo by one of Moyne's assassins."

Peter Duffield also has something of interest to write about this terrorist organisation:—

"The gang is formed in cells of three, of whom only one of each three knows one of the next cell of three. But though neither of Lord Moyne's two killers spilled secrets before their execution, significant information emerged from the trial.

"It was that Hakim and Beth Tsouri—dispatched separately to Cairo—had never met in Palestine. That the pistol used in the killing had been used in five previous outrages. That both men got through the heavily-watched frontier in British uniform."

Many Zionists were quite open about these elaborate preparations, and said they were for defence only, i.e. to protect the Jews against Arab attacks. I doubt very much if they will be limited to defence! The Arabs are of course hiding arms as well, but not in such numbers, nor are they as well trained.

On the Arab organisation Richard Wyndham writes:—

"In the Arab-speaking World, which, apart from the seaboard, completely surrounds the Holy Land, there are over forty millions pledged by their League to support the independence of Palestinian Arabs. ^ This figure does not imply a vast military machine. Mobilisation of Arab forces across the borders would be purely on the feudal system—a 'gathering of the tribes,' with each sheikh providing his private army according to the number of his dependants, and fighting his own battles. I doubt whether, even in Palestine itself, there would be much centralised leadership, as there is no leader. On the other hand, the rough, mountainous country lends itself to 'partisan' guerrilla warfare.

"In the matter of arms, there is no adult tribesman who does not possess a rifle, and each tribe undoubtedly has a good supply of light automatic weapons. This very lack of organisation, however, makes it more difficult to estimate their true armaments, for instead of secret arsenals that can be raided, every man uses his own hide-out—generally a disused well in the desert, or the rafters of his mud hut. They have no heavy armaments; in fact, I doubt whether they would know how to use them. From the point of view of morale this is perhaps to their advantage. Unendowed with the mechanical mind, they could be thrashed to demoralisation in a mechanised battle, whereas at present they would have no shame in bolting, and no hesitation in attacking if the situation seemed favourable. In the above estimate I am not, of course, including the regular armies of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and 'Glubs girls' of the Emir of Transjordan. But that these armies should ever be compelled to march against British soldiers is unthinkable. It would mean that our foreign policy had drifted out of the realm of ignorance into the realm of lunacy. It would mean that we had shattered for ever the Arab's faith in the friendship and integrity of the British Empire."

As may be seen, the Jewish "armed forces" represent quite a considerable threat. Incidentally the Zionists learnt a great deal about fighting from the late General Wingate, who organised and trained Jewish parties. Wingate was very much admired by the Jews in Palestine, and his death was greatly publicised in the Jewish Press, in which he was given some magnificent obituary notices.

The Jewish intelligence system in Palestine is considered to be one of the best in the world. (I once heard a British Major-General describe the Jewish intelligence organisation as the finest in the world.) Government officials told me that it was impossible to keep any plan a secret—it was always known to the Jews before it was operated. Their methods of obtaining information were often unpleasant. A British Palestine policeman married to a Palestine Jewess told me that he and other people in similar circumstances never discussed anything connected with Palestine with their wives, in case their wives found their loyalty to the Zionist cause too strong, or in case the families of the wives were made to suffer if news were not passed on. It was openly considered that the majority of the Jews working in Government departments were loyal first to the Zionist cause and secondly to the Mandate. If they were not they probably lost their jobs, although Jews who were thought "unreliable" Zionists would probably never have been appointed to such jobs.

(i) *The benefit Palestine has received from the National Home*

Many Arabs make out that they have not received any benefits at all from the Jewish immigration. This is obviously not true. However the following sentefees by *The Times'* Special Correspondent produced in subsequent correspondence a good example of the Arab argument:—

"The country's present prosperity is partly due to the war and mainly to the last great pre-war wave of wealthy immigrants from Germany and Eastern Europe. Everywhere in Palestine new industries have been set up of a type hitherto unknown in the Middle East, such as diamond-cutting workshops, pharmaceutical laboratories, and factories for optical precision instruments, and for tinned goods. Behind these medium-sized pioneer industries stand the older 'heavy' industries like the cement works and oil refineries of Haifa, the great building co-operative Solel Boneh, and the potash works on the Dead Sea. At the same time some of the Hebrew collective settlements have begun to develop their own local industries—new types of semi-rural, semi-industrial combines, which seem to produce satisfactory results. All this helps to give modern Palestine a well-balanced economic structure, sufficiently many-sided and elastic to survive the shock of transition from war to peace.

"Revisiting Palestine after an absence of ten years, one cannot fail to be impressed by the progress that has been achieved. This is even more conspicuous among the Arabs, because of their lower starting-level. The transition from mud huts to stone houses, from the rabbit-warren of old Jaffa to the spacious avenues of the modern town, is a greater contrast than, for example, the more homogeneous growth of Tel Aviv. Ten years ago the Arab villages abounded in half-blind old men. Trachoma among the children seemed universal; now it has largely disappeared. The decrease in child mortality is equally striking. After centuries of stagnation the Arab population has doubled between 1922 and 1942. These spectacular results are traceable either directly to the work of Jewish hospitals and doctors or to the Government's health services and schools, which indirectly are also financed by Jewish tax-payers (whose contribution a head is between eight and ten times that of the Arabs)."

Edward Atiyah of the Arab office in London produced the following argument in reply:—

"Your Correspondent, apparently accepting Zionist claims at their face value and putting them forward with more zeal than accuracy, attributes the progress of the Palestine Arabs during the last twenty-five years to Jewish enterprise and the contributions made to the Palestine Government treasury by the Jewish taxpayers. He entirely overlooks the fact that this period has been one of progress and construction in all the Arab World, and that the Egyptians, the Syrians, the Lebanese, and the Iraqis have all, since their liberation from Turkey or their attainment of self-government, achieved an even greater measure of social economic progress than their compatriots in Palestine, and that without any help from Jewish immigration.

"In Palestine the Arabs and the Jews live largely in watertight compartments, each with its own schools, hospitals, and other social services. Arab children go either to the Government schools or to private Arab

schools, Jewish children to Jewish schools, and so to a great extent with hospitals; so that little of the improvement in public health among the Arabs during these years can be attributed to Zionist medical enterprise. It is due largely to the medical services of the Mandatory Power and to the Arab medical enterprise. Actually, in education the boot would seem to be entirely on the other foot, for according to the report recently published by the Education Department of the Palestine Government for 1942-43 there were during this period 1,368 Jewish pupils in Arab schools, while of the 9,979 pupils in Jewish schools there were only thirteen Moslems, and thirteen Christians. Your Correspondent does not give his authority for stating that the contribution of the Jewish taxpayers per head is between eight and ten times that of the Arabs. Seeing that the income-tax is only four years old in Palestine, and that previous to that the bulk of revenue from direct taxation came from the house tax, land tax, and cattle tax (in all of which Arab ownership far exceeded Jewish), it is clear that the ratio he gives is incorrect for the whole period. In any case, the argument of a forcibly conferred benefit, as your Correspondent himself seems to realise, is a mockery."

This argument was strongly repudiated by *The Times'* Special Correspondent in a letter published in that paper on 4th October, 1945, as follows:—

"Mr. Atiyah challenges passages in my articles referring to the benefits which the Arab population of Palestine derived from Jewish enterprise and capital, and alleges that I have accepted 'Zionist claims at their face value.' The fact is that the documentary material in my articles was entirely derived from official statistics and from the Report of the Palestine Royal Commission (Stationery Office, 1937, Cmd. 5479). To take one example, Mr. Atiyah writes that 'little of the improvement in public health among the Arabs during these years can be attributed to Zionist medical enterprise. It is due largely to the medical services of the Mandatory Power and to Arab medical enterprise.' Compare with this the Report of the Royal Commission, page 129:—

The general beneficent effect of Jewish immigration on Arab welfare is illustrated by the fact that the increase in Arab population is most marked in urban areas affected by Jewish development. A comparison of the census returns in 1922 and 1931 shows that six years ago the increase in percentage in Haifa was 86, in Jaffa 62, in Jerusalem 37, while in purely Arab towns, such as Nablus and Hebron, it was only 7, and at Gaza there was a decrease of 2 per cent.

"Or, in terms of expenditure: Government expenditure on medical services in 1934-35, £166,000. Jewish Agency expenditure, £350,000. No expenditure by Arab organisations. (*Ibid*, pp. 312-313.)

"I have no space to answer in detail Mr. Atiyah's similarly ill-informed assertions about education and taxation. The relevant data can be found in official statistics and the Royal Commission's report, pp. 333 ff. and 129. I wish to wind up this part of the argument by two quotations. The first is taken from the report of the Palestine Currency Board in 1937-38:— 'The whole of the financial and economic system in Palestine is so closely interwoven with the expectation of continued Jewish immigration that any drastic interference with its flow must be expected to have far-reaching

budgetary and other consequences.' The second is from a statement by the Colonial Secretary of the Chamberlain Cabinet, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, under whose tenure of office the White Paper of 1939 was issued and who can hardly be suspected of having accepted '*Zionist claims àvtheir face value':—

'If not a single Jew had come to Palestine after 1918, I believe the Arab population of Palestine to-day would still have been round about the 600,000 figure at which it had been stable under Turkish rule. It is because the Jews who have come to Palestine bring modern health services and other advantages that Arab men and women who would be dead are alive to-day, that Arab children who would never have drawn breath have been born and grown strong. The Arabs in Palestine have gained very greatly from the Balfour Declaration. {*Hansard*, 25th November, 1938.)

"Mr. Atiyah further argues that 'the Egyptians, the Syrians, the Lebanese and the Iraqis have . . . achieved an even greater measure of social and economic progress than their compatriots in Palestine.' Any traveller who has spent even a short time in these countries will read this assertion with a smile. Here are a few relevant statistics: Increase in the extension of irrigated areas from 1922 to 1940; Syria 25 per cent, Egypt 13 per cent, Palestine 1,210 per cent. Decrease in infant mortality between 1921 and 1939; Egypt 9 per cent, Transjordan 7 per cent, Palestine (Moslem population) 27 per cent. (No figures for Syria are available.) Health expenditure a head in 1936-37: Palestine £0.161 (index 100); Iraq £0.077 (index 47.8); Transjordan £0.051 (index 31.7). These data could be multiplied; the simplest proof of the attraction which Palestine exerts on the Arabs of the backward neighbouring countries is the increase in Arab immigration into Palestine (1923: 570; 1938: 2,395)."

I consider the reply a very fair one. There can be no doubt that the Arabs have benefited by the National Home. Mr. Atiyah's claim to the natural emancipation of the Arab is also true and I have heavily stressed the importance of this in the last chapter. That the benefits to the Arabs have been "enforced" I do not deny, but whether the Arabs would rather have had no benefits and no Jews is not the point. The point is that the National Home has brought benefits to the Arabs in the past. On the other hand, I quite see the point of view: "no more 'benefits', please, if it means more Jews". The Arabs do not want to sink to a minority in Palestine for the sake of increased benefits. They would obviously rather get increased welfare, prosperity, education, etc., by their own methods even if these methods are much slower.

(J) *The U.S.A. and the Jews in Palestine*

The U.S.A. has been taking an increased interest in Palestine. President Truman instructed General Eisenhower in September 1945 to take swift steps to remedy conditions described by Mr. Earl G. Harrison, to which I referred earlier in this chapter. In a letter to General Eisenhower the President said:—

"I hope that you will adopt the suggestion that a more extensive plan of field visitation by the appropriate army group headquarters be instituted, so that the human policies which have been enunciated are not permitted to be ignored in the field.

"Most of the conditions now existing in displaced persons' camps would be quickly remedied if, through inspection tours, they came to your attention or to the attention of your supervisory officers."

The President also told General Eisenhower that:—

"I am communicating directly with the British Government in an **W**o**r**t to have the doors of Palestine opened to those displaced persons who wish to &o there."

The reason for this is, I imagine, twofold. Firstly, the old reason, namely the influence of the Jews in the U.S.A. Secondly, the new one based partly on a genuine desire to help the plight of the Jews in Europe and partly on the following report from Mr. Earl G. Harrison to the President.

"Palestine is definitely and pre-eminently the first choice of many of these Jews for their future destination. Some, but the number is not large, wish to emigrate to the U.S., where they have relatives, others to England, the British Dominions, or Latin-America. The issue of Palestine must be faced.

"Now that such large numbers are no longer involved, and if there is any genuine sympathy for what these survivors have endured, some reasonable extension or modification of the British White Paper of 1939 ought to be possible without too serious repercussions."

Great Britain's reply to this was to permit immigration at the rate of 1,500 a month, and to set up the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry. When the reply reached the U.S.A. one Senator announced publicly that he regarded it as monstrously cruel to the Jews and "one of the blackest spots in British history!"

Of course, the Palestine issue must be faced! I consider that Palestine should be a problem for solution by the United Nations, and that if the U.S.A. is so strongly in favour of Palestine for the Jews she must accept her share of the responsibility for what happens if there is a consequent Arab uprising in the Middle East. As it is, it is difficult to imagine the U.S.A. sending even one of her soldiers to restore peace if there is trouble as a result of President Truman's request!

The comments of a *News of the World* leader are much to the point, **I think**:—

"It is useless to tell the Arabs that Palestine is a small fraction of the Arab world—they could live elsewhere. You might as well tell a Channel Islander that his island is a small fraction of the British Empire—before handing his home back to France.

"President Truman's interference is understandable; he has nothing to lose. He receives the gratitude of all the Jews of America, but none of the Arabs' odium; for there are few in the United States. It is as if England—to please her African colonies—interfered with the American colour question.

"This country would be only too willing to study American views if the U.S. agreed to accept joint responsibility for Palestine.

"On no account must we allow this Palestine problem to blind us to the hardships and sufferings that still exist among the Jews of Central **Europe**, persecuted beyond endurance for the last five years.

"But the question is surely one for the world."

The policy of the British Labour Party on Palestine before it came into power was well known. They were frankly pro-Jew. Although a member of the Labour Party, it was a point of policy on which I disagreed with them. Since assuming power, I imagine they have had to reflect. I hope so and I hope also that they will not be stampeded into a false decision by pressure from the U.S.A. A decision for which they would not get practical assistance, I contend, from the U.S.A. if things went wrong.

(k) Is there an alternative to Palestine for the Jews ?

I think there is. But the Zionists think not. The question "would the Jews be welcome elsewhere" is one which we must all face. The answer is that in most countries the entry of a large number of Jews would not be welcome. I think the Jews know this. They are aware of an increase in anti-Semitism almost everywhere in recent years. This is another reason why Palestine means so much to them. That the Jews are using every means to force a decision in their favour will be seen from the speeches of the following Jewish speakers, made during the autumn of 1945.

Mr. R. Zaslani (of the Jewish Agency for Palestine):—

"The real problem which faces Britain in Palestine now is one which can lead to war. Unless the needs of the Jews are met, this terrible calamity is inevitable, and, should it happen, we, as an organisation responsible for Palestinian Jews, will have to admit that there is no other way.

"War is an act of despair, and the Jews in Europe are desperate. They are saying: 'We have these alternatives—suicide or refuge in Palestine'.

"Thousands of them are determined that they will take things into their own hands. They will steal boats, buy boats, and they will go across the Mediterranean.

"They will resist all attempts to prevent them from landing. Tens of thousands are prepared to seek refuge from the terrors of Europe by flight to Palestine, and thousands of them will break through. They will have arms, without a doubt.

"The 600,000 Jews in Palestine are all related to these fugitives from the misery of Europe.

"There are arms in Palestine which, for the most part, have never been abused. But, should this descent on Palestine start with bloodshed, then the Jews in Palestine will regard it as their own personal fight. We shall regard such a happening as the greatest calamity to befall the Jewish people in a generation.

"Figures which have reached the Jewish Agency in London show that, in the past two months, more than 15,000 Jews have crossed frontiers to reach Italy.

"This is the most dire warning, but it would be a terrible thing if it were mistaken for nothing more than a political talk. This is the stark truth."

Mr. E. Kaplan :—

"That the policy England has adopted in the Near East may turn against herself.

"Any attempt to declare war on us will be disastrous—and not for us alone. We know our strength and shall know how to defend ourselves!"

Mr. Isaac Tobenkin :—

"To declare war on us is not the same thing as to declare war on the Ghetto. We have learned our lesson. We won't be late and will not allow ourselves to be driven to slaughter. . . .

"We make a last appeal to British Labour. Let them know that the Jewish workers of Palestine are ready to sacrifice themselves for the existence and honour of their nation . . . conditions for Jews in Europe are now worse than ever.

"They are fleeing from Poland, and even in Holland now there is anti-Semitism.

"Only one thing can save these people, and that is the National Home. If it is not granted, then no one can foresee the extent of the catastrophe."

According to Mr. Zaslani the two latter speakers are moderate men of the party!

(At the same time as the foregoing speeches were being made, the following was sent by Mr. Jinnah, President of the AU-India Moslem League, to Mr. Attlee: "It is my duty to inform you that any surrender to appease Jewry at the sacrifice of the Arabs would be deeply resented and vehemently resisted by the Moslem world and by Moslem India. Its consequences will be most disastrous.")

The Jews appear to mean business, and incited by ardent Zionists would resort to force. However, as I have already said, large numbers of Jews are not Zionists. These only want peace. Removed from the incitements of their Zionist brethren, they would accept peace in other territory than Palestine. I am sure that territory would be forthcoming. So apparently is Maude Royden Shaw in these words:—

". . . does not deny—who can?—the existence of vast spaces in the world where Jews could settle: he says the world 'has not found them'. Why? Because it has not looked. Let us then cease trying to cram millions of Jews into an immensely hostile little country, about as big as Wales, counting up the square mileage of the Arab countries, and telling the Jews they will be safe in one of them when it is glaringly clear that they will not; and let us count up the mileage of the British Commonwealth, the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R. for a change. Let us reflect that the U.S.S.R. has done something for the Jews in giving them Biro-Bidsan, but that our British contribution has been a standing up of M.P.s for 60 seconds (or was it 30?) to express the immense sympathy we all feel for the Jews, and the American help is a letter from President Truman to say how urgent it is that the Arabs should do what neither Americans nor British will. It is not impressive.

"We British have at least the excuse that our little country is overcrowded already and that the improvement of Arab living conditions in Palestine,

and the consequent increase in its population—which Zionists calmly claim as due to themselves alone—is largely due to the patient, devoted and unadvertised efforts of the British Administration. The people of the U.S.A. confine their efforts to giving us bad advice and keeping Jewish refugees out of their vast, rich, and under-populated country. That much of it is under-populated no one can deny. So is Canada, so is Australia, so is New Zealand, so is much of Africa. But we cannot compel these countries to admit millions of Jews. No. And we think we can compel the Arabs. We are wrong."

Very terse. Very much to the point.

Before finishing this chapter I advise people who want to go into the Jewish case more deeply to read Victor Gollancz's book *Nowhere To Lay Their Heads*. It describes the tragic history of the Jews in Europe during the 1939-45 war. No one can read it without feeling deep pity and a desire to help them at once.

In addition, I think the following political declaration of the World Zionist Conference held in September 1945 will be of interest, as it summarises the present Jewish view on Palestine. Whether right or wrong it is balanced and moderate in tone—unlike the Jewish speeches I have quoted above:—

"The Conference notes with deep regret and resentment that the White Paper of 1939 is, even after the termination of the war, still in force. The White Paper constituted a repudiation of the international pledge undertaken towards the Jewish people; it violated the natural and historic right of the Jews acknowledged in the mandate to return to their homeland; it confined their freedom of settlement within a small fraction of the country; it condemned the Jews to remain in Palestine, as in all countries of their dispersion, a permanent minority; it denied to the Jews the right enjoyed by every nation to be free and independent in its country.

"But for the White Paper hundreds of thousands who perished in Europe could have been saved in time by being admitted in Palestine. Children for whom the Jewish Agency sought in vain to obtain immigration permits on the outbreak of war, an application which was refused on account of the White Paper, were subsequently burnt in the death furnaces of Maidanek and other extermination centres.

"The White Paper was issued without the approval of the League of Nations and without consultation with the Government of the United States. The only organ of the League of Nations to which the White Paper was referred, the Permanent Mandates Commission, declared it to be incompatible with the provisions of the mandate. Mr. Winston Churchill stated at the time in the House of Commons that the White Paper contained 'a plain breach of a solemn obligation' and that it was a mortal blow to the Jewish people. Speaking for the Labour Party, Mr. Herbert Morrison declared that the White Paper 'would not be automatically binding' upon a Labour Government whenever it were formed.

"A concession to Arab terrorism which raged in Palestine from 1936 onwards with the support of Hitler and Mussolini, the White Paper was

designed to gain Arab support in the event of a war with the Axis. But it failed to achieve even that practical objective, as witness the open alliance with Hitler of Raschid Ali of Baghdad and of the then Mufti of Jerusalem.

"The Jews of Palestine were the only national entity in the Middle East which mobilised its whole potential for the support of Great Britain and her allies. The war effort of the Jews of Palestine, military and economic, was unique in the Middle East. The Jewish Brigade Group took a gallant part in the final defeat of the enemy on the Italian front.

"Only some 60,000 Jews managed to escape from Europe to Palestine during the war. A hundred times as many—some 6,000,000 men, women and children—were put to death by the Nazis and their satellites. What happened to our people in Europe did not and could not happen to any people in the world which has a country and a State of its own. The vast majority of the Jewish people throughout the world feel that they have no chance of 'freedom from fear' unless the status of the Jews, as individuals and as a nation, has been made equal to that of all normal peoples and the Jewish State of Palestine has been established.

"The return of Jews to Palestine and their settlement in it has not proceeded, and will not proceed, at the expense of others. The Arabs and other inhabitants of Palestine will continue to benefit, not less than in the past, from the increasing economic opportunities. In addition to full equality of rights they will enjoy every freedom in organising autonomously their religious, cultural, and social affairs. Jewish immigration and settlement will continue to be based, as hitherto, on the development of resources untapped by others. The Arab States, with their underpopulated and underdeveloped territories, will find in the Jewish state a faithful ally; it will contribute to the best of its ability to the progress of its neighbours.

"The Conference endorses the declaration of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, communicated at the time to H. M. Government, that the White Paper is devoid of any moral and legal validity. Now that the war has ended, the Jews cannot possibly acquiesce in the continuation of the White Paper under any circumstances whatsoever, whether in its present, or in any modified form. There can be no solution to the inseparable twin problems of the Jewish people and Palestine, except by constituting Palestine, undivided and undiminished, as a Jewish State, in accordance with the purpose of the Balfour Declaration. Any delay in the solution of the problem, any attempt at half-measures, any decision which, however favourable, remains on paper and is not faithfully and speedily implemented would not meet the tragedy of the hour, and might only increase suffering among the Jewish people and tension in Palestine.

"The Conference proclaims its full endorsement of the following requests submitted by the Jewish Agency to H. M. Government on 22nd May, 1945:—

- (a) That an immediate decision be announced to establish Palestine as a Jewish State:
- (b) That the Jewish Agency be invested with all necessary authority to bring to Palestine as many Jews as it may be found necessary and possible to settle, and to develop, fully and speedily, all the resources of the country—especially land and power resources:

- (c) That an international loan and other help be given for the transfer of the first million of Jews to Palestine, and for the economic development of the country:
- {d) That reparations in kind from Germany be granted to the Jewish people for the rebuilding of Palestine, and—as a first instalment—that all German property in Palestine be used for the resettlement Of Jews from Europe :
- (e) That international facilities be provided for the exit and transit of all Jews who wish to settle in Palestine.

"The Conference begs to address an urgent appeal to H.M. Government to implement these requests without delay, It appeals to the principal Allies of H.M. Government and to all the United Nations to give H.M. Government their full moral and material support in the adoption and implementation of this policy."

I have no doubt that it will be said I am anti-Jew. I have admitted that I feel very strongly over the Palestine Problem, as indeed does anyone who becomes interested in it and studies it. But I am not anti-Jew. On the contrary, I have many Jewish friends in and out of Palestine of whom I am immensely fond. I have said that I found much more in common in Palestine with the Jews than with the Arabs. I liked very much the simplicity and culture of Jewish family life. I greatly admired the work of the Jewish settlements. I was fully appreciative of the tremendous achievements of the Jews, occasionally against great odds, in Palestine. But I left Palestine very definitely anti-Zionist, and I have tried very hard in this chapter to distinguish between "Jews" and "Zionists." Naturally all Zionists are Jews, but not all Jews in Palestine or outside it are Zionists. Zionism is a nationalist creed, and like all violent nationalism, must employ violence to gain its ends. I found it impossible to reconcile fighting to destroy Nazism in Germany and to support Zionism in Palestine. Zionism has been, and I fear will be, an ugly creed. One cannot write about Palestine without referring to this ugliness. I must also say that many Jews in Palestine spoke to me with great sorrow and despair of the evils of Zionism. I want to stress this last point very strongly—their sorrow and despair were very real and moving.

The claim of the Jews to return to Palestine is a traditional one. However strong it was—and it was strong—it was one that surely should have been accompanied by humility. It is many hundreds of years since the Jews were in Palestine in great numbers. Their return (permitted to them by countries, the inhabitants of which practise a religion whose founder the Jews crucified) should have been a humble one, with a desire to co-operate with the Arab inhabitants. It was quite the reverse. Zionism in Palestine has revealed itself as possessing evil characteristics. Whilst these characteristics exist the Jews cannot expect happiness in the Promised Land.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

THE RE is the problem. To-day there is a continual crisis in Palestine. The British have reinforced their troops there in an attempt to keep order. There are continual reports of Jewish terrorist activity. The Jews in Palestine have organised strikes to express sympathy with their suffering colleagues in Europe. The Arabs have boycotted Jewish goods. There have been clashes on the Transjordan-Palestine frontier over attempts by the Jews to enter Palestine illegally, and without doubt it is impossible to prevent a continual stream of illegal Jewish immigration. The Jews say they will fight if further immediate immigration is not permitted—they may try to force the issue by openly landing immigrants in large numbers, prepared to fire back if the British or Arabs open fire to prevent the landings. If firing did occur the British would be accused of murdering the innocent! The Arabs say that they will fight if any further Jewish immigration is permitted. They stand resolutely by the White Paper. They believe that the immigration gates, if once opened to permit 100,000 Jews, would never close again. They know that President Truman's proposal does not nearly satisfy the Zionists.

Do not let us delude ourselves—the situation is serious. It is an international problem of first rank. If we give way to the Jews, or if we stick by the White Paper of 1939, or if we modify the White Paper, or if we decide on Partition; in any case, there will probably be trouble.

As I write the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry on Palestine is now sitting. The U.S.A. has agreed, at least officially, to inquire into the Palestine problem which is a good step forward. This Committee has taken evidence in the U.S.A., in Great Britain, in Europe, and, finally, in Palestine. Its report is due for publication in May of 1946. I have referred a few times to evidence given before the Committee. Will this Committee produce a report with a lasting solution? I am afraid I doubt it. I fear it will be similar to the other Reports on Palestine. It will probably indicate and explain the cause of the trouble, which is not difficult to find, and will recommend not a bold policy but one of compromise.

Is there a solution to the Palestine Problem? I believe there is, provided the whole approach to the problem is altered. There is certainly no solution if we persist in hoping that a compromise will work; in believing that one day the Arabs and Jews "will live happily together" if we do nothing about it; in dealing with each crisis as it arises on an *ad hoc* basis, without having any firm plan for the problem as a whole. That is why I am opposed to a modification of the White Paper of 1939. It would mean that we had once again vacillated and bowed to a storm. This time to the storm of Jewish pressure. This would not solve the Palestine Problem. It might delay it as we should deal satisfactorily from the military point of view with the Arab troubles which would start again. But putting down Arab risings would not solve the Problem. The Arabs would

rise again later. No, once and for all the Palestine Problem must be solved.

The creation of the National Home was based on the hope that the Jews would be welcome in the newly-created Palestine, and that they and the Arabs would get on well together. It was hoped that the development of the National Home would go hand-in-hand with Arab emancipation. The basis for this hope was presumably that the Arabs and the Jews of Eastern Europe (who were obviously going to be the majority of the Jewish immigrants to Palestine) were both Semites and that in the past Jews and Arabs had lived peaceably together. However, the creators of the National Home had overlooked or ignored two important factors. Firstly, that Arab Nationalism reached its height at the same time as Zionism. These two "nationalisms" had seen their chance in the 1914-18 war of fulfilling their hopes. Their hopes were contrary to one another. Secondly, that the initial Jewish immigrants had no intention of going to Palestine to co-operate. They were Zionists and they went to Palestine to relive and recreate Zionism. These two factors are, of course, closely connected, and it was unfortunate for Zionism that Arab Nationalism coincided with it in equal fervour. As I have said before, I believe that the Jews could have won Palestine if they had entered it as peaceful co-operators, instead of as aggressive Zionists.

During the years between the two Great Wars the British Government fumbled along, attempting to find a compromise; telling the Arabs and Jews "to be good boys"; bowing to storms of protest, whether raised in or out of Palestine; reversing decisions to appease those affected by them. The result now is two violently opposed camps—the Arabs and the Jews—both refusing to co-operate, both determined to protect and practise their national characteristics, both quite prepared to fight to get their way, both hating one another and, what is more, both disliking and distrusting the British Mandatory power. Although the ingredients of success were not present when Palestine was created, I nevertheless think that a really firm and strong attitude by the British would have ultimately achieved success. The Arab despises weakness and takes advantage of it. The Jew in this respect is much the same.

It is essential to realise that the original conception of a National Home developing in Palestine hand in hand with Arab emancipation is quite impracticable until and unless the Arabs are willing for it to happen.

There are two ways of approaching a solution to the Palestine Problem:—

- (1) To commit a major "surgical operation".
- (2) To maintain the *status quo* and make it work.

The major surgical operation

There are three ways to do this. Two of them would almost certainly mean war, the third would quite likely mean war.

- (a) The first way is to turn out all the Jews in Palestine, except those who were there before 1919. The Zionists in Palestine would rather fight, I think, than go. Such action would undoubtedly be disapproved by other nations (particularly the U.S.A., whose Government take a great interest in Palestine). I do not in any case recommend or approve of this solution.

- (b) The second way is to remove all Arabs from Palestine. It is easier to remove all the Arabs from Palestine than it is to remove the Jews. You can at least transpose the Arabs to neighbouring countries, whereas the removal of the Jews would be much more complicated. The removal of the Arabs has been contemplated, and I strongly disapprove of it. I disapprove strongly of the removal of the Jews, and I disapprove even more strongly of the removal of the Arabs. I am definitely of the opinion that the Arabs have a better case and more justification for remaining in Palestine. If any attempt were made to move the Arabs they would fight, and I think it is likely that they would be aided by the neighbouring Arab States, if not by the whole Islamic world. The Moslem leaders could easily justify a Jihad (Holy War) to their people. A rising in India and Egypt in sympathy with, and to aid, Palestine Arabs, would be very embarrassing to the British Empire, particularly if accompanied by an Arab uprising in North Africa. I do not recommend or approve of this solution either.
- (c) The third way is that of Partition. Partition is not a compromise in my view; it still involves a major surgical operation although it offers more chance of success than the first two methods. Partition was the solution suggested by the Peel Commission but never put into effect because the Woodhead Report condemned it. In my opinion that was a mistake. I think a bold policy of Partition in 1937 would have worked.

The case for Partition was recently put by *The Times'* Special Correspondent as follows:—

"It is to be hoped that revolt will be averted and that, after a long period of hesitations, the Royal Commission's suggestion of Partition will be carried out. The displacement of populations which Partition would entail is small compared with the present enforced mass movements in Europe; and after a transition period with a 'reasonable amount of rioting' and voluminous protests, the two partners would, according to Oriental habit, in all likelihood accept the inevitable and settle down to make the best of it. The ultimate aim would obviously be the gradual development of an economic federation of the Middle East—the possibility of which was conclusively proved by the excellent working of the Middle East Supply Centre—with the Jewish State as an essential partner, and at the same time a stable link between East and West."

Sir John Chancellor (High Commissioner for Palestine 1928-31) considers that the policy of Partition is the only hope of a solution of the Palestine Problem:—

"It cannot be denied that the policy of Partition is open to serious objections; but it has on occasion provided a solution to an intractable political problem. The Royal Commission pointed out that there is little moral value in maintaining the political unity of Palestine at the cost of perpetual hatred, strife, and bloodshed, and that there is little moral injury in drawing a political line through Palestine if peace and good will between the peoples on either side of it can thereby in the long run be attained. Both sides will dislike Partition; but each side will oppose any plan that makes some concessions to the views of the other.

"I regretted that H.M. Government in 1938, after announcing their acceptance of the recommendations of the Royal Commission, abandoned the policy of Partition in deference to the views of the Partition Commission, who expressed the opinion that the political, administrative and financial difficulties were so great that the solution of the problem by the partition of the country was impossible. While the difficulties are great, I do not believe that they are insuperable. One of the main arguments used by the Partition Commission against the proposals of the Royal Commission was that in fixing the frontier between the proposed Jewish and Arab States the Royal Commission ignored the important problem of defence, and that the two States were not provided with strategic frontiers.

"I submit that there is no reason why they should be. Few States are fortunate enough to enjoy that safeguard. In the case of two petty States, such as the proposed Jewish and Arab States in Palestine, strategic frontiers would be superfluous. With the air forces of the Great Powers available within a few hours' range for the defence of Palestine there would be little temptation to either of these States to attack its neighbour.

**As regards the difficulties of finance; the Jewish State, supported by large subsidies from wealthy Jews in America, would no doubt be self-supporting, but it is probable that the Arab State in its early days would require financial assistance from without. To adopt the proposal of the Royal Commission that the Arab State should receive an annual subvention from the Jewish State would be to ask too much from the latter. It seems necessary that any financial assistance that the Arab State may require, whether by loan or by annual subsidy, must be provided by the British Treasury; and there is no novelty in the grant of such assistance to backward peoples that are in need of it.*'

It is true that there is no novelty in the grant of a British subsidy to backward peoples, but I think that grants from neighbouring Arab States would be more appropriate. At least they should share in the cost of subsidising such a proposition.

General Sir Robert Haining disagreed with Sir John Chancellor on the defence question *vis-d-vis* frontiers :—

"Sir John Chancellor says that one of the main arguments used by the Partition Commission was that the Royal Commission ignored the important problems of defence, and that the two States were not provided with strategic frontiers. His comment is that strategic frontiers, in the case of petty States, are superfluous, and that there would be little temptation to either of these States to attack its neighbour, as the air forces of the Great Powers would be available within a few hours' range for the defence of Palestine.

"There seems some confusion of thought in all this. To the best of my recollection, the strategic defence of Palestine, by which one means, presumably, the defence of Palestine as a whole against external aggression, did not arise. The argument turned on the attitude of the two peoples toward Partition. If Partition were accepted, and peace and good will likely to exist, then the question of defence, the one against the other, would not arise. If, however, Partition were imposed, and unacceptable to one or other party, then the safeguarding of the mutual frontiers was a

matter of first importance. The terrain within Palestine, coupled with the probable dividing line between the two peoples—which in its turn must inevitably be based on the location, generally, of the bulk of the population of the two parties—makes internal defence a matter of great difficulty, accentuated as it is by modern developments in war, and would seem to necessitate neutral or defence zones, or some such expedient.

"The reference to the use of air forces in such a situation is misleading. Ground defences, including some form of gendarmerie or organised frontier guards, would obviously be needed; but air forces, owing to their inability to distinguish the one side from the other in a frontier violation, whatever its size, in such circumstances are out of place and both a source of embarrassment to those in the right and a possible asset, by the confusion caused, to those in the wrong. We are thinking wishfully if we suggest that such a situation can be met by the use of the Air Arm."

I do not consider that at the moment Partition offers much hope of success. I believe that the Jews would agree to it, but not the Arabs.

The division of an already small country into two parts with a possible third international zone (i.e., Jerusalem, because of its religious importance to Christians as well as Jews and Moslems) would be extremely difficult. The only natural boundaries are hills and I cannot imagine either of the contestants willingly retiring to the hilly country. The boundaries would therefore have to be determined artificially. Who would have Haifa—the one great port of the country—and vital to the British as the exit of the oil pipe-line? Would that remain in British control? Then again the problem of the adjacent towns of Tel Aviv (rightly the pride of the Jews and wholly Jewish in population) and Jaffa (essentially an Arab town). Would one of these be a "Danzig" in the middle of the other's territory? Or would there be a Jewish "corridor" through Arab territory to Tel Aviv, or an Arab "corridor" to Jaffa through Jewish territory? Or would one of the contestants have to evacuate their town completely? Then again there are the questions of customs, the seaboard, etc.

Whichever of the three possible forms of Partition recommended by the Peel Commission were decided on, or even if a new plan were adopted, there would be innumerable outcries and almost certainly bloodshed. Also Britain would be reversing the decision made before the 1939-45 war "not to Partition". The views of the Arab against Partition are well and moderately expressed by Anwar Nashashibi of the Arab Office in London:—

"You advocate the partition of Palestine as the only solution of the problem, and, in justification thereof, you contend that if the scheme as recommended by the Royal Commission was found by the Woodhead (Technical) Commission to be impracticable, yet the idea of Partition as a solution remains unimpeachable. Permit me to disagree, and to point out, first of all, that the Palestine problem does not consist of a contest between Arab and Jewish rights, as you seem to imply.

"Arab rights are based on a continuous and actual occupation for thirteen centuries. As to the allegation that Jews have rights in Palestine because of a previous occupation of 2,000 years ago, this is an unheard-of theory which has never been accepted in any historical instance and will never be accepted, either morally or legally, by any reasonable human being.

As regards your own plea for Partition: (a) The Jews have bought most of the best land in Palestine; this and the remainder will, presumably, be part of the assumed Jewish State; this will consequently mean that the Arabs will have to be relegated to the more or less barren hills at a time when almost half their population inhabit the fertile maritime areas, and they own in such areas, about half the total of citrus-planted land, their major industry, (b) Notwithstanding the practical quasi-impossibility of a fair and intelligent partition, as was duly indicated by the Woodhead Commission, it must be remembered the modern trends are for unification, not dismemberment, and the examples of Ireland and India are contemporary enough and eloquent enough to show that partition creates more problems than it solves. As was pointed out by Mr. T. Reid, who was a member of the Woodhead Commission, 'Abraham Lincoln denied the rights of States desiring partition to secede from a federation; but here the proposed Jewish State would be abstracted from a unitary State, probably against the wishes of the whole people of Palestine.' (c) There is no justifiable reasons to deprive the majority of the inhabitants of Palestine, who are Arabs, of the sovereignty over the whole of Palestine, temporarily exercised by the Mandatory which legally resides in them in their capacity as majority. Consequently, Partition, also in theory, is unacceptable to the Arabs.

"On the other hand, no one can but understand and sympathise with your endeavour to find a way out of the impasse. To help in this direction, the Arab League would, therefore, be ready to recognise the Jewish National Home in Palestine to the extent in which it has developed, which, be it noted, was developed from its initiation against the will of the Arabs. As to the Holy Places, their safeguard and the free access to them can be internationally guaranteed. But if it is meant to solve the world Jewish problem, Palestine, being no larger than Wales, is politically and physically unfit. In this connection the solution must be sought in the underpopulated sub-continent like Australia or Canada, which, according to their own reckoning, are in need of and could absorb millions of settlers."

I discussed partitioning with a friend of mine who is one of the present Labour Ministers and who, incidentally, did not agree with the Labour Party's pre-July 1945 policy for Palestine. He was in favour of the creation of a Jewish State in part of Palestine with a Jewish Empire, i.e., a number of Jewish Colonies in various parts of the world all owing allegiance to the Jewish "Home Country" in part of Palestine. This would entail a Jewish nationality, Jewish passports, Jewish currency, etc. He considered that Palestine itself could not absorb any more Jews with the present Arab population, and that we could not force the Arabs to move out. Hence his solution which would mean Jews all over the world having to decide whether to be "Jewish Nationals" or nationals of the countries in which they reside at present. All Jews would also have to realise that after the creation of the Jewish Empire those who elected to remain nationals of other countries must give absolute allegiance to those countries. The United Nations would have to see there was religious freedom all over the world. The non-national Jews would be assimilated in their respective countries, merely practising a particular religion in the same manner as Christians, Moslems, Buddhists, etc. Any idea of militant world-wide political-religious Zionism

would have to go. I am sure that this solution, irrespective of Palestine, is the right one, and that, in the main, the best chance of happiness for the Jews lies in assimilation with religious freedom.

I am against a cure by a major surgical operation. It might be possible with the Arabs, but it would be manifestly unjust. It would be difficult *vgf/h* the Jews, although it might be desirable with the more unpleasant and violent Zionists. There is, however, so much good in the National Home that the unpleasant side of Zionism must be stamped out: the Jews must stay and co-operate with the Arabs to create a new and happy democratic Palestine. It is the first time that Occidentals and Orientals have been equal partners in the same State. This most important experiment must be made to work, despite its wretchedly miserable beginning. Twenty-five years is, after all, a very short period in the history of mankind. It is therefore in maintaining the *status quo* and making it work that the solution must be found.

Making the status quo work

The first and main essential for this is for the Mandatory Power, having decided on a policy, to make it absolutely clear that the policy will be carried out, however great the storms of protest, and that, if necessary, force will be met with force. This sounds like dictatorship, but, much as I dislike that, I am nevertheless convinced that it is necessary—in fact absolutely essential—in Palestine until there is a radical change in the attitude of both Arabs and Jews.

I am assuming that Great Britain will remain the Mandatory Power. As the League of Nations exists no longer, Great Britain could presumably "hand in" the Mandate and ask the Allied Nations to appoint another country to carry on. That would be cowardly. Great Britain must finish the job *it* started; it is morally bound to do so, quite apart from the vast strategical importance of Palestine to the British Empire. Much as I would like to see it, I cannot imagine the United Nations deciding unanimously on, and agreeing to support, a policy for Palestine! Britain then must do it, although maintaining a firm policy in Palestine will make her unpopular at times with others. For example, the Jews in the U.S.A. will do all they can to make the U.S.A. put pressure on Great Britain to favour the Jewish cause. Similarly it is possible that some people in Britain might wish to favour the Arabs in order to keep the Islamic World peaceful. Both these influences must be resisted—there must be no weakness. The policy for Palestine must be a just one—it would be fatal to try to enforce an unjust one. What therefore is the just policy? It is precisely in determining this that violent controversies always arise, but I believe that the issue is really very simple, and that in the past many red herrings have caused confused thought on this subject.

As I see it, the creation of the National Home was based on the assumption that it would be welcomed, or at least tolerated, by the Arabs. The wording of the Mandate shows that, as do the innumerable statements of policy. Unfortunately it has been clearly indicated by the Arabs that the National Home in Palestine is not welcome. Therefore Jewish immigration must cease until such time as the Arabs say that more Jews are welcome. This will cause a violent protest amongst the Jews, but it cannot be helped. Anyway, I believe that it is the Jews' own fault and that the aggressive way in which they entered Palestine has recoiled on them. Zionism seemed to me most unpleasant

and undeserving of success. The disagreeable characteristics of Zionism, and particularly its Fascist tendencies, have got to go, and the Jews themselves must remove them. There are thousands upon thousands of Jews who dislike Zionism and who are ashamed of it. They must remove the canker from their midst. Until that has happened the Jews cannot be happy in Palestine. They must reverse the policy which forbids Arabs to work on Jewish lands and prevents land once sold to Jews ever passing out of Jewish hands. The Jews are a remarkably cultured and efficient race. They are of the West. In comparison the poor Arab is a miserable figure. The Jews can do a magnificent job in helping the Arab in Palestine. Many will say they have done it already. Some have. But the majority of the help given was incidental to the development of the National Home—it was not given specifically to help the Arab. The National Home unfortunately turned out to be a very selfish scheme—the Zionists intended to carry it through, quite irrespective of Arab feelings. This selfish attitude has got to go, and the Jews must give the benefit of their advanced education, wealth and culture to the Arabs. They must offer the olive branch. They will get rebuffs from the Arabs, who will suspect their motives, but they must persevere. If the Jews do this—as they ought to have done in the first place—genuinely and unselfishly, then they will find the happiness they deserve in the Promised Land. They will only find misery if their violent Zionism continues.

I believe that the 1939 White Paper is a fair policy and should stand. The Arabs have got to realise that the 600,000 Jews now in Palestine are there to stay. The Arabs, by this limitation of Jewish immigration and by the zoning of land, have gained many of their points. Palestine cannot, and never could have been, a completely Arab State. Its religious importance to Christians and Jews was always too great for that. The Palestine Arabs have been thwarted in the complete fulfilment of their nationalistic hopes. They have felt bitterly about the National Home. They have not had a completely fair deal. However, the hard, cold fact remains that the Jews are there to stay and the Arabs must co-operate with them. If they do, they will continue to gain respect and support. If they do not co-operate they will damage their cause. The White Paper goes far to meet their case, which I am sure is right. It is essential that they now give genuine co-operation.

The first step in the solution is the announcement that the policy of the 1939 White Paper stands. (I give the complete text of the White Paper as Appendix "B." It is obvious that certain references in the section on the Constitution are out of date and need revision.) There are now approximately 600,000 Jews in Palestine. This number must be kept up. Jews in Palestine who want to leave should be allowed to and a corresponding number admitted from Europe. If the emigration of Jews from Palestine is unrestricted and other countries open their doors, as I have already said, I estimate 20 per cent will leave. This will leave room for the entry of 120,000 Jews which will not increase the total number of Jews in Palestine. The "entries" must not take place until some "exits" have been made, although obviously one need not wait until the *total* "exits" are completed before permitting "entries"—a steady stream of "exits" balanced by "entries" should be allowed to take place.

The second step is in two parts. Firstly, the living conditions of the Jews in Europe should be remedied at once. Secondly, emigration of Jews from

Europe and "exits" from Palestine should be allowed to commence. I can see no reason why the following countries should not permit immigration of Jews as follows:—

U.S.A.	50,000
Great Britain	15,000
South America (total for all countries)	100,000
Canada	20,000
Australia	20,000
New Zealand	10,000
South Africa	10,000
British Colonies.	15,000
		<hr/>
		240,000
		<hr/>

In some of the above countries it will be possible to establish Jewish Colonies on the land. The Jewish question is a world-wide one and we all have to share in its solution. The numbers I have allotted to each country are small compared to the populations of the countries concerned. I consider that most of the Jews who emigrated would and should become assimilated in the countries of their adoption. Those who wished to go to Palestine would do so in the course of time according to the exit rate of Jews from Palestine and to the possible willingness of the Arabs to accept a total in excess of 600,000 as co-operation between the Arabs and Jews increased.

If this policy were agreed to at once it would mean that ultimately 260,000 Jews would leave Europe (having first been properly rehabilitated and cared for) during the next few years. (120,000 Jews would leave Europe for Palestine; 140,000 Jews would leave Europe for elsewhere; 120,000 Jews would emigrate from Palestine.) There is one point that is often overlooked. The Jews are a brilliant race. It is imperative that many of them remain in Europe. The United Nations must therefore ensure that the Jews' present miserable conditions are remedied at once and that in future complete religious freedom is tolerated all over Europe. Some Jews must remain there and, with their talent, help to rebuild it. They are badly needed for that.

The third step is to end the present artificial separation of Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan. These three Arab countries should be allowed to join together *if* they wish to. Great Britain has already taken the first step towards making this possible. Mr. Bevin announced before the United Nations Organisation early this year that Great Britain was taking immediate steps to give complete independence to Transjordan. France will likewise have to give up Syria and the Lebanon. (There can be no doubt that France is not wanted in these two countries.) The recent debates at the United Nations Security Council made it quite clear that the withdrawal of British and French troops from Syria and the Lebanon must take place as soon as possible. The complete freedom of these two countries must follow. All this would be a big step towards obtaining the co-operation of the Arab League.

The first step in my scheme requires a firm decision on policy by the British Government. The first part of the second step requires immediate action by U.N.R.R.A. and the Allied Control Commissions. The second part of the second step requires the willingness of a number of nations to assist in the

increase of Jewish immigration. (If they are not willing to accept Jewish immigration they must cease trying to force the Arabs to accept it.) The third step requires action by Great Britain and France, ratified by the United Nations.

The "losers" in this solution—the Jews, because of their advanced civilisation—have got to lead in co-operation. They must stamp out the disagreeable characteristics of Zionism; they must co-operate with the Arabs and employ them on existing and future Jewish-owned land; they must help to advance and educate them. The Arabs must co-operate with both the British Government and the Jews. Their "neck in the sand" attitude must go.

What must the Mandatory Power do? To make the White Paper work I consider they must:

- (1) Show their determination to make it work, despite opposition from inside and outside Palestine;
- (2) Scrap the Mandate as it stands and substitute a Constitution for Palestine. This Constitution must aim at ultimately making Palestine a self-governing State with Arabs and Jews as equal partners in citizenship. I visualise this in three stages: In the first, Great Britain will have to continue to bear the main responsibility for Palestine, but it is only fair, I consider, that the United Nations Organisation should appoint delegates from other nations during this stage to help and advise Great Britain in functioning as the Mandatory Power and also to give impartial reports to the U.N.O. Then, after a number of years, Palestine should become a trusteeship of the United Nations Organisation. After a further period of ten or fifteen years, should come the final stage when Palestine is a completely independent country. These stages will take time. There is no short cut to peace in Palestine. The United Nations Organisation may—even after peace has come to Palestine—wish to retain some loose form of "watching brief" over the holy places in Palestine, of which there are many which are the concern of all the three religions involved. Many Arabs and Jews have expressed the wish that Palestine should ultimately be a self-governing Dominion within the British Empire. This may be possible, but it is for the Arab-Jew citizens of Palestine to decide for themselves at the appropriate time.
- (3) Instil the system of local government into both the Arab and Jewish communities. Self-government exists to quite a marked degree in the Jewish communities, but not in the Arab communities. The latter is to be expected as the Arabs are still very backward. The Jews and Arabs must exchange representatives on these local governments. A Jewish representative on an Arab village council would be of great service to the Arab community, and the Jew would learn a great deal from Arab life. The Arab on the Jewish settlement council would learn a great deal from the Jews that would be of great value to the Arabs in furthering their advancement.
- (4) Start mixed schools for Arabs and Jews as soon as possible. This will present many difficulties. The Jews are at the moment much more advanced. However, from what I saw of Arab children, I am convinced that they have great possibilities. Whilst starting mixed schools, it should be ensured that there are enough primary schools to cater for all

Arab children. I am convinced that two of the most essential factors in a solution of the Palestine problem are greatly increased Arab education, and even more important, the joint education of Arab and Jewish children.

- (5) A reform of the Palestine Police. I have not dealt with this at all in any previous chapter. However, the Palestine Police Force (a combined force of British officers and N.C.O.s plus Jewish and Arab members) seemed to me grossly underpaid, with the inevitable risk of bribery.
- (6) The carrying out, in conjunction with Jews and Arabs, of a bold policy for the land, i.e., irrigation, recovery, etc., for the mutual benefit of existing Arab and Jewish communities.

There is no quick solution to the Palestine Problem, except by major surgical operations, the effect of which I do not think would be lasting. A lasting solution will take a long time to become effective. It needs the firmness and justice of the British Government, supported by the British people. It needs the co-operation of the United Nations. It needs the reformation of certain aspects of Zionism and a great deal of unselfishness and denial on the part of the Jews. It needs the co-operation of the Arabs. Many people will say that, if the Jews adopt my suggestions, there will be a danger of their exploiting the Palestine Arabs. There is, without doubt, such a danger. But it will be the responsibility of the British Government to watch that, and if Arab education advances, as it should do, then the danger should not be great. To my mind it is the only lasting solution which offers a hope of success with the minimum of riots and bloodshed.

If the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine can solve their difficulties and eventually run their own independent Palestine, they will, by their example of peaceful co-operation between peoples from the West and the East, have done a lasting service to mankind. It will be a beacon of hope for the future peace of the world.

APPENDIX "A"

THE MANDATE FOR PALESTINE

Preamble

The Council of the League of Nations

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory, selected by the said powers, the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on 2nd November, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; and

Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provision; and

Whereas by the aforementioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations;

Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows:

Article 1

The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.

Article 2

The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

Article 3

The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

Article 4

An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organisation, so long as its organisation and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

Article 5

The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of, the Government of any foreign Power.

Article 6

The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

Article 7

The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

Article 8

The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the aforementioned privileges and immunities on 1st August, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application for a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall, at the expiration of the mandate, be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

Article 9

The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

Article 10

Pending the making of special extradition agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory and other foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine.

Article 11

The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of prompting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.

The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.

Article 12

The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. He shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits.

Article 13

All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League Of Nations in all matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in this article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this article into effect; and provided also that nothing in this mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.

Article 14

A special Commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study, define and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this Commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the Commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of the Council.

Article 15

The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morale, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

Article 16

The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.

Article 17

The Administration of Palestine may organise on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defence of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory. Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.

Nothing in this article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory in Palestine.

The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies.

Article 18

The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory

or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or profession, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom* of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.

Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate, the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population. It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a special customs agreement with any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

Article 19

The Mandatory shall adhere on behalf of the Administration of Palestine to any general international conventions already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial property.

Article 20

The Mandatory shall co-operate on behalf of the Administration of Palestine, so far as religious, social and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

Article 21

The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months from this date, and shall ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities based on the following rules. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to the nations of all States-Members of the League of Nations.

(1)

"Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year A. D. 1700.

(2)

The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorisation referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the competent Department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.

(3)

No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent Department, unless this Department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said Department.

(4)

Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

(5)

No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorised by the competent Department.

(6)

Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest.

(7)

Authorisation to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees or archaeological experience. The Administration of Palestine shall not, in granting these authorisations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

(8)

The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent Department in a proportion fixed by that Department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

Article 22

English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew, and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

Article 23

The Administration of Palestine shall recognise the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.

Article 24

The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with *he* report.

Article 25

In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.

Article 26

The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Article 27

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

Article 28

In the event of the termination of the mandate hereby conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities.

APPENDIX "B"

Official Communique No. 239.

PALESTINE

Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government

(1) In the Statement on Palestine, issued on 9th November, 1938, His Majesty's Government announced their intention to invite representatives of the Arabs of Palestine, of certain neighbouring countries and of the Jewish Agency to confer with them in London regarding future policy. It was their sincere hope that, as a result of full, free and frank discussion, some understanding might be reached. Conferences recently took place with Arab and Jewish delegations, lasting for a period of several weeks, and served the purpose of a complete exchange of views between British Ministers and the Arab and Jewish representatives. In the light of the discussions as well as of the situation in Palestine and of the Reports of the Royal Commission and the Partition Commission, certain proposals were formulated by His Majesty's Government and were laid before the Arab and Jewish delegations as the basis of an agreed settlement. Neither the Arab nor the Jewish delegations felt able to accept these proposals, and the conferences therefore did not result in an agreement. Accordingly, His Majesty's Government are free to formulate their own policy, and after careful consideration they have decided to adhere generally to the proposals which were finally submitted to, and discussed with, the Arab and Jewish delegations.

(2) The Mandate for Palestine, the terms of which were confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations in 1922, has governed the policy of successive British Governments for nearly twenty years. It embodies the Balfour Declaration and imposes on the Mandatory four main obligations. These obligations are set out in Articles 2, 6 and 13 of the Mandate. There is no dispute regarding the interpretation of one of these obligations, that touching the protection of and access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites. The other three main obligations are generally as follows:—

- (i) To place the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, and to encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency, close settlement by Jews on the land.
- (ii) To safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine irrespective of race and religion, and, whilst facilitating Jewish immigration and settlement, to ensure that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced.
- (iii) To place the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the development of self-governing institutions.

(3) The Royal Commission and previous Commissions of Enquiry have drawn attention to the ambiguity of certain expressions in the Mandate, such as the expression "a national home for the Jewish people," and they have found in this ambiguity and the resulting uncertainty as to the objectives of policy a fundamental cause of unrest and hostility between Arabs and Jews. His Majesty's Government are convinced that in the interests of the peace and well-being of the whole people of Palestine a clear definition of policy and objectives is essential. The proposal of partition recommended by the Royal Commission would have afforded such clarity, but the establishment of self-supporting independent Arab and Jewish States within Palestine has been found to be impracticable. It has therefore been necessary for His Majesty's Government to devise an alternative policy which will, consistently with their obligations to Arabs and Jews, meet the needs of the situation in Palestine. Their views and proposals are set forth below under the three heads, (I) The Constitution, (II) Immigration, and (III) Land.

(I) *The Constitution*

(4) It has been urged that the expression "a national home for the Jewish people" offered a prospect that Palestine might in due course become a Jewish State or Commonwealth. His Majesty's Government do not wish to contest the view, which was expressed by the Royal Commission, that the Zionist leaders at the time of the issue of the Balfour Declaration recognised that an ultimate Jewish State was not precluded by the terms of the Declaration. But, with the Royal Commission, His Majesty's Government believe that the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country. That Palestine was not to be converted into a Jewish State might be held to be implied in the passage from the Command Paper of 1922 which reads as follows:—

"Unauthorised statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that 'Palestine is to become as Jewish as England is English.' His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated . . . the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the (Balfour) Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded *in Palestine*."

But this statement has not removed doubts, and His Majesty's Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State. They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their will.

(5) The nature of the Jewish National Home in Palestine was further described in the Command Paper of 1922 as follows:—

"During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organisation for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious and social organisation, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact 'national' characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognised to rest upon ancient historic connection."

(6) His Majesty's Government adhere to this interpretation of the Declaration of 1917 and regard it as an authoritative and comprehensive description of the character of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. It envisaged the further development of the existing Jewish community with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world. Evidence that His Majesty's Government have been carrying out their obligation in this respect is to be found in the facts that, since the statement of 1922 was published, more than 300,000 Jews have immigrated to Palestine, and that the population of the National Home has risen to some 450,000, or approaching a third of the entire population of the country. Nor has the Jewish community failed to take full advantage of the opportunities given to it. The growth of the Jewish National Home and its achievements in many fields are a remarkable constructive effort which must command the admiration of the world and must be, in particular, a source of pride to the Jewish people.

(7) In the recent discussions the Arab delegations have repeated the contention that Palestine was included within the area in which Sir Henry McMahon, on behalf of the British Government, in October 1915, undertook to recognise and support Arab independence. The validity of this claim, based on the terms of the correspondence which passed between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca, was thoroughly and carefully investigated by British and Arab representatives during the recent conferences in London. Their Report, which has been published, states that both the Arab and the British representatives endeavoured to understand the point of view of the other party but that they were unable to reach agreement upon an interpretation of

the correspondence. There is no need to summarise here the arguments presented by each side. His Majesty's Government regret the misunderstandings which have arisen as regards some of the phrases used. For their part they can only adhere, for the reasons given by their representatives in the Report, to the view that the whole of Palestine west of Jordan was excluded from Sir Henry McMahon's pledge, and they therefore cannot agree that the McMahon correspondence forms a just basis for the claim that Palestine should be converted into an Arab State.

(8) His Majesty's Government are charged as the Mandatory authority "to secure the development of self-governing institutions" in Palestine. Apart from this specific obligation, they would regard it as contrary to the whole spirit of the Mandate system that the population of Palestine should remain for ever under Mandatory tutelage. It is proper that the people of the country should as early as possible enjoy the rights of self-government which are exercised by the people of neighbouring countries. His Majesty's Government are unable at present to foresee the exact constitutional forms which government in Palestine will eventually take, but their objective is self-government, and they desire to see established ultimately an independent Palestine State. It should be a State in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured.

(9) The establishment of an independent State and the complete relinquishment of Mandatory control in Palestine would require such relations between the Arabs and the Jews as would make good government possible. Moreover, the growth of self-governing institutions in Palestine, as in other countries, must be an evolutionary process. A transitional period will be required before independence is achieved, throughout which ultimate responsibility for the Government of the country will be retained by His Majesty's Government as the Mandatory authority, while the people of the country are taking an increasing share in the Government, and understanding and co-operation amongst them are growing. It will be the constant endeavour of His Majesty's Government to promote good relations between the Arabs and the Jews.

(10) In the light of these considerations His Majesty's Government make the following declaration of their intentions regarding the future government of Palestine.

(1) The objective of His Majesty's Government is the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine State in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future. This proposal for the establishment of the independent State would involve consultation with the Council of the League of Nations with a view to the termination of the Mandate.

(2) The independent State should be one in which Arabs and Jews share in government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded.

(3) The establishment of the independent State will be preceded by a transitional period throughout which His Majesty's Government will retain responsibility for the government of the country. During the tran-

sitional period the people of Palestine will be given an increasing part in the government of their country. Both sections of the population will have an opportunity to participate in the machinery of government, and the process will be carried on whether or not they both avail themselves of it.

(4) As soon as peace and order have been sufficiently restored in Palestine steps will be taken to carry out this policy of giving the people of Palestine an increasing part in the government of their country, the objective being to place Palestinians in charge of all the Departments of Government, with the assistance of British advisers and subject to the control of the High Commissioner. With this object in view His Majesty's Government will be prepared immediately to arrange that Palestinians shall be placed in charge of certain Departments, with British advisers. The Palestinian heads of Departments will sit on the Executive Council, which advises the High Commissioner. Arab and Jewish representatives will be invited to serve as heads of Departments approximately in proportion to their respective populations. The number of Palestinians in charge of Departments will be increased as circumstances permit until all heads of Departments are Palestinians, exercising the administrative and advisory functions which are at present performed by British officials. When that stage is reached consideration will be given to the question of converting the Executive Council into a Council of Ministers with a consequential change in the status and functions of the Palestinian heads of Departments.

(5) His Majesty's Government make no proposals at this stage regarding the establishment of an elective legislature. Nevertheless they would regard this as an appropriate constitutional development, and, should public opinion in Palestine hereafter show itself in favour of such a development, they will be prepared, provided that local conditions permit, to establish the necessary machinery.

(6) At the end of five years from the restoration of peace and order, an appropriate body representative of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty's Government will be set up to review the working of the constitutional arrangements during the transitional period and to consider and make recommendations regarding the constitution of the independent Palestine State.

(7) His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied that in the treaty contemplated by sub-paragraph (1) or in the constitution contemplated by sub-paragraph (6) adequate provision has been made for:—

(a) The security of, and freedom of access to, the Holy Places, and the protection of the interests and property of the various religious bodies.

(b) The protection of the different communities in Palestine in accordance with the obligations of His Majesty's Government to both Arabs and Jews and for the special position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home.

(c) Such requirements to meet the strategic situation as may be regarded as necessary by His Majesty's Government in the light of the circumstances then existing.

His Majesty's Government will also require to be satisfied that the interests of certain foreign countries in Palestine, for the preservation of which they are at present responsible, are adequately safeguarded.

(8) His Majesty's Government will do everything in their power to create conditions which will enable the independent Palestine State to come into being within ten years. If, at the end of ten years, it appears to His Majesty's Government that, contrary to their hope, circumstances require the postponement of the establishment of the independent State, they will consult with representatives of the people of Palestine, the Council of the League of Nations and the neighbouring Arab States before deciding on such a postponement. If His Majesty's Government come to the conclusion that postponement is unavoidable, they will invite the co-operation of these parties in framing plans for the future with a view to achieving the desired objective at the earliest possible date.

(11) During the transitional period steps will be taken to increase the powers and responsibilities of municipal corporations and local councils.

(II) *Immigration*

(12) Under Article 6 of the Mandate, the Administration of Palestine, "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced," is required to "facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions." Beyond this, the extent to which Jewish immigration into Palestine is to be permitted is nowhere defined in the Mandate. But in the Command Paper of 1922 it was laid down that for the fulfilment of the policy of establishing a Jewish National Home:

"It is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment."

In practice, from that date onwards until recent times, the economic absorptive capacity of the country has been treated as the sole limiting factor, and in the letter which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, as Prime Minister, sent to Doctor Weizmann in February 1931 it was laid down as a matter of policy that economic absorptive capacity was the sole criterion. This interpretation has been supported by resolutions of the Permanent Mandates Commission. But His Majesty's Government do not read either the Statement of Policy of 1922 or the letter of 1931 as implying that the Mandate requires them, for all time and in all circumstances, to facilitate the immigration of Jews into Palestine subject only to consideration of the country's economic absorptive capacity. Nor do they find anything in the Mandate or in subsequent Statements of Policy to support the view that the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine cannot be effected unless immigration is allowed to continue indefinitely. If immigration has an adverse effect on the economic position in the country, it should clearly be restricted; and equally, if it has a seriously damaging effect on the political position in the country, that is a factor that should not be ignored.

Although it is not difficult to contend that the large number of Jewish immigrants who have been admitted so far have been absorbed economically, the fear of the Arabs that this influx will continue indefinitely until the Jewish population is in a position to dominate them has produced consequences which are extremely grave for Jews and Arabs alike and for the peace and prosperity of Palestine. The lamentable disturbances of the past three years are only the latest and most sustained manifestation of this intense Arab apprehension. The method employed by Arab terrorists against fellow-Arabs and Jews alike must receive unqualified condemnation. But it cannot be denied that fear of indefinite Jewish immigration is widespread amongst the Arab population and that this fear has made possible disturbances which have given a serious setback to economic progress, depleted the Palestine exchequer, rendered life and property insecure, and produced a bitterness between the Arab and Jewish populations which is deplorable between citizens of the same country. If in these circumstances immigration is continued up to the economic absorptive capacity of the country, regardless of all other considerations, a fatal enmity between the two peoples will be perpetuated, and the situation in Palestine may become a permanent source of friction amongst all peoples in the Near and Middle East. His Majesty's Government cannot take the view that either their obligations under the Mandate, or considerations of common sense and justice, require that they should ignore these circumstances in framing immigration policy.

(13) In the view of the Royal Commission, the association of the policy of the Balfour Declaration with the Mandate system implied the belief that Arab hostility to the former would sooner or later be overcome. It has been the hope of British Governments ever since the Balfour Declaration was issued that in time the Arab population, recognising the advantages to be derived from Jewish settlement and development in Palestine, would become reconciled to the further growth of the Jewish National Home. This hope has not been fulfilled. The alternatives before His Majesty's Government are either (i) to seek to expand the Jewish National Home indefinitely by immigration, against the strongly expressed will of the Arab people of the country, or (ii) to permit further expansion of the Jewish National Home by immigration only if the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce in it. The former policy means rule by force. Apart from other considerations, such a policy seems to His Majesty's Government to be contrary to the whole spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as to their specific obligations to the Arabs in the Palestine Mandate. Moreover, the relations between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine must be based sooner or later on mutual tolerance and good will; the peace, security and progress of the Jewish National Home itself require this. Therefore His Majesty's Government, after earnest consideration, and taking into account the extent to which the growth of the Jewish National Home has been facilitated over the last twenty years, have decided that the time has come to adopt in principle the second of the alternatives referred to above.

(14) It has been urged that all further immigration into Palestine should be stopped forthwith. His Majesty's Government cannot accept such a proposal. It would damage the whole of the financial and economic system of Palestine and thus affect adversely the interests of Arabs and Jews alike. Moreover in the view of His Majesty's Government, abruptly to stop further immigration would be unjust to the Jewish National Home. But, above all, His Majesty's Government are conscious of the present unhappy plight of large numbers of

Jews who seek a refuge from certain European countries, and they believe that Palestine can and should make a further contribution to the solution of this pressing world problem. In all these circumstances, they believe that they will be acting consistently with their Mandatory obligations to both Arabs and Jews, and in the manner best calculated to serve the interests of the whole people of Palestine, by adopting the following proposals regarding immigration:—

(1) Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which, if economic absorptive capacity permits, will bring the Jewish population up to approximately one-third of the total population of the country. Taking into account the expected natural increase of the Arab and Jewish populations and the number of illegal Jewish immigrants now in the country, this would allow of the admission, as from the beginning of April this year, of some 75,000 immigrants over the next five years. These immigrants would, subject to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity, be admitted as follows:—

(a) For each of the next five years a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants will be allowed on the understanding that shortage in any one year may be added to the quotas for subsequent years, within the five years' period, if economic absorptive capacity permits.

(b) In addition, as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 refugees will be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that adequate provision for their maintenance is ensured, special consideration being given to refugee children and dependants.

(2) The existing machinery for ascertaining economic absorptive capacity will be retained, and the High Commissioner will have the ultimate responsibility for deciding the limits of economic capacity. Before each periodic decision is taken, Jewish and Arab representatives will be consulted.

(3) After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.

(4) His Majesty's Government are determined to check illegal immigration, and further preventive measures are being adopted. The numbers of any Jewish illegal immigrants who, despite these measures, may succeed in coming into the country and cannot be deported will be deducted from the yearly quotas.

(15) His Majesty's Government are satisfied that, when the immigration over the five years which is now contemplated has taken place, they will not be justified in facilitating, nor will they be under any obligation to facilitate, the establishment of the Jewish National Home by further immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population.

(III) *Land*

(16) The Administration of Palestine is required, under Article 6 of the Mandate, "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced," to encourage "close settlement by Jews on the land," and no restriction has been imposed hitherto on the transfer of land

from Arabs to Jews. The Reports of several expert Commissions have indicated that, owing to the natural growth of the Arab population and the steady sale in recent years of Arab land to Jews, there is now in certain areas no room for further transfers of Arab land, whilst in some other areas such transfers of land must be restricted if Arab cultivators are to maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless Arab population is not soon to be created. In these circumstances, the High Commissioner will be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land. These powers will date from the publication of this statement of policy and the High Commissioner will retain them throughout the transitional period.

(17) The policy of the Government will be directed towards the development of the land and the improvement, where possible, of methods of cultivation. In the light of such development it will be open to the High Commissioner, should he be satisfied that the "rights and position" of the Arab population will be duly preserved, to review and modify any orders passed relating to the prohibition or restriction of the transfer of land.

(18) In framing these proposals His Majesty's Government have sincerely endeavoured to act in strict accordance with their obligations under the Mandate to both the Arabs and the Jews. The vagueness of the phrases employed in some instances to describe these obligations led to controversy and has made the task of interpretation difficult. His Majesty's Government cannot hope to satisfy the partisans of one party or the other in such controversy as the Mandate has aroused. Their purpose is to be just as between the two peoples in Palestine whose destinies in that country have been affected by the great events of recent years, and who, since they live side by side, must learn to practise mutual tolerance, good will and co-operation. In looking to the future, His Majesty's Government are not blind to the fact that some events of the past make the task of creating these relations difficult; but they are encouraged by the knowledge that at many times and in many places in Palestine during recent years the Arab and Jewish inhabitants have lived in friendship together. Each community has much to contribute to the welfare of their common land and each must earnestly desire peace in which to assist in increasing the well-being of the whole people of the country. The responsibility which falls on them, no less than upon His Majesty's Government, to co-operate together to ensure peace is all the more solemn because their country is revered by many millions of Moslems, Jews and Christians throughout the world who pray for peace in Palestine and for the happiness of her people.

THE END

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